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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

AND

AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

CONDUCTED BY

B. B. EDWARDS AND E. A. PARK,
Professors at Andover,

WITH THE SPECIAL COÖPERATION OF

DR. ROBINSON AND PROFESSORS STUART AND H. B. SMITH.

VOL. VIII.

ANDOVER:

WARREN F. DRAPER.

LONDON:

JOHN SNOW, 35 PATERNOSTER ROW.

1851.

1853 Oct 10
Nos 29, 31, 32 Gift of Prof. F. B. Ames.
1857 Aug 6
No 30 Thayer's Geo. 626

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1851, by
WARREN F. DRAPER,
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ANDOVER:
PRINTED BY W. F. DRAPER.

22-178

CONTENTS OF VOL. VIII.

NO. XXIX.

| Article. | Page. |
|---|-------|
| I. COLLEGIATE EDUCATION—MATHEMATICAL AND CLASSICAL STUDY, | 1 |
| By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover. | |
| II. REVIEW OF DR. WOODS'S WORKS, | 25 |
| By Heman Humphrey, D. D., Pittsfield, Mass. | |
| III. PARALLEL BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF EARLY AND MODERN CHRISTIANITY, | 34 |
| By Rev. Edward A. Washburn, Newburyport, Mass. | |
| IV. EXPLANATION OF SOME PASSAGES IN GENESIS, | 58 |
| By R. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages, Middlebury College. | |
| 1. Genesis, Ninth Chapter, Verses 25—27, | 58 |
| 2. Genesis, Twentieth Chapter, Verse 16, | 61 |
| 3. Genesis, Fiftieth Chapter, Verse 26, | 62 |
| V. AFFINITY OF ROMANISM AND RATIONALISM, | 64 |
| FROM THE GERMAN. | |
| By Prof. Joseph Packard, Theol. Sem. near Alexandria, D. C. | |
| VI. REVIEW OF RECENT FRENCH WORKS ON METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE, | 73 |
| VII. COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND AND THIRD CHAPTERS OF THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW, | 85 |
| From the German of H. A. W. Meyer. By B. B. Edwards. | |
| VIII. SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, | 100 |
| By Rev. Robert Turnbull, Hartford, Ct. | |
| IX. REMARKS ON THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW. VOL. XXII. NO. IV. ART. VII., | 135 |
| By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary. | |
| X. HICKOK'S RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, | 169 |
| By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., Prof. of Greek, Union College, Schenectady, N. Y. | |

| | |
|---|----------------|
| XI. NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS, | 218 |
| I. Dr. Robinson's New Testament Lexicon, | 218 |
| II. Davidson's New Testament Introduction, | 221 |
| III. Deciphering of the Assyrian and Babylonian Inscriptions, | 224 |
| IV. Harris's Pre-Adamite Earth, | 227 |
| V. Rowland's Maxims of Infidelity, | 228 |
| VI. Chalmer's Memoirs, | 229 |
| VII. Life of John Foster, | 229 |
| VIII. Williams's Religious Progress, | 230 |
| IX. Spencer's Pastor's Sketches, | 231 |
| X. Memoir of Hannah More, | 231 |
| XI. The Footprints of the Creator, | 232 |
| XII. SELECT THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE, | 283 |

NO. XXX.

| | |
|--|----------------|
| I. EDUCATION AND SUPPLY OF MINISTERS IN DIFFERENT AGES AND COUNTRIES, | 235 |
| By Rev. William A. Stearns, Cambridge, Mass. | |
| The First Centuries, | 236 |
| The Dark Ages, | 240 |
| University of Paris, | 249 |
| English Universities, | 250 |
| Dissenters, | 257 |
| Universities of Scotland, | 259 |
| German Universities, | 260 |
| United States, | 263 |
| II. SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, | 268 |
| By Rev. Robert Turnbull, Hartford, Conn. [Concluded from p. 135.] | |
| III. RELIGIOUS BIBLICAL INSTRUCTION AND PASTORAL SUPERVISION IN COLLEGES, | 304 |
| By C. E. Stowe, D. D., Bowdoin College. | |
| IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE PASTORAL EPISTLES, | 318 |
| By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover. | |
| Biographical Notices of Timothy and Titus, | 320 |
| Time of Writing the Pastoral Epistles, | 322 |
| First Epistle to Timothy, | 322 |
| The Epistle to Titus, | 326 |
| Second Epistle to Timothy, | 329 |
| Genuineness—External Evidence, | 337 |
| Genuineness—Internal Evidence, | 339 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| V. HICKOK'S RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, | 346 |
| By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., Prof. of Greek, Union College, Schenectady, N. Y. [Concluded from p. 217.] | |
| VI. DR. JONAS KING'S EXPOSITION OF AN APOSTOLICAL CHURCH, | 378 |
| VII. LIFE AND CHARACTER OF DR. NEANDER, | 384 |
| By George M. Adams, Castine, Me. | |
| VIII. THE NATURE AND WORTH OF THE SCIENCE OF CHURCH HISTORY, | 412 |
| An Inaugural Address, by Prof. H. B. Smith, Union Theol. Sem., New York. | |
| IX. NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS, | 442 |
| I. Sedgwick's Discourse, | 442 |
| II. Woodbury's German Grammar, | 444 |
| III. Europe, Past and Present, | 445 |
| IV. Smith's New Classical Dictionary, | 447 |
| V. Views of a Painter in Palestine, | 448 |
| VI. A Devotional Exposition of the Psalms, | 450 |
| VII. The Chronological Testament, | 450 |
| VIII. Dr. Bellamy's Works, | 451 |
| IX. New Volume of Dr. Emmons's Works, | 451 |
| X. M'Cosh on the Divine Government, | 453 |
| XI. Religious Revival among the Armenians | 454 |
| XII. Lyell's Geology, | 455 |
| X. SELECT BIBLICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE, | 456 |
| United States, | 456 |
| Great Britain, | 458 |
| Germany, | 462 |
| Other Countries, | 467 |
| Miscellanies, | 468 |
| Helps for the Study of the Sanskrit, | 468 |
| Helps for the Study of Arabic, | 469 |
| Helps in the Study of the Syriac Language, | 470 |

NO. XXXI.

| | |
|---|------------|
| I. THE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE MIND, FOR A FUTURE JUDGMENT AND RE-TRIBUTION, | 471 |
| By George B. Cheever, D. D., New York. | |

| | |
|--|-----|
| II. THE RELATION OF STYLE TO THOUGHT, . . . | 491 |
| By Prof. W. G. T. Shedd, University of Vermont, Burlington. | |
| III. THE FOUR GOSPELS AS WE NOW HAVE THEM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, AND THE HEGELIAN ASSAULTS UPON THEM, | 503 |
| By C. E. Stowe, D. D., Bowdoin College. | |
| I. The Value of the Four Gospels as we now have them in the New Testament, | 504 |
| II. Religious Character of the Hegelian Philosophy, | 507 |
| III. Analysis and Characteristics of the principal Hegelian As- saults on the Gospels, | 512 |
| (1) Hypothesis of Strauss, | 513 |
| (2) Hypothesis of Weiss, | 517 |
| (3) Hypothesis of Gfrörer, | 520 |
| (4) Hypothesis of Bruno Bauer, | 521 |
| I. The Real Importance to be attached to these Assaults, | 524 |
| IV. TRANSLATIONS FROM ANSELM, | 529 |
| Translated by Rev. J. S. Maginnis, D. D., of the Rochester University, N. Y. | |
| Proslogion of Anselm, | 529 |
| Proslogion, or an Allocution concerning the Existence of God, | 534 |
| V. AN INVESTIGATION IN SYRIAC PHILOLOGY, | 554 |
| By Rev. Benjamin Davies, Montreal. | |
| VI. LIFE OF ZUINGLI, | 563 |
| By R. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages, Middlebury College. | |
| Birth-place, Lineage and Childhood of Zuingli, | 563 |
| School-days of Zuingli, | 566 |
| Zuingli at the University, | 569 |
| Zuingli, as Teacher at Basle and Student in Theology, | 570 |
| Zuingli is appointed Pastor of Glaris and enters upon his duties, | 573 |
| His Theological, Biblical and Classical Studies at Glaris, | 575 |
| Zuingli as Pastor at Glaris, | 578 |
| Zuingli accompanies the Swiss Troops to Italy, | 581 |
| Efforts for Political and Religious Reform, | 584 |
| His Acquaintance with Erasmus and Myconius, | 586 |
| Einsiedeln — Zuingli's Removal and first Labors there, | 588 |
| VII. UNITY AMID DIVERSITIES OF BELIEF, EVEN ON IMPUTED AND INVOLUNTARY SIN, | 594 |
| By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary. | |
| VIII. NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS, | 647 |
| I. Andrews's Edition of Freund's Lexicon, | 647 |
| II. Recent Works upon Logic, | 650 |

CONTENTS OF VOL. VIII.

vii

| | |
|--|-----|
| III. Journal of the American Oriental Society, | 652 |
| IV. Kitto's Cyclopaedia, | 654 |
| V. The Stones of Venice, | 656 |
| VI. Clark's Theological Library, | 657 |
| VII. Grote's History of Greece, | 658 |
| VIII. Jacobi's Church History, | 659 |
| IX. Unitarian Biography, | 660 |
| X. Commentary on Ezekiel, | 660 |
| XI. Review of the Last Fifty Years, | 661 |
| XII. Religion and Geology, | 662 |
| IX. SELECT BIBLICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE, 664 | |
| United States, | 664 |
| England, | 666 |
| Scotland, | 668 |
| France, | 668 |
| Germany, | 669 |
| Austria, | 672 |
| Africa, | 673 |
| Asia, | 674 |

NO. XXXII.

| | |
|---|-----|
| I. LIFE OF ZUINGLI, | 675 |
| By R. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages, Middlebury College. | |
| [Continued from p. 594.] | |
| His Preaching at the Convent of Einsiedeln, and its Results, | 675 |
| His Relation to the Papal Hierarchy, | 678 |
| His Appointment as Preacher at Zurich, | 681 |
| Zuingli's Reception at Zurich, | 687 |
| His First Preaching at Zurich, and its Results, | 690 |
| The Mission of Samson into Switzerland, and Zuingli's opposi- tion to him, | 695 |
| The Pestilence at Zurich, | 697 |
| II. PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. A REPLY TO ANSELM, AND ANSELM'S REJOINDER, 699 | |
| [SEE JULY NO. 1851, P. 534.] | |
| By J. S. Maginnis, D. D., Professor in the University of Rochester, N. Y. | |
| I. A Book in behalf of the Fool; or a Reply to the Reasonings of Anselm in his Proslogion. By Gaunilon, a Monk of Marmoutier, | 699 |
| II. The Apology of Anselm in Reply to Gaunilon responding in behalf of the Fool, | 704 |
| III. HARRISON'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 715 | |
| By Daniel R. Goodwin, Professor in Bowdoin College. | |

| | |
|---|-----|
| IV. GOVERNMENT AND POPULAR EDUCATION, | 787 |
| By Rev. E. C. Wines, East Hampton, L. I. | |
| V. HISTORY OF LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY, | 767 |
| VI. OF THE NATURE AND KINDS OF THE SOUNDS OF SPEECH AS A PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR GRAMMAR, | 778 |
| Translated from the German of Hupfeld by Prof. George R. Bliss, University of Lewisburg, Pa. | |
| § 1. Mechanism of the Organs of Speech, | 778 |
| § 2. Division and Classification of Speaking-sounds, | 779 |
| § 3. Of the Vowels, | 781 |
| § 4. Of the Consonants, | 787 |
| VII. THE TRUE IMPORT OF כָּאֲרֵי יָדַי וְרַגְלֵי IN PSALM 22: 17, COMMONLY TRANSLATED, "THEY PIERCED MY HANDS AND MY FEET," | 802 |
| By Rev. Robert W. Landis, Hillsdale, N. Y. | |
| VIII. NEANDER'S SERVICES AS A CHURCH HISTORIAN, | 822 |
| Translated by Prof. H. B. Smith. | |
| IX. RECENT WORKS ON ASIA MINOR, | 857 |
| X. NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS, | 878 |
| I. Hackett's Commentary on the Acts, | 878 |
| II. Public Libraries, | 879 |
| III. Letters of Henry Martyn, | 880 |
| IV. Dr. Spring's Lectures, | 881 |
| V. Gayarre's Louisiana, | 882 |
| VI. Analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, | 882 |
| VII. The Third Volume of Davidson's Introduction, | 883 |
| VIII. Boston Athenæum, | 885 |
| IX. Fourth Volume of Torrey's Neander, | 886 |
| X. Owen's Edition of the Iliad, | 886 |
| XI. SELECT LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLI- GENCE, | 887 |
| United States, | 887 |
| Canada, | 889 |
| Great Britain, | 890 |
| France, | 891 |
| Germany, | 891 |
| Russia, | 893 |
| INDEX, | 895 |

PROSPECTUS
OF THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA
AND
AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,
1851.

As these two publications are now united, it may be well to advert to some of the principles on which the work will be conducted. It will be the constant aim of the editors and of the gentlemen who assist them, to furnish essays and discussions of sterling and permanent value, so that complete sets of the work will be regarded as an important accession to any library. Articles will be sought on topics which will be viewed as valuable twenty or fifty years hence, in preference to those of a local, temporary or merely popular character. The weekly and monthly journals are the appropriate channel for the presentation of subjects of a lighter or more immediately practical nature.

The publication will embrace Theology in its widest acceptance, as comprehending the Literature of the Scriptures, Biblical Criticism, Natural and Revealed Theology, Church History with the History of the Christian Doctrines and Sacred Rhetoric. Special prominence will be given to Sacred Literature. It will be the aim to procure for every Number two or three Articles at least, explanatory or illustrative of the Scriptures, direct expositions of the text, or discussions in the rich field of Biblical Criticism. Particular facilities in some parts of this department are supplied by American Missionaries resident in Syria and Western Asia, and by travellers in the East. We shall endeavor to enliven the discussions of a more abstract nature by the insertion, in each Number, if possible, of one piece of biography. We have the promise of an Article for our April Number, on the life and character of the late Dr. Neander, from a gentleman who was several years a pupil of the great historian.

To a limited extent, questions in Mental and Moral Philosophy will be discussed, partly on account of their immediate and important bearing upon Theology, and partly for the sake of the intrinsic value of the questions themselves. Our space, however, is so limited that we shall not be able to go far into this inviting field.

A

Some attention will, also, be paid to Classical Literature. Many of our subscribers, and some of our most valued contributors are presidents and professors in the colleges. No publication in this country is specifically devoted to the classical languages. They furnish many topics of special interest to the biblical student and which have important relations to Sacred Literature.

In short, the great object of the conductors of this publication will be to furnish a Biblical and Theological Journal of an elevated character, which will be welcome to clergymen and enlightened laymen, which will be viewed abroad as doing honor to the scholarship of the United States, and which will directly advance the interests of sound learning and pure religion.

JAN. 1, 1851.

We here transcribe a few of the recent Notices of the Bibliotheca Sacra.

"The October No. of this learned quarterly is just received. Its articles are of a higher character and more learned than those of other Quarterlies. It is particularly adapted to the higher class of general readers, and to professional men. It is an honor to our country, and should be liberally supported. — *Cincinnati Ch. Herald*, Oct. 24, 1850.

"This valuable journal for October, contains its usual variety of able and spirited matter. The article on the Life and Character of Dr. De Wette, has greatly interested and pleased us. It does full justice to this eminent and in many respects excellent man." — *Chambersburg Germ. Ref. Messenger*, Oct. 30, 1850.

"The present No. closes Vol. 7; and in this short space of time, the Bibliotheca has attained into the rank of "the first three" amongst periodicals in this country and Europe, and is an honorable specimen of American scholarship in theology and sound philosophy." — *American Cabinet*, Boston, Nov. 2, 1850.

"This Quarterly, in a theological aspect, takes the lead of everything of the kind in this country. Its articles are from the ablest pens that are employed in the cause of science and biblical learning. It is a rich treasure for any library of the student or minister of Christ. — *Bap. Ch. Chronicle*, Philadelphia, Nov. 6, 1850.

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"This prince of American Quarterlies is before us, and fully sustains its high distinctive character." — *Chicago Prairie Herald*, Nov. 6, 1850.

"The October No. of this most able and interesting quarterly comes to us with even more than the usual richness and variety of its contents. — *Boston Congregationalist*, Nov. 8, 1850.

"The Bibliotheca Sacra, conducted by B. B. Edwards and E. A. Park, for November, (Andover, W. F. Draper,) abounds in choice and recondite learning, with a sufficient sprinkling of popular articles to attract the attention of general readers. "The Life and Character of De Wette" gives an instructive account of the position and influence of that eminent German theologian. The whole number is highly creditable to the condition of sacred literature in this country." — *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, Dec. 1850.

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA
AND
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. XXIX.

JANUARY, 1851.

ARTICLE I.

COLLEGIATE EDUCATION—MATHEMATICAL AND CLASSICAL
STUDY.

By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

THE subject of collegiate education in the United States is intimately related to the prosperity of Theological Seminaries and to the usefulness of the Christian Ministry. Hence we have opened our pages, not unfrequently, to classical criticism, and to topics of a more general nature, bearing on the studies, libraries, revenues, etc. of the colleges of our country. The seminaries are fed from the colleges. If the latter are flourishing, the former will not be likely to languish. If pursuits of a commercial, mechanical or business character, present irresistible attractions to the select youth of our land, then not only will the college hall be vacant, but the churches will mourn, and heathen lands continue to sit in darkness, because none will come to them with the messages of truth.

The basis of theological training, in all the departments, is an adequate knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. A system of divinity has value just in proportion as it is founded on the grammatical interpretation of biblical texts. Beautiful dogmatic systems have often been formed by the adoption of the current explanations of the proof passages, without subjecting them to a sifting examination, by detaching a verse from its context, by building on mere verbal resemblances, or by framing the materials independently of biblical truth, recourse being had to the written revelation in order to save appearances, or as a kind of buttress to the walls. A thorough, life-long,

VOL. VIII. No. 29,

1

grammatical study of the original scriptures, pursued in the Seminary, is essential for all who would be able theologians, or who would magnify their office as expounders of Divine truth. But this study will not be prosecuted with energy unless a foundation is laid in the college. It is the accurate classical scholar who will become the able biblical interpreter. He only who is grounded in Demosthenes and Tacitus, will be likely to relish the words of Paul and Isaiah, as they are found in their original source. There is an universal grammar. The principles of all languages are to a great extent alike. He, who has mastered any single language, has the best preparation to commence any other. He, who has come to the classic page in college as a task, who does not find a kind of going out of the heart to those old masters of thought and speech, will be likely to sell his Hebrew Lexicon at the earliest opportunity, and content himself with king James's version. Hence, the systematic, patient genial study of Latin and Greek in the colleges, is of unspeakable value in its bearings on theological study, and on the success of the Christian ministry. Hence the reason why so many clergymen fail to become skilful interpreters of Divine truth. Their preparation in Greek and Latin was superficial.

Again, the successful study of systematic theology requires a disciplined mind, the power of tracing effects to a cause, of making nice discriminations, of concentrating attention upon a single object, of combining truth into a system, of marking the relations of a vast system of truth, of detecting the most latent and specious sophisms. No one can make rapid or satisfactory progress in the studies of natural and revealed theology without a disciplined understanding. Truth is one and simple, but it is capable of logical analysis, of a development strictly scientific, and of an orderly and beautiful arrangement. But this stern discipline is ordinarily acquired in college. It is the fruit, in a great degree, of severe mathematical study. The pursuit of mathematics and of the related branches of natural philosophy fit the mind for patient attention, for severe and continuous thought, and give it that sharpness and delicacy of edge, which, in unison with the culture acquired by other studies, are an excellent preparation for the pursuits of theology. Hence it is of preëminent importance that the abstract and exact sciences should occupy a prominent place in the college course. Any diminution of interest in this class of studies will operate with prejudicial effect on the whole professional life, and on the entire course of the Christian ministry. Loose and vagrant habits, an inability to concentrate all the powers of the mind, the want

of clear statement and accurate analysis in sermons, are a legitimate effect of a superficial mathematical training.

The same remarks are applicable to taste, and to skill in written compositions. The ability to hold the pen of a ready writer is not acquired in a day. Habits of accurate composition are the slow growth of time. The power of wisely selecting a topic, of protracted meditation upon it, of a logical arrangement of its parts, of calling up from a well stored mind apposite illustrations, and of a tasteful and impressive exhibition of it in language, is rather an acquisition than a gift. It is the product of long months of hardy discipline. It is the result of many a painful process. Though a secure and a precious possession, it is hard-earned. The foundations of a correct taste and of a practised style are commonly laid in college. The theological student carries forward and perfects the discipline. The seed is sown in the early collegiate training which bears its precious fruits in the pulpit and the lecture-room. The elements of good writing, and sometimes its most beautiful and finished forms, are obvious in the commencement exercises of the graduate. In such cases, we may confidently predict a successful professional career.

Equally close and important are the moral relations of the college and the seminary. If the standard of moral excellence in the former be high, a healthful influence will pervade the latter. If the college course is marked by ennobling aims, by a lofty morality, by a sincere piety, then the professional school will be elevated into a serener atmosphere, the ethics which are there taught will find a more welcome home, the Christianity which is professed and preached within its walls, will shine out with more of its native splendor, and the churches in distant years will rejoice in the benigner influences. Thus in an important sense the theological course will be extended, not over three years merely, but over a decennium. While the student is acquiring the general principles of science, he is studying them with a truly theological spirit. The college becomes the nursery of an elevated morality, of a holy living, and of all generous aims, eminently qualifying for studies which are exclusively sacred.

Such being the intimate, reciprocal relationships of the college and the theological institution, we may well consider often, and at length, the condition and the wants of the colleges. It is well worth our while to watch closely their development, and the changes which are proposed in their organization and in their course of studies. We rejoice in their prosperity, as we do in that of the churches or of the country. The destiny of all is bound up together.

Peculiar weight is added to these considerations from the fact of the rapid, and not unfrequently injudicious, multiplication of these institutions. Our widening country is dotted with them. Their existence dates with that of each State, almost with that of the territorial government. Hence the subject is one of paramount importance, and its discussion in our pages needs no apology.

We propose to consider briefly in the following paper the nature of our collegiate system, what should be its aims, and how its highest efficiency may be secured. If we shall deal somewhat in the language of censure, or dwell somewhat on the deficiencies of the present system, it will not be in an unkindly spirit, or with any want of appreciation of the signal benefits which the collegiate institutions have conferred on the country for more than two hundred years. What then is needed to secure the highest usefulness of our colleges?

I. Every reasonable effort should be put forth to improve and perfect the academies and preparatory schools. Too much pains can hardly be expended in sustaining and protecting their growth. They lie at the foundation of our entire system of higher education. A defect here extends through all the following stages. Bad or good habits are here formed and strengthened. A direction is generally given which determines the destiny forever. Every considerate friend of collegiate and professional education can hardly fail to put forth a helping hand in sustaining and encouraging these schools.

There are indeed several academies and classical schools, scattered throughout New England, that are making laudable efforts to elevate the standard of preparatory discipline, and that send forth students excellently fitted for the higher institution. But they are few and far between. The majority of our college students are not trained within their walls. In one respect the effect of our present arrangements is injurious. Those members of a college class who have been well trained at the academy are brought into contact with twenty, or thirty or forty, as the case may be, of those who have had no adequate preparation. The consequence is that the general standard of acquisition is depressed. The well-trained minority must conform to the average scholarship. Without any powerful stimulus for further effort, they may come to rely on their previous acquisitions, and the youth of high promise sinks into a respectable mediocrity. We have in our eye a number of instances of this unhappy retrogradation.

A three years' course of study in the preparatory school ought to be insisted on in all ordinary cases. Every moment of this period may be filled up to the best advantage. The parent or guardian, who

abridges it, in order to save expense, or because his son or ward is somewhat advanced in life, may commit an irreparable injury. Imperfect preparation for college often operates as a serious discouragement throughout the course, and occasions embarrassment and mortification in all subsequent life. The number of studies which are required for admission to college cannot be well mastered in less than three years. The principles and details of the two classical languages are to be fixed in the memory for life. The thorough study of the elements of these languages is necessarily a slow process. Repetition is the only road to success. Frequent and searching reviews are indispensable. Many points in topography and geography are to be ascertained. Maps and drawings are to be freely canvassed, and all the appliances of modern classical erudition are to be brought into requisition. The details of prosody and versification must now be investigated. In short, the forms, the syntactical laws, the outward history and the inward structure of these noble languages are to become familiar to the ingenuous youth as household words, so that when he enters upon his college course, he may enjoy the beauty of the landscape. The drudgery of the ascent should be ended. He should now be ready to take in the wide horizon, and grasp those forms of everlasting beauty which shine around him. In other words, he may now *enjoy* Tacitus and Demosthenes. He can feel something of the strengthening influence which comes from their immortal pages. He pierces beneath the forms to the principles. Through the language he imbibes the spirit. His mind enlarges; the chains of ignorance fall from around him; gradually he attains to a comprehensive knowledge of the great themes which he studies. He learns accurately to estimate the merits and defects of the systems of government, law, and polity with which his mind is conversant. All the while, his eye is trained to appreciate the graceful forms of Plato, and his ear to drink in the subtler melody which comes from the pages of that "old man eloquent." His taste is quickened and purified, till he attains the highest style of the scholar, a susceptibility for all truth and beauty, a power of kindly appreciation for all science and literature.

But it is sad to think how rarely this picture is realized in college! How slow and toilsome the professed scholar's steps! How seldom does he attain the high privileges of his birthright! He has never mastered the elements of the grammar. The analysis of the verb may be an impossible task. He reverts to the classical page only at the call of duty, or the dictate of authority. His preparatory training was desultory and interrupted. He reaps through all his subsequent

life, the harvest which his errors, or those of his early guardians, sowed.

In the preparatory course, too, the elements of the mathematics should be studied. The youth between the ages of fourteen and seventeen or eighteen is competent to master portions of algebra and geometry. Sufficient time for this purpose ought to be spared from the classics. The latter should be indeed the prominent and leading study in the preparatory school, as they are fitted beyond almost any other branch of knowledge to the lively susceptibilities of youth. Still, a good beginning may be made in the other great department of collegiate learning. The mental powers which are addressed by mathematics begin to be developed in the later stage of the preparatory school. This study, likewise, will furnish an agreeable relaxation from the classical routine.

The young scholar, having thus laid the foundation in the classical school, by mastering the elements of abstract science, and by becoming familiar with the forms and principles of the two great languages of antiquity, will be prepared for the wider fields which await him. Exact knowledge in the earlier course, has fitted him to climb loftier heights, has given him a keen relish for the profounder truths and more beautiful forms to which his attention will be called. If the classical school has done its work well, if the three years have been wisely occupied, the education is in one sense complete. Just habits are formed; the great aims of a student's life are appreciated; real and perhaps the greatest difficulties are surmounted, and that course is begun which will lead to the loftiest attainment. In short, the preparatory school occupies in some respects the most important place in our system. It holds the keys of knowledge. It has in its hands almost unlimited means of good. It may easily shape the destiny both as scholars and moral beings of most who are committed to its keeping. It should be fostered with the most benevolent care. It should be elevated to its high and true rank. The few who are now toiling for its improvement should be cheered with all good omens, and with all substantial aid. It is said that the endowed classical schools of England exert a greater influence upon the higher education, than the universities themselves. The same can by no means be affirmed of the Latin schools of our country. A very few have attained, or are laudably endeavoring to attain, a high rank. But they are met with many depressing influences. Instead of being allowed a six or eight or ten years' course, as is the case with the English schools and the German gymnasia, it is with the utmost difficulty that they can

secure three unbroken years. The ill advised haste or economy of parents, or the relaxation of professed rules at the colleges, diminish the prescribed term to two years or eighteen months.

II. The standard of the prosperity of a Collegiate Institution ought not to be numbers, but the kind of education which is secured.

In the United States, with a population of twenty millions, one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty colleges are enumerated. In New England, with a population of less than three millions, there are thirteen incorporated colleges. One of the principal evils of this excessive multiplication is the practical lowering of the standard of admission in order that the college may show as large a list of names as may be. The competition between the different colleges has respect to numbers, not to the quality of the instruction, or the facilities for a thorough education. The terms of admission are about the same at all, but we fear that in some institutions these terms are a variable quantity, that in practice they are greatly lowered, and that, instead of a severe and conscientious examination, all the applicants are admitted with about equal facility. It is well if positive inducements to enter unprepared are not held out to young men who ought on every account to protract their preparatory course. The temptations to this ill-advised lenity are strong. The colleges are mainly supported by tuition fees. The larger the number of students, the greater the revenues. The standard, too, of the prosperity of a college which is sedulously cherished in the community, and which the public press widely extends, is numbers. This college is preëminently flourishing, because it has two hundred undergraduates; its neighbor is in a depressed state, for it has only one half that number, though it may be pervaded by the spirit of genuine scholarship, its rich results being seen in the culture and ability of its alumni. Another baneful effect, to which we have already alluded, is the premium for imperfect preparation, which it holds out to those who are technically said to be fitting for college. Industry is called into exercise, strenuous exertion is put forth by the members of the preparatory schools in proportion to the severity of the examination to which they are looking forward. But as it now is, if the door is shut against them at one college, it is wide open at another. Accordingly, the stimulus to exertion is in a large measure removed.

The evil in question, great as it is, is not irremediable. The current of popular opinion may be turned into the right direction. The attention of the organs which now control or guide this opinion, may be earnestly directed to it. The commendations which they bestow

on the public exercises of a college may be made discriminating and just. The public mind may be fixed on the rigid examination rather than on the large accession. The institutions which now adhere with commendable strictness to their published requisitions, may be encouraged to be still more exacting. And if it is impossible to induce the colleges to create a common law on this subject, or come to a mutual understanding, single institutions may well risk their prosperity for a season, and be content with smaller classes, and thus establish that high reputation for scholarship, which will surely be rewarded in the end. Indiscriminate admission to valuable privileges, or the relaxation of salutary rules, will prove at length to be short sighted policy.

III. The course of collegiate study must be necessarily limited. A selection only can be made from the vast fields of human knowledge.

This necessity obviously results from the almost infinite disparity between the time devoted to the college curriculum and the studies which might be pursued. The period is by courtesy four years, but by vacations it is reduced to three years, and in many instances, in consequence of absences, not more than thirty months or two years remain for effective study. This brief term is wholly inadequate for the attainment of the leading principles even of many important branches of science and literature. The time is fixed and short, the circle of knowledge is ever-widening. Life is momentary, art is long. The age of man is hardly sufficient to master the sciences which have had their birth within the present century. The science of entomology, for example, taxes the life-long energies of such a man as Ehrenberg. The great geographer, Ritter, is likely to leave his work but half accomplished. The student, who would become possessed of the leading principles of a science like Chemistry, needs time and great industry.

Again, the average talent of a class must be taken into the account. The ablest men may accomplish tasks to which the majority are not equal. To adopt a circle of studies which the men of average ability could master only by the utmost exertion, would leave all below them in hopeless ignorance. It would in effect debar not a few respectable scholars from all the advantages of a college.

It is, furthermore, indispensable that a considerable portion of time should be taken up with reviews and reëxaminations, in fixing the knowledge already acquired, in considering it from various points of view. It is not enough that the teacher is skilled and able in communicating the principles and outlines of knowledge. The student must have opportunities for personal investigation. He needs time

for calm reflection, for a patient survey, and for gathering up his scattered knowledge into a regular system. The judgment, we believe, of all experienced instructors, coincides with that of the veteran Wytenbach, that frequent reviewing is the secret of success in study. A little land, well cultivated, enriches the owner. A country is not thoroughly subdued while a single fortress is standing.

The necessity in question arises, also, from the nature of our collegiate system. This system is peculiar to the United States. It differs in essential points from the university systems of England, Scotland and Germany. The schools at Westminster and Winchester secure a discipline and form a character for nice scholarship to which but few of our colleges can lay any claims. Many of the late Dr. Arnold's pupils had acquired fixed habits of scholarship, and settled moral principles long before they left his school. Many, who join the English universities have already gone through a course of discipline longer and more thorough, than is reached by our entire American system, preparatory, collegiate and professional. It would be more pertinent, therefore, to compare our colleges with the English classical schools. With these, however, there are more points of dissimilarity than of resemblance.

The Scottish universities are conducted on principles very unlike those which lie at the basis of the American colleges. They are in a great measure professional schools. The instruction is communicated by lectures. The attendance upon them is optional. They have often been the theatre where brilliant discoveries have been propounded, rather than schools where old and simple truths have been taught. Eminent metaphysicians, original investigators in science have illuminated these venerable halls with their researches. Institutions, like the High School in Edinburgh, are far more analogous to the American collegiate system. The attendance is compulsory; the members are arranged into classes; a complete circle of studies is pursued; and many pupils are trained immediately for practical life.

How divergent the German university system is from ours is well known. No two systems could easily be more unlike. Many of our colleges are far inferior to the German gymnasia. No college in the United States pretends to give so complete a classical training as is effected in a multitude of the German gymnasia. The German universities are admirably fitted to receive the students from the gymnasia and carry forward their studies in some special department, or perfect their training, with the aid of great libraries and eminent professors, so that they may fill the offices of school superintendents,

principals of gymnasia, assistant professors in the universities, and many others in the gift of the government. The object is not so much the discipline of the mind, as the acquisition of positive knowledge, or the investigation of some special topic to its farthest limits, or the publication of a book which shall secure an appointment. On the contrary, the great design of the American collegiate system is the discipline of the mental faculties, the educating and culture of all the mental powers, the sharpening of the instruments by which success in life is to be achieved. This has always been regarded, we believe, as the special aim of our collegiate system. The communication and reception of instruction, highly important as they are, have been viewed as of secondary consequence. Adequate discipline has not been acquired in the preparatory school. It must now, if ever, be secured. No one is prepared for the professional school, or for professional life, till he has undergone this hardy discipline. But the attainment of it is impracticable, if the course of study be extended too far. It is a trite remark that it is immaterial what science or branch of literature, one studies, provided he masters it. The robust discipline is attained if the principles of a single science are apprehended. Each branch of literature is a microcosm. It admits of infinite analysis. It involves topics for inquiry to which no limits can be set. The student, who has made himself familiar with the splendid theories and wonderful results of modern Chemistry, or who has studied the Greek language with all the light thrown upon it by comparative philology, and the researches of German scholars, has girded his mental system for almost any effort in any other field of knowledge. Still, the remark in question requires modification. That science or branch of literature is doubtless to be selected, which, while it invigorates the intellect, ensures the greatest amount of useful information. Regard is, also, to be had, in the selection of studies, to the mental defects of the scholar, and to the symmetrical and complete development of his understanding. The peculiarities of individuals may require a somewhat varying discipline. It remains, however, an unquestionable and fundamental truth that the great design of the college system is to secure mental discipline, and not to anticipate the professional studies, or to attempt to survey the vast fields of science and literature.

IV. It hence becomes a question of the deepest interest, What studies lie at the basis of a college education? What branches of knowledge are best fitted to accomplish the end in view? We may confidently reply, Mathematics with the related branches of Natural Philosophy, and the two Classical Languages. There are, indeed,

other studies of great importance, and which ever ought to form a part of the collegiate course. They meet necessities, which neither Greek nor Geometry can supply, and no reasonable man would banish them from the lecture-room if he could. Still, they might be better dispensed with than the two studies in question. They do not enter so deeply into the idea of collegiate discipline. Their value, relatively to mathematics and the classics, is indicated by the less time which is assigned to them in the schedule of studies.

As this topic is awakening special interest at the present time, we may be allowed to dwell upon it at some length. It will be readily inferred, that in naming these two departments of human knowledge as of primary and indispensable value, we have respect to the domain of the intellect. It is taken for granted that in Christian institutions, as all our American colleges profess to be, the training of the moral faculties is of permanent and indescribable importance, and that all necessary provisions will be adopted to secure their development. Indeed the classics, and the sciences are not to be taught with an exclusive aim to their intellectual effects. The wise, Christian teacher will draw valuable moral lessons from the satires of Horace and the histories of Thucydides. Ethics may be taught and exemplified without the aid of Paley or Brown. The laws of the Divine government are as palpable in the melancholy lines of Tacitus, as in the reasonings of Butler.

The fundamental position of the classics and mathematics in the collegiate system may be shown from a variety of considerations. Let us first look at their nature, or their inherent fitness and tendencies in disciplining the faculties. And first as to the classics.

One of the most obvious and important results of classical study is the habit of discriminating thought which it ensures. It involves from beginning to end a nice analysis, a delicate perception, a constant collocation of words, a sharp definition of synonymous terms, a patient process of comparison till the words which hit the case are determined, a weighing of evidence, a balancing of shades of thought almost imperceptible. In these processes, the mind acquires the power of recognizing the slightest varieties in thought and speech, something like a quick and unerring instinct; the judgment becomes like the scale capable of weighing the smallest particles, of detecting the slightest variations. Language is no longer an uncertain instrument. Many apparent synonyms are shown not to be such in reality. Forms of speech long acquiesced in as of a general or indefinite character, are divested of the haze which has settled around them. The

ancient writers stand forth vindicated as masters of the subtlest elements of thought, as possessing weapons of the most perfect temper and of the keenest edge — a system of symbols for communicating the finest mental conceptions such as the world has never seen. This power of discrimination has respect, be it remembered, both to words and thoughts. One, trained under this discipline, has acquired, at the same time, the elements of the most effective style, and the ability to form the most careful moral judgments. He can detect the plausible sophism, disentangle the web of error, and exhibit truth in its just proportions. He will not be so likely, as other men, to adopt an erroneous theory, to defend a system whose plausibility consists in the ambiguity of its terms, or to make war, in the temper of a bigot, upon his brethren, who differ from him only or mainly in the language which they employ.

Again, the study of the classics ensures a copious vocabulary. The careful student of Cicero and Plato has enriched himself with many spoils. He has laid in a large stock of invaluable materials, gathered from the choicest fields of literature. In all the exigencies of life, in the thousand calls of duty, at moments when no preparation can be made, he can draw upon resources which are admirably classified and whose value has often been tested. The copious stores of the English tongue have been necessarily digested, compared, arranged, as the emergencies required. Successive terms, one phrase after another, have been carefully weighed, and while one has been chosen, the entire series have been sedulously deposited in the records of the memory, ready to trip as “nimble servitors” at the bidding of him who needs them. That the acquisition of a copious stock of select language is one of the effects of classical study, might be proved from the experience of distinguished men in all the learned professions. We have in our eye an eminent American senator, now deceased, who could clothe his beautiful and effective thoughts, in the most varied as well as pertinent forms, who was listened to with delight by all his auditors, and who was an earnest classical scholar when he was an octogenarian.

We may advert, in the third place, to the effects of the study on the taste, imagination and general culture. The sculptor, who is aspiring to the highest excellence, repairs to Rome to study the Belvidere Apollo and the wondrous group of the Laocöon, or to Florence to gaze upon the Venus or the Dancing Fawn. The young painter idealizes his conceptions before the great masters of his art at Dresden, Venice and Rome. The landscape painter plunges into the

recesses of the Alps, or lingers under the "purple" light and amid the eternal spring of Southern Italy, that he may copy his model in her most awful or fairest attitudes. The forms of mediæval architecture, which shoot up so gracefully and in such inimitable proportions in the Netherlands, are patiently studied by him who would produce works worthy to live. So he, who would be drawn to the beauty of written symbols, who would gaze at the "winged words" of the masters of language, who would worthily educate his own instinctive love for beautiful sounds and forms, who would place himself under the full influences of compositions which combine the freshness and simplicity of nature with the last polish of an art that conceals itself, will repair to the pages of the classics. He will carefully study their finished sentences. He will mark the perfect truth of expressions which can never grow old. He will dwell upon some word or phrase exquisitely chosen which is a picture in itself. To these cherished passages, he will revert so fondly, that they will be forever singing in his ears, or be vitalized as it were, and incorporated into his own being. We need not refer any true scholar to the passages which can be excelled by no specimens of sculptured or pictured beauty. The Odes of Horace, the Georgics of Virgil, the Poems of Homer, the Dialogues of Plato will at once recur to the mind. They furnish models which combine all the excellences of which the subject is capable — perfect truth to nature, sweet simplicity, most felicitous selection of epithets, a collocation of words which is music itself, the repose of conscious power. It may be said, indeed, that this is in part a deception. The antiquity of the poems casts a deceitful halo around them. The rich clustering associations of two thousand years are with them. So much the better, we reply. If to their unapproached intrinsic excellences, we add the mellowing and exalting influences of time, then they will be only the more worthy of study.

The distinct benefits which the classics confer on the taste and imagination are such as these: The mind learns to delight in order, proportion, fitness, congruity. It instinctively shuns extravagance, finical terms, unseemly plays of words, all straining after effect, all ostentatious parade, all dainty expressions, all cant phrases, all tautology and wearisome diffuseness. It would be an unpardonable offence against his old teachers, if the scholar should deck out his compositions with tawdry ornament, or deform them with unseemly adjuncts. He feels as the student of Raphael or Michael Angelo does, that they will frown on aught which interferes with the severe simplicity.

ty or the heavenly beauty, which speak in every lineament of their works.

These excellences are strikingly contrasted with the defects of many of those writers who do not make the classics their model. They may possess great force of thought and language, and in certain directions great power of execution. But in an unexpected moment, a sad prejudice will be revealed, an extravagant opinion will be broached; the mind will be developed in a one-sided and disjointed manner. The charm and usefulness of symmetrical culture never meets our eyes. They are able but not finished thinkers and writers. We never repose upon them with entire affection and confidence. We always suspect some lurking weakness, or dread some unlicensed outbreak. We do not look to this class of men for finished writers, for men of the purest taste or comprehensive views, or perfectly sound opinions.

There is another class of these influences, to which we have already alluded, and which must be felt rather than described. We refer to those reminiscences which forever linger in the memory, which people the fancy, which excite the imagination, which attract the affections, like strains of the sweetest music. There are passages in Cicero's works which seem like the dear faces of departed friends yet remembered. They are full of an elevating, genial influence. They crowd the mind with solemn and affecting impressions. They suggest thoughts which, for the time being, expel every low desire and frivolous fancy. They have not indeed a religious efficacy, yet they are powerfully auxiliary to all virtuous tendencies. The music of their words does not sound harshly along with the holier strains that come from the hill of Zion. Passages in nearly all the greatest writers of Greece and Rome embody the beautiful yet fragmentary notes which natural theology utters through all her domains. It is this melancholy association in part, in company with words of the most exquisite fitness and grace, which gives to the passages in question their deathless power. Some of them are the words of men who saw the ancient glories of their country fading away never to return. Hosts of barbarians, or the sands of the deserts were mutilating or burying works which their authors fondly thought they were fashioning for eternity. But, whatever may be the causes of this peculiar influence, it certainly exists, and is like a perennial spring in the hearts of all genuine scholars, and it is an influence which no literature but the classical supplies, except in a very limited measure. We look in vain for it to the student of Johnson, or Burke or Addison. We find it in a degree in the

pages of great poets like Milton and Wordsworth, for they were imbued with the spirit of classic song.

We will now refer, in the fourth place, to another great benefit of classical study. By means of it we can trace no inconsiderable part of our own language to its source, and we lay an excellent foundation for the study of the languages of all Southern Europe. The part of the English language derived from the Latin, or variously affected by it, through the Norman conquest of England, the juxta-position of England with countries that use languages derived from the Latin, and the influence on the English of the studies of learned men, conversant with Latin, is quite important. It is only the classical scholar who enjoys the signal advantage of being able to trace these various forms to their roots on the Roman soil, and of having spread out before his mind, without investigation, their thousand modifications and associations, at once enriching his style and enlarging his knowledge. The same is true, to a less extent, of words derived from the Greek language. An acquaintance with the derivation and history of these expressive terms, many of them so useful in modern science, is an acquisition of no mean value. Again, the classical student is possessed of the elements of all the South European dialects, with a few insignificant exceptions. The traveller in Italy, without a particle of acquaintance with the Italian language, soon feels at home. The sounds, and in many cases, the identical words of a familiar speech greet his ear. The student who sits down to French or Spanish literature, finds that half his labor is accomplished, if he has mastered the Latin. Many of his old friends, indeed, appear under a somewhat different costume. They have enlarged or diminished their attire, not always, as it seems to him, in the best taste, but no transformations can hide from him their original parentage under Roman skies.

We may refer to a recent but, eminent benefit which results from classical study. It introduces us to a vast body of varied and profound criticism. It unlocks treasures of inestimable value. Some of the greatest minds of the present day have traversed the fields of classical literature, and have illuminated with the light of a happy erudition, the most secret nooks, and the remotest corners. Great classical scholars, like Niebuhr, Müller, Savigny, Hermann, have brought stores of learning to bear upon the illustration of the classics, no more admirable in amount than in selection, pertinence and sterling value. Multitudes of very able men have labored, not in verbal criticism merely, not in the lighter matters of metre and prosody, but on

the great questions of law and government and revenue, and on the still greater questions of moral philosophy and theology. The profound problems relating to man's eternal destiny as stated by the Greek and Roman moralists, the degenerating process of heathenism as it wandered farther and farther from a primeval revelation, the true significance of pagan mythology, etc., have been handled with a depth and fulness of learning, with a clearness of method, and with a satisfactoriness of results, which should seem to leave little for the future inquirer. The laws of the two classical languages, the principles of syntax, the relations of these languages to others, opening the rich fields of comparative philology, have been investigated with eminent success. These investigations impart to the subject a truly scientific worth, and command the attention of all who feel any interest in the origin and fortunes of our race. Now this vast body of classical criticism, and historical literature, for which we are indebted to hundreds of able scholars in Germany and elsewhere, can be adequately appreciated only by the classical scholar. In illustration, we may refer to works on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; to those comparing at large the origin, structure and relations of the Latin and Greek languages; to the profound, acute, and, in one sense, creative labors of Niebuhr, and of the very able scholars who have followed in his steps, in investigating the ante-Latin languages of Italy, and the general antiquities of that country; to profound treatises on Roman law; to acute researches in ancient and modern history; and to studies of a more general nature, sweeping over the vast regions from India to the Atlantic, and deducing by a rigorous inquiry the mutual laws of the most important languages of past and present times, and showing the identity, in origin and locality, of the races that spoke them. In short, a vast field has been traversed, and is now thoroughly exploring, by hundreds of eminent scholars in Germany, France, England and other countries. The rich fruits of these explorations can be enjoyed only by those that have mastered the two classical languages. These, in some respects, constitute the central points — embrace the germinating principles of the inquiry. They possess a literature perfect in form and adequate in amount. Being understood by large numbers of scholars, they can be appealed to as common umpires in a dispute. Through them, as a mirror, we can see the culture and development to which all the sister dialects might have attained, or did actually reach.

We may now refer to the other great department of collegiate study, the mathematics and the relative branches of natural philoso-

phy. In the language of Dr. Whewell, "No education can be considered as liberal, which does not cultivate both the faculty of reason and the faculty of language: one of which is cultivated by the study of mathematics, and the other by the study of the classics. To allow the student to omit one of these, is to leave him half educated. If a person cannot receive such culture, he remains in the one case irrational, in the other, illiterate."

The great and indispensable value of mathematical study may be illustrated by a reference to the practice of composition. The ability to write in an impressive manner, is an acquisition of importance for all educated men, for multitudes indispensable. Stores of knowledge are valuable in proportion as they can be used. An effective and accomplished writer does not owe his skill to chance. Neither is he indebted only or mainly to a ready memory, to a nervous excitability, to strong passions, or to the gift of imagination. In addition to these he needs the exact training which mathematics will furnish.

What are the principal hindrances in the way of the youthful writer? On what points is he liable to be discouraged? Why are many unable to make a deep and continuous impression by their written performances? One cause of it is, the inability to fix the attention. The mind is under the dominion of vagrant habits. When brought, forcibly as it were, to reflect upon a particular subject, it starts back instantly. It rebels against all efforts to confine it. The individual who has not disciplined himself to habits of close attention, may write effectively, on particular occasions; but his success is owing to some extraordinary impulse, or to some external cause powerfully exciting his feelings. The effects of his exertions will be likely to be evanescent. They have not the enduring element of connected thought, or of just and comprehensive views. He has not investigated the subject on all sides, but has been seduced by some attractive features, or by some temporary interest involved in it.

Another hindrance is, the inability to abstract the mind from all intruding cares, all foreign and all related objects, and keep it inexorably fixed on the one point before it. One may have the power of fastening the attention in a measure, of drawing it within the general range of the topic to be investigated, but he fails to separate the particular quality, the identical point, to bid all related questions depart, and to keep the thoughts resolutely and for a long time, on the hinge of a discussion, or on the needle's point, as it were of a theme. Napoleon on the field of battle, or in his tent at night, could abstract his mind from every consideration and fasten it on the one necessary to gain his ob-

ject. With writers, it is often the reverse. Foreign or but partially related thoughts come thronging before the field of vision. Hence, they never attain to a logical consistency. One thing does not flow legitimately from another. Their compositions are as far as possible from being well reasoned. They are not the evolutions of a principle, but the stringing together of beads. A thought is impressive only by its independent force. It has no vital connection with its predecessor, nor with that which follows. The fortress is carried, if at all, by the impetuosity of a single unplanned or ill-planned charge, not by well-concerted or closely connected assaults. Defeat or want of success is the rule. Victory is accidental. In other words, the mind of the writer has not been trained mathematically. He has not been disciplined by a rigid geometry. He has not familiarized himself with the unerring and absolute truth of lines and numbers. His positions want the precision which they might acquire from the axioms of pure science. His inferences might flow legitimately from a hundred other doctrines. His reason has not been cultivated. A leading department of his intellect has run to waste. Mathematical discipline would have introduced order into this confusion. A patient study of abstract science would have added immeasurably to his power as a thinker and writer.

The topic under discussion may be strikingly illustrated from experience. Several hundred years bear testimony to the value of mathematical and classical study in the collegiate discipline. The whole civilized world, since the revival of letters, have coincided in the general arrangement of the university course. This general acquiescence, however, has not been effected without discussion. The ground, at several periods and in all the leading countries of Christendom, has been sharply contested. The relative value of the classics has often been tried in a fiery crucible. Mathematical study has encountered fierce assailants. The practical utility, especially of its higher departments, has been confidently denied, as if the great object of the college course were not mental discipline, but the formation of a corps of original investigators in mathematics and natural philosophy. Still, the verdict in favor of these studies, has been all but unanimous. In our own country, opposition to the prominent place which these studies hold in the system, has at various times appeared. But it has always given way to fair and open argument. Besides, the conviction of the value of these studies is not confined to those who have pursued them. Business men, intelligent mechanics and merchants, who have not received a collegiate education, have often given

the most gratifying testimony in behalf of the classics. The high opinion of their value entertained by the late Dr. Bowditch, who was what is called "a self-taught" man, is well known. One of the most eminent and wealthy living merchants of Boston, not himself educated at College, has repeatedly affirmed that a business clerk with a classical education was generally far superior to one not so educated, doubtless because it secures a training of the faculties, a balance of mind, and a quickness of apprehension that is reached by no other method of discipline. An eminent author in the natural sciences, a distinguished scholar of Ritter, remarks, that, as a general rule, those individuals in the classes of natural science, who were skilled in the classics, had a marked preëminence over those who had not thus been favored.

It may, however, be more instructive to adduce, in proof of our general position, the experience of the English Universities, some of the results of the liberal studies which have been pursued in our parent country for several centuries.

The classics and mathematics have been from the beginning at the foundation of liberal studies in England. It is true that classical studies at Oxford have had far too great a preponderance over the mathematical, while at Cambridge, especially before the present century, mathematics were the favorite and far too exclusive study. Yet, on the whole, taking the two Universities and the Classical Schools together, the fundamental studies in the liberal education of Englishmen have been the two in question. The classical deficiency in Cambridge was partly at least supplied by the thorough classical preparation in the Schools, and by the efforts of particular Colleges. The mathematical want at Oxford has been in part atoned for by the rigid discipline of the Aristotelian logic, well known as the favorite study from the foundation of the University.

We may here repeat the remark which we made in an earlier Number, that we do not by any means regard the English course of study as incapable of amendment. Some of these amendments are of grave importance. The natural sciences, political economy, etc., were jealously excluded at Oxford up to the present year. The habits and system of that university, the absorbing attention to the scholastic logic, the exclusion of some of the more liberal classical writers, have doubtless had much to do with the peculiar theological and Papal tendencies which have given an unfortunate celebrity to that venerable seat of learning. A wider and more general course of studies would have liberalized the views of its members. The study of the clas-

sics at public schools and at the universities has been too much of the letter, without the spirit. It has consisted too exclusively of niceties, of imitation, of attention to forms. The pupils have kept too much aloof from the substance, from the great questions of morals, law, politics, general grammar, comparative philology, etc., which have characterized the German method.

Still, notwithstanding all its defects, we look upon the English system with reverence. We believe it has wrought out immeasurable good for the people of that country, and through them on those of other lands. The subversion of the institutions, the substitution of any other branches of knowledge in place of the classics and mathematics, would be justly regarded as an irreparable calamity. The English university system was the parent of our own; and our own system, if not the cause of unmixed good, has been one of the main sources, and one of the mightiest bulwarks of all which is precious in our land.

As a general proof of the practical benefits which have resulted from the English university system, we may point to the English character, to the world-wide reputation of Englishmen for virtue, knowledge, steadiness of principle, practical benevolence and usefulness. It would be folly, indeed, to attribute all this result to this or any other single cause. Many causes have coöperated; chief and paramount among them has been Protestant Christianity. Dissenters, too, who have never been graduated at the universities, have borne a noble part in extending the influence of the British name, though they have shared largely in the indirect benefits which have flowed from the great national schools. Still, we are entitled to name the universities as one of the principal instrumentalities that have created what we mean by British character and influence. A large proportion of her naval and military officers, governors of provinces, consuls and ambassadors, travellers, the men of the three learned professions, statesmen, and multitudes of the gentry, bankers, merchants, etc., received their training in the classical schools and universities. The most susceptible and important period of their lives, from the age of ten to that of twenty-one, was passed in the venerable halls and shades of Eton, or Winchester, or Christ Church, or Trinity, or some other of those foundations, whose very stones and door ways seem to be freighted with instruction. We are authorized, therefore, to attribute to these seats of learning no small share of that which has made England what she is. She is distinguished for sterling integrity. This may be owing in a measure to the fixed and regular

discipline of her schools! She has a name among the nations for the love of liberty in union with law. This may proceed in a degree from the restraints of a prescribed course of abstract study, united with the generous influences of the classical page. England is eminent for wisdom in action—for practical good sense. May not this be ascribed in part to the effects of mathematical and classical study in imparting symmetry to the views, in preserving the mind from bias and one-sided tendencies, and in fitting it to meet the real exigencies of life?

But this point is so important that we may be allowed to specify some particulars. The English people of the upper and middle classes are characterized for sobriety of judgment, by a native common sense, by a steady and not unworthy opposition to change, by a reverential and loving reliance on the past, sometimes, indeed, excessive, but generally in beautiful contrast with the course of their restless continental neighbors. As a leading cause of this characteristic, we may refer to the influence of the universities. There stand those old seats of learning, the very embodiment of past generations. In the whirl of the present, how soothing to look on their time-worn pinnacles, to walk beneath their moss-covered arches, to wander along the aisles which were once trodden by Bacon and Newton! Amid the buoyancy of youth and the excitements of the times, nothing could be more wholesome than to live under these awful shadows of the past. Entirely coincident is the effect of the studies themselves. The scholar lives among the great minds of antiquity, shedding upon him a serene and never-setting light. His daily tasks conduct him to the profound reflections of Thucydides, and the unchanging truths which shine forth from many of the pages of Aristotle. Or he is contemplating the beautiful truths that lie couched in lines and numbers, those immutable "ordinances of heaven." He is refining his sensibilities and his taste among the wondrous creations of ancient literature, or disciplining his reason in the fields of absolute truth.

Again, the English upper class, taken as a body, and many in the middle, are distinguished for an admirable culture, for manners so simple and graceful, that they seem to be inherited, not acquired, attractive, because they are the expression of a native courtesy and real friendliness. It is not the growth of a day; it is not the patronizing courtesy or intolerable assumptions of a class that have just risen from obscurity. It is the product of ages of refinement. It is the growth of a civilization more perfect than the world has elsewhere seen. We cannot but attribute it in part to the university system, to the

proprieties and decencies of the life that is led there, to the intercourse of the young with their accomplished seniors, to the refining and tasteful local associations, and to the congenial influences which come from the studies of the historians and poets of Greece and Rome. These influences may be indirect and imperceptible; but thoughts so beautiful, clothed in forms of such exquisite grace, as are found for example in the Greek tragedians, must form no small element in the culture to which we refer. Through a thousand avenues they enter and pervade the susceptible hearts of the young.

Furthermore, the university system counteracts and neutralizes in a measure the great tendency of the English mind to that which is immediately practical and useful. Oxford and Cambridge have cast up mighty barriers against an intensely avaricious spirit. They are public, standing monuments of the worth of mind. They are constantly uttering their silent yet intelligible protest against that exclusive spirit which would test all things by their weight and measure. England is absorbingly commercial and manufacturing. The acquisition of riches, the eager pursuit of material advantages are her besetting sin. But a liberal education affords some counterweight. The truths of geometry have a close relationship with the loftiest conceptions which can fill the human soul. In the language of Playfair, "the reason of Newton and Galileo took a sublimer flight than the fancy of Milton and Ariosto." Classical studies, too, are eminently humane. Well were they styled the "humanities," from their enlarging, unselfish influences. They have no special affinities with what are called "the material interests." They lead to the cultivation of tastes, which throw a charm over the dealings of trade, lighten the heart of the banker, and lead the mechanic and the land-owner to cherish enlightened views and perform philanthropic deeds. "It is delightful," says Mr. Taft, "to see the influences of classical learning not fading upwards, but penetrating downwards, and masses of people rejoicing to recognize even from afar the skirts of its glory." In further illustration of the utility of the university system, it may be mentioned, that a large number of those who leave the universities, enter upon the study of the law, or into political life in Parliament. Now, what both these classes preëminently need, is mental discipline, not knowledge, not the facts of science, not the details of statistics, but the power of working with the mind, of fixing the attention often on the most arid subjects, of grasping the great points of a question, of disentangling a net-work of inconsistencies, of laying bare sophistical plausibilities, and of bringing at once the whole force of

the intellect on the citadel that is to be carried. The late Mr. Buxton owed his usefulness, under God, to his exact and finished training at Trinity College, Dublin. He triumphed in parliament, not simply on account of the justice of his cause, or the strength of his feelings, or the accuracy and thoroughness of his information, but because he could grasp, and digest in a masterly manner, and luminously expound whatever he undertook. While gaining the prizes in college, he was fitting himself to be the champion of Africa.

The preceding considerations might be abundantly confirmed by the detail of particular cases. It has been constantly asserted and reiterated, that the most eminent public men in England, in every art and science, have not been educated at the public schools, and that the universities contribute but a little to the science and intellectual progress of England. Let us test this remark by a few decisive instances. Francis Bacon entered the university of Cambridge in his thirteenth year, "where he made astonishing progress in all the sciences taught there." Isaac Barrow, whom the king called "the best scholar in England," spent nearly one half of his life in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Just after, "within the walls of Cambridge," in the language of Professor Huber, of Marburg, "were found the two men, Newton and Bentley, who, in the promotion of science and of classical criticism, became the leaders, not of England only, but, in the first instance at least, of all Europe." Newton would probably have lived and died as the overseer of his mother's farm, if his attention had not been accidentally, or rather providentially, directed to Cambridge. Locke's philosophy, pervading the college lectures at Cambridge, paved the way for Newton's agency, and prepared the academic soil and atmosphere for it. Locke himself was educated at Westminster School, whence he was elected, in 1751, to Christ Church College, Oxford. "Here he distinguished himself much by his application and proficiency." John Milton was removed from St. Paul's school, London, to Christ's College, Cambridge, where he "distinguished himself by the purity and elegance of his Latin versification." Joseph Addison spent six years in Oxford, and gained distinction by writing Latin verses. Lord Mansfield was educated at Westminster. Blackstone went from a public school to Oxford, and was fellow of a college when he wrote his Commentaries. "William Pitt's stay at college was unusually long, nor did he leave it until his mind was as perfectly formed as it could be by theory." His knowledge was not confined to the classics, though with these he was conversant. The more severe pursuits of Cambridge

had imparted some acquaintance with the stricter sciences. Mr. Fox was highly distinguished at Eton by his Latin and Greek poetry. "Like Mr. Canning, Lord Carlisle and Lord Grenville," says Mr. Brougham, "Lord Holland laid both at school and college a broad foundation of classical learning, which through his after life he never ceased successfully to cultivate." The Marquis Wellesley was pronounced by the master of Eton to be superior as a classical scholar to Porson. He continued these studies with great success at Oxford. Mr. Wilberforce's "natural talents were cultivated and his taste refined by all the resources of a complete Cambridge education." At Eton, Mr. Canning became distinguished for the elegance of his English and Latin poetry, as well as for the easy flow and propriety of diction which distinguished his pure compositions. At Christ Church, Oxford, he increased his high literary reputation and gained several prizes.

It were easy greatly to enlarge this list from the most illustrious names in England, both from among the dead and the living. The bishop of London, who has been said to be the best living Greek scholar in England, was greatly distinguished at Cambridge, and obtained several prizes. The same is true of a large number of the most eminent mathematicians, natural philosophers, orators, statesmen, classical scholars, etc., now living in England, e. g. Mr. Airy, astronomer royal; Dr. Peacock, author of the algebra, etc.; Mr. Melvill, the eloquent preacher; Prof. Sedgwick and Dr. Buckland, the geologists; Judges Coleridge and Talfourd; Archbishop Whateley; Sir John F. W. Herschell, in the highest rank in college; Bishop Thirlwall, the historian; Mr. Macaulay, who carried off a number of prizes; Prof. Challis, the astronomer; Mr. Adams, who is fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, several members of which college have established an Adams prize "in testimony of their sense of the honor he had conferred on his college and the university, by having been the first among the mathematicians of Europe to determine from perturbations the unknown place of a disturbing planet exterior to Saturn." This list, however, we need not extend. A very large proportion of the ablest men in almost every department of public life, who honor the British name, were educated at the public schools and universities. But, as it has been well said, a chief advantage and excellence of the public schools and universities consists in forming the *secondary* men, who carry a cultivated taste, a liberal and manly understanding and a mild intelligence into all the retired walks of life. We will close these observations by referring to the testi-

mony of the late Dr. Arnold, which is particularly valuable from the fact of the independence of his character, and the favor with which he regarded reforms: "My own belief is, that our colleges of Oxford and Cambridge are, with all their faults, the best institutions of the kind in the world, at least for Englishmen."

We may recur, on a future occasion, to some other points connected with this subject.

ARTICLE II.

REVIEW OF DR. WOODS'S WORKS.

By Heman Humphrey, D. D., Pittsfield, Mass.

The Works of Leonard Woods, D. D., late Professor of Christian Theology, Andover; in five volumes. Andover: Printed by J. D. Flagg & W. H. Wardwell. 1850.

DR. WOODS is a theologian of the old, or Edwardian school, owning but "one Master, even Christ;" and few if any of his contemporaries, on either side of the Atlantic, have contended more earnestly or ably "for the faith, once delivered to the saints." Amid the fluctuations of the age, he has never swerved from the primitive New England orthodoxy—the exponent of which, is the Assembly's Shorter Catechism.

The structure of Dr. Woods's mind is eminently conservative. It has no elective affinity for new and startling theories, of any kind. He chooses to walk in the beaten path "of the Apostles and Prophets," heedless of beckonings, however plausible and captivating, on the right hand or the left. Some have thought him quite too slow and cautious, for an age of progress, which outstrips everything but the lightning. But, if he has not "kept fully up with the times," he has adhered closely to the Bible, and his manifest aim has been, to "prove all things, and hold fast that which is good." Old men should be allowed to abide by the old landmarks, and leave it to those, who with better critical and exegetical helps are coming after, to extend the boundaries of theological science, if they can, within the "charter." We are just now under such rapid head way, that it needs some strong

and steady hands to put down the breaks, as well as high pressure to drive the engine.

The candid reader of Dr. Woods's system of theology, as drawn out in these volumes, will find, that though his convictions of truth are strong and earnest, he is no dogmatist. He is as far as any one from claiming infallibility for his opinions upon abstruse and debated points, cautiously and deliberately as they have been formed. He believes, that there is more or less of error in all human systems and digests, and that absolute perfection is not to be expected in any. But while he strenuously maintains, that the Bible is a complete and full revelation, to which nothing must be added and from which nothing may be taken away, he regards the Scriptures as an inexhaustible store-house of wisdom and knowledge, ready to yield new developments and illustrations of divine truth, to the devout student.

It is no disparagement of any system of theology of anterior date, if in some respects it is surpassed by others which have since come from the press. As every author may fairly avail himself of the ripest fruits he can gather, in the wide fields of sacred culture by other hands, it were a reproach, if with equal talents and better opportunities, the commentator or lecturer of the nineteenth century, were to make no advances upon his predecessors of the eighteenth.

It was, we believe, the general hope of the divinity classes at Andover, when they were listening to Dr. Woods's Theological Lectures, that they might one day see them in print; and no sooner had he left the chair, which he had so ably filled in the Seminary for thirty-eight years, than some of the ablest and most distinguished of his former pupils, addressed him a letter, requesting him in the most respectful terms, to revise the course by which they had been so much benefited themselves, and give it to the public. In this, they only expressed the wish of all the early alumni, and the desire of a still greater number of ministers, perhaps, who had never enjoyed the privilege of hearing the lectures. They rightly judged, that having spent almost the whole of a long life in theological investigations and discussions, he might bring out a system which the church "would not let die." Having now lived to devote three years, or more, with his accustomed diligence, to the revision of his lectures, and carefully re-written some of them—in short, having spared no pains to make them as worthy of acceptance as he could, he has carried them through the press, together with ample selections of miscellaneous matter on kindred topics, and they have already obtained a wide circulation, in a type and style which does great credit to the Andover press.

In cordially recommending these volumes to students in theology and young ministers, we do not forget, that strong objections have been urged in some quarters, against *Systems of Divinity*, or compends of doctrine in any shape. It is plausibly alleged, that with the Bible in our hands, containing a full and complete revelation of the mind and will of God, and embracing everything that is "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for instruction in righteousness," without any systematic arrangement of topics, those who will "search the Scriptures" with a humble and teachable mind, stand in no need of such helps as are proffered in this or any other system of didactic lectures, from the theological chair.

There would be great force in this objection, if the lecturer were to go out of the divine record for any of his materials, in constructing his system. But when he religiously adheres to the "*Law and the Prophets*;" when he confines himself to the teachings of holy men, "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" in the Old Testament, and of Christ and his apostles in the New, what is his object? Not to elicit any new truth — not to save us the trouble of searching the Scriptures for ourselves, but to bring together and arrange the doctrines of the Bible, so that we may see their relations and harmony as it were at a glance, "comparing spiritual things with spiritual." And what harm or danger can there be in this? Are not those great and good men entitled to our thanks, who have spent their lives in studying the Scriptures, and given us the fruits of their labors, while they have left us the whole Bible, just as they found it, to read and judge for ourselves; "calling no man master" upon earth? If any go to Calvin, or Edwards, or Dwight, or Woods, rather than "Moses and the prophets," Christ and his apostles for their creed, they are without excuse. The fault is in themselves, and not in the theologians who never pretended to be infallible guides and teachers. For reasons in favor of systematic theology, drawn out at length, under the following heads: "System carried into every other branch of knowledge — Thorough knowledge best promoted by it — System demanded by man's rational faculties — and by the nature and relations of religious truth," we refer to Dr. Woods's eighth Lecture, Vol. I. His system contains a hundred and twenty-six Lectures, and fills the whole of the first three volumes, and embraces the following outline of topics, in the order here indicated: "Directions for the right prosecution of theological study — Revelation, in four Lectures — The use and explanation of Theological terms — Dangers to be avoided in analogical reasoning — Inspiration of the Scriptures, in six Lec-

tures — Existence of God — The language respecting the divine attributes explained — Man's unlikeness to God — Unity of God — Dangers of analogical reasoning respecting the Trinity — Humanity of Christ — Preexistence of Christ — Deity of Christ, in three Lectures — Sonship of Christ — Divinity and personality of the Holy Spirit — Trinitarian use of the word Person — The doctrine considered as a subject of speculative reasoning — Divine Purposes, in four Lectures — Reprobation — How the doctrine of Divine purposes should be treated — Divine Providence, in four Lectures — Moral Agency, in thirteen Lectures — Man's depravity, in twelve Lectures — The Atonement of Christ, in twelve Lectures — Regeneration, in five Lectures — Directions to inquiring sinners — Evidences of Regeneration — Nature of Christian Nurture — Repentance — Faith, in three Lectures — Prayer, in four Lectures — Justification, in three — The Perseverance of Saints — Resurrection — Endless Punishment — Baptism, in ten Lectures — The Lord's Supper — Lord's day — Church Government, in six Lectures — Personal religion necessary to Ministers."

The filling out of such a plan, embracing all the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion, is a great undertaking; and delivering such a course of lectures to more than a thousand young candidates for the sacred office, involves immense responsibility. How far Dr. Woods has entitled himself to the thanks and confidence of the Christian public as "a Master in Israel;" with what ability and success he has fulfilled his great task, every reader of these volumes will judge for himself. Religionists, (out of the evangelical pale,) by whatever names they may be distinguished, will of course fundamentally dissent from many of these lectures; and some, who fully agree with Dr. Woods on every essential point in his system, will doubtless differ from him in some of his views and statements, of minor importance. It would be an unheard of agreement if this were not the case. No system of theology has ever yet been drawn up, in which all good men have been perfectly agreed, and probably never will be, so long as they study and think independently for themselves.

But that the venerable author of these volumes, has an acute and logical mind; that he has an uncommonly clear discrimination of metaphysical subtleties; that he has pondered long and thought deeply upon all the more abstruse and difficult parts of his system, and that he has fairly stated and met the most common and plausible objections urged against it, few if any, we think, will deny.

In the brief notice which our present limits will allow, we can only

glance at a few topics, as fair specimens of the ability and candor, with which they are all handled, in these hundred and twenty-six lectures. The four, on Divine Providence, at the opening of the second volume, strike us as exceedingly well reasoned and conclusive. The author's definition of Divine Providence, is, that "all things are sustained, directed and controlled by God." "The doctrine proved from his attributes and from experience. Providence particular and universal — important to intelligent beings — asserted in the Scriptures — benevolent — just — wise — powerful and holy. Appeal to Scripture — oriental idiom considered — miracles — argument from the duty of prayer — Divine Providence includes the powers and laws of nature — those powers and laws dependent on God — two agencies, that of creatures and that of God — their relation to each other — practical reflections."

The filling up of this outline, covers the whole ground of debate between those who expressly or virtually aim to exclude the Creator from the government of the world, and those who maintain with Paul, that "He worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will," and with the Westminster Divines, that "the works of God's providence are his most holy, wise and powerful, preserving and governing all his creatures and all their actions." Though Dr. Woods does not profess to explain *how* it is that God governs the universe of moral beings without the slightest infringement of their free moral agency, many, we are sure, whose minds have been more or less perplexed on the subject, will acknowledge their indebtedness to him for his clear statement and able vindication of the orthodox doctrine.

The unwelcome but undeniable doctrine of human depravity, is treated at great length, and with great ability in these lectures. A glance at the table of contents, is sufficient to show, that Dr. Woods has deeply studied the subject in all its aspects and bearings; and every intelligent and candid reader must admit, that the discussion is thorough and candid and scriptural, in a high degree. The leading topics are proofs of depravity from human conduct — of its universality from Scripture — that it is native, or innate, and that it is total, by which the author means, not that men are by nature as bad as they can be, but that "they are entirely destitute of the holy love required by God's law and that all their affections in relation to that law are of an opposite nature." In the progress of the discussion, Dr. Woods is unavoidably led to examine some of the most popular theories of depravity from which he dissents, and to encounter a variety of objections which have been urged from different and opposite quarters

against his own. Those who have slid entirely off from the Calvinistic, or Westminster platform, will of course widely dissent both from his arguments and conclusions. But we are more and more convinced, that evangelical writers differ more in the use of terms than in their views of the original corruption of human nature, than with regard to the extent and malignancy of human depravity. Those who claim to be sound Calvinists, and are so, on every essential point, but who may not agree with Dr. Woods exactly in all his views, will allow, that he reasons with great cogency and fairness, and that his proofs of the native and universal depravity of our race cannot be gainsaid.

On the subject of regeneration, Dr. Woods proves himself to be an eminently sound and able defender of the faith, once delivered to the saints. We regret, that our limits will not allow us to give even a condensed abstract of his reasoning, by which he shows most triumphantly, that in every case of true conversion, "the excellency of the power is of God; even according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead." The theory of moral suasion, as being in any instance the efficient cause of regeneration, is overthrown beyond recovery. The strongest motives are shown to be utterly powerless, to melt or break the "heart of stone," which every unregenerate man carries about in his bosom. The nature of the change, its evidences and its fruits, are also pointed out, with a clearness and cogency, which it seems to us, must carry conviction to every unprejudiced mind.

Restricted as our limits are, we fully intended, when we began, to devote a page or two, to the cardinal doctrine of Justification, which is so clearly stated, so scripturally defined, and so admirably illustrated and established in these lectures; but we can only recommend them, in passing, to the devout study of the serious and candid reader. There are few, but will find themselves more than repaid, by gaining clearer and more definite views of the "way to be saved."

But we must hasten to the thirteen lectures on Moral Agency, which we regard as the ablest series in the whole system, and as embodying a lucid and masterly discussion of some of the most abstruse points in theological science. Edwards, in his immortal Treatise on the Will, is more profoundly metaphysical, and some other writers may have surpassed the venerable Abbot Professor, in the deeper subtleties of the science; but in logical arrangement, in clearness of statement, in exactness of definition, in transparency of argument, in fulness and felicity of illustration, and in unanswerable appeals to human con-

sciousness, we have never read any treatise on Moral Agency, which seems to us more worthy of the theological chair, in any "school of the prophets," or more worthy of being studied by all who desire to obtain correct views of the nature, grounds and extent of their moral responsibility. As specimens of the train of thought and argument, we offer a brief abstract, partly in our own, and partly in the language of the author.

"Moral Agency," he justly remarks, "has a near and important connection with Christian theology; and in prosecuting our inquiries we must pursue the inductive method. We must derive our knowledge from facts and experience." No *à priori* hypothesis can be admitted in the science of mind, any more than in physical science. What we wish to know, are the simple facts that exist and the general laws which they develop. "As in natural science, we observe and arrange the phenomena, so we must do in mental and moral science. Instead of saying such must be the nature and laws of moral agency, our proper business is to find out by Scripture, experience and observation what they are." "I shall assume, that man is a moral agent. We know that moral agency belongs to us, just as we know, that any other attribute belongs to us; that is, by consciousness and by observation of one another—just as we know, that we see and hear." This being admitted, the question arises, is there any test or standard of moral distinctions on which we may rely? There is.

When we have certain affections, or do certain actions, or when we observe the same in others, the feeling spontaneously arises in our minds, that these affections are right. But when we are conscious in ourselves, or contemplate them in others, a feeling of disapprobation is excited. "This feeling takes place uniformly, so far as our minds are unperverted and act according to their nature. The fact that certain men in certain conditions and under the influence of certain causes, judge differently from this, is no evidence against the existence of a uniform constitution in man, any more than the fact, that men under the influence of certain mental or bodily diseases, do not perceive the difference between harmony and discord in music, or between different colors and different tastes, proves, that there is no difference in reality, or that there is no fixed principle, in our minds, which leads us to make the distinction." "But diseased and depraved as the moral sense is, there is much less difference among men in their moral judgments, than has sometimes been represented." Who can witness an act of kindness and magnanimity to an enemy in distress, without

a feeling of respect and admiration, or of cruelty to a friend and benefactor, without a feeling of indignation? "The sentiment of approbation which arises in the mind in relation to such actions, is as uniform, as the sensation of different colors at the sight of a rainbow." "Present a prism to a man's eye and you excite the sensation of different colors; speak to him and you excite the sensation of sound. In like manner present to man's mental eye the feeling of benevolence, and the actions that flow from it, and you excite in him instant approbation. Present the contrary, and you excite disapprobation. And if at any time, the impulse of his own passions leads him to justify the wrong affections of himself or others, he will ultimately condemn himself for it as an act of violence done to his moral nature."

Having, as he thinks, established this point in the first lecture, Dr. Woods proceeds in the next, to consider different states of conscience, in reference to moral agency, and the ambiguity of such words as knowledge, understanding, power, ability, etc., by which men are often perplexed and led astray. The course of reasoning by which he proves, that the merit or demerit of any action lies in the intention, in the state of the heart, and not in the overt act, is remarkably clear and satisfactory.

In the third lecture of this series, on Moral Agency, Dr. Woods goes on to examine the different affections or states of the mind, embracing its sensations or perceptions, intellectual acts and volitions. On these topics, no abstract of ours would do justice to the analytical acumen of the author, nor to his rare felicity in translating metaphysics into the vernacular tongue.

The affections, in themselves, morally good or evil; the laws by which they are governed and their connection with the intellect and the will, are the topics of the next lecture, and they are handled with an ability which would do credit to any writer on Moral Agency. So would the lecture which immediately follows, in which Dr. Woods inquires "What connection our present affections have with any preceding affection, or what influence preceding affections have upon the present." Next he goes on to show, on what principles we ordinarily predict our own future affections and those of others. Then comes Moral Necessity, which, he tells us, furnishes a remarkable example of the difficulty and perplexity occasioned by employing words in a sense not well defined, or not well understood, and to the elucidation of which, he has with rare success, applied the perspicacious power of his mind. Then follow highly discriminating remarks upon the influence of motives, objective and subjective. Then in the next lecture,

he inquires, "Do motives influence men necessarily, and if so, what is the nature of this necessity?" This leads him next to consider certain alleged difficulties, as to moral inability, the divine purposes, our dependence on God and the work of his Spirit in sanctification. This brings us to the tenth lecture in the series, in which Dr. Woods shows, that Moral Agency continues through all changes of character, and refers to Gen. iii, as a satisfactory account of the first human sin, and then very ably closes the discussion in two lectures upon "the sinner's inability to obey the divine command and in what it consists."

This, we are sensible, is but a very meagre outline of these lectures upon Moral Agency; but if it should induce any to possess themselves of the great work in which they are contained, we are quite sure they will never regret the purchase. It should be in the hands of every young minister, as well as on the shelf of every public and private religious library.

The fourth volume contains a series of twelve letters, to Unitarians, occupying 121 pages—then a Reply to Dr. Ware's Letters to Unitarians and Calvinists, of 170 pages—next, Remarks on Dr. Ware's answer to his Letters, of 40 pages—then Eight Letters to Dr. N. W. Taylor, with an Appendix—after which follows an Examination of the Doctrine of Perfection, with a Letter to Mahan, of Oberlin, and lastly, a Dissertation upon Miracles.

This volume bears throughout, the impress of the same richly furnished, perspicacious and logical mind, which has imparted such distinguished character and worth, to the lectures in the three preceding volumes. We regret that no space is left us for extracts, which would more than sustain this high estimate. If the candid reader does not find himself very much entertained, as well as instructed, we are but poor judges in such matters. Proud as Unitarians and Perfectionists are of their champions, we opine, that they would not be over anxious to pit any of them in a fair field against such a "foeman" as Dr. Woods has proved himself to be in these letters.

The fifth and last volume contains three letters to young ministers, five essays on Mental Philosophy, three miscellaneous essays and twenty-five sermons, preached on various occasions.

Here we take our leave of the work before us, which has cost the author the best years of a long professional life; which has been waited for with high expectations, not only by the hundreds who sat at his feet, while he filled the theological chair, but by multitudes who never heard him, and whose labors will be held in grateful remembrance long, very long after he shall have been gathered to his fathers.

ARTICLE III.

PARALLEL BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF
EARLY AND MODERN CHRISTIANITY.

By Rev. Edward A. Washburn, Newburyport, Mass.

No study can offer a richer field to the philosophic thinker, than that of the laws which control the differing ages and phases of opinion. It would seem at first sight a task almost impossible, in the very nature of the intellect as well as the variety of phenomena; far easier for the naturalist to read the history of the earth's formation in the rocky strata, and classify the manifold forms of organic life; or for the astronomer to reduce the immensity of space to a "*mécanique celeste*," than to discover such unity in the domain of spirit. Yet it is by no means so. The mind of man, fertile as are the sources of knowledge, and ever ready as it is to push its inquiries into newer fields, is after all, compassed by a horizon wide, yet clearly marked. And not only do these limits of possible knowledge bring us always back to the same sphere; but the innate affinities of intellect, the likeness of culture, and more than all the deep inward causes, which produce the spiritual movements of every age, produce also a likeness of result. Nor is it often that men enter as individuals into this or that channel of isolated speculation; the master-mind of society is rather the *συναγωγή*, the accumulated wave of general tendencies. Hence then is seen a law of reproduction in human thought. Age on age passes through kindred processes; and in the mind, as in nature, there are certain archetypal forms, which are the conditions and the objects of its striving. We may observe this law in every variety of phenomena. Literature imposes the same necessity of epic, lyric, idyllic, dramatic expression on the genius of the poet; art seeks in vain to do more than reproduce the orders of Greece, and that of the middle age, the offspring of a supernatural religion. Philosophy in the mind of India, of Athens, and the modern world repeats the primary problems. Plato and Kant state the ground-law of pure reason in opposition to empiricism; Hume and Berkeley arrive at like conclusions with the Greek sophists; Paley lays down, as the principle of a Christian ethics, that which Cicero explodes as revolting even to a heathen conscience; the propositions of Spinoza are read in almost parallel passages of Abelard; and the system of Schelling is but a more scientific fulfil-

ment of that ideal Pantheism which envelops as a mysterious cloud the primitive dreamland of Eastern contemplation. The efforts of man in the world of ideas are like the results of his discovery on the broad ocean, which can only at the last circumnavigate the narrow globe, and bring him in a returning circle to the point whence he set forth.

But in nothing is this law of reproduction more visible than in the sphere of theology. Theology is philosophy, seeking scientific unity with a historical revelation; and as its truths are highest of all, so has every age its questions, which master and penetrate its leading intellect. The controversy of Arius marks the early period; the problem of freewill and decrees, that of Augustine; the dispute between Nominalism and Realism underlies profound views of original sin and redemption, which employed the scholastic mind; the mighty principle of justification sways the theology of the Reformation. Ideas, which in one day are of vital interest, are quite forgotten in the next. A theological proposition, in the time of Luther an *experimentum crucis* in too literal a sense, is now a piece of antiquated divinity; and men wonder that any should have gone to the stake for so abstract a matter. To come nearer home, our New England contests of old and new school, of physical and moral ability and the like, are beginning to be merged in far broader questions, which have arisen on the theological horizon; in the contest, for life or death, between a gigantic naturalism and a Christian supernaturalism; or, on yet another side, between the claims of private judgment and Catholic authority. Yet, amidst these differences, we ever behold the law of reproduction; the old questions are repeated in new form, and the reigning tendencies of belief and heresy cast in the same mould. Calvin reproduces Augustine; and Socinus develops the germ of Arius. The tenets of the school of Arminius are anticipated in the Greek fathers. Modern Oxford speaks in the cognate dialect of Cyprian and Vincentius. Early New England theology moved in the same cycle of metaphysical thought as the scholastic; and the later contests with a growing and now full-grown Unitarianism have been fought, inch by inch, on almost every portion of the ancient battle ground, whose record will form, when a philosophic historian is found, a chapter of rich phenomena unsurpassed in Christian Annals. It is facts like these which make the study of doctrinal history of so vast importance, not more than, but equally with, dogmatic theology itself. The doctrinal expressions of every age are more or less always polemic, and reflect a particular phase of thought. But, in the

systematic study of opinions, the scholar takes each successive point of view; he sees pass before him the varied eras of faith, of struggle, and from his philosophic centre, can calculate their real and apparent distance; he perceives in this or that doctrine the necessary reaction of one extreme upon another; he knows, that in his own, as in other ages, prevailing errors have their little hour, and vanish; and he thus becomes, in his comprehensive largeness of vision, not a polemic of his time, but the Christian sage of all times, who, amid the fluctuating forms of belief, recognizes the "*quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus*," the unchanged and unchangeable truth of revelation.

We have dwelt thus long on the introduction to our subject, because we deem it of the utmost importance to grasp fully the principle; and we now proceed to apply it to one of the most striking analogies in the history of doctrine; a parallel between the philosophical relations of Christian belief and unbelief in our own age, and that of primitive Christianity in its earliest era of scientific development. Perhaps two periods could not be chosen, to the superficial observer so apparently diverse in every regard: — the one, an age when science was comparatively in its state of degeneracy, and Christianity as yet in its rudest germ of intellectual culture; the other, an age, distinguished by the noblest genius in every sphere; the age of Kant, of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; the age of exegetical criticism, of historical research, of most searching theological inquiry; the age, when all questions seem to be opened, all forms of truth and error striving on the broad battle ground; when a Newman would turn the overflowing waters again into the narrow channel of Romanism, a Schleiermacher, a Coleridge breathe into philosophy the living soul of faith, a Strauss swallow up the whole fabric of revelation, as a transient phenomenon in a world-embracing naturalism. Yet, singular as it may seem, it is a fact that is apparent to a deeper insight, that there may be traced not merely a general, but a minute and most curious similitude. It will be shown, hereafter, what is the secret of this real likeness and seeming unlikeness, and what the causes which have produced the same conflicts of opinion; but here we proceed at once to an examination of the phenomena themselves; nor do we doubt, that the subject will be found of the deepest interest, the further we penetrate into its details.

In the development of Christianity there was, of necessity, a first age, when it appeared only in the form of a living faith. It was its time of fresh, spontaneous activity; it had not as yet reached self-conscious intelligence; it knew nothing of the speculative contests,

which afterwards divided the church ; its battles were almost wholly external, against Pagan persecution, or internal, against immorality and sin. The reflex of this period is given us in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, whose theology, if we may speak at all of them as theologians, is wholly in the concrete. But it followed, equally of necessity, that another period must dawn upon the church. When the preliminary work of external upbuilding was ended, or far advanced ; when Christianity had leisure to retire from the field of battle, and began to reflect more upon its own truth, to mingle more with the mind of the time, it could be no longer only a religion of the life, but must become one of developed thought. If our readers would study the principle of this transition process, we refer them to the first chapter of Kliefoth's *Introduction to Dogmatic History*, where it is shown with surprising power and beauty. The whole is a masterwork of philosophical analysis. And here, next to the study of the Fathers and the latter Platonists, we must acknowledge our deep indebtedness to modern German writers, on the history of philosophy and doctrine, for our ideas of early Christianity ; the master minds who have studied not its ages only, but its spirit, and gained thus the key to unlock secrets hidden from the Mosheims and the Milners. The second era, then, was that of scientific Christianity. Its enemies must be now the Pagan philosopher and the subtle heretic ; it must pass at once into the broad domain of theology, and exhibit the truth of revelation in the shape of doctrine, which at the same time should approve its unity with all other truth, and its claim as the authoritative oracle of a yet higher, supernatural wisdom. Hence it was that this first era of scientific Christianity was one of peculiar and varied phenomena. While it implanted in the mind of the world the seeds of belief, and laid the basis of its supremacy over human reason, it had of necessity its crude beginnings ; it was compelled to meet with and adjust, in itself and in heathenism without, the mingled mass of intellectual tendencies and systems. The Jew, tied to the dead body of a ritual formalism ; the philosopher, proud of his abstract and aristocratic position, contemptuous of a new religion ; the better minds, hungering and thirsting after truth, yet finding it nowhere, and by their culture unable to apprehend at once the nature of revelation ; the sceptical or the fanciful minds, wandering in mocking doubt, or accepting anything that pleased the speculative understanding, rather than appealed to the deep wants of the sinful heart ; all were to be influenced by, and in turn to influence, the Christian faith. With them, as the one religion, it was to contend ; with some

in open hostility, with others as pretended friends, but insidious foes, who, under the mask of philosophy, would corrupt its simplicity; and yet others it was to receive as its own, even in the earnest and deep study of its truths. It was, indeed, an age of wonderful fermentation of thought. There was no longer, it is true, the philosophic grandeur of former days; the brilliant lights of Plato and Aristotle had faded from the firmament. Yet was it, as it appears to us, a time of greater importance to Christianity, than had it arisen amid the splendors of the academy; because, in the very decay of faith, it appeared the herald of a new truth, and became the centre, around which all intellects grouped themselves as friends or enemies. The mind of antiquity was afloat on a sea of unbelief. The bonds of old religion and philosophic dogmatism were shorn away; and on every side was the utmost freedom of opinion. It was a chaos before the new creation. Manichæism, already spreading in its germinal form, from the East, the cradle of theosophy; eclecticism and mysticism in the garb of neo-Platonism mingling with the faded systems of stoic Pantheism, and the "sty of Epicurus;" with these, blended in strange confusion, old idolatry struggling to retain its hold, and the most monstrous forms of popular magic, combine to show the picture of that unparalleled age. Christianity was to mould these discordant elements into a new unity. It was unavoidable, therefore, that in the contact of its truth with error, there should be produced, before such unity could appear, various forms of partial development; and these, mutually related to each other, as well as to the Christian faith, either as opposites, or in greater and less degrees of harmony. If, now, we put ourselves into the attitude of that time, and seek to construct in imagination its natural processes of thought, we shall find certain well defined modes, wherein it would, by an inward necessity, express itself; and by these we determine, what, in a word most apt, has been called the genetic development of doctrine. On one side would be found an unphilosophical empiricism, arising from the want of any true appreciation of the nature and need of scientific truth in religion, manifesting itself in adherence to the received tradition, in jealousy of all else as destructive of it; and this tendency would have its exponent both in heathen superstition and in Christian belief. On another side would be seen a philosophical spirit, which would demand of the new faith a scientific ground. This would appear, first, in heathenism, as utter hostility to revelation, regarding it as a fresh fanaticism, wholly incapable of rational construction. Again, the same aim would call forth a deeper view, and seek from

partial perception of Christian ideas to receive this religion into a comprehensive philosophic system, while rejecting it as a divine, supernatural revelation. This scientific aim would next show itself in Christianity, in the endeavor of its deeper minds to arrive at a philosophic basis of faith; in some, with too great a tendency to lose sight in idealizing theories of the literal fact, but in the profoundest thinkers, as they grasped more the true principle of connection, in an attempt clearly to define the middle ground between a bare empiricism and an absorbing idealism. Yet a further form, in which the mind of such an age would develop itself, is that of mysticism. Mysticism may be called the philosophy of forlorn hope; the surrender of the intellect, seeking a higher than empirical knowledge, but wanting a true scientific basis to its own subjective impulses of thought and feeling, or to some plausible system, which has in it an element satisfying to the individual craving. Such a tendency would naturally appear in that chaotic state of ideas. Among heathen minds it would exhibit itself in a speculative idealism, irrational and confused — or, in the grosser shapes of sensuous imagination; and on the Christian side, in the substitution of a fanciful religion for the simple faith and life of the Gospel, or of vague spiritual notions for objective truths.

Such are the chief forms in which the mind of the time would embody itself, and such are actually the systems which we find to have been the outgrowths of its history. Our limits will allow only a rapid sketch. We find the first form of empiricism, not only in the efforts of heathen priest and people to breathe a new life into the decaying superstition, as the ivy puts forth its greenness among ruins; but equally in some of the philosophic writers of that day, whose culture, while it raised them above the mass, was shallow and superficial. Such was Celsus, who, if we may judge by the remains in Origen, had not the least insight into the truths of revelation, but was capable only of a petty, carping criticism. In Christianity this empiricism found its natural representatives in the Latin fathers, since the Latin mind was more practical than speculative; and in most of the early apologists and champions of the faith. This character is seen in their prevalent view of heathen philosophy, deriving it from evil spirits, or referring its truths to some objective, fragmentary Hebrew tradition; and again, of revelation, which they confined within the sphere of an authoritative letter, or an outward church system. Such a class of minds was natural, and necessary as a counterpoise against the tendencies of idealism; yet we cannot recognize in theirs more than an imperfect and narrow position. Had

Christianity remained fixed where they placed it, it would have been no theology. We turn, then, to the representatives of the philosophic thought of that age. In all the reigning systems of heathenism, save the neo-Platonic, we have the extreme of denial. Stoicism, in its Pantheistic metaphysics, found no place for revelation; in its ethics asserted a self-sufficient virtue for the self-renouncing morality of Christ; it wrapped itself in its mantle as of old, and met the new faith with "What will this babbler say?" sensuous Epicureanism had no perception of spiritual Christian truth; scepticism, as in a frivolous Lucian, mocked at all earnest belief, and blasphemed against the deepest moral sentiments of the heart. All, from various points, converged in the rejection of Christianity. But it is, when we turn to a nobler school, that we find the first manifestations of a deeper thought. The neo-Platonism of that day was an attempt, amid the ruins of faith and reason, to upbuild an eclecticism; and accordingly, while its teachers would not accept revelation as authoritative, they sought to weave its doctrines into their system, in a word, to embrace it as an element in a comprehensive whole. This is clear to any who has examined their remains, especially with Proclus, in our view the most symmetrical expositor of the school. In his writings there is contained a distinct approximation to the doctrine of the Trinity, as well as fragments of ideas concerning the creation of the world, the truth of a Mediator, such as could only have been derived from revelation, and are utterly different from the conceptions of the heathen mind.¹ But a far more important writer, in this connection, who seems to occupy just the middle point between an anti-Christian philosophy and a Christian belief, is a yet earlier mind, the prototype of Alexandrian eclecticism, Philo Judæus. It appears to us that, even among our learned historians, his due place of eminence has not been awarded him. We might draw a striking analogy between this intellect, combining comprehensive reason with lofty imagination, and the philosophic genius that seems the peculiar character of modern Germany. Of course we do not call him Christian, for it is from the position of Jewish supernaturalism that he reasons; nor do we call him a true philosophic believer, for he deserts the solid ground of history. But we have in him a mighty intellect, struggling to grasp the inner ideas of revelation, and unfold them in their unity with all other truths; yet, in the attempt to rise above historical fact, losing sight of any objective reality, and merging it at last in a comprehensive but baseless idealism. One word will sum up their results.

¹ V. Procli Comment. in Theolog. Plotin. Lib. I. chap. 3d et al.

They indicate an approach towards Christianity, a preparation for its reception by the better heathen intellect, yet an utter failure in the apprehension of it as a special, supernatural religion. Had philosophy gone no further, Christianity would have taken its place in the rank of speculative systems, and its author been honored, as he was in the palace of Alexander Severus, with a niche and a statue by the side of Plato and Socrates.

We must pass, then, to the proper domain of Christian belief, to find the first glimpse of that unity for which the ancient mind was striving. It would be folly to expect in that age an integral system; we must be content to discover ideas and tendencies. The harbinger of this Christian philosophy was Justin Martyr; yet, while in his writings we find noble suggestions, especially in his idea of the *λόγος σπαραγμώδης*, (v. Apollog. II,) which shows a perception of the unity of all philosophic truth, with him Christianity was rather a fuller revelation of doctrines, already known in part by the ancient mind, than of a central, supernatural fact of redemption. It is, when we turn from his cruder reasonings to the works of Clement and Origen, that we find the richest development. Filled with the spirit of Christian faith, while nursed in the atmosphere of Greek genius, their writings are a mine of precious metal, as yet in the ore, but piercing the soil everywhere with broad veins, and its very sands heavy and shining with grains of golden wisdom. Origen is the greater and more systematic of the two. We have nothing to say here of his errors. The fallacy of critics, in judging their remains, has resulted from looking at them in the mass, and so pronouncing them a farrago of follies and fancies. All the works of that age are, what Clement called his, *Stromata*, materials for a doctrinal edifice rather than the edifice itself. It is not their views on particular doctrines, that claim our attention; it is only their fundamental ground as to the relation of Christianity to reason; and it is by our recognition of this their central aim, that we must judge of the influence of those great men. Clement, and yet more Origen in his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, laid down this position, new to that age, that the Divine Revelation was the distinct source of all truths which concerned redemption; that, while the speculative reason might range freely beyond the circle of these truths, within this it must bow in faith, and from this centre build up a Christian philosophy and ethics. It was thus a position, opposed on one side to the empiricism of the mere letter, on the other to the idealism, which destroyed it. This was their work; thus they laid the corner stone of a legitimate Chris-

tian science, and this result they handed down to the ages after them. The rubbish and dross of Origen were cast aside; the gold was refined into a later and better wisdom.

But we must pass rapidly to the last form of intellectual effort, that of mysticism. It was, as we might suspect, from the school of neo-Platonism, it was developed on the heathen side. An eclecticism at first, attempting, but failing to combine the heterogeneous elements of Eastern and Western thought, it took refuge at last in subjective notions and fancies. Porphyry believed in special illuminations, and Jamblichus merged the pure Greek intellect in the wildness of Oriental theosophy. It passed on one side into a kind of philosophic self-isolation, an arrogant assumption of intuitive knowledge; and on another, by that necessity which often compels the intellectual mystic to fly from what is subjective, it degenerated into fanaticism. Out of the sublimated mysteries of latter Platonism came those, who pretended by the discipline of thought to have risen above the sphere of man, and to hold communion with the supernatural. The most remarkable of these phenomena is seen in Apollonius of Tyana. In this man, ancient philosophy descended from its abstract region into contact with the realism of Christianity, and dared to cope with the Son of God in the assumption of wonder-working powers. But we cannot linger here; we pass to the Christian and semi-Christian forms of mysticism. In its simplest shape, as the result of pious feeling, we trace it among several of the Latin fathers; again, in others, in a more speculative dress, mingled with an undefined, imaginative philosophy. But the strangest type of this, is found, at a somewhat later and vanishing period, in Synesius. One can hardly read his mysterious hymns, without the feeling of wonder that such a mind could ever have belonged to a bishop of the church. What would be thought now, should a learned diocesan reproduce the ideas of Schelling's *Welt-seele*, in the most transcendental lyric verse! Christian truth, in these poems, glides like a spectral shadow into the region of philosophic fancy, and dissolves in its own rare atmosphere.

But we must hasten to a view of other forms of semi-Christian mysticism. From the religion of simple faith and worship, was produced the most extraordinary theosophy the world has ever seen. Minds not content with the letter, yet guided by no true principles of philosophy, sought speculative nourishment in the then prevalent Oriental systems; and from this unnatural union sprang Gnosticism. It is one of the most singular contrasts to turn from a page of Paul or James to these fantastic records, and think that such were in any sense Chris-

ian sects. As we read of them in Irenæus, it seems more than Cimmerian darkness; and the reader of Neander must thank him for having first thrown a ray of philosophic light into it. We cannot, of course, enter into the differences of Gnostic theory, but grasp only the central points, from which to know their common relation to Christianity. Their essential principle was that of a higher Gnosis, above the natural sense of Revelation. Assuming that it was meant to be a system of speculative knowledge, and thus finding in its common truths too narrow a sphere; aiming, in the Oriental spirit, at a theory of God, the soul, and the world, they mingled with the received doctrines the most heterogeneous elements, the most intricate problems, which perplex the mind of man, and out of this "*rudis indigestaque moles*," sought to weave a great scheme of the universe. The letter of Scripture was interpreted by purely fanciful hermeneutics: its ideas transformed into the most stupendous conceptions. This world was only a scene in the grand drama of eternity; creation the first link in a chain of degradations, a passage of spirit from the bosom of pure being into impure matter; the existence of man in time and body intrinsically evil; Christ, the Divine *Æon*, descending into this gross sphere to deliver the soul from its enthrallment to the malignant power; and redemption the attainment of intellectual and spiritual freedom above the bonds of material sense. The pagan was in the lowest class of sense, an enslaved man; the Jew and vulgar Christian were a step above him, but possessed only a husk of truth; the Gnostic enjoyed the intuition of truth itself, and was animated with a principle of divine holiness. In a word, Christianity with these men was not a revelation, to be philosophically developed from its own centre, and complete in its natural meaning; but only, as the inscriptions of an Egyptian obelisk, a key or picture-alphabet of a higher science; and the fruit of such confusion of ideas could only be mysticism.

These, then, in a sketch of necessity rapid, were the forms in which the ancient mind manifested itself. It were needless, and irrelevant to our design to more than note the general features. We have said enough to exhibit the process of action and reaction between Christianity and human reason; and would only re-affirm that these are not to be held as arbitrary or disjointed parts, but the necessary phenomena of that age.

From this analysis of early Christianity we turn to the parallel we have affirmed, and show in the features of the present, amid all differences, the essential counterpart. It may be said in general, that there has never been a time, since the primitive, when such an utter

chaos of opinion has existed under the common name of Christianity. There have been, indeed, all along the periods of our religion, the boldest speculations, and ceaseless contests of faith with error: and it is a fact, worthy of note, that in the writings of Erigena, of Abelard, and many others both of the Platonic and Aristotelian eras of theology, may be found as monstrous forms of abstract falsehood as in these latter days of philosophic Pantheism. But all these wore the outward garb of the one revealed faith; they created no distinct classes of Christian, semi-Christian, and un-Christian, but were rather the speculations of individual minds. Now we behold the fact of a philosophic Christendom, severed into sects, standing at all points of the scale, and forming, as at first, peculiar schools of reasoners. This explains the truth already stated, that the difference of the two eras is more apparent than real. Christian theology seems now in the widest sense passing through an age of development, the image and likeness of the primitive. Its issues are as complete and unlimited. It is a period of theories, each of which opposes others on first principles; a time, when there is as vast a variety of error, as alarming a scepticism, as unsettled a philosophic striving, as earnest an aim after belief; when many are walking in twilight, and praying, "Would God it were morning." Our spiritual state may be well described in the Roman poet's picture of the primeval world of dissevered atoms:

"Nulla quies est
 Reddita corporibus primis per inane profundum;
 Sed magis, assiduo varioque exercita motu,
 Partem intervallis magnis conflictata resultant,
 Pars etiam brevibus spatiis nexantur ab ictu;
 Et quaecumque, magis condenso conciliatur,
 Exiguus intervallis convecta resultant."

Lucretius, Lib. II. 94 — 100.

We will consider, then, the leading tendencies of this age, in regard to scientific Christianity. And first, as before, we have our modern empirics; a class which is as numerous now and influential, notwithstanding our religion has shown in its triumphant progress that it has everything to hope and nothing at last to fear from the results of reason. "There must be in all ages metaphysicians," says Coleridge, "men to whom the heaven-descended *γνώσις θεανόρ* is a law of intellectual striving;" and in all ages, we may add, there must be those to whom there is no such conscious necessity, and who therefore oppose such strivings. With minds of this class theology is no science, but a dogmatic statement of facts; a concordance of Scripture texts is

their *summa theologie*; or it may be a routine of worn out discussions concerning a set of particular doctrines, a partisan attachment to the *magister sententiarum* of some narrow school; or, in another shape, it may be a *catena patrum*, a blind resting on the church as an *ecclesia docens*, with no requirement save implicit faith, not because the universal reason and conscience of the Christian past speak to the individual reason and conscience, but because a council has settled truth forever. In our day this empiricism is marked by its indiscriminate opposition to the sciences, which are the sources of its fear. It is seen in the prevalent jealousies of natural philosophy, as if there were really doubt that Revelation could find its reconciliation; and so we must decree in synod that there has not been any creation anterior to the present system, must put down astronomy with its nebular theories, as that sage Aristotelian, who refused to look through a telescope for fear of shaking his settled opinions. It is seen in the dread of exegetical criticism, branding without difference all from Paulus and Strauss to Tholuck and Olshausen; and equally in a blind dislike of the philosophical and theological inquiries of the age, unwilling to sift good from evil, not recognizing that these are in every period the deep necessities of its thought. It is seen in the various minds, that are seeking to regenerate discordant Christendom by the repetition of some magic formulas of Protestant theology, which once had power; and again, in such as a Newman and a Ward, who, weary of ultra-Protestantism, chose ultra-Romanism, and Pygmalion-like, would warm the stone statue of a mediæval Christianity into new life. On the other side, we have a neological empiricism, as hollow and groundless. It was, indeed, the want of a true Christian philosophy, underlying the formulas of doctrinal faith, which first led such as Semler to attack the record. A belief in the dead letter produced a criticism of the dead letter. This neology confined itself to the mole-eyed work of undermining the outer wall; it searched the canon, doubted the authenticity and genuineness of the sacred books, and on purely hermeneutical grounds would anatomize not only the body, but the soul of Christianity. It is this empiric neology, which prevailed in Germany, until now that Strauss has placed an unchristian exegesis on the basis of a philosophic Christology. It is this, which entered among us with Unitarian error; which, unable to grasp the grand, living truths of Incarnation and Redemption, quarrelled about this and that text, set aside the introduction of John's Gospel as a neo-Platonic corruption, and called all its sublimest mysteries Orientalisms. So far as it is a philosophy at all, it is one of pure negations; it rests on

the assertion of a few vague notions of natural theology, with but a bald recognition of distinct Christian doctrine. This empiricism, however, is fast passing away, as its spirit of unbelief has developed into bolder and more decided forms.

We turn, then, to the higher ground of philosophy, and consider, first, the forms of un-Christian and semi-Christian error. The attitude of utter denial, seen in the early schools of heathen false wisdom, has had its counterpart in the English and French deism of the century just past. And, as at first this opposition sprang from the want of the least affinity with Christianity in a material Pantheism, a sensual Epicureanism, and a mocking scepticism, so in the like coarse and revolting principles of a D'Holbach, a Helvetius and a Hume was the entire negation of a divine religion in its spirit and truth. But that grosser unbelief is vanished. Idealism has taken the place of materialism. Here, then, as we have observed in early time, the phenomenon of a philosophy seeking to recognize the truths of revelation, yet in reality subverting its ground-work of supernatural faith, we may behold the same results in the systems of modern idealism, under the twofold aspect of naturalism and of Pantheism. We come now to the phenomena, which are more fully the outgrowths of the age, and present our parallel in its most striking light. There has always been a certain direct opposition of belief and unbelief; but it is only causes, lying deeply in the mind and circumstances of these two periods, which can produce the similitude of which we speak. While in the domain of pure science, the fruits of idealism are nobler, and thus the infidelity issuing from it, is of a more spiritual character; and while, again, it were proof of most obtuse empiricism to blend present with past deism in the same condemnation, it is yet true that the denial of a special and supernatural revelation is as complete on one side as the other.

We shall consider the first form of naturalism, or subjective idealism, in this view. The philosophy of Kant, powerful as it was against the dogmatic scepticism of Hume, and the dogmatic sensualism of Condillac and Helvetius, was itself only a scepticism on a profounder base. It denied the possibility of demonstrating or surely knowing objective truth; it brought all truths within the limits of pure reason, while it gave to the conclusions of that reason only subjective validity. And thus its necessary result was a rejection of the supernatural ground of Christianity; it sought to explain its doctrines by mere philosophic conceptions, its miracles on natural principles; nor could it see, as even a profounder unbelief has seen, the demand in reason itself for

an objective, supernatural reality. The critical philosophy was thus pushed to the very verge of utter denial. If the reader will find one of the fullest statements of this system of naturalism, let him turn to the volume of Tennemann's History of Philosophy, (the complete, untranslated work,) which treats of Christ and primitive Christianity. In this, revelation appears as a true phenomenon of its age. Prophets and inspired messengers are only representatives of Jewish and Christian ideas; Christ is a teacher of a Kantian ethics in a concrete shape; and all religion is the mere affirmation of reason and moral sentiment; a self-development of consciousness, a self-culture of holiness. We have seen and see this system in our country, coalescing with a development of modern Unitarianism, leading it out from the materialism of Priestley into an ideal shape, and at length in its finished results, overturning all faith in the outward and miraculous, pronouncing Judaism and Christianity only transient forms, rejecting on subjective grounds the authority of Christ and His apostles, applying this "foregone conclusion" as a critical dictum to the interpretation of the record, and resting at last on the basis of natural reason and conscience as the oracles of absolute truth and goodness.

But we must pass to the yet higher developments of philosophy; we refer to the stupendous systems of modern natural-supernaturalism. Since the rise of that idealism, which was rather, as Kant called it, a *Kritik* than a system, there has been felt the need of a profounder metaphysics and theology. In proportion as men investigated the truths of revelation, they recognized in its supernatural character somewhat which could not be merged into a mere naturalism. In the Absolute Philosophy of Schelling, further developed by Hegel, was given for those who, with no true Christian principles, yet sought to grasp the supernatural which they could not explain away, the basis of a new and comprehensive system. As a philosophy, it attempts to pass the bounds of a Kantian subjectivity; it looks on nature as a living organism, on God as not a pure idea, but a Being, developing Himself in the forms of outward creation, in the consciousness of man, and again in human history, as the unfolding of Divine law through ages and events. Such a system, then, as applied to revelation, must lead to different views from those of naturalism. Instead of excluding the divine, it includes it in a more comprehensive whole; instead of reasoning away the facts of supernaturalism, it affirms them as instances of the perpetual outflow of a higher power into nature; instead of denying a manifested God, it views Him as ever revealing Himself to the race; it seeks even, as Baur has done in his great

work, to supply the philosophic truth lying at the basis of a Trinity; instead of regarding the incarnation as an absurdity, it sees in it the law of universal humanity, the identical oneness of God and man. In a word, it has grasped the ideas of Christianity, and given them a place in its system, but in so doing robbed them of all which makes them Christian. All that is special is merged in the absolute. All historic facts are the mythologic dress of general truths. Such is the outline of this system, grand in its features, vast in its errors as well as truths. We have then here, as we have said, the peculiar phenomenon of the first and this latest age; an unbelief, totally different from the philosophy which directly rejects revelation, and yet as essentially and entirely destructive of it. It matters not, whether it be by a higher or lower method; whether through the subterranean road of a grovelling atheism, or the aery path of pantheistic speculation, we arrive at last at the same "*profundum inane*," at the annihilation of all those personal and living ideas of God, of redeemed humanity, of immortality, which only a supernatural revelation can supply.

But we must turn briefly to the position which a true Christian philosophy occupies in our age. It has been seen that in the primitive day the aim of the Alexandrian fathers was to rear a Christian science from the starting-point of revelation, as a historical and divine truth, yet to exhibit its harmony with all other truth. The solution of the same problem, in connection with the present state of advanced science in every sphere, is the labor of this era. It is true, nor do we mean to deny, that there has been a legitimate Christian philosophy in each successive century; but we mean that since that earliest period the question of the fundamental relation of Christianity to reason has never stood forth in so distinct an attitude. It was then a necessary striving; it is with us from the circumstances, which in common phrase, have resolved all things into their original elements, as necessary a demand for reconstruction. To learn what are the results of the age in this domain, we must turn, then, to Germany. While we acknowledge the labors of the learned in all branches of Christian knowledge, we must say, unhesitatingly, that in the proper sphere of a scientific theology, there has appeared in no other country a work, destined to have a marked influence on the great speculative conflict now waging in the bosom of Christendom for the very foundations of revealed truth. England has her divines, but they have been so busied with the old questions of theology, with local polemics, and of late with the Anglo-Catholic movement, which is shaking the

unstable equilibrium of her reformation, that she has brought forth only here and there a thinker who has dived to the depth of modern science. France has borrowed her ideas from Germany, and as yet little more than its rationalism. Our country has had no profound metaphysician since Edwards. It is the land which originated the most stupendous form of unbelief that must produce the Christian philosophy of the age. There is, then, to classify the leading tendencies, one class among those who hold the principles of the absolute philosophy who seek, as we have already recognized in the Alexandrian Philo, to find a middle ground between an absorbing idealism and a historic revelation. Such, so far as we can gather from the outlines of his lectures, appears the position of Schelling at present. It is his purpose to show that his system, instead of merging the special and supernatural, gives the true method by which to rise from the ideas of reason to supernaturalism. But, though there are many professed Hegelians who occupy a similar position, we confess, that to our own view there is an impossibility in the very ground of the absolute philosophy of such reconciliation. A system which does not set forth from the fixed centre of historic supernaturalism, must end in its denial, or in a vague theosophy. The truth of Christianity can never be evolved from the abstract idea of the absolute. We find here, therefore, not a right result, but only an indication of the aim of the time. It is to another class of theologians that we look, as those who have begun to construct revealed science in its true basis. The principle, which was first philosophically grasped by Schleiermacher, is the corner stone of a Christian system. In mentioning this great name, we by no means claim for him the praise of a complete theology, but find in him many grave errors, and only the massive fragments of an unfinished edifice. Yet it is a shallow criticism, which sees in him only a Sabellian heresy, and forgets his service to the cause of revelation. His work was, in an age of rationalism on one side and pietism on the other, to fix the fundamental idea of a revealed truth in its relation to reason. And while others, like Twisten, and Müller have purified his truth of its errors and carried it to its completeness, the Christian philosophy of Germany and the age stands rooted in his central principle. Revelation, in his view, is in itself a distinct, supernatural reality, having its subjective basis in the consciousness, recognizing Christ as a Redeemer fitted to its spiritual want, its objective basis in the historic fact of redemption. The same idea is the ground-work of the "*Aids to Reflection*," a work whose value in spite of its partial statement of the doctrines of

original sin, atonement, baptism, is that it grasps the essence of revealed truth, and upbuilds it on a living foundation. Christianity is one central sun, around which all other truths revolve; and a true theology, while it does not deny the legitimacy of the reason in its own domain, from this starting point of the moral consciousness and the revealed fact answering thereto, enters into its domain, and creates a proper Christian metaphysics and ethics. Here, accordingly, on one hand, is overthrown the principle as well as the result of that rationalism, which, beginning with an intellectual abstraction, merges in absolute ideas the essential meaning of revelation as a redemptive fact; and on the other, by a right method the divine truth is developed in its harmony with all truths, not in the way of an unphilosophical dogmatism. But we cannot dwell longer here than to show a distinct aim and direction. It may be asked, if such a principle has not been affirmed by many sages before; and to this we answer, it is doubtless a truth implied in all Christian theology; the praise of our age is to have brought it out in its essential meaning, its complete form. No theology is ever in advance of the philosophy of its time, but is founded upon it. Metaphysical rationalism has never before sought with such dialectic skill to prove the impossibility of revelation in the very groundwork of reason. Theology has been hitherto occupied rather with particular doctrines; has built up systems on an assumed dogmatic basis; now it has been compelled to investigate its deeper, fundamental relation to pure science, and the result has been a true adjustment of the claims of philosophy without infringement on supernatural religion. We have thus far traced a remarkable analogy in the features of the primitive and present eras, and we have space for no more than the briefest sketch of the rest. Mysticism was spoken of as the outgrowth of that early mind, and as then on the side of heathenism, it sprang from a philosophy which, wanting a true basis, surrendered itself to individual notions, or mingled with the poetic pantheism of the East, so do we have its antitype. It is found in that class of mock-transcendentalists among us, who arrogate to themselves the title *κατ' ἑξοχὴν* of the spiritual thinkers of New England, but whose philosophy is indeed only the weakest dilution of that German mind, which it imitates. It wears sometimes the form of subjective idealism, sometimes of pantheism, but is in truth only a confused mingling of these in an unscientific mysticism. It claims for itself direct intuitions of the absolute, and its self-soliloquizing is communion with the divine; it scorns the idea of revelation, a Mediator, a written word, a formula of worship, and from its sub-

lime heights looks down on the gross souls bound in the fetters of Christian belief. All cant is ridiculous ; but the cant of our modern philosophic sentimentalism is the absurdest, because most pretentious of all. Nothing can exceed the folly which has infested its votaries. It is a philosophy which spurns logic, and which logic spurns ; a philosophy of notions and words, whose chief strength lies in a peculiar dialect, drawn from the sacred books of its sages, and preserved as the convenient substitute for well defined thought. Nor should we forget to mention in this connection, as an instance of the parallel we have exhibited, its tendency to fanaticism. One of its strongest features is, that it has allied itself to the crude jugglery of animal magnetism, has recognized it as perhaps a new communion of the soul with higher powers of nature. Apollonius of Tyana has reappeared in the followers of Mesmer and the Poughkeepsie seer. While Christian miracles are denied, the miracles of modern *clairvoyance* are asserted ; and it is even gravely suggested that a key may be found in them to the wonder-working cures and prophetic vision of Jesus of Nazareth. So true is that keen criticism of Pascal :—“*Incredules, le plus credules. Ils croient les miracles de Vespasien, pour ne pas croire ceux de Moïse.*”—*Pensees*. But we must hasten to the consideration of this mystical tendency on the side of Christian belief. Here it is we must name the Pietism of Germany, which, from the early day of Spener, has attracted to itself many hearts, taking refuge from the coldness of rationalism in the warmth of devotional feeling. Much of our evangelical religion has this character. It is the form in which an earnest Christian consciousness expresses itself, but it wants a philosophic clearness and depth ; it rests the doctrines of revelation too much on emotions, which are not intelligibly grasped ; it differs from a right Christian philosophy in this, that it does not by a scientific analysis of the spiritual consciousness lay the basis of objective and universal truth, but asserts only its own subjective states of devout thought and feeling, its own individual convictions of sin and longings after redemption. But it is in what we may call a semi-Christian form, we find the last type of modern mysticism. Primitive religion brought forth Gnosticism ; our age has its Gnosticism, as fantastic, as stupendous, the outgrowth of like causes, and the counterpart of the past in its general features. We refer to the theosophy which holds so marked an attitude among the chaotic elements of the time ; which, erroneous as it is, has drawn to itself many intellects of a high order, and created a school—the system of Swedenborg. The principle of the

modern as of the ancient Gnosticism is the assertion of a higher Gnosis, vouchsafed to the wise above the multitude of believers; its method is the same, an endeavor to find in common Christianity a symbolic form, beneath which is hidden a more spiritual truth, a husk containing a purer kernel of wisdom, a revelation given in the germ by Christ, and now fully developed by a second Emmanuel. It is, in short, a theology of the imagination, which takes the ideas of Scripture, and rears on them a superstructure of its own; carries the miracles to a second power; turns the written word into a cipher, of which the initiated have the key; a vast, symmetrical mysticism, unfolding many noble views in religion and ethics, interwoven throughout with fancies and falsehoods, itself built essentially on a fancy and a falsehood. The mind of many, tired of a bare naturalism, yearning for supernatural truth, yet by the very force of reaction borne to the extreme of indiscriminating faith; not content, therefore, with simple Christianity, quarrelling, like Sir Thomas Browne, because it has not mysteries enough, ready to accept the "*Credo, quia impossibile*," plunges into this bottomless sea of Swedenborgianism, and finds there ample room to float at pleasure. The same despairing spirit, which leads the man of devotion, but more sensuous imagination into the attractive worship of Rome, as a refuge from ultra-Protestantism, guides him of more intellectual, abstract temperament into the church of the New Jerusalem.

We might at greater length pass on from feature to feature, but our limits compel us to omit several, perhaps as important views. Two of these we name as characteristic tendencies of our own and the early ages; the syncretism, which is so prevalent in this time of opinions; and, again, the false and formal Catholicism, which has carried so many into the Roman church to realize the dream of unity in a mere mechanism of faith and worship. But, as these are rather popular than scientific tendencies, we only mention them. Let the reader follow out, if he will, this line of comparison, and it will offer him one of the most curious and fruitful studies of philosophic anti-quarianism. It is enough for us, if we have laid down a sufficient induction for the conclusions we would draw.

The knowledge of causes is that which the philosopher seeks, not the mere aggregate of facts; and it is to these we turn. It were empiricism of the grossest kind to suppose that such phenomena could exist, without a deep and peculiar reason. Nor will it be said, by any who has true insight, that they can be solved by the general theory of a philosophic striving, more or less alike in every age.

An analogy so remarkable, so varied, can only come from circumstances and inward principles, pertaining to these two eras, as to no others; and it is, when we study these, we find the light which reveals this extraordinary page of Christian history. We have, then, already seen that in its appearing our religion must have existed as a spontaneous faith, and equally that it must have had its after-time of scientific expansion. Yet, in the attainment of doctrinal form, it must have passed through a long process of inward and outward struggle, must have grappled with the ideas of the age, and stood as a revealed truth in the midst of erroneous and of partially true systems. The varied phenomena of that period were the necessary results of conflict, the necessary conditions of a future unity. But we must not suppose that such a contest could wholly cease, even after Christianity assumed a more definite form of truth. It is rather the design of God, while the foundations of the faith are eternal, to allow His religion to have its natural career, in connection with the free activity of human intellect. Nor, while we have and may have in the creed and worship of Christianity, the settled groundwork of practical religion, may we expect to attain a perfect, changeless system of Christian science, until the advancing knowledge of man has reached its fullest harmony with the truths of revelation. It may be said indeed that, allowing a necessary progression in Christian science, it is a real progression, not a retrogression, or a ceaseless oscillation we should look for; and that, after eighteen centuries it is somewhat discouraging to behold the world still in the state of primitive chaos. And, viewed in itself, it is so; viewed in regard to the self-will of men, it is most lamentable; yet it is a fact, capable of an explanation that supplies hope and assurance. It has not been a retrogression, but as has been said of social progress, "an advancement in a spiral line." If, then, we examine philosophically the state of the age succeeding that of the Reformation, we shall find special causes which produced this chaotic condition of things. In the will of God, and the free development of history, the church passed through centuries of decay; and while we cannot agree with those who look on the middle age as without light or life, while it had its mighty minds, and eras of thought, it was an age of cramped energies, of narrow and distorted growth. Philosophy followed as a slave, bound at the chariot wheel of Aristotle. The Bible was not a lost, yet it was a sealed book. An iron dogmatism was riveted upon the mind of Europe. It was of necessity that a change, should it come, must rise, not by degrees, but in the sudden untamed activity

of a whirlwind. The intellect of Christendom, roused into reaction, like the pent stream, which at the farthest point of pressure, bursts the rock, and makes its own wild outlet, broke the barriers of a Romish system; and in proportion to its former slavery was the excess of its new freedom. Religion felt the impulse, and partook in its influences; while a Luther and a Melancthon thought to go no further than the position of a scriptural Christianity, the movement swept over and beyond them. Natural science passed into the wide field of discovery, and as it laid down results hitherto unknown, they were not found in harmony with the received dogma. The study of language opened the books of Hebrew and Greek learning; and the criticism exercised on all ancient records, was severely dealt on the sacred volume. Metaphysical philosophy entered on the free career of speculative error and truth. All those revenged themselves on Christianity for their long bondage; and there arose among men of science that fearful era which has so long prevailed. Christian dogmatism, in turn, strong in its inner fortress of authority, would not at first come forth to meet its enemies in the open plain, but dealt out its indiscriminate and haughty defiance. In the closing half of the past century, this movement seemed to have reached its zenith. There appeared no longer a settled religion left in the world. As in the first it stood, grappling with all enemies, laboring for a foothold; and as then all varieties of error manifested themselves, and truth was seen only in an imperfect form, so was it again.

The eighteenth century saw revelation and science in direct hostility. Metaphysics boldly asserted the baselessness of a supernatural faith. Ethics severed morality from belief and worship. Natural science laughed to scorn the cosmogony of Moses, the miracles of the Old and New Testaments. Criticism found interpolations and falsehoods in the text. Neology tore it in pieces as a tissue of myths. History cast aside Judaism, and hurled the works of the Fathers with contempt among the rubbish of tradition. It is lamentable, indeed, to look back on the annals of that past epoch, when a material philosophy of unbelief was succeeded by a spiritual philosophy of unbelief, when an unchristian literature and science reigned over Europe: but we can only take refuge in a Christian optimism, and believe that, as it sprang from natural and necessary causes, it will yet come out in a right channel. It could not be expected that such a state of things should subside at once; for more than forty days had the deluge of error been swelling to its height; it must be more than forty days before dry land could be seen, and then it was a waste left by

the waters, an overturning of all landmarks, a needful rebuilding of each habitable home. There was demanded a gradual reconstruction of Christian science. It could only be, as in deeper insight, in more patient labor, falsehood should be met with truth; as a better natural science should find its facts harmonious with a rightly interpreted Scripture; as a better criticism should find a pure and settled text; as a better metaphysics should discover the way of union with historic revelation, that there should be restored the identity of reason and faith. Such was, and is yet to a great extent the chaotic state of Christendom; such its phenomena, and such their causes. Never, since the birth of our religion, has been seen so stupendous a conflict as has been waged between the truth of God and human error; no other age, except the primitive, whatever its importance in philosophic or religious culture, can compare with this in which we live, in the grandeur of its efforts, the variety of its issues, the momentous problems which hang on its results. Nor have we yet reached its conclusion. The battle is not yet over: nay, we are to expect the mightiest attempts of error in proportion to the advances of truth. But, while the chaotic condition of Christendom yet remains, it is evident from what has been said that the whole character of the strife is changed. It is not now, as in the past, an utter hostility of science to Christianity. The materialism and sensualism of the eighteenth century are gone; and on every hand is felt the demand, not of destruction, but of reconstruction. Pantheism itself, as well as Christian belief, is aiming in its own way at this. It is the tendency which underlies the grand movements of the age, intellectual, social, religious. The question on which the mightiest results depend, which must be felt by all deep minds as the most momentous of all, is, what shall be the character of this coming era of retinon? The inquiry is one which has its different answer, according to the different attitude of each in regard to both science and revelation. On one side the transcendental unbeliever expects the time when Christianity shall be acknowledged the transient phenomenon of a less advanced period; a millennium of pure reason in science, in art, in society, in worship. On the other, the timid religionist sees only the signs of despair; and, between the two, are found many who remain in utter doubt, hardly knowing whether to fear or hope the more for the cause of truth. But we turn to this question in calm confidence. It appears almost blasphemy, to him who believes in the power of Christian truth and the promise of its Author, to be troubled with misgiving. That lofty sentence of the apostle should be our motto: "We can do

nothing against the truth, but for the truth." And yet more, to him who feels the necessity of a harmony between revelation and science, and has rightly studied the history of these successive strivings after it, it is a hope, founded not only on faith, but on a faith, which is "the substance of that hoped for." In this very analogy that we have drawn, do we read the assurance of triumph. It was necessary that primitive Christianity should pass through its fearful conflicts, before its victory, yet that victory came. Poor and imperfect, as viewed in the broader light of modern science, that early philosophy appears; yet when we compare its results with the character of the time before it, when we remember that before even that imperfect Christianity, a more imperfect heathenism and scepticism passed away; when we remember the constellation of genius and learning which shone upon the fourth century, we may see in it a sure advancement. And in like manner, when we regard the equally necessary causes which led to our struggles, and on every hand the omens of the present, we may expect similar results. Such is our view of the present attitude of Pantheism. As the early speculations of a Proclus, a Philo, only formed a partial step in the process which produced a true philosophy, so we look upon the overshadowing system of Hegel as a transient effort to grasp those supernatural truths, which will themselves reveal its emptiness, and mould a higher and more satisfying system. Yet it will be asked, what special ground of hope is given here, if, according to this very analogy, we may only look for a partial and short-lived success, for an after age of worse confusion? Our answer is given in the difference, as well as in the likeness, of the two eras. The contest of this time, though like, is deeper, and the result will be deeper. The first witnessed an incipient struggle; the last has witnessed the meeting of philosophy and revelation on the final ground of battle, and the victory, when it comes, will be proportioned to the grandeur of its causes and its issues. Compared with the Pantheism of modern Germany, the most stupendous system of error the mind can create, heathen unbelief was puerile; compared with the boldness of neology, the attacks of a Celsus and a Porphyry were harmless; compared with the results of a Clemens and an Origen, the Christian philosophy of a Schleiermacher, a Twisten, a Müller, an Ullmann, are an immeasurable progress. And on every hand we may see the signs of this new unity. Geology and astronomy are taking Christian ground; criticism is producing her learned men of thoroughly believing mind; history is recognizing the place and influence of revelation; metaphysics and

ethics are striving after the harmony of reason and conscience with faith; and in the most important domain of all, scientific theology, we have already traced the striking phenomena of our age. Out of the bosom of Protestantism is proceeding a new and living Christian philosophy; and whatever the fears of many, there has never been a period, when in every part of Christendom has been such a vigorous awaking of both speculative intellect and devotional feeling, in the direction of belief. Even Romanism has passed, with a Möhler, into the ground of scientific inquiry, and his position and method are utterly different from those of a former dogmatism. Our trust is in that progressive development through which not the reason of man only, but of God, is leading His Church. Christianity cannot die. Her triumphs are sure. Unbelief will pass, as it has passed away. We may lament the evils of the present; we may look for no immediate conclusions, but we must not, cannot fear the end. We must view these movements as the inundations of a mighty Nile, which, although they do not leave untouched the dwellings planted on the level of the shore, prophesy fair harvests blooming on soil fertilized by the waters; and we must wisely learn, before the next overflow, to rear our houses on firm piles above the highest mark of the rising element. This is our hope, and this our labor. In such a retrospect of the past, and such cheering omens for the future, we may look forward to a better era than any already reached; an era that shall achieve what the primitive and succeeding times have only "known in part and prophesied in part;" an era when a nobler constellation of genius than that of a Clemens, an Athanasius, an Augustine shall gild the firmament of the church; when, after her most gigantic conflicts, she shall win a lasting triumph, and to the centuries of a dis-severed Christendom shall succeed the age of faith and living worship.

ARTICLE IV.

EXPLANATION OF SOME PASSAGES IN GENESIS.

By R. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages, Middlebury College.

I. GENESIS, NINTH CHAPTER, VERSES 25—27.

"AND he said, Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren. And he said, Blessed be the Lord God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant. God shall enlarge Japheth; and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant."

It will be recollected that these words follow the account of the planting of a vineyard by Noah, his yielding to the temptation to drink of the wine and consequent exposure, and which his son Ham, father of Canaan, not only beheld but reported to others, whilst Shem and Japheth thoughtfully took measures to screen it from view. This conduct brought upon the transgressor, the curse of the father, contained in the 25th verse, and more particularly explained in the following verses, by contrasting the fate of his posterity with that of his brothers. We should expect to find Ham in the place of Canaan in these verses, and some versions have substituted that name, or have translated, as if the text were *וְהָיָה שֶׁם לְעַבְדָּו*, but without critical authority. The 22d verse, in which Ham is called the father of Canaan, prepares the way for this verse, and the simple meaning is: that Ham shall be cursed in his posterity, the son bearing the iniquity of the father. The crime of Ham, according to oriental notions, was not a trivial one. "No greater offence could have been committed against him (Noah) than Ham, who was himself a man of mature years and had sons, committed in this case." The laws of filial reverence and modesty in domestic intercourse, were in that early age regarded as sacred. The transgression was a domestic one, and so the punishment. When the penalty was inflicted upon the father, depriving him of the right of a son, his children naturally and necessarily suffer with him. Herder *Hebr. Poetry*, I. 221. *עַבְדָּו עַבְדִּים*, servant of servants, that is, the *lowest servant*, the opposite of *אֲדָמָה*, *מַלְכִּים*, *מַלְכִּים*, Comp. Heb. Gram. § 117. 2, and Ewald, § 488.—*וְהָיָה שֶׁם לְעַבְדָּו*, to his brothers, as is plain from what follows, Shem and Japheth.

In Shem and Japheth is plainly included their posterity, and hence the suffix pronoun *לָהֶם* (to them) at the end of the 26th verse is used

instead of יָב, according to Grammar, § 101. 2. Expl. 1. Ewald, § 421.

Noah does not proceed directly to the blessing that he is to pronounce upon Shem, but foreseeing his future prosperity, he more vividly portrays it, by breaking forth in a song of praise to God, who is the author of this good fortune. A somewhat similar usage is found in such passages as 14: 20, Ex. 18: 10, 2 Sam. 18: 28. יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ, Jehovah the *God of Shem*, the author of the blessings bestowed upon Shem. It should be noticed that Jehovah (יְהוָה) is only used in reference to Shem, to whose posterity, as the chosen people, he especially reveals himself by this name. See Tuch and Hengstenberg upon the passage.

The first clause in the 27th verse is more difficult of interpretation: יָשָׁב בְּאֶרֶץ שֵׁם; the paronomasia here between the first and last words at once meets the attention. This verb, יָשָׁב, future Hiphil (Jussive) from יָשַׁב was undoubtedly chosen for the sake of the similarity of sound with יָשַׁב instead of a form of יָשַׁב with which it is here synonymous, although the primitive signification of יָשַׁב, *to open, expand*, is nearly the same, and this is the usual signification of the same verb in Aramaean. The latter verb followed by יָ as יָשַׁב here, is translated in 26: 22, *made room for*, and that is the literal idea in the present passage: to place in a free, unrestricted position, i. e. to make prosperous, and it should be rendered as expressing a wish: see Grammar upon the Impf. (Future) Jussive, § 126. 2. "May God make room for Japheth." So, in general, most of the ancient translations. The Sept. *πλατύναι ὁ θεὸς τῷ Ἰάφεθ*: Vulg. *dilatet*; according to the Arab. of Saadi: *Beneficiat Deus Japheto*. Comp. also in the use of יָ, Is. 4: 2, 18: 20, et al. — יָשָׁב בְּאֶרֶץ שֵׁם "Let him dwell in the tents of Shem." The object of יָשָׁב is undoubtedly a pronoun referring to Japheth. The parallelism of members seems to require, that this verse should have regard to Japheth, as the preceding had respect to them; and besides, the last words of the verse: and "let Canaan be his servant," are a useless repetition from the preceding verse. But a more decisive argument for this interpretation is as Hengstenberg (*Christology*, Vol. I. p. 44) indicates: As Noah intentionally used the name Jehovah in speaking of Shem, and Elohim in speaking of Japheth, the name would undoubtedly not have been left to be supplied by the reader. The word שֵׁם is also variously interpreted. Some expositors, as Gesenius, Michaelis and others make it an appellative noun, meaning *name, illustrious name*, with שֵׁם "renowned habitations;" but there should be some good rea-

son for giving this word a totally different meaning here and in the preceding verse, and as none appears, we do not hesitate to render the clause: "and let him [Japheth] dwell in the tents of Shem," that is, let them be partakers with Shem in the blessings which are peculiarly his. The interpretation which makes this phrase mean that the posterity of Japheth shall sometime gain possession of the country of the posterity of Shem, and reduce them to subjection, is so much at variance with the context, which requires that the blessings of Japheth should be only subordinate or supplementary to those of Shem, that it needs no confutation.

The question naturally arises, what are the blessings desired and predicted, for the posterity of Shem, and in which Japheth is to be partaker? Von Bohlen, Tiele and others endeavor to make out a literal fulfilment in the temporal condition of the posterity of the three brothers, but the futility of this attempt is apparent on close inspection. Even Tuch, who cannot be accused of an undue partiality for the spiritual in interpretation, rejects their theories and says: "This declaration [referring to the clause, 'and Japheth shall dwell in the tents of Shem,'] goes back to the united act of filial piety of both brothers, and is intended to represent the ideal union in which at a subsequent time their posterity shall, as their progenitors now, be united, for a higher object. That is here first indicated in a more general way, which is distinctly declared in the subsequent history, chap. 12: 8, that the salvation of all nations shall proceed from the offspring of Shem, who, making Zion the common centre of their efforts, shall without distraction be united in the fear of the Lord."

This may be considered as the second stage in the revelation of the blessings which are to be bestowed upon the human race, and which shall have their consummation when the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ shall be fully established in the earth. The most general declaration immediately followed the fall: "it (the seed of the woman) shall bruise the serpent's head," Gen. 3: 15. But here it is indicated, that the deliverance shall be wrought through the posterity of Shem; in chap. 12: 3, 18: 18, et al. it is declared that in Abraham, of the lineage of Shem, shall all the families of the earth be blessed. The same is made to Isaac the son of Abraham, 26: 4, and to his son Jacob 28: 14, with which compare Zech. 12: 7 and Mal. 2: 12, where we find *וְהָיָה יְהוָה וְאֶתְּיָהּ*, and *וְאֶתְּיָהּ* corresponding to *וְהָיָה יְהוָה*, in this passage of Genesis. And subsequently, as is well known, the promises became much more explicit and numerous. Comp. Isa. 2: 2—4, Zech. 14: 16 sq., Ps. 22: 26 sq., and Hengstenberg Christology, I. p.

25. In the Chaldee paraphrase of Jonathan, the interpretation which is given above, is recognized: "proselyti fient filii ejus et habitabunt in schola Semi." So Jerome, Augustine and others. Calvin explains these verses in substance as follows: "there shall be a temporary division between them and Japheth. Afterwards a time shall come when they will again be united into one body, and have a common abode.—Then the sons of Shem, of whom a greater part had scattered off and separated themselves from the sacred family, are to be collected together, in order that they may abide under the same tabernacle. People also of the stock of Japheth which had been a long time wandering and scattered about, are to be received into the same household. For God by a new adoption has made one people of different races, and has effected a fraternal union among those who were aliens," cf. 2: 14, 19.

II. GENESIS, TWENTIETH CHAPTER, VERSE 16.

"And unto Sarah he said, Behold I have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver; behold he is to thee a covering of the eyes unto all that are with thee, and with all other: thus he was reproved."

The last part of the verse alone occasions any difficulty: Behold, *וְהָיָה* not *he* referring to *אֶחָיו*, thy brother, but *it*, that is, the thousand pieces of silver, shall be *כֶּסֶף צִינִיָּה*, a covering of the eyes, a recompense or penalty both with thee and with all: *וְנִכְרְתָה*, and thus justice is done thee. Abimelech, it is said in the 14th verse, made a present to Abraham of sheep and oxen and servants, when he restored him his wife, who had been called his sister. These seem to be given as an expiation for the wrong done him. But he is not satisfied with this; he says to Sarah, I have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver, which shall be a recompense to you individually for the wrong done, and to others. It is plain from the whole narrative, that Abimelech did not, at least after the explanation in the 12th verse: "she is my sister," intend to impute any blame to Abraham and Sarah for what they had done. On the other hand, he seems to understand the injury is all on his part, and that it consequently behooves him to make the proper expiation. This consideration aids us in explaining the words, *כֶּסֶף צִינִיָּה*, "a covering of the eyes;" for if it means, as Rosenmüller and others suppose, that Sarah shall make use of this money to buy her a veil, so that she by this means appear in future to be a married woman, and not deceive others as she had done Abimelech, the reproach would be palpable. And be-

sides, it yet needs proof that the veil was used in this early age as thus distinctive. See Gesenius Lexicon, under כָּסוּת. We must, then, give another explanation of these words. And it seems to us that chap. 32: 21 leads to the correct interpretation here. אֲכַפְּרָה פָּנָיו בְּמַנְחָה, "I will cover his face," (Eng. vers. appease him,) with the present. The original idea seems to be that of turning away the attention from, by means of a gift, and hence expiatory, so that the injury may no longer be seen. And injury or transgression according to the Biblical representation is before the person injured or concerned, so that he sees it, and when forgiven, it is covered, Ps. 85: 3, or cast behind their back, Isa. 38: 17, or what is equivalent, the eyes or face are covered, so that it is out of view. The Seventy seem to have rightly understood the passage under consideration, who render *ἵσταται σοι εἰς τιμὴν* (fine, penalty) *τοῦ προσώπου σου*. — But this expiation was not made for Sarah alone, but also for all who were concerned; hence the words לְכָל אֲשֶׁר אִתָּךְ וְאִתָּךְ כָּל, "in respect to all that has happened with thee and with all." It is a matter of some question whether the word וְלִבְיָהּ is in the 2d or 3d pers. fem. praet. of Niphal, but probably the former. The meaning given to it is very various. Gesenius: "And she was convicted, had nothing to say in excuse." Rosenmüller: et "reprehensa est;" but how this is consistent with the explanation that Gesenius gives of the preceding words, and with the spirit of the whole passage, is difficult to see. For, of what was Sarah convicted, or for what had she to render an excuse? We find that יָדָה in the Hiphil sometimes means to judge, to procure justice, and hence in the Niphal it may mean, to be judged, to have justice done one; and accordingly here: and recompense is made, or justice done thee. See De Wette's Translation, and Tuch's Commentary on Genesis.

III. GENESIS, FIFTIETH CHAPTER, VERSE 26.

"So Joseph died, being an hundred and ten years old; and they embalmed him in Egypt."

In the second verse of the same chapter, it is said: Joseph commanded his servants, the physicians, to embalm his father, etc. These are the only instances in which embalming is spoken of in the Bible, and here the object is apparent, namely, to enable them to remove the bodies of the patriarchs from Egypt to the land of Canaan. The custom of embalming, as is well known, prevailed in Egypt even from a very early age; according to Rosellini, II. 3, mummies have

been found of the dates of the earliest kings. The office in the cases mentioned above, was performed by the physicians of Pharaoh, v. 2. The manner of embalming is described by Herodotus, 2. 86, and by Diodorus, 1. 91. The latter says generally: They prepare the body first with cedar oil and various other substances, more than thirty (according to another reading, forty) days; then, after they have added myrrh and cinnamon and other drugs, which have not only the power of preserving the body for a long time, but of imparting to it a pleasant odor, they commit it to the relatives of the deceased. According to Herodotus, the time employed in embalming was seventy days, the time during which they mourned for Jacob, and the forty days of the embalming, spoken of in verse 2d, relates to the time in which the body was kept in the salts of nitre, after the infusion of the spices, which completed the embalming. So that, when rightly understood, there is an agreement between the classical and biblical writers. Comp. "Egypt and the Books of Moses," p. 70 sq.

The phrase, "he was put into a coffin (קִרְיָן, a wooden chest) in Egypt, has been adduced as a proof that the author of the Book of Genesis was not familiar with Egyptian customs. But it proves, on the contrary, to be in accordance with Egyptian usage. For it is plain from various sources that wood was the common material for coffins, and basalt the exception. Herodotus says: "Now, the relatives take away the body (i. e. after the embalming) and make a wooden image in which they inclose it." And if this were not the case, a sufficient reason for preferring wood in this instance, arises from the injunction in the 25th verse: "Ye shall carry up my bones from hence," as the weight of stone would render the transference difficult.

ARTICLE V.

AFFINITY OF ROMANISM AND RATIONALISM.

FROM THE GERMAN.

By Professor Joseph Packard, Theol. Seminary near Alexandria, D. C.

[The substance of the following article is taken from the *Beiträge* of Dr. Ernst Sartorius, of Königsberg, Prussia, formerly of the University of Dorpat. He may be known to some of our readers as the author of "Lectures on the Person and Work of Christ." It is found in the First and Second Parts of his *Beiträge*, or Contributions to the Defence of Evangelical Orthodoxy, and in his Reply to Kant. I intended at first to translate the whole, but as the original occupies about 150 pages, and the arrangement and division were peculiarly German, I concluded to give the substance of it digested, and more adapted, I trust, to the taste of the English reader. Occasionally I have translated closely, and at other times I have condensed the argument, omitting the more obvious refutation of erroneous doctrines. I have retained everything of importance in this valuable essay. It is enriched with quotations from the Decrees of the Council of Trent, the works of the principal Rationalists and of the Reformers, many of which will be found here. The discussion of this subject is peculiarly seasonable at this time, and may be of service in the controversy between truth and error.]

It is the design of the present essay to prove the affinity of the systems of Romanism and Catholicism in their fundamental principles. Such an attempt cannot be deemed unreasonable at a time when true Protestantism is assailed in different quarters by both.

The striking difference between the two systems in *form*, might appear to many, at first sight, as highly unfavorable to our object. While, on the side of the Rationalists we find the most unbounded license of private speculation, and no apparent external or internal unity, we perceive on the side of the Romanists a compact and connected system, which pleases the eye of the spectator by its symmetry, and which he would look upon with complacency, if founded upon pure truth. So striking is this apparent difference, that my attempt to prove their fundamental agreement has been considered as paradoxical, nay, a ridiculous fancy. But, every one acquainted with the subject knows, that this argument is nothing new, that it is to be found in Schubert De Naturalismo Ecclesiæ Romanæ, 1750, and in Chemnitz' Examination of the Council of Trent, and that hints of this accordance are to be met with in the writings of Melancthon, Luther and Calvin.

The erroneous opinion that there is a wide and essential difference between the two systems, has been designedly kept up by those, who, to divert attention from themselves, and to repel any suspicion of such agreement, have always expressed the utmost horror of Rationalism; and who have been always ready to charge those with it, who are, in truth, the farthest removed from it, and the least in danger of it.

If our limits allowed, and if it fell within the scope of this essay, we might show from history, that the relation of the Reformation to the scholastic philosophy was the same as that of modern orthodoxy to the Kantian philosophy. The Reformation began in the attacking by the reformers, of the scholasticism of the Church of Rome. The most superficial historical research, and the slightest acquaintance with the writings of the reformers, will convince any one of this.

But, we proceed to consider some of the principal points of agreement between the two parties, dwelling upon some at greater length than upon others.

Both, then, we should first remark, agree in setting up a different *source and rule of faith* than the written divine word. They place the subjective word above the objective, and make the former the judge of the latter. They differ indeed widely in manner as to the nature of this human authority: the one holding to a Pope, governed by tradition and the decisions of councils, the other making of every man himself such a Pope, and maintaining, as Wegscheider expresses it, that everything is to be determined "by the precepts of sound reason, *tanquam verbum vere divinum internum*." This difference in *form* is accidental, and in no way inconsistent with their identity in principle. In both, there is human authority; in the one case, that of the intuition of reason, in the other, that of Papal supremacy. Both alike leave the sure canon of the external word, and derive their true origin from the subjective. Both are natural religions, and we might also term them with propriety, fanatical religions; for as soon as we leave the written word, we have no security against falling into mysticism, or any other form of fanaticism. We might show, *pari passu*, that the system of mysticism remarkably coincides with those of Romanism and Rationalism.¹

But we proceed to show their remarkable agreement in the doctrines of sin and the justification of the sinner, of which Melancthon said, that error could be more safely admitted in any other than

¹ Beiträge 2. 4-13. The enthusiasm of Romanism in maintaining a successive inspiration for individuals.

these; and that he, who did not understand these, would not be called a Christian. It has been admitted by Kant, that outward differences in manner constitute no objection to inward affinity in principle in different systems; and that all systems which expect to merit the grace of God in any way, are accordant. But we would first remark generally, before going into detail, that the Romish and Rationalistic systems may be characterized as Pelagian, while the true Protestant system is anti-Pelagian. Nor do the Rationalists themselves, though wont to deal so arbitrarily with church history, venture to deny that their system is Pelagian, or call in question this assertion. They evade the charge of apostasy from the faith of the church, by alleging, that these distinctions are of little consequence, and that a man may hold what opinion he pleases about them, and yet retain the faith of the church.

The orthodox doctrine of the sinfulness of man, so clearly taught by the most explicit and decisive language of Scripture, especially in the 5th and 7th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, is refuted by a Decree of the Council of Trent, that concupiscence has not the true and proper nature of sin.¹ Bellarmin, the great defender of the Church of Rome, has devoted a long series of chapters to the defence of this Decree against the Protestants. The Rationalist, Wegscheider, in his *Manual of Theology*, and Paulus, have no hesitation in adopting this decision of the Council of Trent, as the correct one. "The Romish Catechism has correctly decided that concupiscence, if not wilful, is far removed from the nature of sin."

Both parties thus, in defiance of the most explicit language of scripture, coincide in opinion, that original sin is only so far to be considered sinful, as the man consents to it, and acts it out in what is forbidden. They both reason in the same way, that it is impossible that our natural desires should be sinful. This is true, as they were originally implanted in our frame; they were then pure and pleasing to God. They are not even now to be extirpated from human nature. And far be from us that iron system of philosophers and monks, which would require this of men, as Calvin says, "*Nihil nobiscum ferrea ista Philosophia!*" and Melancthon, "It is not to be supposed that all affections are to be expelled from nature, as the fanatics vainly talk of their stoical apathy." But while this is true, it is cer-

¹ Concupiscentiam, quam aliquando apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat. Ecclesiam Catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit, anathema sit.

tain that none of our passions now exist in their original purity and order, as the ornament of our nature. Their equilibrium has been disturbed; they now overstep their proper bounds, or lag far behind; they glow with heat, or are frozen with cold; they are selfish, and love the creature more than the Creator. This disorder within, which cleaves to us from our earliest childhood, since it is opposed to the standard of the divine law is sin, whether the will consents or not; nay, so far from being subject to the will, it brings the will unconsciously into subjection to it, as Melancthon says: *Tanta est vis concupiscentiæ ut malis affectibus sæpius obtemperent homines, quam recto judicio*; and as Pascal has strikingly remarked in his well known passage on this subject: "It is concupiscence which gives to the will itself a perverse tendency, infuses a selfishness into its volitions, robs the best services of man of their true value, and destroys the peace of the soul in the conflict within."

So emphatically is the orthodox doctrine taught in Scripture, that both parties have no other resort than to wrest such passages, by a common exegesis, from their plain and obvious meaning. The Rationalists, when the literal sense would oppose their system, have recourse to forced interpretations, accommodated, as they term it, to a "rational exegesis," and thus make Scripture suit their purpose. The Romanists not only do this, but appeal against Scripture to the Decree of the 5th Session of the Council of Trent. While the Rationalists avoid the term "*merit*" and instead of it use "make worthy," the Romanists likewise make a subtle distinction between meriting *de condigno* and *de congruo*.

What we have said is sufficient to prove the undeniable affinity of the two parties in the doctrine of *sin*; we proceed now to consider their agreement in principle as to the sinner's *justification*, and we shall be able to show that both have departed in equal degree from the truth.

From the false view of the natural condition of man, the common *σφάλμα ψεύδος* of the two systems, we should expect to find them equally in error as to the sinner's justification. Let us examine for a moment, more particularly, their view of man as a sinner, and of his ability to prepare himself for justification. According, then, to their systems, every man is a sinner, in so far as he now and then transgresses the divine law. With these occasional slips, he is in the main good and blameless, with sufficient natural strength of reason to teach him his duty, and of will to influence him to do good works, acceptable to God, and worthy of justification. While there is some-

thing sinful in every man, there is much that is good; and if the balance is struck, it would be in his favor. We quote here the whole of an important passage from Wegecheider, which shows fully the rationalistic view of justification: *Quicumque e vita, tarpı ad virtutem emerſerit is eadem proportıone, qua jam in virtutis studio progressus fuerit, in gratiam cum Deo reversus, ab eodem premiis dignus judicabitur. Deus ex universo vitę tenore dignitatem hominis cujusque aestimans, peccatori resipiscenti sortem æternam justa lance ponderatam tribuet, atque prout vera virtus in animo peccatoris crescet, ita fiducia ei restituitur. Venia igitur peccatorum recte ponitur in conversione gratiæ divinæ ad peccatorem, et pœnæ imminutione, pro ratione dignitatis prae moralis justissime definita.*

What now is the Romish view of justification? The Romanist may say that he is justified by faith, using evangelical terms, but he means by faith something far different from the true Protestant. He does not regard it as confidence in the divine promise, appropriated to himself, so that faith and the word of God are correlative;¹ but as he terms it a *fides formata*. He considers it as put by synecdoche for love, and all the good works which flow from it. He looks upon it as a meritorious quality in us — a good disposition, which we are to manifest, before we receive justification. He introduces into the idea of faith as much as possible of obedience to the law, and declares that by this active faith men are justified. In the same manner the Rationalist speaks of obedience to the principle of natural religion and inward culture, as making us worthy of the grace of God. If the sinner now works in himself this acceptable state of heart, and gives the preponderance to his virtuous disposition, by this faith coöperating with good works, as the Council of Trent expresses it, *coöperante fide cum bonis operibus*, he cannot fail of obtaining a *justificatio prima*, of which we see his good works are the efficient causes and grounds. This justification, instead of being as Melancthon expresses it, *similis et æqualis est omnium*, varies in every man

¹Beiträge 1. 131. *Justificatio fit per verbum.* Mel. How strikingly similar is the language of Hooker on this subject! "We cannot be justified by any inherent quality; Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in him. God accepteth them in Christ, as perfectly righteous, as if they had fulfilled all that was commanded them in the law. Shall I say more perfectly righteous than if themselves had fulfilled the whole law? I must take heed what I say; but the Apostle saith, "*God made him,*" etc. Such are we in the sight of God, as is the very Son of God himself. Man hath sinned; God hath suffered; God hath made himself the Son of Man, and men are made the righteousness of God."

according to the degree of his worthiness; while justification, according to the orthodox view, is the pronouncing just through the obedience solely of Christ from his most holy nativity even to the most ignominious death of the cross. To use the language of the Cone. Form, "*sola sua, tota et perfectissima obedientia a nativitate sua sanctissima, usque ad ignominiosissimam crucis mortem, est justitia.*" And again: "*Justitia fidei causam Deo in gratuita et benignissima imputatione justitiæ Christi absque ulla nostrorum operum additione consistit.*" The Helv. Confess.: "*Passio vel mors sua, omniaque, quæ a suo in carne adventa nostra causa fecit et portavit.*" Melancthon, in his Apology: "*Christi merita nobis donantur, ut justi reputemur fiducia meritorum Christi, tanquam propria merita haberemus.*" Calvin: "*Ecce solo nos habemur justi, quia Christi obedientia nobis accepta fertur, ac si nostra esset.*" But the Heidelberg Catechism is even more decisive: "*Sine ullo meo merito ex mera Dei misericordia mihi perfecta satisfactio, justitia et sanctitas Christi imputatur ac donatur, perinde ac si nec ullum ipse peccatum admissem, nec ulla mihi labe inhaereret, imò vero quasi eam obedientiam, quam pro me Christus præstitit ipse perfecte præstitissem.*" We have presented these passages as showing the unanimous agreement of the Protestant Confessions.

Let us now compare the Romish view. Justification, according to the Council of Trent, is not only remission of sins, but sanctification and renovation. Sanctification is not the fruit of justification, but a part of it, and enters into the act. The sinner is not regarded only, and pronounced righteous, but is made so by the operation of the Holy Ghost. He does not become righteous through a gracious sentence of God, but actually so through his indwelling virtue; and owes his eternal life and salvation far more to his own inward righteousness, (*justitia inherens*), than to the grace of God. This inward righteousness, meriting *de condigno* the grace of God, is thus partly a gift of God, and partly a work of man. But as a comparison of the Romish and Protestant view is just here so important, we give the Decree of the Council of Trent. "*Hanc dispositionem, seu præparationem, justificatio ipsa consequitur, quæ non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis. Non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes unusquisque suam secundum mensuram, quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout vivet, et secundum propriam cujusque dispositionem et coöperationem. Quanquam enim nemo potest esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur, id tamen in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissimæ*

passionis merito, per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret. Unde in ipsa justificatione, cum remissione peccatorum, hæc omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur per fidem, spem et caritatem."

As justification is thus obtained by man's worthy predisposition,¹ so is it to be preserved and increased by his own strength and good works; according to the Romish system, the man can go on from a first to a second justification.

If righteousness is an imputation of the perfect righteousness of Christ, it cannot admit of degrees of greater or less, higher or lower; it can neither be increased or diminished, but must forever remain one and the same, or we deny perfect righteousness to Christ. If we can become still more righteous by our works, and deserve a higher degree, we are imperfectly justified by Christ, he becomes a minister of sin, and the true idea of righteousness is destroyed. This the Romish system does in its doctrine of progressive justification. It has decreed thus on this point: "In ipsa iustitia per Christi gratiam accepta, cõperante fide bonis operibus crescunt atque magis justificantur. Si quis dixerit iustitiam acceptam non conservari atque etiam non augeri per bona opera; anathema sit."

It follows from this view of justification, that, as it has been earned by our own qualities and merits, and is to be preserved by the same, we can never be assured of our justification. The Council of Trent denounces accordingly an anathema against all who hold such a doctrine: "Nemini peccata dimitti, vel dimissa esse dicendum est. Neque aliud asserendum est, oportere eos, qui vere justificati sunt, absque ulla omnino dubitatione, apud se ipsos statuere, se esse justificados. Quilibet, dum se ipsum, suam propriam infirmitatem et indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia formidare ac timere potest." It calls such a doctrine, inanis fides Haereticorum, and forgiveness is refused to those who hold it. That this doctrine flows naturally from the Romish view of justification, and is a gainful part of the Romish system, has been shown by Chemnitz. The man thus forced to look to himself, to his own infirmity and indisposition to what is good, the more conscientious he is, the more will he perceive his deficiencies, and stand in constant doubt of his justification. This doctrine of the Church of Rome must lead either to a careless security in sin and presumption, or else to despair, as Melancthon says: *Hæc doctrina*

¹ Beitrage 1. 118.

Legis vel ad presumptionem vel ad desperationem adducit. It fails us in our greatest extremity, in the trying hours of life, when the oppressive consciousness of our unspeakable deficiencies fills the soul with alarm ; it makes us ashamed in the decisive hour of death, and as the last and bitterest fruit of false doctrine will perish with us before the bar of an infinitely holy God.

If we compare the view of justification advanced by Wegscheider, which has been quoted, and the declarations of Kant, that by an imitation of Christ's example, and by forming in ourselves the ideal of humanity, which is acceptable to God, we are to be justified, we find no essential difference in the two systems. They know of no other justification than that by the law. Both are natural legal systems, and of both is it true, in the language of Melancthon : "*Non videt ratio aliam justitiam, quam justitiam legis.*"

And from the fundamental error, that justification is incomplete without good works, must necessarily spring an entire confounding of the proper office of the law and the Gospel. The highly important and essential difference between them is either falsely represented, or alike rejected by both. Both parties agree, that the object of the coming of Christ into the world was, as a new moral lawgiver, to prescribe a higher and more perfect moral law than Moses, and present in his own person a perfect example of its fulfilment, by imitation of which, men may be justified before God. They both regard him as a masterly teacher of a moral system, freed from the Mosaic ceremonial. They consider the gospel as differing from the law only in this respect, that the law requires external works ; the gospel, besides, internal affections, a distinction which though sufficiently refuted by the tenth commandment, still Kant and his followers repeat. What is this, as Melancthon says, but to teach the law and destroy the gospel, and confound the proper office of both ? How full and clear was the voice of the Reformers as to the office of both ! Says Melancthon : "The office of the gospel is to receive good gifts from God, that of the law to offer our own. They divided the uses of the law into three parts ; the civil, (*usus politicus*,) to bring man to an external reverence ; the pedagogic, to bring him to Christ ; and the didactic use for the regenerate, and partakers of Christ by faith. Of this last use, Melancthon says : "The law is to be taught even to the regenerate, that as their knowledge and penitence for the sin that dwelleth in them increases, so may also their faith increase. The law is to teach us these good works, which God has prepared for us to walk in. We are not to invent such, but to be governed by his

word." And again he says very forcibly: *Hæc particula gratis facit discrimen legis et evangelii.* Luther, in his sermon on the office of law and gospel, says: "The gospel does not tell man what God requires of him, but what he has done for him; it bids him believe and be sure that God will forgive him his sins, and receive him as his child." The whole sermon is worthy of an attentive study.

We have thus seen the remarkable agreement of the two systems, in their doctrine of justification. They both teach sinful man to trust in himself, in the works of his own hands, and in his inward righteousness. They would begin and end, as we have proved from their own words, the salvation of man in his sinful self. Both maintain that man, by virtue of the natural light of reason, and by the power of his free will, can attain to the favor of God and to eternal life.

It was against soul-destroying errors like these, that the Reformers, with the Bible in their hands and in their hearts, raised up a standard; and though the world and the rulers of its darkness set themselves against them, yet they boldly and loudly confessed the old Bible faith in Jesus Christ, the crucified, the Saviour of the lost, the eternal Son of God, whose power and glory are only surpassed by the greatness of that love which moved him to veil the splendor of his divinity in the form of a servant; the divine becoming human, that the human might become divine, and be restored to pure and holy fellowship with God. They declared that every thing that man put in his place must be rejected; and the word of God sounding forth in its power and greatness, penetrated the humbled hearts of thousands, and brought them in faith and love to the feet of Jesus, where alone the soul can find peace, sanctification and eternal life. They have bequeathed their faith, as their most precious legacy, to us. Their confessions have ever been the bulwark of Protestantism, the inviolable *Magna Charta* of its freedom. While these are preserved, like the ancient Palladium, the church is safe.

Are these the boasted advances of our age in Theology, that after three centuries, we should relapse into the same errors from which we were then happily relieved by these great hearted men? Shall we extinguish the Sun of Righteousness, that we may be enlightened by the ignes fatui of Reason? Truly the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God! The wise of this world receive not the wisdom of God; nay, they despise it as foolishness. They are forever erecting their children's houses, which fall down as fast as they are set up, while his foundation, other than which no man can lay, standeth sure and immovable. God often leaves his enemies now, as he

old of old, to turn their swords against each other, and thus destroy them by themselves. I would mention only the systems of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. How remarkable that just at a time when human reason is so highly extolled, and the divine word so greatly decried, these systems are in conflict with each, and some have already fallen! Did the preservation of God's truth in the world depend upon human faithfulness, we might well despair. But a divine power sustains it; it conquers by its own irresistible might. When most depressed, as all history shows, it has often risen and crushed its adversaries. We must be then indeed of little faith, if we despair of its final triumph. The grass of human doctrine withereth; the flower of human wisdom fadeth, but the word of the Lord endureth forever.¹

ARTICLE VI.

REVIEW OF RECENT FRENCH WORKS IN METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE.

Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel. Par J. Willm, Inspecteur de l'Académie de Strasbourg. Ouvrage couronné par l'Institut (Académie des Sciences, Morales et Politiques.) 4 Tom. 8vo. pp. 528, 630, 466, 648. Paris. 1846-1849.

De la Philosophie Allemande. Rapport à l'Académie des Sciences, Morales et Politiques, précédé d'une Introduction sur les doctrines de Kant, de Fichte, de Schelling, et de Hegel. Par M. De Rémusat, Membre de l'Institut. 8vo. pp. CLVIII 210. Paris. 1845.

In 1836, the Academy of Moral and Political Science of the French Institute, at the suggestion of the Philosophical section, proposed a critical examination of German philosophy, as a subject of competition. The result is contained in the above works.

The competitors were to adhere to the following conditions: 1. By extended analysis to render an account of the principal German

¹ Verbum Dei manet in æternum. This was the motto of the Elector of Saxony, and his servants wore its initial letters embroidered in their garments. See a sermon of Sartorius, delivered at the Commemoration of the Third Centennial Anniversary of the Augsburg Confession, on The Glory of the Augsburg Confession.

systems, from Kant to the present time. 2. To give special attention to the system of Kant, with which all the others are connected. 3. To give a critical estimate of the German philosophy; to discuss the principles on which it is founded, the methods it employs, the results it has attained; to seek out what of error and what of truth have met together in it, and to discriminate what, in the last result, may legitimately remain in one form or another of the philosophical movement in modern Germany.

In 1838, six memoirs were presented. They were adjudged insufficient, and the proposals were renewed, with a limit of two years. Seven competitors then offered their works; the section "*jugea ce concours fort et brillant*;" but no one essay was thought sufficiently complete to fulfil the conditions of the programme. The final judgment was prorogued till 1844; and then three memoirs survived, which are the subject of the Report of De Rémusat.

This report is admirably drawn up; it is a kind of model of what such reports should be; and it is such a document as perhaps only a Frenchman could produce. It is eminently candid, and also strict; there is an air of courteous authority about it which is as it should be; it goes into the subject matter just about enough, and it gives a full account of the memoirs themselves, in all their parts. Honorable mention is made of M. Fortuné Guiran, the author of one of the essays; but the prize is decreed to M. Willm, as having given the most satisfactory exposition of the whole subject. His work is described as solid, faithful and conscientious; executed with care rather than with art; the style is simple, just, and for the most part clear; he shows, however, the traces of familiarity with German idioms, and sometimes has too many words, and too many strange words, though the latter fault is natural to one who is trying to transfer German philosophy into the French tongue. Parts of his work are specially signalized as of unusual ability and novelty—that, for example, upon the philosophy of Hegel. The report concludes, of course, with an assertion of the claims of the French philosophy as compared with the German. The results of the latter, it is said, inspire distrust; they are contrary to that truth which it is the object of philosophy to methodize, and not to annul. Neither in its method, nor in its results, neither as a matter of science nor as a matter of truth can the French philosophy fully accept the German philosophy. "Germany has been unfaithful to that wise and sure method inaugurated by Descartes," whom all philosophic Frenchmen delight to honor. To explain ourselves clearly, and in technical terms, in that

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psychological method which does not indissolubly connect ontology with psychology; and in the autological doctrines which are not constantly based upon psychology, we cannot recognize the philosophical method of modern times; we do not recognize the fundamental condition of science. "The French philosophy may be enlightened by the lights of the German, and enriched by its ideas, but it ought to remain indissolubly faithful to the fundamental beliefs of human reason, and to the method of Descartes." Such is the constant *refrain* of the French, ever since Cousin took up the word. What they really mean by their "psychological method," as distinguished from the German method, it is not so easy to ascertain. As distinguished from the method of the materialistic philosophy, it has indeed a sense; but what its significance is as definitely exhibiting the scientific peculiarity and honor of their school, as contrasted with the Germans, we have endeavored in vain to discover in the repeated eulogies of it by Cousin and his zealous adherents. Nor does the exposition which M. De Rémusat gives of it in his preface, aid us much, especially when he assures us that Plato had this psychological point of view; and that the science of man (i. e. psychological science) is the science of reason.

The introduction to this report gives us a kind of sketch of the leading opinions of the chief German philosophers. It is written with clearness; but its criticisms are too general, and its appreciation of the real questions and problems of the German schools, is insufficient. And yet it is perhaps the best general and succinct exposition of these systems which is readily accessible.

The work of M. Willm, inspector of the Academy of Strasburg, and corresponding member of the Institute, is comprised in four large volumes; and it is undoubtedly the most complete, and faithful and candid exposition of German philosophy, to be found outside of that speculative country. The author is not himself a great philosopher, but he is able to understand and describe the systems of great philosophers. He is not remarkable for acuteness, and he is often too vague and general in his criticisms; but in respect to learning, to impartiality, and to general philosophical ability, he is well fitted for the great task which he has here undertaken. It has been the work of years of laborious research. It was begun before the prize of the Academy was instituted, and his last volume was published five years after the award had been decreed to himself.

This work is not only the most important and able in the French literature, upon the subject of German philosophy, but it is also the

only one which can pretend to any degree of thoroughness or completeness. In 1836, M. le baron Barchou de Penhoen published a history of German philosophy, in two volumes; but it is rather a narrative about the systems, than a philosophical exposition of them. The work of L. F. Schön (*Transcendental Philosophy*, Paris, 1831) is restricted to the system of Kant, and gives only a tolerable view of his Criticisms of the Pure Reason and of the Practical Reason. Cousin's *Lectures on Kant* (1844) present a rapid and brilliant sketch of the main principles of the Pure Reason, with a skilful attempt at the refutation of them in their bearings on the great interests of morality and religion. Besides this, in his lectures on the history of Moral Philosophy, we have an account of Kant's Ethical system; but he has nowhere attempted even a complete outline of the schemes of the later German philosophers. The work of M. Matter, on Schelling, (1845,) is more valuable as a contribution to the history of literature, than as a philosophical production. M. Ott, doctor of law, published in 1844, a work with the title, "*Hegel and the German Philosophy; or, a Critical Exposition and Examination of the Principal Systems of German Philosophy since Kant, and especially of the system of Hegel.*" His notices of the earlier systems is superficial; it is a book upon and against Hegel, avowedly written in the interest of the Roman Catholic church against Protestantism. "Protestant philosophy," he assures us, "is done; Hegel has given it the last word." And the result of it is "universal confusion." That Hegel's system left M. Ott's mind in this state, is quite probable. Besides these, and some earlier productions, now past use, which give an account of the German systems, the French literature also contains translations of some of the more important works of the German philosophers, all the leading ones of Kant, Fichte's *Destination of Man*, *Destination of the Learned*, also his *Theory of Science*, Schelling's *Bruno*, *System of Transcendental Idealism* and *Philosophical Fragments*, (translated by Willm.) and Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*.

These were the forerunners of Mr. Willm's more arduous attempt, under the impulse of the Academy.

In a long introduction of some eighty pages the author expounds the points of view under which his criticism is conducted; gives a rapid sketch of German philosophy from the time of Leibnitz; and vindicates the general division of his work. He divides the modern German philosophy into three parts; the first, the period of Critical and Transcendental Idealism, comprises Kant, Fichte, and their

great opponent Jacobi; the second, the period of Absolute and Objective Idealism, gives the systems of Schelling and Hegel, with the dissenting and opposing schemes, especially those of Herbart. Each of these two parts is in two volumes.

The first volume and one third of the second is devoted to Kant, and it is perhaps the most complete and satisfactory portion of the whole work. The extent of it was demanded by the programme, and is justified by the inherent importance and influence of Kant's position and system. The remainder of the second volume is devoted in about equal portions to Fichte and to Jacobi. Upon the dissent of the latter, and upon the merits of his dissent great stress is laid, not more perhaps than is justified by the importance of the principles which Jacobi advocates, but more than is due to the actual influence or the philosophical acuteness of his works. Nearly four hundred pages of the third volume are occupied with Schelling, and the remainder of this, with 350 pages of the fourth volume, gives a full and most valuable account of Hegel's various productions. Under the head of Dissenting and Independent Philosophy, we have the system of Schleiermacher, Baader and Krause, and even those of Göthe, Jean-Paul and Alexander v. Humboldt. And last of all, Herbart is described as the great representative of the opposing philosophy, and of his various works a better account is given than can be found in any of the histories of modern philosophy. And yet our author's critical estimate of the value of Herbart's system hardly assigns him his due importance; for his philosophy may now be said to be the only system which is making progress in Germany. The works of Drobisch and Hartenstein are contributing to rescue it from the silence, and even contempt, with which its realistic positions have been treated by an overbearing idealism. Under these six names, then, Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling, Hegel and Herbart, M. Willm recounts the history of modern German speculation. Incidental notices of the writings of their followers, the lesser lights, are scattered through the volumes and the notes.

The whole work is one of an impartial historian of philosophy. The plan uniformly followed is to give a full analysis of every important work of each philosopher. This analysis is often minute, not to say tedious. The main points are fortified by translated citations. At the end of this analysis, M. Willm gives a general view and criticism of the whole system. At the end of the whole work there is the same for the whole. These citations are generally generous and manly in their tone, they have a certain air of independence, but they lack precision. It hardly seems to us that in this respect the work

answers the design of the Academy. The author is worthy of praise, however, in not lending his authority to that glorification of the French philosophical supremacy, with which most of the French accounts of German philosophy abound. His philosophical training has evidently been rather German than French. His position at Strasburg is favorable to an understanding of both the nations. And we think that no one can doubt that he has been more successful in transferring German philosophy into a foreign land than almost any of his predecessors. A comparison of his account of Hegel's work with that of Ott, and even of his exposition of Schelling's system, with that of M. Matter, shows his superiority. Cousin is here his only rival. The German categories do indeed often seem strange in their French garb, but that is unavoidable; and the author has not sacrificed faithfulness to elegance.

Our author is no blind panegyrist, and still less is he a blind reviler of these daring German schemes. He gives to Kant, the honor of freeing philosophy from the fatal grasp of sensualism, and of vindicating the authority of our moral nature, while he dissents from all the main conclusions of his criticism of the Pure Reason. He vindicates Fichte from the charge of an absolute denial of an external reality, and yet is not sparing in his condemnation of him for denying the Divine personality. While he maintains that the primitive form of Schelling's system, that of identity, rests on a gratuitous hypothesis, and contains decided pantheistic tendencies, he dare not deny its influence in elevating our ideas of nature, and in contributing to a more vivid impression of the immanence of God in his works. Of the later system of Schelling he does not give an account; and this would be a serious defect in his work, were it not to be supplied in a future volume, which is promised. His criticism upon Hegel's philosophy is better than that of any other excepting Kant, assisted as he is by the able logical works of Trendelenburg; its defects are carefully stated, its pantheistic tendencies and practical conclusions are opposed; while full credit is given to its immense systematic power, its grasp and comprehensiveness, and to the almost unrivalled philosophical genius and attainments of its originator.

It may be interesting to give a concise statement of the character and results of this great philosophical movement as they are presented by so able an historian. To do this we will abridge and translate some portions of M. Willm's concluding summary.

The insufficiency of sensation (or "sensible experience") to explain the facts of consciousness, and the impotence of materialism in ren-

dering an account of moral and intellectual phenomena are now generally conceded; sensualism, with all its theoretical and practical consequences, is forever banished from science, thanks to the united efforts of the French and the German philosophy. And this triumph of a spiritual philosophy in the nineteenth century is so much the more remarkable, since it is not a simple reaction, but has been obtained at an epoch when the physical sciences are making the most rapid progress, and when thought has been expressed with the greatest freedom.

While Kant recognizes internal and external experience as the only source of all real knowledge, he makes this experience itself to be a product of the activity of mind, and in the general laws and forms of sense and of understanding. Jacobi and Herbart are realists; they maintain the independent reality of external objects; but the former at the same time regards consciousness as the guaranty of this reality, and as the natural seal of moral and religious truths, of which reason is the organ; the latter recognizes the right of intellect to rectify, to modify, and to complete the data of experience according to the demands of logic, and seeks for truth far beyond the empire of the senses.

Fichte has made too much of the subjective element; but he has put beyond question the spontaneity and the power of the subject, of the *ego*. The results of his system confirms the position that the *ego* cannot by itself alone comprehend the world, that the real world will escape us if we renounce seeing with the eyes and feeling with the organs that are put at our service. Thus it is evident that besides the thinking subject it is necessary to admit the existence of an independent object; which is however in relation and harmony with the *ego*, acting upon it and ready in turn to be acted upon.

Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are idealists; yet in different degrees. Kant professes what he calls the *critical* or *transcendental* idealism, and he protests against the system of Berkeley. His philosophy is idealistic in respect to phenomena, and not in respect to things as they are in themselves. The idealism of Fichte is more radical, and this philosopher was able to keep himself from nihilism and from atheism only on the basis of that same faith in our moral reason, by which Kant reestablished the truths which he regarded as theoretically problematical. The idealism of Schelling and of Hegel is absolute and objective, not like that of Berkeley, but in a wholly new sense; it might be more justly called *rationalism* or *absolute intellectualism*. They do not deny the real existence of the external

world, but they present it as the issue of mind or spirit, as made what it is by spiritual ideas, which alone are primitively and essentially true and real. They admit experience, but they say that this only gives us the surface of things, which are not at the bottom that which they appear as immediately known through the senses; their endeavor is, if we may so express it, to intellectualize experience by means of rational intuition and by the necessary evolutions of sovereign thought.

Kant assigns to reason, as the faculty of cognition, authority only in the way of criticism, and pretends to restrict it, so far as real knowledge is concerned, to the limits of the phenomenal world; yet he attributes to it a relative authority as a logical faculty, but an absolute value only in the form of practical reason. The rationalism of Fichte is more decided than that of Kant, but, not being able to explain the real world by the movements of thought alone, he denies it in theory and admits it on the faith of practical reason alone.

Jacobi, with all his distrust of discursive speculation, of the speculation of the *understanding*, which wrongly applies the maxims of experience to matters metaphysical, is yet a rationalist in according entire confidence to the fundamental convictions of man's rational nature, to consciousness fertilized and developed by observation and thought.

Herbart is a rationalist in conceding to the intellect, not the right indeed of abstracting from facts and of exercising itself in the void, but that of interpreting facts, of making them complete by analogy and of transforming them by reflection.

Schelling and Hegel, in fine, make human reason equal to the divine intelligence, make it the depository of eternal ideas, and pretend, by the necessary evolution of thought, to comprehend and reconstruct the universe, the natural and the moral order of things.

Rationalism is then everywhere dominant in the German philosophy; it is the soul of it, both when it claims to explain the world *à priori*, and when it acknowledges the necessity of starting from the data of experience.

In respect to religious questions, Kant, Jacobi and Herbart are theists; but Kant recognizes only a *moral* theology, Jacobi only a theology of *feeling*, and Herbart only a *physico-theology*. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are pantheists, yet with differences. Fichte professes a sort of moral pantheism. The pantheism of Schelling is more material;¹ that of Hegel is altogether idealistic or logical.

¹ This can only apply to the first form of Schelling's system, and even in application to that it is hardly an intelligible statement.

That gross pantheism which makes matter divine, and which is the equivalent of atheism, is foreign to all these systems, and the immoral and irreligious consequences deducible from it were far from the thoughts of their authors.

As to the immortality of the soul, it appears incompatible with the pantheism of Schelling and of Hegel. Yet Schelling himself and a fraction of the school of Hegel have endeavored to reconcile personal immortality with pantheistic principles. Jacobi believed in it with all his soul; Kant made it a necessary condition of the moral law, certain as this law itself; and Herbart finds this dogma so simple and so evident, that it seems to him superfluous to prove it; it is the necessary result of his doctrine respecting the soul, which is, that it is in its essence simple, and hence eternal and imperishable.

In respect to ethics, Kant, Jacobi and Herbart may be placed on one side, over against Schelling and Hegel; Fichte occupies the centre between the two parties. The ethical principle of Kant is wholly rational; that of Jacobi wholly from feeling; and the morals of Herbart are derived from both reason and feeling. Fichte advocates a kind of mystic morals, yet strong and generous, full at once of personal dignity and of self-denial, of independence and of devotedness. In the idealism of Schelling and of Hegel the practical reason is absorbed by the theoretical, and morals properly speaking occupy a secondary place. The absolute precept of pantheistic idealism is this—*know thyself*; and the whole destination of man, in this system, seems to be to arrive at a knowledge of himself as absolute mind.

Moral freedom is not equally guaranteed by all these systems. According to Kant, liberty is the only immediate rational fact, the only law which we know of the "intelligible world." According to Jacobi it is so certain, that it is his scale for measuring the truth of systems. He is ready to reject without further examination every scheme of fatalism. Fichte makes freedom to be the very essence of spirit, the principle of self. Though Herbart does not deny liberty, yet he does not consider it as a primitive fact, but he makes it the product of the development of the intellect, of the concurrence and mutual action of ideas. Schelling and Hegel profess an intellectual fatalism. Liberty presupposes an individuality, a real personality, such as pantheism does not admit.

As to the philosophy of nature, Kant, Schelling and Hegel explain every thing dynamically; opposite to them is Herbart, whose physics are entirely constructed on mechanical principles, although he grants that such principles are not sufficient to explain all the phenomena of the organic world.

All these philosophers have had, and still have, numerous adherents; it is then natural to suppose that there is in each system a fund of truth; for though error may seduce for a time, it cannot long carry the best minds in its train.

There was a time when almost the whole philosophy of Germany was of the school of Kant; some were drawn along by the force of the current, but others by their convictions, and among these were men of the highest distinction. That part of his system which deserved their assent, is that which will be abiding—and that is, the idea of a criticism of the human understanding, and the general spirit of his ethics. Such a criticism of the nature and limits of our knowledge founded on an examination of the primitive elements of reason, upon an analysis of consciousness, will ever be the obligatory beginning of philosophy. Such an examination will always lead to the result that the system of our knowledge reposes upon an intellectual basis; that the “forms” of our knowledge are furnished by the understanding. From this it is not necessary to conclude with Kant, that all our knowledge is subjective, but only that our knowledge of the world is from our point of view alone, limited and inadequate indeed, yet true in itself though incomplete. And as to Kant’s ethical system, the general formula may be modified, and its rigor attenuated, but the sovereign principle presented by him in all its purity and majesty can no longer be misconceived. Kant has conquered forever, at least in the view of science, the ethics of prudence and self-love. His indirect proof of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, as necessary conditions of the moral law, will also remain, though in other forms; and his idea of an universal and just state, as the providential end of history, will also abide. His theory of the sublime and beautiful [to which he was instigated by Burke] has been the commencement of a new system of Aesthetics, not false but incomplete, for beauty and sublimity are in the objects as well as in ourselves.

In Fichte we have a singular union of an heroic idealism with an ethical system of pure self-denial; no one has more strongly insisted upon the sovereignty of self; no one has carried farther a regard to duty; and if, for a time, the moral order was his God, he at least showed that he was ready to sacrifice everything to the object of his worship. His idealism will remain as a testimony how far the human mind can go in the attempt to draw everything from its own substance—a proof both of its activity and of its inefficiency. To have the right to profess realism, we must have tried the way of idealism according to Fichte.

Besides the examination of the power of self, which was the aim of Fichte, and of the pure reason which was the object of Kant, we have in Jacobi an evidence of the necessity of an analysis of our actual consciousness, illustrated also, by the Scotch and French schools of philosophy. Though this will not give us a system of philosophy, yet it is the necessary basis of such a system. Here are revealed our fundamental religious, and moral and aesthetic feelings, the disinterested love of truth and science, all those elementary dispositions which go to make up the rational nature of man. Jacobi did not make a system; but his merit consists in having constantly opposed the voice of consciousness to the aberration of the philosophy of his times.

Schelling and Hegel have exaggerated a true principle, and that is the harmony between our spirits and the external world, between the subject and the object, the concord of legitimate thought and of objective realities. This principle is tacitly recognized by every positive philosophy. It is perverted in the doctrine of absolute ideality, and in the pretension that man can attain a divine and absolute science, and reconstruct the universe by a dialectic process. The idea of Schelling, in his philosophy of nature, of an immanent and dynamic principle, by which the universe is made an organic whole, is indeed only an ideal, and it may not ever be absolutely proved and traced out; but still it is by the light of such an ideal that we must study nature; for only thus can we have a science and a progressive science of nature, instead of a map of facts without inherent unity. And this may be done without ceasing to consider each thing as having its relative independence, without seeing in man nothing above a production of animal life, and while we still admit that God is the cause of all the order of the universe.

The idea of Hegel is still more vast; it is to the whole of philosophy that which Schelling's is to the philosophy of nature. Hegel has the merit of having laid hold of the problem of speculative science in all its grandeur, and having attempted to carry it through all the departments of human thought. Such an idea of unity and system as he propounds, has always been the soul of philosophy, though it can never be absolutely realized. There is, indeed, no true philosophy of history, without the supposition that the human race is advancing to realize some great end, that of universal freedom, of a perfect state. There is no true history of philosophy, if we see in its causes only a fortuitous succession of systems. We may not adopt the end or the scheme which Hegel propounds, either for phi-

osophy or for history; but we say, that history can be rationally conceived of only as a progress towards some one end, and that the history of philosophy is instructive only as we view it as a constant means of arriving at real truth.

The philosophy of Herbart is contributing to the overthrow of the purely idealistic systems, and may be the transition to the reëstablishment of a veritable realism.

Idealism, as an absolute and final system, must be abandoned; but only in its ruins, and in part from its ruins will a new system be re-constructed. This philosophy will not be the old dogmatism which Herbart has striven to reëstablish; it will be a realism attempered by idealism, a rational realism, founded, not on the dogma of the real identity of subject and object, of thought and being, but upon the harmony which God himself has established between our reason and the external world, between intelligent nature and real nature, between the reason which is in us and that divine reason of which the universe is the expression.

Such is the substance of the conclusion, the final summary, of these elaborate volumes. Though many points here are stated too indefinitely, and though others are not at all peculiar to the German system, but a part of all philosophy, yet it seems to us that the summary is upon the whole cautious and candid. It may appear cold, in view of the theological and moral questions which are at stake; but the clear, intellectual dissent of a candid historian of philosophy, is a more influential authority against a false dogma than many an impulsive invective of those who know not the difficulty of the problems, especially when it is addressed to the members of the French Institute.

Of all the works that have appeared upon the German philosophy, this one is to be most commended. The account of these bold and difficult systems in the able and popular *History of Modern Philosophy*, by J. D. Morell, is the least satisfactory portion of that interesting work; it is less thorough, and the results of less independent investigation than are his sketches of either the French or the English schools.

M. Willm promises another volume to complete his work, which shall give an account of the later philosophy of Schelling; of the various parties in Hegel's school; the rage of Bauer and the desperation of Feuerbach; of the disciples of Herbart and Fries; of Reinhold in Jena; and Ulrici in Halle; of Weisse and the younger Fichte; of Beneke in Berlin, and others still. The whole is to be

completed by a bibliographical review of those works in German philosophy since the time of Kant, which still retain their value in the various departments of science. And he trusts that the final impression left upon the reader will be, the conviction, that "in the country of Kant, sound reason will eventually triumph over the vagaries of speculative imagination and the excesses of a haughty dialectics, which can only be done by constantly putting ourselves anew in the right position for hearing the voice of consciousness and knowing the eternal interests of humanity."

ARTICLE VI.

COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND AND THIRD CHAPTERS OF THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW.

From the German of H. A. W. Meyer. By B. B. Edwards.

[DR. Meyer is consistorial counsellor at Hanover, and pastor primarius of the city church. Nine Parts of his Commentary on the New Testament are published, embracing the four Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians and Philemon. Owing to the demand for new editions of the earlier parts, and the pressure of other engagements, Dr. M. has called to his aid Prof. Huther, of Schwerin, who has prepared a Commentary on the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, and Dr. Lünemann, of Göttingen, who has published a Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians. Second editions of Meyer's commentaries on the first three Gospels, and on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, have appeared. The later volumes, and especially the second editions, exhibit very marked improvement both in ability in expounding the text, and in orthodox views and feelings. In the Preface to the Commentary on the Colossians, 1848, the author writes: "It is the spirit of God which quickens the church; and it is the old, simple truth of the Gospel, which makes the church free, and one and invincible. On this rock, on which the church is placed, will the waves and foam of the spirits who affect another gospel than that of Nazareth, break and disappear." "The stock remains the

same as that which the Reformation drew from the divine germ of the Gospel. All life which does not proceed from this stock, is the life of destruction, the more feverish, as now, the more it is nourished only from without; and only the more dangerous, when placed, as now, under the power of the restless spirit of the times. Experience has sufficiently proclaimed, and it exists in us, that we are to grow up in conformity with the Scriptures, to that unity of Gospel faith, which, with all the variety of individual views, takes not away the unity of the spirit, and stands and remains on the foundation, which is God's living Son, his Light and Life, his Work and Spirit in his Word, which endures forever, while the fashion of this world passeth away."

The following passages will present, perhaps, a favorable specimen of the author's mode of exposition, though his views are still more conservative and sober now than they were six years ago, when the second edition of the Commentary on Matthew was published. We have omitted some comments and references as not interesting or important to the English reader.—TR.]

CHAP. II. v. 1. *Γεννηθῆντος*. The star is conceived as appearing contemporarily with the birth, v. 7. How long it was after the birth before the Magi came, appears approximately from v. 16, according to which, with all Herod's cruelty, and with his aim to make sure work, we may place the arrival of the Magi, with the most probability, somewhat over a year after the birth. *Δέ* is metabatic, serving to introduce another narrative. "Bethlehem Judah," to distinguish it from Bethlehem in the tribe of Zebulun. Josh. 19: 15. Our Bethlehem (Ephratah, Gen. 35: 16, 19) lay in the tribe of Judah, comp. Judges 17: 9, 19: 1, 1 Sam. 17: 12, six miles south of Jerusalem.¹ *ἐν ἡμέραις*, יָמֵי Gen. 26: 1, 2, 2 Sam. 21: 1; "of Herod," Herod the Great, son of Antipater, received in the year 714 U. C., from the Senate the kingly dignity, through Antony, by whom, not long before, he had been made tetrarch; but he did not attain actual possession of his kingdom till 717, after the capture of Jerusalem by himself and Sosius. He died in 750.² Magi, מַגִּי, formed among the Persians and Medes, a much respected priestly class; they employed themselves especially with the mysteries of nature, astrology

¹ Reland Pal. p. 642, Rosenmüller Bibl. Handb. II. 1. p. 123, Robinson Researches II. 158.

² Wieseler Chronol. Synop. 1843, p. 50. On the whole Herod family, Wolf Curæ, p. 60, Jahn's Archaeologie II. 1, 563, Schlosser Geschich. d. Fam. Herod. Leip. 1818, Winer Realwört. 1847, I. p. 481.

and medicine.¹ There was also among the Babylonians, Jer. 39: 3, at the time of the Chaldean dynasty, such an order, at the head of which was Daniel, Dan. 2: 48. The name Magian, was then in general transferred to all without distinction of country, commonly wandering orientals, who had dedicated themselves to those sciences.² *ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς* belong to *μαῖοι*, Magians from the East, i. e. oriental Magians. By this connection, the position of the words is the most natural; the article of *ἀπὸ*, etc., is not required, since *μαῖοι* is without the article. The indefinite phrase "eastern countries," is to be left indefinite.³ It has been conjectured that the Magi came from Arabia, Persia, Parthia, Babylonia, Egypt. But neither from the entirely indefinite expression, "from the East," nor in the kind of gifts, v. 11, have we anything but an approximately sure datum. Wholly groundless is the attempt to determine the number of the Magi, from the *three* fold gifts, and on account of Ps. 72: 10, Is. 49: 7, 60: 3, 10, to regard the Magi as kings. Are we to view them as heathen, as most, since the time of the Fathers, have supposed, or Jews? In favor of the first supposition, is the inquiry, "Where is he who is born king of the Jews;" and how consonant also was the Messianic idea that the heathen appeared to pay homage to a Jewish king? Is. 60: 3 seq.! The expectation of the Jews, also, of the universal dominion of their Messiah might have been then sufficiently extended in the oriental countries,⁴ to lead actual heathen astrologers to the Jewish capital, with the intention of making the inquiry.⁵ "Jerusalem." In the capital they expected the most reliable information.

VERSE 2. *Γὰρ* gives the reason of the question. "His star," the star pointing out his birth. We are to conceive of an extraordinary star, not before seen by them, at whose appearing, they conclude from astrological rules, the birth of a new Jewish king. From the word *ἀστὴρ*, not *ἀστρον*, and unquestionably from v. 9, it appears that a constellation is not meant. This is contrary to the opinion of many,⁶ who refer to a very near conjunction of Jupiter

¹ Herod. I. 132, Diog. Laert. I. 1-9, Aelian, V. H. 2, 17, Porphy. de Abst. an. 4, 16, Cic. de Div. 1, 41, Plin. N. H. 24, 29, 30, 2.

² Wetstein in loc., Winer II. p. 45.

³ Mt. 8: 11, 24: 27, Luke 13: 29, Rev. 21: 13.

⁴ Suet. Vesp. 4, Tac. H. 5, 13, Joseph. B. J. 6, 5, 4.

⁵ Comp. Cass. Dio. Hist. R. 45, 1, Suet. Oct. 94.

⁶ Kepler de J. Ch. vero anno natalitio, Franc. 1606, Münster Stern d. Weisen Copenh. 1827, Ideler Handb. d. Chronol. II. 399, Paulus, Neander, Leben J. 29 Olshausen doubtful, Krabbe Vorlesun. 96, Wieseler Chronol. Synop. 62, Ebrard Krit. d. Evang. Gesch. p. 248.

and Saturn in the constellation Pisces, which occurred U. C. 747; with which still, Ebrard, defining *ἀστήρ* more exactly, sees in the star of the Magi, not that constellation itself, but the *new* star of the first magnitude, which Kepler saw in 1604 at the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn, but which disappeared in 1605, while Wieseler has recourse to a comet observed in China in A. D. 750. The Jew Abarbanel¹ concluded from a similar conjunction in 1468, that the birth of the Messiah was near, and indicates the constellation Pisces as significant for the Jews. But v. 9 points only to a *remarkable* star, to one going and standing in a wonderful manner; so it is clear that neither a comet, nor a planet, nor a meteor is meant. The church fathers conceive it to be an angel.² The splendor of the star is wondrously painted by Ignatius ad Eph. 19. It was a general belief of antiquity that the appearance of stars denoted great changes, and particularly the birth of important men.³ The Jews especially believed in a star of the Messiah.⁴—*ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ*. Some translate, “in the rising.”⁵ But on account of v. 9, where the antithesis of *ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ*, and *οὐ ἦν τὸ παιδίον* obviously bring out the *local* difference; and on account of *ἀπὸ ἀνατ.* in v. 1, the translation “in the East” is to be preferred, which also well agrees with the *καὶ ἡλθομεν* following—*προσκυνεῖν*, by casting one’s self down with the face on the ground, before one, reverence and subjection were denoted. Gen. 19:1, 42:6, 18:2, 48:12, Herod. I. 184, Nep. Con. 3. Curt. 5, 2, 6, 6.

VERSE 3. Herod trembled as he feared the overthrow of his throne; the inhabitants were troubled as they expected the cruelty of their tyrant, revolutions and political horrors, it then being the belief that very sad times would precede the Messianic kingdom.⁶ *Ἱεροσόλυμα* fem. form. Comp. 3, 5, Jos. de Bell. J. 1, 5, 7, 18, c. Ap. I. 1047.

VERSE 4. *Πάντας*—*λαοῦ* is not considered by Fritzsche after Grotius⁷ as a meeting of the Sanhedrim, but as an extraordinary convention of *all* the chief priests and scribes, in order to investigate the thing more exactly. But the words themselves admit the meaning *Sanhe-*

¹ Maajne haschuah, Amst. 1547.

² “A divine and angelic power, appearing in the emblem of a star.” Theophyl.

³ Wetstein in loc., Baur Symbol. n. Mythol. II. 308.

⁴ Bertholdt Christol. Jud. p. 55.

⁵ Ebrard, Wieseler, etc. Comp. Stob. Ecl. Phys. 1, 20, Luke 1:78.

⁶ The dolores Messiae, Sanhedr. f. 98. 2. Shabb. 118, 1. Lightfoot Hor. ad Marc. 13, 19. Schöttgen Hor. II. 512, Bertholdt Christ. Jud. p. 45.

⁷ “An assembly of learned men, extra ordinem, convened by the king.”

drim, since this is denoted even without the third class of assessors, who with them are called the *ᾠρεσθῆντες*.¹ Besides, it was in the highest degree in accordance with the importance of the matter and the interests of the king, to lay the question before the Sanhedrim, so as to obtain an official solution of the same as a basis for further proceedings. Hence I prefer the common explanation "a full session of the Sanhedrim" so that all the chief priests and elders, who belonged to the Sanhedrim, are meant² — *ἀρχιερεῖς* included partly the actual, directing high-priest,³ partly those priests who had before filled that office, (for then, through the arbitrary caprice of the Romans, this honor was often changed, Jos. Antt. 15, 8) and probably also the leaders of the twenty-four classes of the priests, 1 Chron. 24: 6, 2 Chron. 36: 14, Jos. Antt. 28, 8, 8. — *γραμματεῖς*, סופרים, in Luke, *σοφισταί* and *νομοδιδάσκαλοι*, were the teachers and interpreters of the divine law, who as counsellors in religious and civil relations, mostly belonging to the sect of the Pharisees, and partly to the Sanhedrim, were highly esteemed.⁴ — *γενῆται* not in the future sense, of a certain future represented as present, Bernh. Syntax p. 371, but purely present. The inquiry was: "Where is the Messiah born?" The Sanhedrim were to say what they knew on the birth place of the Messiah. In this general form the question is to be left, in which Herod reserved wholly to himself, the question whether the birth had already happened, or was still to take place.

VERSE 6. In Micah 5: 1, which passage is here freely quoted, and not according to the Sept., the sense is, "Though Bethlehem is too unimportant to be reckoned among the principal cities, still a governor of Judah shall proceed from thence." In Matthew, this thought, with a little variation, is reversed: "Bethlehem is surely an important place, since," etc. Hence it is unnecessary with Grotius and others, to take the passage in Micah interrogatively, "Art thou, then, Bethlehem, too small," etc.?⁵ — *γῆ* only in derived sense *city*, then, and

¹ Comp. 30: 18, 26: 3; on the contrary in 27: 1, the *γραμματεῖς* are not named. See also Acts 15: 15, 24: 1.

² On the סנהדרין consisting of 71 members, the highest politico-religious court of the Jews after the exile, see Buxt. Lex. Talm., p. 1514, Selden de Synedr. Reland Antt. Sac. 2, 7. Hartm. Verhind. d. A. T. 173, Winer Realw. II, 551.

³ *O ἀρχιερεῖς*, סופרים, Lev. 15: 10. Winer, I. 502.

⁴ Reland Antt. Sac. 3, 9, 17, Lightfoot Hor. in loc. and at Mt. 23: 4. Suicer Thesaur. on *γραμμα*, Winer II. 426.

⁵ [The quotation made by the Sanhedrim is not verbally accurate. The great object, however, for which it is cited is perfectly clear, namely, that the Messiah was to be born in Bethlehem. This point only was important. Great freedom

properly the district in which the city lies. — *ἐξελούσσαι*, according to Mat. nascetur, thus, *קָמָה* Gen. 17: 6.¹ — *ποιμανεῖ*, comp. the Homeric *ποιμένες λαῶν*.² Finally, this passage, which in Micah refers to a great king of David's family, is also explained in the Rabbins of the birth of the Messiah. Schöttg. and Wets.

VERSE 7. *Λάθρα* inconsistent enough, since secrecy could only awaken suspicion, but to work privily is natural for a bad man! The inquiry for the time of the appearance of the star has its ground in this, that the suspicious Herod already thought of the possibility of not again seeing the Magi, and that then he should still have a datum for further proceedings against the fated child, comp. v. 16. — *τοῦ γαιουμένου ἀστέρος*. "Not the beginning, but the continuance is denoted." Grotius. Herod asks: "How long since the star appeared?" How long it has been visible, namely in the East, v. 9. So the Part. is to be construed as in the Present tense, not in the sense of the Aor. or Imperf.

VERSE 8. *Προσθενέρας* and immediately after *ἰδών*; these and like participles are not to be explained as Hebraistic pleonasma, but they serve, in all languages, especially the ancient, to impart, by a peculiar circumstantiality a vividness to the commencement of sentences and the by-clauses.³

VERSE 9. "After they had heard the king, they departed. A simple description of their artless deportment. — "And behold the star," etc. They travelled by night, according to the well known oriental custom. Bengel on *ἰδοῦ*, "*toto itinere non viderant stellam*." Winer, 318. — *προΐηεν*. In the opinion of some, the star did not again appear till the Magi reached Bethlehem, and they translate the verb in the Plup., *had preceded*. But *προΐηεν* is Imperf., and is never used in the sense of the Plup., and the entire theory proceeds only from the effort to diminish what is remarkable; and it is contrary to the character of the narration. The common explanation only

in the matter of quotation from the Old Test. is everywhere obvious in the New Test. "כָּל־בְּנֵי־לֵוִי in Mic. 5: 1, is pr. the families into which each tribe was divided, the heads of which were called *בְּנֵי־זֶכֶךְ* Zech. 12: 5, 6; and Mat. by meton. puts *ἡγεμόνες* chiefs of families for the families themselves, as also for the cities in which they dwelt. Robinson's New Testament Lex.—Tr.]

¹ Comp. Heb. 7: 5, Lib. Enoch, p. 196.

² Examples from the classics in Raphel, Kypke, Alberti, Wetstein and Elnner. So *קָמָה* of a governor, 2 Sam. 5: 2, Jer. 23: 2 seq.

³ Kühner Gr. II. § 666, A. 2, School Gr. Eng. Tr. p. 472. On this use of *προσθενέας*, see Gerad. Beitr. p. 103.

corresponds to the words and the connection: "The star went before them on their journey from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, and remained standing over the place (house) where the child was."

VERSE 10. *Σπόδρα*, on adverbs at the end of a sentence, see Schäfer ad Demos. V. 367, Bornemann Xen. Anab. 2, 6, 9.

VERSE 11. It is not to be said that Matthew knows nothing of the stall, (Luke,) or of the hole, (Apocrypha,) for the Magi did not come till after the birth. "The child with Mary" so naturally come together, that the omitting to mention Joseph is to be attributed to no design. "Treasures." Symbolical applications of particular gifts are arbitrary.¹ It was and is still the custom of the East, not to come before princes without presents. Gen. 43: 11, 1 Sam. 10: 27, 1 K. 10: 2, Aelian V. H. 1. 31.

VERSE 12. *Καὶ* the simple *and*, further narrating. — *ἀνταποδίδωσιν*. "An answer having been received," "being admonished by a divine response." The preceding inquiry, where it is not mentioned, is presupposed. Comp. Acts 10: 22. "Thus they had desired, or had asked." The *Pass.* occurs only in New Test. and Josephus. This direction to the Magi was not designed to secure the safety of the child, *vs.* 13 sq., but their own.

VERSE 13. *Φαίνεται*. The historic Pres. in lively, vivid narrative² — *ἕως ἃς εἶπω σοί*, "till I shall have given thee direction." — *τοῦ ἐκτελέσαι*. This construction of the Infm., with the Gen. of the article, expresses intention.³ It is not a Hebraism (ᾗ with the Infm.,) but genuine Greek, when that language was flourishing, but still more common in the decline of the Attic.⁴

VERSE 15. *Τὸν υἱόν μου* is referred in Hos. 11: 1 (cited after the original text, not after the Seventy,) to the Israelitish people, who are called in the Old Test., in the theocratic sense, Son of God, Ex. 4: 22, Jer. 31: 9. The Seventy have *τὰ τέκνα αὐτοῦ*. The *ἰσακλήσθη* here refers to the carrying down of Jesus to Egypt, and his abode there, [which must take place, in order that the prophecy might be fulfilled; [no, *ἰσα* here means, not *in order that*, but *so that*. The event took place, so that there was a fulfilment. This is commonly

¹ "They had brought frankincense and myrrh to him as God."—Chrys. "They had given gold to him as king, frankincense as God, myrrh as to him about to taste of death."—Theoph.

² John 1: 29, 44, 9: 13, Acts 10: 10, Matthiae § 504, 1, Kühner II. p. 63, School Gr. p. 337, Winer 309, Zumpt Latin Gr. p. 431.

³ *Fritzsche* in loco and *Excur.* II. Winer p. 376.

⁴ *Matthiae* p. 1257, *Berab.* Synt. 357.

regarded as an accommodation of language to our Lord, which was originally applied to the Israelites. — TR.]

VERSE 16. Ἀπὸ δυοῶν sc. παιδός, “of two years,” so the Syr. and Arab.; also Beza correctly, *a bimulus*. Others suppose *δυοῶν* to be Gen. neut., *a bimatu*. This is entirely contrary to the usus loquendi, for in all the parallel passages from the Heb. and Seventy, a masculine is to be supposed from the context, Num. 1: 3, 20: 45, Ear. 3: 8, 1 Chron. 27: 28, 2 Chron. 31: 16. The males of two years and younger, Herod, according to this narrative, caused to be murdered, in order to accomplish his design the more unerringly. He had ascertained from the Magi, that according to the time of the appearing of the star, the child must be in his second year. “In all its districts:” single houses and hamlets outside of Bethlehem, which yet belonged to its territory. — ἐναντίον, Calvin correctly: “Matthew speaks according to the feeling and opinion of Herod.”

VERSE 18. Jer. 31: 15, here freely cited according to the Seventy, treats of the carrying away of the Jews to Babylon, whose calamity, their ancestor, Rachel, laments. According to the typical explanation of Matthew, the lament of Rachel, represented by the prophet, is transferred to the murder of the children of Bethlehem, whose children are *hers*, since she was Jacob's wife, and the mother of Joseph and Benjamin, Gen. 35: 18; and this typical significance of Rachel's sorrow was so much the more present to Matthew, as Rachel lay buried near Bethlehem, Gen. 35: 19. Some think that Matthew has conceived of Rachel as the representative of Bethlehem, or of the Bethlehem mothers. But why, according to the typical explanation of the prophetic words, should not Rachel herself appear as wailing over the slaughter of those children? Now, Ramah, where, according to the prophet, the lamentation is heard, is viewed by Matthew as the type of Bethlehem. After the old expositors, Kuinoel arbitrarily explains: “The place is not indicated where the lamentation arose, but that to which it extended, so that it signifies, ‘that it was heard far and wide.’” Ramah was in the tribe of Benjamin, six Roman miles north of Jerusalem, the border fortress of the kingdom of Israel towards Judah, not far from Gibeah.¹ Here were the exiles held in custody. Jer. 40: 1 — ἐρῆρος etc., three similar conceptions are placed together, to strengthen the common fundamental idea. See examples in Wets. The old canon, that the Part. stands for the finite tenses, is false.² A simple, easy connection

¹ Reland Pal. 959, Winer Realw. II. 300, Robinson II. 815-17.

² Winer Gr. p. 395, Döderlein ad Soph. Oed. Col. 599, Fris. Dis. II. ad 2 Cor. p. 43, ad Rom. I. p. 281, Herm. ad Viger. 776.

of the Part. with the finite verb is possible with ἡρώδης or with οὐκ ἦθελε, so that καὶ would be also, "Rachel weeping—was also inaccessible to comfort."¹ The first I prefer as the most natural and most agreeable to the pathetic style, so that "Rachel weeping," follows in apposition; for the writer, moved by the gravity of the succeeding sentiments, turns from a Part. to a finite verb.²

VERSE 20. Τεθνήκασι—ζητούντας is to be understood merely of Herod. The Pl. very often occurs where a generic idea is expressed, and then denotes the object, not in respect to the number, but the category to which it belongs.³ This construction is often, specially in the tragedians, emphatic.⁴ Some explain the word of Herod and his counsellors, but against v. 19; others, of a pluralis excellen., in the highest degree inconsistent with the declaration of an angel in regard to a deceased tyrant; still others, because the words are borrowed from Ex. 4: 19. But the similarity is either accidental, or designedly chosen for the sake of the historical parallel.—ζητᾶν τὴν ψυχὴν "to seek after the life."⁵ Herod died of a loathsome disease, in the 37th year of his reign, and in the 70th of his age.⁶ The tyrant died in despair.

VERSE 20. Augustus, after the death of Herod, divided his kingdom among his four sons, as follows: Archelaus had Judea, Idumea, and Samaria; Antipas, Galilee and Peraea; Philip, Batanea, Trachonitis and Auranitis. The last two were named tetrarchs. Archelaus had the title of ethnarch, which he would have exchanged for the regal title, if he had been found worthy of it, Jos. Antt. 17, 11, 4. On account of his cruelty, he was banished, after nine years, by Augustus, to Vienne in Gaul, Jos. Ant. 17, 13, 2, B. J. 2, 73, and died there—βασιλεύσας is here used in a general sense, "to govern."⁷—ἀποβήθη, for Archelaus was like his father in a suspicious temper and cruelty, Jos. Antt. 17, 11, 2—ἐκὶ ἀσέλθους a well known case of attraction, according to which adverbs of rest are connected with verbs expressing direction towards an object.⁸ "Parts of Galilee,"

¹ On the difference between καὶ οὐκ and οὐδέ, see Hartung Partikell. I. 212.

² Kühner ad Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 30, Robbins's ed. p. 270, Kühn. Gr. II. 376.

³ Winer Gr. p. 200.

⁴ Herm. ad Viger. p. 739.

⁵ Comp. Rom. 11: 3. The Part. Pres., as often, is here used substantively, Rom. 4: 4, Gal. 1: 23, Eph. 4: 23.

⁶ Jos. B. J. 1. 23, 1, 5, Euseb. II. E. 1, 6, 8, Jos. Antt. 17, 8. 1, 17. 2, 3.

⁷ Pape's Lex. I. 365.

⁸ John 7: 35, 8: 21, 11: 8, 18: 3, Seventy, Dent. 1: 37, 2 Sam. 17: 18. So ἐκ is connected with verbs expressing direction, aim, Dent. 1: 37, 1 Sam. 2: 14.

i. e. to Galilee. The voluptuous Antipas was known to be milder than Archelaus.

VERSE 28. *Ἐλθὼν* to Galilee—*εἰς πόλιν*. *εἰς* belongs not to *Ἐλθὼν*, but to *καρπάζων* with which it stands; *καρπίζ.* involves the fact of the preceding motion connected with the settlement, and so that this fact was predominant in the mind of the writer.¹ Nazareth was in Lower Galilee, in the tribe of Zebulun, on a hill, Luke 4: 20, with pleasant environs.²—*ὅπως* not ecclastic, but *in order that*.³—*διὰ τῶν ἀποφ.* not the Pl. of category, according to which Isaiah only would be meant, but the prophets in general.—*ὅτι* not the recitative, which only introduces the words of another, Kühn. II. p. 478, but *that*, since no express declaration is quoted.

CHAP. III. v. 1. *Ἐν*—*ἐνίναυς*, Ex. 2: 11, 28, Is. 38: 1, a lax designation of time, which still always points to a foregoing date, Mark 1: 9, Luke 2: 1; here “in the time while Jesus still remained in Galilee.” Matthew leaps over the history of the youth of Jesus, and goes at once to his forerunner, partly, as he might be ignorant of this early history, partly, since he was concerned only with the leading facts in regard to the Messiah. The vague expression, “in those days,” belongs to the simplicity of unstudied historical writing, as Ex. 2: 11, where, with the same expression, the time is meant in which Moses remained at the Egyptian court; not the time of his childhood, v. 10, but of his manhood. Bengel: “Jesus dwelling at Nazareth; an interval is denoted, not brief, but marked by no greater change.” *δὲ* is metabatic—*παράγιν.* is present historical. “Desert of Judea,” Judges 1: 16, Josh. 5: 61, a tract devoted to pasturage, little built upon or inhabited, beginning at Tekoah and extending to the Dead Sea.⁴ The local notice in Luke 8: 2, 3, is more exact, but that of Matthew, with whom the wilderness is not bounded by the valley of the Jordan, is not incorrect.

VERSE 2.⁵ *Μετανοοῦντες* denotes the change of the moral feelings, which was requisite in order to a participation in the Messianic kingdom. Sanhdr. f. 92, 2. “If the Israelites exercise penitence, then they are liberated by the Redeemer.” In the mouth of John, the conception could only have been that of the Old Testament, expres-

¹ Comp. 4: 13, Acts 7: 4, Kühn. II. p. 317, Wilke New Test. Rhet. p. 47.

² Reland Pal. p. 96, Winer Realw. II. p. 142, Robin. III. 183–200.

³ [It seems, however, to be ecclastic, and to be equivalent to *ὡς ἀληθοῦς* v. 16, 8: 17. — Tr.]

⁴ Rob. Pal. II. p. 182, seq. Winer Realw. II. p. 698.

⁵ See Von Rohden Joh. d. Täufer in s. Leb. u. Wirken, Lübeck, 1836.

sing a deportment according to the moral demands of the law, but not the Christian, according to which, repentance has faith in Christ as its immediate consequence, after which the Holy Spirit received, establishes and completes the new moral life, Acts 2: 38. — *ἡ γῆ is near*, for John expected that Jesus would establish his kingdom. — *ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*, the kingdom of the heavens (the PL is to be explained from the conception of the seven heavens. 2 Cor. 12: 2,) so named only in Matthew;¹ elsewhere in the N. Test. "kingdom of God," "kingdom of Christ," or absolutely "the kingdom." It is called the Messianic kingdom, not because the words *οὐρανοί* express God, but because this kingdom is conceived as descending from heaven and entering the world, Gal. 4: 26. The common idea of the Jews in regard to the Messianic kingdom, was predominantly politico-national, with the fanatical stamp of an universal dominion, to last a thousand years; the Messiah awakes the descendants of Abraham; then follow the reign of a thousand years; the resurrection and condemnation of the heathen; the descent of the heavenly Jerusalem, and the eternal life of the descendants of Abraham on the earth, which is to be transformed, along with the universe. With Christ and the apostles the idea of the Messianic kingdom is not national, but universal, i. e. so that the participation in it is not conceived as depending on a connection with Abraham, but on faith in Christ and the moral state conditioned thereby, without distinction of nations; hence the religious and moral point of view — the idea of an actual theocracy — comes into the foreground, without the idea of the universal dominion, the expectation of the renovation of the world, the resurrection, the judgment and eternal glory, losing their positive significance, truth and worth. These expressions, "kingdom of heaven," etc., never signify else than the Messianic kingdom, even in those passages where they *seem* to denote the church, the Christian religion, etc. That John the Baptist had embraced the idea of the Messianic kingdom in its moral aspect, and free from Jewish prejudice, without still giving up the political element, 11: 3, is shown in vs. 7 seq.

VERSE 3. It was the Jewish belief, originating from Mat. 3: 1, that a greater prophet would precede the Messiah. Men generally expected Elijah; others, Moses, Jeremiah, Isaiah.

VERSE 4. *Ἄνθρωπος*, "but he himself, John, who was speaking," forms a transition from the prediction in respect to the Baptist, to

¹ Targ. Mich. 4, 8, and often in the Rabbins, Wets. p. 256.

the delineation of the historical person. "He had his garment of camel's hair," distinguishing him, and constantly worn by him. — *αἰρεῖ* is neither to be written *αἰρεῖν*, nor is it a pleonasm. It is appropriate from the position of the narrator, and is without reflexive emphasis. Coarse garments for clothing and for tent-coverings, are still prepared from camel-hair, Winer I. 645. "Leathern," not from a luxurious material, but such as Elijah wore. The dress and food of the Baptist corresponded to his stern character. — *ὀσφύς* the Sing. denotes the part of the body around which he wore the girdle. Several kinds of locusts were eaten, Lev. 11: 22. This is still done in the East, specially by the poorer classes. The wings and bones are removed, the remainder is sprinkled with salt, and either cooked or eaten raw.¹

VERSE 5. "The country around the Jordan," *יַרְדֵּן וְעַד הַיָּם*, Gen. 18: 10, 11, 1 K. 7: 37, the country on both sides of the river, now el-Ghôr.² On the custom of symbolical washings among the Jews, Gen. 35: 2, Ex. 19: 10, Num. 19: 7, and other nations, see Wets. in loc., Meiners's History of all Religions, p. 81, etc. John's baptism was not a modified use of the Jewish proselyte baptism. For the latter — the oldest witness in respect to which is in the Gemara Babylon. Jebamoth 46, 2, and about which Philo, Josephus and the older Targumists are wholly silent — was not introduced till after the destruction of Jerusalem. While the temple stood, proselytes were admitted by circumcision and the presentation of an offering, which last was preceded, as every offering was, by a lustration, which the proselyte administered to himself, as a Levitical purification. But, John's baptism is to be viewed in connection, not only with this lustration, but in general with the religious usages of the Jews in respect to washings, and their symbolical meanings. That there was an expectation of a special Messianic baptism, is improbable — *ἱερολογούμενοι*. Is a summary or a specific confession meant? one or the other, according to the difference of individuals and their relations. The compound verb marks the open and earnest confession, Acts 18: 38.

VERSE 7. "Pharisees," (from *פָּרָשׁ* to separate, the separated), received, besides the law, traditions; taught a doctrine of fate, still without denying the freedom of the will; immortality (and as it respects the pious in other bodies, not a resurrection of the body, and not a transmigration of souls); good and evil angels, and they affect-

¹ Niebuhr Reise I. 402, Winer I. 487.

² Winer I. 601, Robinson II. 596.

ed a holy life.¹ The Sadducees (from סַדּוּקִי?), acknowledged merely the written law, not the Pentateuch only, but the whole Old Testament, but with the exclusion of traditions, denied the existence of superior spirits, fate, immortality, and held to severe morals; they were in less esteem among the people than the Pharisees, against whom they formed a determined opposition; still they were numerous among the principal men and the rich.² — ἐνί the moral direction of the aim, L. 23: 48, Winer Gr. p. 485. It has not the meaning of *against*, "that they might oppose his baptism." They came with the design of being baptized, but were offended by the preaching of repentance and of punishment, Luke 7: 30. — ἐχθρ. artful, wicked men, Is. 14: 29, 59: 5, Ps. 58: 5. "Wrath to come," the Divine wrath to be poured out when the Messiah comes to judgment, 1 Thess. 1: 10. The Jews appropriated this wrath to the heathen, John to the godless, who repented not. The wrath of God is not the punishment, but the holy feeling of absolute displeasure towards the wicked, from which punishment proceeds as a consequence, Rom. 1: 18, Ephes 2: 3. — *φύγειν αὐτό* is a pregnant construction "to flee and thus remove themselves," Is. 48: 20. The Aor. Infin. denotes the action as momentary. Kühn. II. p. 80, exhibiting the point of the outbreaking of the wrath, in which also the flight is realized. Meaning: "Can no one have taught you that ye should flee," etc.

VERSE 8. Consequence from the preceding: "With your present character, ye cannot escape punishment; consequently, so conduct as is meet for those who have repented." "To bring forth fruit," a figurative expression, borrowed from a fruit tree, Acts 26: 20.

VERSE 9. *Λογίζεσθαι* is never pleonastic, and can in no place be neglected, Winer Gr. p. 697; "think not that ye may say," etc.; "in yourselves," reflection represented as the language of the inner man. comp. Heb. "he said in his heart," Ps. 4: 5, 10: 6, 14: 1. "Abraham to your father." The Jews believed that the children of Abraham would, as such, share in the salvation of the Messianic kingdom, for Abraham's righteousness would be imputed to them. "God is able," "He may exclude you from salvation, and from these stones lying around the Jordan may raise up others, who shall be Abraham's *gen-nine* children," Rom. iv., Gal. iv., John 8: 39, 40.

VERSE 10. The deciding moment is already near, after which the unworthy shall be excluded from the kingdom of the Messiah, and

¹ Jahn Archaeol. III. 117, De Wette Archaeol. § 274, Winer, II. 244.

² Jahn, II. 203, Winer, II. 252, Grossmann de Philosoph. Sadd. Lips. 1836.

be cast into Gehenna. — *καί* 'also,' 'even.' The verbs in the Pres. tense, *ἐκόντ.* and *βάλλ.* mean "what will happen immediately and certainly," with special definiteness, not the general sense, "accustomed to be hewn down," etc.

VERSE 11. "Still, I am not the one who shall decide in regard to the reception or rejection, but it is the *Messiah*. — *εἰς μὲν.* denotes the aim of the baptism, Winer Gr. p. 478. — *ἐν ὕδατι* instrumental. The opposite higher baptism of Jesus "with the Holy Spirit and fire" shows that the points indicated as instrumental are reciprocal, comp. Mark 1: 8, L. 3: 16, and that *εἰς μέτρων* is only a more exactly defining by-clause. In Mark and Luke the coming of the Messiah as such is brought out emphatically. The Pres. denotes the near and definite commencing Fut. — *ὅς οὐκ εἰμὶ* etc. "Compared with the Messiah I am too small to be his most menial slave." To carry, to put on and take off the sandals, was the office of the meanest slaves, among the Jews, Greeks and Romans. — *ἐν πν. ἁγ. κ. πνεύ.* 'with the Holy Spirit,' those among you who shall believe in the Messiah; with the fire of Gehenna, those who reject him. Both ideas are figuratively represented as "to baptize," so far as the two are the opposite aspects of the Messianic lustration, by which believers are sanctified, unbelievers are cast into hell.

VERSE 12. *Ὅς* is not pleonastic; "he has his fan, appropriate to him, in his hand, ready to use." Comp. Is. 9: 5 in Sept. *ἀλωα*, *ἡμά*, an open, circular, smooth place in the field itself, where the grain was trodden out, either by oxen, or a threshing-sledge drawn by oxen, Rob. Pal. III. 143, Winer II. 591. "The floor is purged in order that the grain and chaff may be separated, and each collected for their appropriate destination." In the image, "the floor of the Messiah," does not denote mankind, but the place where he has assembled them, and determines the separation of the judgment, Mat. 25: 31 — 33. The compound *διακαθ.* denotes the purification throughout, from one end to the other. The granaries were mostly dry, subterranean vaults. — *ἀχυρον* not simply chaff in the narrow sense, but the worthless parts of the stalk and ear, which remain after the threshing. "The Messiah will take the worthy — those who repent — into his kingdom, but the unworthy he will give over to the eternal punishment of Gehenna."

VERSE 13. *Τότε*, then, as John was announcing the coming of the Messiah, and was baptizing the people. Jesus would be baptized by John, because he was conscious that it was the will of God, in order to inaugurate him formally and solemnly as the Messiah.

VERSE 14. This passage does not contradict John 1: 33, as the latter asserts that John had not known Jesus as the Messiah, or he needed to have his belief confirmed by the visible proof of the descent of the dove. — *δικαίωλον*, more emphatic than the simple verb — *ἐγὼ χρεῖαν*, "If either of us is to be baptized, I have need to be baptized by thee as the most worthy," Grotius. "And comest thou to me?" a question expressing astonishment, for nothing was said of baptism in the divine announcement, John 1: 33.

VERSE 15. *Ἄγε, now*, allow it now. — *ἡμῖν*, thee and me. "All righteousness," everything which it becomes us to do.

VERSE 16. *Εὐθύς* is connected with *ἀνέβη*, "after he was baptized, he went up immediately." "The heavens were opened," not a brightening up of the sky, not a storm quickly disappearing, but an actual opening of the heavens, in which the Holy Spirit descends, Ex. 1: 1, John 1: 52, Acts 7: 56, Ia. 64: 1. — *αὐτῷ* refers to Jesus and is the Dat. commodi, "for Jesus." — *εἶδε* the subject is not John, but Jesus; *ἐν αὐτῷ* is not for *ἐν αὐτῷ*, Kühn. § 628, 1. — "as a dove." Luke 3: 22 says expressly that the dove descended *ἐν σωματικῷ εἶδει*, in a bodily form, which determines the more indefinite expressions of the other evangelists.

VERSE 17. *φωνή* — *λέγουσα*. We are neither to supply *ἐγέρετο*, nor does the Part. stand for a finite verb, but we are to translate, "and see there a voice," etc., Luke 5: 12, 19: 20, Acts 8: 27. *ὁ ἀγγαγρός*, the Article does not make the expression emphatic, dilectissimus, but it is grammatically required. The Divine voice solemnly proclaims Jesus as the Messiah, *ὁ υἱός μου*, which designation of the Messiah from Ps. 2: 7, in the Christian consciousness was not a mere official name, but was at the same time of a metaphysical import, denoting the *genesis* of Jesus in his spiritual nature.

ARTICLE VII.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

By Rev. Robert Turnbull, Hartford, Conn.

1. *An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century.* By J. D. Morell, A. M. New York, Carter and Brothers, 1850.
2. *Cours De L'Histoire De La Philosophie Moderne, Par M. Victor Cousin.* Didier, Paris. 1847.

FEW terms are more indefinite in their meaning, and more variant in their application, than that of Philosophy. Sometimes it is used as equivalent to Psychology, or the science of mind; then it is made to denote some particular branch of speculative inquiry, in the realm either of matter or of spirit. It is no uncommon thing to hear of the philosophy of life, the philosophy of health, and the philosophy of digestion! Indeed philosophies wonderfully abound in modern times, and one might suppose, from the prevalence of the term, that we live in the most philosophical era that ever dawned upon our race. We have philosophies of religion, of morals, of language, of rhetoric, of art, of history and of politics. In Germany, and to some extent in France, and in this country, the term philosophy is frequently used to designate ontology, or the science of absolute being; but the province of this science has never been exactly defined, and is to most persons, a *terra incognita*. Natural philosophy has a province tolerably well defined, though physical or positive science is its more common and certainly its more appropriate designation. Philosophy, properly so called, or speculative philosophy is occupied, though not exclusively, with the nature and manifestations of spirit. It transcends all physics, and is thence justly styled metaphysics.

"The first man that *reflected*," says Morell, "was the first speculative philosopher; — the first time that ever thought returned to inquire into itself and arrest its own trains was the commencement of intellectual philosophy; and once commenced it was inevitable that philosophy should continue as long as a problem was left in the mental or moral world to be solved. The primary efforts of reason to get at the ground principles of human knowledge, were naturally weak and imperfect; but as reflection advanced, the path became clearer,

until some individual of more than ordinary reflective power arrived, as he considered, at a solution of the main problems of human life, and sent it forth into the world. This was the first system of philosophy." — p. 20.

But inquiry does not stop at the human mind; all things both in the realm of matter and of spirit have their causes; and hence philosophy has been viewed by some as "that which is to explain the principles and causes of all things." Hence we may have a philosophy of all possible matters in heaven above and in earth below. Speculative philosophy may be made to cover the entire ground of human knowledge, and include both psychology and ontology. It may constitute at once the science of man and the science of God, in other words it may cover the whole domain of being and thought, and thus stand forth to the world as the science of sciences, the primal and essential philosophy of the universe. "By some," says Morell, (p. 21,) "it is termed the science of the absolute and universal; others denominate it that branch of human knowledge which is conversant with abstract and necessary truth." In a note, he says, the following definition has been suggested to me as comprehending every essential point — *philosophy is the science which reduces all things to the region of pure ideas, and then traces their connection and unity.*" He adds, in the text; "All these definitions, and many others which might be mentioned, amount in fact very nearly to the same thing. If it were necessary to make the idea of philosophy still clearer, perhaps we might say that it is the science of *realities* in opposition to that of mere appearances,—the attempt to comprehend things as they are, rather than as they seem. Starting originally from phenomena, internal or external, it seeks to discover what reality there is beneath them, what is the law of their development, and what the ground of their existence. Thus, if it treat of the subjective world, it inquires into the nature and validity of our faculties, into the true foundation of our knowledge and faith; if, on the other hand, it treat of the objective world, it strives to look through the outward appearances of things and comprehend the essence by which they are upheld; having done this, it next seeks to determine the connection that subsists between subject and object, and the common origin from which they both proceed. In carrying on this process of inquiry, the human mind can never content itself with a superstructure of knowledge which is either uncertain in its foundations, or imperfect in any of its parts; accordingly the philosophic spirit, when once begun, ever strives after a perfected system, in which every phenomenon within

or around it shall be accounted for, and every problem analyzed or solved."

In this view, philosophy must take an illimitable range. It may have a beginning, and even a progress towards perfection; but when and where can it end? When or where attain perfection? In a word, when and where can it assume the character of a true science? Every secret revealed, every problem solved, every mystery illumined, knowledge will be complete. Man, nature, God, the universe—all will be explained, without a difficulty, or a doubt! Such a pursuit may well be termed, in the honest language of Morell, "the striving of man's reasoning to comprehend the great problems of the world within and the world without, to probe their real nature, and assign their real origin." p. 22. Well, too, may Cousin say, that philosophy is "la lumière de toutes les lumières, l'autorité des autorités—the light of all lights, the authority of authorities," and exclaim, in a sort of rapture, "that mystery is a word which does not belong to the language of philosophy."¹ If some thoughtful person should here offer a suggestion touching the limitations of the human mind, and the inevitable ignorance of mankind, or, at least, the incapacity of most persons to understand even the first elements of such a philosophy, Schelling will reply, with a superb disdain: "Really one sees not wherefore Philosophy should pay any attention whatever to incapacity. It is better rather that we should isolate Philosophy from all the ordinary routes, and keep it so separated from ordinary knowledge that none of these routes should lead to it. Philosophy begins where ordinary knowledge terminates."² Language this quite natural in one who claims to be, par excellence, the expounder of what Plato calls "the royal Science."

Allowing that such a philosophy is possible in the present condition of man, allowing at least that contributions with reference to its attainment may be commenced and indefinitely prosecuted, it will be admitted that its first and most essential department must be a well-digested account of all our mental phenomena, or what is ordinarily termed psychology; and yet strange to say, Morell, Cousin, Hamilton, and other eminent philosophers, speak of such a psychology as yet a *desideratum*.³ True we have psychologies for schools and acad-

¹ Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie, p. 18, 97.

² Neue Zeitschrift für Speculativ Physik, Vol. II. p. 34.

³ Schelling, who in this respect differs from Cousin, frankly abandons psychology as utterly useless in his system of rationalistic science. To him it is a thing altogether empirical.

emies, but they are either mere compilations, or fragmentary disquisitions, or, what is worse, mere hypothetical speculations on the science of mind. A single portion, for example, of Cousin's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, in fact, a mere criticism of Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*, has been dignified with this title, and published as a text-book for schools and colleges! A most emphatic proof of the low point to which, in this country, philosophy has fallen. Rauch's *Psychology*, Upham's *Mental Philosophy*, and works of a similar character, contain many good suggestions, but their intelligent authors, we are sure, would not claim them as complete scientific accounts of our mental phenomena. In the writings of Locke, Kant, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Cousin, Hamilton and others, we have valuable contributions to the science of mind, but assuredly no complete and consistent psychology.¹ Still the great majority of philosophers, as we courteously term them, have plunged into the deepest questions of Ontology, have discussed the nature and origin of ideas, the essence and "genesis" of the universe, nay the very nature and constitution of God, and confidently published their lucubrations as systems of Philosophy! Thus we have the Subjective Philosophy of Fichte, the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, the Nature-Philosophy of Schelling, and the Eclectic Philosophy of Cousin. Yet an insatiable curiosity will lead all reflective minds to pry into the causes of things, not simply into their occasional or phenomenal, but their absolute and essential causes. The highest problems pertaining to themselves, to nature, and to God, in spite of all hazards, will engage their attention. Bold and speculative minds will sweep, or attempt to sweep the whole field of thought, and give us the true theory both of matter and of spirit. In such efforts doubtless some grand and lofty ideas may be struck out, some magnificent and finely-wrought theories projected, some ineffable glimpses may be opened into the very centre and essence of things. But surely a comprehensive, coherent philosophy of the universe, to say the least, is only an imaginary possibility, to which, thus far, we have taken only some initial, and, it must be confessed, rather unsatisfactory steps.

Be this, however, as it may, a historical and critical account of such speculations, if properly executed, must possess great interest and value, and deserve the profound study of every thoughtful mind. The materials for such a history are accumulating with great rapidity.

¹ The metaphysical writings of Descartes, Leibnitz, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are mostly rationalistic. Facts, if used at all, are pressed into the service of abstract theories.

Brucker, Tiedemann, Tennemann, Hegel and Ritter among the Germans, Stewart and Hamilton in England, and Cousin, Damiron, Saissset and Saintes in France, have labored successfully in different departments of this field. Though availing himself of the labors of his predecessors, Morell has added a valuable contribution on the philosophy of the nineteenth century, particularly that department of it which includes the more recent speculations of the German philosophers. His style is clear, vigorous and even elegant, though frequently diffuse and declamatory, and on this account, occasionally wanting in philosophical precision, though for this very reason probably more agreeable to most readers. His mind also is orderly and systematic, and his powers of analysis and criticism are certainly considerable. It is true, that his fundamental principles of criticism and even his historical arrangement of details are those, almost word for word, of Cousin and Damiron.¹ Many of his finest analyses are borrowed from these or similar sources, and what is of greater consequence, most of the results to which he seems to have arrived, are precisely those of the French Eclectic School. He has made some slight criticisms on Cousin, and taken some gentle exceptions to one or two of his positions; nevertheless he has adopted nearly all his fundamental principles, both of historical criticism and systematic philosophy. This is strikingly the case with reference to the doctrine not only of the spontaneity and absolute authority of the "pure reason," but of its *impersonality* and consequent *divinity*. He seems to be satisfied with the mode in which Cousin professes to make "the passage from psychology to ontology," and justifies the system of fundamental ideas, by which he "construes the universe." He cautions his readers against the pantheistic tendencies of Cousin's philosophy, but defends the principles from which that pantheism is deduced. If Cousin is himself to be believed, he is as little of a pantheist as Morell. Cousin distinctly affirms the existence of an intelligent and personal God.² But his doctrines of the impersonality of reason, and of the *necessary* production of the universe involve him in difficulties, from which Morell furnishes no way of escape. But more of this anon.

We have seen the comprehensive sense in which Morell, in common with most of the German and French philosophers, uses the term phi-

¹ Morell acknowledges his obligations to Damiron.

² In a Note to his "Introduction to the History of Philosophy." He seems however to use these words in a sense different from that ordinarily attached to them, as we shall show in another part of this Article.

losophy. With him it is not simply mental or moral science, not psychology or even theosophy, but all of these combined, the science of "the absolute and unchanging," the interior science of all things, the spiritual philosophy of the universe. Now, while we have serious objections to this use of the term, we will not urge them at present; we will even consent to assume its legitimacy; but it ought to be distinctly understood what it really comprehends. It goes, in its last analysis, as every one must see, into the unconditioned essence and interior constitution of all that exists, including being and thought, action and law. It comprehends the nature and movement both of mind and of matter, the last secret of the universe without and the universe within, the nature of the absolute substance, and infinite causes, in its interior essence, as well as in its external manifestation, genesis or creation of all dependent being. Its real sphere thus lies back of all the positive sciences, and of all the mere phenomena of matter and of mind, back of all the possible relations and conditions of the universe, and reveals to us the absolute and immutable Being, the ultimate and eternal law. Indeed as the created universe lies in God (for "in him we live and move and have our being,") this philosophy, in its final aim, is nothing less than the science of God — not as manifested or revealed in finite forms, but as existing in his own absolute and boundless perfection. It must not only find God, which we grant to be a possible attainment to the human soul, but so find him, as to be capable of "construing," or, as the Germans say, "ideally constructing" the universe from that simple idea or primary fact. First finding the centre of all things, and not only apprehending but comprehending it, it must thence proceed through all its radii to the vast circumference of created things, and give the metaphysical history of the whole. The place of starting, the original basis of all this generalization, of all these vast analytic and synthetic processes, the real *συν στω* of the philosophic speculator, is his own individual consciousness! The process, in fact, is double — it proceeds from the circumference to the centre, and thence again to the circumference. Its real point of starting however, and the consequent foundation of the entire speculation or philosophy, is the individual consciousness. The whole must be drawn from this, as the web of the spider is spun from its own bowels. "Accordingly," says Dr. Richard Rothe, Professor of theology at Bonn, as quoted, with approbation, by Mr. Morell in his "Philosophy of Religion," — "Accordingly the position which the speculator takes is essentially this: he falls back upon the datum of his consciousness, which has for him the most immediate

certitude; and leaving all other possible data in abeyance, *construes the universe* out of that alone, purely by virtue of the dialectic residing in it. This primary datum too for our thinking must contain in it the logical necessity of not remaining fixed in it alone, as immediately given, but of going forth beyond it; it must by virtue of its inherent dialectic break off before it comes back again to its starting point, but forms itself into a veritable system in which the Universe lies ideally included."¹

The universe, in its interior nature and original genesis—what an illimitable ocean of thought; how far transcending the range of the finite intellect, and how densely covered, to ordinary minds at least, with clouds and darkness."² That its dim outline, or one or two of its sides, if outline or sides it can be said to have, where all is infinite, may be discovered by us; that some slight excursions, in calm weather, may be made upon its broad bosom, we will not positively deny; and yet we are here using terms borrowed from the finite and contingent, which in reference to the infinite and absolute, for that very reason, have no definite or adequate meaning. For, it is not the universe, visible and bounded which is proposed as a subject of philosophical inquiry; but the universe, as invisible and boundless, not God as revealed in the finite, but God as existing in his own absolute and inscrutable essence. That the supreme cause of all things, the true and eternal Jehovah may be discovered, though never adequately comprehended, by the finite reason of man, as an existence, with vast attributes of power and wisdom, that he may be recognized as the centre of the universe, the only true object of adoration and worship, we admit; but a philosophy of such a subject, a science of the absolute, the boundless, the ineffable, where is it, how is it, and what can it be? Man is conditioned and finite; how then can he find out to perfection the unconditioned and infinite? If it exist for him as an object of faith, or of a sublime and inexplicable intuition, how can it exist for him as an object of science? Thought, however wide,

¹ Philosophy of Religion, p. 344.

² We say "ordinary minds," *ex concessio*. We might well say, "any minds." The infinite alone can measure and construe the infinite; and we know of no minds that are infinite. God alone comprehends God. Man may *apprehend* him, as revealed, but can never *comprehend* him. Even the finite absolute—the real essence of soul, or the real substratum of body, utterly elude our grasp. We may know it as revealed in forms and utterances, or by an ineffable consciousness as a simple existence, or power, but cannot adequately comprehend it. It too is a mystery. So God is a mystery, and man, his image on earth, is also a mystery. Back of all we know, ever lies the unknown.

and magnificent its range, is yet finite and conditioned. In every possible case, it involves a relation and a limit, that of subject and object; and except in the case of the fundamental elements of all knowledge, the ground principles of all science, is a deduction or an inference. How then can it grasp and so limit and comprehend the illimitable, the incomprehensible? Revelation, of course, is not to aid us in such a philosophy. That is ruled out by the very terms. It is a science, a philosophy of the absolute we are after, a science from which the very idea of mystery is excluded.¹ Our consciousness indeed has wonderful scope and fertility. It mirrors, philosophers tell us, the universe and even God, which sounds a good deal like saying, that the finite includes the infinite, the part the whole.² At all events, it has great fundamental laws or principles of reasoning, universal and authoritative intuitions, from which it can deduce what we somewhat vaguely term the infinite and eternal. By its constitution, it gains or rather *possesses* the idea of cause, and thence from the relative supposes, perhaps reaches the absolute, from the finite, the infinite, from the phenomenal the real, from the human the divine. All this we cheerfully grant; for as intelligent and moral beings we are made "in the image of God," and have "large discourse of reason, looking before and after." Faith involves intellect, as the Christian fathers uniformly teach, having its "grounds in the nature of man."³ All religion supposes God, and the Christian faith everywhere takes this truth for granted, as something already proved or admitted. But the question turns upon a philosophy of God, an absolute science of the universe, to be constructed from the facts of consciousness, the very idea of which supposes a certain limitation in the conception of subject and object. If you say it is not absolutely impossible, and may be attained at some indefinite period in the fu-

¹ "Mystery," says Cousin, "belongs only to religion." Introduction a L' Histoire de la Philosophie," p. 97.

² In this view, they call man a *microcosm*, a little universe, a universe as it were in embryo, but in such a case, the universe, however vast, is bounded, and if bounded then conditioned and finite. Reason may be a reflection of God; after all the reflection cannot measure and comprehend the reality. It indicates its presence as an *infinite* mystery — that is all.

³ Hooker in his "Ecclesiastical Polity," Vol. I. pp. 310, 311, speaks of philosophy as one of the grounds of faith, but defines it as "true and sound knowledge attained by natural discourse of Reason," and quotes Tertullian, to this effect: "Even in matters of God, we may be made wiser by reasons drawn from the public persuasions, (general convictions) which are grafted in men's minds. * * * . For there are some things even known by nature, as the immortality of the soul to many, and our God to all."

ture history of man, if not on earth at least in heaven, you will certainly admit, that it is unspeakably vast and difficult, and if all speculators for a thousand years to come should miss their way here, and fall into grievous errors and inextricable difficulties, no thoughtful person can feel the least surprise.

You know matter, you say. Do you know it except by some of its more obvious qualities? It is extended, divisible, porous, etc. Yes, but to what do all these qualities belong? What is the nature of the being in which they inhere? It exists, you say; but what is it? What is the relation between subject and object here? How much of those qualities are due to the mind itself. How many are simple forms of the intellect, or mere appearances of the sense? Where are they, and what are they, when the mind is gone? Whence came they; whence indeed came matter at first. Is it the product of spirit? Is it the creation of God? If so, what is its relation to spirit, what is its connection with God? If it had a beginning, will it have an end. And is that which has a mediate, and temporary existence, which once was not, and which by and by will cease to be, worthy of the name of a substance or an existence at all? It is changeable — it is fluent — it is divisible *ad infinitum* — it passes away! What is it, then? A phantom, or, peradventure a force, but a force proceeding from an infinite centre, a real and everlasting essence? In a word, what is it? ¹

You know mind also. Do you know it except by its attributes of thought, feeling, affection, etc? Yes, but what is mind, what is spirit? in other words, what is that ineffable something in which all these attributes inhere? Is it created, dependent, conditioned? How, and to what end? In what way is it linked to the infinite? how, above all, is it separate from the infinite? God made man in his own image, is the belief you hold. Made him! Of what? Of something, or of nothing? Made him! How, when, where? Did God make him out of his own ineffable nature? And if so, is man, too, *divine*? divine, and yet finite, changeable, dependent, and above all, sinful? He is composed apparently of two diverse elements, two contrary systems, the physical and the spiritual, or what we call the body and the soul. Is man, then, dual? and if so, how are the divine elements blended? How acts the soul upon the

¹ Morell states, over and over again, that the vulgar notions of matter are clearly erroneous; and that philosophers are coming more and more to the conclusion, with which he seems to coincide, that it consists, solely of "a combination of forces." This, at least, is the view of Leibnitz and Cousin.

body; the body upon the soul? Man has a beginning. Has man an end? His body decays, falls back to its kindred nature, of which it forms a part; what becomes of his soul? Nay, what is his soul?

You know God, O! sage and profound philosopher! His nature, you say, is entirely comprehensible.¹ Well, then, what is God? The absolute Being; the uncreated Essence—the necessary, all creative Cause, the Cause of causes, the Source of all existence, in whom the universe, we and all things “live and move.” These are good words and true. But what do they import? What is that absolute, that uncaused, that unconditioned, that Infinite, of which you speak? What is that awful, that unutterable Being of which you predicate so much? You can speak of some of his attributes and actions, as revealed in finite forms, and by that revelation *limited*, and therefore in part *concealed*; but what is God himself? Are you, too, infinite, that you can know him thoroughly? Did you lie in the bosom of his boundless Essence before “the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy;” and did you see, with your omniscient glance, the light spring from chaos at his first command? Has your mode of being any relation or resemblance to his? Can you tell how he creates, creates out of nothing, or which is the same thing perhaps, creates out of himself? How passes the infinite into the finite, the one into the many, the absolute into the relative, the immutable into the temporary, the Divine into the human? You say you are a producer, a creator, perhaps. Cousin says as much in one of his Lectures, much applauded by his Parisian audience;² but can you create out of nothing? can you produce from yourself? How can the finite compare itself, in essential relations and acts, with the infinite? If, in your imagination, you “bridge over” the chasm which seems to yawn between the relative and absolute, the creature and the Creator, have you solved the problem scientifically? Have you not rather deceived yourself by a play upon words? The infinite, the self-existent, the absolute,

¹ Cousin (“Introduction à l’Histoire de la Philosophie,” p. 96,) maintains the comprehensibility of the Divine nature, but not in an absolute sense, as he explains in a note; which is the same thing as saying, that we can know God only in part, that is by *limitation*. As revealed, we may comprehend the character and claims of God, sufficiently for practical purposes. But, the instant we penetrate, or attempt to penetrate, into the absolute nature of God, we find the limits of our powers. Cousin himself says, (“Introduction,” p. 143,) “There remains, then, in God, notwithstanding the universe and man, something *unknown, impenetrable, incomprehensible*.”

² Cours de l’Histoire de la Philosophie, 2. s. Tome I. pp. 100–101.

we recognize it and adore it; but to reduce it to a science, to construct it into an ideal philosophy, is surely not a science, but a delirium and a folly.

We are not reasoning the matter here; for this our limits will not suffice. We are merely suggesting some obvious considerations which the notion of constructing an ideal God and an ideal universe naturally suggests. "Philosophy," says Morell, "is the science which reduces *all things* to the region of pure ideas;" and which, thence, constructs for us, on the basis of consciousness, an universal spiritual science." We are certainly safe in saying that its constructions, thus far, have not proved very substantial and enduring. We think there is a true philosophy, as there is a true religion; but such a philosophy is modest and pains-taking. It begins with facts, proceeds with facts, ends with facts.¹ These it seeks in the realms both of matter and of spirit, where it reverently watches the revelations of the eternal mind; and as fact after fact, principle after principle, discovers itself in beautiful harmony, rejoices to advance nearer and nearer to the great central fact of the universe, from which all other facts spring, and to which they forever gravitate. Ideas and hypotheses, however plausible or splendid, and consequently ideal systems, however ingenious and profound, must after all give way to facts or realities. The ideal world must correspond with the real world—the ideal God with the real God. To reduce all things, or even many things, to the region of pure ideas, must involve a task more than human; for it implies a knowledge of all things to begin with, which even German philosophy has not yet attained. Some things come to us in the form of original *à priori* conceptions, enough, perhaps, to form a basis for our faith in a revealed religion, which assumes the idea of God, and enough, probably, to assist us in "the conduct of the understanding;" but in matters of such difficult investigation and boundless range, it is always best to "begin at the beginning," and advance slowly and cautiously towards higher attainments. To soar like a seraph on the wings of light, into the boundless empyrean, might be more brilliant and imposing. But whether it would be equally satisfactory in the end, may admit of question. For, alas! men are not winged angels, but plain, plodding mortals, who must laboriously climb the hill of science, and be satisfied with the expanding prospects ever opening upon their vision, as they ascend

¹ We use the term *fact* here as equivalent to *reality*. It may be a phenomenon, a relation, a cause, a principle, or a being.

from point to point into the infinite depths. That speculative science, or spiritual philosophy, is yet in its infancy, we are quite assured; and that in order to its intelligent progress, much of what, in past ages, has been dignified with this name, must be abandoned as useless rubbish. It would be pleasant to be gods; but we cannot cease to be men.

And here we beg to call attention to a most important fact connected with this matter. "The past history of philosophy," says Sir William Hamilton, universally acknowledged the first philosophical critic of the age, "has in a great measure been only a history of variation and error."¹ One system has devoured another, till the very thought of a system of philosophy, to most persons, seems little less than a ridiculous imposition. Cousin, indeed, with much learning and ingenuity, has gathered together the fragments, *disjecta membra*, of all past philosophies, and by adding several items of his own, has attempted to construct the whole into an Eclectic Philosophy, with what success we shall presently see. Certainly it appears well, and evinces great analytic, as well as constructive talent, on the part of its learned author, whose orderly arrangement and pellucid, and even splendid style, have a wonderful charm. But portions of it are so extravagant, and even puerile, that one is half tempted to believe what many intelligent Frenchmen, when interrogated as to their opinion of their great philosopher, say, shrugging their shoulders, "*Monsieur Cousin! Monsieur Cousin est un charlatan!*"²

Let us suppose the science of astronomy, or that of chemistry, to have undergone the perpetual variations through which speculative philosophy has passed, and is still passing, should we dignify it with the name of a science or a philosophy? Should we not say, as we gazed upon its multitudinous and contradictory theories, that it belonged to the "Ptolemaic era" of human thought, and had yet to enter into the true path of scientific investigation?

But, it will be inquired, perhaps, has not some progress been

¹ Reid's Collected Works, Vol. I., Note A., p. 747.

² We ourselves have no such idea of Cousin as this language implies. He has certainly great ability both as a thinker and writer. His translation of Plato alone is an illustrious monument of his learning. His style is clear, felicitous and eloquent, and his Lectures, especially, on the history of Philosophy, are quite readable and instructive. Occasionally, however, he betrays the vanity which seems peculiar to the great majority of French writers, especially those of them who claim to be *par excellence* philosophers, and sometimes falls into great extravagances. His notions on the philosophical character of England and of France, and especially of the destiny of the latter, are simply preposterous.

made in certain departments of speculative inquiry, in psychology, for example? Have not many interesting facts been classified? Have not some great and primary principles been established? Surely the human mind is better understood at the present day; the science of logic has advanced; the fundamental axioms of all reasoning have been recognized, and surely some light has been thrown upon our relations to the infinite and the eternal! Allowing this to be true, at least in a modified sense, where can we find anything like a true and coherent system of philosophy, or even of mental science, about which any original, or really distinguished investigators are agreed? How confused and fragmentary the speculations of our greatest philosophers! how empty and even preposterous some of their conceits?¹

But variation in speculative philosophy has uniformly taken a specific direction. Indeed, it is a singular circumstance, and one deserving our careful study, that its leading theories in all ages, have terminated in some form of scepticism. A material Atheism on the one hand, or an ideal Pantheism on the other, have been their logical and necessary result. There is not one of them which cannot be run into some insuperable difficulty, some absolute and even monstrous error. In all times, indeed, some philosophical thinkers have had glimpses of the truth; and others, terrified at the abyss which yawned before them, have taken refuge in some form of authoritative religion, or philosophical mysticism, in which faith rather than reason was the predominant element; but the general current of philosophical speculation has been in the direction of a material or a spiritual pantheism.

This fact is so important, that we shall be forgiven, if for the sake

¹ Let any one peruse carefully Sir William Hamilton's "Supplementary Dissertations," that particularly on "Common Sense," (Reid's Collected Works, Edin. Edition, Vol. I. p. 742,) and he will be satisfied that psychology itself is yet to be investigated afresh, and reconstructed on a firm and permanent basis. We have in Reid, Stewart, Cousin, and others, lists of fundamental axioms of human thought, but they are all inadequate and imperfect. Reid labored in this field more successfully than all his predecessors: but his works, interesting and profitable as they are, are rather preparations for a science of mind, than the science itself. Many of Cousin's analyses are striking and beautiful, but they are mingled with errors and extravagances, arising from the very nature of his fundamental theory, the aim of which is to give us a universal science from the collation and combination of all other systems. So far as we know, the Germans have not even attempted the formation of an inductive science of mind. Their labors have all been in the field of the *absolute*.

of verifying and elucidating it, we enter into some historical and critical details.

Let us begin then with the very dawn of speculation, in the ancient philosophies, vast, gorgeous and shadowy, like the countries which gave them birth. Whether these philosophies were founded upon religion, or religion upon them, is a question not yet decided — though the probability is, that they were engrafted on the popular superstitions. Religion is the first want of our nature, philosophy the second; and we have no reason to believe that this order was reversed among the Hindus. Their worship, however, was more a worship of the outward and the carnal, than of the inward and the divine. Hence, they deified the universe, and adored its ever-varying aspects. For the same reason, the speculations of the sages, dreamy and often profound, uniformly revolved about the universe as divine; and their worship, if such it may be called, was always a worship of nature, or of themselves. Cousin states decisively, that the first fruit of their philosophy, the moment it became independent of the Vedas, or sacred books, was atheism.¹ This system, which goes far back into the annals of India, was called Sankhya, the author of which was Kapila, and is an avowed system of scepticism. Coincident with this, but diverging from it, was the philosophy of Pantandjali, which, as the other made nothing of God, made everything of God. According to Kapila, all thought is derived from sensation; consequently there is nothing but matter. Opposed to this sensualistic and atheistic philosophy, was the theory of rationalism, called Nyaya, which is nothing more nor less than a system of subjective idealism. As in Fichte's scheme, the soul is the centre of this philosophy, and is infinite in its principle. True, it is distinct from the body, is a special substance, and is different in different individuals; so that this form of idealism was not at first consistently carried out. This, however, was subsequently done; so that the idealistic philosophy, usually styled Vedanta, denied the existence both of matter and of mind as finite realities, and made God the ALL. The final, definite, absolute verity, according to Karika, a celebrated commentator on the Sankhya, is as follows:

"I neither am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."

But transcendental mysticism, in which God is recognized as the ALL,

¹ *Histoire de la Philosophie*, 2 s. Tome II. p. 120. See also Tennemann *Manual of the Hist. of Ph.* p. 41.

and the absorption of thought, feeling, and even existence in him, is the prevalent philosophy in India. According to this system, God is creator and destroyer, spirit and matter, heaven and earth, time and eternity, light and darkness, beginning, middle and end, subject and object, love and hatred, father and mother, saint and sinner. The Hindu Brahm is the absolute God of the pantheistic philosophy: and although idolatry is prevalent enough in India, yet the sentence has become a proverb, *Ek Brumho ditt'yo nashhi*: *One God and beside him no other*. From Brahm the absolute abstraction, comes Brahma, an emanation of the former, and the first person of the Hindu Triad. Brahm is without beginning or end, unchangeable and omnipotent, but unconscious, without mind, without will, without action. The one, however, becomes the many, becomes Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, in a word, the visible universe. God, therefore, is all—all is God. Man is God, and like a flame, returns to his centre of heat and beauty. All things form a circle, in which there is perpetual revolution, but no change. Matter is mind, mind is matter, and both are God.¹ Hegel is mightily pleased with this pantheistic philosophy of India, and quotes with approbation the Bhagavad Gita, in which Krishnu is introduced addressing the warrior Ardjouna: "I am the author and destroyer of the universe, etc. I am the breath which dwells in the body of the living, the progenitor and the governor. * * * I am the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. I am under the stars, the radiant sun, under the lunar signs the moon, the sweet perfume of the earth, the splendor of the flame, the life in animals, etc." Hence the key for the deliverance of the soul, according to the school of Vedantam, is in these words, which the Hindu philosophers have to repeat incessantly: *I am the Supreme God, Aham, Ava, param Brakma*—the last practical result of a fanatical pantheism.²

Professor Tholuck, in his interesting work on the Pantheistic philosophy of the Persians, (Seufismus) informs us that the Mohammedan heretical philosophers, the Scoofies, teach that God is everything, in the most absolute sense of that expression—*nihil esse praeter Deum*; that the creation is an emanation of God, and that the absorption of self in Deity is the highest good. In a word their doctrine is that of a sublime but inexorable

¹ Consult Sir William Jones, and particularly Colebrooke's *Miscellanies*, Cousin's *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie* 2 s. Tome 2, Sixieme Leçon. See also Ritter's *Ancient Ph.* V. I. pp. 60-128, Tennemann's *Manual*, pp. 40-41.

² Tholuck's *Seufismus*, p. 214, quoted from *Lettres Edifiantes*, Paris, 1809.

pantheistic fatalism, in which all distinction between matter and mind, sin and holiness, God and man, is swallowed up and lost.

Let us turn now to Greece, manifestly under the influence of the oriental mind, but acute, restless, penetrating, practical and pressing philosophy, as all else, to its extreme logical verge. Given to nice distinctions and subtle reasonings, with a language rich, pliant and delicate, they seized with avidity upon the great problems of speculative inquiry, and projected an infinite variety of plausible and splendid theories. Here, if anywhere, philosophy might have reached perfection and solved the enigma of the universe. But we find it constantly vacillating between sensualism and idealism, atheism and pantheism, and finally running out into a flat and arid scepticism.

The early Greek philosophers were divided between the Ionian and Eleatic schools, the first of which was a system of absolute naturalism, and took the form of a material pantheism, or rather atheism, for a material God is no God; the second, or Eleatic school, a system of pure idealism, which ran out into a refined but equally pernicious pantheism. Thales the founder of the Ionian school derived all things from water; but whether he admitted any power superior to this, or recognized any species of God distinct from the material universe, is a matter of dispute. Anaximander advanced a step farther, and maintained that all things, or the material universe in its totality, is the only God. Anaximenes and somewhat later, Diogenes of Apollonia, maintained that air and not water is the true source of all existence, while Heraclites, the last representative of the Ionian school, found it in the more beautiful and resplendent element of fire.

According to this school the soul of man is a mere mechanical power, somewhat refined — consequently fatalism, in its direct form, was its last and necessary result.

From this school was derived the atomic theory of Leucippus, and Democritus, according to which the body, the soul, and the entire universe external and internal, are composed of definite atoms. The soul is a collection of such atoms igneous and spherical, producing at once motion and thought. As to God, they said nothing of his existence, the universe was the only object of their worship; if indeed the term worship be not a misnomer in such circumstances. They recognize nothing but matter, in its various forms and movements.

Between the Ionian school, with its mechanical universe, and the Eleatic with its abstract and idealistic pantheism, we find the Italian school, founded by Pythagoras, who with a profounder insight than

most of his contemporaries, penetrated beyond mere phenomena, and recognized the interior relations of things. But his whole spirit was cast into a mathematical mould, and so he constituted the universe of numbers, and recognized the Deity only as a numerical unit.¹

The Eleatic School was formed under Pythagorean influence. Unity being its central principle, diversity or plurality came to be despised. At last this diversity was given up by Zeno, who denied the innate energy, and consequently the real existence of the external universe. Absolute spiritualism, the most appropriate form of pantheism, was the natural result, and constituted the dominant principle of the Eleatic school, and equally with the grosser atheism of the Ionians, destroyed all just conceptions of the nature and government of "the true and living God." Still, it is quite evident to an attentive reader of the early Grecian philosophy, that many individuals were blindly seeking after God, if haply they might "feel after and find him."

These opposing schools combated each other with various success, the consequence of which was, the rise of many sceptics who despised them both, and a very few eclectics who attempted, but without decided success, to blend the principles of the two systems. Anaximenes, however, on this ground, gained some idea of a great first Cause of all things; but failed, after all, to reach a true spiritual conception of the Supreme Ruler, not only as the primary cause of all things, but as the ever living Sovereign both of matter and of mind. The principal result of these contradictory speculations was the universal prevalence of a frivolous and sceptical spirit.

At last, Socrates, the shrewdest and best of all the Greek philosophers, the friend and teacher of Alcibiades, Xenophon and Plato, who, like Reid in Scotland, recalled his countrymen to the principles of common sense, made his appearance, and by his contempt of sophistry and by innumerable casual suggestions, formed an era in Grecian philosophy.² He poured infinite contempt upon the sophists, and en-

¹ Our account of the Grecian schools is drawn chiefly from Ritter, Tennemann, Lewes, and Cousin, except in the case of Socrates and Plato, in reference to whom we have followed Plato's own works, with such assistance as we could draw from the philosophical historians referred to, and other sources of information.

² It was not, however, in precisely the same import of the term as that attached to it by Dr. Reid, that Socrates appealed to the principles of common sense. He made no attempt to ascertain the fundamental axioms of thought. He called attention only to common convictions, conceded principles, and obvious every day uses, and exhorted men to study themselves, and not be cheated by

deavored to turn the minds of men in upon themselves. "Know thyself," was his great maxim, virtue his end and aim. He had no theory, no system, properly speaking, wrote no book, founded no school: a circumstance well for him, and perhaps well for the world. He followed common sense, and the higher instincts of his nature, "the good demon," as he symbolized it, and which, in the case of every true and candid man, will evermore suggest the reality of a Supreme Being, the beauty and authority of virtue. Man is made for God, and he has only to open his eyes to see him, his heart to feel him. But, the instant he begins to speculate on "the absolute," by means of ideal abstractions, he falls into error and sin. Socrates seemed to understand this, by a sort of sacred intuition; and his glory consists in following that intuition to its legitimate, practical results. That he had better views of God, or of the gods, to use his own expression, and of the true destiny of man, than the majority of his contemporaries, cannot be doubted. But what were his real ideas of the divine nature, and of the immortality of the soul, is yet a matter of dispute. He was wise enough to know his ignorance, as he himself playfully suggests, when accounting for the fact that Apollo had pronounced him the wisest of men. Other men, he said, were ignorant, and he too was ignorant, but possibly he was wiser than they, because he was aware of the fact, and honestly confessed it! His teachings, however, obviously tended to the production of a more just and comprehensive theology than had ever prevailed in Greece. Properly speaking, he was a moralist rather than a metaphysician, and longed for some higher light than could be furnished by reason alone. Plato, in one of his Dialogues, represents Socrates meeting one of his disciples, and endeavoring to convince him that he knows not well what to pray for, and adding, "It seems best to me that we expect quietly, nay, it is absolutely necessary that we wait with patience till such time as we can learn certainly how we ought to behave towards God and man." In the Theaetetus, the following reply is made by an interlocutor to Socrates, reasoning on the immortality of the soul, uttering as it seems to us, the true spirit both of Socrates and Plato: "I agree with you, Socrates, that to discover the certain truth of these things in this life is impossible, or at least very difficult. We ought, therefore, by all means, to do one of two things: either, by hearkening to instruction, and by our own diligent study, to find out the truth; or, if that be impossible, then to

logomachy. His method, if he had any, was that of *clear definitions*, useful within certain limits, but liable to infinite abuse.

fix on that which appears to human reason best and most probable, and to make that our raft while we sail this stormy sea, unless one could have a still more sure and safe guide, such as a divine revelation would be, on which we might make the voyage of life, as in a ship that fears no danger." The death of Socrates, one of the most sublime in the annals of the world, crowned his life with imperishable glory; but even then, while serene and self-possessed, in the consciousness of truth and virtue, and hoping doubtless for something better beyond the grave, his modesty, perhaps his doubt, mingled in the touching words addressed to his friends: "It is now time that we depart, I to die and you to live; but which has the better destiny, is unknown to all except the gods."¹

Notwithstanding the beauty of his life, and the sublimity of his maxims, it is singular that under the very eyes of Socrates, and as one of the immediate results of his teachings, as Cousin confesses, sprang two schools, the Cynic and the Cyrenaic, the one resulting in a fanatical rigor, the other in the grossest licentiousness. Scepticism was defended by the Socratic dialectics under Euclid of Megara.

But the grandest development of Grecian speculation is found in Plato and Aristotle, men of vast and varied powers, but of diverse temperaments and somewhat opposing philosophies, the one tending to the inward and ideal, the other to the outward and real, though not absolutely denying either.² The God of Aristotle is a grand entity of some kind, the primal cause of all things, but inaccessible to the minds of men, entirely separate from his works, and indeed caring nothing for the universe; so that the natural effect of his philosophy, decidedly empirical in its tendency, was one of indifference to religion and final scepticism. By far the most learned man of his age, more learned even than Plato, with whom he studied twenty years, intensely acute and methodical, the author of the syllogism,³ and the father

¹ Plato's "Apology for Socrates." The following is Cary's translation: "But which of us is going to a better state, is unknown to every one but God." The import is the same, and sufficiently expresses the force of the original.

² Aristotle, who rejected the existence of Plato's ideas or abstractions, as actual entities, and maintained their simple subjective character, was not quite consistent with himself, and in the end constructed the universe of Thought, and so became, in a different direction, almost as ideal as Plato. Lewes, Vol. II. p. 126; Ritter, III. p. 176—178.

³ Perhaps not absolutely so, as the syllogistic form of argument has been found in the writings of some of the oriental philosophers, and must have been known in Greece before the time of Aristotle. Still he gave articulate form and system to this method of reasoning.

of natural history. Aristotle made a near approach to the inductive and experimental method of modern times, and yet he became decidedly rationalistic, indulged in the most subtle speculations on entities and quiddities, and finally fell into a notion respecting the primal substance, first as absolute or unknown, then as active or realized, making God the mere Thought of the universe, *objectified* in the creation, and coming to consciousness in man, a system reminding us more of Fichte and Hegel, than of Bacon and Locke, and giving birth, in its last result, to a cold and cheerless atheism.

Plato does not deny the facts of the external world, any more than the simple facts of consciousness. He starts from these, but speedily transcends them. His system is ideal and sublime. It mingles the Grecian and Oriental minds, and is not without its difficulties, and contradictions. He reduces all things to ideas, which he regards, not merely as names or abstractions, but as actual entities, having a necessary and eternal existence. To him, being and thought are identical, the process of thought is the process of the universe. He finds the summit of all things in the pure and universal Reason, whence he constructs the outward world of abstract and permanent ideals.¹ He despises the outward and phenomenal, and while he recognizes the Supreme Cause, as a real and infinite essence, he makes him so absolute, in other words so abstract and ideal that he seems to transcend all our approaches of thought, above all of affection and worship.² The reason of man is a part or a reflection of the Universal Reason, and finds its highest aim in mingling with its perfect ideal. It is fallen from its primitive state, for it existed in the past eternity, whence it has innate ideas, or dim recollections of a higher and purer being, and must ascend once more to that primitive perfection, by abstraction from the sphere of matter and sin.³ The Supreme Reason organized chaos into beauty. But as there is nothing beautiful but intelligence, and no intelligence without a soul, he placed a soul in the body of the world (kosmos or the universe) and represented the world as an animal. Being an animal, with organization, activities, life, warmth and movement; like a human body, it resembled its Creator, as human beings resembled the world, or, τὸ πᾶν ζῶον, the Universal Animal! This was the work of the Supreme Reason; so that the instant this vast animal began to move, live and think, God looked upon it and was glad.⁴

But as there was Good, so Plato concluded there must be Evil.

¹ Timæus, p. 348, De Repub. VI. 116 - 124. See also the Theætetus, passim.

² De Repub. VI. 484.

³ Phædo, passim.

⁴ Timæus, p. 36.

This, however, exists only in the lower region of matter, or the phenomenal world, from which we must make our escape into the region of perfect and supreme ideas. We must seek the good, the true, the beautiful, by departing more and more from the outward, the contingent, and temporary, into the inward, the necessary, and eternal.¹ Indeed the only true reality is the Ideal, and to mingle with it ought to be the constant aim of the immortal soul.

We say nothing here of Plato's notions (developed in "The Republic") touching a community of property, and what is more shocking, a community of wives; it may be well, however, to remark that his mind was eminently mathematical, as well as imaginative, and that his system is only a refinement, and, if the expression may be allowed, a spiritualization of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, unity being the central idea, plurality the necessary development. It is well known that over the door of his Academy he wrote: "Let none but geometricians enter here." The Pythagoreans said that "Things were the copies of numbers;" Plato said they were the "participants of Numbers." Causes, however, he made "Intelligible Numbers," that is, Ideas; and the Things which represent them, "Sensible Numbers."² God, the Supreme Reason, he represented as the Supreme Geometer, who evermore, from his own archetypal and eternal ideas, "geometrizes," or produces the universe. Doubtless, this was a prodigious advance in Grecian philosophy. Indeed it had now reached its culminating point. It never rose higher than Plato, and instantly began to degenerate. Plato is the father of Idealism. His method and principle were abstraction and transcendentalism—all things in his view proceed from God, the Supreme and Absolute Idea, and are constituted by ideas. Their archetypes are eternal as God, although, in one place he represents them as created by God. It was but a step to say that the external world is only an appearance, a beautiful but bewildering masquerade; or as Emerson has expressed it, that "God is the only substance, and his method illusion." Plato scarcely says so, but he supplies the premises from which others deduced the appalling error. An infinite idealism, consequently an absolute pantheism, is the logical and necessary result of the Platonic philosophy.

¹ Plato very strikingly develops his idea of the soul, in the Phaedrus, by a sort of "mythic hymn," as Socrates, who gives to Phaedrus his views upon the subject, calls the beautiful allegory which he recites for this purpose.

² De Republica, VII. 525, 529, Aristotle, Meta. I. c. 6—I. 7, Lewes Biog. Hist. of Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 66.

From Plato and Aristotle then we see the Platonic and Peripatetic schools rapidly rushing to absolute spiritualism on the one hand, or absolute sensualism on the other. At last, about the time of Christ, the two prevalent forms of philosophy were the stern doctrine of the Stoics on the one hand, founded on the idea of absolute idealism, and consequent pantheism with its coincident principle of inexorable fate; and on the other, the system of the Epicureans, a mechanical naturalism, which denied the existence of a supreme Deity, and resolved all virtue into a calculation of prudence, or a judicious pursuit of pleasure.

Among these, and especially among the Stoics, the philosophical Calvinists of their day, were many great and good men, some of whom, as Cleanthes, in his memorable hymn, which seems all but inspired from heaven, made occasional approaches to the highest truth, and sacrificed much for virtue, but the constant tendency was to extremes of spiritualism or of sensualism, or, as a recoil from these, to an unreasoning mysticism, or a contemptuous scepticism.¹ Indeed an absolute scepticism was the fearful shadow which constantly accompanied the ancient philosophy, and seemed eventually to take possession of the entire Grecian mind.

Scepticism, however, can never satisfy the cravings of the soul; and hence we find subsequently to the Christian era, a revival of the Platonic philosophy in Alexandria, mingled with a predominant element of transcendental and pantheistic mysticism. The oriental theosophy, too, came in to modify speculation, giving it a more pantheistic as well as a more gorgeous and imposing character. Grecian philosophy then assumed a new aspect altogether, mingling with religion and theosophy, and sometimes with Christianity, even at the moment of opposing it. Indeed it could scarcely be called Grecian at all. It was rather eclectic in its character and cosmopolitan in its aim. Both Plotinus and Proclus borrowed largely, not only from Plato, but from the Eastern Magi. Then, philosophy had some grand and imposing features, but it could not escape the vortex of the absolute, and went out in a paroxysm of mystic transcendentalism.

Wherever Christianity came, it modified the prevalent philosophy. It was long opposed, however, by the Gnostics, the speculative philosophers of their age, who aimed at absolute knowledge (*γνῶσις*), and looked with contempt upon the common Christianity, as a weak

¹ After all, Cleanthes, oppressed with doubt and fear, committed suicide.

superstition. In process of time, it grew somewhat eclectic, and took Christianity under its wing, rejecting the Old Testament, and giving the new a philosophical explanation. Every one acquainted with the subject, knows that most of the Gnostic theories were founded upon pantheistic ideas, mingled with the dualistic notions of the Parsees. God, according to their system, is the absolute Being, from whom emanate all other beings, gods, and men, in regular succession and gradation. Creation is represented, as in the Hindu mythologies and philosophies, as an emanation, pure and resplendent at its first issue, but becoming grosser and darker at its extremities.¹

As soon as the doctors of the Christian church began to philosophize with freedom, they lost themselves in the theory of emanation. Justin Martyr, Tertullian even, Clement of Alexandria, Origen especially, nay more, Athanasius, and above all, Arius, with their divergent doctrines respecting the Divinity of Christ, all lapsed into this error. Their reverence for the Holy Scriptures kept them from wandering too far into the labyrinths of speculation, but they greatly marred the simplicity of truth by their subtle reasonings and fierce polemics. They wonderfully mingle spiritual and material notions, in their conceptions of the Divine character, and the creation of men and angels.² In the middle ages, the predominant philosophy, if we may dignify it with that name, was the philosophy of Aristotle applied as a form or method of logic to the dogmas of the church. This produced an elaborate and imposing system of theological dialectics, controlled and limited by ecclesiastical authority. The schoolmen, therefore, could not well rush into the extremes of philosophical speculation; and yet how frequently is the God of their worship a mere logical quiddity, or metaphysic abstraction.

It must be confessed, that within certain limits this was an era of immense intellectual vigor among the few that did think at all. The very names of the theologians and doctors of the middle ages suggest to those even slightly acquainted with their literature, a certain feeling of respect and even veneration. "Scholasticos," says Leibnitz, "agnosco abundare ineptiis; sed aurum est in illo coeno." In truth there were giants in those days, though confined within narrow

¹ Ritter, Vol. IV. pp. 545, 607. *Histoire du Gnosticisme*, par M. J. Matter, Tome I. pp. 220-339. For an abridged statement, see same author, "*Histoire du Christianisme*," Tome I. pp. 160-178. Neander's *History of the Church*, I. pp. 366-600.

² Let any one read a few pages of Origen and Tertullian, and he will be satisfied of this.

bounds, and beating, with heavy tread, the same circle of mystic speculation. Anselm of Canterbury, who, with the profoundest reverence for the teachings of the church, ranged the whole field of the higher metaphysics, much in the imaginative spirit of Plato, mingled with the logical subtilty of Aristotle, gave the process of "reason seeking the faith," and of "faith seeking the reason." He endeavored to establish religion on the simple idea of God, and that again on the idea of the absolute, as existing in the human mind, the precise argument of Descartes and Leibnitz on the same subject, the validity of which as a metaphysical proof of the Divine existence, has been vehemently disputed to the present day. Anselm is entitled to the appellation of the doctor transcendentalis. Others followed him, some tending to sensationalism, others to idealism. Among these we have Peter Lombard, Magister Sententiarum Sapientum; Alexander Hales, the doctor irrefragibilis, count of Gloucester, author of the *Summa Universae Theologiae*; and Thomas Aquinas, the doctor angelicus, that learned and high born Dominican monk, author of the celebrated *Summa Theologiae*, and founder of the school of the Realists, called by his schoolmates at Cologne, the Dumb Ox, who fulfilled the prophecy of his master, Albertus Magnus,¹ by "giving such a bellow of learning as was heard all over the world." He was a profound thinker and a good man, being justly denominated by his contemporaries "the Angel of the Schools." Having spent a long life amid the loftiest abstractions, where ideas, as with Plato, took the form of archetypal entities, mingled with prayers and canticles, he died in peace at Terracina, Italy, saying, "This is my rest for ages without end." Still later, we find John of Fidanza, commonly called Bonaventura, the doctor seraphicus, who taught that philosophy is true religion, and true religion philosophy, and rose to the sublimest heights of mystic fervor; Henry of Göthüls, or Henry de Gand, the doctor solemnus; Richard of Middletown, the doctor solidus; Giles of Cologne, the doctor fundatissimus; Vincent de Beauvais, the teacher of St. Louis, and author of the *Speculum Doctrinale, Naturale, Historiale*; and above all, John, Duns Scotus, the doctor subtilis, that keen but somewhat arid Scotchman, or rather Northumbrian, the founder of the Nominalists, who taught that the end of philosophy is to find out "the quiddity of things—that everything has a kind of quiddity or quidditive existence—and

¹ Albert of Bollstädt, Professor at Cologne and Paris, and one of the most celebrated doctors of his day.

that nothingness is divided into absolute and relative nothingness, which has no existence out of the understanding."¹ Belonging to the same era, and climbing the same dizzy heights of philosophic speculation, were Roger Bacon, the doctor mirabilis, so learned for his times, that he was deemed a sorcerer; Raymond Lully, (Lullé,) the doctor illuminatus, a fervid Spanish monk, half African and half Arabian, who invented the logical system called *Ars Universalis*; and John D'Occam, the doctor invincibilis, singularis et venerabilis, that redoubtable Franciscan monk, who told Louis of Bavaria, that "if he would defend him with the sword, he would defend him with the pen." He studied under Duns Scotus, revived the discussions of his master, and taught with such success that the Nominalists became victorious in a dispute which, in the spirit of the times, often proceeded from words to blows.² Nor ought we to forget, in this connection, those other philosophical or religious doctors who illumined the dark ages, (so called, though not with exact propriety,) Francis of Mayence, *magister acutus abstractionum*; William Durand, the doctor *resolutissimus*; Walter Burleigh, the doctor *planus et perspicuus*, author of the first history of Mediaeval Philosophy; and especially Gerson of Paris, doctor *christianissimus*, who possessed of all the science and learning of the times, abandoned the whole for the knowledge of Christ, passed a life of great purity and devotion, vindicated communion with God as the only true philosophy, and wrote, there is every reason to believe, that admirable manual of Christian devotion, "*The Imitation of Christ*, by Thomas A' Kempis."³

¹ Roscelin, a canon of Compiègne, who belonged to the latter part of the 11th century, is the proper father of Nominalism, if indeed we are to refer it to Aristotle. But Duns Scotus and Thomas D'Occam were the great expounders and defenders of the system. Roscelin was followed by the celebrated Abelard.

² The period of which we are speaking, extended from the 10th to the middle of the 14th century.

³ For a brief and elegant account of the Mediaeval Philosophy, see Cousin's "*Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*," 2 s. Tome II. pp. 221-257. His "*Fragmens Philosophiques*," article "Abelard," ought also to be consulted. Tenne-mann's Manual will supply many particulars, pp. 218-258. Portions of Anselm's works have been recently published. They are very curious, as containing speculations and modes of expression similar to those of the French and German philosophers. Descartes and even Leibnitz are anticipated in many things. Ritter's recent work on the History of Christian Philosophy, is doubtless characterized by the same traits of accuracy and thoroughness which are manifest in his History of Ancient Philosophy. Some information, but not much that is satisfactory, may be gathered from Hallam's "*Middle Ages*," and his "*Introduction to the Literature of Europe*," as well as from Villemain's very interesting and

It is singular, but true, that nearly all the arguments and theories of the rationalistic school of modern philosophy, have been anticipated, in forms more or less perfect, by the philosophers of the mediæval period. Descartes, Leibnitz, and Schelling seem only to echo their speculations. They proceed on the same *à priori* principles, and except that the latter are less restrained by ecclesiastical notions, arrive at much the same results. Among the schoolmen, the same speculative disputes touching the nature and origin of ideas, the relation of the finite to the infinite, which in other ages led to absolute spiritualism on the one side, and absolute materialism on the other, were carried on for generations, giving rise to the rival schools of the Thomists and Scotists, the Nominalists and Realists of that thoughtful and stormy era. The practical effect of the whole is strikingly symbolized in the proposal made by some of the most illustrious doctors to canonize Aristotle as preëminently "the philosopher of the church!"¹ The great truths of religion mingled and modified by the errors of the times, were reduced, by the help of Aristotelian dialectics, to "the region of pure ideas," and then set to fighting on scientific principles. The irresistible consequence was, the prevalence, in the fifteenth century, within the precincts of the Catholic church, of a heartless and godless scepticism, making the reformation of the sixteenth century a matter of absolute moral necessity.

Previous to this, however, Philosophy began to emancipate herself from ecclesiastical authority, but it was only to rush, as usual, into the extremes of atheism or pantheism. The revival of learning in Italy introduced Plato and the Greek philosophers. The reign of

instructive "Cours de Literature." In Brucker's 3d Vol. of the Critical History of Philosophy, may be found a mass of valuable, but poorly digested facts.

¹ If Aristotle had been a god, he could not have been regarded with greater reverence in the age to which we refer. His very name was a synonyme for reason. His logic and physics, so far as known, along with the Ptolemaic astronomy, constituted the science of the church. He, not Jesus Christ, was the sun of their intellectual heavens. They made an anagram of his name, "Aristoteles" *iste sol erat*. Some one having detected spots on the sun, made known his discovery to a priest. "My son," replied the priest, "I have read Aristotle many times, and I assure you there is nothing of the kind mentioned by him. Go, rest in peace, and be certain that the spots you have seen are in your eyes, and not in the sun." Are you for, or against Aristotle? was the great question of philosophy; and yet the disputants on either side knew little of the real opinions of the immortal Stagyræ. A more ample study of his works has discovered more points of resemblance to Plato and the Pythagoreans than most persons even now dream of.

Aristotle and the schoolmen began to wane. The change was hopeful, but blind, irregular, spasmodic. Much generous enthusiasm prevailed, and some grand truths were dimly descried, or passionately grasped. But the most vigorous and independent thinkers of the new era, called the revival of philosophy, the Picos, the Telesos and the Brunos, most of them, if not material pantheists, or rather atheists, were ideal pantheists. On the side of the naturalists and materialists, we have Pompanato, Achillini, Cesalpini, Vanini, Campanella, with a strong tendency to atheism, indeed, with a decided leaning, in some cases, to this horrible dogma. On the side of the idealists, the two Picos de la Mirandola, Ramus, Patrizzi, Marsilio, Ficino and Giordano Bruno with a decided tendency to pantheism. Giordano Bruno, the most celebrated of these, the most original and enthusiastic, and withal, the martyr of his school, rushed into the boldest and most extravagant idealism. He maintained the absolute unity and identity of all things, and adored *the All* as the true and eternal God.¹

¹ Giordano Bruno was born in 1550, ten years after the death of Copernicus, in the vicinity of Naples, and was publicly burned, by order of the Inquisition, at Rome, on the 17th of February, 1600. He was "a true Neapolitan child," with many faults, fierce, fervid and fickle, like its burning atmosphere and volcanic soil, yet brave, generous and confiding, full of poetry and passion. Indomitable and restless, he threw off the restraints of custom, rejected the Aristotelian philosophy, and in Italy, Germany, France and England, did battle for what he thought the truth. He was now earnest and sublime, then witty and facetious, and anon extravagant and even licentious. At times he seems more of a buffoon than a philosopher. Everywhere he created a prodigious sensation, and made more foes than friends. He especially hated Aristotle, and as the Aristotelians made the world finite, he declared it infinite, subject to an universal and eternal revolution; the Aristotelians defended the immobility of the earth, Bruno, following Copernicus, pronounced for its rotation. Pythagoras, Plato and Plotinus were his favorite authors. He believed in God, as Spinoza did, but that God was the one substance, the one intelligence, of which all the forms of matter, and all the energies of mind are but modes and manifestations. As thought is distinct from the mind in which it exists, so the universe is distinct from God, in whom it exists. It is not, therefore, created or made, it simply exists, as the energy or embodiment of God. He informs it, lives in it, as the cause of causes, the energy of energies. Diversity is the manifestation of identity. God is in all — God is the all — all, therefore, is divine. It comes from God, returns to God. In a word, God is the universe, the universe is God. He is the whole, we and all things are the parts. He is the Being of beings, the Unity of unities, without whom is nothing, besides whom is nothing. "*Deus est monadum Monas nempe entium entitas.*" These views are developed, though not in systematic or logical order, in his two principal works, *De la Causa*, and *De l'Infinito*.

The germ of Leibnitz's *Monadology* may be found in Bruno. Spinoza, it is sup-

The Reformation under Luther and Zuingli effected a prodigious change in the study of philosophy. Luther called the attention of men to the simple Word of God, as Bacon subsequently called them to the study of nature, as the great field whence the facts and doctrines of Christianity were to be derived. He denounced the authority of Aristotle as well as the authority of the Pope, and vindicated the great Protestant doctrine of rational and thorough investigation. This suggested the true method of philosophy, and Bacon therefore followed, by calling men from vague and abstract speculations and theorizings, to the study of nature and of themselves, and founded science upon the simple methods of experiment and observation.¹ His attention, however, was directed less to the study of the mental than of the natural world, though by no means insensible to the value and importance of the former. Induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, on the basis of fundamental axioms, formed the simple but sublime circle of his method, the method of nature and of God.²

Hobbes of Malmesbury immediately followed, and attempted to apply the same method, though with a vague and imperfect conception of its nature, to the study of mind. Misunderstanding its most essential principles, he began to theorize like all his predecessors, and fin-

posed, borrowed from him some of his principal ideas. The immanence of God in the universe, and the distinction so much insisted upon by Spinoza, between *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*, are found in Bruno. Schelling has entitled one of his works, *Bruno*, and makes no secret of his admiration for his Italian prototype. It is a curious fact that Bruno, like Descartes, makes what is clear and evident to the mind the criterion of truth, a principle which forms the basis of Spinozism. At the stake, Bruno welcomed death as a passage to a higher life, a transition from the finite to the infinite. More of a poet than a philosopher, he was, like many of his countrymen, a wayward child of genius, in whom the good and the bad were strangely mingled. His method is imagination, his reasoning, rhapsody. Hence he says himself, "*Philosophi quoad modo pictores atque poetae*," an honest confession, to which he adds with simplicity, "*Non est philosophus nisi fingit et pingit*."

¹ Stewart's *Dissertations*, pp. 80, 81, 82.

² The method of Bacon is often spoken of by the speculative philosophers of Germany, as if it were that only of classification, which certainly would make it empirical enough. This would give us only phenomena, in their most outward forms, and never lead to the knowledge of nature as a system of forces. Bacon's organism uniformly proceeds upon the fundamental notion of *cause* or *power*, and gives us not only phenomena but principles. It recognizes spirit as well as matter, and gives as its last result, the idea of spiritual forces, in other words, of a supreme and eternal God, the Cause of causes, who is "above all, through all, and in all."

ished his speculations, by giving to the world, in language of surprising clearness and force, a system of absolute materialism and fatalism. In his view, the one great fundamental fact of mind is sensation, a result produced by "the impact of material objects around us upon a material organization, which men call mind." Atheism of course naturally results from such a system. With one fell swoop, it extinguishes all religion and virtue. But as religion and virtue are both necessary to society, Hobbes proposes to secure them by physical force, that is by an absolute civil despotism, in the hands of the reigning monarch!¹ Hobbes however was speedily eclipsed by Locke, one of the greatest, if not the greatest of the metaphysicians whom England has produced. Of great acumen, vigor and comprehensiveness of mind, patient, candid and sagacious, he succeeded in throwing new light upon the whole subject of mental philosophy. Religious, too, with great reverence for the teachings of Revelation and a proper estimate of the limits of the human mind, he never permitted himself to fall into those extravagances into which the majority of his predecessors plunged. Still his generalization was altogether too narrow; and he either denied or explained away some of the most fundamental facts of mind. Right in rejecting the innate ideas of Descartes, he did not perceive the great primal truth which underlies the unfortunate nomenclature of the French philosopher, and resolved all the facts of mind, into a modification of sensation and reflection. He was not a mere sensationalist, as some of the German and French Philosophers affirm, far from it. Practically he was a spiritualist, and recognized the great interior facts of our spiritual and moral nature, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.² But falling, at the very outset, and before the existence of anything like a thorough psychology, or even the slightest investigation of the phenomena of mind, into a speculation on the origin of our ideas, and making reflection though a spiritual power, dependent for its action and its materials upon mere external phenomena, or the simple facts of sensation, without the capacity of transcending them, except by artificial inference, he constructed a system of philosophy which easily gave rise to a narrow and sensual materialism. For if the mind, however vast its reflective powers, or beautiful and elaborate

¹ Hobbes' views, philosophical and political, are developed in his work entitled, *Leviathan*, respecting which, see Stewart's "Preliminary Dissertations, Part I. pp. 98-105. Notes p. 238.

² In proof of this we might cite page upon page of the "Essay on the Human Understanding," but it is unnecessary.

its combinations, has no absolute intuitions or fundamental principles of common sense, as the Scottish philosophers call them, primitive and authoritative axioms of belief, independent of all external matter and the mere sensations or impressions thence derived, it can never reach the real, the spiritual, and especially the unconditioned and the infinite, or if it reach them, can never prove their existence. No combination of sensations or even of reflections, however modified and exalted, can give us the idea of absolute cause or ultimate power, far less of spiritual unity, infinity and eternity, in other words of God and the universe, and the relations between them as cause and effect.

It is not therefore matter of surprise, if in England the principles of Locke, in the hands of less scrupulous men, and particularly of the deistical writers as they are called, perhaps improperly, for they are less deistic than atheistic, were used to defend all the errors of sensualism and fatalism. "Collins aimed chiefly at establishing upon a firm basis the doctrine of necessity; Dodwell struck out boldly into the path of materialism, while Mandeville, assuming with Locke that there are no innate principles in the human mind, dealt a mischievous blow at all moral distinctions."¹

The principles of Locke are not indeed to be confounded with those of such narrow materialists as Hartley, Horne Tooke, Priestley and Darwin; nor is he to be regarded as responsible for their aberrations; for Locke distinguishes between sensation and reflection, as sources of our ideas, and vindicates the existence of spiritual and moral realities.² But upon this point he does not always express himself with equal clearness and precision; occasionally he forgets his own distinctions, and everywhere rejects the absolute and intuitive character of our primary or fundamental convictions. In a word his system supplies no means of actually proving on scientific principles, the very foundations of our belief in the reality of a spiritual and moral world. In the last analysis he makes the mind dependent upon the senses, and its highest generalizations mere combinations of observation and experience. In this respect he went far beyond Bacon himself, who in his "*Advancement of Learning*," insists upon the reality and supremacy of a spiritual, or what he calls a primal and divine philosophy.³

Against the principles of the materialists we find in England many ingenious and profound thinkers uttering a loud and earnest protest.

¹ Morell, *Hist. of Philos.* p. 96.

² Works, Vol. I. pp. 78—92. Stewart's *Dissertations*, Part II. pp. 32—87.

³ Works, Vol. I. B. II. pp. 193—195.

Among these Shaftesbury, Cudworth, Clarke and More, are especially distinguished, both by learning and genius. But it was Berkeley, the amiable and gifted Bishop of Cloyne, good as well as great, who revolted from them most strongly; so strongly indeed as to rush into the opposite extreme of spiritualism. With much originality, subtilty and vigor of mind, and a style of great clearness and vivacity, he demolished the ordinary arguments for the palpable existence of the material world. Assuming one of the grand errors of all preceding philosophy that our knowledge of the external world is mediate and not immediate, representative and not presentative, a something as it were figured to us by the mind, and standing for the outward fact, which we can never know; in a word, that all our knowledge, according to Locke, consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness, he showed, on the clearest and most logical principles that the existence of matter separate from the mind can never be proved, and thus cut the roots, as he supposed, of materialism, fatalism and atheism. Berkeley was too acute to deny the actual existence of the external world; nay he was willing to accept it for all practical purposes; all he maintained was the impossibility of proving its existence as separate from mind or independent of spirit.¹ Mind in his view, is first, is fundamental, is real, is the only thing real and fundamental; and matter, if it exists at all, is dependent upon it, receives its costume and coloring, nay its very being and reality from mind. Pure and ethereal himself, he exulted in the idea of the apparent and evanescent character of all gross and outward things; for along with these he saw vanishing all infidelity and sin. In the pure, spiritual or ideal world still left, his lofty and reverent soul, guided and controlled by Revelation, saw nothing but God and truth and duty, radiant, immutable and immortal. Others however, less pure and reverent, and it may be, still more thorough and logical in their reasonings, saw these sublime realities, based upon mere subjective principles, and determined by the action of the individual soul passing away with the dreams of fancy, or sinking in the abyss of an absolute spiritualism.

Starting from precisely the same premises, but pursuing a different route, Hume, cold, subtle and profound, disproved the real connection between cause and effect, and the consequent existence of the

¹ Hence he says (Principles of Human Knowledge, §§ 35, 6, 7—40) "That the things which I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, *really exist*, I make not the least question. * * * That what I see, hear, and feel, doth exist, i. e. is *perceived* by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being."

supreme God, as he well might, if cause is to be regarded as a mere subjective notion of the finite mind, without a corresponding reality in the nature of things, and thus left nothing in the world of matter or mind but an universal, all-devouring scepticism.¹

The Scottish mind, generally practical and sagacious, and withal enamored of the ideal and the divine, as the real basis of human thought, and the true source of all that is highest and purest in man, was shocked at these aberrations, and uttered against them a vehement protest. The most distinguished philosophers of Scotland, Hutcheson, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton, while admiring both Locke and Hume, have been wonderfully preserved from the extremes of absolute naturalism and absolute spiritualism.² In consequence of this, the views of Hume were never permitted to take root in the national literature. Indeed, it is to Reid, a Prebyterian clergyman, and professor in Glasgow University, to whom the honor is due of demolishing the representative theory, and thus refuting the opposite errors of Berkeley and Hume. But these distinguished thinkers have been preserved from error and extravagance chiefly by confining themselves to a patient investigation of mental and spiritual phenomena, and steadily eschewing all attempts at ontological speculation. While others, with more venturous wing, have been soaring into the empyrean of absolute thought, or rather perhaps plunging fruitlessly into the awful depths of mystic speculation, these modest but acute and learned men, have been opening the secret chambers of the spirit, and revealing, in a calm and steady light, the secret laws and processes of the intellect, the conscience and the heart. How firmly and loftily has Sir William Hamilton, the last and the greatest of these intellectual giants, while mastering all philosophies, ancient and modern, and apparently more at home amid the speculations of transcendentalism, than the transcendentalists themselves, for the last twenty or thirty years, resisted all the seductions of ontological speculation. Grasping with the ease of a Titan, the whole mass of philosophical investigations, he has calmly pursued his inquiries, without projecting a single theory, or hinting at the possibil-

¹ Hume's views are developed partly in his "Essay on Human Nature," but chiefly in his "Enquiry into the Human Understanding." His scepticism is brought out chiefly in the 12th section of the "Enquiry."

² Brown, with great powers of analysis and a towering imagination, was caught in the snare of Hume's speculation on cause and effect, and if he did not fall into it, approached the very borders of the abyss. His elaborate work on "Cause and Effect," is a splendid failure.

ity even of a philosophical system. And yet we hesitate not to say that he is the only man since the days of Reid, who has made anything like effective and solid contributions to the science of mind. Others have speculated, in many cases with much learning and genius, but so far as we know, without adding anything essential to mental philosophy, or the solution of the vast problems of the finite or the infinite nature.¹

It must be confessed, however, that in England and Scotland, the speculations of Locke, while quickening the national mind, and enlarging the boundaries of mental and moral inquiry, have checked the influence of a higher and more spiritual philosophy, and too often stifled the aspirations of a heaven-born faith. They have originated and perpetuated a system of arid and secular morality, and run out into the gross and vapid utilities of Priestley and Bentham.

But it is in France especially that the material philosophy has been expounded and applied in its baldest and grossest forms. By a singular, but not unnatural, perversion, claiming Locke as its father, it proceeded, in that country, by a gradual process, to the most monstrous extremities. Denying not only the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, but the common obligations of morality, it found its natural result in the horrors and impieties of the first revolution.—Taken up, in the first instance by Gassendi and Condillac, both of them ecclesiastics, and men of talent, who derived all knowledge from sensation and all virtue from expediency, it was carried out by Helvetius, Condorcet, and the Baron D'Holbach, whose "*Système De La Nature*," Voltaire himself pronounced to be "illogical in its deductions, absurd in its physics, and abominable in its morality."²

According to these philosophers nothing is real which does not appeal to the senses; the soul itself is the effect of animal organization, thought the product of the brain as chyle is of the stomach, the universe a huge machine, moved forever by inexorable fate, man a link in the vast and interminable chain of revolutions, life a bubble which floats for a brief hour on the heaving bosom of nature and then sinks back into the abyss, morality the interest of the individual or the State, God the phantom of a diseased imagination, and immortality

¹ In moral science some advance, we think, has been made. Jacobi, Jouffroy, F. Schlegel, Vinet, Mackintosh, and Wayland have done good service in this department.

² Morell, *Hist. of Philos.* p. 112. See Damiron, "*Histoire de La Philosophie en France*."

the dream of a fanatic superstition! A system this, if system it can be called,

"Which leans its idiot back
On folly's topmost twig."¹

The Revolution, like a fire fed by the combustibles which it consumes, swept away these extravagant notions; and a better era dawned upon France. A great reaction ensued, in favor of a more spiritual philosophy, which has received its present development in the eclecticism of Victor Cousin. It leans, however, to the absolute idealism of Germany and is yet crude and imperfect in its principles and forms. Materialism, too, is far from being extinct in France. It lingers among many of her celebrated thinkers, and has been defended, with great learning and ability, by Auguste Comte, who finds nothing in the universe around him or within him but laws and phenomena.² Profoundly versed in natural science, he renounces the idea of a providence and a God as the greatest hindrance to science, and constructs the universe from a vast generalization of mechanical forces. The idea of an ultimate or a final cause has escaped from his investigations, and his universe is nothing but a vast and eternally revolving machine, without mind or heart, without end or aim. Man quivers, for a moment, on the wheel of fate, and is then swept into the vortex of all-creating, all-devouring law!

Leaving much that might be said upon these and kindred facts, as developing the progress and results of the materialistic or sensational philosophy, we proceed now to consider the more spiritual philosophy of continental Europe, including France and Germany, certainly the most brilliant page in the history of speculative inquiry. It has called into action all the resources of the human mind, and has passed through all conceivable changes of truth and error, now bathing its wing in the very light of God, and anon plunging amid the horrors of abysmal night.

Descartes, with a mind profound, energetic and free, spurning the restraints of custom and authority, and fired by a noble ardor to comprehend the nature of things, has been recognized, on all hands, as the father of the true philosophy of the human mind.³ Less saga-

¹ The essence of the sensual philosophy is all contained in the following sentence from Cabanis, "*Les nerfs voilà tout l'homme*" — *the nerves are the whole of man!*"

² "*Philosophie Positive*," Par Auguste Comte.

³ Stewart, Cousin and Morell equally concede to him this character.

cious, indeed, than Locke, and really contributing less to the stock of human knowledge, he saw, with great clearness, the vast distinction between mind and matter, and commenced his studies with a purely psychological and inductive method. He did not, indeed, carry out with full consistency, his own fundamental principles of inquiry, and finally lapsed into some egregious errors. At first he refused to take anything for granted not proved by the facts of consciousness; but at last seemed to take everything for granted; so that D'Alembert is justified in saying, that "Descartes began with doubting of everything and ended in believing that he had left nothing unexplained."

As nature is to be studied in itself, and by means of simple observation; so Descartes justly concluded that mind is to be studied in itself, and by means of consciousness, or conscious reflection.¹ "*His Cogito ergo sum*," though a *petitio principii*, on the ground that the *I think*, involves and indeed expresses the *I am*, after all furnished him with the fundamental principle of all mental and spiritual science. For, of whatever we doubt, we cannot doubt that we doubt. Conscious personality is involved in every mental act, and consciousness therefore must supply us with the facts of mind. Psychology, therefore, or a well digested account of our mental phenomena, must form the basis of all speculation as to the nature and destiny of mind.²

On this ground, Descartes asserted the pure spirituality or rather immateriality of mind, for spirituality is only the negation of what we term material qualities, and thus did an immense service to the cause of truth. This, however, with slight exceptions, is about the whole amount of his contributions to mental philosophy. His theory of innate ideas, as explained by himself, the criterion of which he makes clearness and distinctness, a criterion manifestly inadequate if not absolutely false, led him to assert the validity of every notion lying clearly and distinctly in the mind.³ Here, therefore, he found the idea of the absolute and infinite, that is of God, and concluding that such an idea could not come from finite nature; though infinite and absolute are but the simple negation of finite and relative; he concluded that it was a necessary idea, an idea from God himself, and therefore proving *à priori*, that is an absolute way, the Divine existence.

But how do we prove the existence of the external world, as well as the existence of God? In other words, how do we prove the

¹ "Meditations Metaphysiques"—Première Meditation.

² "Meditation seconde." Oeuvres (Ed. Charpentier), pp. 68, 77.

³ Meditation Quatrième, p. 93.

finite reality as well as the infinite reality? This, too, exists in the mind clearly and distinctly, and it is not to be supposed, argues Descartes, forgetting utterly his inductive or psychological method, that God would deceive us in such a matter, he concludes that the external world has a real and not merely apparent or phenomenal existence.¹ Our mental faculties prove the existence of God, and the existence of God proves the validity of our mental faculties, is the vicious circle which throws inextricable confusion into the Cartesian philosophy.²

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE IX.

REMARKS ON THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW. VOL. XXII. NO. IV. ART. VII.

By *Edwards A. Park*, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary.

IN the *Biblical Repertory* for October, 1850, has been published a Review of the last Convention Sermon delivered before the Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts. Some admirers of this Review have published the remark, that no one can mistake "the hand" that is in it, and have fitly characterized its author as "one of the most accomplished Reviewers in the country." As it is said to have emanated from a well-known theological instructor; as it suggests some grave questions of rhetoric; and as it illustrates various evils incident to anonymous criticism, it seems entitled to a dispassionate regard. There is no need, however, of canvassing all the principles, right and wrong, which are advanced in the Review, nor of commenting on *all* the wrong impressions which it makes, with regard to the sermon. We shall content ourselves with noticing a few, as specimens of the many mis-statements into which the critic has inadvertently lapsed.

It is a familiar fact, and one of great practical importance, that there are two generic modes of representing the same system of religious truth; the one mode suited to the scientific treatise, the other to the popular discourse, hymn book, liturgy. They differ not in language *alone*, but in several, and especially the following particulars: first, in the images and illustrations with which the same truth

¹ *Meditation Quatrieme*, p. 93.

² *Meditation Cinquieme*—particularly the close, pp. 107, 108.

is connected; Reinhard's Dogmatic System, for instance, not admitting the fervid imagery which glows in his eloquent discourses; secondly, in the proportions which the same truths bear to each other: Van Mastricht's scientific treatise, for example, giving less prominence to some, and more to other doctrines, than would be given to them in the earnest sermons of Krummacher; thirdly, in the arrangement of the same truths; Turretin's arrangement not being adapted to the ever varying wants of men, women, and children; fourthly, in the mode of commending the same truth to popular favor; a treatise of Ralph Cudworth, depending on nice distinctions and scholastic proofs, but a practical sermon of John Bunyan, depending on a bold outline and the selection of a few prominent features which win the heart at once; fifthly, in the words, and collocations of words used for expressing the same class of ideas; the truths in Ridgeley's *Body of Divinity* not being clothed in the language proper for an impassioned exhortation, or for popular psalmody. The design of the sermon under review is, to develop some practical lessons suggested by this plain distinction between these two modes of exhibiting one and the same doctrine.

One of these lessons is, the necessity of the preacher's enlivening a single abstract doctrine by concrete exhibitions of it; as, for example, the doctrine of eternal punishment, or of the general judgment, or of the resurrection, by images of the fire; darkness, worm, gnashing teeth, throne, open books, palm branch, white robe, etc. etc.¹ Another of these lessons is, the importance of inferring certain great doctrines from their congeniality with constitutional or pious feeling, and of ennobling the manifestation of this feeling by the clear statement of those doctrines.² The expressions of feeling are premises from which the intellect must deduce important corollaries; while it must not force upon these expressions the meaning which might be derived from a rigid analysis of them, but, making allowance for their unguarded terms, must penetrate into their substantial import. So far from its being a design of the sermon to deny that "truth is in order to holiness," as a reader of the *Review* would infer, a design of the sermon is rather to show that "every doctrine which [the intellect discovers in the Bible or in nature] is in reality practical, calling forth some emotion, and this emotion animating the sensitive nature which is not diseased, deepening its love of knowledge,

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 540-542. Throughout this article reference is made to the edition of the sermon in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1850.

² Bib. Sac. pp. 542-546.

elevating and widening the religious system which is to satisfy it. Every new article of the good man's belief elicits love or hatred, and this love or hatred so modifies the train and phasis of his meditations as to augment and improve the volume of his heart's theology."¹

Instead of its being a tendency of the sermon to discountenance logical studies, one object of it is to show that "we lose our civilization so far forth as we depreciate a philosophy truly so called;" and "our faith becomes a wild or weak sentimentalism, if we despise logic," p. 543. Instead of the sermon's being adapted, as the Review implies, p. 660, to represent 'diversities of doctrinal propositions as matters of small moment, and make light of all differences which do not affect the fundamentals of the Gospel,' it reiterates the idea in various forms, that the "metaphysical refinements of creeds are useful," that "our spiritual oneness, completeness, progress, require" us to "define, distinguish, infer, arrange our inferences in a system," and that although "there is an identity in the *essence* of many systems which are run in scientific or aesthetic *moulds* unlike each other," yet even some of these unessential differences are more important, others less so, than they seem. Hence is inferred the duty "to argue more for the broad central *principles*, and to wrangle less for the side, the party *aspects* of truth," and to guard against what Dr. Hodge calls "a denunciatory or censorious spirit," which "blinds the mind to moral distinctions, and prevents the discernment between matters unessential and those vitally important."²

Many pious men are distressed by the apparent contradictions in our best religious literature, and for their sake another practical lesson developed in the discourse is, the importance of exhibiting the mutual consistency between all the expressions of right feeling. The discrepancies so often lamented are not fundamental but superficial, and are easily harmonized by exposing the one self-consistent principle which lies at their basis.³ The assertions, for example, that God repents of having made our race and that he never repents, although contradictory in themselves, are not so in their fit connections; for they refer not to the same specific truth, but to different truths, both of which, however, may be reduced to the same ultimate principle,

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 543.

² See Hodge on Rom. 14: 1-23, also Bib. Sac. pp. 543, 559-561. It may be stated here, once for all, that whenever quotations are made in this article from the Review, or from the sermon, the writer has introduced his own italics, for the purpose of making this article the more definite.

³ Bib. Sac. pp. 546-550.

that the changeless God is disposed to punish sin. So the assertions God is a rock and God is a Spirit, are contradictory if interpreted as divines often interpret language, by its letter, but they are not contradictory if interpreted as divines ought to interpret language, by its intent; for they relate not to the same specific idea, but to different ideas, both of which, however, may be reduced to the same ultimate principle, that the immaterial Divinity is a strong and sure support of his people.

Numerous and serious errors arise from understanding figurative expressions as if they were literal, and from transferring prosaic, vapid formulas, into sacred songs, fervent prayers, pathetic appeals. For this cause another practical lesson developed in the sermon is, the importance of keeping in their appropriate sphere the two modes of expressing truth, and the importance of appreciating the evil which results from unduly intermingling them.¹ Much of this evil finds its way into the religious character of men. Every controversial essay exposes it. Every day we see that the careless intermixture of the two forms of truth "confuses the soul," raises feuds in the "church," encourages "*logomachy*," "makes men uneasy with themselves and therefore acrimonious against each other," causes them to "sink their controversy into a contention and their dispute into a quarrel," etc. Often "the massive speculations of the metaphysician sink down into his expressions of feeling and make him appear cold hearted, while the enthusiasm of the impulsive divine ascends and effervesces into his reasonings, and causes him both to *appear* and to *be*, what our Saxon idiom so reprovably styles him, hot-headed." Sermon, p. 553. We have no right to press our dogmas so far as to check the natural tendency of men to use language which, if interpreted according to the letter, is not correct. We must allow them to say that the sun rises and the fire is hot. An eminent and excellent divine once commenced an epistle to a friend with the exhortation not to pray for power to do right, because all men have this power but are merely disinclined to use it; and he closed the letter with an affectionate petition that his friend might be *enabled* to discharge his duty in this respect. The feelings *will* express themselves in words which the intellect left to itself would never have devised. We must do justice to these feelings. Let them have free play. This, however, is no excuse for inferring from the language of emotion, that the idea denoted by the literal interpretation of that language is the truth. If

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 550—558.

so, the Romanists have gained their controversy and Galileo was rightly proscribed. We must not build a fortress of polemic theology on a mere flower of rhetoric; if so, we do not consolidate the fortress, and we crush the juices out of the flower. How much of theological mysticism has resulted from regarding the stanza of Cowley, that with God

"Nothing is there to come, and nothing past,
But an eternal *now* does always last,"——

as if it were a scientific formula, not less exact than poetical? How much of ethical error has arisen from interpreting the fervid exhortation, that impenitent sinners should pray for grace to put forth their first holy choice, as if this exhortation were designed to imply that they may pray without holiness for aid in performing their first right act. Rigidly explained, the phrase must have this meaning, but was it intended for a logical or a popular phrase? And is it not often understood, in the sense which is not indeed, but which nevertheless *ought* always to be designed, as a stimulus to immediate repentance, a stimulus applied so vehemently that the solecism of the words is overlooked.

Other practical lessons suggested in the discourse are, the importance of making our sermons less dull and stiff, by making them less abstract; the importance of rendering our theological treatises less ambiguous by writing them in a style less in need of qualification; the importance of a larger charity toward good men, and of a deeper reverence for the one system of inspired truth which unites in its maintenance so many classes of devotees.

But the Reviewer seems not to have noticed the true practical aims of the sermon. He was led, perhaps, into his misapprehensions of it by its title. This title is distinctly affirmed to have been chosen "for want of a better,"¹ not because it is all that could be wished. Let us then state some of the reasons which may justify it.

First, it is less cumbrous than any other which would be equally expressive of the author's meaning. The title might have been, The form of theology suggested by and best suited to the calm processes of the intellect, and the form of theology suggested by and best fitted to awaken and then to gratify the right feelings. Or it might have been, Theology in the form prompted by the reasoning powers and best adapted to speculation, and theology in the form prompted by the sensibilities and suited to excite and then satisfy emotion.

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 534.

But the title actually selected is, *The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings*. This need not be misunderstood, for it is expressly defined as not denoting two *kinds* of truth essentially unlike, but as denoting two dissimilar *modes* of representing one and the same truth. A brief Proposition, when definitely explained, is allowed as a convenience to all preachers.

Secondly, the title was selected as a deferential and a charitable one. It was designed to mitigate prejudices, by conceding somewhat to them. The representations which are classified under the theology of feeling are often sanctioned as "the true theology," by the men who delight most in employing them. What the sermon would characterize as images, illustrations and intense expressions, these men call *doctrines*. It is a *doctrine*, for instance, that the bread is Christ's body; that men are regenerated in baptism; that the sins of a man are forgiven by God if a minister forgive them; that moral inability is not a mere desperate unwillingness, but a literal powerlessness; that guilt is as literally imputed to the innocent as innocence is imputed to them, and that innocence is as literally imputed to the sinful as sin is imputed to them. In like manner the conceptions most obviously denoted by such terms as eternal generation and procession, are often said by the men who are most fond of using these terms, to be necessary parts of "the correct theology." In deference to this frequent usage, these conceptions may be named "the theology of the heart." We call one system of theology "rational" or "liberal," simply because it is called so by its advocates; much more then may we designate by the phrase "emotive theology," those representations which are so tenaciously defended by multitudes as the truth fitted both for the feeling and the judgment. It appears less invidious to designate them by some such phrase, than to stigmatize them as merely figurative or poetical modes of statement. The sermon repeatedly declares, that there is a depth of significancy in some of these representations, which cannot be adequately expressed by the words figurative, imaginative and poetical, for these words have often an import too superficial; that the language of the emotions, even when *dis-sonant* from the accurate statements of truth, has yet a meaning which is perfectly correct, but is "more profound than can be pressed home upon the heart by any exact definitions." It affirms, that even when Dr. Jonathan Edwards, and Andrew Fuller, and Dr. Day call our "moral inability" a figurative term, they use the word figurative in a sense which needs to be explained, or it will be misunderstood.¹

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 537, 538, 549, 567. See also note B. to the second pamphlet edition of the sermon.

Therefore, one design of the discourse is to show the dignity and importance of those subjective conceptions which, although not conformed to the literal verity, are yet, like all vivid conceptions, attended with a momentary belief in their conformity to it, and which enliven our more accurate ideas of it, and which, being supposed by many to be logically correct, may be honored with a more respectful name than *mere* fancies or metaphorical representations.¹

A third reason for the title is, that it is conformed to the analogy of language. As a substance, though distinguishable, is yet inseparable from its form, the name of the substance is often applied to the form. We speak of a syllogistic and of a popular argument, when we mean merely two different ways of expressing the very same argument. We speak of the language of eloquence and of logic, of the imagination and the passions, when we refer to the same identical language in different arrangements. We allude to the Jehovah of the Old Testament and the Jehovah of the New, without implying that there are two different Gods, but implying only that there are two different manifestations of God. The Sabellians, in order to avoid Tritheism, speak of God the Father, *and* God the Son, *and* God the Spirit, as one God in three modes of development; but, according to the Reviewer's way of interpreting the title of this sermon, the Sabellians may be fairly charged with being Tritheists, and believing in three different Supreme Beings. Diverse names are often applied to dissimilar forms or states of the same essence; as to one material substance when it is exhibited in dissimilar shapes; to the soul itself in different modes of its activity. The same ideas and even words, as they are presented in differing combinations, are denominated eloquence, poetry, or prose. Men distinguish between a doctrinal and a practical sermon, a didactic and a controversial theology, between the theology of one master and that of another,² between the theology of Paul and that of John, when they fully admit and intend only to declare by these phrases, that exactly the same truths are presented in diverse styles for different ends. Why then may we not distinguish between an intellectual and an emotive theology, when we expressly affirm that each differs from the other in form rather than in

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 540, 549.

² Prof. Tholuck has said that the theology of Pres. Edwards *and* the theology of Hegel, on the subject of the will, *are* the same; of course he could not mean the same in form. Dr. Channing has said that the theology of Dr. Hopkins *and* the theology of Fenelon, on the subject of disinterested benevolence, *are* the same; of course he could not mean the same in style and contour.

essence? If we may speak of a belief or conviction of the head as distinct from a belief or conviction of, i. e. prompted by the heart, when we mean essentially one and the same mental belief or conviction, why may we not speak of a theology of the head as distinct from a theology of, i. e. prompted by the heart, when we mean the same theology in essence? This appellation is by no means unusual, even in familiar converse. And for the Biblical Repertory to distort the title of the sermon into an affirmation of "two theologies" (a phrase never used in the discourse) substantially opposite to each other, is as marked a violation of the rules of speech, as it would be to represent the eloquence of the outward manner, of the reasoning process, of the passionate address, of the direct exhortation, as four radically different "eloquences." But this remark anticipates one class of the misapprehensions developed in the Review.

1. The Repertory mis-states the very object of the discourse. It describes the sermon as advocating not two different forms but two essentially antagonistic "*kinds* of theology," two opposing sets of "*doctrine*," both equally correct. It recognizes no difference between an image or symbol, and a truth. As many of its reasonings are directed against the wrong subject, they spend themselves like arrows aimed at the wrong target. It is needless to refute them, after they have been shown to result from a misunderstanding of the theme.

The Review mis-states the object of the discourse, first, by omitting the formal *definition* of its title. In introducing the subject, after having stated that "when preachers aim to rouse the *sympathies of a populace*, they often give a brighter coloring or a bolder prominence to *some lineaments* of a doctrine than can be given to them in a *well compacted science*," the discourse proceeds, "There are two *forms* of theology of which the two passages in my text are selected as individual specimens, the one declaring that God never repents, the other that he does repent. *For want of a better name* these two *forms* may be termed the theology of the intellect and the theology of feeling. Sometimes, indeed, both the mind and the heart are suited by the *same modes of thought*, but often they require dissimilar *methods*."¹ And immediately afterwards, lest this should be misunderstood, the subject is thus reannounced: "What then are some of the differences between these two kinds of REPRESENTATION?" Now, against the canons of fair criticism, the entire paragraphs containing this formal definition are omitted by the Reviewer. The true intent of the discourse is thus in a degree hidden from his readers. This definition

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 534.

given in form at the outset, adds an emphasis to many subsequent phrases which our critic has either kept entirely out of view, or the meaning of which he has in some degree concealed by his one capital omission. No reader of the sermon needs to doubt, that the theology of feeling is "*the form of belief* which is suggested by and adapted to the wants of the well trained heart;"¹ contains the '*literal truth* presented in appropriate *images*;' allows '*discordant representations* of the one self-consistent *principle*;' sanctions "an interchange of *styles* all unfolding the same *idea*;" includes "*forms* of language which circumscribe a *substance of doctrine*, a *substance* which fashioned as it may be, the intellect grasps and holds fast; a *substance* which arrests the more attention and prolongs the deeper interest by the *figures* which bound it." With the preceding definition the whole tenor of the discourse shows its object to be, the delineation of "*our mode of shaping and coloring* the doctrines of theology," and these doctrines are "those *cardinal truths* which the Bible has lifted up and turned over in so many different lights as to make them [the truths] the more conspicuous by their very alternations of *figure and hue*."² Accordingly, the discourse delineates the *one doctrine* of Future Punishment and the "*symbols*" by which it is illustrated; the *one doctrine* of the Resurrection, and the "*pictures*" by which it is enlivened; the *one doctrine* of the General Judgment and the *poetical conceptions* which vivify it;³ the *one doctrine* of Regeneration "revealed in dissimilar *forms*;" the *one doctrine* of man's unwillingness to repent, expressed in "*phrases* which disagree with each other;"⁴ all these "symbols," "pictures," "poetical conceptions" and illustrative images not being distinct doctrines but only distinct modes of representing the same doctrine, not belonging to theology as used for speculation but belonging to theology as employed for impression.

Throughout the sermon the distinction is between the "*intellectual statements* of doctrine," and the more "*impressive representations* of it," i. e. of the same doctrine; and it is declared in apology for even the anthropopathical style, that "into more susceptible natures than ours the *literal verities* of God will penetrate far deeper than even when shaped in their most pungent *forms*, they [i. e. the literal verities] will penetrate into our obdurate hearts." But notwithstanding all these various and wearisome repetitions of the same idea, the Reviewer makes the impression that the sermon really advocates "two conflicting theologies," which are unlike in *substance* as well as in *style*; two

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 535.

² Ibid. pp. 555, 560.

³ Ibid. pp. 540-542.

⁴ Ibid. p. 547.

antagonistic "*doctrines*" pertaining to the sinful nature, the atonement, etc. He has made this impression, partly by omitting the author's essential definition of his theme. Is it not a rule of controversy, that a writer's formal definitions shall be formally quoted by his antagonist? Does not the sermon state that its title is selected "for want of a better," and does not this imply that the title may be perverted, unless it be defined? Why, then, does the critic fail to apprise his readers that the title has been defined, and why does he thus make it easy to misrepresent the entire scope of the sermon? We wish to be distinctly understood. The "accomplished Reviewer," of whom his admirers say that no one can mistake "*his hand*" in these criticisms, is by no means accused or suspected by us of *dexterity* in keeping important explanations out of sight; but is merely reminded of his inadvertence in not bringing them clearly and prominently into view; an inadvertence which is none the less hurtful because it is accidental. His fault, however, is not one of omission merely; for,

Secondly, he mis-states the very object of the sermon by explaining the theme in words and with illustrations which the discourse neither uses nor justifies, but clearly opposes.¹ He has not only *left out* the phrases which *interpret* the Proposition, but has also *put in* phrases which *misinterpret* it. The fact is a curious one, that whenever he seems to gainsay the main distinction between the two forms of religious truth, he departs from the phraseology of the discourse, and substitutes a phraseology of his own. His objections would seem inapposite, if he did not prepare the way for them by defining the object of the discourse in words which he himself has introduced, not with the design we presume, but with the result of caricaturing that object. Thus he repeatedly conveys the idea that the sermon directly authorizes such unqualified terms as "two theologies," "two kinds of theology," one of which is conformed to the "logical consciousness," the

¹ It is singular that not only the Reviewer's literal language does injustice to the literal language of the sermon, but his figures of speech do injustice to the figures of the sermon. Thus he says, p. 660: "The temple of God which temple is the church, is not to be built up by *rubbish*," but the sermon speaks of the "jealousies of those good men who build their faith upon Jesus Christ as the chief corner stone, and yet are induced by unequal measures of genius and culture to give different *shapes* to structures of the same *material*;" and again "the *subject matter* of these heterogeneous *configurations* may often be one and the same, having for its nucleus the same cross, with the formative influence of which all is safe." p. 559.

other to the "intuitional consciousness,"¹ the one "true to the feelings and false to the reason, the other "true to the reason and false to the feelings;" whereas none of these unmodified phrases have been employed, and some of them have been designedly rejected as inaccurate, by the author of the discourse.² But the Reviewer may say that the sermon must be considered as advocating two essentially different theologies, because it speaks of a theology of the intellect and a theology of the heart. In the same method of reasoning, it may be inferred, that because the author of the sermon believes in the divine Creator, and in the divine Preserver, and in the divine Governor, and in the divine Lawgiver, therefore he believes in four first persons of the Trinity; and because he believes in the divine Redeemer, and in the divine Mediator, and in the divine Judge, and in the divine Intercessor, therefore he believes in four second persons of the Trinity; and because he believes in the divine Renewer, and in the divine Sanctifier, and in the divine Comforter, and in the divine Inspirer of truth, therefore he believes in four third persons of the Trinity. The simple fact is, that our critic, without intending to abuse, has distorted language.

Having thus described the sermon as advocating two radically opposite kinds of theology, the Reviewer has (innocently, we presume) prepared his readers for a new dualistic invention, and he therefore represents the discourse (without specifying wherein) as proceeding on the supposition "that the feelings perceive in one way and the in-

¹ In unfolding (or rather obscuring) the design of the sermon, the Reviewer says (p. 646) of its author, "he proposes the distinction between the theology of feeling and that of the intellect. There are two modes of apprehending and presenting truth. The one by the logical consciousness (to use the convenient nomenclature of the day) that it may be understood; the other by the intuitional consciousness, that it may be felt. These modes do not necessarily agree; they may often conflict, so that what is true (?) in the one, may be false (?) in the other." These terms, "logical and intuitional consciousness," are the well known terms of Mr. Morell; and a reader of this Review, who had not read the sermon, would infer that the sermon advocated Morell's philosophy. For the honor of this Reviewer, we trust that he did not intend to excite a suspicion at once so false and so hurtful; but by using these suspicious terms, which he must have known were not in the sermon, he has prepared the way, as really as if he had designed it, for several of his subsequent charges.

² The sermon alludes once to "different kinds of theology which cannot be reconciled with each other," and alludes to them as *contradistinguished* from the different *forms* of theology which are the theme of the sermon. It characterizes them as two antagonistic systems of *intellectual* belief; and specifies, for an example, the theology which inserts and that which omits "the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus," p. 559.

tellect in another," that "the perceptions themselves vary, so that what appears true to the feelings, is apprehended as false to the intellect," that there are "different percipient agencies in the soul," two conflicting intelligences in man; the one seeing a thing to be true, and the other seeing it to be false, and yet both (each?) seeing correctly from its own position and for its own object."¹

Now, we presume that in the history of theological criticism, there have been more singular caricatures than this; and accordingly this may be endured with patience. Let us then calmly consider the foundation of this oft repeated charge, that the sermon represents the soul as not "a unit," but as having "a dualism" in it. The only foundation for it is, that the discourse contains a prolonged account of the feelings as distinct from, and often as opposed to the reason. But what shall we say of those metaphysical systems in which one volume is devoted to the intellect, and a separate volume to the sensibilities? What shall we say of the common language of men, in which we hear every day that the judgment governs the fancy, or the imagination controls the judgment, the passions mislead the conscience, and contend with each other; the "old man" and the "new man" struggle together in the same man, we have "a divided soul," "a divided heart," are "double minded," etc. etc.² Does any one pretend to find in this ordinary speech an implication that the soul is dichotomized and subdichotomized into ten or twenty "conflicting agents?" One might as well make this pretension, as profess to discover an implied "dualism" in the sermon which is thus bisected. What shall we say of this very Review, speaking, as it does so often, of an expression "*false* to the taste and to the feelings."³ Does the taste perceive *falsehood*? Do the feelings *perceive* it? What shall we say of its peculiar remark, that the phrase "God the mighty Maker died," has to be *defended* by the *intellect* at the bar of the *feelings*?⁴ What shall we say of the "dualism" which is found between this Reviewer and Dr. Hodge; for Dr. Hodge says in his Commentary on Romans 7: 15-23, that "there is a conflict between the natural authoritative sense of right and wrong and [the] corrupt inclinations," that "*indwelling sin wars* against the *renewed principle*, and brings the soul into *captivity* to itself," and he deliberately affirms that the

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 663, 669, 666.

² When a man says, I have a soul and body, does he mean that the "I" is separate from the soul and body? What does he mean by *my* soul, *myself*?

³ Bib. Rep. p. 652.

⁴ Ibid p. 666.

word "I, in the language of the apostle, includes, as it were, *two persons*, the new and the old man."¹

Now, can a fair critic infer from this language, that the Reviewer and Dr. Hodge, (if we may continue so long in our dualism,) and all men are ready to reason on the principle that one person is two persons, and has two souls? Why, then, does the Reviewer draw such an inference from the sermon? *Every body knows* that such language is necessary in this imperfect state of being. Just in proportion to the clearness with which we aim to distinguish between the dissimilar processes of the soul, must we employ terms which, if pressed to the letter, would imply not a "dualism," but an indefinite multiplication. Two things which cannot be separated, may yet be distinguished throughout a prolonged description. We may reason for hours on the distinction between the substance and the attributes of matter, without implying that there is a separation between them. The Reviewer's charge of dualism rests on his own oversight of the difference between *distinct* and *separate*. We can no more easily converse without alluding to an apparent division in the soul, than without saying that the sun sets, or ice is cold. Usage justifies such representations. It requires them. We should be mere pedants without them. All philosophers admit them. But such expressions, as they are generally understood, are reconcilable with the truth that the soul is simple and indivisible. For this undivided agent has different states or modes of activity, and in relation to these different states or modes of activity, it assumes different names. The conscience is the soul viewed as capable of acting in one manner; the will is the same spirit viewed as capable of acting in a different manner; the intellect is the same soul viewed as capable of perceiving; and the heart is the same spirit viewed as capable of loving what is perceived. And here is suggested another reason why the modes of presenting truth which are adapted to the soul in one method of its action, may receive a different name from that applied to the modes

¹ One of the sweeping assertions made by the Reviewer is, that "the Bible never recognizes that broad distinction between the intellect and the feelings which is so often made by metaphysicians," Bib. Rep. p. 671. But does it not often represent a pure spirit as having a percipient eye and ear, and a feeling heart, bowels of mercies, etc.? Dr. Hodge says, (Com. on Rom. 14: 1-23) that "conscience or a sense of duty is not the *only* and perhaps not the most important principle to be appealed to in support of benevolent enterprises;" "but we find the sacred writers appealing *most frequently* to the pious and benevolent *feelings*;" and yet the Reviewer says that the Bible "*never* predicates depravity or holiness of the feelings as distinct from the intelligence."

of presenting the same truth which are adapted to the soul in another method of its action. And this illustrates the persistive error of the Review, which detects in these two modes of presenting truth, two radically antagonistic "kinds of theology," because the word theology is applied to each; and which also detects in the two different modes of the spiritual activity which the sermon describes, two intelligences, or "*such a dualism in the soul.*" Why did not the Review push its consistency still farther, and because the sermon describes two different modes of teaching astronomy and natural philosophy, charge it with advocating two radically opposite astronomies and philosophies? The sermon specifies two diverse methods of representing our personal identity; therefore, there are two opposite identities in each individual, as our critic might infer, if he should persevere in the course which he has begun. We will not borrow his own decorous language, and say of his reasoning on this subject, that it "indicates a most extraordinary confusion of mind;" we only say that it makes a confusion of mode with essence, the forms of a thing with the thing itself.

It is indeed possible, (for what is not possible?) that from some rhetorical phrases in the sermon, if they be interpreted as if they were found in a mathematical treatise, and if also they be severed from their relations, an inconsiderate or else a resolute critic might force out an inference in favor of "two percipient principles in the soul;" as with the same ease he might infer a similar dualism from the language of every man, not excepting the author of the seventh of Romans, and especially from the most carefully written treatises of this Reviewer. But the argument of the discourse is independent of that rhetorical and convenient phraseology; it might be conducted with the more cumbrous phrases of "the soul in the state of reasoning," "the soul developing itself in the mode of emotion or volition," etc. Indeed, the direct aim of a note to the sermon,¹ is to show that "the heart (*never*) perceives, for the intellect *only* is percipient, but holy feelings prompt the intellect to new discoveries, furnish it with new materials for examination and inference, and regulate it in its mode of combining and expressing what it has *discerned*. An affection of the heart towards a truth develops a new relation of that truth, and the *intellect* perceives the relation thus suggested by the feeling," etc. If there are any principles underlying and pervading the whole dis-

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 564, 565. This note is not even referred to by the Reviewer, and still seems to have drawn from him the concession, that the author would "deny that he held to any such dualism in the soul." Bib. Rep. 660.

course, they are that "the theology of the intellect is the one *system* which recommends itself to a dispassionate and unprejudiced *mind* as *true*," (perceived to be true by the intellect); and that "the theology of the heart is the *collection of statements* which recommend themselves to the healthy moral feelings as *right*," (not *perceived* to be *true* by the heart);¹ that while the intellect is the only faculty which apprehends truth, and while it forms various conceptions of it, the feelings are more gratified with some of its conceptions than with others, and those conceptions of doctrine, which are peculiarly congenial with the excited heart, belong to its favorite cast of theology; that the Bible teaches one and only one definite system of doctrines; these doctrines contemplated by the mind arouse the sympathies of the heart, and these sympathies prompt to varied forms of expressing the same doctrine. As the Reviewer has well said, p. 657, "it is because such doctrines are didactically taught in the Bible, and presented as articles of faith, that they work themselves into the heart, and find expression in its most passionate language," language, however, which the critic must and does repeatedly affirm to be different from the style fitted for speculation.

What does the Reviewer mean, then, when he represents² the sermon as teaching, that "conflicting apprehensions are equally true," and as ascribing "to the sacred writers conflicting and irreconcilable representations?" Over and over it is asserted in the discourse, that while the intellectual theology is "accurate not in its spirit only but in its letter also," the emotive theology involves "the substance of truth, although when *literally* interpreted it may or may not be false."³ The purpose of one entire head in the sermon⁴ is to prove, that the one theology is precisely the same with the other in its real meaning, though not always in its form; that the expressions of right feeling, if they do contradict each other "*when unmodified*," can and must be so explained as to harmonize both with each other and with the decisions of the judgment; that "literally understood these expressions are dissonant from each other; their dissonance adds to their emphasis; their emphasis fastens our attention upon the principle in which they all agree; this principle is too vast to be vividly uttered in a single formula, and therefore branches out into various parts, and the lively exhibition of one part contravenes an equally impressive statement of a different one; the intellect educes light from the collision of these repugnant phrases and then modifies and reconciles them into" the

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 563.² Bib. Sac. pp. 534, 535.³ Bib. Rep. p. 664.⁴ Bib. Sac. pp. 545-550.

harmonious and harmonizing truth. The sermon repeats, again and again, that it is *impossible* to believe contradictory statements "without qualifying some of them so as to prevent their subverting each other;" that the reason "being that circumspect power which looks before and after, does not allow that of these conflicting statements each can be true save in a qualified sense;" and that such statements *must* be qualified by disclosing the fundamental "principle in which they all agree for substance of doctrine," "the principle which will rectify one of the discrepant expressions by explaining it into an *essential* agreement with the other."¹

But there is a third way in which the Reviewer makes a wrong impression with regard to the very object of the sermon. He implies and assumes, that the representations fitted for the excited sensibility are supposed in the sermon to be always different from the representations fitted for the calm intelligence. He feels satisfied that he has annihilated the distinction between the style of the intellect and that of the feelings, when he has cited passages which belong to both! He hurries on to the inference, that if the theology of the intellect "aims to be intelligible rather than impressive," then of course the theology of the heart must *always* not only aim to be, but absolutely *be* unintelligible! And he gives plausibility to this (his undesigned) caricature of the sermon, by omitting its oft-repeated explanations. One of these explanations is stated in the most prominent paragraph of the discourse, thus: "*Sometimes*, indeed, both the mind and the heart are suited by the *same* modes of appeal."² A second of these explanations is stated as an introduction to the analysis of the style suited to the heart, thus: "In some respects, *but not in all*, the theology of feeling *differs* from that of intellect."³ A third of these explanations is stated in another prominent passage, thus: "Both of [these forms of theology] have *precisely the same* sphere with regard to *many* truths, but not with regard to all."⁴ Yet not a single one of these explanations has the Reviewer so much as even noticed. He has quoted passages immediately *before* and immediately *after* them, but has not quoted *them*. In despite of numerous other repetitions of the same modifying thought, as where the sermon so often says that the representations prompted by feeling are often minutely and literally accurate, this critic has persisted in reasoning as if the sermon had affirmed precisely what it has denied, that the two generic forms of theology differ at all times, in all respects, and

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 546, 548.

² Ibid. p. 535.

³ Ibid. p. 534.

⁴ Ibid. p. 551.

in regard to all doctrines. One object of the sermon is, to state the differences between the two generic forms, where any differences exist, and it is repeatedly announced that they do exist at some but not all times, in some but not all respects, in regard to some but not all truths. The Reviewer might as well say, that when we speak of prose as distinct from poetry, we must mean that no passages are suitable both for an essay and a poem; he might as well say that when we speak of "doctrinal" as distinct from "experimental" preaching, we must mean that they are unlike in all particulars, as he can say that when we speak of the intellectual theology as distinct from the emotive, we must mean that all parts of the one are unfitted for the other. Turretin's Theology is called scientific, because in its primary intent and as a whole it is fitted to aid our speculations; still, in some particulars, it is practical in its tendencies. Baxter's Saints' Rest is called practical, because in its primary intent and as a whole it is fitted to move our affections; still, in some particulars, it is scientific. So the theology of and for the intellect is represented in the sermon as likewise suited in a degree to the heart, and *vice versa*; but the primary and general scope of the one is easily distinguished from the primary and general scope of the other. The style of the pulpit would be as much improved as the style of our doctrinal treatises, if this distinction were more faithfully observed.

Without staying to comment on the many similar instances in which our critic has begun his quotations directly *after*, or has broken them off directly *before* the remarks in the sermon which qualify them, let us proceed to another class of his undesigned mis-statements.

2. He gives an erroneous view of the main theory of the discourse, with regard to the peculiar language of the emotions. We have just seen, that the expressions of the heart are not described in the sermon as uniformly differing from those of the judgment. Here is one error of the Reviewer. He has committed another in supposing, that the sermon "does not discriminate between mere figurative language, and the language of emotion."¹ Now, the sermon not only repeats the idea that the theology of feeling differs from that of intellect in other particulars than in its use of figures, for it differs in "proportions of doctrine," in "the especial prominence given to" certain features of it, etc. etc.; but the sermon also reiterates the idea, that the language appropriate to the sensibilities is not *wis-*

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 674.

formly figurative, but "may or may not be false when *literally* interpreted," and "aims to be impressive, *whether it be* or be not minutely accurate;"¹ that it often consists of those earnest, intense expressions which, not being hyperbolic, are not ordinarily termed figures of speech; that *merely* figurative expressions do not constitute the language of emotion, for this language is often characterized by the *abundance* and *boldness* of its metaphors; that it is not merely figurative or poetical in the sense of arbitrary or unsubstantial,² and still mere poetry often admits the most literal expressions. From the saying that the heart "sacrifices abstract remarks to visible and tangible images," must an expert critic infer that the heart is *never* satisfied with a plain expression? Must he rush on from "often" to "always," from "frequently" to "universally," from a qualified sentence to a rash one?

The Reviewer³ makes the following criticism: "Our author represents the feelings as expressing themselves in figures, and demanding 'visible and tangible images.' We question the correctness of this statement. The highest language of emotion is generally simple." — And suppose we concede to the Reviewer, that the *highest* language of feeling is *generally* simple, must we therefore retract the remark that "sometimes both the mind and the heart are suited by the same modes of thought, but often they require dissimilar methods"? (Sermon, p. 534.) The Reviewer proceeds to say that "nothing satisfies the mind when under great excitement, but literal or perfectly intelligible expressions. *Then is not the time for rhetorical phrases.*" And after these remarks, which he ought to have qualified, he quotes some impassioned phrases of the Bible, as specimens of "the simplest form of utterance." And suppose that these phrases were every one apposite, must we therefore recant the remark that, "in some respects, *but not in all*, the theology of feeling differs from that of intellect"? (Sermon p. 535.) Has not our critic, however, made some unexpected mistakes in his citations of simple as opposed to figurative phrases? Has he not quoted some passages which Gerhard would not record as literally accurate statements? He has, for instance, actually cited as unrhetical, the well known words, "Against thee, thee only have I sinned." Now, it so happens that John Milton has specified these very words as an example of a highly figurative style. "Yet some would persuade us," says the poet, "that this absurd opinion was king David's, because in the fifty

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 535, 536.² Ibid p. 538.³ Bib. Rep. p. 650.

first Psalm he cries out to God, 'Against thee only have I sinned;' as if David had imagined that to murder Uriah and adulterate his wife, had been no sin against his neighbor; whereas that law of Moses was to the king expressly, Deut. xvii. not to think so highly of himself above his brethren. David, therefore, by those words could mean no other, than either that the depth of his guiltiness was known to God only, or to so few as had not the will or power to question him, or that the sin against God was greater beyond compare than against Uriah. Whatever his meaning were, any wise man will see that the pathological words of a Psalm can be no certain decision to a point that hath abundantly more certain rules to go by."¹ We have heard of a respectable clergyman in our land, who from the passage, "Against thee, thee *only* have I sinned," attempted to prove that "all sin is against God only," that David committed no offence against Uriah, who must soon have died, even if he had not been slain in battle; nor against Bathsheba, who was elevated in consequence of the sin to great renown; nor against the Jewish people, etc. etc. Now, if the expression of David be not rhetorical, not figurative, not distinguishable, and our Reviewer cites it as not distinguishable from the simple language of the judgment, this preacher's inferences were correct. Another divine of no mean name has inferred from the phrase in the same penitential prayer, "Create in me a clean heart," that the Psalmist had not been regenerated before the sin which he here laments; for, in praying that a clean heart may be *created*, he implies that it did not antecedently exist. Now, it is very obvious that the sermon under review was aimed against such a use of such phrases, a use which is far too frequent and too lamentable to be sanctioned by the precipitate assertions of even so eminent a Reviewer.

There is one more particular in which our critic mis-states the theory of the discourse with regard to the peculiar language of emotion. He implies that the discourse represents this language as not at all under the supervision of the intellect, as entirely independent of logical rule. Assuming that the style for the feelings is identified with the figurative, and is described as uniformly different from the intellectual style, he criticizes the sermon as not only giving two intelligences to one man and making two radically opposite theologies, but also as justifying figures of speech which are intended to express a doctrinal error. He says that the author of the sermon "evidently

¹ English Prose Works of Milton, Vol. II. pp. 164, 165.

confounds two things which are as distinct as day and night; viz. a metaphor and a falsehood; a figurative expression and a doctrinal untruth. Because the one is allowable, he pleads for the other also."¹ But is it not sufficiently easy for the Reviewer to perceive, that one design of the sermon is to justify the emotional, or, as the Reviewer will have it, the figurative theology, because when explained aright it never opposes but contains the substantial truth? Does not the sermon repeat over and over that the fit language of emotion never really *means* what is logically incorrect; that it is "substantially accurate when not literally so," and that whatever diversity there may be in the modes of faith which the mind or heart adopts, yet "the central principles of it" are always one and the same truth?² Does the Reviewer really suppose, that because "the theology of feeling when literally understood may or may not be false," therefore, according to the sermon, it is to be literally interpreted and believed although false? "It is a canon of criticism," says the sermon (p. 541), "that we should express all the *truth* which our hearers need, and express *it* in the *words* which they will most appropriately feel."

But the Reviewer goes farther still. He has read in the discourse that the Bible, when "it represents Christians as united to their Lord," "*does not mean* to have these endearing words metamorphosed into an intellectual theory of our oneness or identification with Christ," and when "it declares that God has repented," etc., "*it does not mean* that these expressions, which as inflected by times and circumstances impress a truth upon the soul, be stereotyped into the principle that Jehovah has ever parted with his infinite blessedness," and when the Psalmist cried, "Awake! why sleepest thou, O Lord," and Martin Luther exclaimed, "Hearest thou not, my God; art thou dead?" they used "words that excite no congenial glow in technical students, viewing all truth in its dry light, and disdaining all figures which would offend the decorum of a philosophical or didactic style, but words which wake the deepest sympathies of quick-moving, wide-hearted, many-sided men, who look *through* a *superficial* impropriety and discern *under* it a *truth* which the nice language of prose is too frail to convey into the heart, and breaks down in the attempt."³ But although the Reviewer has seen this idea repeated more times than there are pages in the sermon, he yet without a blush represents this very sermon as teaching that the feelings do not need to be nourished by the truth, and that in devotional exercises we may express

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 665.

² Bib. Sac. pp. 535, 537, 540, 545, 555, 561, etc.

³ Bib. Sac. pp. 538, 539.

doctrines which we do not believe. He says, "In *opposition* to this view, *we* maintain that the feelings demand truth, i. e. truth which satisfies the intellect in the approbation and expression of their object;" the soul "cannot believe what it knows to be a lie;" "the hymn book or liturgy of no church contains doctrines contrary to the creed of that church."¹ What the sermon calls the "poetic license" of hymn books, the "style of remark which for sober prose would be unbecoming, or even, when associated in certain ways, irreverent;" what it calls "the words, not the truths, but the *words* which have been embosomed in the love of the church," all this the Reviewer confounds with a meant doctrinal falsehood. When the sermon says that some poetic stanzas "are not accurate expressions of dogmatic *truth*," the critic flies to the conclusion that they are intended to teach dogmatic error! He thus complains of the sermon as recommending a style of worship "profane to the feelings and a mockery of God." He makes the impression that he is impugning the discourse when he asserts, that "to use in worship expressions which the intellect pronounces to be doctrinally untrue is repudiated by the whole Christian church as profane."² — We are willing to forgive the Reviewer seven times and seventy times seven; but we beg leave to ask, how many times he really needs to be told, that the sermon never justifies expressions which are untrue in the *doctrines* designed to be taught by them, and that it only justifies some expressions which overpass "*at times* the proprieties of the didactic style," and which are untrue in their *literal meaning*? It insists as plainly as it can insist, that men must understand the language of the intellect "according to what it *says*," for it is definite and precise; and must understand the language of the heart "according to what it *means*," for the words "God came from Teman," do not mean that he moves from place to place, etc. It insists that the hyperbolical language, so called, is to be interpreted "as it is meant," and when so interpreted it "never transcends" but rather "falls short of" the real verity; that all the emotional language, indeed, is the "most natural utterance" of "a heart moved to its depths by the *truth*."

One cause of the Reviewer's mistakes on this subject is, that he does not seem to recognize the power or even the existence of those conceptions which the mind forms for the sake of illustrating and vivifying its ideas of the substantial truth, as such conceptions are distinct from the mind's ideas of the substantial truth itself; and therefore he

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 665.² Ibid. p. 667.

does not properly estimate the force or design of figurative language. We were not prepared to expect from so learned a man such a sentence as the following, (Bib. Rep. p. 652): "Figurative language when interpreted literally will of course express what is false to the intellect, *but it will in that case be no less false to the taste and to the feelings.*" Now, of what use is the figure? What is the power of its primary, as distinct from its secondary meaning? The obvious principle is, that figurative language causes the mind to form certain conceptions which, although not according to the exact truth, yet often illustrate it. These conceptions are, often at least, combined with a momentary belief in the presence of the objects conceived, and thereby they often so interest the mind as to give it a more vivid idea of the truth to be illustrated; further, the comparison between the conception proximately, literally suggested, and the idea remotely, figuratively suggested, often interests the mind in its examination of the exact truth; and thus the taste is pleased, the intellect aided, and the feeling awakened by the conception, which the mind would not form, were it not for the figurative language, and which would have no influence were it not for the understood literal meaning of that language.

But all figures are not equally adapted to illustrate, to please, and to excite. Some are used merely for convenience, as many figures of syntax and etymology. Others are used chiefly for illustration, as what rhetoricians call the "explaining comparisons." Others are used mainly for ornament, as what rhetoricians call the "embellishing comparisons." Others still are used for the excitement of feeling, as what rhetoricians call, the "figures of passion," which are distinct from "figures of the imagination." The figures of passion belong to the peculiar language of feeling; the other figures are appropriate, under proper restraint, to the language of the intellect, although many of them are more frequently used in that of the heart. If the literal terminology were of itself copious and versatile enough, it would be, as it is not now, uniformly employed in our reasoning processes. As the argumentative style *abounds* with plain, so the emotive style *abounds* with figurative diction. Because the sermon under review asserts that the intellectual theology prefers "the literal to the figurative" we must not leap to the conclusion that the sermon would exclude the figurative altogether from this theology. Because a man prefers gold to silver, we must not infer that he would trample silver in the dust. Still there are some figures, those of passion, which the well known rule is to exclude from the didactic theology.

They are too bold for calm discussion ; they need to be modified too laboriously ; they suggest conceptions so vivid, as to be mistaken for the premises of an argument, rather than to be regarded, as they should be, the illustrations of the truth.

Of these passionate figures, so often found in the theology of feeling, some are used by impulse more than by design. "When the mind," says Dr. Campbell,¹ "is in confusion and perplexity, arising from the sudden conflict of violent passions, the language will of necessity partake of this perturbation. Incoherent hints, precipitate sallies, vehement exclamations, interrupted perhaps by frequent checks from religion or philosophy, in short, everything imperfect, abrupt, and desultory, are the natural expressions of a soul overwhelmed in such a tumult." The words which are uttered in such a state, though obscure in themselves, are perspicuous as expressive of the feelings, they work upon our sympathies and prompt us to form more vivid ideas of the object which thus excites the soul than we could form, if the words uttered had been in themselves more precise. Let these words, however, be transferred from their fit connections into a didactic treatise, and they *may* be absolutely unintelligible. There are other figures of passion which are designed to give us vivid ideas of an object in one of its particular aspects, when the mind has no power to form a definite, precise idea of that object as a whole. These figures, also, are often obscure in themselves, and their very obscurity rouses the imagination and heart, and under the stimulus of this excited sensibility the mind forms a more impressive notion of the entire object than it would form were it not thus stimulated. Thus, says Dr. Blair,² obscurity "is not unfavorable to the sublime. Though it render an object indistinct, the impression, however, may be great ; for, as an ingenious author has well observed, it is one thing to make an idea clear, [precise], and another to make it affecting to the imagination ; and the imagination may be strongly affected, and in fact often is so, by objects of which we have no clear [precise] conception. Thus we see that almost all the descriptions given us of the appearances of supernatural beings, carry some sublimity, though the conceptions which they afford us be confused and indistinct. Their sublimity arises from the ideas which they always convey, of superior power and might joined with an awful obscurity." And Mr. Burke³ says, "I think there are reasons

¹ Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book II. Ch. VIII.

² Rhetoric, Lecture III.

³ On the Sublime and Beautiful, Sect. IV.

in nature, why the obscure idea, when properly conveyed, should be more affecting than the clear." "The mind is hurried out of itself by a crowd of great and confused images, which affect because they are crowded and confused." "In nature, dark, confused, uncertain images have a greater power on the fancy to form the grander passions, than those have which are more clear and determinate." On some subjects, he adds, "a clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea." So in his celebrated parallel between Dante and Milton, Mr. Macaulay says,¹ that the former "gives us the shape, the odor, the sound, the smell, the taste, he counts the numbers, he measures the size" of all which he describes. "His similes are the illustrations of a traveller" "introduced in a plain, business-like manner," "in order to make the meaning of the writer as clear to the reader as it is to himself." "Now, let us compare," proceeds Mr. Macaulay, "with the exact details of Dante, the dim intimations of Milton. — The English poet has never thought of taking the measure of Satan. He gives us merely a vague idea of vast bulk. In one passage the fiend lies stretched out huge in length, floating many a rood, equal in size to the earthborn enemies of Jove, or to the sea-monster which the mariner mistakes for an island. When he addresses himself to battle against the guardian angels, he stands like Teneriffe or Atlas; his stature reaches the sky. Contrast with these descriptions, the lines in which Dante has described the gigantic spectre of Nimrod. 'His face seemed to me as long and as broad as the ball of St. Peter's at Rome; and his other limbs were in proportion; so that the bank which concealed him from the waist downwards, nevertheless showed so much of him, that three tall Germans would in vain have attempted to reach his hair.'"

In accordance with these very simple principles, not dug out of the depths of German metaphysics, but taken from the surface of Blair's Rhetoric, the sermon under review describes the theology of feeling as introducing "obscure images," "vague and indefinite representations," all of which, however, so affect the heart as eventually to aid the mind in forming more vivid ideas of the truth than it would have otherwise formed. These very obscurities are intelligible as exhibitions of excited feeling, but often would not be intelligible if used as didactic statements. The emotive theology is also described as introducing other figures 'the most expressive which the debilitated heart will appreciate, but which yet fail of making a full disclosure,

¹ *Miscellanies*, Vol. I. p. 32.

and are only the foreshadowings of the truths which lie behind them.¹ But the Reviewer, opposing the theory of the sermon with regard to figurative language, says,² that this language "is just as definite in its meaning, and just as intelligible as the most literal." He ought to have qualified his remark, and said, first, that *some* figurative language is thus perspicuous; and secondly, that some is in itself designedly indefinite, and its indefiniteness is more expressive than its precision would be; thirdly, that some is easily intelligible if properly used in its fit connections, and yet may not be intelligible out of those connections; and fourthly, that there are some kinds of writing, the prophetic for instance, of which the minute signification was not intended to be obvious to all readers. But, according to the Reviewer's unmodified statement, the prophetic style would be as perspicuous to us as the style of the Gospel narratives; the highly wrought figures of Hebrew poets would present no more difficulty to commentators than do the simplest phrases in John's epistles, and figurative language would be as common as plain language now is in works of science. The Reviewer sweeps on too fast and too far. He fails to discriminate between a vivid idea of one feature of an object, and a definite idea of the whole object; and also between clearness and preciseness. Figures of speech may be clear, when they express not only the notion intended, but also something more; in expressing more they are not precise. He also fails to discriminate between the intelligibility of figures when they are used in their proper place, and their intelligibility when they are used out of their proper place;³ just as if the figure, "a man ought to hate his father and mother, brother and sister," which is perfectly clear in one connection, would be equally clear if transferred without a qualifying phrase to a dogmatic treatise; just as if "The Way of Life," might fitly contain an unmodified exhortation to "The duty of hatred towards parents and benefactors." The Reviewer himself, where he has no theory to controvert, has hit the truth far more nearly than in these controversial criticisms; for in commenting on the seventh of Romans, he represents Paul as exclaiming: "It is not I therefore, my real and lasting self, but this intrusive tyrant [sin] dwelling within me that disobeys the law;" and then the commentator adds: "This *strong and expressive* language, though susceptible of a literal interpretation which would make it teach not only error but nonsense, is still perfectly perspicuous and correct because accurately *descriptive of the common*

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 550, 556, etc. ² Bib. Rep. p. 651. ³ Bib. Sac. pp. 551, 555, 556.

feelings of men." In different words,—this vehement language in *other connections* might be nonsensical, but in its present connection it is clear in its import, because it is perfectly expressive of agitated feeling. Again, the very gentleman, of whom it has been said without any sinister intent, that no one can mistake "his hand" in this Review, explains the celebrated passage, Rom. 9: 3, "I could wish that myself were accursed," etc., with the remark, "The difficulty arises from pressing the words too far, making them express *definite ideas*, instead of *strong and indistinct emotions*." Similar criticisms are frequent in this commentator, who is in an ungraceful *dualism* with the Reviewer. If we should retort upon him his own courteous accusations we should say, "It is to be remembered that it is not the language of excited, fanatical, fallible men that our [critic] undertakes thus to eviscerate," by representing it as having been uttered *without definite ideas*, etc. But are these the fitting accusations for a Christian and a *divine*?

In what way can we account for it, now, that when the learned commentator comes to criticise a New England sermon, he should have forgotten the rhetorical principles with which he was once familiar? He does not discriminate between the truth that often "obscurity favors the sublime," and the error that obscurity is proper for science. Because the sermon says that "*often*" when a passionate phrase is wrested from its fitting adjustments and transferred to a dogmatic treatise, it appears unintelligible or absurd, the Reviewer represents the sermon as teaching that all passionate phrases are absurd or unintelligible. We shall soon see that, according to him, the theology of feeling is characterized in the discourse, as a collection of statements which are false and incapable of being understood. He reasons on the principle that because a mathematician could not, without an absurdity, attempt to prove that something is less than nothing, therefore when men confess in prayer that they are less than nothing, they have no meaning. He might as fairly say, that because a natural philosopher would be unintelligible in advancing the proposition that there can be a point in space which is underneath the very lowest point, therefore there is no idea conveyed in the poetic hyperbole:

"Which way I fly is hell, myself am hell;
And in the lowest depth, a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me, opens wide
To which the hell I suffer seems a heaven."

In regard to the nature of such figurative language as is peculiarly

appropriate to the theology of the heart, there is indeed an obvious difference between the sermon and the Review, but there is a difference equally obvious between this Review and some other productions of its reputed author. The following is a notable illustration. The sermon says,¹ in a style which might appear to be sufficiently guarded: "*Left to its own guidance*," (the intellect) "would never *suggest* the *unqualified* remark² that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, for it declares that this debt may justly be claimed from them; nor that he has suffered the *whole* punishment which they deserve, for it teaches that this punishment may still be righteously inflicted on themselves; not that he has *entirely* satisfied the law, for it insists that the demands of the law are yet in force. If it should allow those as logical premises, it would also allow the salvation of all men as a logical inference, but it rejects this inference and accordingly, being self-consistent, must reject those when viewed as literal premises. It is adapted to the soul in her inquisitive moods, but fails to satisfy her craving for excitement. In order to express the definite idea that we are exposed to evil in consequence of Adam's sin, it does not employ the passionate phrase, 'we are guilty of his sin.' It searches for the proprieties of representation, for seemliness and decorum. *It gives origin* to no statements which require apology or essential modification; no metaphor, for example, so bold and so liable to disfigure our idea of the divine equity, as that Heaven imputes the crime of one man to millions of his descendants, and then imputes their myriad sins to him who was harmless and undefiled." Now, the Reviewer confronts this passage with remarkable decision,³ and avers, not that some, but that "*all* the illustrations" [and among them is the phrase, "God the mighty Maker died"] "which our author gives of modes of expression which the theology of the intellect would not *adopt*" [give origin to, suggest] "are the products of that theology. They are the language of speculation, of theory, of the intellect, as distinguished from the feelings." What, then, are

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 535.

² The sermon admits, p. 568, that the intellect may make an occasional use of such remarks, *when* they are qualified, and *after* they have been suggested by the feelings, but says that, "*left to its own guidance* it would never suggest" them. But the Reviewer, while he fairly quotes the *rest* of the sentence, drops from it the important qualifying words, "*left to its own guidance*," and he thus fails to give its full meaning. Afterwards, also, he confounds the words "suggest," "give origin to," which the sermon uses, with the word *adopt*, which he seems to use as their synonym.

³ Bib. Rep. p. 648.

these illustrations? One is the "*unqualified* remark that Christ has *fully* paid the debt of sinners." Does not the Reviewer himself qualify this phrase, in his common explanations of it? Why does he so often teach that Christ has not paid the debt of sinners in *any such sense* (which would be the ordinary sense of the phrase) as to make it unjust for God to demand the sinner's own payment of it? Why does he teach, that although the debt of sinners is paid, in a *very peculiar sense*, yet it is not so paid but that they may be justly "cast into prison until they themselves have paid the uttermost farthing?" Another illustration is, the "*unqualified* remark that Christ suffered the *whole* punishment which sinners deserve." And does not the Reviewer elsewhere thrust in various modifications of this phrase, saying that Christ did not suffer *any* punishment in such a sense as renders it unjust for the entire punishment of the law to be still inflicted on transgressors; that he did not suffer the whole, the precise eternal punishment which sinners deserve,¹ that in fact he did not suffer any punishment at all in its *common* acceptation of 'pain inflicted on a transgressor of law on account of his transgression, and for the purpose of testifying the lawgiver's hatred of him as a transgressor?' Why, then, does the Reviewer here represent this "unqualified remark" as identical with the ambiguous phrase, "Christ bore our punishment," and as a "summation of the manifold and diversified representations of Scripture?" Another of these illustrations is, the equally unmodified statement that "Christ has entirely satisfied the law." How many times has the Reviewer elsewhere asserted that Christ has not satisfied the law *as a rule of duty*, but that it still continues and will always continue its demand for perfect obedience? Of course he does not believe, without a qualification, that "Christ has *entirely* satisfied the law." Why, then, does he here treat this "unqualified remark" as identical with the loose phrase "Christ has satisfied the law," and as a "*precise* representation" of the truth. The statements that "Adam's sin is imputed to us, and our sin is imputed to Christ," are likewise characterized by the Reviewer as not less "purely addressed to the intellect," not less

¹ Dr. Joseph Huntington, believing that Christ literally endured the precise punishment threatened in the law, reasons thus: Sinners "in their surety, vicar or substitute, i. e. in Christ, the head of every man, go away into everlasting punishment, in a truly gospel sense. In him, they suffer infinite punishment; i. e. he suffers (it) for them, in their room and stead;" and therefore as they have once suffered the whole curse of the law, they cannot be justly exposed to it the second time; hence Universalism.

"purely abstract and didactic formula," than any others. It is a matter of literary history, that to impute sin to a man is, in the common primary use of the terms, the same as to accuse him of having committed it; and that when these terms are employed in the sense of merely treating a man in certain respects as if he had committed the sin, they are used with a secondary meaning, stronger and more nervous than the unimpassioned intellect would have prompted for itself. So the phrase, "guilty of Adam's sin," is a figure of speech; i. e. "a mode of speaking or writing in which words are deflected from their ordinary signification, or a mode more beautiful and *emphatical* than the ordinary way of expressing the sense." As all of these phrases have originally a like figurative character, (in the best meaning of the term, figurative,) so they retain this character after they have been transferred to the technical dialect. They retain it just so long as their scientific is different from their primitive and ordinary signification. They were originally prompted by a desire to enstamp deeply upon the heart, certain doctrines in certain individual relations. They were not *originally* intellectual statements, but have been *transferred* from their pristine to the dogmatic sphere. They still continue, however, to be impressive rather than transparent, to be vehement rather than explicit. And therefore it is notorious, that long after they have been explained and re-explained so as to abate their primitive force, and give them a technical diverse from their obvious meaning, the common usage will yet reassert its claims, and these very terms are to be again qualified, and once more softened down, limited, restricted, hedged in with adjuncts, defined as often as employed, and after all, they are misunderstood by multitudes who contend for them, who *will have* it that doctrinal terms are used in their plain sense, and who thus make it needful for these giant-like and long-suffering divines, whose business is the taking care of these evasive words, "to pace forever to and fro on the same wearisome path, after the same recoiling stone." Such is the character of these emphatic utterances, even when transmuted into what are called "intellectual propositions." Their history has made them useful for reference. Their own nature makes them often eloquent in use. They are natural modes of developing the heart's deepest affections in certain pensive moods; but '*left to its own guidance*, the intellect would never have *suggested* them as *unqualified*.' Being figurative in the scientific sense of the term, they are exciting; some of them being often obscure when used in prosaic connections, irritate their already excited devotees, and induce them to upbraid where they

ought to reason. John Foster says of such devotees to the technical style, that "if a man has discarded or has never learned the accustomed theological diction, and speaks in the general language of good sense, as he would on any other subject, they do not like his sentiments, even though according with their own; his language and his thoughts are all Pagan; he offers sacrifice with strange fire." And a celebrated political writer has said of such men, "They will themselves die or make others die for a simile."

3. This topic, however, introduces another class of the Reviewer's unintended mis-statements. He gives a wrong idea of the doctrinal illustrations in the discourse.

It is a melancholy truth, distinctly asserted by the writer of the sermon, that man has a "fallen," "evil," "loathsome," "corrupt," "odious" "nature, which precedes and certainly occasions (his) first actual sin." This is the doctrine in its prosaic, but it may be stated in an intensive form; and one aim of the sermon is to justify the occasional use of such words, as that this "diseased" and "disordered" state of the sensibilities is "sinful," "blamable," "guilty;" provided that such words be used, not for implying that there can be a literal sin which is uncondemned by conscience, i. e. the power of deciding on the moral character of acts; not for implying that our "inborn, involuntary corruption" can be the sole ground why a subject of it, *if he can be supposed to be* innocent of all actual disobedience, should be condemned to a punishment which supposes that the punished one is personally and literally ill-deserving on account of his "transgression of the law;" not as implying that a soul merits a legal penalty merely for the passive condition in which it was created; but the words "sinful, blamable, guilty nature" are to be sometimes justified, provided that they are used for historical reference, or for vehemently expressing "our dread or hatred of this" evil nature, which is so intimately connected with our actual sins, and so surely as well as justly exposes us to punishment on account of them.¹ But the Reviewer, without any fair attempt to explain the principles on which the use of these words is allowed or disallowed, satisfies himself with reiterating the charge, that the doctrine of our sinful nature is affirmed in the discourse to be true to the feelings and false to the intellect.² We think that the Reviewer would have done more justice to himself, if he had acknowledged that when he uses the term "sinful nature" as denoting a nature antecedent to all sinful exercise of it, he

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 567, 568.

² Bib. Rep. pp. 664, 673.

does not mean by "sinful" what men generally mean by the word, a quality which is condemned by our "power of discerning the moral character of acts;" he does not mean by sinful a quality for which the being who has never harbored it is personally ill-deserving; but he means a peculiar kind of sin, and uses the term with a very peculiar signification; and he differs from the sermon, therefore, not so much with regard to the doctrine, as with regard to the propriety of often designating that doctrine by a common word used in a sense which men in common life do not give it, a sense which they frequently and fatally misunderstand. What does a man gain by calmly denominating that passive condition a sin, for which alone the subject of it cannot be personally reprov'd by conscience, nor be condemned as himself deserving of a real and proper punishment.

It is another sad truth, plainly declared by the author of the sermon, "that man with his unrenewed nature will sin and only sin in his moral acts;" that "man, with no extraordinary aid from divine grace, is obstinate, undeviating, unrelenting, persevering, dogged, *fully set* in those wayward preferences which are an abuse of his freedom;" and "so important is it that this infallible certainty be felt to be true, that our hearts often incline us to designate it by the most forcible epithets," to express an accurate *dogma* in a more impressive *form*. It was, therefore, one design of the sermon to justify the occasional use of such phrases as, "man is unable to repent," "sin is necessary," provided that such terms be used to express strongly and impressively the certain, fixed unwillingness of unrenewed man to do right.¹ But the Reviewer, although he must know full well that this doctrine of the sermon has the sanction of President Edwards, yet with apparent coolness represents the sermon as denying the doctrine of inability and affirming this doctrine to be "false to the intellect."² He goes farther still³ and declares that the theory of the discourse represents feeling and knowledge "in *perpetual* (?) conflict," "the one teaching the doctrine of inability, the other that of plenary power," and he implies that the discourse represents the same man as having "the *consciousness* of inability to change his own heart, and yet the *conviction* that he has the requisite power." The critic means well, but it would be interesting to learn how he became unable to see that man is not once represented in the sermon as having a consciousness opposed to his conviction, but is uniformly represented as having both a *consciousness* and a *conviction* of his *unwill-*

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 548, 566, 567.

² Bib. Rep. pp. 664, etc.

³ Bib. Rep. pp. 673, 661.

lingness to repent, and as often expressing this unwillingness by the forcible word inability. Will the Reviewer never distinguish between "two doctrines," and the same doctrine expressed in two forms? He has not done honor to himself as a fair-minded critic, in so strangely perverting or *ignoring* the following passage of the sermon: "The emotive theology, therefore, when it affirms this [i. e. the natural] power is correct both in matter and style; but when it denies this power, it uses the language of emphasis, of impression, of intensity; it means the *certainty* of wrong preference by declaring the *inability* of right; and in its vivid use of *cannot* for *will not* is accurate in its *substance* though not in its form;" and this "discordance being one of letter rather than of spirit is removed by an explanation which makes the eloquent *style* of the feelings at one with the more definite *style* of the reason."¹

Besides often affirming that there is an infallible certainty of man's continued impenitence until he be regenerated by the Divine Spirit, the sermon introduces the statements, that man's "*unvaried* wrong choices imply a full, unremitted *natural* power of doing right," and that "the character of our race needs an essential transformation by an interposed influence from God."² The Reviewer now springs to the charge that the first of these statements is "a vapid formula of Pelagianism," and the second is "a very genteel way of expressing the matter which need offend no one, Jew or Gentile, Augustin or Pelagius."³ Does the Reviewer mean to say, that Pelagius would have sanctioned either of the above cited statements when fairly presented in its connections? Did Pelagius recognize our "disordered nature," our "unvaried, undeviating wrong choices," our "natural" as *opposed* to our "moral power?" Did he suppose that the character of the *race*, as well as of particular individuals, needs not only an improvement but also an *essential transformation*, and that this radical change must be effected not only by moral suasion, but by the *interposed* influence of the Holy Spirit? Will not the Reviewer acknowledge then, that the two statements so offensive to him are wrested from their adjuncts and merely caricatured, when they are held up as involving the substantial error of Pelagianism?

The author of the sermon has never doubted but firmly believes, that in consequence of the first man's sin all men have at birth a corrupt nature, which exposes them to suffering, but not punishment, even

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 548. See also 547, 565-567.

² Bib. Sac. pp. 547, 548.

³ Bib. Rep. pp. 655, 656.

without their actual transgression ; which, unless divine mercy interpose, secures the certainty of their actual transgression, as soon as they can put forth a moral preference, and of their eternal punishment as the merited result of this transgression ; a corrupt nature, which must be changed by the supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost before they will ever obey or morally please him ; and therefore the author believes that men are by nature, i. e. in consequence, on account of it, sinners, and worthy of punishment "for all have sinned." But the Reviewer is bold enough to say, that the two passages "a sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the sin of one man," and "men are by nature the children of wrath," are represented by the author of the sermon as "impressive but not intelligible," "true to the feelings but false to the reason."¹ We do not believe that the Reviewer intended to make a false as well as injurious impression by these words ; he probably leaped to the inference, as untrue in itself as it is illogically drawn, that if some figures of speech do *sometimes appear* false and unintelligible when they are transferred from their proper to an improper place, then *the two above cited passages* not only *appear* but *are* both false and unintelligible *in this place* and as they are ordinarily used. This inference, however, is rejected as a mere paralogism by the writer of the discourse.

The author of the sermon has never doubted but fully believes, that all converted men will be, on the ground of Christ's death, not only saved from punishment but raised to happiness, will be not only pardoned but justified, not only treated in important respects as if they had never sinned, but treated in important respects as if they had been positively and perfectly holy. Still, the Reviewer, both without and against evidence, has preferred the charge that the author represents the passage "men are not merely pardoned but justified," as "not intelligible," and as "false to the reason."² Now here is a definite and an unfair accusation, to which we reply by asking a definite and a fair question. When and where has the author denied that the doctrine of justification as distinct from that of pardon, is intelligible or true ? If the Reviewer has not borne "false witness against" the author, let him prove his witness to be correct. If he has been thoughtlessly betrayed into an accusation not more injurious than it is groundless, let him have the kindness to remember the words of Mr. Pitt : "Whoever brings here a charge without proof, defames." It is of no use for him to say that because the sermon represents *some*

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 674.

² Ibid p. 674.

figures of speech as absurd when in their wrong connections, therefore the sermon represents the phrase "men are not merely pardoned but justified" as absurd in the particular connections in which it is generally used. The primary meaning of the word justify, is altogether less conspicuous and embarrassing than the primary meaning of the word impute, and if the sermon *had* affirmed the word impute to be ordinarily "*unintelligible*," the Reviewer had no right to draw the false inference that the word justify would be characterized in the same manner. Because some pictures appear to be mere daubs, unless viewed at *one* specified angle, the Reviewer must not dash on to the conclusion that the Sistine Madonna is a mere daub, when it is viewed at all the angles which are commonly taken.

It is a solemn truth, distinctly avowed in the discourse,¹ that "There is a life, a soul, a vitalizing spirit of truth, which must never be relinquished for the sake of peace even with an angel. There is (I know that you will allow me to express my opinion)² a line of separation which cannot be crossed between those systems which insert, and those which omit the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus. This is the doctrine which blends in itself the theology of intellect and that of feeling, and which can no more be struck out from the moral, than the sun from the planetary system. Here the mind and the heart, like justice and mercy, meet and embrace each other; and here is found the specific and ineffaceable difference between the Gospel and every other system. But among those who admit the atoning death of Christ as the organific principle of their faith, there are differences, some of them more important, but many far less important than they seem to be." And, again, the author of the discourse avers,³ in the most prosaic language, that "the atonement has such a relation to the whole moral government of God, as to make it *consistent* with the honor of his legislative and retributive justice to save all men, and to make it essential to the highest honor of his benevolence or general justice to renew and save some. Therefore it satisfies the law and justice of God *so far and in such a sense*, as to render it proper for him not only to give many temporal favors, but also to offer salvation to all men, bestow it upon all who will accept it, and cause those to accept it, for whom the interests of the universe allow him to interpose his regenerating grace." But

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 559.

² As the discourse was delivered before a Convention of Trinitarian and Unitarian clergymen, such a parenthetic clause seemed to the author to be decorous.

³ Bib. Sac. pp. 562, 563.

our critic represents the sermon as denying that Christ satisfied the law and justice of God, as "explaining away the scriptural representations of the satisfaction of divine justice by the sacrifice of Christ," and as intimating that "because I may express the truth that Christ was a sacrifice by calling him the Lamb of God who bears the sin of the world, I may in solemn acts of worship so address him without believing in his sacrificial death at all."¹ It is a noticeable fact, that while the sermon *deduces* the intellectual truth of a vicarious atonement from the demands of holy feeling, and definitely affirms, p. 544, that "the doctrines which centre in and around a vicarious atonement are so fitted to the appetences of a sanctified heart as to gain the favor of a *logician*, precisely as the coincidence of some geological or astronomical theories with the phenomena of the earth or sky, is a part of the syllogism which has those theories for its conclusion;" yet the Reviewer inverts this whole process, and, p. 678, unblushingly represents the sermon as teaching that feeling and knowledge are in "perpetual (?) conflict," "the one craving a real vicarious punishment of sin, the other teaching that a symbolical atonement is all that is needed." Anxious to find some excuse for this charge of the Reviewer, we have searched for one in vain. He will not attempt, we imagine, to extenuate his fault by pleading that the author speaks of a "vicarious atonement," while the Reviewer speaks of a "vicarious punishment;" for the Reviewer himself will acknowledge that "in the most strict and rigid" meaning of the term, "punishment has reference to personal guilt."²

The author of the sermon believes, and has never implied the contrary, that Christ's death being vicarious, his sufferings being substituted for our punishment, we are literally unable, after having once sinned, to be saved without him; that we are not only redeemed from eternal punishment by his propitiatory sacrifice, but, even after we have been regenerated by his Spirit, we are entirely dependent on his grace in sending the same Spirit to secure our continuance in holiness; and, moreover, that we are every instant preserved in being by his Almighty power, so that without him we literally *cannot* even exist; and still it is boldly declared in the Review, that the sermon represents the passages, "without Christ we can do nothing" and "he hath redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us," as "not intelligible" and as "false to the reason!"³ But the accom-

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 653, 664, 665, 674.

² Princeton Theol. Essays, Vol. I. p. 141.

³ Bib. Rep. p. 674.

plished critic, not satisfied with inflicting this injury, has actually made the following cool statement: "The phrase that 'God came from Teman' or 'he made the clouds his chariot,' *when interpreted according to the laws of language*, expresses a truth. The phrases, 'Christ took upon him our guilt,' 'he satisfied divine justice,' *when interpreted by the same laws*, express, as our author thinks, what is false."¹ If the Reviewer is able to say all this, what will he not say next? He has not only concealed some of the most important *declarations* of the sermon, but has published the non-existent thoughts of its author. "*As our author thinks!*" Is it not a rule of comity in letters, never to report that a man believes what he emphatically denies that he believes? The phrases "Christ took upon him our guilt, and satisfied divine justice" are false, "as our author thinks," "when they are interpreted according to the use of language!" Really, unless we had learned long ago not to be surprised at anything which can be said by anonymous critics, even when in the main they are good men, we should be astonished at this apparently sober charge. Might not the Reviewer have easily seen it to be one aim of the discourse to prove, that all such phrases, when interpreted according to the laws of language, express what is intellectually and morally true? to prove that they must be explained according to what they *mean*, and that they always mean what the intellect can reconcile with other truths? The eager critic has here committed two faults. The first is a fault of logic; for he has taken the premise, that passionate phrases when explained literally and without qualification, and so not according to the laws of language, are *often* untrue, and has hence inferred that these phrases when explained with the proper qualification, and according to the laws of language are untrue. His reasonings may be reduced to this enthymem: The sermon states, pp. 522, 563, that Christ has satisfied the law and justice of God, so far and in such a sense as to render it not a matter of legal obligation, but a matter of propriety and consistency for him to regenerate some men, offer salvation to all men, and bestow numerous favors on the elect and non-elect; therefore, it follows that the phrase Christ "satisfied divine justice," *when interpreted according to the rules of language, expresses, as our author thinks, what is false.*

As the first error of the Reviewer in this charge is one of logic, so the second is one of controversial ethics. He has asserted that his *own* inference from the sermon is the actual opinion of the author of

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 665.

that sermon. And here his ethical fault is the more unseemly, because the Reviewer's inference is illogical, and the author's premise is a simple one, laid down in many of our elementary works. We should advise our critic to review Dr. Hey's *Canons of Controversy*, if we could suppose him ignorant of the rule, that one should never impute his own inferences, especially his unwarrantable inferences, to another man who is innocent of them. He should not impute them literally, by affirming outright that the innocent has committed these errors; nor should he impute them figuratively, by treating the innocent as if he had been guilty of these wrong conclusions.

If the Reviewer had pursued to its full length the principle which he seems to have adopted in some of his criticisms, he would have said, that the sermon denies the doctrine of Eternal Punishment, because it implies that this doctrine would be true, even if there were to be no literal fire or worm; that the sermon denies the doctrine of the General Judgment, because it implies that this doctrine would be true, even if there were to be no opened books; that the sermon denies the doctrine of the Resurrection, because it implies that this doctrine would be true, even if the same particles of matter composing our earthly bodies should not compose our spiritual bodies. For the Reviewer seems to have reasoned on the strange principle, that if the same doctrine be presented in two forms, one prosaic and one poetical, then the doctrine is denied, or is described as false to the intellect. Obviously, the sermon never intimates that any truth is false to the intellect. This language, and the idea suggested by it, are merely of the Reviewer's imputation. He has, apparently, reasoned thus: the sermon affirms that certain doctrines are, at certain times, associated with certain images, and expressed in certain words, which the intellect would never have suggested for the purposes of speculation; and therefore the sermon affirms that those doctrines are false to the reason. Just as if the sermon would have denied the truth of John 21: 25, provided that it had declared the possibility of the world's containing more books than can be ever written.

But the Reviewer is not satisfied even with these imputations. Although the sermon was designed to be homiletical rather than doctrinal, yet it incidentally teaches the dogmatic truths of Eternal Punishment, the Resurrection, the General Judgment, man's Entire Sinfulness, his Native Corruption, his need of Regeneration by the interposed influence of God, the Vicarious Atonement, and "the doctrines which concentrate in and around" it; and it repeatedly represents all Christian truth as that "which God himself has matched to our

nicest and most delicate springs of action, and which, so highly does he honor our nature, he has interposed by miracles for the sake of revealing in his written word."¹ Still, the Reviewer often characterizes the sermon as "inimical to the proper authority of the Bible," "subversive," "destructive" of it, as exhibiting sad affinities to Rationalism; and as fit to be associated in some of its doctrinal tendencies, with the writings of Schleiermacher, Röhr, Morell, etc.² In his Eleventh Letter on Clerical Manners and Habits, Dr. Miller says: "Let all your conduct in judicatories be *marked* with the *most perfect candor and uprightness*." "Men in the main upright and pious, do sometimes indulge in a species of indirect management, which minds delicately honorable and strictly desirous of shunning the very appearance of evil, would by no means have adopted. Such are the little arts of concealment," etc.: "Never employ language toward any fellow member (of a judicatory) which you would not be willing to have directed toward yourself."³

Suppose, now, that in criticising this Review, we should use his own *argumentum ad captandum vulgus*. There are fundamental heresies, that of the Theopaschites that of denying the Trinity to be eternal, the Godhead to be perfect, etc., of which he might be convicted, as easily and as honorably as he has convicted the sermon of a neological spirit. Take a single illustration. It is an established principle, that the properties and attributes of either nature by itself, may be applied and ascribed to the whole person who combines two natures, but that the properties and attributes of the whole person cannot be ascribed, without qualification, to either nature by itself. Thus we may affirm that man, compounded of soul and body, eats and thinks, but not that the soul eats, nor that the body thinks; the complex being is perhaps corpulent and sentimental, but the body is not sen-

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 561, 544.

² We will do justice to the charitable spirit of the Reviewer, and say, that in one passage on p. 646, he makes the following concession: "We are far from supposing that the author regards his theory as subversive of the authority of the Bible. He has obviously (?) adopted it as a convenient way of getting rid of certain doctrines (?) which stand out far too prominently in Scripture, and are too deeply impressed on the hearts of God's people, to allow of their being denied."—The charm of this passage lies in the fact that it purports to be apologetic. It begins to be a serious question with us, whether we have any acquaintance with the author whose designs are thus charitably explained; whether we have ever read a paragraph of his discourse. Either we are lamentably ignorant of the sermon, or else the gentleman who has assailed, has radically misapprehended it.

³ Miller's Letters, pp. 320, 328.

timental, nor the soul corpulent. On the same principle we may affirm, that Christ, compounded of God and man, is immutable, and died, but not that the man is immutable, or the God died. If we say that God has died, we speak poetically or erroneously. But the Review defends the phrase, "God the mighty Maker died," as "a dogmatic truth," for "its strict doctrinal propriety," its "doctrinal fidelity," and even goes so far as to state that this phrase belongs to "the language of speculation, of theory, of the intellect, as *distinguished* from the feelings."¹ But, if it be true that God the mighty Maker died, then it is true on the principle that all which Christ did and suffered, God did and suffered; and all which was done by Jehovah, was done also by the man Christ Jesus. And this profane principle the Reviewer adopts; and so accordingly he believes, not only that the worlds were made by a man, the eternal decrees formed by the son of a carpenter, but also that, as Christ, so the eternal Deity was born, was educated, was ignorant, was lost by his parents, was carried about from place to place, was fatigued; God the Spirit was refreshed by food and sleep; God the Mighty was unable to bear his cross, was weak and not mighty; God the Maker was (contrary to one of the Reviewer's creeds) both begotten and also made; God the immutable grew in stature, was subject to daily, hourly change; God who is ever blessed, was at one period the greatest sufferer on earth, was nailed to the cross; the everlasting God was dead, not living; and therefore unchangeable power, wisdom, blessedness, and even life cannot be ascribed to him, "as our Reviewer thinks." Now, we will do this Reviewer the *justice* to say, that if we should imitate him in imputing to him as his own belief, the inferences which he has never avowed, but which might be drawn from his words, as fairly as he has drawn inferences from the sermon, we should do what our self-respect forbids us to do.

Pitiable indeed is the logomachy of polemic divines. We have somewhere read, that the Berkeleians who denied the existence of matter, differed more in terms than in opinion from their opponents who affirmed the existence of matter; for the former uttered with emphasis, "We cannot prove that there is an outward world," and then whispered, "We are yet compelled to believe that there is one;" whereas the latter uttered with emphasis, "We are compelled to believe in the outward world," and then whispered, "Yet we cannot prove that there is one." This is not precisely accurate, still it

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 666, 648.

illustrates the amount of difference which exists between the Reviewer and the author of the humble Convention sermon. Let us listen to them in an imagined colloquy. The Reviewer exclaims aloud, "I believe in a sinful nature preceding all sinful exercise of it," and then whispers, "This passive nature is not sinful in the sense of being condemned by the conscience of one who never acted amiss; men are not personally blamable for being born with it; they do not deserve the fatal sentence at the judgment merely for the way in which they were made." The author exclaims aloud, "I believe that man's nature preceding all exercise of it contains no such sin as itself deserves to be tried, blamed, condemned at the judgment, and punished forever," and then he whispers, "Still this nature, as it certainly occasions sin, may be sometimes called sinful in a peculiar sense, for the sake of intensity." The Reviewer cries on a high key, "I believe that the sin of the guilty is imputed to the innocent under a just administration," and then adds in a lower tone, "The word impute, however, is not here used in its more obvious meaning, and does not imply that the imputation affects the character of the innocent or makes them actually displeasing to God." The author cries with a loud voice, "I believe that the sin of the guilty is not imputed to the innocent," and then adds on a lower key, "The innocent, however, are made to suffer in consequence of the guilty, and being thus treated in certain respects as if they had done wrong, sin may be sometimes said, for the sake of a deep impression, to be imputed to them." The Reviewer exclaims in a loud tone, "I believe that the innocent are justly punished for sin which they have never committed," and then adds in a milder accent, "They are not punished however in the most strict and rigid meaning of the term, but are only made to suffer on account of the sin of those with whom they are connected, and for the purpose of sustaining the law as inviolable." The author exclaims in a bold tone, "I believe that the innocent are not justly punished for sin which they have never committed, for, in the words of Andrew Fuller,¹ "*real and proper* punishment is not only the infliction of natural evil for the commission of moral evil, but the infliction of the one upon the person who committed the other, and in displeasure against him; it not only supposes criminality, but that the party punished was literally the criminal:" still in a milder accent the author adds, "The suffering of the innocent for the guilty may be sometimes called punishment with a peculiar meaning, for the

¹ Fuller's Works, Vol. IV. p. 34.

sake of unusual force." The Reviewer exclaims with earnestness, "All men sinned in Adam," but he explains with deliberation; "They did not literally exist in him, and his voluntary acts cannot be reckoned theirs strictly and properly." The author is earnest in saying, "All men did not literally exist in Adam, and could not have strictly and literally sinned before they existed;" but he is careful to add, "Adam's fall was so infallibly connected with the total depravity of his descendants, as to give a true and deep meaning to the phrase, which may be sometimes used as an intense one, that they sinned in him." The Reviewer proclaims aloud, "I believe in a limited but not general atonement," and then whispers, "It is sufficient, however, for the non-elect as well as the elect." The author proclaims aloud, "I believe in a general but not limited atonement," and then repeats with diminished emphasis, "It was never decreed, however, that this atonement should result in the regeneration of the non-elect." Says the Reviewer, "I will use terms in their technical, although it is not their most obvious meaning;" says the author, "I will generally use terms in their more obvious, although it is not their technical meaning." Whereupon the Reviewer speaks out: "You are inimical to the proper authority of the Bible;" to which the author responds, "You found this charge upon a mere difference about words, about the emphasis to be given them; about the modifications of voice with which the words are to be uttered; and it is notorious that a dispute about words leads to more and still more words, and ends, if it end at all, in hard and sharp words; it is what our polemic divines ought by this time to be tired of, logomachy."

4. But we have already anticipated a distinct class of the Reviewer's unintentional mis-statements. He represents the sermon as unguarded in its tendencies. He says that "it enables a man to profess his faith in doctrines which he does not believe,"¹ and thus to advocate opposing creeds. Is such an objection worthy of such a critic? Does not he himself cling to the creed that the children of Adam are punished for the sin of their father, and also to the Biblical creed "that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father;" "neither shall the children be put to death for their fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin?" But the critic will respond, these apparent discrepancies can be reconciled; and we rejoice, one aim of the sermon is to show that all creeds which are allowable can be reconciled with each other; for, as far as allowable, they contain underneath their diversified forms the substance of the truth and of nothing but the truth.

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 646.

Dr. Blair remarks¹ what every body knows, that "all passions, without exception, love, terror, amazement, indignation, anger and even grief throw the mind into confusion, aggravate their objects, and of course prompt to a hyperbolical style." In accordance with this trite saying, the sermon makes an hypothetical assertion,² that if a creed be wrongly viewed as "a triumphal song of thanksgiving," and if agreeably to this view it be written in the style of a highly poetical effusion, and if when written in this style it be chanted under the influence of thrilling music and amid the pomp of a gorgeous ceremonial, then, in such a false position, the cantilator of such a creed may be so rapt in enthusiasm as to sing the ecstatic words without inquiring for their "precise" import. Who could imagine that the following inference would be drawn from the foregoing truism:—If a man with *false* views of the nature of a creed, may be so overcome by the minstrelsy of a cathedral as to cry out, "*credq quia impossibile*," while he cantilates an imaginative Confession, which is obscure in its sublimity, and confusing by its crowd of images; then it follows that a student acting, as a student ought to act, deliberately and circumspectly, may with set purpose subscribe a plain and precise creed when he knows it to be false both in its language and in its meaning. The man who can reason thus will soon conclude that if Peter spoke on the mountain without knowing what he said, then he wrote his epistles under the same kind of afflatus. We cannot imagine what a person means by extorting such inferences, but whatever he means, we forgive him.

That the Reviewer arrives at any of his accusations by reasoning in this way, we do not affirm. We cannot divine the process by which he comes to some of his charges. Sometimes he appears to adopt the premise, that the language of the Bible or of a creed must not be qualified at all, and if it be qualified then it is, (to use a word of his own) "eviscerated" of its meaning. But he "explains away" the literal import of many technical terms, just as really as they are explained away in the sermon. And as for qualifying the language of the Bible, does the Reviewer infer the "real presence" from the plain phrase "this is my body;" or the necessity of the pedilavium from the still plainer phrase, "ye ought to wash one another's feet." It were just as fair for us to affirm that he "explains away" the Bible when he denies that God manifests frowardness, Ps. 18: 26, as it is for the Reviewer to affirm that the sermon "explains it away." He has used, *totidem verbis*, the same argument of "rationalistic tenden-

¹ Rhet. Lect. XVI.² Bib. Sac. pp. 553, 554.

cies," which the Romanist brings against the Protestant. It is the notorious *argumentum ad invidiam*.

But he is more definite in one of his charges. He says that the sermon proposes "no adequate criteria for discriminating between the language of feeling and that of the intellect," leaves "every one to his own discretion in making the distinction, and the use of this discretion, regulated by no fixed rules of language, is of course determined by *caprice* or taste;" that the sermon is "*perfectly arbitrary*" in explaining figurative language, etc., and its operation "must be to subject [the teachings of the Bible] to the opinion and prejudices of the reader," etc.¹

All the principles of Morns and Ernesti on Interpretation, cannot, of course, be collected into one Convention Sermon. But this sermon does propound some criteria for discriminating between the true and the false.

One of these criteria is, the agreement of a doctrine with right or Christian feeling. Whatever *words* this feeling sanctions are thereby signified to be correct in form; whatever *meaning* it sanctions, is thereby signified to be *true* in fact. Every statement is to be disapproved "which does not harmonize with the well ordered sensibilities of the soul." "In this light we discern the necessity of right feeling, as a guide to the right proportions of faith," pp. 546, 555.

A second of these criteria involved in the first, is the agreement of a doctrine with the *necessary* impulses of the soul. Reason "will sanction not only all pious feelings, but likewise all those which are *essential* developments of our original constitution," p. 567. "Whenever a feeling is constitutional, and *cannot* be expelled — whenever it is pious and cannot but be approved, then such of its impulses as are uniform, self-consistent and persevering, are data on which the intellect may safely reason, and by means of which it may add new materials to its dogmatic system." "Has man been created with *irresistible* instincts which *impel* him to believe in a falsehood? Or has the Christian been inspired with *holy* emotions, which allure him to an essentially erroneous faith? Is God the author of confusion, in his Word revealing one doctrine, and by his Spirit persuading his saints to reject it?" p. 544. Whatever the Reviewer may say of these necessary impulses, Dr. Hodge cannot disparage them, for he says in his Commentary on Rom. 8: 1-8, "What God forces us, from the very constitution of our natures, to believe, as for example, the existence of the external world, our own personal identity, the differ-

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 652, 653, 673, 674.

ance between good and evil, it is at once a violation of his will and of the dictates of reason to deny or to question."

A third of these criteria involved in the two preceding is, the moral tendency of a doctrine. Whatever belief is on the whole useful, the same is thereby signified to be true; whatever mode of expressing this belief is useful, the same is thereby signified to be right. "So far as any statement is hurtful, it parts with one sign of its truth. In itself, or in its relations, it must be inaccurate whenever it is not congenial with the feelings awakened by the Divine Spirit. The practical utility, then, of any theological representations, is one criterion of their propriety." "Here also we learn the value of the Bible in unfolding the suitable adaptations of truth, and in illustrating their utility, *which is on the whole so decisive a touch-stone of their correctness*," p. 555. The Reviewer may say, perhaps, that this tendency of a doctrine is "no adequate criterion" of its truth; but Dr. Hodge says in his Commentary on Rom. 8: 1-8, "There is no better evidence against the truth of any doctrine, than that its tendency is immoral." Now, the preceding extracts from the sermon are not desultory passages, but are parts of lengthened paragraphs, the *main object* of which is to show that a standard of truth is to be found in the congeniality of a statement with pious or constitutional feeling, and in its moral tendencies; see pp. 544, 545, 555-558. *So far forth as, and in whatever sense* it is agreeable and healthful to our moral feelings, to say that God exacts of men more than he gives them power to perform, to say that he imputes to them a crime which they never committed, just so far forth, and in just that sense, may we be entitled to believe those sayings as substantially true.

But a fourth criterion propounded in the sermon is, the agreement of a doctrine with the feelings of good men in general. "These *universal* feelings provide us with a test for our own faith." Pious men differ in the minute philosophical forms of truth, but their unanimity in the substance of it, indicates "the correctness of their cherished faith, as the agreement of many witnesses presupposes the verity of the narration in which they coincide." "The broad substance of doctrine around which the feelings of all *renewed* men" (the point of the argument lies in the word "*renewed*," which the Reviewer changes into "reverent")¹ cling ever and everywhere, "*must be right*," for it

¹ The sentence of the Reviewer is the following: "The church is not infallible in her bodies of divinity, nor her creeds, nor catechisms, nor any logical formula; but underneath all, there lies a grand substance of doctrine, around which the feelings of all reverent men cling," etc., Bib. Rep. p. 654.

is precisely adjusted to the soul, and the soul was made for it," pp. 544, 545. In whatever sense the feelings of all good men welcome the Reviewer's "dogma," that the Maker of the world has once died, *in that sense* is the dogma indicated to be correct.

A fifth criterion is the agreement of a doctrine with other well known truths. Correct figures of speech disagree with each other; correct literal statements, never. The intellectual theology "regards a want of concinnity in a system, as a token of some false principle. And as it will modify itself in order to avoid the error involved in a contradiction, so, and for the same reason, it has authority in the last resort to rectify the statements which are often congenial with excited emotion," p. 546.

A sixth criterion mentioned in the sermon is, the agreement of a doctrine with the inferences of reason enlightened by revelation. The chief aim of pp. 546-550 is, to show that "as the head is placed above the heart in the body, so the faith which is sustained by good argument, should control rather than be controlled by those emotions which receive no approval from the judgment." "In all investigations for truth, the intellect must be the authoritative power," it "explains, modifies, harmonizes the meaning" of all conflicting statements; must bring them all "into unison with the intellectual statements which, however unimpressive, are yet the most authoritative." And the reason draws its inferences from the works of God, but chiefly from his "miraculously attested" word. So far forth and in whatever sense it can be *proved* that the innocent are punished for the guilty, just so far forth and in that sense, is the statement true. It is now a noticeable fact, that at the very time when the Reviewer condemned the sermon, as leaving every one to his "*caprice or taste*" in distinguishing between literal and figurative language, he had upon his table the edition of the sermon containing these words:¹

"No one hesitates to say that the poetic view of astronomy, in which the sun is described as masculine, the moon as feminine, the stars as children of the moon, should be reduced into a consistency with the philosophical view, and that the demonstrable science should not be distorted so as to harmonize with the graceful fable. Neither does any one shrink from interpreting the assertion, God is a rock, into an accordance with the assertion, God is a spirit; for both statements cannot be literally true, and the one which commends itself to the intellect, is the rightful standard by which to modify the one suggested by the heart. Else the *fancies* and *caprices* of man will be, what his reason and conscience ought to be, his guide."

If, then, an interpretation be intuitively perceived to be correct, or be proved so by valid argument from the word or works of God, if it

¹ Second pamphlet edition, p. 46.

substantially agree with other interpretations known to be right, if it have been generally received as true by "*renewed*" men, if it have a healthful moral influence, if it accord with our constitutional or pious feeling, then it has so many signs of its correctness. All these criteria, and others also, are stated by the author, who is "*perfectly arbitrary in the application of his theory,*" and according to the Reviewer "*adopts or rejects the representations of the Bible at pleasure, or as they happen to coincide with or contradict his own preconceived opinions.*"¹

The author does, indeed, recognize (Sermon, p. 555) the solemn truth that "here," in his theme, "we see our responsibility for our religious belief. Here are we impressed by the fact that much of our probation relates to our mode of shaping and coloring the doctrines of theology." We cannot escape from this probation. Our Almighty Sovereign designs to try our hearts in our detection of the principles which are communicated to us in symbols. It were, indeed, congenial with our love of ease, to have our duties for every day written out with exactness on the palms of our hands, that we may simply look and read. It were pleasant if God had arranged the stars of heaven into letters and sentences all unfolding our precise relations to him, and modifying themselves into new testaments of truth whenever we needed new light. But instead of thus accommodating our listless spirit, he has required us to *dig* for our knowledge, to *work* out our salvation with fear and trembling; and has made the probation of all men, and the chief probation of some men to consist in their mode of regulating their judgments, imagination and feelings in the pursuit of wholesome doctrine. Let us not attempt to flee from our appointed trial, but let us endure it as men with humility and prayer. Let us not arraign our Maker because he has sown the path of investigation with perils; but let us meet the perils with a manly trust in his guidance. All study is dangerous; but the neglect of it is more so. Candor may be abused to our hurt; bigotry will be used to our sorer mischief. If we aim to be fair inquirers for truth, we may err; if we strive to be pugnacious defenders of a party we shall lapse into sad mistakes. Let us ever bear in mind that we are to give account at the great day, not only for every idle, injurious, defamatory word, but also for the narrow, clannish, sectarian spirit with which we may have discussed the truth. Who is sufficient, without God's help, for *preaching* or even for *thinking* of that Gospel which "is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel."

¹ Bip. Rep. p. 684.

ARTICLE X.

HICKOK'S RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.¹

By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., Prof. of Greek, Union College, Schenectady, N. Y.

PSYCHOLOGY — the word, the reason, the science of the soul. "It is *only* a developed consciousness," or a development of consciousness, says the writer of the famous article on Reid and Brown in No. CIII. of the Edinburgh Review. The objection here is to the word *only*. The definition is true as far as it goes. Psychology is a development of consciousness; but is it not something more? Dr. Hickok, as well as others of the general class of thinkers to which he may be said to belong, and among whom this work will, beyond all question, give him a very high standing, maintains that it is. He would probably find no fault with the statement, if the term consciousness were so extended, beyond what is commonly called the soul's experience, as to embrace the inward contemplation of the truths which the experience awakens it to find within itself as among the conditions of its own being. To avoid all such confusion, however, he has entitled his examination of the soul — *A Rational Psychology*. It is, in other words, the soul's experiences seen in the light of its own reason, — not as dispensing with experience, or preceding it in the order of time, but taking it first as a guide to that position from whence it is *seen*, not only that such experiences *are*, but that they must have been just what they are, and could have been in no other possible way. This is his use of the term *à priori* which occurs so frequently. It is not the absurdity of *à priori* knowledge as actual consciousness in the order of time, but the gaining, through experience or consciousness, taken in its widest sense, of an advance position from which the soul looks back and sees that there was but this one path, and that thus its guide experience was itself determined all along by that higher light to which it has at last conducted the spiritual consciousness. Hence it is called an *à priori*, or *rational psychology*. It assumes to show us, not only *how* we feel, how we perceive, how we understand, how we comprehend, or, — to use the gene-

¹ Rational Psychology, or the Subjective Idea, and the Objective Law of an Intelligence, by Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., Prof. of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Auburn. Published at Auburn, 1849, by Derby, Miller & Company.

ral term which embraces them all—how we know, but also that so we *must* have known, in a mode as surely determinable and determined as truth itself, which is the object of knowledge, is determined and could have been no other than what it is. Thus there is an *a priori* idea for each power and department of the soul, whatever, or how many, they may be, and there is to each an objective law in perfect harmony with it. There is an idea of the sense, and corresponding to it an actual law of feeling and perceiving. There is an idea of an understanding and a corresponding law of thinking. There is an idea of a reason (whether we have it as faculty or not, although the one would certainly seem to necessitate the other) and there is within us a law presenting in consciousness the ends to which such a faculty may be directed, and the intellectual and moral wants, above the region of the sense and the understanding, to which it may give a satisfaction and a meaning.

This distinction of the understanding and the reason has been claimed, by his ardent followers, as exclusively belonging to Coleridge. Nothing, however, can be more unfounded. There is no doubt that Coleridge everywhere obtrudes it upon the reader as his own, and yet there can be as little doubt that he borrowed it, or might have borrowed it, to say the least, from the German metaphysicians. It is equally clear, too, that the same distinction was held by the two master minds of antiquity, and what is more, that it is inseparable from the very spirit of the language in which they wrote. We may say, moreover, that the more common division employed both by the learned and the unlearned,—we mean that of the sense and the reason, in which the department of the understanding is shared between the two, or that of the sense and the understanding, in which the reason is merged in the latter,—is by no means so inconsistent with the threefold distinction as might at first be imagined. No one of these faculties, it may be said, ever acts alone. There is no pure sense (at least in man, whatever may be the case with the lower animals) without some act of the understanding. It is never, as Aristotle says, purely *αλογον*;¹ and, moreover, there is no exercise of the human understanding without some faint coöperation of the reason. Hence, by conjoining the second with the first, and the third with the second, we naturally fall into a twofold division; especially if we employ the terms more in reference to the objects about which the mind is employed than the mental exercises themselves. Hence the un-

¹ Aristotle De Anima, Lib. III. 9. 2.

derstanding employed on the objects of the sense is, with no great impropriety, called by the general name of the sense, as distinguished from the reason (or the understanding which is in this mode of speaking connected if not confounded with it) regarded as occupied with those enduring notions of the one, or those universal truths of the other, which sense alone could never give.

The distinction, then, is the author's own, as much as it is Coleridge's, or Schelling's, or Kant's. It is his own, because no one, we will venture to say, has more carefully thought it out, or more scientifically marked out the field of each faculty, than has been done in the work before us. This, however is a matter of but little consequence. The threefold division of objects and of corresponding powers must present itself to every mind that truly reflects. There are three energies of the soul (call them by what name we will) ideally distinct, although it may be that they are seldom actually separate in their operation. There is that within us which takes notice of appearances, or phenomena, or the forms that dark sensation assumes under this gaze of the soul, and which, if it were the only mode in which the intelligence energized, would give us nothing else. There is another which takes cognition of things and events, or, in other words, the realities, which this faculty informs us these phenomena represent; and had the soul no higher power, there could be no interest in, and therefore no knowledge of, aught beyond. There is, however, another power of the spirit which all must be conscious of, obscure as may be its operation in some minds, and which occupies itself with the meaning of things, — affirming *à priori* that they must have a meaning, and seeking to explore what that meaning is. Thus we have appearances, — things — and the meaning, or reason¹ of things. We have the phenomenal, the natural, and the supernatural. We have the present, the temporal, the eternal, — in other words, that which has no existence but in the moment or moments of impression, — that which the law of the understanding, transcending the sense, compels us to regard as having a producing being, — and that which a higher faculty, transcending both sense and the understanding, presents as beyond all limitations, either of present or flowing time. To fill up this outline a little, — we may say, appearances have construction in space and time, although without some other faculty than the sense they would come and go isolated and un-

¹ All who have been in the habit of confounding reason, design, and motive, as meaning about the same thing (and there are many such) will, of course, see no demand for any faculty distinct from the understanding.

remembered. Things and events are connected by the notions, cause and substance, into a system we call nature, but without some other faculty than the understanding, it would have only a scientific value, raising no question of a higher interest, and doing nothing to answer such a question when raised in some other way. But there is an operation of the soul, which, however obscure in some, and however limited in all of us, does to some extent comprehend sense and nature, or, at least, awaken the interest which demands such comprehension in order to give meaning and reason to appearances and things.

We might, to some advantage, vary the view by presenting it in the form of the three great questions in regard to the universe of being, — The what? The how? ¹ and The why? The *τι*, and the *ὅτι*, and the *διότι*. The sense and the understanding would try to find an answer to the first, understanding and reason to the second, and the reason (especially the moral reason) to the third. And this answer, in its most comprehending terms, would be given in the words, God, The Soul, and Immortality.

In regard to the first of these, or the Great Reason of Reasons, the scientific understanding might likewise attempt, and does attempt, the solution; but it would ever bring it under the how, the *πῶς*, instead of the *διότι* of the universe. It has ever been inquiring — whence came nature, and the world, and how do they exist, or trying to explain the fact (*ὅτι*) that they do exist; but ever as questions of curious or scientific interest. Cosmogony was the earliest problem in philosophy; geological and nebular hypotheses furnish the favorite speculations of the most modern science. In such inquiries the understanding seeks its God, but it never gets anything more than a first cause, a first power, a first mover, a developing principle, taken, too, at last, as a necessary notion of the wearied mind, and although assumed as beginning nature, yet never in fact regarded as out of nature; in other words a scientific God in whom there is no ethical interest. There was no irreverence in the assertion of a most eloquent writer, that "such a belief in a great first cause" may have as little moral value for us as a belief in the existence of the great sea serpent.²

The true meaning of the universe is a question put by the moral reason. It is no question for the animal; it would hardly seem to be one (if we may judge by the *animus* they often display) for some

¹ Or the fact.

² Foot Prints of the Creator, by Hugh Miller, p. 42.

men of the highest scientific and even aesthetic attainment. There may be a great exhibition of designing intelligence, but ever as the adaptation of physical means to physical ends, which, after all, are never ends, or to artistic ends which never go out of the workmanship. But reason and conscience ask, what is the design of all designs, going clear out of nature into some acknowledged region beyond and above it. We may trace the long road, and the countless ages, from infusoria up to humana; or we may hunt them backward until, for the mere satisfaction of the cause-tracing understanding, we bring into the chain the notion of a first Power, or a first Principle of development. We may find, too, all along our way, abundance of artistical design, an armory of means and contrivances for devouring and defence, a wondrous apparatus of life, and death, and reproduction. But what is the meaning of it all? Strange as may seem the paradox, yet in this respect, and without some higher teacher, and some higher text-book, the darker and darker grow the rocks the more they are scientifically understood. This must be so until they, together with all nature, are comprehended in relation to man and immortality, and, above all, to the supernatural creating power of Him to whom "a thousand years are but as one day, and one day is as a thousand years." Here too even reason requires aid from above, and it is at last "by faith we know that the worlds were made by the word of God, so that the things that are seen were not made of things which do appear." And *for* His glory were they made. Unless this is seen, we are yet in the region of the *æons*, and all our science is valueless just in proportion as its objects are unmeaning. The all-explaining word benevolence does but little to dissipate the mystery. It only calls up some awful facts, which, unless nature is more misinterpreted than ever Scripture was, can never find their explanation in any mere happiness-theory that is not itself comprehended in some higher idea.

Thus may we say, by way of accommodation, that these two faculties have each their deity, but with this immense difference. In the judgment of the one, God is *for* the universe; in the *a priori* demand of the other, the universe is *for* God. In the one, the deity is needed as the first term in the infinite series, or as some assumed unknown quantity without which it could not be mathematically summed, or as some first mover, without which the dynamical problem cannot be solved. The pantheistic understanding, too, according to the one or the other aspect of its most ancient philosophy, requires a similar conception, either as the *starting* principle of the world's outgrowth,

or as its *terminating* development. In all these cases, when once brought in, it is needed no more for any moral or religious ends. God is for the universe. Reason and the conscience, on the other hand, reverse this entirely. They demand the idea of a God such as revelation more clearly presents, who is not only beginning, but end, who is alpha and omega, the first and the last, by whom, and through whom, and for whom are all things, and who, "for his own eternal glory, hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." It is only in the doctrine of *à priori* moral decrees that we escape that iron bound physical fatalism, which the superficial sciolist is so fond of charging upon the creed most opposed to his own. The reason finds refuge in the supernatural, not regarded as something away at the end of nature, and thus, in fact, a continuation of it, but as everywhere above, or as reigning high over nature in all its extent of time and space.

And thus, too, can the human soul alone truly comprehend itself. So far as humanity is nature and nothing more, it comes and goes like all other nature; it is *γενόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον*; it is born and perishes, just like all other physical powers. But as belonging also to the supernatural, it has immortality, and as thus connected with the Father of Spirits, all things are for it as one of the ends or rather as included in the great end for which nature and the world were made.

But we are too much drawn, at present, to those sublime topics on which the author, at the end of the volume, exhibits his chief strength, and which must, therefore, be deferred to some succeeding part of our review. Our first business is to give a rapid sketch of the contents of the work before us; and here, the utmost we can do is to present the merest outline of the author's views, and of his peculiar method. We commence by stating, that in his map of the human soul, the three great departments are, the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason, each of which are considered, in a three-fold way, in respect to the idea, the objective law, and the ontological verity of its objects. This division, rigidly maintained, imparts to the work great scientific symmetry. Corresponding to these departments are the three chief characteristic operations: conjunction or rather construction in space and time, connection in cause and substance, comprehension in meaning and idea.

Part I., The Sense, is introduced by definitions which are marked by etymological clearness, and then maintained with mathematical strictness throughout. The sense includes the whole faculty for

bringing an object within the distinct light of consciousness. The intellectual agency which takes up appearances as distinct objects of knowledge, is apprehension; and this may be of the external sense, or of that inner state of the mind which may be justly called the internal sense. The completed process in the sense is perception, or the taking of the appearance as object through some medium. The appearance,¹ as object perceived, is phenomenon; and this whether of the external or the internal sense. Phenomena have matter, that is, content given somehow in the sensibility, and form, or the modifications of the matter which permit it to be classified in relation to other phenomena. The capacity for receiving the content is sensibility; the affection induced is sensation. The faculty for giving form to the matter in the sensation, is the imagination, or the imaging faculty, which is the same essentially with that which constructs form in pure space without sensation,² p. 113. See also p. 145.

An object void of all content in sensation is called pure; with sensation it is called empirical. Intuition is immediate beholding. Pure intuition is that of a pure object as above defined; empirical intuition

¹ This might seem liable to the objection of being a mere tautology. Appearance is phenomenon. It might perhaps have done to have said, "Sensation, as object perceived, is phenomenon."

² There may be sensation even here. In the empirical imaging process from without, the content in the sensibility, whilst in the last matter of the material sensorium, affects the inner or spiritual sensorium where the dark and formless sensation is *envisaged* in the spiritual light, and thus becomes *perception*. The pure imaging, to which the name imagination is most commonly given, may be regarded as the reversing of this order, or as proceeding first from the pure energy of the mind, by which it is directly envisaged in the spiritual sensorium; from whence, in our present embodied state, we have reason to believe, it also affects, or rather re-affects the material sensorium, or brain, or last matter, whatever and wherever it may be — thus producing in it an affection similar to that which came from the external process. This is weaker and less distinct, not from want of power in the spiritual action, but because the sensorium is at the same time filled with images crowding in from without, or with recollections of those images passing to and fro; which is ever more or less the case in our waking hours. In sleep, this internal imaging power is unobstructed, and then its pictures are as vivid as the external images in our waking state. Just as the reflection seen in ordinary window glass is dim and shadowy, because the objects from without are pressing through, and the thin and pale reflection appears like a mere ghost among them. Put quicksilver on the other side, or in other words, cut off the supply from the external, and the interior envisaging reflection stands out perfectly distinct. If this view be correct, then there is a point, or rather line of intersection, at which perception and imagination, though originating, the one from without and the other from within, are essentially the same affection of the sensorium.

of an empirical object. A judgment is a determined relationship between two or more cognitions. It is analytical, that is, obtained by an analysis of the conception in the consciousness, — or synthetical, that is, obtained in some other way, and added to it.

These definitions prepare for the specific method of the process of rational psychology for the faculty of the sense. First, there is to be obtained the "subjective idea" of how perception is possible; next, the "objective law" in the facts; and thirdly, the outline of "an ontological demonstration" of the valid being of the facts and objects.

1. The pure intuition (Ch. I. Division 1, Sec. 1.) This, though chronologically last, is logically first. By abstracting from the phenomenal all that has come into consciousness through sensation, we find that which was prior to and conditional for the perception. Thus we have the pure form for all phenomena of an external sense. This remains as void place for the intellect alone, pure and indestructible; and for the intellect it is much, whilst it is nothing for the experience. This is pure space as given in the intuition, and this intuition of pure space is the primitive intuition.¹ We know it through experience, yet that very knowledge is, at the same time, a knowing it as something independent of experience, prior to experience, and without which it is seen to be impossible that any experience should be.

In pursuing the same process of abstraction with the phenomena of the inner sense, whether contemplated as passing emotions or mere sensations, we get the conception of pure period, or pure time, which, in like manner, remains for the intellect pure and indestructible, — known chronologically from the experience, yet known from this very knowledge, as a knowledge prior to, and conditional for, all experience. It is real form for the content of thought that once filled it — it is the pure intuition of time.

From these *à priori* cognitions the author proceeds (Section II.) to state other *à priori* positions necessarily connected with them; such as — Space and time are no part of the phenomena which appear in them, — Phenomena are conditioned upon but not caused by these cognitions, — Space and time have a necessity of being, independent of phenomena, — They have no significancy in respect to any

¹ We are compelled, in this sketch, to mingle the author's language and our own. Sometimes a single sentence in his own words will give, at a glance, a sufficient outline of a chapter. At other times, condensation requires the use of other terms, which we have freely employed.

other cognitions than such as are phenomenal, — Next in reference to each other. After we have the general cognitions, we know *à priori* such as these — Space has three dimensions — It *must* have three dimensions and can have no more — Time can have but one dimension — Space in respect to time has no significancy — Time in respect to space has significancy — The concurrence of both space and time is conditional for all determination of motion, etc.

Having obtained the cognitions, we now reverse the process (Section III.), and seek to construct real forms from the formless and limitless space and time as given in these primitive intuitions. This the primitive intuition cannot do. It is mere beholding. An *ab extra* agency is required, and this is the imagination, to which allusion was before made, — the imaging, or as Coleridge calls it, the *esemplastic* power. This agency is given here in its results, whilst there is reserved for future sections the more difficult work of attaining the *à priori* principles of the process. In getting an idea of the sense, or of a sense, let there be given, then, an intellectual agency which may come upon the field of the primitive intuition. In the as yet uncollected diversity of pure space a position is assumed. The void is no longer empty. A point stands out (*γαίνεται*, “becomes phenomenon”) in the intuition. As the agency moves on, other points are attained. These are brought into conjunction as continuous contiguity. Here, then, is real form. The mathematical line *appears*. It has reality, but as yet only subjective reality. Nothing hinders the going forth of the intellectual agency, in this way, to the construction of all possible forms in pure space, through any conjunctions of points, and lines, straight and curved, with all possible angles, and hence all possible figure.

And so for the construction of pure forms in time. As time is for the internal sense, so all construction of period demands that the inner sense be, in some way, modified in its affection. This may be conceived by assuming a line as permanent in the space intuition, and also every point of that permanent line as, for this purpose, a permanent point. The intellectual agency moving along this line gives continual modification to the inner sense;¹ and thus a definite period is constructed, in which the passing instants have been conjoined in unity, and limited on each side into totality. In this way

¹ It does so in the birth and change of the conceptions, *here, there, away, from, to, etc.*, in the space of the phenomenal intuition, although the *ποῦ*, the where in a whole of space, or in a nature of things, actual or ideal, is as yet a conception unknown to the sense.

all possible period may be constructed, and in this way, too, all *must* be constructed, if constructed at all.

The author next proceeds (Section IV.) to remark on the Categories of Aristotle, and the twelve predicates of Kant, as preparatory to his own view. In this he finds that there are three distinct modes of intellectual agency demanded for the completion of the phenomenal in the experience,—that each of these three agencies has three elementary principles conditional for carrying on the process, and that these three principles are all that can possibly enter into the work. In making out this scheme, he is compelled to differ from Kant (whether rightly or not we do not now inquire) in giving to the department of the sense some things which the German philosopher brings under the understanding. Kant regards the sense as the receptivity merely of content for perception. The author includes in it an intellectual agency competent to complete the perception. We might perhaps take some ground of exception here, rather to the arrangement than to the essence of the author's view, but for the present we pass on. Of these three, then, there are thus brought into the sense the two intellectual operations answering, the one to Kant's category for quantity, the other to his category of quality, whilst the third, or that of relation, is still allowed to keep its place, and is accordingly postponed to the second part of the work.

Next for the three elements in the operation of conjunction. The intellectual agency does not merely *move* in the primitive intuition but collects within itself what it takes up in passing,—in this way only being an *intelligent* agency (*intus legens, ἐν-νοῶν*). Hence we have unity. As the agency moves on, that which was taken up becomes a collection, a diversity in unity and this is multiplicity (*multi-impliciti*) "many united." As this proceeds, it is ever one, and more, and more, and more, and thus whilst the agency is in progress, it has ever within itself the second element plurality. In the termination of the agency, when it ceases to collect any more of the diversity in unity, and defines what has been united, we have the third element totality. These are the three elements of quantity. It is not possible that an intellect should give quantity in pure space and time in any other way.

But the intellectual agency cannot be conceived of as collecting in unity without having a higher unity in itself, and a still higher unity in that light in and by which it works. Before proceeding, therefore, to investigate the intellectual operation for the distinction of quality, which falls within the second division for empirical objects, the author

goes back a little, and introduces his views of consciousness (Sect. V.) as necessary to satisfy the question, What is conditional for the intellectual agency, that it may be competent to such conjoining and distinguishing operations? And here we can only rapidly state his positions. First, It must be more than the simple act. There must be a unity of the conjoining agency. There must be more than this, — a unity of self-consciousness. The agency must act, not now in one light, and then in another, but ever in one and the same. For consciousness the author is somewhat peculiar, and we think very happy, in regarding, not so much under the notion of a faculty, an energy, as of a light in which the intellectual agency stands as well as its object, and through which it sees, not only what it does, but also itself doing, although it cannot see the ultimate or personal self which stands behind both the intellectual agency and its doing. Thus the constructed product becomes an object. In the mirror of consciousness it is thrown face to face before the self in the intuition (*obvius jacens*). The object as pure only *seems* (*δόναι*), but when given as actual content in the sensibility, then it *appears* (*φαίνεσθαι*). Both however are real. There is a real *seeming*, and a real *appearance*.

Thus also it is manifest, why pure objects in space and time are incommunicable; although there may be, by symbols, the inducing the agency and the light in another self to construct and reveal similar pure objects in his subjective apprehension. A real communicableness would demand, not only a unity (of the two) in the revealing light, but also an invisaging of the very self, — all clairvoyant pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding. With some remarks on the distinction between knowing that a self is, and knowing what it is, and also on the manner in which we awake to self-consciousness (a subject on which we may make some comment in another part of this review) the author closes the first division in the idea of the sense — *the attaining it in the pure intuition*, in the proof that so it is, and so it must be.

The Second Division is the idea in the empirical intuition. The first requisite (Section I.) is the attaining a transcendental position for an *a priori* examination. Here we cannot, as before, proceed by abstraction of all content in the sensibility; for this would be in contradiction to the idea to be obtained. We are driven, therefore, to an anticipation, a taking or assuming beforehand, or, as the Greek philosophers termed it, a *πρόληψις*, of such content in its most generalized aspect. This prolepsis is of no one organ, or organism. It

may be for one sense, or for five, or for five hundred, if there should be so many ways of affecting the sensibility. It is mere matter for all possible phenomena, as affording the additional principles for any empirical intuition which may possibly be, and according to which alone it can possibly be. Such a prolepsis being given (Section II.) as mere content undistinguished, an intellectual agency broods over the chaos. As before, in the pure intuition, it *conjoined* in unity; now, it discriminates or *distinguishes* in an individuality. The intellectual agency in the mere apprehending of sensation (whatever, and of whatever degree the sensation may be) discriminates it first from non-sensation. There is thus a determination that the sensibility is not void, and hence there is born for the mind the first element—reality. We have the $\tau\acute{o} \delta\epsilon$. The next discrimination excludes from this appearance all other possible appearances, thus affirming its own reality as distinguished from every other,¹ and here we have the second element, particularity. It is not only $\delta\epsilon$ but $\delta\epsilon \tau\epsilon$. Next, then, is found in it that which is not in any other reality, and thus it is separated positively, and not merely negatively, from all reality but itself. Here is born the third element, peculiarity. The appearance is not simply $\tau\epsilon$, but $\pi\omicron\iota\acute{o}\nu \tau\epsilon$. The completed result is quality for all sensation, and of all kinds. The operation here, in reference to its result, is called distinction; as an intellectual work bringing the diverse sensation into a precise appearance in consciousness, it is termed observation.

There follows next, (Section III.) the *à priori* determination of what diversity must be in quality. This diversity may have two directions. First, the matter, as content in the sensibility, may be diverse. It may come through different organs of sense, and thus be diverse in kind; there may be colors, sounds, smells, etc. Or it may give different sensations in the same organ, and thus be diverse in variety; there may be red, blue—bitter, sweet, etc. Here in the reality there is difference in contrariety, and it may therefore be termed the heterogeneous. Again, there is diversity involving no contrariety in the reality which may possess similarity throughout. The redness of one place is a different redness from that of another, one coldness from another coldness, one pain from another pain. There is thus a diversity which may be termed homogeneous. And this again may be diverse in three ways. It may be diverse in degree, through any limitation from zero, or the absence of all reality,

¹ Kant's Negation.

upwards. This may be termed intensive diversity. It may be diverse in space, or extensive. Quality may also be homogeneous and yet diverse in respect to time; and this we may term *protensive*.

To get form, then, to the content in the sensibility, there must be, not only a distinction of the heterogeneous, but also a conjoining of the homogeneous diversity. Hence (Section IV.) we have not only the questions — What is the quantity absolutely? and then again, what is the quality? but also a third — What is the quantity of the quality? How much is the quality in extent, in intensity, and in protensity? In the pure intuition there is only quantity. In the empirical all quantity has its quality, and all quality has its quantity. The only quality of quantity is the *extensive*; and so the quantity and its quality are both given in the same constructing operation. But not so with quality. Here both operations are required. To find the precise quality we distinguish; to find how much it is, we conjoin, and this demands a threefold construction in extent, in intensity, and in protensity. The operation before was called observation; now it is called attention. The one gives distinctness to quality, the other definiteness to quantity; one gives us the distinct matter, the other the definite form of the phenomenon. Thus we have intensity within the sensibility, extension without in space, and protensity both within and without. Without observation the consciousness would be "void;" without attention the matter would be "without form." Sensation is the chaos; the intellectual energy the spirit that broods over it. Consciousness is the light in which it moves.

Thus we have the field of the sense in its ideal possibility. The author pauses a moment (Section V.) in his straight forward scientific course, to review briefly the opinions of others who have, wholly or partially, traversed the same region. We cannot now follow him in that excursus, except to take notice that he regards Plato's famous cave (Repub. VII.) as a method of exhibiting the manner of phenomenal cognition, where the qualities of things perpetually occupy the attention, and the sense is forced to absorb its entire functions in attaining appearances, whilst an *à priori* philosophy alone can reach the living realities. Reid and Stewart regard this as employed simply to explain the process of sensation and perception. Coleridge denies that it can be limited to any such meaning at all, but assumes that it represents rather the incompetency of the understanding to attain the verities of the reason. The scholar who actually examines this most interesting passage in all its bearings, must be satisfied that our author is nearer to the truth than either. Notwithstanding Cole-

ridge's very contemptuous criticism, the application which Reid and Stewart make of the passage is perfectly fair and legitimate, besides being sanctioned by good authority. It may, however, be legitimately extended, and is so extended by Plato, in what follows, to a higher contrast between all of our humanity that is in any way connected with the material, and all that is purely spiritual.

We next proceed to the sense in its objective law (Chap. II. Section I.). And first for the distinction between an hypothesis and an idea with its correlative law. An hypothesis is but an assumed circumscription of facts to be diminished or widened as the exigencies of the facts may demand, as the nebular theory in astronomy, or the hypothesis which explains the phenomena of the planets as being pieces knocked off the sun by the stroke of comets. An idea is a systematic unity necessary and universal for all possible facts that may come within it. It is seen in its own evidence, and is, therefore, wholly an *à priori* cognition. Yet still, it is but the knowledge of the possible, and must rise to science through its correlation to an actual law. There remains, then, to find the law in the facts of the sense as corresponding to the IDEA.

Here are two heads of investigation. There are first, facts closely bound up in the idea now taken as hypothesis for examination, and secondly, more remote facts which, although apparently disconnected, seem to "leap unexpectedly within the law," and thereby furnish a more striking if not a more conclusive proof. The one is styled the *colligation*, the other the *consilience* of facts.

We can only briefly refer to them. Under the first head (Sect. II.) we have, 1st, Facts connected with obscure perception. This, in general, is shown to be always more or less in connection with the degree of freedom or hindrance to the above operations of distinction in quality and conjoining in quantity. 2nd, The relative capabilities of the different organs of sense. The organ which has the highest capability for the distinguishing and conjoining acts of the intellectual agency, or furnishes the best facilities for them, attains to the best perceptions whether of figure in space, of period in time, of intensity in degree. Hence the superiority of the eye and touch to the taste and smell. 3rd, Facts connected with deceptive appearances. Here an operation of conjunction has been effected, and form appears, but the agency in attention has been led astray by some imperfection in the condition of the sensation, producing just the effects that must result from what was shown *à priori* in the idea. Under each of these heads the author traces the law through a great variety of facts,

presented at great length with most convincing clearness, and forming to some readers one of the most interesting parts of the book.

Under the second head, of *consilience* (Sect. III.) are brought many facts from the art of painting and the science of perspective, all verifying the hypothetical law, and, as presented by the writer, possessing not only a deep scientific interest, but an exceeding beauty of thought and illustration.

The appendix, or third division, under this head of the sense, according to the author's admirably arranged scheme, is an ontological demonstration of the valid being of the phenomenal. It divides itself under three aspects: 1st, As against materialism, 2nd, Against idealism, and 3rd, Against universal Pyrrhonism. But as we wish to occupy a good part of our general review with an examination of the principal arguments under these heads, we pass on to the second grand department of the whole work, or THE UNDERSTANDING.

Perception in the sense (Part II.) gives us phenomena, — fleeting, isolated, and standing wholly in one self. If we would know them otherwise, a higher faculty is necessary. Sense conjoins, or to embrace in one word both its operations, constructs; the understanding connects. One is collocation; the other is an inner bond (*nexus*, a tying, binding, interweaving together by something which runs through all). The sense shows qualities in one place and one period; the understanding affirms a connection in one ground by the inner supersensual bond of substance, and a connection in one source, by the inner bond of causality. This of itself wholly separates it from the faculty of the sense.

But there are other wide and essential differences (Part II. Ch. I. Sect. I.). The conjunction, etc. is perceived; the connection, or dynamical bond is thought. In the one, we have phenomenon, in the other *νοούμενον*, which, for the want of a similarly formed English word we call notion (*notio*) — pure knowledge, that is, knowledge which is known without being perceived. Phenomena are conjoined ~~with~~ phenomena, but are connected *by* the notion. The notion stands under the phenomena, as their bond of connection. It is therefore understood; and hence the faculty, by an appropriate figure, is called the *understanding*. We perceive the collocation and succession of phenomena; we understand for them, or that they have, substance and cause. As there is pure and empirical sense, so there is pure and empirical thinking. The one gives a train of thought, the other an order of experience. When phenomena are thought as connected in their ground, the product is called a thing; when in their source,

an event; when in both, a fact. Thus sense is intuitive, a direct beholding; understanding is discursive. It goes from phenomenon to phenomenon through the understood notion, and thus connects them by a supersensual bond, not perceived but thought.¹ The judgments of the understanding are truly *à priori* as they are conditional for all experience. In the judgment — The sun warms me — there is assumed *à priori*, or understood, the notions both of ground and source; without which notions all sensation is isolated and all experience unconnected.

But how determine the validity of the notional? (Section II.) Hume resolves it into a habit of observation. Brown utterly annihilates it, and leaves only a collocation of phenomena, and an order of sequences. Reid jumps the difficulty with his dogmatic dictum of common sense. To give in full the striking illustration of the author, (p. 342,) "How shall we answer the sceptic who says that he has examined all these, and has satisfied himself that their whole induced conviction is a mere mist and fog bank deceptively rising over a stagnant understanding, and which is utterly dissipated into thin air whenever the sunlight strikes upon it from above, or the ebb and flow of active thought agitates it from beneath." We must give it up, or attain the operation of connection in its *à priori* elements. In this, if successful, we shall have the understanding, as we before had the sense, in its *idea*.

We can only determine (Section II.) how an objective experience is possible by taking some media which are common, both to the construction in the sense, and the connection of experience in the understanding. Such media are found in space and time, which are common to both, and are also *à priori* or necessary conditions for both.

And now to find (Section III.) how such an experience may be determined in space and time. There are three, and only three, suppositions which can be employed for this purpose. The first is that of the sensationalist, and "constructs space and time from the phenomena." The objection to it is, that though for the sense,² time and space may exist in continuity, yet when construction ceases, then conscious extension and duration cease; every phenomenon is isolated; there is no bridging the chasms, and thus attaining in this way,

¹ Yet understood or *thought* as a reality just as much as any phenomenon is seen as a real phenomenon.

² The author cannot mean here, that we get the conceptions of space and time, in *any way*, from the sense. A fuller view of this is taken in another part of our article.

to any *whole* of space, or any *whole* of time, to serve as connectives. The second supposition is, that of the idealist — “That space and time as thought in a whole of each may determine the connection of phenomena in experience.” Here, to begin with, we have indeed the two all pervading and enduring connections perfectly thought in their only possible modes, namely, space in its one mode of permanency, and time in its three modes of perpetuity, succession, and simultaneousness. But the objection is, that though there might be the same space and time thought as a whole for each man, yet each one’s perceptions of the same or of all phenomena, might differ, and so each one would have his own world, without anything to determine his experience to be objectively common to others, or to give it any ground of permanent and producing independence out of himself. Phenomena are perceived; space and time are only thought, and cannot be made to appear. The author’s illustration here is so clear and apposite, that we give it in full, although desiring to be as brief as is in any way consistent with clearness. “I can determine the place of one phenomenon, rising in a lake and then sinking, compared with another phenomenon afterwards rising and sinking, and can tell their bearing and distance; but this is because the lake itself is perceived, and connects and determines the places of the appearance. But such is not space and time as a whole. They are thought — not perceived.” The phenomena alone, whether coming from an objective world or not, can never give the thought; and the thought, merely as thought, cannot determine the phenomena objectively in their places and periods.

One only supposition remains. “We need a notional connective for the phenomena which may determine them in their places and periods in the whole of all space and time, and may give both the phenomenal and their space and time in an objective experience.” In other words, we want something which shall be in itself pure notion, and yet be seen *à priori* to determine, when realized in an objective law, an objective experience. We want something in which we may use both the sense and the understanding, and *combine perception and thought* in one process. Something which shall be a pure notional, and yet prove an occasion for phenomena appearing in consciousness. For this alone, if attainable, can bridge the passage from one to the other. Again, sense, or the intellectual agency (the author might have said) in the field of the sense, may answer the question *how much*, but cannot say *where* in a whole of all space and time the phenomenon is. The assumed notional must, therefore, be connected,

not only for the phenomenal with other phenomenal, but also for the phenomenal with its place and period in such whole of space and time.

This required notional the author professes to have thought out, as it is given to us in the next section, (Section IV.) First, in respect to space. The position is so important, that we give it at length in his own words. "Let there be the conception of a force in a place which maintains its equilibrium about a central point, and completely fills a definite space, and which forbids all intrusion within its place, except in its own expulsion from it, and we will here call that conception the *space-filling force*. Its equilibrium every way upon its own centre secures that it must remain steadfast in its own place, unless disturbed by some interfering force *ab extra*, and thus constancy and impenetrability are the necessary *à priori* modes of its being," (p. 361.) The author would mean, that this space-filling force is something both thought and perceived; for though he says "it may be an *occasion* for phenomena in consciousness," yet he recognizes it as furnishing a content for the sensibility in an organ of touch, by opposing resistance to muscular pressure, and thus producing perception of hardness, figure, etc., as also for the other senses when certain requisite conditions are supplied, (p. 362.) He would thus maintain, that it has a mode of being in the understanding as that of a force constant and impenetrable, (which are purely *thought*,) whilst it has also a mode of being in the sense, as that of perceived quality. In other words, it is both *νοητόν* and *αἰσθητόν*; it is both *νοούμενον* and *φαιρόμενον*, although the author says, it cannot itself become appearance. And yet he must mean, we think, that what as thought we call *force*, that as perceived in the content it furnishes to the sensibility, we call *matter*.¹

It thus secures that its phenomena be objective to all. It determines its place the same for every self-conscious agent, as a *constant* in the understanding, remaining whether the sense is withdrawn or not—the same for every percipient, or for no percipient. Or to

¹ Is it *real solid matter*? From some things the author has elsewhere said, especially p. 555, we infer that he would not hesitate to call it thus, after a supposed superinduction of other forces upon the original conception, and which would make it palpable to our grosser senses. He, however, seems here to regard it in its most abstract state, or as that which is left for the pure notion of the understanding, after everything which might modify is abstracted, just as in the sense by a similar abstraction, pure space is left for the pure intuition. He would doubtless hold, however, that this remote *ἀρχή* or beginning of matter might perhaps give its phenomena to some possible organ of sense.

give the author's own words, p. 865: "Only as space is filled with that which, as understanding conception, is competent to furnish constant occasion for that which, as sense conception, may *constantly* appear, is it possible that any *determination* of space should be given in experience?"

And here, for the present, we must arrest our sketch, to say, that in this prolepsis of a space-filling force we have reached that which, for some important matters, though not for the whole work, may be called the author's position. The careful reader, after he has once mastered the conception, will see that it is the keystone of his argument against the idealist. It is, however, not merely an attempt to bridge over the chasm which is supposed to yawn (objectively) between the understanding and the sense. The same conception is employed in the third department of the work, and on a large scale, as furnishing a ground in the reason for the belief of a comprehending agency in a real *creation* of the universe.

In short, his full meaning is, that this space-filling force is *substance*, whilst its phenomena are the sense modes of its manifestation. It is substantial entity in space as opposed to *non-ens*.

To a reflecting mind, thinking intensely on matter and substance, and occupied, perhaps, by some such theory as that of Boscovich, the idea may have often occurred, for a moment, that what we call by these names may be an energy, a constant force, space rendered impenetrable, or "the manifestation of the Divine power in space."¹ There may have occurred something like the *ἀνευρορ* of Anaximander, or the *hyle*, the mother of matter of the Greek philosophers, which belonged to the *νοητά* rather than to the *αἰσθητά*; or there may have been some similar thought which more or less resembled our author's. But whether the same or not, it is, as here presented, emphatically *his* conception; because he has worked it out in a system of his own, which, whether true or not, is certainly remarkable, not only for its scientific beauty, but for the many interesting results the author seems to have drawn from it towards the building of an *à priori* natural philosophy in its conditioning principles. The fact that it can be made to harmonize well with the most general phenomena of a nature of things, and to give them an *à priori* interpretation of great simplicity and beauty, is alone an argument of weight in its favor. It is certainly enough to conciliate the reader to a favorable examination.

¹ If the reviewer may be pardoned in referring to some statements of his own in a work entitled *Plato Contra Atheos*, page 279.

Such has been its effect on the reviewer, although there are difficulties in the way of its full reception, which he has not yet been able to overcome. The notion of substance is that of a simple unity, or rather one-ness; force, on the other hand, ever seems to imply a duality of opposition. The notion of substance, or at least of material substance, seems to be that of an *ens* not only wanting but excluding the conception of motion, or tendency to motion, unless as super-induced *ab extra*; force, on the other hand, ever seems to hold the idea of motion, or tendency to motion, or that resisted tendency which is equilibrium in distinction from the absolute rest of immobility. Again, there are the cravings of the understanding, which seems imperatively to demand a notion of something still back of the force, of which the force *is*, and thus to create the apprehension of falling into one of those amphibolics which arise from the attempt to sublimate a thought into an occasion for objective experience, and which the author has himself, in so masterly a manner, set forth in respect to the difficulties of other schools in Section VI. Part II. of this book. With respect to this last objection, he might perhaps resolve it into a bad habit of the understanding which has been so accustomed to regard the notion as ever lying back of, or under, phenomena, that it rejects it when at last it actually seems to make its *appearance*; but waiving all such difficulties we can only say, at present, that we have been deeply impressed with the author's view, and that, with some modifications and explanations, we might be prepared to accept it as containing a substantial verity. As we wish, however, to find room in the present article for a review of the argument against the sensationalist; all consideration of this interesting subject of the space-filling force, and especially of the views to which it leads, of the supernatural and the absolute, as presented in the third part, must be necessarily deferred to another part of our examination. For more in reference to it, in the work itself, the reader is advised to study pages 383 and 555 in continuation. Our further sketch is also deferred in like manner, and for a similar reason; together with a discussion of those intensely interesting moral and theological topics which the author so ably treats in his third department, or, The Reason.

In the work before us, the examination of each faculty very appropriately closes with an argument to prove the valid being of the objects of which it takes cognizance. First, There are real phenomena, and there are real things, causes, events, etc. Secondly, There are

real intellectual operations, such as pure intuitions of time and space, conjunctions in quantity, collections in unity, plurality and totality, distinctions in quality, together with certain *à priori* cognitions, which cannot be created from sense, or come from any reflection on sense that does not bring them with it as the conditional means for the performance of its work; and there are also other real intellectual operations, such as the viewing of phenomena in one whole of space and time, and connecting them in the notions substance, cause, etc., which never could have come from any objective order of experience merely, had there not been, *in the mind itself*, and *from the mind itself*, such intuitions, notions, connections, etc., as conditional for all possible experience. The argument thus, in both departments, of the sense and of the understanding, divides itself into three parts—against the materialist or sensationalist,—against the idealist,—and against the sceptic who makes use of the war and contradictions of the two, to deny all grounds for a true belief in the existence of anything either objective or subjective.

The argument against the first is comparatively easy. Some little confusion may arise from allowing him to use the word reflection, which has really no meaning in his scheme, and only serves as a delusive foil to turn away objections he cannot answer. Some slight difficulties, too, arise from confounding the sense as a field, or one of the fields, for the operation of the intellectual energy, with the sensitive powers that furnish the objects on which it energizes, and to which sensitive powers the name, the *sense*, truly belongs, when employed by itself to denote a department of our nature. Thus, leaving out the terms, sense and understanding, we may speak of the intellectual agency as *constructing* phenomena in form, in quantity, and quality, and of the same or another intellectual agency, as *connecting* things and events in substance and causality. Whether we regard them as two distinct faculties, or the same faculty energizing on two distinct fields, and in two distinct ways, must depend upon other parts of our psychological scheme; but on either view, it remains, with equal consistency, that the intellectual agency, with the constructions, connections, intuitions, and notions it brings with it as the light in which it works, are high above, that is, are distinct from and transcend all sensation and all experience. They are brought into the field of the sense, not found there.

There is, we think, some of the same confusion which may arise from the careless reading of our author, not from the want of the utmost clearness in the use of terms, for we think he has seldom been

surpassed in this respect, but because it may not be borne in mind that he departs from Kant and others of the kindred school, in bringing the notions of quantity and quality into the field of the sense, rather than of the understanding. The difference, however, we think, is more apparent than real. Kant restricts the sense to the first of the views we have taken of it, as furnishing content merely for perception. The author gives it a larger range, and "includes within it an intellectual agency competent to complete the perception," p. 158. How far this may be in itself correct, or how far this restricting of one field and enlarging of the other may be merely for the advantage it affords in presenting what is conceived to be a more symmetrical view of the mind's operation, we do not now inquire. Rather, however, than admit that these intuitions of time and space, these cognitions of unity, totality, etc., could be given by the mere sense, we should altogether prefer Kant's division, however ill proportioned it might seem to make the map of the mind. It is clear, however, that the author, although classifying these cognitions and intuitions under the sense, never intended to make them the product of sensation in the sense of Locke, nor of any barren reflection mirroring in a blank mind only what sense had given it. Proof abundant of this may be found in almost every part of his argument, and we should not at all have dwelt upon it, had it not been for the possibility that some might carelessly regard him as thus deriving from the sense whatever he treats of as being in the field of the sense.

The opposite view is justly styled materialism, from its inevitable tendency. Writers may differ much from what their systems would make them, and this because their souls have been formed under far different influences. Locke, although originating a philosophy identical with that which Condorcet carried to pure atheism and materialism, was a devout man, who feared the Lord and revered the Holy Scriptures. Cousin, who finds so much sensualism in Locke's philosophy, is, to say the least, in nowise distinguished for any of that true spirituality which comes from a hearty love of God's written revelation, and the Christianity which has ever been taught in the Church. Edwards may have carried Locke's doctrine of sensation and motive to the very borders of a physical fatalism, (although the reviewer is far from coinciding in any such opinion,) and yet who could doubt the high spirituality of Edwards, living as he did, ever in holy communion with "the things unseen and eternal," or even institute a comparison between it and that of the boasting German idealists, or of any even of those more serious minds among them who profess a form of evangelical mysticism.

But whilst we cannot always judge men by their philosophical system, the system itself *must* manifest its tendency, and it is this alternate tendency which alone furnishes its most appropriate name. Says the pious author of the *Horae Solitariae*, "The false or heathen philosophy which derives all knowledge from sensation, naturally enough ends there." It cannot get above its source, and however much it may be buoyed up, for a time, by props drawn from an earlier and a better philosophy, must at last terminate in denying the reality of anything above sense, and, finally, of the sense or sentiency itself as having any true entity aside from the body that *feels*.

Thus viewed the argument against the sensationalist is clear and direct. It is simply throwing on him the whole *onus probandi*. Concede to him all the advantage of holding, in some way, to a blank spirituality (if he would not wish to rank with those who deny all but matter) and yet he is not essentially helped. He is to show how certain things can ever get into this *capacity from* the sense, unless put into the sense by the very mind that is to receive and reflect them back again. We meet him with the common sense argument (for if there can be an argument drawn wholly from sense this is one) that he is trying to get out of a thing what was never in it—a feat which no mere capacity, or faculty, or blank power of reflection, can ever accomplish. He is reversing the famous maxim of his older brethren, *de nihilo nihil*, in the very case where it is most applicable. He is trying to get something out of nothing; for *he* does this who attempts to bring more out of less. In other words, he is deducing very great effects from causes altogether inadequate. There is an immense range of the mind which can neither be originally extracted from sense, nor regarded as having grown out of it. It would comprehend in fact, all above mere feeling—all that involves the conception of space and time.

Let us suppose such a blank spirituality slumbering in connection with a power of sensation which is to furnish it with its *ideas*, and which is itself as yet unawakened. The former is to receive, and reflect upon, only what it may derive from the latter. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*. It is not only the occasion, but the very containing and developing seed whence is to grow up all future knowledge! In these circumstances the sense is once aroused to sentiency; suppose by the puncture of some sharp instrument in the brain or material sensorium. It feels its first feeling, and transmits it to the blank intelligence above. We might speculate on this one *feeling*, and show that even here the awaking mind must *receive*, or

rather *perceive*, what could not have been in the sense. Here is change, here is *ens* and *non-ens*, here is unity, here is the diversity of being and not being. All this, too, might be fairly supposed of the pure inner sense, once, in some way aroused to a consciousness that it *is*. But we pass on. The sensibility goes to sleep again, and is again aroused by a similar token from the objective world. It feels its second feeling, and transmits it to the blank spirituality above. Like causes must produce like effects. This second feeling is like the first, and can, therefore, only bring to the mind a like result. If there be a difference, either from excess or diminution in the second, or from the addition of something from the first still remaining in the sentience, it can be no difference of kind, but only of degree, or intensity. It will be just the same sensation (in kind) over again, giving no other product in the soul, or at the utmost, only a plus or minus of sensation, such as might have been given by the first impression on the sensorium, had it been so proportioned in force and direction. But here we are met by the startling fact, that there is connected with this second feeling something which was not in the first. It is, too, not a mere difference of intensity, or even variety of sensation, but something radically *distinct in kind*. There is the cognition of something as *past*, or of *pastness*, if we may employ such a term. There is an intuition of time. The soul is awakened to find this within herself. She is aroused by the sensation, but it is of herself she knows she has been sleeping. It is from her own light, and not from any reflecting back on sense what sense has given, that she knows there has been a before, that there is a now, and that there is coming a hereafter. This intuition of time alone, thus coming from herself, though kindred from without, lights up far and wide the interior of her being, and shows her that it is no void place, but well supplied with goodly store of intuitions, cognitions, notions, ideas, ready instantaneously to give forth their own illumination, whenever the objects are presented which they are adapted to embrace in their beholding. We may be years in taking a full inventory of this spiritual house, *ταύτης τῆς οἰκίας τῆς ἀναρροποιήτου*, but as neither sense, nor even consciousness gave them existence, so can neither, by its absence, detract aught from the constant reality of their being.

The same arguments might be applied to all our perceptions of space, of figure, of quantity, of quality. Sense cannot answer the question *when*, and it remains equally silent to the question *where*. We feel hardness, we see colors, we hear sounds, and these singly or

combined produce sensations of varying intensity, but it is only in the light which the pure spirituality sheds upon them that we perceive unity, or duality, or plurality, or totality, or number, or ratio, or figure even; for these can be only seen in the intuition of space which sense cannot give. And so, *à fortiori*, may we say, that it is by a still higher knowledge of the soul we know that phenomena must inhere in substance, and cohere in mutual causality.¹

Sense may draw its line upon the retina, or the brain, or the last matter that intervenes, but the spirit measures it by its own canon of straightness. So also it may protract its varied lines, but the soul surveys their relations by its own ideas of parallelism, angularity, rectangularity, ratio, equality,² etc. If it be said, that these are manifestly furnished by sense, we appeal to the fact that they are nowhere found throughout the sensible world in their perfection. There are no perfectly straight lines lying, as the old Greek geometers defined them, *ἐξ ἴσου*, equally between their extreme points. There are no perfectly straight lines exactly parallel; there are no perfect circles. Sense and experience, the more minutely they are examined, are found never to come to the perfect ideal models which the mind has *somehow* got into its possession. They could, therefore, never have given us these ideal standards, because, without such previous ideal, we could never know how much the sensible imitations were below it, or, in fact, that they were below it at all. We may talk as we will of the association of ideas, but if the chain is not originally fastened to something permanently in the mind, and which regulates the whole association, how shall we ever mount up by it into the mind itself. It is maintained that though imperfect they are near enough to the truth to represent the perfect idea, and that so the mind reaches down and gets it from this representation? But what is meant? What is representation but a throwing back of what had been imparted. It ever of necessity implies an *original*; and by what does the mind correct the imperfect copy after it has thus got it in possession?

The mathematician may make his demonstration from a very ill

¹ Every time we read Plato's argument in the *Phaedon* respecting these "reminders" of the *τὸ ἴσον*, *τὸ καλόν*, etc., we are the more and more convinced, that, instead of being the egregious quibble which some pronounce it, it is absolutely unanswerable.

² The idea of *equality* comes into that of *straightness*. Evenly — that is, nothing on one side that is not on the other. The modern definition substitutes a different and less simple notion.

drawn diagram, because he easily rectifies it, in his mind's eye, from his own pure ideal; and so it is near enough for his purpose, though a clumsy obtuse angle may have to represent rectangularity. The accomplished musician can use a very imperfect instrument, and enjoy the intellectual pleasure of the harmony,¹ notwithstanding some gratings on the sense, because he mentally brings up its jarring strings to the perfect attuning of his own mind. It is enough if it suggest the perfect chords which the musician's soul knows so well. But where would either of them be, if they had no other, and never could have any other, standard than could be obtained from the clumsy diagram, or the ill-tuned piano. In short, there cannot well be conceived a grosser *hysteron proteron* than that which derives the rule, or, in general, the accuracy of the rule, from the very imperfection whose deficiency it is brought to measure.

We see that the line is straight, and that the spaces are equal, because we *à priori* know what straightness and equality are. The seeing is determined by the knowing. Otherwise there would have been immeasurable diversity, and no unity, or approach to unity, either of name or idea. The word *suggest* will not remove the difficulty for the disciple of Mill and Locke. It is a term which belongs to the other school. The imperfect approach cannot create the ideal rule, but it may very well put the soul in mind (if we may use the familiar expression) of one it had before.

Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu. We would not be so extravagant as to invert this famous maxim, and say that there is nothing in the sense which was not previously in the intellect; but in view of what has been said, we may maintain, that little or nothing in the sentiency, or which comes from the sentiency, would appear what it does appear, were it not for its connection with the intellect, or, in other words, the light giving spirituality above. Even the sense, says Aristotle, is not wholly *alogal* — οὐχ ὡς ἄλογος καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν θεῖν ἂν τις ῥαδίως; by which he evidently means, that what the sense has in itself is rationalized, and made different from what it would be, by its connection with a higher or lower intellect. We see nothing as we should see it, if we had only sense and a blank spirituality,— even admitting that that were possible. Every reader must be familiar with examples in which our intuitions, our notions, or, if any choose to call them such, our assumptions, be they original or acquired, do greatly vary our perceptions, and even, sometimes, the very

¹ It may seem a paradox, but in this way, a scientific musician might be less offended by a poor instrument, than one who had a good ear and no science.

sensations themselves. Our perceptions of distance ever depend on an assumed size, and even here we get nothing absolute, because on the other hand our perceptions of size do ever depend on an assumed distance, either spontaneously taken, or given to us by circumstances. We speak of the real size of objects. But how shall we ascertain it as matter of sense? Not even the famous Auguste Comte, with all his parade of "experience" and "positive knowledge," could give us the mathematical formula for this apparently simplest of all problems. No man on earth can make a definition of it, that does not immediately involve something *out* of what might seem to be a direct perception of size itself, or, in other words, demand an ideal measure. I look out of my window in the evening, and behold what appears to be a great light. For some reason, I had fixed its locality across an extended valley. This was my *notion*, my understanding. It makes no difference now whence that understanding came, and whether original or acquired. It had its instantaneous effect upon the perception. Again, some cause modifies it, and I am convinced that the place of the phenomenon is just across the street. Not only the perception, but the very sensation is changed. There is a dwindling at once in brightness and size, and all that remains is the *appearance* of a dim candle in the window of a neighboring house.

This is a familiar case; and yet it might be shown that almost all the affirmations of our senses, instead of giving us the most *direct* knowledge, as some would say, do, in a similar manner, involve some hypothesis, and are liable to similar modifications. Unless rectified by a continual judgment, of which, in its intuitive rapidity and frequency we take no notice until revealed to us in the analysis of perspective science, the mere sensual revelations of our eyes would often be distorted and delusive pictures. Hardly anything appears to one sense exactly according to what another sense, or the understanding, judging according to another sense, would pronounce reality; and it may be unhesitatingly affirmed, that we never see anything of its true shape from whatever position it may be viewed. We talk of correcting one sense by another, as though that would help the present difficulty, or repair the broken arches of the materialist's crumbling bridge. We need again some plank from the other shore. We bring in again the thought of a rule or model out of sense. In affirming that we correct one sense by another, there is of course implied some higher standard than either. Without it we have no means of determining which is most correct, and therefore best

entitled to be used as a measure for the other, or how far one or both fall below the standard of absolute correctness. Without this, it would be like measuring the yard by the foot, and then the foot by its assumed multiple the yard.

Education, arts, associations, do all, on the same principle, vary our perceptions, and make them to appear different from what they otherwise would have done. One man sees that in the picture which another does not see; and this too from no deficiency in the mere sense, or of vividness of painting on the retina, or on the brain. One man hears a voice in the music, the other cannot hear, although it may be endowed with even more correctness and power of the mere acoustic organ. Cicero in a most striking manner adverts to this dependence of perception on the inner state of the soul — “*Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia quae nos non videmus; quam multa quae nos fugiunt in cantu exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati.*”¹ To use the language of the author, p. 244, though applied to a somewhat different purpose, “the intellect fills up the chasms which may have been truly voids in the sensation, and, by reconstruction, restores again the original, guided by the content which is given;” or, as we might say in the present cases, guided by its own ideal in supplying the defects of the content, or in correcting its perversities and redundancies.

These views are strongly confirmed by the examples which the author brings forward in his section entitled “*Colligation of Facts*” for the objective law of the sense. We are inclined, however, to suspect him of error when he says, p. 252, that “all conjoining into figure, or giving shape or outline of object, by the ear, is impracticable.” If the general philosophy he has so clearly presented, be correct, the eye has doubtless a great superiority in awakening such perceptions, (and this is all that is necessary for the argument there) but not the exclusive power. We cannot easily decide how small an avenue may be wide enough for the soul's cognitions, not to *come in*, as the disciple of Mill would say, but to *go forth* to the shaping of the chaotic notices in the sensibility. Even the inner sense alone might awaken the ideas of number in all their immensely varied relations. Whatever suggests the *à priori* thought of distance,² from

¹ Acad. Prior. II. 7.

² It would be the third in order of the elementary cognitions which the soul employs in giving form to the sensation, — *ens, ex-istens, di-stans*, — the first, the being of that which is perceived; the second, its being as distinct from the percipient; the third, its separation, away from the percipient.

or towards, or, in other words, of separation from the percipient in space, may, in time, bring out all the other perceptions of figure. The fact of such perception being achieved *through* a low or obscure organ of sense, would strongly prove that, for the completion of the process in all, there is required a pure spiritual *eisemplastie* operation from the mind itself. The delusion which makes us believe that we not only feel, but perceive directly by the organ, has come from the ease and rapidity of construction through the finer feeling of the eye. In tracing the slower process through the other senses, in which we are distinctly conscious of almost every step the mind takes in completing the perception, we more readily admit the belief in a purely intellectual act, which, if necessary in one, is necessary in all, to give form to the content in sensation. There can be but little doubt, that had the whole human race been confined to the organ of hearing, there might in time have been suggested by it, distance, figure, size, hardness, etc. — that is, in a highly improved state; and this would consist, not merely in an increased sensual acuteness of the organ, but in a higher and readier facility of adapting to its sensitive notices the forth-going cognitions of the intelligence. There would be no extravagance in supposing this carried so far as to make it perfectly natural and proper to say, It sounds hard, and soft, or round, or square, or even to enable us to distinguish the presence and qualities of objects which we now think of as pertaining solely to the eye. And so in respect to the deficiency of sight. The senses may all be said to vary in two ways — in distinctness, and in strength of impression. In the first of these, the eye is preëminent; in the second, it is the lowest in the organic scale. Yet, still there can hardly be a doubt, that if we had only the sense of seeing, without muscular feeling or the power of locomotion, there would be enough of force in the eye to call out of the mind its dynamical cognitions, and through these to introduce it to an acquaintance with the world of dynamical causation.

The common explanation of correcting one sense by another, strongly suggests an argument in the *Theaetetus* of Plato, that some might regard as involving mere verbal fallacies, but which, we think, will bear the closest examination into its substantial soundness. It is to show, that as each sense has its separate office for distinct sentiences, and that what we become sentient of by one sense, we cannot become sentient of by another; it therefore follows, that whatever notions or thoughts have reference alike to two or more senses, and may be equally predicated of the objects of each, could have come

from neither, but must have belonged to the spiritual mind, and have been seen *by it* in its own light, and not *through* the sense. We hope our readers will pardon us in giving a short extract from this interesting dialogue :—

*Soc.*¹ *Sense* you said was *knowledge*.

Theæt. Just so.

Soc. Should I ask you then, By what does a man see the white and the black, and by what does he hear the acute and the grave? You would say, I think, by the eyes and the ears.

Theæt. I certainly would.

Soc. The free and easy use of words without too strict a regard to the mere niceties of language is, in general, not only to be allowed but commended. Nevertheless we are sometimes compelled to take a contrary course. As now, for example, there is an absolute necessity that I should take a tight hold of your answer, my dear boy, in order to show wherein it is not exactly right. For look carefully now—which answer would have been most correct? to say that the eyes are that *by*² which we see, or *through* which we see? and so of the ears.

Theæt. As it now appears to me, they are the means or organs *through* which we perceive their respective objects, rather than *by* which.

Soc. True, my boy, for it would be an awful thing, indeed, were it so that there sit within us many independent sentiences like the Greeks in the wooden horse, instead of their all tending together to one—call it soul or what you will—*by* which, yet *through* these senses, we become sentient of all sensibles. (Thus it is *by* the soul, *through* the organs of sense, that we become *even* sentient.) But more—could you also grant me this, that what you become sentient of *through* one sense, you cannot possibly become sentient of *through* another sense?³ As, for example, what you become sentient of *through* the hearing, you cannot become sentient of *through* the sight, and again, what you become sentient of *through* the sight, you cannot become sentient of *through* the hearing. Do you grant this?

Theæt. Most certainly.

Soc. If then you have any thought or notion in your mind about both sensations, you could not have become sentient of it either *through* the one or the other, seeing that it is a notion that belongs to both.

Theæt. It would seem impossible.

¹ Plato *Theætetus*, 184, B.

² The distinction in the original is made by the use of the dative in the one case, and *διὰ* with the Genitive, in the other. The first denotes the agent, the second the organ.

³ The objector would pronounce this a verbal fallacy. We do *see* and *hear* the same *thing*, he would say. But this is the very point in question. Do we hear and see, or hear or see, *things* at all? Or do we hear its sound, and see its figure, and taste its savor, and smell its odor, and feel its hardness? If there is any thought which belongs no more to one sense than to another, are we sentient of it by either, or by both, or are we sentient of it at all?

Soc. Take sound and atom then — have you this thought, the same in respect to both, that they ARE ?

Theaet. I have.

Soc. And also the thought that each is (not simply different but) a different thing from the other, while it is the *same* with itself ?

Theaet. Why surely.

Soc. And moreover that both are *two*, and each is *one* ?

Theaet. That, too, beyond all doubt.

Soc. Through what, then, have you all these notions concerning the two ? For neither through the hearing, nor the sight, is it possible to receive any such common thought. And now I will give you another proof in this. For suppose if such a case were conceivable, that in respect to both, that is, sound and color, we were examining this question, namely, whether they were salt or not, either one or both — you know very well by what you would make the examination, and that this would not be sight, nor hearing, but something else.

Theaet. It would be the sentient power that resides in the tongue.

Soc. Very well. Now tell me again. Through what does that power operate which manifests to you what relates to all the senses, as much as to these two just mentioned — I mean such common notions as those to which you give the names, (or of which you say) *it is*, or *it is not*, etc., besides the others of which we just now asked.

Theaet. It is substance and being you are now talking about, and not-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and identity, and diversity and moreover oneness and number generally. It is clear, too, that your question has respect to even and odd, together with all those notions of number that are involved in them. And you mean to ask — through what one of the bodily organs we become sentient of these, as we became sentient of the other first mentioned (namely, colors, sounds, etc.) through the organ of sense and by the soul.

Soc. Most admirably done, my boy Theaetetus — you take me well. That is just what I meant to ask.

Theaet. By Zeus, then, Master Socrates, I can give you no other answer than that there seems to me to be no such organ or organs at all for these as in the former cases, (that is, we are not sentient of them at all or derive them through sense) but the soul itself, as it seems, both *by* and *through* itself, *sees* all these notions which we have in common respecting them all.

Soc. Beautifully answered. You are indeed a beautiful boy now, Theaetetus, and not at all homely, as Theodorus represented you. And besides the beauty of it, you have done me a great favor in delivering me from the necessity of quite a long explanation ; since to yourself it thus appears, that some things the soul looks at and sees, itself, and *in* and *through* itself, whilst the knowledge of others it derives through the organs of the body. But to what class would you assign these — beauty and the contrary, good and evil ?

Theaet. To the latter class most certainly. These, above all things, does the soul survey in their being, and in their mutual relations, ever, in so doing, calling up *within herself*, the past, the present, and the future."

In other words, color, and sound, and hard, and sweet, the soul becomes sentient of through the organs of sense, but unity and number, and identity and likeness, etc., together with the good and the beautiful, and their contraries, she sees both by and through herself, because these notions, or knowledges, are in herself, and never came out of sense, nor from any blank reflection of, or reflecting on, what was merely given by the sense.

The followers of Mill would claim to be the common sense school. Their explanations, they would say, are easy—their terms intelligible to the common mind. They involve none of that mystical jargon which belongs to the “exploded doctrine of innate ideas.” But will this claim bear the test of careful examination? There has been already shown, we think, the utter barrenness of their word reflection. Another explanation in very common use with some is made by the still more notionless word *capacity*. There is no mystery in the mind’s operations if we only suppose it to have a capacity for this, and for that. But pray—what is a capacity? It is a place for holding—*δεξιαός τε*. When we say, moreover, the soul *has* a capacity, we only double the figure, and it makes it thus doubly unmeaning. It then becomes a capacity holding a capacity, or a capacity for a capacity, and so on ad infinitum.

But granting that there may be such a merely holding-place, or vacuum, in the soul,—the question still remains. We have not advanced a hair’s breadth towards its solution. How do the intuitions, notions, ideas, aforesaid, ever get into it? If they are there *à priori*, then are they innate, or *in-born*, to use the better Saxon phrase, and then there would be good *sense*, as well as good *reason*, in saying, the soul has a capacity for them. If not, we are just where we were, and the unmystical psychologists must find room for them in the sensation, and this, it has been shown, they can never do.

There is the same barrenness in the word faculty, which others would employ in this common sense operation of getting something out of nothing. The term is all very well, if we do not take away all meaning for our present purpose, and reduce it to a blank agency, by attempting to conceive of a *faculty* (*facultas*) without the distinct appropriate energies, means, *supply* (according to the best sense of the word) for doing what it was appointed to do,—having, moreover, no knowledge of what it is to do, or how to do it,—comparing without any previous rule of comparison, distinguishing without any known ground of distinction, combining without any *à priori* unity of aim, or aim of unity, to which, and by which, the combination is to be di-

rected,—and, above all things, remembering without any knowledge of time, and estimating motion without any knowledge of space; for these most inconceivable of all absurdities flow directly *à posteriori* *atque à fortiori*, from the common sense explanation, that we get this very knowledge, or the ideas of time and space by induction from the perception of motion and the exercise of memory. We relieve the term from absurdity, only by making it wholly unmeaning. Faculty for this, or that, becomes synonymous with possibility, a term which may be predicated of almost any one thing in *rerum natura* in respect to almost anything else. In this way, for all we know, the plant has a faculty, somewhere, that is a possibility to become an animal, and the animal has a faculty to become a man. We need only say, that nothing can be more opposite to all this barrenness, than the manner in which our author invariably employs the term, defining ever, with the most satisfactory clearness, the intuitions, notions, and comprehensions, it must carry along with it in all the operations it is appointed to perform. The same objections apply to the common use of the terms, *belief*, *habit*, *association*. All is contingent. There is no *à priori* ground for the belief, no starting principle by which the habit and the association may be originally determined, or that can give the law through which they subsequently cohere.

No writers are more apt to impose on themselves and their readers, in this way, than those of this school who have the most to say of experience and “positive knowledge” as the “fruit alone of sense and experience.” Often when they think they have presented the more easy and intelligible explanation, they have only covered up a difficulty by giving it a name. We need *only* suppose the soul to have a capacity, or a faculty, or a power of reflection, or of memory, and all mystery is dissipated at once. With these as our machinery, and sense and sensible experience as the foundation, we can raise any superstructure we please. The school are ever fond of ridiculing the doctrine of occult qualities in the ancient physics, whilst they introduce it with all its darkness into the realm of mind. An example of this very ready way of explaining things occurs in a remark of Sir John Herschel as quoted by Prof. Davies in his late work on the Logic of Mathematics. His position is, that mathematical knowledge comes from experience and induction, in the same way as outward physical science; which is also a favorite position with Mill. They are the same he says, “*only* that in the one case the mind *spontaneously* presents the facts on which the induction rests,”—as though this spontaneous presentation were a very non-essential affair, and did

not constitute the immense difference in the two cases, making, in fact, an impassable chasm between them!

If we must have a metaphor, the best that could be used would be the one the author has so happily employed in respect to consciousness, p. 169. Instead of a capacity, or rather, together with a capacity, which is a very good figure in its place, we may say the soul has a light which she sheds upon the opaque content in the sensibility, and which immediately brings form and distinctness out of chaos,—a light through which sensation becomes perception, and phenomena are *known* as representing things and events in a permanent and enduring nature of things. This light we may metaphorically suppose, either to be of the very essence of the soul itself, or to be generated by a spiritual energy, which, in its own working (above and aside from sense) gives birth to both light and heat,—or, in other words, the purely spiritual emotion of interest in knowledge, and the purely intellectual illumination by which it is seen.

It was held as a part of the ancient Greek physics, that in seeing, a real light went forth from the eye to meet that which was conveyed, through the diaphanous medium, from the object itself. Whatever modern science may object to this, there was, we believe, a substantial truth, if not in the optical theory itself, at least lying right behind it. We may take it as meaning, that even sense is not pure passivity. The soul sends forth an energy, even in sense-seeing, instinctive it may be, rather than voluntary, yet none the less its own spiritual act. She does something instead of simply receiving. She communicates to the eye a light without which it would be in darkness, and the pictures on the retina, or the brain, would never be read. And then, could we conceive of the eye as a separate existence, this infused light might be regarded as its spiritual principle. *Εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῶον ψυχὴ ἂν αὐτῷ ἦν ἡ ΟΨΙΣ*—"If the eye were an animal," says Aristotle (De Anima, Lib. II. 1. 9), "*vision would be its soul.*"

But why not at once call it knowledge, *ideas*, from the intellectual meaning and tenses of *εἶδω*¹—a meaning which we have reason to regard as being no more metaphorical, and no less real, in the one case than in the other. Why not then call it knowledge (*notio*), since the moment it finds its object it knows it, and remembers it moreover as cognized by something which had an *a priori* being. It

¹ Some of these, it is well known, signify to *see*, others to *know*. *εἰδωλον* (idol) would be from the one class, *ἰδέα* from the other. Both are alike literal—alike metaphorical.

is easy to anticipate the plausible objection, that it can be no knowledge until it become itself an object of consciousness, and thus sees itself seeing, and knows itself knowing, or that there is an absurdity in the conception of a *dormant* knowledge,—in other words, a knowledge unknown, and thoughts unthought. But have we not the same mystery, for we would not dare to style it absurdity, in respect to what we call our acquired knowledge? For, whether inborn or acquired makes no difference here. It is one of the most indubitable facts of our spiritual constitution, that there is a knowledge which we may be said to *possess*, and yet to *have* or *hold* it not,—*κεκτήσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν*—according to Plato's well illustrated distinction, in his simile of the aviary, or spiritual pigeon-park, toward the close of the Theaetetus, 197. A. And so also Aristotle (De Anima, Lib. II. c. 1. 5). "It may be spoken of," says he, "in two ways, as knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) in itself, and as knowledge in actual spiritual beholding (*ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν*). For in the very being of the soul itself there is a sleeping and an awaking.¹ The awaking is analogous to the spiritual *beholding*; the sleep to the *having* and yet not *energizing*—*τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν*."

There is to each man a knowledge which is truly *his* knowledge, belonging to his being as it belongs not to another, and yet it may be truly said he *knows* it not; he *thinks* it not. It is as truly asleep within him, as when the whole soul, including the visual as well as the *theoretical* (*τὸ θεωρεῖν*) is buried in the profoundest slumber. Take then our acquired knowledge, we say again, and the mystery is not at all diminished. It is rather increased. Notwithstanding our familiarity with the fact, there are some elements in it, which, when we examine them closely, enhance the wonder. How very small a part of that immense store of intuitions, thoughts, feelings, facts, scenes, events, which go to make up the knowledge of one single man, (be he one of the most narrow information,) is at any one hour of his life in actual exercise, that is *actually* known or thought? How small the ratio of his waking being at any one time, to that far greater part which is sleeping,—much of it too, perhaps the most of it, having thus slept for many years.

But, where is it? What relation has it to his spiritual constitution? Does it truly enter into his very *esse*? so that he ever carries it with him, the past in the present, and *is* all that he is during every moment that he *exists*. Twenty years ago a thought was

¹ He means, doubtless, aside from the animal sleep which it has from its connection with the body and the sentient nature.

thought, an event was witnessed, a scene was beheld, a feeling was felt. Now it comes up again in my actual waking knowledge; but during all this time it has been unthought, unseen, unimaged, unfelt, and may we not say, as far as this argument is concerned, — *unknown*? Some of it has fallen into so profound a slumber, that it will perhaps never awake until carried into the fixed and changeless state of another existence. But, where is it? We repeat the inquiry; for the question seems to involve some truths of most serious moment. Has it been all this time a *non ens*? If it has had a true being, can it be conceived of except as in relation to my soul, or (for no other preposition can suit the exigency of the thought) as *in* my soul, — in my spiritual being, as it is not in the spiritual being of any other personality? We say spiritual being, for we do not now argue with that lowest class of materialists who would think that an easy and sufficient explanation of this whole matter could be found in the supposition of ten thousand times ten thousand configurations of a material brain, moved by ten thousand times ten thousand material springs, touched by innumerable associations, themselves all strung together by material ligaments, and among which material configurations, each comes up, when, in the endlessly complicated movements of this machinery its own spring is touched, and the whole structure of every other part of the brain at once corresponds thereto. Even such obtuse men, *ἀντίρρονοι ἀνδρες*, as Plato calls them, such hard-headed materialists as these, who resolve all knowledge into touch and resistance, might be puzzled by the question, What is to prevent, if perhaps one man's brain, amidst these endless convolutions, should get into a material state exactly corresponding to that of another, (a case by no means inconceivable,) what is to prevent that the one should immediately find himself endowed with all the knowledge, and all the experience of space and time, past and present, of the latter brain?

But our argument is with those who believe that man has an immaterial spirituality, whether they regard it as a mere capacity or not. We ask them to look intently at the difficulty, and then explain it. They may reply that they discover none. Some might be ready to ask, What do such inquiries mean? Does the interrogator himself know? There is surely no such difficulty in the case. The solution is plain enough even for a "child's book on psychology." The word memory explains it all. This knowledge about which there is vainly supposed to be something so occult, is simply *remembered*. When the soul wants to use it, she remembers it by a capaci-

ty, or faculty, she has for that express purpose. Should there be an attempt to go a little further, we are told of the association of ideas.

We "recall" it, too, it is said, as though it had flown away to some extra mundane region, and were not somewhere within the domain embraced by the personal *we*.

But this is only a name for the fact; it explains nothing. There is yet the deep "*mystery of memory*," as St. Augustine somewhere styles it. We may doggedly try to put up with the dogma of Reid, that "memory is an *immediate* knowledge of the past;"¹ but in that word, the past, the difficulty all comes back again; and we ask ourselves — How can the past be in the present, unless we carry our whole being with us, and all the knowledge of the past is bound up in the present by those original notions, cognitions, intuitions, ideas, or knowledges, which were born in the soul, which ever abide in it irrespective of all time, out of the combinations of which all other or outward knowledge arises, and into which it may be ultimately analyzed as its constituting elements, without at the same time losing that distinct objective reality which it has obtained through their form-giving power.

If we reject, then, as exploded, the doctrine of inborn knowledge, or treat it as a mystery and an absurdity, we have yet, in some respects this deeper "*mystery of memory*" — *the present knowledge of the past*, the unknown and yet known, the *for-gotten* and yet *gotten*, or as the same is expressed in Plato's Greek, and with nearly the same idiomatic metaphor, the *unheld* and yet *possessed*.

We have dwelt the longer on this part of the argument, not to supply any deficiency in the author's treatment, but to present in the most familiar way we could, what the nature and plan of his work compelled him to give in a rigid scientific manner. We wish especially to draw attention to it as an important part of his general view, and as furnishing the best position for the proper appreciation of other parts of the work.

Of this we can only say, that it increases in interest on every page. Some of the discussions in the latter part of the book are of the profoundest moment. All readers who have suffered the comparatively dry details of statement and definition, in the first part of the volume, to deter them from the close study of the whole, may be assured that they have lost much which possesses not only a philosophical and a scientific, but also a high moral and religious value.

¹ Intellectual Powers, Essay III. Chap. I.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. DR. ROBINSON'S NEW TESTAMENT LEXICON.¹

THE assertion is sometimes hazarded by those who claim to be the guides of public opinion, that there has been but little advance in sacred philology since the days of Calvin; that in his writings we may find the principal expositions of the sacred text which commentators of the present day propound as new discoveries. It is doubtless true that Calvin's Commentaries have much philological merit, and that he furnishes a correct explanation of most of the leading texts on which his system of divinity is founded. Nevertheless, it remains true that great progress has been made in biblical study since this learned and venerable reformer lived. The scholars of the sixteenth century often endeavored to prove their doctrines by irrelevant texts, by passages which yielded only a verbal support, or whose application was doubtful. We have only to look into the writings of President Edwards, two centuries later, to see how much his acute and profound intellect would have been aided by better principles of interpretation. Within the last thirty years, the texts which sustain the orthodox system have been often subjected to a close and scientific examination, and that system now stands on a much surer basis than it ever had before. Some texts have been given up as untenable for the maintenance of a particular doctrine; others have been found impregnable. Besides, it would be absurd to suppose, that the immeasurable advance made in modern times in the knowledge of oriental literature and antiquities, of general grammar, and of the Hebrew and Greek languages in particular, should not have cast important light on the great *loci classici*, the fundamental proof-texts, to which appeal is made in the last resort. It is a matter of great importance if these passages can be set in a clearer light, and be made to point with a surer aim. But of the rapid, we may say immense, progress which biblical science has made, we need no more convincing proof than the Lexicon now before us will furnish.

Again, it is often said, that we are greatly indebted to German writers for our knowledge of antiquities, history, classical criticism, etc., while they have failed to give us much which is valuable towards the better understanding of the doctrines of the Gospel. For Latin and Greek lexicons and grammars we must repair to Freund, Zumpt, Kühner, Buttmann, Thiersch, and Pape, but when we are to expound divine truth, we must not resort to these "earthen cisterns." Yet, in ascertaining the true, spiritual meaning

¹ A Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament, by Edward Robinson, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. A new edition, revised and in great part re-written. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1850. pp. 804, 8vo.

of divine truth, to what better source can we apply than to the lexicon before us? It unseals the fountains of living waters. It gives us exact definitions of the inspired declarations. It is a clear, beautiful and consistent commentary on those words "which are spirit and life." Yet it is not affirming too much to say, that this lexicon would never have been written, if it had not been for the philologists of Germany. On this subject, they have furnished the materials and given the impetus to all the world besides. It is to the labors of Schneider, Passow, Hermann and others, that we owe the true idea of a Greek lexicon, and are not now stumbling over the pages of Schrevelius and Schleusner. It is to them and to their successors in lexicography, grammar and commentary,—Winer, De Wette, Meyer, etc.—that we are able to give the exact grammatical meaning of words on which all true doctrine must be built. The works just mentioned, enable us to reach, in innumerable places, what we believe to be the mind of the inspiring Spirit. By their aid we can see, e. g., in the Epistles of Paul, what may be called a divine harmony, a Christian logic. The bands and joints of the discourse are placed in a striking light.

By a remark made above we would not imply that Dr. Robinson's Lexicon is not an independent work. The author is no servile copier. He has applied a practised eye and a sound judgment to the immense mass of materials before him, and produced an original and independent work so far as those terms are applicable to an undertaking of this character. We may state the following as prominent qualities of the Lexicon:

First. An engaging outward form. The beautiful Porson type, the paper, the freshness of the ink, the spaces between the paragraphs, etc. make the page eminently attractive. The external appearance of grammars and dictionaries, we are glad to see, is now regarded as a matter of special importance in this country and in Germany, as it long has been in England. A New Testament lexicon is designed for persons of feeble vision and of advanced age, as well as for those whose eyes have not waxed dim. In this particular, the present lexicon has not been equalled in our country.

Second. A natural and philosophical arrangement of the meanings of a word. Let us take the noun *Πνεῦμα* as an illustration. There are three great classes of meanings. I. The word is defined in its primary, or material sense, 1, as a breathing, breath; 2, air, breath in motion, wind. II. The word as applied to man in his present two-fold state, 1, the vital spirit, anima, the principle of life; 2, the intellectual part, the animus, mind, soul, *a* as opposed to the body or animal spirit, *b* as the seat of feeling or emotion, *c* disposition or temper of mind, *d* will, counsel, purpose, *e* including the understanding, intellect. III. The term as applied to simple, incorporeal beings; A of created spirits, 1, the human soul, when separated from the body; 2, an evil spirit, demon; 3, good angels; B of God as immaterial; C of Christ in his exalted, spiritual nature; D the Spirit of God, in intimate union with God the Father and Son; 1, the Holy Spirit as a Divine Agent, *a* joined with the Father and the Son, with the same or different predicates, *b* in connection with or reference to God, *c* in connection with or in reference to

Christ, *d* as coming and acting upon men and producing various effects; 2, by metonymy, the Holy Spirit for the effects and consequences of his agency, *a* of physical or procreative energy, *b* of that special, divine influence which rested on Jesus, *c* of the divine influence by which prophets and holy men are excited, e. g. in inspiration, *d* by which the apostles were qualified to act as founders and guides of the Christian church, *e* of the divine influence by which the Christian temper is affected, *a* as opposed to $\eta \sigma\alpha\phi\epsilon\varsigma$, *b* as the same mind which Christ possessed; 3 meton. of a person or teacher acting, or professing to act, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The above summary will show in what a clear and orderly manner the primary sense is marked and the derivative senses traced from it and from each other. To see the progress which has been made in orderly definition one need only compare such words as $\piνευμα$ and $\sigma\alpha\phi\epsilon\varsigma$ in this lexicon with the confused and inaccurate account of them in Schleusner.

Third. The particles are treated with great fulness and perspicuity. No class of words reveal the subtle character of the Greek language so strikingly as the particles; to exhibit them satisfactorily, even in the New Test. dialect, requires the closest attention and a habit of philosophical discrimination; yet no class of words are more important in educing the sense, especially in Paul's epistles. To this portion of the language Dr. Robinson has devoted special attention. The results of the investigations of many able German grammarians on the classical dialects are exhibited in this lexicon as modified by the New Testament idiom, and cleared of doubtful and adventitious accompaniments.

Fourth. The author's local knowledge of Palestine, as would be expected, is here employed with eminent advantage. The large number of proper names, words descriptive of various objects of natural history, etc. are delineated with a precision which personal observation only would render possible. In this particular, the lexicon is a great advance upon any similar work which has yet appeared in Germany. In this class of words, e. g. Jerusalem, one is struck with the author's happy judgment in selecting just enough of the most important particulars, where the temptation would be strong to make the description disproportionately copious. A good lexicographer, as well as a good architect, looks carefully to the proportions of his edifice. It would be interesting to write an essay on certain words, rather than to confine one's self to give the exact sense.

Fifth. Minute accuracy. So far as we can see from a daily use of this lexicon, for nearly eight weeks, there is an extraordinary freedom from error, not only in the typography, but in the almost innumerable references. Mistakes in figures are extremely apt to creep in, even after the most vigilant attention. To turn to commentaries and other books for accuracy in this particular, is in general, out of the question. There must be a laborious personal examination.

In short, we congratulate the churches and the clergy of all denominations in this country and Great Britain that this great work has been brought to a close so successful. To a large extent, it will supercede the use of concor-

dances and commentaries. It is a monument of patient and successful labor, of exact and varied knowledge, and of sound judgment on the most important of all subjects, the elucidation of heavenly mysteries.

II. DAVIDSON'S NEW TESTAMENT INTRODUCTION.¹

WE gave some account of the first Vol. of this work, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1849, pp. 357-365. The author is Professor of Biblical Literature in the Lancashire Independent College, near Manchester, England. The work before us is the first attempt of the kind, so far as we know, in the English language. The Introduction, by Hug, which is on a more extensive plan, has been twice translated into English. Many Introductions have been published in the German language, such as those of De Wette and Guericke. Dr. Davidson's first volume embraces the four Gospels; the second closes with the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians; the third, which will be published in the course of the next Spring, will close the New Testament. Sixty-five pages of the second volume are occupied with the Acts of the Apostles. In the next 100 pages, the author treats of the life of Paul, the chronology of his life, his education, writings, style, and diction, all serving as a general introduction to the Pauline epistles. Then follow special introductions to ten of Paul's epistles, in each of which such topics as the following are considered at more or less length: origin of the church, persons of whom the church was composed, time and place of writing the epistles, object, language, integrity, authenticity and genuineness, and outline of the thought or subdivisions. Of course the number and character of the topics would somewhat vary in the different epistles.

Perhaps the best method of conveying a just idea of the work, will be to present a summary of the conclusions to which the author has come, on the two epistles to the Thessalonians. He considers: 1. Origin of the Church at Thessalonica. Paul and Silas visited the place on Paul's second missionary journey. A large church was soon established, consisting mostly of gentiles, 1 Thes. 1: 9. Many of the gentiles who had attended the synagogue, and had become proselytes, believed. Paul's stay here was comparatively short, so that he was not able fully to instruct the church in the doctrines and duties of Christianity. It is supposed that a main feature in the Apostle's preaching was apocalyptic, i. e. it turned on the coming of the kingdom of Christ. 2. Time and place of writing the first epistle. It seems to have been written at Corinth, near the commencement of Paul's first visit to that city, A. D. 52; if so, it was the first of his epistles. It should seem from various circumstances, e. g. the need of further instruction and admonition, that the church had been recently planted. Various arguments to show a later date of the epistle are fully considered. 3. Immediate occa-

¹ An Introduction to the New Testament, by Samuel Davidson, D. D., LL. D., Vol. II. The Acts of the Apostles to the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians. London: Bagsters, 1849. pp. 467, 8vo.

sion and object of the epistle. Paul's object was to encourage the believers to continue steadfast in the faith, and to admonish them in respect to remaining immoralities, neglect of their worldly calling, etc. The author concludes with an outline of the contents of the epistle. 1. Occasion, object and date of the Second Epistle. The occasion was the fresh intelligence which Paul had received from Thessalonica. His leading object was to instruct the church in regard to our Lord's coming. The advent was not so near as many supposed. Antichrist must previously come and exert a powerful and destructive influence. An epistle had been forged in the apostle's name, and expressions which he had uttered, were distorted for the purpose of fostering the idea of the Messiah's speedy advent to judgment. False apprehensions, anxiety and consternation were the consequence. Who forged the letter is uncertain, or whether his intention was good or evil. The Second Epistle should be dated towards the end of Paul's stay at Corinth, A. D. 53, or 54. 2. Contents. 3. Authenticity and genuineness of both epistles. The authenticity is unequivocally stated by Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian. The early lists of the Homologoumena contained them. There are indistinct allusions to them in the apostolic fathers. The internal objections to the authenticity have little or no weight, being merely the subjective fancies of such men as Baur of Tübingen. The principal stumbling block is the celebrated passage 1 Thess. 4: 15, 17. It is thought that the apostle really expected the day of judgment in his own lifetime. This idea he expresses in his first epistle, but modifies it in the second. But a phrase similar to that in the first epistle relating to the nearness of the second advent is found 1 Cor. 15: 52, written after both of the epistles to the Thessalonians. After reviewing and rejecting three hypotheses, which have been adduced to explain the passage, Dr. D. maintains that the only tenable view is that which excludes the writer and the early Christians generally from the language, "we who are alive," etc. The personal pronoun is used in the way termed by rhetoricians, *communicatio*, the apostle transferring to himself what belongs chiefly or wholly to the readers or to persons represented by them. "We who are alive and remain," can mean only "such Christians as live and remain." Paul employs himself and the early Christians as the representatives of those who should be alive at the second advent. So in Deut. 30: 1, the generation addressed is the representative of a succeeding one. In John 6: 32, a succeeding generation is employed to represent a past one. The language in 1 Thess. 4: 15, does not imply the absolute, but the relative nearness of the event.

One of the most striking characteristics of this work is the thoroughness with which the author has gone into the most recent investigations of the German biblical critics. Nothing seems to have escaped his search. He has patiently threaded the daring speculations and idle fancies of the Tübingen school,—a school that have pressed their subjective criticism so far that it becomes simply ridiculous, and is now deemed unworthy even of the attention of respectable neologists. Yet Dr. D.'s laborious investigation of these cavils may be followed by an eminent practical advantage. It shows

to what miserable shifts and subterfuges the oppugners of revelation are now reduced. It should seem that they must be soon driven from the field.

The work is very valuable in another point of view. It brings into a very convenient and readable shape a vast amount of criticism and of instructive material on all the New Testament books, which material is scattered through a hundred German and Latin commentaries, introductions, monographs, reviews, etc. Not a few of these are invaluable in casting light on the argument of an epistle, in removing obscurity from some cardinal doctrine, or in reconciling some serious discrepancy between two writers. There are discussions—whatever may be said of the cavils and destructive course of some of the German critics—which should be welcomed by every friend of the Bible. We are deeply concerned with all which relates to the records of our faith. We not only wish to believe that the foundation standeth sure, but to be able to give reasons for our belief. In the wide diffusion of knowledge, in the great increase of men of acute minds and of sceptical views, in the middle and lowest ranks of society, both in this country and in England, such discussions as are found in these volumes will be very opportune. They will furnish ready weapons for the overthrow of skilful assailants.

Besides, for the advanced philologist these volumes contain very valuable and timely discussions. Whether he agrees with the respected author, or not, in such questions as the Hebrew original of Matthew, the genuineness of the last verses of Mark's Gospel, only one imprisonment of Paul at Rome, etc., he will be glad to see the topics brought into a convenient form, and all the arguments for a particular position skilfully selected and marshalled. The author evidently seeks for truth, rather than victory. His work affords many indubitable evidences that he is an honest, painstaking and independent, as well as learned, investigator. We again commend it earnestly to the attention of biblical students as one of the most valuable works which has lately appeared in the department of sacred philology in any country. Those who are not familiar with the questions here discussed, but who feel an interest in biblical investigations, would be highly gratified and instructed by the study of these volumes. They will open fresh sources of thought and feeling. We may add that the work is brought out in the best style of London typography.

With a few suggestions on particular points in Vol. II., we will conclude this notice. "Notwithstanding his danger, the apostle continued at Ephesus nearly three years," p. 90. His danger did not continue during the whole time. "When he arrived at Jerusalem the fifth time after his conversion, immediately before the passover," p. 91. The pentecost, the passover had been spent at Philippi, Acts 20: 6. "The measure failed of the effect intended, at least with the majority. The zealots were only more embittered against him," p. 93. But were these zealots believers? Was not the measure successful as to the believers? "Clement himself, writing from Rome, should rather in that case have employed *παρεσχεμενος*, or a similar word; *having gone*, not *having come*," p. 99. But *ἐλθὼν* may mean that.—See the Lexicons. "The authority of the fragment, though belonging probably to

the 3d century, in favor of the journey to Spain, is too precarious to be relied on," p. 102. The fragment shows, beyond all question, that the belief of a journey to Spain was entertained *by some*, whether the writer means himself to deny or affirm it. It is conclusive as to the existence of a tradition to that effect in the second century. "The date that can be settled with the most accuracy is the time of Porcius Festus's arrival in Palestine, in room of Felix," p. 107. This is the most uncertain of all the leading dates. "But it cannot be doubted that Paul was acquainted with the Latin language. He could both speak and write it," p. 128. Can we affirm this so positively? "Luke puts his materials together without much carefulness," p. 24. Is this expression well chosen? "To the unknown God," p. 88. To an unknown God. The reason given for Paul's visit to Arabia savors rather of a modern college, than of apostolic experience, pp. 79, 80. "He went through a process of training there, for the purpose of preaching the Gospel."

III. DECIPHERING OF THE ASSYRIAN AND BABYLONIAN INSCRIPTIONS.

In an article of eighty-three pages, in Part 2d of the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1850, Major H. C. Rawlinson has given a general view of the results at which he has arrived in deciphering the Inscriptions. We have condensed some of the more important facts.

There are found in many parts of Persia, either graven on the native rock, as at Hamadân, Vân, and Behistûn, or sculptured on the walls of the ancient palaces, as at Persepolis and Pasargardae, cuneiform inscriptions, which record the glories of the house of Achæmenes. These inscriptions are, in almost every instance, trilingual and trilateral. They are engraved in three different languages, and each language has its peculiar alphabet; the alphabets, indeed, varying from each other, not merely in the fact that the characters are formed by a different assortment of the elemental signs, which we are accustomed to term the arrow-head and wedge, but in their whole phonetic structure and organization. The object of engraving records in three different languages, was to render them generally intelligible, as the governor of Baghdâd would now publish an edict in the Persian, Turkish and Arabic languages.

The Persian cuneiform alphabet was first deciphered, and the language was subsequently brought to light. There are not now probably more than twenty words in the whole range of the Persian cuneiform records, upon the meaning, grammatical condition, or etymology of which, any doubt or difference of opinion can be said now to exist.

As the Greek translation on the Rosetta stone first led to the deciphering of the hieroglyphic writing of Egypt, so have the Persian texts of the trilingual cuneiform tablets served as a stepping-stone to the knowledge of the Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions. The tablets of Behistûn, of Naksh-i-Rustâm, and Persepolis, have, in the first place, furnished a list of more than eighty proper names, of which the true pronunciation is fixed by their

Persian orthography, and of which we have also the Babylonian equivalents. A careful comparison of these duplicate forms of writing the same name, and a due appreciation of the phonetic distinctions peculiar to the two languages, have supplied the means of determining with more or less certainty, the value of about one hundred Babylonian characters, and a basis has thus been fixed for a complete arrangement of the alphabet. The next step has been to collate inscriptions, and to ascertain or infer from the variant orthographies of the same name, and particularly the same geographical name, the homophones of each known alphabetical power. Here it must be observed, that though two inscriptions may be absolutely identical in sense, and even in expression, it does not by any means follow that where one text may differ from the other, we are justified in supposing that we have found alphabetical variants. Many sources of variety exist besides the employment of homophones; abbreviations may be substituted for words expressed phonetically; or the allocation is altered; or synonymes are used; or grammatical suffixes or affixes may be used, or suppressed, or modified. By mere comparison, however, repeated in a multitude of instances, so as to reduce almost infinitely the chance of error, Major Rawlinson says he has added fifty characters to the hundred previously known through the Persian key. This acquaintance with the phonetic value of about one hundred and fifty signs limits his present knowledge of the Babylonian and Assyrian alphabets.

The Babylonian translations of the Persian text in the trilingual tablets have furnished a list of about two hundred Babylonian words, of which we know the sound approximately, and the meaning certainly. Nearly all these words are found entire, or only with some slight modification, in Assyrian. The difficult, and at the same time, the essential part of the study of Assyrian, consists in thus discovering the unknown from the known, in laying bare the anatomy of the Assyrian sentence, and guided by grammatical indications, by a few Babylonian landmarks, and especially by the context, in tracing out, sometimes through Semitic analogies, but oftener through an extensive comparison of similar or cognate phrases, the meaning of words which are otherwise strange. This last branch, Major Rawlinson has prosecuted with great care, and he thinks he has added two hundred meanings certainly, and one hundred more, probably, to the vocabulary already obtained through the Babylonian translations. He estimates the number of words in the Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions, at about 5000, and he does not pretend to be acquainted with more than a tenth part of that number; but the five hundred already known constitute the most important terms in the language.

The actual language of the Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions, is neither Hebrew, Chaldee, or Syriac, or any of the known cognate dialects, but it has so many analogous points with those dialects, both in grammatical structure and elementary words, that the author thinks it may be determinately classed in the Semitic family. The languages of Assyria and Babylonia can hardly be termed identical, as each dialect affects the employment of certain specific verbal roots, and certain particular nouns and adjectives, but

they are at any rate sufficiently alike in their internal organization to render illustrations drawn from the inscriptions of Babylon applicable to those of Assyria, so far as such illustrations may be of philological value. The Semitic affinities, therefore, of the Babylonian translations at Behistûn are more or less shared by the Assyrian. The pers. pronoun first person sing. in Bab. and Assy. is *anak*, Heb. אֲנִי; suffixed to nouns, it is *ua* and *i*, to verbs *ani*. The pronoun of the 3d pers. seems to be *nanta* or *anta*, Heb. הוּא; suffixed, it is a simple *k*; 3d pers. sing. masc. *su*, Heb. הוּא; among the demonst. pronouns is *haga* הַזֶּה. The author thinks that he recognizes in the Babylonian, Niph., Hiph. or Hoph., and Hithpael conjugations of the Heb., and the Ithpaal, Aphel, Ittaphal, Shaphel, and Ishtaphel of the Chaldee. The Bab. verb in Pret. marks the distinction of persons by prefixes, like the Heb. Fut. Among the Bab. particles are *lipenai*, before, *itta* with, *ad* to, *anog* in front of. The Babylon. roots are almost wholly biliteral, e. g. *ten* to give, תִּן; *duk* to smite, דַּק; *mi* to die, מוּת; *rad* to go down, יָרַד; *kun*, to establish, כָּבַד; *sil*, to dwell, שָׁב; *am*, mother; *bar*, a son; *beth*, a house; *ert*, land; *sem*, a name, etc.

The earliest records brought to light, written in the cuneiform character, are the inscriptions in the north-west palace of Nimrûd, belonging to a king, whom the author inclines to identify with Sardanapalus, though he was not by any means the first builder or king in Assyria. In the palace just named, there is an inscription of Sardanapalus, repeated more than a hundred times, commencing: "This is the palace of Sardanapalus, the humble worshipper of Assarac," (Nisroch. 1 K. 19: 37,) "and Beltia, of the shining Bar, of Ani, and of Dagon, who are the principal of the gods, the powerful and supreme ruler, king of Assyria, who was the son of Hevenk, the great king, the powerful and supreme ruler, king of Assyria," etc. The inscription goes on apparently to notice the efforts of the king to establish the worship of the gods; incidentally occurs a list of tributary nations, from which it would appear that the coasts of Phœnicia, the high lands of Media, and the upper provinces of Asia Minor were not yet reduced under the power of Assyria. The son of Sardanapalus, Temen-bar II., built the centre palace of Nimrûd, and of whose annals the obelisk supplies us with a notice of singular completeness and detail. It gives a brief statement of the events, mostly warlike campaigns, of thirty-one years of his reign. Above the five series of figures on the obelisk, are epigraphs containing a sort of register of the tribute sent by five different nations to the Assyrian king. The third tribute is from a country called *Misr*, Egypt?

With two more kings terminates the series of kings immediately connected with Sardanapalus. Mr. Layard thinks that a new dynasty with a new religion, now acquired the kingdom. Mr. Rawlinson suggests that it may be only an interregnum. The Khorsabad dynasty has been thought to be the monarchs mentioned in Scripture, who were contemporary with the kings of Israel and Judah. "My opinion at present," says the author, "is against the identification; but the evidence is pretty nearly balanced; and

if the great difficulty, the dissimilarity of names, were removed, I might possibly become a convert to the belief that in the three kings who built the palace of Khorsabad, who founded Mespila, and who constructed the lions in the south-west palace of Nimrûd, we had the biblical Shalmeneser, Sennacherib, and Esarhaddon." On these and other points, we must wait for further inquiries. The author supposes that the six continuous kings of the Nimrûd line may have reigned from about B. C. 1250 to 1100, and allowing an interval of 70 years for a suspension of the line, the era of the Khorsabad king would fall about B. C. 1050.

The author names the inscriptions at Vān and its vicinity, Armenian; they are written in the same alphabet as that used in Assyria, but belong to a language radically different, the Scythic, though it has adopted numerous words from the Assyrian. Six kings of the Armenian line, in a direct descent, are named. The monuments, Mr. R. assigns to the seventh and eighth centuries B. C.

The Babylonians borrowed their alphabet from the Assyrians, and it requires no little ingenuity at the present day to form a comparative table of the characters. Perhaps the most interesting of all the Babylonian monuments are the bricks. It was a custom borrowed from Assyria, that the bricks used in building the cities on the Lower Tigris and Euphrates, should be stamped with the name and titles of the royal founder. It is hoped that ultimately from these bricks, a chronology of the country may be reconstructed. With regard to Babylonia Proper, it is stated that every ruin from some distance north of Baghdād as far south as the Birs Nimrûd is of the age of Nebuchadnezzar. Mr. R. has examined the bricks, *in situ*, belonging perhaps, to one hundred different towns and cities, within the area of about one hundred miles in length, and thirty or forty in breadth, and he never found any other legend than that of Nebuchadnezzar. Lower Babylonia or Chaldea, will probably furnish far more important materials for illustrating the ancient history of the country, than are to be found about Hillah and Baghdād.

Susiana is rich in ancient sites. The cuneiform character employed on the monuments is the farthest possible from the Assyrian type, and the language appears not to belong to the Semitic stock. Another class of inscriptions is found in Elymais Proper, which varies from all the others.

IV. HARRIS'S PRE-ADAMITE EARTH.¹

We have long regarded Dr. Harris as one of the most original, profound and comprehensive Christian writers of our day. The present work is the first of a series of Treatises in which the author is seeking to unfold the successive steps by which God is accomplishing his purpose to manifest his All-sufficiency. It is purely scientific and philosophical; it exhibits good

¹ The Pre-Adamite Earth: Contributions to Theological Science. By John Harris, D. D. Third Thousand. Revised and Enlarged. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln, 1850.

research and power of analysis, clear and profound reasoning, and demonstrations.

"This first volume consists of five parts. The first contains those Primary Truths which Divine Revelation appears to place at the foundation of all the objective manifestations of the Deity; the second presents the Laws or General Principles, which are regarded as logically resulting from the preceding Truths; and the third, fourth and fifth parts are occupied with the Exemplification and Verification of these Laws in the inorganic, the vegetable, and the animal kingdom of the pre-Adamite earth, respectively." A considerable portion of this volume is introductory to the entire series, and should therefore be thoroughly mastered in the scope of its reasoning, by those who would follow the author intelligently along the pathway of his grand conception. The attempt is made, and we think successfully, to show "that there is a theology in Nature which is ultimately one with the theology of the Bible." "The whole process of Divine Manifestation, including nature, is to be viewed in the light of a sublime argument, in which God is deductively reasoning from principles to facts, from generals to particulars." Assuming this, he deduces certain primary principles, and applies them to the successive stages of creation. He shows conclusively the harmony of Scripture and Geology, and traces in a fresh and forcible manner the origin of the material universe up to a wise and intelligent Power, while he refutes and silences the cavils and theories of a false and infidel science. J. M. S.

V. ROWLAND'S MAXIMS OF INFIDELITY.¹

"Common Maxims" are the most influential forms of belief, both as it regards error and truth. Infidelity as a public recognized avowed *system*, is dead and buried beyond the fear of a resurrection. It has now a mere *fragmentary* being; its errors exist in isolated forms, and float loosely and at random through the public mind. But infidelity is wielding a tremendous power in our land, though not apparent to the sight; and though it wields no potential creed or organized agencies. These "common maxims" are abroad—are "talking" to the unregenerated heart; they do their mischief without alarming the fears of the popular mind. It is a *guerilla* form of warfare, and all the more dangerous and fatal to individual faith and hope on this account. Mr. Rowland has met infidelity just where its remaining strength lies, and has shivered to pieces the weapons of its present warfare. He has taken up one after another of the popular maxims of Infidelity, thoroughly analyzed them, and shown their error and evil tendency. The execution of the work is certainly happy and able. The style is clear, compact, and forcible; the reasoning is candid and conclusive; and the book is full of good sense and practical utility. Just such a work was unquestionably needed. It will do good in a line and with a class of minds which are not particularly reached by any similar work. It is in many respects preferable to Dr. Nel-

¹ On the Common Maxims of Infidelity. By Henry A. Rowland. New York: Carter & Brothers, 1880.

son's Cause and Cure of Infidelity, and every lover of the truth ought to desire and seek for it an extensive circulation. J. M. S.

VI. CHALMERS'S MEMOIRS.¹

The first volume of these Memoirs awakened in us an intense desire to see the second, and having now read the second, we are impatient to reach the third. Certainly we have not read so intensely interesting and instructive a work, in the department of biography, in a long while. It has given us new ideas of the transcendent ability, and of the social and moral elevation of character, of that great man. — This volume comprises the period of his Glasgow settlement, first as the Minister of the Tron Church, and then of the parish church of St. John's, — eight years of the prime and vigor of his life, when his mind was at full maturity, when he was at the height of his popularity as a preacher, and when all the resources of his great intellect and of his benevolent heart were laid under full contribution, to honor his calling, and make it powerful for good. And a more brilliant and effective ministry was perhaps never exercised in our world. The Tron Church was often the theatre of scenes seldom witnessed under the preaching of the Gospel. There it was that he preached his celebrated Astronomical Discourses, which drew together, on week-days and during business hours, nearly all the professional and business men of Scotland's commercial metropolis, and held them spell-bound by the power of his eloquent thoughts. His correspondence too during this period with many of the master-minds of his day, is exceedingly valuable; it gave birth also to some of his most famous productions. And not the least interesting part of his labors during this period, was his successful attempt to establish and maintain a mission church in his extensive parish, and a thorough system of education for the numerous poor contained in it, as well as for his well-known experiment of pauper management, in which he worked out one of the most perplexing problems in political economy. We earnestly commend these Memoirs as among the most charming and valuable books of the season. J. M. S.

VII. LIFE OF JOHN FOSTER.²

The Life and Correspondence of such a man as John Foster possess peculiar claims to our attention. We regret that our space, after omitting entirely to notice the majority of the new books laid upon our table, will allow but little more than the bare announcement of the appearance of the work.

The work throughout bears the impress of Foster's great and original, but

¹ Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers, D.D., LL.D. By his son-in-law, the Rev. William Hanna, LL.D. Vol. II. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1850.

² The Life and Correspondence of John Foster; edited by J. E. Ryland. With Notices of Mr. Foster as a Preacher and a Companion. Two volumes in one. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1850.

somewhat gloomy and one-sided mind. The staple of the volume is his own Letters, in which he not only portrays his private and domestic life, but opens his mind freely to his friends on various topics of general interest and matters of faith, and discusses with his characteristic originality of view and comprehensive power of thought, many of the profoundest subjects of human inquiry and investigation. It is not only deeply interesting but solemnly instructive to follow the great Foster through this mass of correspondence, much of which we think might have been omitted to advantage. However valuable and useful his writings, as a preacher it is a surprising fact that he accomplished little, and may be said to have made a perfect failure of it. Resembling Hall and Chalmers in many traits of his mind, and wielding a pen quite as vigorous and potential as either, we cannot account for the fact that he had so little power or reputation as a preacher. There is something affecting even in contrasting him with such contemporaries; in seeing him, after various fruitless attempts to succeed, wholly laid aside from the ministry during the greater part of his life, or exercising it only occasionally in obscure villages to illiterate audiences. Well did Hall compare him to "a great lumbering wagon, loaded with gold." He was too unwieldy for the pulpit; not enough practical and in sympathy with the outward, living world. But his pen has immortalized his name and influence. His *Essays* are among the most valuable in our language.

J. M. S.

VIII. WILLIAMS'S RELIGIOUS PROGRESS.¹

These Discourses are on the following subjects: Religion as a principle of growth — Faith in its Root — Virtue — Knowledge — Temperance — Patience — Godliness — Brotherly Kindness — Charity.

We do not think the present volume, either in purity of style, or vigor of thought, equal to the previous productions of Dr. Williams, which have placed him in the first rank of the thinkers and writers of the country. Still the topics embraced in it are ably handled, and the teaching is sound and Christian. The progress the Author advocates is in the right direction; its basis is eternal truth; its elements and laws are found in the Gospel of the grace of God; and its goal is an eternity of holiness and bliss. It is refreshing in these days, when the multitudes who are shouting "progress" know not what they want, nor in what direction they are going, to hear a bold and manly voice from the heights of Zion giving utterance to the inspired teachings on this great subject.

J. M. S.

¹ Religious Progress: Discourses on the Development of Christian Character. By William R. Williams. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln, 1880.

IX. SPENCER'S PASTOR'S SKETCHES.¹

The *fourth* edition in three months! This looks as if we had not misjudged the character and value of this volume in the highly commendatory review which we gave of it a little in advance of its publication (see *Bib. Rep.* for Oct. 1850). It is indeed a book of remarkable interest and power of instruction. Its graphic sketches of character, incidents and religious experiences; the thorough knowledge it evinces of the human heart in its most subtle phases of self-deception and unbelief; the skill with which it meets many of the strange difficulties which trouble thousands of "inquirers respecting the way of salvation;" the wisdom and soundness of its teaching upon many of the most delicate and difficult subjects which are wont to embarrass those whose duty it is to guide souls; the glorious views of the Gospel which it unfolds and exhibits to console and encourage the penitent; and the spirit of whole-souled pity and sympathy and earnestness which it breathes in every page, make it a book second in interest to none that we can name, and as instructive as it is interesting. It is just the book which every Christian pastor needs to stir him up and to guide him in his great work. It is just the book for every Christian to study who would be wise to win souls to Christ; and to be put into the hands of every friend, and every sinner whom we would have escape the perils of unbelief and embrace the great salvation.

J. M. S.

X. MEMOIR OF HANNAH MORE.²

As a condensed and popular Biography of the gifted Hannah More, we hesitate not to commend this beautifully executed volume, as possessing peculiar and superior excellencies. It is, according to our taste, a *model* biography; not over-minute in its details; not cumbered with over-much correspondence; but a truthful, graphic, eloquent portraiture of the main features in the life and character of this transcendent woman. Mrs. Knight's style is racy and delightful; her arrangement is admirable; her appreciation of the subject of her Memoir is discriminating and just; and instead of tiring as we are wont to do over the heavy and almost endless pages of modern biographies, we follow her with eagerness to the conclusion, and regret that she had not given us more. Charming! has the author achieved her task. Would that all the mothers and daughters of our land would read, to appreciate and to imitate the virtues of this noble and gifted one, this attractive memoir. The volume contains a striking *likeness* of Hannah More, and an elegant engraving of "*Barley Wood*," her favorite rural residence.

J. M. S.

¹ *A Pastor's Sketches: or Conversations with Anxious Inquirers respecting the Way of Salvation.* By Ichabod S. Spencer, D. D., Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1850.

² *A new Memoir of Hannah More; or Life in Hall and Cottage.* By Mrs. Helen C. Knight. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1851.

XI. THE FOOTPRINTS OF THE CREATOR.¹

The works of this author are full of interest for the general reader, and the theologian. The former will be attracted by the freshness, the homely strength, and the picturesqueness of the style, by the frequent beauty of the thoughts, by the iron grasp which the author takes of his subject, by his self-reliance and originality, and by the conscious mastery of the theme, whatever it is, which comes before him. The attentive theologian will find not simply a discussion of the common relations which geology holds to revelation, or abundant and striking illustrations of the doctrines of natural theology, or the expressions of a benevolent heart for the well-being of man; but a bold avowal of evangelical sentiments, and the interweaving, to a considerable extent, of the articles of a creed which has been quite distasteful to many scientific as well as literary men. The last chapter of the volume before us is on the bearing of final causes on geological history. Some of the thoughts which are developed at length are such as the following:—We learn from human history that nations are as certainly mortal as men. Geology teaches that species are as mortal as individuals and nations, and that even genera and families become extinct. There is geological evidence, that in the course of creation the higher orders succeeded the lower. The brain—that of the fish—which bears an average proportion of not more than two to one to the spinal cord, came first; last of all appeared the brain of man, which averages as twenty-three to one. The period when he was introduced upon the scene appears to have corresponded with the state of his habitation. The large reasoning brain would have been wholly out of place in the earlier ages. The period, too, of the mammiferous quadrupeds seems to have been determined, like the succeeding human period, by the earth's fitness at the time as a place of habitation for creatures so formed. By piecing the two records together, that of Scripture, and that revealed in the rocks, we learn that in slow and solemn majesty has period succeeded period, that fish, reptiles, mammiferous quadrupeds, have reigned in turn, that responsible man ultimately entered into a world ripened for his reception; but further, that this passing scene is not the final one in the long series, but merely the last of the preliminary scenes. There should seem to be a lack of proportion in the series of being, were the period of perfect and glorified humanity abruptly connected, without the introduction of an intermediate creation of *responsible* imperfection, with that of the dying, irresponsible brute. That scene of things in which God became Man, and suffered, *seems*, as it no doubt is, a necessary link in the chain.

Mr. Miller has been for several years editor of the "Witness," the principal newspaper of the Free Church of Scotland. Fifteen years of his previous life had been passed as a stone-mason, and five years as accountant in

¹ The Footprints of the Creator; or, The Asterolepis of Stromness. By Hugh Miller, author of the Old Red Sandstone, etc. From the third London edition. With a memoir of the author. By Louis Agassiz. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln, 1850. pp. 380.

the bank at Cromarty, his native town. His principal publications, besides the "Footprints," are "The Old Red Sandstone," four editions of which have been published in England, and which is soon to be reprinted in Boston; and "First Impressions of England and its People," describing a few months' tour, in which Mr. Miller often turns aside into the by-ways, and gives us instructive chapters on the condition and modes of thinking of the middle and lower classes, interspersed with geological speculations.

ARTICLE XII.

SELECT THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

UNDER the above head, we shall condense the most important intelligence which we can procure, especially in biblical, theological and classical literature. Many of our subscribers are clergymen who reside in distant parts of the country, remote from libraries and booksellers' shops. Such, we have reason to believe, regard the information communicated on the last pages of each number of this journal as particularly valuable. For their benefit, we shall go into some detail in regard to the literary value, cost and accessibility of some of the more important books. A correspondent in China suggests that foreign missionaries and others who are engaged in translating the Bible, would be pleased with notices of books fitted to aid them in their difficult undertaking. English gentlemen have also requested us to furnish a list of the more valuable theological publications which appear from the American press, the notices in newspapers being generally too brief or too indiscriminate to furnish the requisite information.

UNITED STATES.

A new number of the Journal of the American Oriental Society will soon be published. Valuable materials for a volume are on hand, and will be printed as soon as the pecuniary means of the Society will justify. Among these materials are essays on the structure, analogies, etc., of some of the languages of Southern and Western Africa; on the Dakota or Sioux language; on the Oscan and South Italian dialects; on the History of the Conquest of Persia by the Arabs, from the Turkish version of the annals of Et-Tabary; on Arabic Versification; a narrative of the Tour of Dr. J. Perkins from Oroomiah to Mosul, in 1849; on the Unity of the Human Race, as affected by Language, etc. The first number of the first volume has been reprinted. Valuable additions have been made to the library. In this connection, it may be stated that H. J. Anderson, M. D., who accompanied

Lieut. Lynch in his exploring expedition to the river Jordan, will soon publish an extended Report on the geology of Palestine.

Some important theological works are in the process of circulation by the Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, in Boston. Among these are the works of the Younger President Edwards, in 2 vols. 8vo.; and of Rev. Joseph Bellamy, D. D., of Bethlem, Ct., also in 2 vols. Both were edited by Rev. T. Edwards, D. D., of New London, Ct. To the works of each, a short life of the author is prefixed. Some of the productions of Dr. Bellamy have had a deservedly high celebrity in England, as well as in this country. All will now rejoice that they are accessible in so convenient a form, and at a reasonable price. We may here mention that an additional volume in 550 pp. of Dr. Emmons's Sermons has been published under the care of Dr. Ide, of Medway. It is printed and bound so as to match with the preceding six volumes. It contains forty two sermons, mostly of a practical character. We may advert to these volumes on another occasion.

Dr. Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, published by Messrs. Merriam, of Springfield, is selling at a rate unprecedented, we believe, for so large a work. About 3000 copies have been distributed among the School Districts in Massachusetts, during the past year, in conformity with an act of the legislature of the State. The demand from other sources has also increased to the amount of several thousand copies beyond the preceding year. Many copies are now sent to distant parts of the world, where the people speak or are learning the English language, for missionary, commercial, and other purposes. The dictionary would be an inestimable treasure, not only in every school district, but in the family. Young children may be taught to resort to Webster as the arbiter of disputes, as a safe and satisfactory guide, and as a storehouse of invaluable information. In this respect, as well as in others, Dr. Webster, and his editor, Prof. Goodrich, are benefactors to the country. At the same time, we may say, that the public are under great obligations to Mr. Worcester, for his excellent Dictionary. It is a production every way worthy of his indefatigable industry, sound judgment, and large experience as a lexicographer. There are many who find it very convenient, in some cases necessary, to use two or more dictionaries, as the student of Latin or Greek does not wish to confine himself to Liddell and Scott, or Leverett, or Freund. Worcester's dictionary has marked excellences, to which we need not now advert. In this connection we would say, that we heartily join in the closing remark of the writer of the article on the English Language in the *Edinburgh Review* for Oct. 1850. "It becomes us to guard it (our noble language) with jealous care, as a sacred deposit, not our least important trust in the heritage of humanity. Our brethren in America must assist in the task." We will cheerfully do so, and we will begin by referring to one abomination in this very article, p. 297. "The period during which it *was being effected*." The *London Quarterly Review*, Sept. 1850, p. 458, speaks of an individual as *progressing*.

We are glad to hear that the Dictionary of the Latin Language, on the basis of Freund's great work, which Prof. Andrews and his assistants have been for several years preparing, is at length published.

200 A.

NOTICE.

ACCORDING to the terms by which the Bibliotheca Sacra and Biblical Repository are united, some articles and notices of publications, which were prepared for the Biblical Repository, will be inserted in the Bibliotheca Sacra during the present year. Two of these articles, and some notices, will be found in the present Number. The arrangements for uniting the publications were completed at so late a day, that there is not that variety in the topics discussed in the January No., which it will be the aim of the conductors to secure hereafter. This has unavoidably led to the insertion of a disproportionate amount of matter on the general subject of Philosophy.

It may here be stated, that the conductors are not to be held responsible for the correctness of all the sentiments advanced by their correspondents. In every Number there may be particular statements or opinions from which the editors would dissent. The general tenor and spirit of a discussion may be good, while some particular views may be without foundation. For these, the writers of the articles are responsible. For the highest usefulness of the periodical, the question of the insertion of articles in a particular number must be left to the judgment of the conductors.

We have been obliged to defer, for want of space, most of the Intelligence prepared for this Number.

In a part of the copies of this Number, the following clause should be inserted after the word "conscious," in p. 31, line 15 from bottom, "of different affections."

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
NO. XXX.
AND
AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,
NO. LXXXII.

APRIL, 1851.

ARTICLE I.

EDUCATION AND SUPPLY OF MINISTERS IN DIFFERENT AGES
AND COUNTRIES.

By Rev. William A. Stearns, Cambridge, Mass.

At a time when some of the first minds in America and England are engaged with the question how shall the increasing demand for educated, energetic and godly ministers be supplied—a knowledge of the experience of other ages and other countries on the subject can hardly be otherwise than valuable.

The necessity of a learned as well as pious ministry need not be demonstrated to the readers of this Journal. If there is anything which the student of ecclesiastical history may consider as settled by the experience of Christendom—it is that an unspiritual or ignorant clergy would be among the greatest moral disasters which could befall mankind.

To secure an enlightened ministry, to qualify and bring into action a competent supply of true men, who shall fill the stations of clerical influence at home, or go forth as missionaries abroad—is an end less readily accomplished than the superficial might imagine. But there are peculiarities in our own country, to which allusion will be made by and by, which enhance the difficulty now suggested, and threaten to make it insuperable. The wise and devout both among laymen and clergymen who have given sufficient attention to the subject, deem it an inquiry of anxious importance, how the ministry which America demands for herself and mankind, in the peculiar circumstances of our country, can be brought into the field?

It is in reference to this question that we invite our readers to a brief review of the practice of the church in securing a competent supply of qualified spiritual guides. What inducements have other times and countries presented their Christian youth to enter the ministerial profession — and what facilities have they afforded for acquiring the requisite preparatory education? what are some of the circumstances which enhance the difficulty of rearing up a right and abundant ministry in the United States — and by what means can the end so desirable be best accomplished? These are among the questions, on which it would give us pleasure to cast even a few rays of light.

THE FIRST CENTURIES.

The first teachers of religion were selected by the Saviour himself — and during the whole of his ministry, while employed often as his assistants, they were kept always under his immediate instruction and supervision. Soon after the ascension, one of the greatest minds the world has produced, was associated by a supernatural calling with the twelve. The apostles and their immediate successors were endowed with the gift of tongues and other miraculous powers. In the infancy of the church, before time had been given for appropriate intellectual and spiritual cultivation — the teachers of Christianity were supernaturally qualified for their work. The gospel was announced beyond the limits of Judea to a great extent by men driven abroad by the fierce persecution of the times — the ordained and divinely assisted leaders directing the general movement, gathering churches, and perfecting their organization and instruction.

After the first founding of Christian institutions in the prominent cities of the Roman empire — and the gradual withdrawal of supernatural agencies which were given only, according to the exigency of the times, for the first planting of the church — and especially after the inspired apostles and their pupils the apostolic men such as Clement, Ignatius and Polycarp were dead — the need of educated and commanding minds began more and more to be felt. This want was met in part by learned Pagans converted to Christianity, of whom Justin Martyr, Pantænus and Origen are illustrious examples. Common Christians were unable to cope with learned heathenism — or direct the more and more complicated affairs of the church. Nor were the converted philosophers sufficiently numerous, had they all been otherwise qualified, for the purpose. The church was constrained, therefore, by her circumstances, as well as inspired by the

liberalizing atmosphere of a free Christianity which she had begun to breathe, to take measures for the education of her own sons. From almost the beginning, even in deep poverty, and distraction, the early Christians are believed to have taught their children the principles of Christianity—and laid the foundations for their being intelligent and worthy members of the churches. There is no evidence, however, that anything like a regular theological school for the education of a ministry was established earlier than the middle of the second century. The school at Alexandria seems to have grown up gradually, as the necessities of the times urged it forward. Under Pantænus, Clement and Origen, it gradually became an informal indeed but real theological seminary. To it flocked learned Pagans—and young men who desired to be instructed in the Christian doctrines and to become teachers in the church. Instruction was here given in the Scriptures, in the dogmas of religion and in Christian manners and duties. It was long the nursery of piety and learning—the *alma mater* of holy and learned men who were the lights of the church.¹

Although we find no traces of schools so celebrated in the West, yet every church was virtually a school and in it under the superintendence of the bishops young men of promise were educated in Christian principles and letters. Indeed say the Benedictines on the authority of Fleury (*Dis. 2, n. 14, p. 69*) that though the schools were generally common to all the faithful, this could not prevent the bishops having ordinarily with them a certain number of young men whom they instructed with particular care as their children and who in process of time became themselves masters. It was thus that the great luminaries of the occidental world were formed even down to the fourth and fifth centuries.²

As to the manner in which young men were selected, supported and educated for the ministry no very clear light has come down to us. That the bishops began to train young candidates for the sacred office, in schools connected with the central church of their dioceses, there can be no reasonable doubt. And that pecuniary means to facilitate the education of such were not wanting, we have not only the intimation above given, but the fact that enormous funds were early placed at the disposal of the bishops, to be disbursed for the benefit of the church, at their discretion. This was done by abundant oblations from charitable church-members—and by legacies of deceased

¹ Mosheim, Vol. I. p. 81. Neander, Vol. I. 527, etc.

² *Histoire Littéraire De La France, Par Benedictins. Tom. I. p. 234.*

Christians to whom, the church instead of relatives was often made the principal heir. By the middle of the second century the church of Rome not only supported the clerks and poor Christians of their own city, but bestowed largely of their abundance upon other churches near and remote, supplying food also to Christian prisoners and to many condemned to work in the mines. The hope of confiscating the ecclesiastical treasures was among the principal causes that induced the emperors after the death of Commodus, to engage in the persecutions which followed. Great privileges and immunities were granted and new sources of wealth were opened to the church, by Constantine. Up to the commencement of the fourth century, the present custom of leaving estates for specific objects had not been introduced. Christians gave or bequeathed absolutely, and all charitable benefactions were thrown into the common stock to be distributed by "the ecclesiastical colleges called churches" at their discretion. Church property still increased, princes making large grants and private persons, even to the exclusion of their children, bequeathing estates to the churches, while many widows and damsels were induced to leave their wealth to the common cause. This property soon came chiefly under the management of the ecclesiastics. "The bishops disposed of everything, the deacons executed it and all the clergy lived upon what the church had, though all did not administer. St. John Chrysostome makes mention that the church of Antioch fed above 3000 persons at the public expense."¹

During the first three or four hundred years, then, of the Christian era, the church had evidently the means of furnishing herself with a competent ministry — its first teachers enjoying the instructions of the Saviour himself — the next generation educated by inspired apostles; then many pagan philosophers and other learned men of Greece and Rome converted to Christianity, were soon qualified to lead in its affairs; and finally enormous sums, with almost unlimited discretion, were placed in the hands of the Bishops, whose business it was, in looking after the general interests of the church, to provide for the supply of its sacred offices, and who, in schools connected with their churches, and in their own families, could educate charitably or otherwise as the circumstances might be, a competent number of excellent men for these high trusts. Add to this the religious enthusiasm of the times, the eagerness with which wealthy parents would devote their children as well as their property to the church;

¹ *A Treatise of Matters Beneficiary*, by Fra Paulo Sarpi, Mirandola, A. D. 1676.

and we can readily suppose there would be no lack of tolerably educated candidates for the ministry.

From the commencement of the fourth century, the inducements to enter the ecclesiastical ranks, were of the most powerful kind. They appealed not merely to the religious feelings of the more ardent and devout, but to the ambition of worldly minded men. The church had already gained an external conquest over the world. Bishops were nearly its sovereigns, and priests and ecclesiastics were sharers in their immunities and advantages. The hope of honor, emolument, influence, power, called loudly upon aspiring and able youth to consecrate themselves to the church, and prepare themselves for the superintendence of its affairs. Many generous and devoted young men entered upon the ministry with honest aims, and hearts ready for sacrifice, while others of feebler faith and more doubtful piety were not repelled by any expectation of hardship from the inviting field; and others still of much baser character and motive, embraced the sacred office as the surest means to comfort and aggrandizement. The clergy of each diocese, with their bishop, formed a privileged society by themselves. Freed from all personal taxes and public burdens, especially such as are connected with military service, and under which the laity groaned — all comfortably supported, if not absolutely rich, enjoying the best society which the times afforded, revered for sanctity by the people, having the means of improvement in their hands, with a fair prospect for wealth and promotion in view, it would be strange if in this state of things the ranks of the clergy were not filled to overflowing. Such was in fact the case; and as the church became corrupt, and introduced heathenish ceremonies into her simple worship, an increased multitude of clerical leaders and subordinates could find at least a nominal occupation in the sacerdotal robe. In the cathedrals of Constantinople and Carthage, the clerical establishment contained no less than some five hundred ecclesiastical functionaries.¹

Opportunities were not wanting for suitable preparatory instruction. We have already seen, that in every diocese there was at least one general or cathedral school, designed not only to instruct catechumens of whatever age, in the faith, but also to carry forward in the principles of Christian learning, those young men who aspired to the sacred profession. These schools were at first under the immediate personal superintendence of the bishops. But when these

¹ Neander, Vol. II. p. 151, Gibbon, Vol. II. p. 423, Guizot's *History of Civilization*, Vol. I. p. 64.

officers came afterwards to be involved more and more in the complicated affairs of the church, they appointed learned men to act under their general supervision, as teachers of the young. With such masters, the cathedral schools were gradually formed into organizations which were the germs or foreshadowings of those great seminaries of learning which adorn modern ages. It does not appear that the profane sciences were taught in Christian schools previous to the fourth century. But from that time Christians availed themselves to a considerable extent of the famous pagan classical seminaries which flourished in all the great cities of civilized Europe. Christian masters, also, though professedly confining themselves to theology and morality, introduced human science as not without its utility in enabling one to understand and defend the dogmas of the church.¹

THE DARK AGES.

We have come to the time when the civilized world was visited by a shipwreck of literary institutions, and the general destruction of literature and science in society. The repeated and overwhelming irruptions of the Northern barbarians upon civilized Europe, produced universal desolation, especially as respects those studies which refine and elevate mankind. "The gradation," say the Benedictines, "is very remarkable. The irruption of the barbarians caused the entire ruin of the empire; the ruin of the empire destroyed ambition to cultivate the sciences; want of ambition occasioned negligence, and contempt of letters; these produced idleness, which as a necessary consequence, was followed by ignorance; and ignorance plunged its victims into anarchy and vice."²

About A. D. 500, monasteries began to be established in Europe, and the benefactions of the liberal were henceforth given to them, instead of the clergy. These institutions acquired immense possessions, which, according to the will of the donor, were spent in supporting monks, in hospitality, in aiding the poor, "in schooling and educating of youth," and in other pious works.³

Monasticism arose at a very early period in the East. The original monks were eremites; in Egypt and in Syria they dwelt for a time alone. Afterwards, being formed into associations, they lived secluded from the world, and passed their time in labor, devotional services, and in begging their support. In the West, the institution was from

¹ *Histoire Littéraire de la France.* Par Benedictins. Tome I.

² *Lit. His. Ben.* Tome II. p. 31.

³ *Fra Paolo Sarpi.* Benef. p. 9.

the beginning of a more human-like and elevating character. It was designed for religious men who, in retirement from the world, might find enjoyment and discharge duty in Christian studies, devotional services, self-discipline, useful labor and beneficent deeds. Religion fled to them as a covert from the times, and literature and science were saved from utter destruction, by finding an asylum in these retreats. Indeed, of many of them, schools were at first the leading characteristics. The theological coenobium under Schaumburgus was intended chiefly for a school and an ecclesia of theologians.¹

Monasteries were founded in Gaul and other parts of Europe, originally without much expense to the public. When an association was formed for the purpose, as much wild land was ceded to them as they would cultivate, and their time was divided between prayers, study, and labor on the soil. After preparatory attention to the arts, the time devoted to study was spent upon the great works of the Latin and Greek fathers, and upon the Scriptures. Every convent had its library, and many of the feebler monks were employed in copying ancient manuscripts, instead of working upon the soil. Although their primary business was with spiritual learning—for almost the whole of the Latin and Greek classics which have come down to us, we are indebted to their indefatigable labors. Every monastery had its school for the instruction of the youth who came thither to embrace the monastic life. In them were trained some of the finest minds of the age. Of the famous monastery of the Isle de Levins, it was said by S. Caesaire, “that here excellent monks were educated and sent out for Bishops in all the provinces. They were received small, and were returned great. From being weak and without experience, in understanding and influence they became kings. The institution raised its members to the highest degree of virtue, even to Jesus Christ, on the wings of charity and humility.”²

Monasteries were multiplied to an almost incredible extent. It is said that there were no less than 15,000 connected with the Benedictines at one time. They were open on easy conditions, to all classes. The rich and the noble often sent in their sons to be educated for the church. The poor, especially orphans, and many of them from early childhood, were received on charity; while the middling classes, and the wealthy, if they pleased, could here find an asylum for life, on condition of assenting to the rules of the order, and contributing their possessions to the common stock. The cause of this wonderful rush to the monasteries, may be found in the circumstances of the times.

¹ Magdeburgh Centuries, seventh century, p. 89.

² Ben. Tome II. p. 39.

Some were moved by a fervent religious spirit; some by conscious crimes or sins — mistaking the true means of expiation; but very many were driven by the public confusion which prevailed, by terror of the barbarians, by the exorbitant demands of the ruling powers, and by a knowledge of the fact which soon became general, that these humble abodes of the professedly self-renouncing, were the true, and after a time almost the only roads to preferment and honor in the church.¹ Consequently, says Gibbon, “whole legions were buried in these religious sanctuaries. Here, peasants, slaves, mechanics, as well as some noblemen and noblemen’s sons found shelter and subsistence.”²

About the time when so many monasteries were founded on the continent by Jerome, Columban, Benedict and others, Christianity was propagated in Ireland by St. Patrick and monasteries were established in that region. “The lands which he received as presents from converted chieftains he applied to the founding of cloisters which were designed to serve as nursing schools for teachers of the people and from them was to proceed the civilization of the country.”³ The monastery of Bangor, in Flintshire, where the world-renowned missionary Columban was educated, contained at one time above 2000 brethren. He was the founder of the famous school of the prophets in Iona, which though a monastic institution, was for a long period, after the middle of the sixth century, the great light of insular Europe. Many similar establishments sprung up in Scotland, Ireland and Wales, so that during the next 400 years not less than a hundred convents rose and flourished, on the model of Iona.

There were other facilities for ministerial education. The great schools at Alexandria and Athens still flourished though not perhaps in all their glory. There were schools also in Rome, Constantinople and other places which Christian princes still patronized — some of them like Amalasontha, regent for her son Athalerick about A. D. 530, pledging the teachers their full salary out of the public treasures.⁴ The bishop Etherius collected the boys of his community, instructed each one in letters; *eique agros et vineas largitus est*, as the citizens bestowed their liberality on him. Patroclus built an oratorium in which he instructed boys for the church.⁵ Gregory the Great established a school of young singers which he himself directed and to which he gave revenues and dwelling-houses at Rome. Even to the

¹ Neander, Vol. II. p. 261. ² Gib. IV. p. 378. ³ Neander, Vol. II. p. 124.

⁴ Schröckh’s *Christliche Kirchengeschichte*, Theil XVI. 60, 61.

⁵ *Magdeburgh Centuries*, Vol. II. sixth century, p. 205.

ninth century there were those who pretended to show the bed on which lying he used to sing, and the rod with which he threatened the boys.¹ There were few examples among the religious teachers of this darkening period who attempted to communicate even the elements of philological learning, but sacred psalmody was indispensable to a good theological education. When we think of the Gregorian chant, we cannot but respect the taste of its author, enemy as he was to secular learning. At the council of Vauance A. D. 592, It was ordered that all ministers according to the salutary custom observed through all Italy should take the young unmarried readers into their houses, teach them psalms, keep them to the reading of the holy Scriptures and instruct them in the law of the Lord.²

Though ignorance, in the sixth century had become deplorable, yet some of the old secular schools still survived. There were also a great number of cathedral schools, one at least in every diocese, under the direction of the bishop or of some scholar or scholars appointed by him. These were spread all over Gaul and other parts of christianized Europe. In them youth were instructed to some extent in the liberal arts, by way of preparation for those sacred studies which constituted the principal business of the schools.³

Pausing a moment at the commencement of the seventh century, we can see, on looking back over the preceding three hundred years — that up to this time there could have been no want of clergymen, qualified according to the ideas of the times, for the sacred office. The vast wealth of the church, the power and immunities of its ministers, cathedral schools, and cloisters — confusion in civil affairs, driving many of the first minds into the monastic seminaries — the ease with which any young man could obtain an education for the ministry — learning concentrated in the ecclesiastical orders, preferment to be hoped for chiefly in the line of the same — these circumstances would naturally crowd the clerical ranks to their utmost capacity.

From this period, viz. the end of the sixth century, down to the time of Charlemagne towards the close of the eighth, the same general system of theological education was preserved. The episcopal schools still sustain themselves though in waning glory. Distinguished prelates, lights of the age, if lights they should be called, superintended the instruction of these seminaries of knowledge.⁴ In the diocese of Vienne the number of the schools was prodigious. Within these

¹ Schröckh's *Christliche Kirchengeschichte*, Theil XVI. 63.

² *Ibid.* 64.

³ *Ben. Lit.* Vol. III. p. 30, 31.

⁴ *Ben.* III. 425, 426.

limits there were said to be no less than sixty monasteries, without including those of the capital.¹ The Monks of France were accustomed under direction of the bishops, to give instruction and preach in the country, hear the confessions of worldly men, and announce the faith in unenlightened regions.² Some of the monastic schools became very distinguished and were the literary and religious *cunabula* of many of the finest minds of the age.³ Such especially were the schools of Luxen and Fontenelle. Young men of the first families flocked to them for the purpose of obtaining the elements of science and the first principles of Christian truth.⁴ The monastery of S. Midard at Soissons was very celebrated both for discipline and letters. Four hundred monks sustained there the perpetual psalmody, while in a public academy connected with the convent, divine and human sciences were taught. In the school of the monastery of Montier la Celle were found many bishops and writers not without merit, while from the monastery of S. Germain at Auxerre were chosen nearly all the prelates who governed the church in that region.⁵ It is easy to judge, say the Benedictines, what great care must have been taken to cultivate letters in these institutions, from the fact that the lights of the age proceeded as much from them as from the episcopal schools. Indeed these last often derived their glory from the former inasmuch as the greater part of the bishops at the head of the episcopal schools had themselves received their education in the cloisters.⁶ The French schools of this age also formed a great number of able missionaries who went forth and established Christianity in the unevangelized parts of Gaul. So that while the church was suffering great losses in the East, it was making great acquisitions by missionary labors in the West.⁷

The principal difference in the condition of letters between the fifth and seventh centuries, consists in this. Laymen generally, and a part of the clergy neglected learning, while the monks gave greatly increased attention to it. Few, however, wrote for posterity, or took any pains to preserve original productions.⁸

Indeed, notwithstanding the favorable account of the Parisian Benedictines, respecting their much admired Gaul, learning as they also frequently confess, both secular and ecclesiastical, was in a deplorable condition. The time of students was spent on comparatively insignificant studies, while thorough scholarship had almost disap-

¹ Ben. III. 432.² Ibid. 435.³ Ibid. 437.⁴ Ibid. 438.⁵ Ibid. 441.⁶ Ibid. 443.⁷ Ibid. 447.⁸ Ibid. 455.

peared from society. But the little knowledge which existed among the clergy was quite equal to the demand. Laical ignorance contented itself with ecclesiastical ignorance for its guide. High offices in the church were open to the most worldly-minded aspirants who had the ability to secure the favor of lawless princes, and were willing to wear occasionally the sacerdotal robes.—From the beginning of the year 500, every clerk had been ordained to some office, and lived upon the common maintenance. None were ordained without a benefice, or, in the centuries next following, without at least the expectation of a benefice. But, about the times just preceding the reign of Charlemagne, while many made themselves clergymen to secure exemptions, stipends and emoluments, as also to obtain rank, wealth and power, through “the wealthiness of the benefices,” chief men of the court, city or government were often elevated by their unscrupulous princes to the office and professions of the Bishops.¹ All these circumstances combined go to show that what with some self-denying men who courted hardship for Christ’s sake in the more difficult labors of the church, and many partially-educated monks suffering with ennui in their monotonous employments which had now become exceedingly jejune and unprofitable to the intellect, and longing for the freedom of active service — and what with ambitious and unprincipled aspirants to posts of affluence and honor, the ranks of the clergy, educated more or less as circumstances might demand, must always have been crowded to excess.

Charlemagne was the great light of the dark ages. A man of a rough but generous spirit, of indomitable energy, of an intellect gigantic for the times, invincible in war, he had also some natural tendencies towards refinement, a desire to extend civilization, and most of all, a rude zeal for the prosperity of the church. Our subject and our limits will not allow us to speak further of him as a statesman and a soldier. Without early education, he had the sagacity, in his manhood, to see that wisdom is the handmaid of virtue, and that knowledge is power. For the benefit of his kingdom, and especially of the church, he invited learned men to his court, and established a school in his imperial palace. The chief master of this seminary was Alcuin, a distinguished scholar and theologian, an Englishman from the great monastic school at York. Among the pupils were Charles, Pepin, and Louis, sons of Charlemagne, two archbishops, Riculf archbishop of Mayence, and Rigbod, archbishop of

¹ Fra Paolo Sarpi, p. 13, 26.

Trèves, several of his privy councillors, his daughter and his sister, both of the name of Gisla, and a part of the time the monarch himself. For the reëstablishment of the monastic and Episcopal schools which had now everywhere fallen into decay, Charlemagne published an *imperial circular*, of which the following is an extract:

"Charles, by the aid of God, etc., to Bangulf, Abbott and his brotherhood, health:

"We beg to inform your Devotion to God, that, in concert with our councillors, we have deemed it beneficial that in the Bishoprics and monasteries confided by the favor of Christ to our government, care should be taken not only to live orderly and according to our holy religion, but moreover to instruct in the knowledge of letters, and according to the capacity of individuals, all such as are able to learn." * * *

"It is certain, at all events, that the allegories, emblems and imagery of the holy writings will be more readily comprehended in their true spiritual meaning, by those who are versed in general learning." * * * "As you value our favor, fail not to communicate copies of this communication to all the suffragan bishops, and all the monasteries around you."¹

Under the influence of such men as Alcuin, Theodulph, bishop of Orleans, and Leidrade, afterwards archbishop of Lyons, the theological schools were everywhere reëstablished, and began to obtain celebrity. Among the capitularies of Theodulph, are the following: "If any priest wishes to send his nephew or any other of his relatives to school, we allow him to be sent to the church of St. Croix, or to the monastery of St. Argnor, or of St. Lipard, or any other monastery confided to our government." "Let the priests hold schools in villages and districts, and if any of the faithful wish to confide their young children to them, in order to have them study letters, let them not refuse to receive and instruct them in perfect charity." * * * "And while instructing children, let them exact no price therefor and receive nothing, except when the parent shall offer it them willingly, and out of affection."² The last two sentences are quoted partly to introduce the remark of Guizot, who had so thoroughly studied the history of these times, that "this last article is almost the only monument of this epoch which positively institutes a teaching destined for others than priests. All the measures whether of Alcuin or Charlemagne, which I have hitherto spoken of, have the literary

¹ Guizot *Hist. Civ.*, Vol. III, p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

education of priests for their object."¹ The views of Charlemagne on the subject, are more fully expressed perhaps in another ordinance of which we copy a part: "Charles, by the aid of God, king of the Franks and Lombards, and prince of the Romans, to the high ministers of religion throughout our dominions; having it near at heart that the churches should more and more advance towards perfection, and being desirous of restoring by assiduous care the cultivation of letters which have almost entirely disappeared amongst us, in consequence of the neglect and indifference of our ancestors, we would excite by our own example all well disposed persons to the study of the liberal arts."²

Under the influence of Charlemagne and his learned coadjutors at court, perpetuated by his immediate successors, Lewis the Meek and Charles the Bald, the episcopal schools and cloister schools which had so degenerated as to be almost worthless were revived—and others were established all over the empire. They were designed, as already intimated, for the clergy, as much knowledge was not often considered necessary in other stations. Decrees were passed in council that every bishop should employ some learned men to instruct the young priests of his congregation, in the doctrines and in the manner of preaching the same according to the purest understanding of the fathers; that church music should be taught in these schools, lest ignorance of this sacred art should lead to ignorance in every other kind of useful knowledge. The bishops established schools in their dioceses, especially to instruct the young ecclesiastics in religion and in the arts so far as they were thought conducive thereto. It was an established principle in the cathedral schools, that next to their own studies, the wiser and more experienced should devote themselves to the instruction of the younger. Especially was this expected of the cloister schools which were still richer, more numerous, more firmly established, more flourishing.³

But the splendor which ushered in the ninth century was soon to be eclipsed. The division of the empire, the distraction of society which followed, and the recklessness of princes in seizing upon church property,—though the reformation in letters was never afterwards in all places wholly destroyed, replunged the world generally into darkness. And as usually happens when circumstances allow the reaction its full force, temporary illumination was followed by a deeper night. Before the close of the century, ignorance and corruption

¹ Guizot, Vol. III. p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³ Schröckh's *Kirchen-Geschichte*, Vol. XXI. p. 138, etc.

overspread society, the clergy and the schools not excepted. "The ignorance of the clergy was so great that few of them could read or write, and *very* few could express their thoughts with precision and clearness."¹ Confusion, deterioration approaching barbarity, marked the age. Bishops were distinguished chiefly for voluptuousness, and priests and monks by the vices they were set to reform. Kings and princes seized upon church property and bestowed it upon their dependents. The powerful who had the command of benefices filled them with inefficient and often immoral ministers who would suffer vices to pass unreprieved—or gave them as a means of support to such sons of chief families as by the feebleness of their talents could acquire a living in no other way.²

In the tenth century men of learning and piety were still more uncommon, and even in the best of the schools little of much value was taught. The century has been justly called the *iron age*, as respects literature and science, in European christendom. But ignorance was not the worst feature of the times. The moral light had become darkness, and how great that darkness! The clergy of this age have been not unjustly characterized as "illiterate, stupid, ignorant," "libidinous, superstitious and flagitious."³

We cannot follow down in detail the gloomy history of the ages immediately following. Partial reformatations were here and there attempted, a few new schools were established and taught with some success; there were ecclesiastics who had mastered the Trivium and even some the Quadrivium, but with honorable exceptions, the corruption of morals among the clergy was deplorable and astonishing. Everything on the whole went on from bad to worse, down to the establishment of the great universities of modern times, and in some respects even down to the reformation. Whoever would refresh his memory, with the dark side of those dark and dreadful days, may turn to page 369 of the second volume of Mosheim, and read the translator's note, which he will there find, as descriptive of clerical manners in the fourteenth century. It is an exhibition of moral putridity which had been steadily accumulating and festering for almost 500 years.

This brief review of ministerial education in the dark ages shows, that clerical ignorance is the sure precursor of public corruption—and that down almost if not quite to the times of the reformation, the church could not have suffered from the want of such ministers as she was willing in her degradation to receive.

¹ Murdock's Mosheim, Vol. II. p. 60.² Ibid. pp. 60, 61.³ Ibid. p. 119.

UNIVERSITY OF PARIS.

The oldest universities of Europe sprung up in the twelfth century. Distinguished teachers, like William of Champeaux, and Peter Abelard his disciple, proposed to give public instruction to such as would hear them. In the new stimulus felt by the human mind, multitudes rushed to the seats of learning thus established, and for their benefit suitable charters being obtained, universities were established. That at Paris was chiefly a theological school, and was for several centuries designated the "first school of the church." All its graduates, whether in the faculties of the arts or of divinity, had the power of teaching in the university. Its pupils were exempted from all taxes, customs, personal burdens — and the institution received great privileges and immunities. In 1453 the school at Paris had 25,000 students, and soon after, it is said, 30,000. It was difficult for the scholars, on account of their great number, to find suitable lodgings. Various expedients were adopted to remedy this inconvenience. But the poorer students being still exposed to great hardships, certain benevolent individuals erected buildings for their use, making provisions in them both for free lodgings and free board, to which afterwards stipends were added to defray general expenses. These foundations were first established by the religious orders, for the benefit of students in theology.¹ This department was founded and chiefly endowed as a college by Robert de Sorbonne, and thus derived the name of Sorbonna or Sorbonne, which it has retained.² Provisions of the same character became afterwards numerous and abundant.

A good account of what is now called the University of France may be found in Vol. XI. of the *American Quarterly Register*, 1836, written by Rev. Dr. Baird, at that time residing in Paris. The old and world-renowned University of Paris was broken up and destroyed in the Revolution, 1792, and has never since been restored on its former plan — though the system of higher education in Paris is virtually the same as before. The University of France has reference to the entire school system of the kingdom, including the schools of collegiate and theological education. There are 300 communal colleges supported chiefly by tuition fees of pupils. The Royal Colleges are 40 in number. They are supported by government, which also makes provision for a great number of students at the public expense. The salaries of professors are small, but pensions are granted to the superannuated who have served more than twenty years.

¹ *Encyclopædia Britannica*.² Mosheim, Vol. II. p. 228.

There are eight Faculties of theology, six of them Catholic, one Lutheran. In 1815 there were 5,233 theological students. The government gives annually to the Catholic theological seminaries, for the education of young men for the ministry 2,525 bourses, valued at 400 francs each, making in all the enormous sum of \$189,375, while to the protestants it grants 30 bourses and 60 demi-bourses, amounting to \$4,500.¹

The Royal and Communal Colleges are not professional schools, but schools of secondary instruction, corresponding somewhat to the gymnasia of Germany, the Rugby and Eton schools, in England, and our own colleges. Pupils are admitted however at a very early age, sometimes when not more than eight or nine years old, and with very small acquirements.² The college courses, 1836, are almost entirely Latin and Greek, with a little Geography, History and Rhetoric. Examinations for degrees in arts are confined to these two ancient languages, except that the pupils must answer any questions in philosophy, history, literature and philology suggested by the passages in which they are examined. From these schools they proceed to the study of theology and other professions.³ The higher schools are excessively stimulated by prizes, competitions, etc. all the way up into society.⁴

Connect the foregoing with the public maintenance of the clergy, and there appears no want of available means in Catholic France for educating a priesthood and filling its ranks to excess.

ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES.

The English universities and endowed schools next demand our attention. That the gospel was preached in England at a very early period, by apostolic men, if not by an apostle, and with success, there can be no reasonable doubt. It is also probable that Lucius, an English king or nobleman, performed important service in the reviving and extending of British churches, in the second century; and that not long after, efficient measures were taken for the establishment of schools for the education of the clergy. Indeed, it is affirmed that this same Lucius was the founder of the great monastery at Bangor, which flourished so remarkably in the early centuries. It was at first a college of Christian philosophy, or an academy of liberal arts and learned men; but after a time, was changed into a monastery

¹ Am. Q. Reg., Vol. XI. ² Bache's Report on Education in Europe, 1839.

³ Essays by the London Central Society of Education, Vol. I. ⁴ Bache.

under title of apostolic order.¹ The *Magdeburg Centuries* speak of it as being a most noble college in the reign of Constantine, nourishing more than 2000 men in Christian studies.² In A. D. 603, Adelfred, king of Bernicia, having laid siege to Chester, twelve hundred and fifty monks went out from this monastery with the Britons, to assist, by their prayers and encouraging exhortations, in the defence. The enraged king sent a detachment who attacked these unarmed monks with such vigor, that only fifty of them escaped. After the surrender of Chester, he took possession of Bangor, and entirely destroyed the monastery, "a building so extensive that there was a mile's distance from one gate of it to another, and it contained two thousand one hundred monks."³

To Iona, where was the great institution founded by Columban towards the end of the sixth century, we have already alluded. It was for several centuries the principal theological seminary of the Scottish church, and in it most of her clergy were educated.⁴ The whole island had been given to the Scotch (Irish) monks by the Picts for preaching the gospel to them. Camden's *Brit.*, Vol. II. 401. An able account of this institution, by Rev. Dr. Pond, may be found in the *A. Q. R.*, Vol. IX. As to the manner in which they were supported, a general remark will apply to this and all similar schools of the times, whether in England or on the continent. They were connected with monasteries. The monks maintained themselves partly by manual labor, on the lands conveyed to the institutions by their founders and patrons, partly by property bestowed upon them by richer members, who, in renouncing the world for the seclusion of a coenobite, had volunteered, according to the custom, to cast their possessions into the common stock, and partly by the contributions and legacies of "the faithful," who were disposed to sustain the cause of Christian learning, or make the sainted anchorites the almoners of their bounty to the poor.⁵

When Alfred succeeded to the throne of England, A. D. 871, the nation was found deeply sunk in ignorance and barbarism. Dreadful ravages had been made by the Danes, who destroyed the monasteries, burnt the libraries, butchered or dispersed the monks. Such was the ignorance of the times, that Alfred complains that he knew of no one south of the Thames, who could interpret the Latin service.

¹ Usher's *Britannicarum Ecclesiarum Primordiis*, Chap. V. p. 132, etc.

² Cent. IV. Ch. VII.

³ Hume's *Eng.* Vol. I. p. 32, Harper's Ed.

⁴ Mosheim, Vol. I. p. 381, u. 7. ⁵ Gib., Vol. IV. p. 384.

This prince made great efforts to restore learning, and was formerly reputed the founder of Oxford University, which, according to Mr. Hume, he endowed with privileges, revenues and immunities.¹ This statement of the English historian is now generally discredited. But, whoever may have been the founder of the university, there is good evidence that, as early as the end of the ninth century, "Oxford was the seat of a school of the highest intellectual activity then existing."² By the end of the eleventh century, it had as good a title to be called a University as Paris.³ In the thirteenth century, it is said that no less than 30,000 scholars, including young and old, servitors, waiters, etc., were enrolled as connected with it. Allowing for exaggeration, it is certain that this seat of learning was thronged by immense multitudes of pupils. They were not, however, all nor chiefly theological students. The nation at large was waking to life, and thousands flocked to the great fountains of learning to satisfy the thirst for knowledge, and prepare for the various stations which intelligent society should offer. The institution, however, met with reverses, and so lost its popularity, that A. D. 1438, it was said, "out of so many thousand students reputed to have been here at a former time, not one thousand now remains to us."⁴

Cambridge was raised into a seat of learning first by the monks of England, who maintained their establishment for a time at a place about thirty miles north of that city. We hear of it in the eleventh century. After undergoing various fortunes like its elder sister, both universities, subsequent to the Wickliffite controversy, were abandoned by the people very much to the clergy. Oxford was miserably poor. The only university building of any importance erected before the Reformation, was a theological school, for which the university begged assistance from all quarters. "It still stands as a splendid memorial of the architecture of the reign of Edward IV."⁵ The pupils were now mostly taken from the poorer classes, "so that in fact few of the academic population could support themselves." Henry VI. founded King's College, and gave many benefactions and stipends to scholars, while wealthy prelates and other great men maintained a certain number of students, at their own expense, and teachers were supported by ecclesiastical endowments and clerical benefices.⁶ Indeed, the number of students now greatly depended upon the number of endowments for their support.

¹ Hume, Vol. I. p. 74.

² Huber's Hist. of the Eng. Universities, edited by F. W. Newman, A. D. 1843.

³ Ib. p. 43.

⁴ Ib. p. 168.

⁵ Ib. p. 168.

⁶ Huber, Vol. I. p. 171.

The most effective means employed, in the education of young men, especially for the ministry, was in the founding and endowing of colleges. These were intimately connected with the university, under its general supervision, making a part of it, but having property and rights of their own. They were not intended originally to support graduates, but "to assist clerical students through their course of study," which might last from ten to fifteen years. As a necessary evil, the Fellows were allowed to retain their stipends till they could secure a benefice; the college Fellows thus became gradually, "the actual stem of the university." The college system was originally, briefly this: Benevolent individuals established foundations for indigent scholars, erected buildings in which they lived, and entrusted the affairs of the institution to overseers, who, in their corporate capacity, were called a college. The system begins with 4 magistri who formed University College in Oxford, and proceeds to the 70 Fellows in King's College, Cambridge. Bishop Wykenham founded the first complete college. His endowment was named New College. It was established in the university at Oxford, and contained 70 Fellows, of whom 50 were theologians, 8 canonists, 10 chaplains, 3 choralists and 16 chorister boys. The college had 12 prebendaries as teachers, 270 free admissions for scholars. A Latin school kept at Winchester for preparatory education, was attached to the college.¹ "From the first, the endowed members of the colleges either belonged by preference to the ecclesiastical order, or were destined to the church."² The foundations were for students, masters of arts being considered students also, only of a higher class. These last being allowed to remain in their places till they could obtain a benefice in the Church, or were otherwise provided for, became in time so numerous as to occupy sometimes all the places, and exclude younger students. Hence, in the fifteenth century, foundations were given chiefly "to furnish a decent and permanent maintenance for poor men of learning of the clerical order," and not as mere stipends for undergraduates. The degree of Master of Arts became gradually a tacit condition of election to a Fellowship. This mode of filling the foundations was the predominating one at the end of the fifteenth century.³

About this time or a little before, the spirit for classical learning began to revive. Enthusiasm for this species of scholarship reached its highest point during the reign of Henry VIII. and under the in-

¹ Huber, Vol. I. p. 201.² Ibid, 203.³ Ib. 204.

fluence of Cardinal Wolsey. This new movement was sustained chiefly by individual energy. The Eton and Cambridge foundations of Henry VI. and his noble queen had probably the revival of classical learning in view. Corpus Christi College was founded A. D. 1516 by Fox, bishop of Winchester, especially to encourage classical attainments. It was endowed for 20 fellows, 20 stipendiary students, and 3 professorships, Greek, Latin and theology.¹ Cardinal College was established by Wolsey in Oxford. The revenues of 22 priories and convents were diverted to it, by papal bulls and royal privileges in 1524 and 1525. Provision was made for 60 canonists and 40 priests, with 10 endowed professorships, besides subordinate situations, stipends, etc., making in all not less than 160 members. Wolsey contributed the first year 8000 pounds from his own princely revenues—and also founded at Ipswich a great Latin school of preparatory education to be connected with it. Wolsey's College after being exposed to destruction by the king was revived by him and further endowed with lectureships and 100 studentships. It is now called Christ's Church College, and has attained an uncontested supremacy over all institutions of the kind.²

Queen Elizabeth was a distinguished patroness of learning. Through her influence those who sought her favor founded the Rugby school and nearly a third of all the endowed schools in England—of which, including Ireland and Wales, there are three or four hundred. In her reign the universities, which for a long time had been frequented chiefly by the sons of the lower classes, began to enjoy the favor of the aristocracy—and a degree became the mark of a gentleman. Sons of the gentry in Elizabeth's time, and ever since, have composed the greater part of the academic population, though ecclesiastics have always maintained a leading control, and have occupied most of the Fellowships in the institution.³

Both the universities have been greatly enriched with new colleges, and increased endowments for the old ones, since the times of Elizabeth. The resources of Christ's Church, Oxford, amount now to over £80,000 a year. It lodges about 400 persons within its walls, having a splendid room and sometimes suites of rooms for each.⁴

Fellowships in the colleges are of different value. There are some in Oxford which are worth, in prosperous years, not less than £600 or £700—while others produce an income of not more than £100—and some in Cambridge are still smaller. But all secure to the foun-

¹ Huber, Vol. I. p. 231. ² Ibid, p. 262. ³ Ib. p. 333. ⁴ Ib. Vol. II. p. 272.

dationers board and lodging—and are now tenable for life, unless the holder marries, becomes possessed of large estates, or accepts a more lucrative living elsewhere. The scholarships vary, in annual value from £100 to £80, and even £20 or less, though with some additional advantages in respect to board. There are also in most of the colleges a class of scholars, known as exhibitioners, who receive annual pensions either from the college or from endowed schools of which these scholars were formerly members. Some of the exhibitions are said to be very valuable. The professorships are all established by the crown or by private endowments—though the holders of these offices have little to do except read lectures occasionally. In 1839 there were in Oxford, besides five halls, partially endowed, nineteen endowed colleges. In Magdalen College, for instance, there were on the foundations a president, 40 fellows, 30 demies, schoolmaster, usher, 4 chaplains, 4 organists, 8 clerks, and 16 choristers; Corpus Christi College, a president, 20 fellows, 20 scholars, 2 chaplains, and 4 exhibitioners; St. John's College, a president, 50 fellows and scholars, chaplain, etc. There were in all 557 fellowships, 26 university scholarships, 2 university fellowships, 399 college scholarships, exhibitioners, etc., 8 university benefices valued at £2,400; 445 college benefices valued at £136,500, besides college prizes, university prizes, etc. The total revenue at Oxford for officers, fellows, scholarships, etc., was as follows: colleges, £152,670, university, £22,000; in all £174,670. Cambridge has not quite so many fellowships, but nearly twice as many scholarships, exhibitioners, etc. The value of its benefices is considerably less than of Oxford. The whole number on the books considered as belonging, in some capacity or other, to the institution is a little larger at Cambridge than at Oxford—Cambridge 5,575, Oxford 5,264.¹ Indeed, the one institution is the counterpart of the other, Cambridge being the twin sister of Oxford, or the same *theme* with *variations*.

The University at Dublin sustains the same general character with the foregoing, though in all respects of much humbler dimensions. The universities of London, founded 1836, and of Durham, 1837, are of too recent origin to be of importance to our present purpose.

There are numerous endowed schools in England for preparatory education. The school at Westminster contains from 300 to 350 boys in eight classes. They are divided into town's boys and king's scholars. The king's scholars are always forty in number, and are

¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. XXII.

chosen from the upper half of the school, chosen after severe examinations, chosen solely from merit. Being placed on a foundation is thus esteemed an honor and is a preparation for a foundation at Christ's Church in Oxford or Trinity College, Cambridge. At Eton, on the contrary, boys are admitted on the foundation at their first coming without examinations, without special regard to merit, but chiefly because of indigent circumstances. Hence what is esteemed an honor at Westminster is considered a degradation at Eton. The foundation scholars at the latter school are, moreover, as a general thing, inferior to their fellow pupils of the same age and standing.¹ These facts are instructive especially in reference to the best manner of bestowing charity upon students who need help.

Reviewing the English universities in connection with the education and supply of Christian ministers, it will be readily seen, that there has been at no time any serious want of pecuniary means for preparing a sufficient number of men for the sacred office. "Down to the middle of the reign of Henry VIII," says Macaulay, "no line of life bore so inviting an aspect to ambitious and covetous natures as the priesthood."² And though a reverse in the condition of the inferior clergy bore heavily upon a portion of the order towards the end of the seventeenth century, yet on the whole the clerical profession in the established church has been full of invitations at least to serious and intelligent youth down to the present time. They may acquire an education, though indigent, in a highly honorable way, be sure of a comfortable living and standing in the best society as Fellows of a college till some beneficed parish is open for them — and there in a situation secured to them for life, enjoy learned leisure, opportunities for doing good, and the respect and friendship of the first classes in the country.

Church livings are also inviting to the educated younger sons of the nobility, who flock in great numbers to the church as a means of easy, honorable support and usefulness. Especially will this be the case while lucrative and easy situations are so numerous. Besides wealthy benefices which demand more or less labor and the enormous incomes of the high Episcopal dignitaries, according to a late Parliamentary return it appears that in England and Wales there are no less than 51 *sinecure* benefices, of which 18 are in the diocese of Norwich, their value varying from £10 to £1,125 a year, some of them even without any church whatever.³ Valuable livings are also

¹ Edinburgh Review, March 1831. ² Macaulay, Hist. Eng. Vol. I. p. 303.

³ Boston Christian Advocate and Christian Witness, Oct. 25, 1850.

accessible to clerical aspirants in the extensive colonies of the British Dominions. When, in these situations, the clergy cannot derive their support from a parish or diocese over which they are placed, an ample allowance is afforded them out of the immense church revenues which are under the direction of the crown in connection with the ecclesiastical commission. Faithful service for a brief period in these remoter stations, entitles the missionary to a support at home for the rest of his life. We are informed, for example, on unquestionable authority, that the gentleman sometime since appointed bishop of Southern Africa, after spending ten years abroad, will be entitled to a discharge from further duty, and to receive a pension of £2000 a year, in his native country for the rest of his days.

Moreover, the nature of the education which these universities especially propose, and which clerical situations require, is peculiarly attractive to a class of people with which England more than any other country in the world, abounds, to minds of intelligent dignity, conservative Christianity and tasteful seriousness. These universities undertake, not so much to form scholars, as gentlemen in the largest acceptance of the term—gentlemen to sustain the honors of a noble descent, clerical gentlemen to preserve and adorn the religion of the state, and school teachers of all grades who may educate the rising generation of gentlemen. "Sound common sense," says Huber, quoting a passage from Kültner, who, he thinks, gives a just account of the best side of things, "a knowledge of the world and mankind, respectability and dignity of manners, with an understanding of the rules and ordinances of the church, are looked upon as the best Pastoral Theology."¹ These are traits of character which, among other still higher qualifications, all right-minded Christians would wish to see in the clergy, and which doubtless are promoted by the generous manner in which beneficiary aid is bestowed upon the youthful scholar preparing for his office—while the character of the preparatory education, and the duties of the profession, as thus defined, attract many of the first minds in the land to the sacred offices of the church.

DISSENTERS.

The Dissenters of England are not equally favored in all these respects, with their brethren of the established order. Shut out from Oxford absolutely, by the ordinance which requires subscription to the Thirty Nine Articles, before matriculation; and from Cam-

¹ Huber, Vol. II. p. 341.

bridge virtually by the rule which requires the same conformity for a degree, the Dissenters were for a time "in an evil case." They soon, however, founded seminaries of learning for themselves, some of which are in a highly flourishing condition at this day. Alexander Bowers, in his history of the University of Edinburgh, published in 1817, says, "that the history of the education of English dissenting clergymen is little known" in Scotland, and has never been properly investigated even in England. The best account of these institutions with which we are acquainted, has been written since the above date, and published in the A. Q. R. VIII. IX. and subsequent volumes. The articles were compiled by Rev. B. B. Edwards, now Professor in Andover, from original materials obtained, partly in manuscript, from Rev. Drs. Reed and Matheson, and other distinguished Dissenters. The original Dissenters had, many of them, been educated as churchmen, in the English universities, and were thrown into the ranks of dissent, by the Bartholemew Act of 1662, which ejected 2000 of the best ministers in England from their offices and livings. Their immediate successors were educated in Scotland, Holland, and by private ministers. Public academies were soon opened chiefly for theological students. The Orthodox Congregationalists established Highbury for the express purpose of preparing young men for the ministry. This institution, we are informed, has quite recently been amalgamated with Homerton and Coward Colleges. Homerton College existed, though in different places and with various fortunes, for more than a hundred years. It was under the patronage of a society for the education of pious young men for the ministry. Its object was to support twenty such men of good talents, and educate them for the stations they were to hold. The evangelical institution at Newport Pagnel had its origin in the plans and liberality of such men as Newton, Thornton and Cowper. Its object was to prepare pious young men for the sacred office. Hackney Theological Seminary is under the patronage of the Evangelical Association for spreading the Gospel in England, and was founded A. D. 1803. It has sent out eight or ten foreign missionaries, and ten times as many home missionaries. "Let us continue," says the Society's committee, "to select men of decided and eminent piety, able to endure labor, men possessed, too, of mental energy; apt to acquire and communicate divine wisdom; let us do the best we can to educate them for our purpose; let us use our best endeavors to place them in useful spheres of action; let us encourage them by every means in our power; pray for them," etc. Blackburn Independent Academy is of a similar character. Most

of the scholars connected with these institutions are said to come from the wealthier classes of the middling interests — and as good a provision has been made for the support of the more indigent, as under all the circumstances, could be expected.

UNIVERSITIES OF SCOTLAND.

We turn our attention next to the North. In 1410 a “*Pedagogy*” of a liberal character was founded at St. Andrews; another at Glasgow in 1450; King’s College, Aberdeen, was founded in 1494. It was this year enacted by Parliament, in the time of James IV. of Scotland, that all barons and freeholders of property throughout the realm, should send their eldest sons and heirs to the schools from six or nine years of age, till they had acquired “*perfitte Latine*” and then three years to the schools of art or “*jure*” or pay £20 to the king.¹ The high school of Edinburgh was completed in 1578, and arrangements were made to secure a thorough knowledge of Latin in it. A new impulse was communicated by this school to the citizens of Edinburgh, many of whom had been highly educated in Italy, France and Geneva. Considering the cause of the Reformation “as identified with the progress of literature and science, they became extremely anxious to erect similar schools in every corner of their own nation where there existed any probability of success.” In 1579 the magistrates of Edinburgh took into consideration the founding of a university; for which purpose, indeed, as far back as 1550, Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney, had bequeathed 8000 merks. The charter was given by Queen Mary. The institution has been generously endowed by royal grants, parliamentary enactments, bequests, etc., while the city of Edinburgh has been its constant and generous patron. This university is not now of a strictly ecclesiastical character. The same is true of that at Glasgow, St. Andrew’s, and the colleges at Aberdeen. The professors, however, must take the established creed, and are subject to inspection by the church in matters of faith. The professors of divinity are members of Presbytery, and the universities send each a representative to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. In other respects they are intended for general education.² There are no Fellowships in these institutions, resembling those of Oxford and Cambridge, where a number of literary men can be maintained, after the regular university course is completed. Pre-

¹ Bower’s Hist. Univ. Ed. Vol. I. p. 62.

² Report of Commissioners on the Universities of Scotland, 1830.

vious to 1830, students in theology were exempted from the payment of college fees. The reason of the exemption was "the difficulty of procuring a sufficient number of young men properly educated for the church." That difficulty having ceased, the commission recommended the payment of small fees amounting to about £4 a year, by each student in divinity.¹ The commission of 1830 object to the great number of small *bursaries* which they find in these institutions. At King's College there are 134 bursaries, at Marischal College 106, at St. Andrew's 55. The number has increased and was thought likely still to increase, much beyond what is necessary for cases of indigence and for extraordinary merit. The consequence was that many students had been induced to attend upon these institutions for the sake of the small bursary, who had mistaken their calling. Instances are noticed of persons thus drawn from their proper sphere of life, who were afterwards subjected in consequence to great mortification, and were found in conditions of extreme penury and distress. It is the opinion of many of the wisest and best men in Scotland, that if a part of these bursaries were abolished, nothing would be lost to the cause of general learning or the clerical profession.² One thing probably conduces more than almost anything else to the present abundant supply of ministers in Scotland, in addition to the inducements held out by the bursaries, and to the fact that the religious spirit in Scotland is of a high order. The General Assembly has a system of parochial schools under its immediate care, in which 100,000 pupils³ are constantly instructed not only in human learning but in the principles of the Scottish church. These parish schools are nurseries not only of religion generally, but of those dispositions which predispose to the study of theology and the office of the Christian ministry.

GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

We cross once more to the continent. In Prussia the secondary schools are gymnasia, of which in the summer of 1834 there were 124, attended by 24,461 scholars, of whom 738 passed to the universities. These gymnasia are in large towns and most of the scholars are day scholars. The knowledge acquired in them is nearly equal to what is usually obtained in our colleges, being much greater in Latin and Greek, though less in intellectual philosophy and mathematics.

¹ Report of Commissioners on the Universities of Scotland, 1830, p. 69.

² *Ibid.* p. 52, etc.

³ North British Review, Vol. XII. No. 24, p. 492.

These schools are supported by the funds of the State and fees of the pupils.¹

The professional schools are universities, where instruction is given in the arts, theology, etc.

The university at Prague was founded A. D. 1348 by the king of Bohemia, under sanction of Pope Clement II. From this time down to the Reformation, the professors and students being considered ecclesiastics, the organization rested entirely on a spiritual basis. Under promises of salaries, immunities and advantages, teachers and scholars were attracted from all parts of the world. Charles IV. enriched the institution with lands, libraries, allowances for professors, stipends for students, etc.²

Erfurt (not now in operation) was founded in the middle of the 15th century, and was endowed with rich stipends, and great numbers of burses: such as the collegium majus, bursa pauperum, bursa nova, bursa antiqua, bursa mariana, etc.

"What above all distinguishes Leipsic, is the great number of stipends founded by the State, as well as by private donations, and which a great number of students have always enjoyed." It will be seen in Bib. Sac., April, 1850, that there are nearly a thousand of these stipends, besides foundations for professors, and that the university is unusually rich. In the university of Frankfort on the Oder, John George founded a community where sixty students might be boarded at a cheap rate. This institution has since been united to the university of Breslau. Marburg, founded A. D. 1527, the first university that was established after the Reformation, received the income of several suppressed cloisters, and other important privileges. It was afterwards furnished with valuable stipends, foundations and endowments.

Jena, founded A. D. 1547, received the possessions of these suppressed cloisters. Not to mention other early donations, its funds were greatly increased in 1817. Stipends and prizes for meritorious students were likewise established.

Herborn, now discontinued, was founded A. D. 1584. The students were mostly natives of the country, and almost all were theologians. The natives enjoyed stipends which were all paid in ready money, and amounted to from 40 to 100 florins apiece.

Halle was founded toward the close of the seventeenth century.

¹ Bache's Report.

² A. Q. R., Vol. X. p. 345, "A Concise History of German Universities, by Robert Baird, Paris, May, 1838."

A theological seminary was established in the university, soon after its foundation, and was endowed with considerable stipends for poor students. Other donations succeeded, and after Wittenberg became connected with it in 1815, refectories and stipends were multiplied. In 1829 it had almost 1800 students, of whom 944 were theologians.

In Göttingen, besides great endowments, there is an annual prize medal in each of the faculties, (for composition,) of the weight of 25 ducats. Its library contains 300,000 vols.

Bonn, founded 1786, suppressed 1801, revived in 1815, receives from the State 82,522 Prussian dollars. Prizes for superior excellence in scholarship, refectories, stipends and like encouragements are by no means wanting.¹

In Würtemberg there is, or was, a few years ago, an arrangement by which two hundred theological scholars, half Protestants and half Catholics, might be gratuitously supported through their whole course, first: after leaving the gymnasium, in one of the primary theological schools, for four years; then in the university of Tübingen, for five years — on condition that they will adopt the clerical profession.²

Thirty-four universities have been established in Germany. Fourteen of them are suppressed, and twenty still exist: of these, five are Catholic, 11 Protestant, four of a mixed character. These are for a population of 40,000,000.³

In 1836 the expenditures of the university of Berlin, were \$99,846, of which \$64,550 were paid out of the public treasury. The expenditures of Bonn were \$89,685, of which government furnished \$49,949. The expenditures of Breslau were \$72,299. Of this, the government paid \$27,180. The expenditures of Halle were \$70,738 — government paid \$42,278. Königsberg expended \$60,912, of which \$25,433 were furnished by the government.

These universities were chiefly founded by the governments of the country in which they are situated. They are under the immediate and entire control of these governments. Buildings are erected and repaired, libraries enlarged, scientific collections are gathered, professors supported, and all the expenses which the university revenues do not meet, are paid out of the public treasuries.⁴

There seems then to be ample provision in Germany for filling the ranks of the clerical profession. There are also inducements of the

¹ American Quarterly Register.

² Bib. Rep. Vol. I. p. 225.

³ A. Q. R., Vol. X. IX.

⁴ Biblical Repository, January, 1831, Theological Education in Germany, by Dr. Robinson. For a valuable account of these institutions, see also the subsequent numbers of that journal.

strongest kind to pursue a course of liberal education, and obtain the requisite qualifications to the ministry. All places of public emolument or honor, both in Church and State, are held, more or less directly, but entirely under the control of government; and none of these above the lower class of school masters, can be obtained, except by those who have completed the prescribed course of education at the university. There, the educated class is the true and only aristocracy. When a young man, having passed successfully his university examination, becomes an accepted candidate for the sacred office, he is entitled to expect a situation, and if he fills it with credit, to look for promotion. The best livings, the most honorable and lucrative professorships are open to his aspirations. Or if he prefers to remain a pastor, where an easy course of prescribed duties is performed, all the remaining time is his own. This he may spend in literary leisure, or in preparing valuable works for the press, or in any other way that he sees fit. And if he is neither immoral nor particularly unfaithful, elevated above the prejudices and caprices of his parish, he may go on in the independent discharge of his office, assured of ample support to the end. While, in this state of things, there are yet many devoted pastors, who labor with untiring zeal for the good of their flocks, many doubtless rush into the clerical profession, without any just appreciation of its sacredness. But between these two classes there is, there can be, under present circumstances, no lack of ministers in Germany.

The *Encyclopædia Britannica* enumerates ninety universities in Europe, besides those in England, Ireland and France. But they are neither essential to our purpose, nor do our limits allow us to notice them.

UNITED STATES.

What we have to say in reference to the education and supply of ministers in the United States, may be arranged chiefly under the following heads:—1st. Motives to entering the Christian ministry. 2d. Present and prospective call for ministers. 3d. Facilities for acquiring the preparatory education. 4th. Means necessary to secure the requisite supply.

First. Motives to entering the ministry. The purest motives are most powerful when spiritual religion is most flourishing. These centre in true godliness of mind, and exhibit themselves in the supreme devotion of a thorough Christian heart to the highest welfare of man. They have brought thousands into the ministry, and will

always, so long as true religion exists, furnish the church with at least some pastors who sink all selfish ends in their desire to please God and benefit the world. Perhaps it is presumption, but we confidently believe that rarely since the days of the apostles, has any Christian people enjoyed in her ministry a larger proportion of self-denying godly men, than may be found in these States.

But, with the exception of these highest motives, there are with us but few inducements to enter the ministry. Our clergy can expect no aid from government, be sure of no life livings, look for no power or influence beyond what personal character may give them, and anticipate no important immunities or privileges, except it be the privilege of hard and scantily remunerated labor, with the prospect of rejection by a capricious people, or of breaking down, as respects health, by middle life, or of penury in old age. Of this state of society we do not greatly complain. It may help to secure a spiritual ministry and religion in the churches much deeper than forma. But it can hardly be expected that the profession will be filled—that good men will press into it in sufficient numbers to supply the demand, unless at least there are such facilities for education, that a young man may qualify himself for the ministry, without severe pecuniary embarrassments all the way through his preparatory course, and involving himself in a debt which for many years, if ever, after entering upon active duty, he cannot pay off. This remark derives emphasis from the fact, that if we would raise up a ministry, when there are few motives to attract young men to the sacred office, we must look for them, to a great extent, from those classes in society which have been inured to hardships by their circumstances, and not chiefly from those who, born in affluence, and brought up in indulgence, and without habits of self-reliance, are yet best able to bear the expense of an education. The remark derives further importance from the facts, that new professions are inviting the educated to their ranks, and can offer our youthful graduates such attractions, and hold out such promises of usefulness, that even some of the high motives which impel one to the ministry might easily be made to turn him aside.

Second. Present and prospective call for ministers. At a time of great pecuniary embarrassments, when all our benevolent associations were crippled, and retrenchment and contraction became necessary in both domestic and foreign missions, and many feeble societies especially at the West, found themselves unable to sustain their pastors—this happening immediately after peculiar exertions had urged

unprecedented numbers into the ministry, there may have been for a time an apparent surplus of candidates for the sacred office. But foreseeing minds then perceived, what has already begun to be realized, that the time could not be distant when an alarming deficiency must take the place of unusual abundance; and while our churches at home would suffer from want of a sufficient supply of suitable men to preach the gospel, all our operations abroad for the salvation of the world would be limited and checked. Already we hear the call from all quarters, for educated, enterprising, pious men to fill the stations of clerical usefulness at home, and carry the good tidings of the gospel abroad. In the prodigious yearly increase of population in the United States, and in the aggressive benevolence of the American church, especially in her attempt to carry forward a work which however Utopian some may deem it, she has seriously taken in hand, *vis. THE CONVERSION OF THE WORLD*, a greatly enlarged ministry is imperiously demanded.

Third. Facilities for acquiring the preparatory education. We have more than a hundred colleges, great and small, belonging to different denominations, scattered over the land, with almost half that number of theological seminaries. But these institutions, except a few in the older States, are excessively poor, many of them maintaining a precarious existence, upon the charities of the public. There is not a single college or theological school adequately endowed in the whole country—not one so furnished with scholarships, stipends, bursaries, etc., that young men, however great their abilities or decided their piety, can depend upon them mainly to meet the expenses of a public education. Individuals here and there have done much in aid of students needing assistance, and churches have sometimes sustained a promising member in fitting himself for the pastoral work. Local societies also have accomplished something in selecting and partly supporting young men through a collegiate and theological course. But the main dependence of the Congregational and a part of the Presbyterian churches, for forty years past, has been upon a central organization, which has furnished pecuniary aid to more than three thousand young men. Without the American Education Society, there would long before now have been “a famine of the bread of life.”

Fourth. Means necessary to secure the requisite supply. To endow a hundred colleges thoroughly, must be the work of half as many generations. In the universities of England, France and Germany, foundations for professors, fellowships, stipends, bursaries, etc., have

been accumulating for hundreds and in some of them for almost a thousand years. They are identified moreover with the interests of the State, and government is pledged to sustain them. In our own country, from the multitude of sects, from the very freedom of our civil institutions, no great reliance can be placed, for sustaining collegiate or university education, upon the public chest. The ministry must be educated by the churches, or the churches must do without a ministry, or be cursed with an incompetent one. When every reasonable effort has been made to endow, by private benefaction, the higher educational seminaries, as the work of ages cannot be accomplished in a single generation, we can hardly expect that much more will be done than to furnish a very limited number of professors, with partial support. But ample endowments for students, especially that class of students which evangelical churches are most concerned to educate, cannot be expected. This country, compared with England, has few literary men of piety and wealth who can appreciate the importance of such endowments sufficiently to furnish them.

Besides, foundations thus established, in a large number of widely separated colleges, and in a country where there is such freedom in religion, would be greatly exposed to perversion. The best supervisors of funds are the contributors, near the time of contribution.

We cannot but feel that no arrangement is better adapted to the genius of our country and the exigencies of the American church, for the education of its ministry, than large central organizations like that to which we have already alluded. The advantages of such an institution as the American Education Society are numerous. It ensures certainty and regularity of disbursements, a result of more consequence to that quiet of mind which is essential to successful study, than the inexperienced may imagine. It promotes unity of plan, and of measures, with the requisite efficiency. It secures or may secure wise and economical supervision, and saves the expense which must otherwise be wasted on a large number of functionaries, acting without concert if not sometimes in collision, employing their time in the service of local societies whose affairs might all be managed by a single qualified mind, acting under wise and safe supervision. It furnishes a common centre from which information can be diffused and energetic impulses given. It saves young men from that annoyance to which they must often be subjected, when individual churches, holding different shades of theological opinion, and having different views of public measures, undertake the education of its

own members. It may be expected to treat with delicacy those feelings of honor and independence which every true man would wish to cherish, and which may be subject to revulsions, if they are not destroyed, when one individual this month and another the next, bestows a reluctant charity upon some indigent student whom he consents to shelter as a sort of PAUPER scholar, for a season.

Nor are these the only advantages of such an organization. In a country where there are such almost irresistible tendencies to cut short the time of education, and rush half prepared into the field of public action, and when some important seminaries of learning have begun to waver in their high course and succumb to the times, a society under wise supervision, by requiring thoroughness in its benefited scholars, with a complete course of education, may oppose an effectual barrier to the increasing of a superficial and deteriorated scholarship. Another incidental advantage of such a society is that it will naturally help to regulate the supply. When there is a scarcity of ministers appeals to the churches will enlarge the contributions, and at the same time encourage young men of piety to seek an education. Should the profession ever be more than full, the fact once known, contributions will be diminished, and a much smaller number of candidates sustained; and in this way by the natural course of things, the evils resulting from the too numerous small bursaries in the universities of Scotland will be avoided. It is good, moreover, for the *piety* of the churches, always to be raising up its own ministry, always to have a pecuniary interest in selecting, sustaining and watching over the candidates for that office on which her highest welfare and that of society so much depends.

Intelligent men must perceive that the objections to such a system are chiefly not in the system itself, except wherein it might be modified and improved, but, if anywhere, in its occasional administration, the mistakes of which *experience* will be able to correct. Should the managers of such an institution at any time lack wisdom or efficiency, should they sustain men of inferior qualifications, or by excess of supervision cramp the generous feelings of youth, dislike to the system would be an inevitable consequence, and its own beneficiaries, as soon as they come into the ministry, would be the foremost in manifesting alienation towards it. But when Directors are chosen annually, and the election is made by the contributors themselves or their representatives — consisting of the leading minds in the churches — nothing would seem safer from the dangers of any permanent mismanagement.

The review we have taken of ministerial education and supply shows, beyond a doubt, that as it always has been, it always must be, maintained by Christian beneficence — and that in our country the demand for ministers can never be met, without generous contributions by the church to aid its rising clergy through that expansive course of education which is so essential to success. Nor can this be esteemed a hardship, by any pious and intelligent layman. On him as well as on others rests the command, Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. Should he bear the full pecuniary burden of a young man's education, the young man himself who gives years of preparatory study and then a life to the work, sacrificing his chances to accumulate property or secure worldly honor, makes by far the greatest sacrifices of the two. When this matter is fully understood, the church instead of talking of her charity students will realize that the true beneficiary is not the hard toiling scholar scantily sustained while he struggles forward to the ministry, but **HERSELF.**

ARTICLE II.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

By Rev. Robert Turnbull, Hartford, Conn. [Concluded from p. 135.]

BUT what is the relation of the external or created universe to God? This is a great question which Descartes attempts to answer. It is produced, he says, by God at first, and not only so, but constantly reproduced. The whole dependent world both of matter and of mind is a vast mechanism carried on by external laws, demanding the constant interposition of the Divine hand. Matter has no direct action upon matter, neither has matter any direct action upon mind, nor mind upon matter. Their action and interaction depend upon the all-creating, all-renewing force. Therefore, concludes Descartes, there are no secondary or occasional causes, and the whole universe, material and spiritual lies, like a passive machine, in the hands of God, moved, modified and controlled by his resistless might.¹

¹ It is on this ground that M. Jules Simon, in his Introduction to his edition of the works of Descartes, speaks (p. 57) of Cartesianism as "Une système Mécanique." See Descartes, Sixth Meditation. — *Oeuvres*, p. 109.

Here then we find the fruitful germ of a system of pure idealism, which speedily evolved itself in the speculations of Malebranche and Spinoza.

In Descartes we see what is by no means singular in the history even of profound and philosophical minds, the most startling combinations of strength and weakness, of truth and error. For, he not only denied the existence and operation of occasional causes, but he placed the essence of mind in thought, of matter in extension, thus confounding being or substance with attribute or quality, insisted that the lower animals are mere machines and actually lodged the immaterial spirit in the conarion or pineal gland!

Malebranche, whom we mention now, though actually following Spinoza in the history of philosophical opinions, was a minister of the papal church, quite orthodox of course, and certainly a man of a reverent and lofty spirit. He seized with avidity, upon the principles of the Cartesian philosophy; and since all finite being has its life and action in God, and mind can communicate directly with God; and since also, the ideas of all things, as Plato has shown, exist in the mind of God, it follows, argues Malebranche, that the human mind sees everything in the Divine, and that God himself is "our intelligible world."

What then is the use of the external at all? It exists, says Malebranche, by the will of God, as discovered to us in the Scriptures, thus deserting the reasonings of philosophy for the teachings of revelation.¹ Hence it only required some bold, consistent, sceptical spirit to adopt the same fundamental notions, and rush with them into absolute spiritualism.

Such a man was Spinoza, that singular and subtle Jew, whom Novalis, in a 'furor' of admiration, calls "the God-inspired Spinoza," and whom even Schleiermacher and Schelling, as well as Cousin and Coleridge, delight to honor.

Assuming clearness and distinctness as the criterion of the validity of necessary ideas, the fundamental position of the Cartesian philosophy, starting from the supposition of necessary, self-subsistent being, making use also of those peculiar notions of Descartes that there are no secondary or occasional causes, God himself being the only neces-

¹ Malebranche's views are developed with much ingenuity and eloquence in his "Search for the Truth" (*Recherche de la Vérité*). A beautiful and convenient edition of his works has been published by Charpentier, under the supervision of M. Jules Simon, who has prefixed to it an instructive and elegant Introduction. Tennemann calls Malebranche "the most profound of the French metaphysicians."

sary and efficient cause, that matter can exert no direct influence upon mind, nor mind upon matter, that the essence of mind is thought, and of matter extension, Spinoza, by a consistent, relentless logic, deduced the following positions:¹

1. That there is in the universe only one substance, that is, one self-sustaining, universal, absolute and eternal Being.

2. That this substance has two attributes, *thought* and *extension* — thought being manifest in mind, extension in matter.²

3. That matter and mind, proceeding from the same source, or being the same attributes of one substance, are identical. Mind is real, matter is phenomenal. And as all things come from God, and exist in God, all things, that is, the universe of matter and of mind, are God, not indeed God, in his absolute essence, but "God immanent," that is, God embodied, God manifested.³

A fundamental and favorite position of Spinoza is, that one substance cannot produce another; and if God therefore produces finite matter or finite mind, it is but an extension of himself, or projection into space and time of his own inscrutable being. The cause passes into the effect; the effect, in this sense, is the cause, and the cause is the effect; so that the ordinary distinction of cause and effect is lost. The one is God absolute, the other is God conditioned, or as he chose to express it, the one is *Natura naturans*, the other *natura naturata*.⁴

Nor can we deny, if these fundamental positions are granted as just, in a word, if the universe is constituted by ideas, and thus human thought and absolute being are one and identical, that there can be in the sense of Spinoza, only a single all-comprehending substance. All else which we call finite, must be attribute, quality, phenomenon,

¹ In proof of these statements, we refer to Spinoza's "*Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ*," in the first volume of his Works (Tauchnitz's edition, 3 vols., edited by Dr. Bruder, an edition of great completeness and elegance, and to which all our references are made), as also to his little tract, "*De Emendatione Intellectus*," (*Opera*, Vol. II. p. 7.) in which he lays down the true method of philosophical investigation. The following passage (Vol. I. p. 24) deserves particular attention, as the basis at once of the systems of Descartes and Spinoza: *Hæc igitur detecta veritate simul etiam invenit Omnium scientiarum fundamentum, ac etiam omnium aliarum veritatum mensuram ac regulam; scilicet Quicquid tam clare ac distincte percipitur quam istud verum est.*"

² *Opera*, Vol. I. "*Cogitata Metaphysica*," p. 117. "*Ethica*," pp. 187, 190. See also "*Ethica*," Part II. p. 225.

³ *Opera*, Vol. I. (*Ethica*) p. 197. Compare pp. 190 and 204, particularly Prop. XVIII. "*Deus est omnium rerum immanens non transiens.*" See also Prop. XXVI. p. 208.

⁴ *Ethica*, Props. XXIX, XXX, XXXI. *Opera*, Vol. I. pp. 210, 211.

however vast and varied, however grand and beautiful. If all things are in God, in an absolute, literal sense, then God is in all things. The universe is not *dual*, but one, and that One, THE ALL. For, as God, the universal, self-existent, eternal Being, the substance par excellence, *id quod stat per se*, or, *id quod stat sub omnibus*, the necessary substratum and fount of being and thought, action and form, is infinite, he can neither be diminished nor increased; he can neither give more than he is, nor take more than he is; so that if he creates or produces — to use the language of men — he creates or produces out of nothing, that is to say, out of himself; therefore, in the universe, and throughout eternity, there can be no more than God, no less than God. Of course the supposition that matter is necessary and eternal, is thrown out. The fact, conceded by Descartes, and by the whole thinking world, with the exception of the materialists, that matter is a produced and temporary existence, on the same ground that the finite mind is a production of God, plays a most important part in the reasonings of Spinoza.¹ On this ground, therefore, he concludes that God is one and not two, one and not many, and yet the one becomes the two, the many, the all. So that, in a strict and absolute, not popular or figurative sense, God is all and in all. Thought is absolute, infinite, universal, and matter is its form or shadow. The omnipresence of God is what Spinoza calls extension — not meaning by extension anything gross or palpable, but the universal, all penetrating presence of the infinite and eternal essence. Particular things are only modifications of God.²

As self-existent, God, according to Spinoza, is free; for there is nothing to limit his power; this, however, amounts to nothing more than exhaustless and everlasting activity, constantly evolving itself, by necessary laws, without anything like what we call will, volition, or purpose. He thinks, thinks eternally, but contemplates or thinks only himself, without ideas, without the flow of consciousness, without the succession of reason or intellect.³

From this it is easily seen how Spinoza explains the finite, or phenomenal world. The question is asked, is it eternally distinct from God, or is it produced or created by God? No, says the subtle and consistent pantheist, God does not really change, God does

¹ Spinoza's fundamental error consists in his denying or obscuring the idea of *Cause*. Properly speaking, he does not admit the possibility of an effect. *Creation*, therefore, is ruled out of his system. The external universe is only a manifestation, not a creation, of God. Opera, Vol. I. pp. 139, 213.

² Opera, Vol. I. p. 208.

³ Ibid. pp. 213, 216.

not create, "in the vulgar sense of the term," he simply is. He is the "I am that I am." He is the one, unchangeable, absolute, necessary being that underlies, and in fact, constitutes all that exists. Thought and extension are attributes of his being, as unchangeable as himself. Hence all individual or particular thoughts, or extensions, are mere abstractions, or forms, unless they are referred to the absolute thought and infinite extension of God. That is to say, in themselves they are nothing. The phenomenal world, therefore, says Spinoza, is constituted by an infinite number of "particular determinations or expressions" of the one absolute Being, infinite thought giving rise to finite minds, and infinite extension to finite or material forms.¹ God, then, may be viewed absolutely, as *natura naturans*, or relatively as *natura naturata*, the one containing all things potentially in itself, the other being an evolution of this nature into all the modifications of thought and extension of which the universe is composed; or, as we might say, the one being *Brahm*, or absolute, eternal being, the other *Brahma*, or relative being, distributed in finite forms, "lying on eternity and the stars."² In a word, God is *εὐ νᾶς*, the universe, of which all things past, present and to come are but modes or manifestations, or, in Spinoza's own words, "*Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens non transiens*," while "man is but a mere balance of powers, and passions, the tension by which he subsists." Right is the correlate of power, while sin is weakness, negation, or deficiency; whence the object of all law is the exercise of force, and all law is limitation.³

How little all this differs, in the end, from the grosser system of Hobbes, or from the dreamy conceptions of the old Hindu philosophers, who, according to Sir William Jones, "believed that the whole creation is rather an energy than a work, by which the infinite mind is present at all times, and in all places, and exhibits to his creatures a set of perceptions, like a wonderful picture or piece of music always varied but always uniform." So that we may well say with Dugald Stewart, in reference to the reproduction of old and exploded errors, "One is almost tempted to believe that human invention is limited, like a barrel organ, to a specific number of tunes."

And yet, conceding the fundamental positions from which the sys-

¹ The mode in which this is done, is explained in the Second and Third Parts of his "Ethica."

² Opera, Vol. I. p. 228. See p. 233, in which he shows that matter, or body, is a mode of the Divine extension.

³ Ibid. p. 115. Compare pp. 131, 212, 217.

tem of Spinoza is drawn, with a perfection of logic which has all the force of mathematical demonstration, conceding, for example, that grand assumption of his, that being and thought are identical, and consequently that the order of ideas is the order of the universe; or, that other, that the cause must always pass over into the effect, in fact, constitute the effect; or that other, that the infinite Being or Cause can never produce anything different from, or separate from himself — its absurdity instantly vanishes, and one cannot help being struck with involuntary wonder at the stupendous force of that single, solitary thinker. Ah! who can tell into what depths the noblest mind, once adrift on the ocean of speculation, may involuntarily sink. One false movement, the loss of a chart, of a compass, or a star, may involve the greatest philosopher in irretrievable difficulties, nay, insure his final and eternal shipwreck.

That Spinoza, strange and wayward in many respects, was a man of transcendent mental power, nay more, of great depth, simplicity and earnestness of character, can scarcely be questioned by those acquainted with his life and writings. Perhaps metaphysically fanatical if not absolutely mad (*ferox ratione*); for it seems to us there is a metaphysic, as well as a natural, lunacy; he was carried away, as by an evil genius, into the bogs and quagmires of pantheistic doubt and despair. Yet, poor man, he followed this *ignis fatuus*, with a sublime enthusiasm, worthy of a better fate; so that his whole life, according to Schleiermacher and Cousin, was a long and lofty aspiration after the absolute and divine. But alas! we fear the God he sought was but the dream of a distempered fancy, which so far from conducting to the bosom of infinite love, only plunges the weary spirit into the blackness of darkness forever.¹

It may be well inquired here why Spinoza uses the term God at all to designate the great, primal, immanent, universal Substance, the *Causa causarum*, if not for the purpose of softening the horrid aspect of his opinions. Indeed Professor Norton of Cambridge states, on the authority of Le Clerc, that "Spinoza composed the work in which his opinions are most fully unfolded, in the Dutch language, and committed it to his friend the physician Mayer to translate into Latin; that where the name of God now appears, Spinoza had writ-

¹ The works of Spinoza were published a few years ago at Heidelberg by Dr. Paulus, with a highly laudatory preface. Dr. Bruder, the editor of the Leipsic edition, speaks of him in terms of equal admiration. A German translation has appeared from the pen of Auerbach, and a French one from that of Saissset. Amand Saintes has written his life with great ability; and while dissenting from his system, commends Spinoza as a great and a good man.

ten Nature; but that Mayer induced him to substitute the former word for the latter, in order partially to screen himself from the odium to which he might be exposed."¹ We do not attach much importance to this anecdote, indeed we have good reason to doubt its authenticity; but assuredly the term Nature would seem quite as appropriate, as that of God, in the system of Spinoza. His absolute Substance is certainly not God, in any proper sense of that expression. What then shall we think of a philosophy or of a religion, professing to be Christian, which recognizes Spinoza as the rejected saint, "verstossenen heiligen Spinoza," and speaks of him as "full of faith and full of the Holy Ghost?"²

It has been supposed by many, by Göthe for example,³ that Spinoza carried philosophical speculation to its highest point, that here it found its limit beyond which no human intellect can go. Leibnitz however, a man of almost illimitable range of thought, had no such idea; for correcting, as he supposed, the errors both of Descartes and Spinoza, he endeavored to lay the foundations of a vast structure of spiritual philosophy. His system indeed was not thoroughly matured and developed, and it has to be collected from a considerable mass of brief and fugitive compositions, including his letters, as well as from his *Theodicea*, the object of which is rather theological than philosophical. The aim of Leibnitz was practical, rather than theoretical, though founded upon profound and original investigation. He wished to harmonize conflicting opinions, both theological and scientific, and find a basis, upon which original and independent thinkers of all sects and schools might stand together, in the defence of a common philosophy and a common religion. He refuted the sensational origin of ideas, defended as he supposed by Locke, carried out the spiritual views of Descartes with reference to mind, giving a better exposition of fundamental ideas, and enlarging the criteria of their validity. Taking the human mind, in its necessary laws, as the groundwork of his philosophy, and having attempted to reduce all

¹ "The Latest form of Infidelity," By Andrews Norton. It will be recollected that when this earnest protest appeared at Cambridge a few years ago against the transcendental Scepticism of Emerson, Parker and others, Dr. Ware, Jun. published a discourse on the "Divine Personality," the object of which was to show that no proper idea of God could be formed which did not involve the attributes of intelligence, freedom and will.

² Schleiermacher's *Reden Ueber die Religion*. See also "History of Rationalism in Germany," by Amand Saintes, p. 239, English trans. A fuller statement upon this point may be seen in "*Vie et Ouvrages de Spinoza*," by the same author.

³ In "*Wahrheit und Dichtung*."

things to pure ideas, he endeavored thence to construct the universe.¹ His method, therefore, though apparently more thorough and comprehensive than that of his predecessors, was yet ideal and rationalistic. Rejecting the criterion of Descartes, that of clearness and distinctness, he took that of identity and contradiction as the criterion in necessary matter, and the principle of "sufficient reason" in contingent matter. The first of these involves the possible, that is, whatever may be conceived of as not contradictory, or, if you please, whatever must be conceived of without a contradiction. This gives us the absolute and the true, or that which must necessarily be. The next, that of the sufficient reason, measures the actual, not that which must be, but that which may be, that, in a word, for which, as actually existing, there is sufficient reason. To discover what ideas are valid respecting the contingent world, must be determined by reference to use, or final causes.²

Applying these criteria to things themselves, he finds not only the idea of substance, with its attributes of thought and extension, (that is of embodiment, for such is Spinoza's idea) but also of cause or power, spontaneous and creative; so that God, as the great primal Substance, or Subsistence, not only is, but acts and produces. Power does not reside in masses, for these are infinitely divisible; power is inherent in substance from which all material qualities must be excluded. So that, strictly speaking, we come to power or force, as a pure and immaterial essence.³ This constitutes the basis of existence. Thence spring all the forces and forms of the universe.

On this principle Leibnitz constitutes the world (kosmos) of immaterial energies. His system is developed as a *Monadology*; that is, one absolute, infinite, immaterial, eternal *Monad* (or *One*) being assumed as a conscious and voluntary cause, he proposed to show how from this source all the finite monads or forces of the universe derived their existence, whether these appear in immaterial souls, or in what we term physical forms.⁴ Leibnitz's mind, like those of

¹ Leibnitz's method is not inductive and psychological, but abstract and ontological. This point is well brought out by M. Jaques in his Introduction to the edition of his works, from the press of Charpentier, Vol. I. p. 31. His views of the human mind are developed in his "Essays on the Human Understanding," his theosophy or theology, in the "Monadologie," and "Theodicée."

² Spinoza decisively rejects final causes, Leibnitz as decisively maintains them.

³ While the system of Descartes is mechanical, that of Leibnitz is dynamical. The universe in his view, is composed of simple forces, or monads, which he says expressly are without extension or divisibility. *Monadologie, Oeuvres*, Vol. II. p. 463.

⁴ *Oeuvres*, Vol. II. p. 469.

Pythagoras and Plato, as well as Descartes and Spinoza, was pre-eminently mathematical, and his problem of the universe is little less than a geometrical proposition. Given one necessary, universal and eternal Monad or Force, to find all other monads or forces. Indeed, he speaks after the manner of Plato, of Jehovah as the supreme and eternal Geometer.¹ From this system all dualism is excluded. Of matter, in its ordinary import, there is none. Force is the primal element which underlies all other elements, and constitutes all finite essences, all finite forms. Identity runs through matter and mind; substantially they have the same origin and the same end. They involve, indeed, infinite diversity of quantity, quality and form, but spring from one source, partake of one nature, constitute one universe. In a word, they are a combination of spiritual monads or forces, which spring from the one indivisible, absolute, everlasting Monad, or Force which we call God.

It ought, however, to be recollected that the name, monad, does not precisely determine the nature of the essence or power to which Leibnitz applied it. It is given for the sake of distinction, and simply signifies *one*, one elementary something, essence or force,—in God, creative, conscious, intelligent, designing,—in finite mind or matter, one essence or force, not gross and material, like an atom or a corpuscle, but pure and spiritual, like the being from which it derives existence. Indeed, Leibnitz wished to avoid the difficulties which spring from the ill understood distinctions, which we make in reference to matter and mind; he therefore gives this name to the simple idea of a force, or energy, capable of developing itself in outward act and shape. God is the original Monas, or Force, from which all others are created or generated, by a conscious act of productive volition; so that in this respect, his views differ from those of Spinoza, and on the whole, harmonize with some of the highest forms of theological truth.² The created monads vary in character and power.³ Some are in a state of stupor, so to speak, and constitute dull matter, yet possess a sort of perceptive power; while others are conscious and form in the case of those distinct and clear,

¹ "So completely, indeed, and so mathematically linked did Leibnitz conceive all truths, both physical and moral, that he represents the eternal Geometrician as incessantly occupied in the solution of this problem. The state of one Monad (or elementary atom) being given, to determine the state, past, present and future, of the whole universe."—Stewart, *Dissertations*, Part II. p. 75.

² It is on this ground, that in his *Theodicea*, he maintains the conformity of faith with reason, *la conformité de la Foi avec Raison*.

³ "Monadologie," § 9. *Oeuvres*, Vol. II. p. 464.

the souls of men and angels, in the case of those somewhat dull or indistinct, the souls of the lower animals. All these have their own inherent energy and their own peculiar sphere, and thence exert no direct or immediate influence upon each other. Each one, however, is a microcosm, and contains an image of the universe.¹ They act in harmony, by a preëstablished divine arrangement, just as two automata constructed by the same artist and made to move together by the same impulse, act in harmony, by means of a preformed arrangement.²

Mind and matter, however, according to this theory are not essentially different. They are identical, being one in their origin and their end. They act according to the same fixed and necessary laws. All things, physical and moral, are preëstablished. All obey one impulse, and subserve one end. Hence the doctrines of preëstablished harmony, of philosophical necessity, and Optimism.

And what is all this, however grandly and beautifully developed by its author, but a scientific basis for pure idealism? Ideas not realities, forces not beings, construct the universe, and nothing but idealism or rationalism, in other words, absolute spiritualism can spring from such a system. Still, in the hands of Leibnitz, it is made subservient to the loftiest faith, the warmest devotion. His *Theodicea* has the force of a grand moral Epic, in which are celebrated the perfections of the eternal God. The celebrated Genevese philosopher, Bonnet, tells us that he used it as a manual of devotion.

Leibnitz, though speculating beyond the bounds of the human intellect, and losing himself in the untried depths of absolute being, though pouring contempt upon some of the greatest discoveries of the Newtonian philosophy, and giving ample evidence of possessing many of the weaknesses of our common humanity, was probably one of the greatest philosophical geniuses which Germany or the world has produced. His speculations found a congenial home in the minds of his countrymen. In nearly all the theories which have successively followed among that speculative people, Leibnitz constantly reappears. It is the same lofty, but strange and fanciful melody, with infinite and ever recurring variations.

Wolf methodized the Leibnitzian philosophy, but not possessing the warmth and genius of his master, presented it to the schools of

¹ Oeuvres, Vol. II. p. 471. "Monadologie," § 51.

² Oeuvres, Vol. II. p. 473. "Monadologie," § 62. "Cheque monade créé représente toute l'univers."

Oeuvres, Vol. II. p. 473. "Monadologie," §§ 63. 65. 78.

his native land, as a vast and complicated system of ideal abstractions, giving rise as usual, to an arid and destructive scepticism, which lasted for many years.

But the eighteenth century closed with Kant and the Kantian philosophy, in which the possibility of metaphysics or ontology as a science, is positively denied, and as many think demolished, and a basis laid for consistent, philosophical scepticism. By those not acquainted with the subject, Kant is spoken of as the father of German transcendentalism; while the fact is, while often using the term, he endeavors to extinguish the very idea of transcending our subjective states. To speak of the Kantian *metaphysics*, as many do, is a gross misnomer; for in the system of Kant, metaphysics is an impossibility. The great problem of the "Kritik of Pure Reason" is the possibility of "synthetic judgments *à priori*," or, in plainer words, the possibility of attaining absolute (unconditioned) truth, which Kant decides in the negative. He does not, as many well-informed persons seem to think, deny the reality of the external world, or the reality of mind; far from it; but he brings subject and object together, the inner and the outer world, and shows that it is only their synthesis or union, their point of contact, so to speak, of which we can know anything. Nature is real, but is given us only in consciousness, and under the forms of perception, space and time, which are simply laws of mind, not objective realities. But in addition to perception, the mind possesses the faculty of understanding (*verstand*), which has its principles and forms equally subjective, and for aught that we know artificial; while higher still, it possesses the power of reason (*vernunft*), which simplifies and coördinates the whole as unity, giving us as a principle of generalization and order, the one, the absolute, the unconditional, the causative, in other words, God, the soul, and nature. But these, too, are subjective; whence objectivity or reality is assumed and cannot be demonstrated scientifically.

Thus, again, are all things reduced to the region of ideas, of dim and visionary abstractions. Reality escapes into the void, and truth remains, like a shadowy island, in the midst of a boundless gulf. "The region," says Kant, "of the pure understanding is an island. and enclosed by nature itself in unchangeable limits. It is the region of truth (an engaging title) surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean."¹

But the heart, Kant's heart itself, demands God, duty, immortality, not merely as ideas, but as realities. For these great truths, then, Kant in a subsequent work, which he calls the "Kritik of Practical

¹ Kritik of Pure Reason, English translation, p. 222.

Reason," finds a basis in the wants of the individual and of society. As the eye is adapted to light, and light to the eye, and the one being given, the existence of the other follows, as a matter of course; so, also, God exists for man, man exists for God. Deity, religion, immortality, are absolute necessities; society is organized around these ideas, and cannot exist without their influence. Here, then, he lays what he deems a broad and substantial foundation for religion and morality. But as to a proper scientific basis for these truths, according to the Königsberg thinker, reason furnishes none.¹ They may be believed, but cannot be demonstrated. So that the boasted Kantian philosophy, grand and imposing at first sight, as one of the castles of the dark ages seen through the misty twilight, turns out after all, to be a comparatively small affair. "Too frequently," as Carlyle remarks, "the anxious novice is reminded of Dryden in the battle of books; there is a helmet of rusty iron, dark, grim, gigantic — and within it, at the farthest corner, is a head no bigger than a walnut."²

Its effect upon Germany, however, was prodigious. Neglected for a time chiefly on account of its obscure and difficult terminology, "witch jargon," as Herder calls it, it found ardent admirers, and spread like wild-fire through all the German universities. It gave rise to the most violent contentions and agitations. Heresies innumerable sprang up in its pathway, and the young divines of Germany who were especially enamored with it, seemed to run wild with a sort of metaphysical mania. Kant was hailed by his admirers as something more than a philosopher, as a prophet, and the entire metaphysics of past ages were trodden under foot as salt that had lost its savor. Even Leibnitz, the great German favorite, was for the time forgotten. The air of mysticism and depth connected with the Kantian system, its vast, "forest-like terminology," where the panting intellect of ordinary minds wanders amid inextricable labyrinths, or sinks exhausted with "scholastic miasma," though appalling enough at first, possessed for the speculative and enthusiastic German mind, an extraordinary attraction.

While Kant's philosophy cleared the atmosphere of Wolf's ab-

¹ Sir William Hamilton (Article on Cousin, in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1830) gives it as his opinion, that Kant's grand error consisted not in representing reason to be weak, but *deceptive*. Certainly it may be the one without the other.

² This passage occurs in Carlyle's "Life of Schiller," a work containing more good sense than some of the later and more boastful works of the Scottish Teufelsdröckh.

stractions, it introduced others in their room, and opened, in the case of many who carried out his logic to its legitimate results, an easy path into the Serbonian bog of absolute scepticism. But Kant himself was no infidel, in the ordinary sense of the term. He lost sight of the object in the subject, and failed to solve the problem of the universe, but he never denied the fundamental truths of religion, or transcended the dictates of common sense. A quiet, solid, thoughtful man, he performed his round of duties; and died in the bosom of the Lutheran church. Enter the gloomy and apparently interminable wilderness of his logic, and every now and then you will come to some beautiful, sunny glade, with the blue heavens overhead, and the song of summer birds among the trees. Occasionally, after long toiling among the brambles, foot-sore and weary, you reach some craggy elevation, and, forgetting all your toils, descry in the distance vast continents, with oceans of light, and islands "green as emerald." Take, for example, the following passage regarding the Divine existence, than which nothing can be found grander or more striking in the range of literature.

"The present world opens to us so immense a spectacle of diversity, order, fitness and beauty, whether we pursue these in the infinity of space, or in its unlimited division—that even according to the knowledge which our weak reason has been enabled to acquire of the same, all language fails in expression as to so many and undiscernibly great wonders—all numbers in measuring their power, and even our thoughts in bounds, so that our judgment of the whole must terminate in a speechless, but so much more eloquent astonishment. Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, regularity in origin and disappearance; and since nothing has come of itself into the state in which it is, it thus always indicates, farther back, another thing as its cause, which renders necessary exactly the same further inquiry—so that in such a way the great whole must sink into the abyss of nothing, if we did not admit something existing of itself, originally and independently, external to this infinite contingent, which maintained it, and as the cause of its origin, at the same time secured its duration. This highest cause, (in respect of all things in the universe,) how highly are we to think of it? The world we are not acquainted with according to its whole contents; still less do we know how to appreciate its magnitude by comparison with all that is possible. But what prevents us, since we once require in respect to causality an external and supreme Being, we should not at the same time, in respect of the degree of perfection, place it above everything else possible; which we can effect easily, although certainly only the delicate outline of an abstract conception, when we represent to ourselves, united in it as a single substance all possible perfection—which conception, favorable to the claim of our reason, in the midst of experience,

by means of the direction which such an idea gives towards order and fitness, and yet is never opposed to experience in a decided manner.

"This proof deserves at all times to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, the most adapted to ordinary human reason. It animates the study of nature, just as itself has its existence from this, and thereby ever receives fresh force. It manifests ends and views, where our observation had not discovered them, and extends our cognitions of nature by means of the clue of a specific unity whose principle is out of nature. But these cognitions react back again upon the cause, namely the occasioning idea, and increase the belief in a higher being into an irresistible conviction."¹

Fichte, young, ardent, enthusiastic, with great logical power, and an imagination which nothing could limit, took up the problem of the Kantian philosophy, at the point where his predecessor left it, and endeavored to determine the relation of subject and object, of the world within and the world without. His mode of resolving the problem was bold and summary; subject and object, in his system, are one. The subject "posits" or realizes, or, if the term be clearer, embodies, the object. Each soul, or subject, makes its own world. The Ego posits the Non Ego and makes it real. The external world exists, exists necessarily, but exists by means of the internal world, and is dependent upon it. Mankind, in attributing a real existence to the external world, the world of outward forms, are right, but wrong in supposing the object independent of the subject. Both exist, but not separately. Mind and matter are identical. There is only one existence, having the twofold aspect of subject and object.²

Thus we have an immediate knowledge of all things. We are our own universe, our own world; we are spirit, we are matter; nay, in some sense, we are God. The development of self forms our world, constitutes our duty and destiny.

In this system, then, God and duty, though seen under a peculiar aspect, and perhaps belittled, are not denied. The result is subjective idealism, or, as in similar cases, the reduction of all things to pure ideas, and those ideas united in the single, individual, indivisible

¹ Kritik of Pure Reason, p. 474. It may seem to some that Kant is here somewhat inconsistent with himself, for he denies that the argument possesses what he calls *apodictical* force; and yet he allows it to be consistent with reason, and fitted to produce "irresistible conviction." The discrepancy, however, may arise from his variant use of the term *reason*; for, notwithstanding his imposing technology, he uses this term, as Sir Wm. Hamilton says, in fourteen different senses.

² Like Descartes and Spinoza, Fichte affects absolute demonstrative certainty, not philosophy simply, but *Gnosis*, *Wissenschaftslehre*. The principal work in which his views are developed is entitled, "*Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre*."

Ego. God, says Fichte, cannot be inferred, he must be believed in. Faith is the ground of all conviction. You believe in the existence of the world, which is nothing more than the incarnation or embodiment of that which you carry within you. It is, so to speak, your own shadow, yet to you and all of vast moment, for it is the means of your development and perfection. In the same way God exists in your consciousness, and you believe him. He is the Moral Order (*Moralische Ordnung*) of the world, as such only can you know him.¹ In other respects, he is unknown and inaccessible. In a word, he is infinite, an object not of reason but of faith. But we cannot attribute to him intelligence and personality; for thus we fall into anthropomorphism. Properly speaking, God *is*—is everything—consequently he cannot *have*.² Neither intelligence nor will can be predicated of his infinite nature. He is himself intelligence—he is himself will. Consequently Fichte, in his later works, where his system is somewhat modified, speaks reverently of God, as the supreme and everlasting Will. God, therefore, is not you, nor I, nor aught else specifically, but is in all and through all, the moral order, the infinite medium, the grand ideal of the whole.

That such a system of subjective idealism should give rise to errors, the most startling, cannot be matter of surprise. Fichte, at the best, is seen evermore hovering over the abyss of absolute nothing, and occasionally losing himself in its fearful depths. "Tomorrow, gentlemen," he said on one occasion with startling audacity, "I shall create God!"³ By this he meant that he would develop the process by which God comes into consciousness as subject and object.

It must be said that the system of Fichte logically carried out distinguishes both nature and God, and leaves us nothing but thought, or subjective idealism, which creates its own Deity, its own world, and its own immortality. Fichte however earnestly denied the charge of atheism, and appalled by his own principles, took refuge in a sort of stoical and mystical devotion in which God and the immortality of the soul are recognized as objects of simple faith.⁴ He represents himself as standing between two worlds, "the one visible,

¹ *Sittenlehre*, (1798,) pp. 184, 189.

² These views are brought out to their legitimate consequences, in the work which may be regarded as a supplement to the "*Wissenschaftslehre*," entitled, "*Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine Göttliche Weltordnung*,"—"On the ground of our Belief in a Divine World-Order."

³ *Amand Saintes*, "*Histoire du Rationalisme*."

⁴ On what grounds he did this, see Tennemann's *Manual of Hist. of Philos.*, p. 437. Morell, p. 431.

in which the act alone avails, and the intention matters not at all; the other invisible and incomprehensible, acted on only by the will," and where he sees "the Divine Life, self-forming and self-representing Will, clothed to the mortal eye, with multitudinous sensuous forms, flowing through him and through the whole immeasurable universe, here streaming through his veins and muscles — there, pouring its abundance into the tree, the flower, the grass. The dead, heavy mass of inert matter, which did but fill up nature, has disappeared, and, in its stead, there rushes by the bright, everlasting flood of life and power from its Infinite Source." Here, then, recognizing the Eternal Will as the creator of the world, and the creator of the finite reason, who exists in Himself, "and in whose light we behold the light and all that it reveals," he cries out with adoration: "Great living Will! whom no words can name, and no conception embrace! well may I lift my thoughts to thee, for I can only think in thee. In thee, the Incomprehensible, does my own existence, and that of the world, become comprehensible to me; all the problems of being are solved, and the most perfect harmony reigns. I veil my face before thee, and lay my finger upon my lips."¹

Schelling, who is yet alive, and whose system, not yet thoroughly coördinated and developed, comes after Fichte, in the order of philosophical speculation. Fichte had laid the foundation of his philosophy in simple consciousness, and made it entirely subjective; Schelling rejects this as a ground of absolute certainty, and maintains that in addition to understanding and reason, man has a higher power which may be denominated transcendental intuition, or the vision of absolute truth; whence his system is that of an absolute objectivity. Plotinus had called this faculty ecstasy, Schelling called it intellectual intuition. Assuming, therefore, as existing at least in some minds, those for example, of a higher order, this vision of things as they are, Schelling attempts to construct a magnificent and all-comprehending Nature-Philosophy, by which all science, natural and supernatural, is to be explained. Schelling adopts one of the great principles of Fichte's philosophy, the identity of subject and object, but goes a step further, by maintaining that they find this identity in a higher power. The Ego and the non Ego which in Fichte create each other, in Schelling are created by the absolute. In themselves they are real, but identical in a single essence. Knowledge and being correspond. They are correlates. The one mirrors or represents the other.

¹ "Bestimmung des Menschen," as quoted in Lewes's *Hist. of Ph.*, Vol. IV. p. 164.

Subject and object, the finite and the infinite, are one in God. In a word, Schelling reduces the universe to the region of pure ideas and thence takes the ideas or notions of his own mind as the types of all possible knowledge. Nature is spirit visible, spirit is nature invisible. Man is divine, that he may see God the divine. He knows all things in God.

In this system we have first the absolute Substance, not the finite Ego of Fichte, but the infinite and eternal Ego, the cause creative, immanent, universal, invisible, as Bruno and Spinoza taught; and secondly, the created or finite result, or the visible, tangible, universe. But the absolute Ego produces the non Ego, not by its own force or out of its own nature, but out of us, by an interior creative energy. "Men are but the innumerable individual eyes with which the infinite World Spirit beholds itself."

The principle of identity, though recently modified, and to some extent abandoned by Schelling, runs through the whole of his philosophy, and pantheism is its necessary result. Man becomes subject and object by becoming conscious of himself. God, the absolute, in the same way, becomes subject and object by becoming conscious of himself. He finds himself by an external realization, "The blind and unconscious products of nature," says Schelling, "are nothing but unsuccessful attempts of Nature to make itself an object (*sich selbst zu reflectiren*;) the so called dead nature, is but an unripe intelligence. The acme of its effects—that is, for nature completely to objectize itself, is attained through the highest and ultimate degree of reflection in man, or what we call Reason. Here nature returns into itself, and reveals its identity with that which in us is known as the object and subject."¹

Thus nature and the universe form a circle. First, the absolute embodies itself in what we call finite forms, which are only reflections of itself, and thus sees itself mirrored in the productions of the external world. This is the first movement by which the absolute develops itself. The second movement is a "subsumption, or the regress of the finite into the infinite," in other words, it is nature, as finite, again making itself absolute, and reassuming the form of the eternal. "The combination of these two movements is the reünion of the subject and object in divine reason; it is God, not in his original and potential, but in his unfolded and realized existence."²

¹ System des Transcend : Idealismus, p. 5.

² This will strike the reader at once as precisely the view of Bruno and Spinoza, expressed by the *Natura Naturans*, and *Natura Naturata*. Schelling's sys-

This is pantheism as perfect as that of Spinoza. To relieve himself of the terrible embarrassment, felt even by the German mind, in a pantheism so absolute and overwhelming, Schelling has started upon a new track, and claiming that he had only given the negative or simply ideal side of philosophy, which springs from thought, but can never come to being, an admission of the highest moment, he proposes to give the positive side, which starts from being and comes to thought. By this means he attempts to rise above the pantheistic view of his ideal philosophy, and exhibits God as the supramundane Being, creation as an emanation from God, and man as a being at once dependent and independent — dependent as to the principle of his being, independent as to his free personal existence. But the effort, instructive as it is, is a decided failure. The two systems are not coördinated; and in the second, as in the first, there are serious and fundamental errors. The absolute God is yet retained, without consciousness, intelligence and personality, except as he becomes real and personal to us by an embodiment of himself in the external creation.

Hence Schelling's doctrine of the Trinity, for he ventures upon an explanation of this mystery, as three divine potencies, and his doctrine of redemption through Christ, as the return of the finite into the infinite.¹

Schelling pours contempt upon physical science, as an outward and empirical thing, and even casts away psychology as useless in a system of absolute nature-philosophy. Copernicus, Newton, Bessel, Leverrier, are plodders in the world of sense; Locke, Reid and Stewart mere empirical seekers in the outer courts of philosophy.² He goes to the inner shrine and centre of truth, "the prima philosophia," as he terms it, and constructs the universe of science from *à priori* principles. In Germany, his speculations on nature have been much admired, but are incapable of verification, and though ingenious and often splendid, lead to no practical result. On this theory, being and thought must be identical, though Schelling honestly confesses

tem, as a whole, may be described as a Transcendental or Absolute Idealism, the title indeed of one of his principal works, "*System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*."

¹ For a clear and interesting statement of Schelling's views upon this subject, consult Morell's *Hist. of Phil.*, pp. 451-454.

² See *Jahrbucher der Medicin*, Vol. I. His great aim here is to show, that science is valuable only so far as it is speculative — that it is not "phenomenal or relative, but absolute." Reason as finite, and science as finite, are nothing. His "*Natur-Philosophie*," is the construction or science of nature, *à priori*.

that he has lost himself between them. Finite and infinite must be one. God is centre and circumference, subject and object, the universe without and the universe within. Thought, then, is impersonal, is divine. Hence, whatever is known or thought by man exists. Ideas are the measure of the universe. So that, instead of studying nature and facts, whether as given in the world of matter or of mind, or by means of a specific revelation, we ought simply to study God in ourselves. All knowledge is given us in our existence. God is in us, we are in God. In a word, man is in some sense, *omniscient*! Thought (*Das Denken*) is not my Thought, and Being (*Das Wesen*) is not my Being; for everything belongs to God or the All. We know God, then, as we know ourselves. Subject and object are identical in a third, which is the absolute, which absolute is neither ideal nor real, neither mind nor matter, but both. This absolute is God. He becomes "conscious of himself in man," and thus man, under the highest form of his existence, manifests Reason, and by this reason, "God knows himself."¹

In what respect this is an improvement upon the old idolatrous pantheism of the Brahminic faith, it would take Schelling himself to say. Such a philosophy gives us nothing but abstractions, apparently grand and beautiful at a distance, like the mirage of the desert, but mocking the thirst of the traveller, and leaving behind it and before it only "the waste howling wilderness." Is it wonderful, then, that one of the most powerful of the writers of young Germany, who reprinted the Letters of Schleiermacher on the "Lucinde" of Schelling, which urge fundamentally the same views on the subject of religion, should in the preface blasphemously declare "that he would rather be in hell with Schelling, than in heaven with Marheinecke," and that the world would have been happier "if it had never heard the name of God!"² Such are the horrible results of boldly speculating beyond the necessary bounds of the human intellect. Under the influence of such a philosophy, the poetic and gifted Steffens mournfully said, "All living nature, the whole of varied life seemed to me faded and gray; all my wishes and hopes vanished, for

¹ We may be suffered to say here, that Coleridge was caught in this philosophy of the absolute, and was even more mystified and bewildered than Schelling. It appears, from innumerable coincidences, and even identities (plagiarisms on the part of Coleridge,) that the Englishman helped himself from the writings of the German *plenis manibus*. Coleridge was a genius of the highest order, but not a remarkably clear or consistent philosopher.

² History of Rationalism, by Amand Saintes, p. 244.

I was compelled to confess to myself that as such they contained falsehood. * * * The total abrogation (of finite personality) seemed to me to destroy all that I considered dear and holy." Philosophers like Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel, to borrow a figure from Carlyle, or rather from Schiller, who in his *Philosophische Briefe*, paints the struggles of a doubter, are like the conjurer that has pronounced the spell of invocation, but has forgot the counter-word; "spectres and shadowy forms come crowding at his summons; in endless multitudes they press and hover around his magic circle, and the terror struck Black Artist cannot lay them." Nothing but the darkness of an eternal night opens before our terrified vision, and an infinite wail, as of perdition, echoes through the universe.

It is but justice however to Schelling to say that it is asserted, on high authority,¹ that the Berlin philosopher has renounced, or essentially modified, the system of *identity* and now teaches the supreme and personal sovereignty of the one true and living God; that he extols Christianity as the completion of reason and the last hope of the world. It may be, that, as he grows older, he feels the need of some better faith both for himself, and for the distracted church of his native land; but whether he will succeed in giving a true exposition of philosophy or of Christianity is yet to be seen.

We may here take occasion to remark, that the recent German philosophy has all turned upon the solution of a single problem, the relation of subject and object, of the Ego and the non Ego, or at a higher point of thought, the relation of the infinite and the finite, and has uniformly resulted in pantheism, or the identity of subject and object, of God and the universe.

But pantheism has various forms, and it is not a little curious that both Fichte and Schelling reject what they call pantheism as opposed to their peculiar theories! Upon this subject their distinctions are amazingly delicate, and would scarcely strike ordinary thinkers as distinctions at all. Generally speaking, however, by pantheism they mean the deification of the visible or palpable universe, the universe of mere forms and phenomena. This species of pantheism, Hegel himself unhesitatingly rejects.

But this is unnecessarily to limit the import of the term. By pantheism is generally understood any system which maintains the identity of all things, which makes the finite universe not so much a product, as a manifestation of God, which denies all occasional causes

¹ Dr. Neander, as quoted by Amand Saintes, "Vie et Ouvrages de Spinoza," p. 288.

and merges the whole in the infinite essence, in a word, any system which denies or doubts the Divine personality, freedom and intelligence, and represents God simply as Being, absolute and all-comprehending, whether such Being be regarded as material and mechanical, or ideal and spiritual.

Indeed, according to the view we have given, pantheism may assume *four* distinct forms. It may deify nature as it is, making matter, or some form of vital, or of mechanical force, the single substance, or essence of the universe, infinite, absolute, eternal, but undergoing perpetual changes, and giving rise to all the peculiar manifestations of what we term soul and body. This is the pantheism of the ancient Ionian school, and of some of the oriental mystics. Had Hobbes of Malmesbury possessed the feeling of worship, such would have been the form of pantheism he would have favored. Auguste Comte might be brought to worship such a God, if indeed he does not regard all worship as folly and superstition. This theory, however, is much more likely to take the form of pantheism, denying the very possibility of religion and virtue; or, if allied to superstition, to lapse into polytheism, and adore the manifold forms of matter, whether these be the starry host of the Persian magi, or the crocodiles of Egypt.

The second form of pantheism may be the deification of the human soul, or as the Germans call it, the Ego, making that the fountain of the universe, the All that exists substantially, everything else being the Ego realized or objectified. This is the subjective, pantheistic idealism of Fichte and his followers.

The third form of pantheism might be the rejection of what we call nature or the universe as mere form or appearance, and the deification of spirit, as the only substance, having the fixed attributes of thought and extension, and thus producing by an absolute and eternal necessity both nature and man. Such a theory would justify its abettors in speaking of finite beings and finite things, but always with the reserved, or implied idea, that they are only manifestations or emanations of the universal Spirit, into which they are perpetually returning. This is the pantheism of Spinoza, and in a modified form, that of Bruno and Schelling.

The last and most complete form of pantheism would be the reduction of all things, matter and spirit, to *pure thought*, and the construction of the universe from nothing, and its consequent *possible* return to nothing. Outward manifestations, limited forms, need not of course be deified in this system, on which account, the author of such a theory, might reject the vulgar pantheism; but his only God would

consist of mere thought and relation, with their constant changes, and eternal succession. This is the absolute pantheism of Hegel, beyond which speculation cannot go. The universe is at last reduced to a pure abstraction, thought itself springs from zero, and returns to zero.

Das Nichts, Nothing — is the beginning and end of the Hegelian philosophy; and here therefore German metaphysics finds its completion. Between the two zeros or the two nothings, a magnificent field, including God, science, history, art, present themselves for contemplation and study; and all these Hegel, with amazing logical subtilty, has discussed. But his philosophy, whatever in other respects it may be, begins in nothing, from which come all things, and ends in nothing, to which tend all things.¹

But such a statement appears so extravagant and startling that we must justify it by a few remarks. Pantheism, we have said, is the true secret of the German philosophy. The only chance, therefore, which a new theorist has for originality, must lie not in the adoption of a new view, but of a new method. He must still tread, though in different style, and in an apparently new direction, the circle of the absolute. Hegel at first agreed with Fichte and Schelling. Common science he rejected as empirical, as belonging to the outer world of mere forms and shows. The observation of facts, patient investigation, induction, deduction, what indeed most persons call science, he treated with disdain. Hence, in his first work, *De Orbitis Planetarum*, founded on Schelling's Nature-Philosophy, he poured unbounded scorn upon Newton and the modern astronomy! Gradually, however, he found it necessary to recede from Schelling. His mind was more orderly and logical; and he wished to establish philosophy upon an absolute basis. He would assume nothing, not even the Ego of Fichte, or the *intellectual intuition* of Schelling. He would construct, on strictly logical principles, a system of universal and irrefragable truth. Instantly he gave himself to the task with all the energies of his subtile and vigorous intellect. So absorbed was he in his work, that he went on writing when the cannon of the French army was roaring under his window in the memorable battle of Jena.

Unconsciously, however, Hegel assumed one thing, yet only one, though that one the real basis of the entire German Ontology, namely,

¹ We presume that the Hegelians would not say that the universe will ever be actually reduced to absolute nothing. All they maintain is, that nature is a constant *transition* or oscillation between nothing and something, between the *abstract* which is nothing, and the *concrete* which is something; consequently that nature never is, but is always *becoming*.

the identity of subject and object, and consequently of being and thought. Taking it for granted that fact and idea must be coincident, he took the genesis of thought for the genesis of the universe, the process of logic for the process of God. This given, his whole system follows without an effort, and taken alone it is one of the most wonderful specimens of a gigantic and pitiless logic. Except this, however, he assumed nothing, not even consciousness, or the ordinary axioms of human thought. Literally he began with nothing. But nothing is a negation, and a negation implies the existence of something which it denies. Something and nothing are the two poles of a truth, or idea, which consists of the union or contact of the two. Neither of these exists by itself. They exist in their relation only; so that the relation in this case is the only truth.

But how can nothing be said to exist, we may well inquire, our Saxon *dummheit*, and want of Teutonic *Anschauungsvermögen*, as the Germans say, making our question seem quite a poser. Hegel, however, promptly replies, It exists as a thought, that is, as an abstraction. *Das nichts ist; denn es ist Gedanke*. And so also pure being (*seyn*) which is only a thought, an entirely unconditioned thought, exists in the same manner. Thus his famous maxim is that *Being and Thought are the same*, whence also *Seyn und Nichts ist Dasselbe*.¹

Thought and being, or ideas and realities being the same, according to Descartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz and Schelling, Hegel's conclusion fairly follows.

The Hegelian method may be described as the identity of contraries, which has a basis of truth in the fact that all things have, so to speak, two sides, and appear to us as contradictions; and the entire problems of metaphysics turn upon the reconciliation of these opposing dualities, as a distinguished thinker has expressed it, *les conciliation des dualités desesperantes*.² All things in the created universe spring from the infinite, whence the duality of the finite and infinite — the finite — the non or not-finite, — they have two sides, therefore, one dark, the other luminous; the one bounded, the other unbounded; the one known, the other unknown, except by faith. Man is finite, yet he lies in the infinite; but how, who can tell? He discerns, or believes the infinite, but he sees, he comprehends only the finite. He sprung from the *Absolute*, the unconditioned, the unbounded and

¹ Encyclopædie, pp. 89—97. For admirable accounts of Hegel and Hegelian pantheism, see Amand Saintes' "Vie et Ouvrages de Spinoza," pp. 290—333. Dr. Ott's "Hegel et Philosophie Allemande." Willm's "Philosophie Allemande," Vol. IV.

² Vinet, "Essais de Philosophie Morale."

eternal, which he adores, but the secret nature of infinite Being or of God he cannot explore. His *thought*, like himself, seems to hover between the finite and the infinite. It reposes apparently upon the absolute, yet understands it not; for whatever is understood has relations, and never can measure the absolute. There are certain fundamental axioms of thought, which bring with them no reasons, no conditions, and rest therefore upon a simple, fundamental belief; but the instant we conceive them, apply them, or reason with them, they enter into relations and limits. All positive thought, indeed, as Sir William Hamilton maintains, by irrefragable reasons, is conditioned. It is never absolutely simple—it involves two sides, as it were two contrary poles, vibrating between the finite and the infinite, the local and universal, the absolute and related, the subjective and objective, the self-subsistent and the phenomenal. Cause and effect, one of our most essential and common ideas is, fundamentally, but the idea of the infinite passing into the finite, or producing the finite, the unlimited passing into bounds, the eternal into time. For all finite causes, in the process of thought, must hang upon the infinite Cause; and there is a sense, both logical and religious, in which God is “all and in all.” This double character of human thought, and this apparent corresponding duality and contradiction of the universe, may be found in all science, in all knowledge; for here evermore are cause and effect, being and relation, action and reaction, darkness and light, time and eternity, finite and infinite, man and God. Even without reference to the infinite, man himself is dual, being soul and body, mind and matter, subject and object, and viewing all things, somehow, as intermediate between them both, or as having relations to both. In a word, thought is dual, being at once subject and predicate, cause and effect, analysis and synthesis,—in its simplest forms and highest generalizations, uniting contraries, reconciling contradictions.

Hegel had some idea of the true method of thought, but he carried it into extremes. Confounding all thought with being, all object with subject, he had to begin with nothing, as we have said, and end with nothing.

Two contraries, such as existence and non-existence, appear to exclude each other. Hegel pronounces this notion to be false. Everything, he says, is contradictory in itself—this, in fact, is its essence; and its identity consists in the union of the two contraries. Thus Being (*Seyn*) in the abstract or unconditioned is nothing, that is, apart from any individual or particular thing, is the same as nothing. Existence, therefore, is identical with its negation, that is, with

nothing. The two ideas involve each other. The middle term, the union or relation of the two, is conditioned existence, that is, the universe. Take another example, the idea of weakness is a negation, but it implies the idea of force; but force in the abstract is nothing. They are identical; and here, therefore, in their union or middle term appear as a positive or concrete power. Pure or absolute light is no better than darkness; for light without color or shadow is invisible. Absolute clearness is identical with absolute obscurity, that is, with its negation; their union, however, or their middle term gives us light!¹

If you say, this is word-quibbling, Hegel would reply, on his ground-principle, the identity of thought with reality, that whether it is word-quibbling or not, it is absolutely true. But it leads to contradictions and absurdities, you say. Hegel rejoins, it must lead to contradictions, of course, but not to absurdities. Reality is found only in the clash and final union of innumerable contradictions.

According to this logical process, then, nature and thought may be constructed. Subject and object do not exist as separate realities, but exist only in their identity. Their relation is the only thing conceivable. So also finite and infinite, which appear to exclude each other, are identical. Mind and matter, too, are identical, indeed they are only subject and object viewed in different aspects. The two poles unite and form the truth, which is an eternal relation. God and the universe would seem to exclude each other, but they are identical after all, and their identity is the truth.²

On this ground Hegel contended that Schelling's views of the identity of subject and object is not exact. The latter assumed the reality of both sides or poles of the magnet, or the reality of two contraries; and the identity he called the point of indifference between them. Hegel decided that the positive truth or reality is found not in the two terms related, but in the relation itself. Thus he gives us an absolute idealism, or a universe of mere relations. All things therefore are not mere appearances to us, as taught by Kant, but mere appearances in themselves. Thoughts are the only realities. "The real objectivity is this: that our thoughts are not merely thoughts, but are, at the same time, the reality of things."³

¹ "Hegel et Philosophie Allemande," par Dr. Ott. See also, Lewes' Hist. of Philos., Vol. IV. pp. 203, 204.

² Our thoughts, according to Hegel, are the reality of things, and thoughts are only relations, or give us only relations. "Encyclopædie," p. 97. "Geschichte der Philosophie," Vol. III. p. 690. Willm, Hist. de Philos. Alle. Vol. III. pp. 398, 399.

³ Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. p. 689.

If there be a God, then, according to Hegel, he is only the *Absolute Thought*, or rather the Absolute Relation. So that God, or thought, comes to consciousness only in man! He finds the highest sphere in scientific thought. "It appears," says he, "that the World Spirit has finally succeeded in freeing himself from all impedimenta, and is able to conceive of himself as Absolute Spirit (or Intelligence, *Geist zu erfassen*.) — For he is such only so far as he knows himself to be the absolute Intelligence: and this he knows only in science, and this knowledge alone constitutes his true existence."¹

In the logic of Hegel, *this* and *that*, here and there, now and then, nothing and something, finite and infinite, good and bad, right and wrong, time and eternity, are the same things. These too, all are as nothing except in their identity or relation. Properly speaking, things do not exist — they are only coming into existence. They form a Trinity, Nothing, Something, and the Relation between them. These, then, are one, one in the identity or relation. So that Hegel pretends to accept the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God the Father is the eternal Idea — *Idee an und für sich*, that is, the Idea as an unconditional Abstraction, which is the same as Nothing. God the Son, engendered by the Father, is the *Idee as Anderseyn*, that is, as a conditioned or realized object. God the Holy Spirit is the Identity of the two, that is, the Absolute Relation, the negation of the Negation, and the totality of all existence. Separate from the world, then, there is, according to Hegel, no God; so also, separate from the consciousness of man, there is no Divine consciousness or personality. The Deity is only the eternal process of Thought, uniting the objective movement in nature and the subjective in reason or logic, and coming to a full realization of itself only in the universal genesis or spirit of humanity.²

Thus vanishes, as a reality, the whole external world. Thus vanishes God as a self-existent, personal essence, a being of intelligence and will. Thus vanish, in fact, all possible beings and things, swallowed up in the vortex of a vast, all-devouring logic. Thought only remains, or rather relation, that is to say, abstraction, and what is this in its last analysis but nothing? The world is reduced to an idea, the foundations are destroyed. God and the universe are gone!

And yet hundreds of minds in Germany, some of them of the highest order, and all of them above mediocrity, have received all

¹ Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. III. p. 689.

² "Philosophie der Religion," Vol. II. pp. 480, 481. "Geschichte der Philosophie," Vol. III. p. 377.

this as the last revelation of human wisdom, the most perfect triumph of philosophic thought! What, then, can we say but this, that the sophists (*σοφῶν*) of this world are caught in their own subtlety? "Professing themselves wise, (*σοφῶν*, philosophers,) they have become fools."

"Gens ratlone ferox, et mentem pasta chimæris."

A race with reason mad, and fed upon chimeras.

The German philosophy has been imported into France, and to a slight extent into England and the United States; but thus far has not, in these countries, assumed a definite form, except perhaps in the Eclecticism of Cousin and his followers. It is well known, that subsequent to the revolution of 1798 in France, a decided reaction against the sensual philosophy took place, and a few intelligent thinkers, aided chiefly by the Scottish philosophy, were gradually approaching a higher and purer system. Under the auspices of Laromiguière, Royer Collard, Jouffroy, and Cousin, for a time, the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart was all the rage. Cousin's inquiring spirit, however, led him to the study of Kant, and he began to promulgate in his lectures the doctrines of the Königsberg sage. But he did not stop here. Having introduced the Parisians to the labyrinths of the Kantian philosophy, he became enamored of Proclus, the Alexandrian mystic, who revived the study of Plato and introduced among the speculative thinkers of his day a sort of vague and mystical pantheism. Cousin edited Proclus, lectured on him, borrowed some of his ideas, vamped up others, and would have made him the demigod of the popular philosophy, had the giddy public been willing. A visit to Germany made him acquainted with the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and especially Hegel, who has been styled "the modern Proclus of Germany."

On his return to France, Cousin made the public acquainted with as much of the doctrine of Hegel as it could bear, adding something of his own to make the mixture "slab and good." He adopted, especially, Hegel's principles of historical criticism, and reproduced, in clear and elegant French, the comprehensive and striking views of his master on the development of speculative philosophy, as a natural growth of humanity, a necessary movement of "the divine spirit in the soul of man."

But Cousin, to be original, must find a method of his own. He admired somewhat the old Greek philosophers, especially Proclus, and yet cherished no slight respect for Locke and the Scottish philosophy.

His mind is clear, methodical and comprehensive, and his style a model of grace, vigor and elegance. What, then, more promising than the idea of *Eclecticism*. Indeed, it was the only method left for anything new by means of the old. Philosophy had run out into two extremes, as it were opposite poles, of what might be, as Cousin supposed, a common centre. Might they not be brought together, and the truth at last discovered? In a word, might not Locke and Kant, Stewart and Proclus, Reid and Hegel, be reconciled, and a grand and beautiful system thence deduced? Yes, Eclecticism is the only system now remaining to the aspiring philosopher, who should advance the domain of science, and make himself a name in the annals of speculative thought.

Behold, then, the origin of Eclecticism, and its claims to the admiration of the world. The experiment has been successful, and now Eclecticism is the prevalent philosophy in France. It has been treated with some respect in England, though demolished in its fundamental positions by Sir William Hamilton. It has been welcomed, but not thoroughly grasped, by a certain class of minds in the United States. Its impression, however, upon the great body of our thinkers has been comparatively slight. Recently Mr. Morell of England has taken it under his protection. While objecting to some of its minor positions, he seems to regard it as the true method, and obviously adopts its fundamental doctrines. He defends it from attack, and clearly conveys the impression, that in his view, it has solved the great problem touching the passage of psychology to ontology, or the relations of the finite and phenomenal to the infinite and the real. Mr. Morell, however, has not grappled with the difficulties of the question, and has turned away, as if in conscious weakness, from the strong statements and striking arguments of Sir William Hamilton.¹ His history, however valuable in other respects, only reëchoes the historical criticisms of Hegel, Damiron and Cousin. It indicates industry, learning and skill, with a commanding use of clear and elegant English diction, but no originality, vigor or profundity of mind.

But what is Eclecticism? Is it a simple collection of philosophic fragments, in which the most incongruous and contradictory methods, processes and notions are coördinated by a thin spider web of system; or is all the error first eliminated from the great mass of divergent theories, and nothing left but the residuum of pure gold? This were much to claim certainly. Still, if Eclecticism means anything worth

¹ The passage in which this occurs is curious enough, and worthy of attention. "Hist. of Philos." p. 656.

while, it must mean the latter. A mere collection of notions and hypotheses, though interesting as materials for a history of philosophy, would of itself possess no intrinsic value as science. A *criterion* must be found. Truth must be tested, and separated from falsehood. How can this be done? Where is the criterion referred to — where the purifying fire, the separating process, and the final touchstone to endorse the golden treasure? M. Cousin's ingenuity alone? By no means. What then? M. Cousin's system, or what M. Cousin assumes as the true philosophy? Nothing else is conceivable. So that in Eclecticism we have only a new system, added to the thousand and one which have preceded it. This must be admitted; but recollect it is a system taken out of all other systems and bringing them into fraternal unity. How? For that is the question already put — and here we begin to detect a fallacy, a sort of vicious logical circle. The gold or the true system is taken from all other systems which, according to M. Cousin, are dross and gold together. How? By the true system — that is to say, the gold is taken from this huge pile of rubbish, by means of itself!

But you mistake, exclaims the Eclectic; all error, according to M. Cousin, is only incomplete truth, not dross and gold exactly, but gold out of place, gold incomplete. To get the truth then, or the philosophic gold in its completeness, the different parts, Kant, Reid, Hegel, Proclus, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Spinoza, have only to be brought together.

But is there not a palpable fallacy here also? What! is error in reality only incomplete truth? You might as well say, that brass, iron, tin, nay, absolute dross, are only incomplete silver and gold. Error is often an absolute denial of the truth, and bears the same relation to it that darkness does to light, or wrong to right. A few grains of truth may be found in all erroneous systems, and in this their plausibility may consist; but two, or half a dozen errors, even if they consist of incomplete truths, that is, of one sided, imperfect, partial views, brought together, will not give us more than they contain. Nor can an error, on one extreme, be corrected by bringing it into contact with an error, on the opposite extreme. Something must be thrown out of both; that is, whatever is misstatement, false logic, or false inference must be thrown out. In a word, all the dross and baser metal must be separated from the precious ore. Error doubtless is often an incomplete view of the reality, a half truth, as we call it, by courtesy, but more frequently it is something positively false; as for example, the assumptions that all clear and distinct ideas

are necessarily true, that subject and object are identical, that like can never produce unlike, that spirit cannot create matter, that the infinite cannot produce the finite, and cause it to exist separate from itself, that human thought is identical with being, the finite reason commensurate with infinite existence. So also, the opposite assumptions are positively false, namely, that all thought is derived from sensation, that there is no real distinction between mind and matter, the former being only a modification of the latter, that there is no God but the vast combination of mechanical forces, no duty but expediency, no heaven but political freedom or carnal pleasure. All these are not simply incomplete views of truth, but plain and palpable falsehoods. They deny the reality of things, and by no process can be transmuted into truth. Light and darkness, right and wrong, *yes* and *no*, God and Satan, can never be made one.

It is evident, then, that a criterion is demanded, in some intermediate system, some higher and better views? Does Eclecticism furnish such? In other words, what are Cousin's peculiar notions, which bring the most opposite systems together, and from the whole, give us absolute, philosophical truth? We reply, the "pure spontaneity," and especially the "impersonality of reason," and the passage thence from the finite to the infinite, from the related and conditioned, to the absolute and eternal.

As to the impersonality of reason, the organ to M. Cousin of pure truth, what does that amount to, if not to this, that reason, while in man, does not belong to man at all; and if in any sense finite, is also infinite? Well, then, whose reason is it, if it is not mine, nor thine, nor man's in general? The only reply possible is, that it is God's. In other words, it is the absolute, universal reason, and is thus identical and commensurate not only with thought, but with existence. Man's reflective power, his intellect and senses, including his affections, according to Eclecticism, lead him into error, never at least, give him the pure truth. But reason, being impersonal and divine, is the immediate inspiration of the Almighty, nay more, is absolutely infallible. It is enthusiasm, says Cousin, who defines inspiration by that term, that is, *God in us*.¹

How does M. Cousin and Mr. Morell, who also adopts and defends all this, prove the impersonality of the reason? They do not prove it—they merely affirm it. The whole thing is an assumption; for surely it is no proof of the impersonality and divinity of reason to

¹ *Gods in vous*. See "Histoire de la Philosophie," 2 s. Tome II. p. 135.

say, that it is not under the control of the will or the affections, or that it has its own sphere and its own laws.¹

Now, we respectfully ask, can such a position touching reason in man, be entertained except on the ground of subjective pantheism? Is reason, that which is highest in man, really not himself, but God? Is the soul of man finite by its personality, infinite by its reason? In a word, is it God in humanity, as Hegel also teaches, who thinks, and thus comes into consciousness and joy, in the palpitating spirit of the human race? In a word, are God and humanity one?

That the human spirit is so constituted as to form not only ideas according to sense, but ideas according to spirit, in a word, that it is endowed with the capacity of forming fundamental and universal axioms, which are the basis of all conviction, we cheerfully grant. But to assume that reason in man is the absolute and universal Reason, in other words, God; for God and universal Reason are one, is assuming one of the fundamental positions of Spinoza and Hegel, namely, that thought is absolute and divine, or, that Being and Thought are one.² It makes man literally nothing, except as a manifestation or expression of God. Logically carried out, it would establish the complete identity of all things, and swallow up mind and matter, the universe and man, in an absolute, universal spiritualism.

But Cousin's great claim to distinction, as an original thinker, is said to be his mode of crossing the chasm between the finite and the infinite, by means of "the impersonal Reason." This, then, will test the worth and power of his philosophy: for this is the grand problem, the *pons asinorum* of metaphysics. Let it be remembered, however, that simply to assume the two points or poles of this double fact, and the relation between them, is not to solve the problem. Any one can do that, and leave the whole question just where it was before. The solution sought, must show how the one has sprung from the other, and in what sense the one is involved in the other, especially how finite beings are dependent, and yet not dependent, as in the case of free agents, upon the infinite Being—how they are united, and yet separate, one and yet many. In a word, the problem to be solved is, how can there be unity and yet duality, or plurality, God and yet man? Are both, or all of these, in the higher elements of their existence, *identical*, the difference between them being only apparent

¹ Morell Hist. of Phil., p. 54. Compare p. 649 et seq.

² Indeed, Morell admits that, in his general positions upon this subject, Cousin is only "treading in the footsteps of his German predecessors."—Hist. Philos., p. 649.

and incidental? Is reason, for example, which gives to man his peculiar distinction in the scale of being, only God as the real essence and substratum of the human soul, and is it through this medium we reach the absolute, and thus identify ourselves with all that exists? Are Reason and Being one, and is God really infinite and finite at once; in other words, the All, not in a popular and moral, but absolute and metaphysical sense?

This, we maintain, is the real theory of M. Cousin. Through impersonal reason in man, he claims to reach the absolute, the infinite and eternal. Having risen to this elevation, how does he construct the universe of finite beings and finite forms? In a word, how does he solve the great problem to which we have referred, and briefly described as the problem of creation? Does God create out of nothing? No, says M. Cousin, God creates out of himself, he creates out of a creative energy. It is his nature to create. God is a cause, a cause which must necessarily pass into effect, which therefore eternally passes into effect.¹ Very well; but how? Please to solve the problem scientifically. How passes the infinite into the finite, mind into matter, God into man and angels? In other words, how does God, from his own spiritual and creative energy, construct the outward universe of finite beings and finite forms? It would seem to most persons an inscrutable mystery, and certainly no metaphysician, in ancient or in modern times, has made the slightest approach to its solution. M. Cousin, however, considers it the easiest thing imaginable. A few strokes of his facile and elegant pen are sufficient to reveal the mighty secret. "To create," says he, "is a thing not difficult to conceive, for it is a thing which we do every moment; in fact, we create whenever we perform a free action. I will, I form a resolution, I form another and another, I modify it, I suspend it, I prosecute it. What is it that I do? I produce an effect, which I refer to myself as its cause, as its only cause; so that, with reference to this effect I seek no cause above and beyond myself. This is to create. We create a free action, we create it, I say; for we impute it only to ourselves. It was not; it begins to be, by virtue of that principle of causality which we possess. Thus, to cause is to create; but with what? with nothing? By no means. On the contrary, with that which constitutes the very basis of our being. Man does not draw forth from nonentity, the act which he has not yet done, and which he is about to do; he draws it forth from the power which

¹ It will be seen that Cousin here endorses one of Spinoza's fundamental errors.

he has to do it, that is, from himself. Here is a type of a creation. The divine creation is the same in its nature.¹ God, if he is a cause, can create; and if he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create; and in creating the universe, he does not draw it forth from nonentity, which does not exist, which is only a word; he draws it from himself; for that power of causation and of creation, of which we feeble men possess a portion; and all the difference between our creation and that of God, is the general difference between God and man, the difference between the Supreme and Absolute Cause, and a relative, secondary cause."²

Well may we exclaim, as we gaze upon this product of the laboring mountain, What! is this all? Is creation nothing more than action, and especially a necessary, absolute, eternal action? Such is Cousin's position, and such, too, is Spinoza's. I move my hand—I trace lines upon paper;—is this creation? Does this bear even the remotest affinity, except in the idea of cause, to the Divine production of the universe, not from preëxistent materials, but from nothingness, that is to say, from God himself? You build a house, that is an act, or series of acts, which have a cause, a voluntary cause. Is it then a creation? Does it bear any proper analogy to the creative energy of God, springing, at his infinite volition, into worlds of light and beauty, or constructing, by a process utterly unknown to man, the numberless forms of concrete being? *Let there be light, and there was light!* God said, Let us make man in our image; and man, the lord of creation, walked in glory and in joy through the groves of Eden. Can man do such a thing as that; nay, can he form even the slightest conjecture as to the rationalé or mode of its production. We talk metaphorically of poetical creations and what not; but who, in his sober senses, believes that any one creates in the same sense that God creates? Is Milton divine? Great indeed, and so to speak inspired, but as incapable as a Hottentot, of creating a single ray of light, the petal of a flower, or the down upon an insect's wing. Creation, forsooth, it does come, on Cousin's notions, to a very small affair.

But, no, the chasm between the finite and the infinite cannot be crossed at this rate. A pretty figure of speech, or a handsome play upon words, does not solve the problem of the creation.

¹ To create "out of nothing," is not what Cousin represents it to be, when the expression is used by intelligent persons. It does not mean the production of an effect, without a cause; for, in this sense, *out of nothing, nothing comes*; it means simply to create, not out of pre-existent materials, but by an inherent creative power.

² Cours de l'Histoire de la Phil. (Introduction,) pp. 101, 102.

But Cousin admits that God creates; that is a good deal for a philosopher who goes into raptures at the name of Benedict Spinoza; and yet by the very terms it is quite evident that he denies it. God it seems, according to Cousin, is an absolute, necessary and eternal cause, or creative force, which cannot but pass into effect. The cause then exists for the effect, is controlled by the effect. Whence it follows, as Cousin avows, that God is "creating without cessation and infinitely." God then *must create*—this is his characteristic according to Cousin. He has no real choice in the matter; and the idea of a creation in time, a creation which has a beginning, is denied. The cause must pass into the effect whether it will or no; indeed, it was always cause, always effect. In which case creation is not, properly speaking, a *work*, but an *energy* or *act*, a necessary, perpetual, everlasting act. Cousin may admit, that God is first in the order of ideas, but in reality *creation* is as eternal as God, and can never be separate from God. God and the universe are eternally one. The whole is like the genesis of thought; subject and object, infinite and finite, go together, so to speak, necessitate and involve each other. Once more, then, thought and being are identical. God and nature are one, but one as subject and object, cause and effect. Hence Cousin's *Trinity*, bearing a striking resemblance to Hegel's; God absolute, and God conditioned, or God in himself, and God in the universe, and the relation between them, producing unity. Human consciousness has "three momenta"—a reflected Trinity, *unity*, *multiplicity* and the *relation* between them. So also, in God, according to Cousin, there is first, the absolute unity—then creation or plurality, and the relation between them. "The unity of the Triplicity, alone, is real; and at the same time this unity would utterly perish, if limited to either of the three elements which are necessary to its existence; they have all the same logical value and constitute one indecomposable unity. What is this unity? The divine intelligence itself. Up to this height, gentlemen, does our intelligence upon the wings of ideas—to speak with Plato—elevate itself. Here is that thrice holy God, whom the family of man recognises and adores, and before whom the octogenary author of the *Système du Monde*, bowed and uncovered his head, whenever he was named."¹

Here, then, in clear daylight, is Cousin's idealism, and notwithstanding all his protests, his pantheism, not indeed the vulgar pantheism which deifies only the outward creation, but a pantheism as

¹ "Histoire de la Philos." (Introduction), p. 95.

decided as that of Spinoza and Hegel. The result, on the fairest logical grounds is inevitable. God at last is *the All*, at once finite and infinite, cause and effect, immensity and space, mind and matter, divinity and humanity, eternity and time. Hence, with a boldness which is almost startling, he says: "God is at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only just so far as he is cause, and cause only just so far as he is substance; that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of being, and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple in a word, that is to say, at the same time, God, nature and humanity. Indeed, if God be not everything, he is nothing."¹ Cousin, indeed, claims to believe in a personal God—a being of intelligence and will; but inconsistently and illogically, provided his language is to be taken in its ordinary sense. Protest against it as he may, an absolute pantheism, which he speaks of as "the bugbear of feeble imaginations" has swept him within its fathomless depths.

The fact is, Cousin, with all his fine genius and attainments, is caught in the snare of a bewildering Ontology. Adopting the fundamental error of the identity of being and thought, of reason and God, and discarding the very possibility of mystery, he speculates as if he were in the confidence of Jehovah, and had assisted at the creation of the world. He makes no account of the limited powers and resources of man, none especially of his imperfect and sinful condition. His system, therefore, imposing and beautiful as it may be, is constructed upon the false foundations of the German ontology. His psychology, in which are many interesting details, is an after-thought, brought in to buttress the falling fabric, but only lending it imaginary support. Embodying many fine details, and splendid historical criticism, it is nothing more than an artificial *Eclecticism*, in other words, a piece of magnificent patchwork.

Never ought it to be forgotten that ideas are not facts; and an ideal philosophy, however logical and imposing, must finally be brought to the test of reality. One theory after another may be

¹ "Fragmens Philosophiques," Preface. Quoted at p. 120 of the "Introduction à l'Hist. de Philos." Cousin claims to reject pantheism, but he explains it as the deification only of the outward or material world. In this respect his views have been greatly misunderstood. For, while this pantheism may be rejected, and proofs upon proofs of the fact cited from his works, he may reserve his faith for another form of pantheism, more beautiful, but equally false.

projected, like meteors on the brow of night, and men may stare and shout, but the calm heavens roll on in their silent majesty, and mock our folly from afar. The fact is, the powers of man are bounded. He may desecry, — he may believe, — he may adore, the primal Source of being, the absolute and infinite Cause of all that exists; but he cannot make it a science or a philosophy. The attempt to do so has uniformly failed, will forever fail. It plunges the mind into an inextricable labyrinth of thought from which there is no escape. In this boundless "antrum," or as it were, illimitable forest, philosophy, like Polyphemus of old, has wildly wandered, with vast and gigantic powers, but struck with a fatal blindness, and rushing into inevitable destruction.

On the other hand, instructed by common sense and Divine Revelation, as to the necessary limits of the human mind, and taking things as they are, acting upon the spontaneous impulses of a purified soul, above all, guided by the Holy Spirit, the most illiterate Christian, though a child, often knows more of God, of himself, and of the universe, than the profoundest philosopher. Guided by knowledge and love, conveyed to the world through the mission of Christ, he is made "to lie down in green pastures, and led beside the still waters," while the proud metaphysician stumbles and perishes "on the dark mountains." Hence, says Isaac Barrow, quoting, in combination several passages from Chrysostom, "by virtue of faith, rustic and mechanic idiots¹ do, in true knowledge, surpass the most refined wits, and children prove wiser than old philosophers; an idiot can tell us that which a learned infidel doth not know; a child can assure us that, wherein a deep philosopher is not resolved — for, ask a boor, ask a boy educated in our religion, who made him; he will tell you, the Almighty God — which is more than Aristotle or Democritus would have told. Demand of him, why he was made; he will answer you, to serve and glorify his Maker — and hardly would Pythagoras or Plato answered so wisely. Examine him concerning his soul; he will aver that it is immortal, that it shall undergo a judgment after this life, that accordingly it shall abide in a state of bliss or misery everlasting — about which points, neither Socrates nor Seneca could assure anything. Inquire of him, how things are upheld, how governed and ordered; he presently will reply, by the powerful hand and wise providence of God — whereas, among philosophers, one would ascribe all events to the current of fate, another to the tides

¹ Idiots — common, ignorant persons.

of fortune ; one to the blind influences of the stars, another to a confused jumble of atoms. Pose him about the main points of morality and duty ; and he will, in a few words, better inform you than Cicero or Epictetus, than Aristotle or Plutarch, in their large tracts or voluminous discourses."¹

ARTICLE III.

RELIGIOUS BIBLICAL INSTRUCTION AND PASTORAL SUPERVISION IN COLLEGES.

By C. E. Stowe, D. D., Bowdoin College.

WHO can tell what tender affections, what earnest hopes, what fond anticipations are concentrated on a group of young men such as is found in all our colleges ? Could we see the anxious, throbbing, agonizing hearts — the father's earnestness, the mother's solicitude, the sister's love — could we make present to ourselves the pride and joy which are diffused through the family circle by the young student's success and good reputation — or the mortification, distress and bitter disappointment which follow his failure and shame — we should look upon every member of college, of whatever character, as an object of deep and permanent interest.

Whatever he may be in himself, he holds relations to others which invest him with dignity and importance. Let any man watch the yearnings of his own soul towards his own son, and then let him remember that what his son is to him, the sons of other parents are to them, and he never can despise any one who is a father's or a mother's child.

Important as every young man is to his family friends, considered in reference to himself, he is still more important, still more interesting. *There* is an immortal soul, destined to a never ending existence — and what an existence ! What capacities of enjoyment — what susceptibilities to suffering ! What powers in that one mind to be developed or crushed — to be a source of joy to the possessor, or of misery unutterable — and that forever ! And how delicate the mental and moral structure ! How liable to injury ! In what imminent

¹ Barrow's Works, Vol. II. p. 86, Edin. Edition.

peril of falling to ruin! If we were intrusted with the carriage of some fragile and priceless fabric, like the celebrated Portland vase, for example, and the road was rough and rocky — or if we were to transport, through stormy weather over an angry sea, some unique product of a Raphael's pencil, how careful should we be — how anxious lest an untimely jolt, or a wandering drop of water, should forever mar the precious deposit. Yet how infinitely small is the value of all works of human art, however excellent or unique, compared with the worth of the human soul, the product of an all-wise Creator's skill! It seems to me the man is mad who can lightly esteem any human being, when he once considers what a human being is.

Our physical creation, magnificent as it is, would have but little of interest or beauty, were it not for the intelligent souls, in curiously organized bodies, which inhabit it. How infinite the variety of pleasing sounds, and how attractive — how enchanting the power of music! But, what is sound? what is music? Without an ear to catch the vibrations of the air, there would be no such thing as sound; without the organ of hearing, music would have no existence. What is this magnificent arch of the heavens above us, but the combined action of light and vapor upon the eye? And if there were no eyes, there would be no sky. How beautiful is the rainbow, as it rests upon the bosom of the cloud! Yet, the eye is as necessary to give existence to the rainbow, as it is to see it after it is formed. How exquisite the beauties of color, as seen in the flowering plant, or the lustrous insect; but, without eyes to reflect the rays of light, there would be no such thing as color. And what are eyes, or ears, or nerves, without the intelligent soul within, to enjoy the results of their organization and action? In a very important sense, man himself is, passively at least, the creator of the harmony and beauty which we enjoy; and wonderful and beautiful as the works of creation are, man himself is the most wonderful, the most beautiful of all — the last production of creative skill, and the only one which bears the image of the Creator.

In Scripture, the whole visible creation is represented as being formed with reference to man, and as existing for man, in a sense so intimate, that all nature sympathizes with his weal or woe. When man fell, nature herself, the earth and its products, vegetation, animals, all fell under the curse, for his sake; and when the work of redemption shall have been completed, and man restored to his original holiness, by the mediation of the only begotten Son of God, then the creation itself, so long unwillingly subject to vanity, shall be de-

livered from the bondage of corruption, and restored to the glorious liberty of the sons of God. and there shall be new heavens and a new earth, wherein the righteous dwell, Rom. 8: 19-22, 2 Pet. 3: 13. For what purpose are all the arrangements of this world? What is the use of anything on this earth? Is it not that the world may be inhabited by comfortable, well-informed, well-behaved human beings? What but this are all the interests of society — all the use of governments, of civilization, of learning, commerce, manufactures, the whole social organization? And as the existence on earth is so transient, and the existence beyond the grave, eternal, what comparatively is worthy of a thought, except the salvation of the undying soul! Was it not for this that the Son of God for a season left the glory which he had with the Father before the world was, and dwelt, and labored, and suffered, and died on this earth?

In whatever aspect we view the subject, the moral and religious improvement of the young men gathered in our colleges, assumes the very first place in interest and importance. Everywhere the religious and moral training of the educated young man is important, and in our own country it is more emphatically so, for, here men never do things by halves, but whatever they are, that they are wholly, and nothing else. The French or the German young man, in his university life, may be dissipated within certain limits, not much overleap the boundaries which a worldly prudence prescribes, and in due time, as matter of course, become a staid, sober, dignified citizen. But not so with the American. Let the young man here, in his college years, act the inebriate or the profligate, and there is the end of him; he is never anything else; and early death, and a drunkard's grave, is the best that his friends can expect of him; for if his life is prolonged, it will be only the protraction of shame and woe. Frequent are the falls in our land, but rare, very rare, are the recoveries. How important, then, that there should be direct and earnest endeavors for the religious and moral culture of our college students! How much is depending upon it, both as it respects individual happiness and the well being of society at large! For it is our educated young men who will give tone to society, and control the destiny of the generation in which they live. The usual course of college study, however well chosen and earnestly pursued, cannot meet the object; for mere intellectual training, without careful moral culture, does not correct the evils of the heart; on the contrary, in many cases seems to aggravate them. The ever eloquent Cicero, who had a moral sense delicate and cultivated beyond almost any writer of the Pagan

world, saw this great truth very clearly. In the third book of his work, *De Natura Deorum*, he introduces Cotta arguing in the following strain :

“Sentit domus unius cuiusque, sentit forum, sentit curia, campus, socii, provinciae, ut quemadmodum ratione recte fiat, sic ratione peccetur. Alterumque et a paucis, et raro; alterum et saepe, et a plurimis: ut satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a Diis immortalibus datum esse rationem, quam tanta cum pernicie datam. Ut vinum aegrotis, quia prodest raro, nocet saepissime, melius est non adhibere omnino, quam spe dubiae salutis in apertam perniciem incurrere; sic haud scio, an melius fuerit, humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sit multis, admodum paucis salutaris, non dari omnino, quam tam munifice et tam large dari. Quae enim libido, quae avaritia, quod facinus aut scelus suscipitur nisi concilio capto, aut sine animi motu et cogitatione, id est, ratione perficitur? ——— Utinam igitur, ut illa anus optat,

—— ne in nemore Pelio securibus

Caesa cecidisset abiegna ad terram trabes,

sic istam calliditatem hominibus Dii ne dedissent! Qua perpauci bene utuntur; qui tamen ipsi saepe a male utentibus opprimuntur; innumerabiles autem improbe utuntur; ut donum hoc divinum rationis et consilii ad fraudem hominibus, non ad bonitatem impertitum esse videatur.”¹

The ordinary course of college discipline cannot meet the case; for this is merely negative in its character, directed only to the suppression of disorder, and not intended or adapted to win the confidence, or cultivate the affections. There must be something positive, something to bring forward the right as well as suppress the wrong — something which shall not only prevent the outgushing of bitter waters, but shall sweeten the fountain itself.

To effect this great purpose, the idea of God must be brought in close and continuous contact with the soul. Vice is mean, grovelling, earthly — a degradation of the immortal spirit, and for the soul to see and feel its relationship to God is its great security against the meanness of vice. The whole creation around us should be our temple, and every emotion of the mind an act of worship, if the heart would be secure from the assaults of the tempter. Let the young man learn to regard all that he sees as the workmanship of God; let him learn to admire the wonderful resources of the Divine mind, as developed in the objects of creation, which meet him at every turn; let him become conscious of the continued presence and operation of that Great Power, which

¹ *De Natura Deor.* III. 28-31 or 70-76, *Opera* ed. Orelli IV. ii. 113-115.

" Warm in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glow in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent ;"

let him become habituated to the great truths taught by Natural Religion ; — let these become a part of the daily aliment of his mind, and grow up into its permanent substance — and can low, earthly, grovelling vice take hold of him ? Not that the mere knowledge of nature can remove him from temptation, but the habit of contemplating nature in connection with the God of nature, the habit of communing with God whenever one studies nature — this it is which elevates the soul and raises it above the grosser forms of earthliness. If Natural Religion by itself cannot regenerate and sanctify, as we admit in general it cannot, it would seem that it might at least secure one against intemperance and licentiousness, and low, vulgar, filthy wickedness — and these are the forms of sin which most usually ruin our youth for this world.

Learning without God makes but a distorted mind — a soul for which God's dominions have no appropriate or safe place. Then should not God, and a knowledge of God, have a place, and a recognized, important, well-understood place in every college ? To avoid the evil of sectarianism, must we fall into the still greater evil of atheism ? To prevent our young men being bigots, shall we allow them to be infidels ? To give them *large and liberal minds on religious matters* (?) is it necessary, is it worth the while, will it requite the cost, to let them grow up under the influence of sensual youthful passion, without any of the counteracting influences of religion to restrain and control ? *No*, a third time *No* !!

We have a power altogether above and beyond that of Natural Religion — we have Revealed Religion, that *life and immortality which are brought to light in the gospel* — and this is and must be our great reliance, and here we have a sure and certain hope ; and let us not be so foolish as to refuse to avail ourselves of this power.

Wherewith shall a young man cleanse his way ? By taking heed thereto, according to thy word. Ps. 119: 9.

The power of the word of God must be our reliance for controlling the minds of our young men, and guiding them in paths of purity, usefulness and peace. The days of mere human authority are past, forms and modes once venerated have lost their influence, and the requirement to submit to any routine, solely on the ground that it has

been long submitted to, excites ridicule and aversion, rather than reverence and obedience.

We must have the word of God, and that word must commend itself to the unprejudiced mind by its own intrinsic merit; it must have within itself a persuasive power; it must meet the natural yearnings and spontaneities of the soul. Mere objective authority, even though it were the authority of God himself, would scarcely be submitted to in this generation of self-reliance and self-esteem. The *objective* must commend itself to the *subjective*, or there will be continuous revolting. They who are striving to hold men by mere ecclesiastical authority and church tradition, to restrain them by the force of antiquated customs and veneration for the wisdom and virtue of their ancestors, have most painful experience of this truth. They have more than both hands full of work; no sooner do they stop one leak-hole than a dozen others burst forth; the whole fabric is already half dissolved; and they find themselves in the condition of the fifty daughters of Danaus who were condemned to the task of carrying water in sieves.

In this matter of revealed religion, there must be authority, and authority implicitly submitted to, or the benefits of revealed religion cannot be realized. The most important topics of which revelation treats, are topics of which we know absolutely nothing, of which we have no means of knowing anything, except on the authority of the Revealer. The origin and the early history of our race; the origin of sin and evil; the way of redemption; the retributions of eternity; the nature of the spiritual world and the employments of the soul there; the nature, the number, and the condition of the original inhabitants of the spiritual world; these and hundreds of other subjects of a similar kind, and of the deepest interest, are utterly beyond the reach of all our natural means of information; we have not the means of forming even a probable conjecture concerning them, and unless we have a positive, objective revelation, we are wholly in the dark in regard to them. Concerning the condition of the inhabitants of the spiritual world, for example, or even whether there be any such inhabitants, or any such world—how can we know anything except by positive revelation from above? We have never been in the spiritual world to learn anything there of our own knowledge; we have never seen any one who has been there, that we might learn directly from him; and none of the original inhabitants of that world have ever dwelt with us, to tell us what they know of those unseen regions. I know there have been pretended voyages to the spiritual

world, even in our own time, and every age has been visited by ghosts and apparitions in numbers greater or less; but the character and conduct and doings of these pretended visitants, has, for the most part, been so uniformly and so monotonously silly — so exactly in the same strain and yet so abjectless and jejune, that we are compelled to think, if these are the spirits of the departed from this earth, certainly in dying they must have lost what little of common sense they ever possessed; or on the supposition that they are the original inhabitants of the world of spirits, we must feel towards them, after they have made such exhibitions of themselves, much as the simple-minded Trinculo felt towards the awfully dreaded Caliban, when he heard him begin to talk and found him ready to fall down and worship the drunken sailor Stephano, for giving him intoxicating drink: "By this good light, he is a very shallow monster — I afeard of him! — a very weak monster — a most poor, credulous monster — I could find in my heart to beat him, but that the poor monster's in drink — I shall laugh myself to death at this puppy-headed monster — a most scurvy, ridiculous monster." Examine all the histories of these ghost doings from the middle ages down through Cotton Mather and Justinus Kerner to the spiritual rappings and the ghostly riotings of our times, and they all have the same uniform character of petty annoyance and pertinacious silliness; so that, however formidable they might appear at first, we cannot in the end avoid coming to the same conclusion in regard to them that Trinculo did in regard to Caliban, that they are very shallow, weak, poor, scurvy, puppy-headed, ridiculous monsters. If these are actual specimens of the spiritual world, then the fables of Homer and Virgil are far preferable to the reality; and this world, imperfect and hard as it is, is altogether the most respectable part of God's dominions. And yet how many, who regard the revelations of the Bible with cold distrust and decided incredulity, receive with almost implicit confidence these ridiculous manifestations! So it often is, they who reject the truth with all evidence in its favor, embrace the grossest impostures with all evidence against them. So the Jews rejected Jesus Christ and received Bar Chochba as their Messiah; and we read in Scripture of those, upon whom, *because they received not the love of the truth that they might be saved, God sent strong delusions that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth but had pleasure in unrighteousness.* 2 Thess. 2: 10—12.

In the Bible only do we find information respecting the spiritual world, of such kind and given in such a way as to deserve respect and confidence. This is our only guide. On this and all kindred topics,

the Bible is the only chart of a coast otherwise wholly unknown; and yet a coast along which we must sail during the most interesting, the most critical part of our voyage. We may judge something of an unknown coast by the form and structure of the head-lands, the shape and flow of the waves, the change and run of the tides, etc., yet, from all these and other such sources very little indeed can be known; and a blind piece of work it certainly would be, arbitrarily, here and there, as caprice and pride might dictate, to throw aside the chart and sail by conjecture. Yet this is the way in which many deal with the Bible, and thus put in jeopardy the eternal interests of their future existence.

The Bible claims to be absolute and final authority on all spiritual matters; and from the very nature of the case, if it is not this, it is nothing, and worthy of no reliance. If it be not authority absolute and final, we have no means whatever of correcting its mistakes, of separating the true from the false — and having found it to be, in the most important particular, a false witness for itself, we can no longer know from itself what is worthy of belief and what is not. It is like employing a guide in a strange and difficult country, who pretends to know the whole way perfectly; but we scarcely enter on our journey, before we discover that with some very important parts of the road he is as little acquainted as we are. How much security should we feel with such a guide for the remainder of our travels?

It would be obviously impossible, in the limits assigned to us here, to go into a full discussion of the doctrine of inspiration. We must confine ourselves to one point, namely, the authority of Christ as a divine teacher, which few at this day seem willing openly to deny. Yet if we admit His authority, in any proper sense of the term, the authority of the Bible as a revelation from God is established beyond all reasonable doubt.

Christ claimed for himself full authority, as a teacher commissioned and qualified by God, to give instruction infallibly true, and of paramount authority on all spiritual matters.

Matt. 11: 29, 30. John 5: 20 — 24, 39 — 43. 8: 42 — 49. 18: 39.

The same authority which he claimed for himself, he ascribes most fully to the prophets and writers of the Old Testament; and even rests, in a most important sense, the validity of his own claims, on the fact, that in his person the Old Testament scriptures were fulfilled.

Matt. 26: 24 — 31. Luke 22: 39. 24: 25 — 29. 44 — 46. (Compare 1 Cor. 9: 8 — 10. 10: 1 — 11. 2 Tim. 3: 14 — 17. 2 Pet. 1: 19 — 21,

for the estimate in which the apostles held the scriptures of the Old Testament, as they were taught to hold them by the Lord. Luke 24: 32 — 46. Also the whole epistles to the Romans, Galatians, Hebrews.)

He promised also, in the most explicit manner, to endue his apostles and the writers of the New Testament, with the same authority which he himself possessed.

John 19: 18. 20: 21. Matt. 28: 19. 10: 19, 20. Luke 12: 11, 12. 24: 49. Matt. 16: 19. 18: 18.

He even engaged to reveal to them, by the influences of the Holy Spirit, truths, beyond those which he had ever taught personally.

John 16: 9, 12, 13, 14. 14: 25, 26.

And this authority was understood to extend to their written, as well as their oral instructions, as is demanded of course by the very nature of the case.

Acts 15: 20. 2 Thess. 2: 15. Ephes. 3: 2, 3. 2 Pet. 3: 15, 16.

And he confirmed all these claims by such mighty works as no man could do except God were with him.

John 3: 2. Matt. 11: 2 — 6. John 5: 36. 14: 10, 11. 15: 29.

And those for whom he made these claims, made the same claims for themselves.

1 Cor. 2: 10 — 13. Gal. 1: 11, 12. 15 — 19. 2 Pet. 3: 15, 16.

And they performed the same mighty works in confirmation of their claims.

Mark 16: 15 — 20. Acts 5: 12, 15, 16. 8: 5 — 8. 19: 11, 12.

And forasmuch as their claims might be more liable to be disputed than his, Christ promised to them a still stronger external attestation, even greater works than he himself had performed.

John 14: 12. Acts 5: 15. 19: 12.

This promise of Christ, however, whatever reference it may be supposed to have to the *manner* of performing some miracles (as above cited), undoubtedly refers mainly, perhaps exclusively, to the great spiritual results of the teachings of the apostles, the foundation of the Christian church, the conversion of the Gentiles, etc. — an attestation which continues with unabated, nay with augmenting force, to the present time.

The authority of the whole Bible is thus affirmed by the personal and oft-repeated testimony of Christ: and if it be not authority, Jesus himself is found a false witness, and unworthy of credit on any subject. If we know that in one instance he taught wrong, how can we know, on his own authority, that in any instance he teaches right?

Of course we do not expect that anybody will, in these days, take

anything on trust, at least anything good. Whatever authority is gained for the Bible, we expect to work for it. All we ask, as the basis of our operations, is, a reasonable degree of intelligence and candor. The mind must be trained to see the grounds on which the claim of Scripture rests, to recognize these claims and submit to them. The age is full of scepticism, of evasions, of nullifications of the Divine authority. Doubts are started as to particular texts, as to certain books, the whole Old Testament, a large portion of the New ; certain statements and certain doctrines are objected to as unworthy of God ; or, to get rid of disagreeable truths, the whole Bible, by means of forced interpretations, is politely bowed out of society ; and the last method is frequently resorted to by the most rigid dogmatizers, as well as the loosest libertines in theology. Men are willing that the Bible should give them a lift now and then, but only so far and in such direction as they please. The influence of so great and good a man as Neander, falls in with these corrupt tendencies of the age, encourages and increases them ; and his example and his teachings, in this respect, become far more pernicious than they could have been, had he been less excellent, less learned, less sincerely and devotedly a Christian. He himself seemed fully conscious of the danger to be apprehended from this source ; and scarcely made a secret of his regret that his *Life of Christ* was about to be translated and published in America. He seemed to think (and justly, I suppose) that our young men would be rather better off without it than with it ; though it might do good in Germany, where men were already so far from the Bible, and have a tendency to bring them back towards it ; yet, in America it would be found, he feared, to be beneath the prevailing standard, and would therefore lower the tone of reverence and submission to the Divine authority, rather than elevate it. Such apprehensions are seen everywhere peeping out from his letter prefixed to the American edition of his work. The good man ! the corrupt atmosphere in which he had always lived, had touched the conclusions of his understanding more than the feelings of his heart.

Here the great moral battle of the age is to be fought on this question : Has the Scripture any binding authority ? Are its teachings of any weight to us, except so far as we can approvingly reproduce the same ideas in our own minds ? In other words, is revelation *objective*, or is it merely *subjective* ? Does God reveal himself to man, or is man himself the only revealer of God ? Most fully and distinctly do we take the ground of the binding authority, of the *objectiveness* of revelation. Most decidedly do we believe that God speaks

in the Bible, and with a clearness of utterance altogether beyond that which we can find in our own consciousness, or in the works of creation around us—and therefore it is the duty of men to hear, to believe, and to obey. The Bible itself is *the revelation*, and not merely *the record of a revelation*.

Now, with these premises to start from, what is the only proper and safe method of dealing with this matter? By the appropriate methods, by strict, laborious, faithful, historical and critical research, we must ascertain what books were recognized by Christ and his apostles as of divine authority; then in like manner must we ascertain the condition of these books as to integrity and incorruptness; and, finally, having thus made ourselves sure of the words, we must learn the meaning of the words just as we learn the meaning of the words of any other book—only, never forgetting that the Holy Ghost, which inspired the writers of the sacred volume, is also needed—and promised to aid the readers of it—and *here our responsibility ends*. The meaning being ascertained, all we have to do is, to take the meaning just as it is given, to yield at once unconditional, unquestioning submission to the divine authority, without any reservation or equivocation. Now, here is a resting place, and our only resting place. Here we have a firm foundation which can never be moved; and this is the position, and the only position exactly adapted to the human mind—which fully meets its capacities and emotions, its oft recurring fears, and its conscious weaknesses. A fellow man may tell me what he pleases about what is perfectly plain to his reason, and what he knows by his own consciousness; my reason and my consciousness are as good for me as his are for him (at least, good or bad, they are all that I have, and I must use them for want of better;) but when God speaks to me, then I know, then I can believe, then I can safely submit. In short, the enlightened Christian must put the Bible and its authority, just where the blinded papist puts the church and its authority. The want which drives the papist to the church is a real one, a want inseparable from human nature in its present state; but he goes to the wrong place to find a supply for it. Let the Christian go to the right place.

And it is wonderful how Divine providence, in these days, is opening the resources for ascertaining the integrity and incorruptness of the Bible, beyond what has been done in any former age.

The monumental hieroglyphics of Egypt, keeping pace with the Bible history from the age of Abraham, to the time of the latest Jewish kings; the mysterious arrow-headed characters on the archi-

tectural remains of the ancient Persian empire, involving the Bible narrative from the destruction of the Hebrew monarchy, to the very close of the Old Testament canon — have both been deciphered and read during our own generation, and with the most wonderful and gratifying results. And even now, the long buried monuments of the old Assyrian empire, of which almost nothing had before been known, which, like a restless ghost, has only occasionally appeared on the field of history, and then instantly vanished; but which yet is intimately interwoven with the Bible history, from the very commencement of historic narrative in the tenth chapter of Genesis, quite down to the minor prophet, Nahum, a period of not less than 1500 years, — the chroniclers, I say, of this old monarchy, are now emerging from their 3000 years' burial under ground, talking in their strange old half Hebrew tongue, and telling us important passages of their eventful story, which modern linguistic skill has already begun successfully to interpret.¹ Who can fail to see, that as man becomes sceptical and unbelieving, God too takes care to turn his scepticism and unbelief to shame?

But here we are met with an objection. How are the people to make these learned and laborious investigations? How are they to know what is the word of God, and whether we have it entire and incorrupt?

The people at large are not to make these investigations. It is impossible that they should make them. They have neither the time, nor the opportunity, nor the capacity to do it; and God neither requires nor expects it of them. And therefore he has not given the Word alone — but the Word in connection with the unperishing Church and the living Ministry — that Church which will never cease till Christ again appears to reestablish forever his authority over man, and that Ministry which is to be Christ's Ambassador and Christ's Interpreter on earth, till his great and final advent.

It is the business of the ministry to make these investigations — to ascertain these points — to be the divinely authorized teachers in regard to them — to be the mouth of God to the people. If the people will have a ministry incapable of making these investigations, or unwillingly to attend to them — a ministry incompetent, unfaithful, or dishonest, the responsibility is their own, and they must bear the loss.

There have always, from the beginning to the present time, been teachers incompetent and false; men in all ages have been misled and

¹ How much is to come of this, time only can show.

ruined by them; the prophecies, the gospels, the epistles abound with warnings against them. Still, the living, teaching ministry is an essential, integral part of the Divine economy, an indisputable link in the chain of salvation; and the Bible for the people, without the ministry, is quite as far from God's plan, as the ministry without the Bible for the people—which last is the pernicious, corrupting, mischief-making error of the Romish church. The ministry must teach, and teach, too, with authority; and the people must be taught. The people, in order to be taught, must be teachable; and the minister, in order to teach, must first himself learn; and then, according to the apostolic injunction, he must *let no man despise him*.

A good man, pleading a good cause, has an influence which no bad man can have; his words have an authority which the words of no bad man ever can have. People who have neither learning nor acuteness enough to detect a false statement or sophistical argument, yet, if their hearts are in sympathy with the good and true, are very quick to *feel* the difference between a false teacher and a true one—and these, if I may so call them, *moral instincts* of the regenerate, are often appealed to by the sacred writers in reference to this very point of distinguishing the true teacher from the false.

There is something in divine truth, worthily exhibited, which awakens a response in every human heart, not utterly given over to earthliness and degradation. Independently of all argument, independently of all views of utility, of all reachings forth for happiness, a divine truth fitly presented will force a throb in the soul as surely as a pulsation in the atmosphere will produce a sound in the air.

There is no need of argument—the thing comes of itself—and our strongest, most abiding, most useful convictions, are often those which spring directly from the heart, without any conscious exertion of the discursive faculty. Says an eccentric but brilliant writer: “He who denies the existence of God is certainly a fool. He who thinks it always necessary to demonstrate his existence by argument, is a still greater fool.” In the same strain writes Matthias Claudius: “No one can with truth reproach me for being a philosopher; yet I never go through the woods without having it whispered within me, Who made these trees grow so beautifully? and then softly and as if from a great distance, comes to me, as it were the voice of a great Unknown. I’ll bet you, I am then thinking of God, with such joyous reverence do I tremble while I am thinking.”

There is, at the present time, peculiar need of thorough Biblical instruction in all our colleges. The wants of the age on this subject

are imperative; the evil to be counteracted is wide-spread, insidious and most destructive. There are many who receive the Bible, on the whole, as a divine revelation, who regard Jesus Christ, especially, as a teacher sent from God, who would be shocked to be spoken of as infidels, and most of all, to be regarded as the enemies or the rejecters of Christ — who yet, practically, give to the Bible very little authority, consider much of it as antiquated and even obsolete, and doubt whether the writers of it had an inspiration different in kind from that which other men have had, though perhaps in some respects higher in degree. This is an error particularly pervading the educated and active young men of the present generation throughout the world; and is one of the offshoots of a pernicious philosophy, which does not recognize the existence of a personal, self-conscious Deity, but regards the human mind as the only representative of the divine, and the creation of the human soul as the only act by which the Creator can become conscious to himself of his own existence. Of course, individual immortality is also denied, and the whole history of intellectual existence is, nothing but an eternal emanation from and re-absorption into the in itself unconscious divine essence. This philosophy, like a miasmatic atmosphere, corrupts many who do not know of its existence, and undermines the whole authority of revelation with not a few who imagine themselves firm believers in revealed religion. Nowhere is this philosophy of negation and destruction working more mischief than among the young men of our colleges; and if prompt, efficient and appropriate measures are not speedily taken to counteract it, we shall soon have all our learned professions, not excepting even the clerical, controlled by subtle pantheists, who will insidiously profess all reverence for the Bible, pay the tribute of a simulated respect to piety, and perpetually use with all seriousness and gravity the technical phrases of the most orthodox theology, entirely emptied of their original meaning, and made simply the hieroglyphics of an atheistic mystery.

From such a consummation, already realized in some portions of the old world, may the good Lord forever deliver this land of the Puritans!

In some subsequent number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* we shall show what this philosophy has already done and is now doing with the most sacred portions of the Christian revelation.

ARTICLE IV.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

It is a gratifying fact, that amidst the prevalent scepticism in Germany, the Scriptures have found able defenders. If the authenticity and integrity of the sacred books have been assailed with great pertinacity and acuteness, they have also been vindicated with signal ability and success. Talent has been matched with equal talent; learning has been confronted with still ampler knowledge. In the benignant providence of God, the country which has supplied the poison has furnished the antidote.

But however important the defence of the Bible may be in Germany itself, it is thought by some to be a superfluous task in Great Britain and in this country. Why should English and American scholars trouble themselves with the Teutonic scepticism? Why should our periodical publications lay before their readers the results of inquiries which would never else be entered upon, the solution of doubts which would never else be started? A sufficient answer is, that the scepticism is not confined, and cannot be, to the continent of Europe any more than English or French infidelity in the last century, could be confined to London and Paris. Error flies on the wings of every wind. It is impossible to lay an embargo upon it in any country of Christendom. It will meet and battle with truth on every field. Papal and neological dogmas cannot be imprisoned in the countries of their birth. Our candidates and ministers would do well to resort to the great Protestant armories of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and be prepared on all points to meet the Bellarmins and Bossuets of the present day. Alike necessary will it be to encounter the sophistries of the "higher criticism," which has had its congenial soil in Germany. The emigration to this country from the German States is very large, and will occasion, no doubt, the influx of no inconsiderable amount of learned rationalism. The new States will be particularly obnoxious to this evil. To encounter it successfully, truth must have her numerous and well-trained champions. Besides, the mischief is widely propagated through the written page. It is stated, on high authority, that well prepared translations of Strauss's "cunningly devised" work on the Gospels,

is largely circulated and read in England, in the form of tracts. It may soon be found that the elaborate work of Dr. Davidson on the New Testament, in which he has refuted (as some suggest unnecessarily) so many errors of the Strauss and Tübingen schools was published none too early.

Another answer would be that in discussing and overthrowing an error, valuable truths are elicited. The collision casts new light on some important doctrine. Fresh and interesting aspects of a subject are presented, which might have remained, in the ordinary and peaceful study, forever unknown. The strength of a beam is not known till it is tested by a heavy weight. Truth is not seen to be invincible till it has come out of a sharp encounter. Amid the storms of the last thirty years, it has struck its roots deeper than ever. Till it felt the tempest, it was not known how sound its heart was. The impregnable position in which the Gospels stand was not apprehended, till Strauss and his followers had exhausted their quivers. For these reasons, and others that might be named, we think that no apology is needed for the frequent discussions in our pages of topics in biblical criticism, and for meeting, so far as we are able, the attacks which are made on the volume of inspiration, whatever form they may assume. In so doing, we are consulting the best interests of the church and of the country, by providing weapons by which the truth may be successfully defended.

It is for the reasons above stated, in part, that we have translated and condensed the article which follows. It is the substance of the Introduction to the Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to Timothy and Titus, published in Göttingen in 1850, by Dr. J. E. Huther of Schwerin. It is well known that the genuineness of these epistles has been doubted or strenuously denied by De Wette and others, on several grounds, which will be specified. Dr. Huther has, as we think, satisfactorily refuted these objections, and vindicated the Pauline authorship. Great value has been given to the discussion, also by the manner in which the author has discussed the question of a second imprisonment of Paul at Rome. It is well known, that this has long been a subject of great interest, and involved in no little difficulty. It appears to us that Dr. Huther, if he has not completely established the theory of a second imprisonment, has at least rendered it much more probable than that of a single imprisonment, on which Wieseler has lately expended so much pains and so many acute remarks. Dr. Huther's commentary is the latest which has appeared on the Pastoral Epistles, and is a continuation of that of Dr. Meyer.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICES OF TIMOTHY AND TITUS.

Timothy was the son of a Christian Jewess, whose name was Eunice; his father was a Greek. His birth-place cannot be definitely determined, for that *Δεσβαῖος*, Acts 20: 4, is to be connected with *καὶ Τιμόθεος*, is at least very improbable, since the position of the *καὶ* is rather against this connection than in favor of it. That *ἑκεί*, Acts 16: 1, refers to "Lystra," is in the highest degree probable, but it does not follow that Timothy was born in Lystra. Timothy had received a pious education from his mother and grandmother, whose name was Lois; he was also conversant from a child with the sacred Scriptures of the Jews, 2 Tim. 1: 5. 3: 14, 15. Paul became acquainted with him first at Lystra, on his missionary journey. He was already a disciple, *μαθητής*, and was well reported of among the believers in Lystra and Iconium. That Paul calls him his "son," 1 Tim. 1: 1. 2 Tim. 1: 1. 1 Cor. 4: 17, arises from the fact that he had received his first knowledge of the Gospel through the Apostle, either immediately, or through his mother and his grandmother, 2 Tim. 3: 14. Paul took him as a helper in his work; yet he previously circumcised him, as his father was known in that region to be a heathen. As an assistant Timothy accompanied the Apostle on his journey to Philippi. When Paul and Silas left this city, Acts 16: 40, Timothy, with some others of Paul's companions, seems to have remained there some time. In Berea, they were again together. When Paul journeyed to Athens, Timothy and Silas continued in Berea; still, Paul left word for him to come to him immediately, Acts 17: 14, 15; this probably he did. Not long after, Paul sent him to Thessalonica, to ascertain the condition of the church there and to strengthen it, 1 Thess. 3: 1—5. When Timothy had performed this duty, he again met Paul at Corinth. Timothy's name is inscribed in the two epistles to the Thessalonians, which Paul wrote from this place, 1 Thess. 1: 1. 2 Thess. 1: 1. When Paul, on his third missionary tour, tarried a long time at Ephesus, Timothy was with him; where he had been in the intermediate time is not known. Still, before the uproar caused by Demetrius, Paul sent him from Ephesus to Macedonia, Acts 19: 22. Immediately Paul wrote the so-called first Epistle to the Corinthians, from which it appears that Timothy had been directed to go to Corinth, but that Paul did not suppose that he would reach the city, till after the reception of the epistle, 1 Cor. 4: 17. 16: 10, 11. When Paul wrote from Macedonia the second epistle to the

Corinthians, Timothy was again with him, for his name appears in the superscription; this would be inserted the more readily, as Timothy had just left Corinth. Then he went with Paul to Corinth, for that he was with him there is shown by the salutation which Paul conveys from him to the church in Rome, Rom. 16: 21. When Paul, after three months' abode, left Greece, Timothy, with other helpers, accompanied him. He journeyed with him *ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας*, i. e. to Philippi, whence was the route over to Asia Minor. Thence Timothy and some others preceded Paul to Troas, where they remained till the Apostle arrived, Acts 20: 3—6. Here there is a large gap in Timothy's history, as he is not again named till Paul's imprisonment at Rome. That he was with the Apostle, is clear from the fact that his name is in the inscription to Paul's epistles to the Colossians, Philemon and the Philippians; another reason for the supposition is, that none of Paul's companions stood in so close relations to him as Timothy. When Paul wrote to the Philippians he designed to send Timothy as soon as possible to them, so as to learn more exactly the circumstances of the church, Phil. 2: 19, seq. From the two epistles to Timothy, we learn the following facts in regard to his life. On a journey to Macedonia, Paul sent him back to Ephesus, that he might there oppose the false doctrines that were constantly extending, 1 Tim. 1: 3. Probably, when entering on this service, if not earlier, Timothy was solemnly consecrated to his office by the laying on of hands by the Apostle and the "presbytery," where the fairest hopes were expressed concerning him, by prophetic words, comp. 1 Tim. 1: 18. 4: 14, 2 Tim. 1: 6; he had already witnessed a good confession, 1 Tim. 6: 12. Still, Paul then hoped immediately to come to him. At a later time, Paul found himself a prisoner at Rome. When he anticipated his death as drawing near, he wrote to Timothy that he should come to him immediately, before winter, that he should bring Mark with him, and also certain articles which he had left at Troas, 2 Tim. 4: 9, 13, 21.

There is no mention of Timothy elsewhere in the New Testament, except in Heb. 13: 23; that the Timothy here named might be another Timothy, is certainly possible, but it is not probable. From this passage, it appears that Timothy, when the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, was a second time set at liberty, and that the author of the epistle intended, in company with Timothy, if he came soon, to see those to whom the epistle was sent. According to church tradition, Timothy was the first bishop of Ephesus.¹ From the First Epistle

¹ Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. III. 4, says: *Τιμόθεος τῆς ἐν Ἐφέσῳ παρωκίας ἱεροποιεῖται πρῶτος τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν εἰληθέναι.* Comp. also Const. Apost. 1, 7, c. 46, Photii Bibl. 254, Chrysost. Homil. 15 in 1 Tim.

to Timothy, we merely learn that the oversight of the church at Ephesus was committed to Timothy by the Apostle, a similar office to that exercised by the apostles over the Christian churches; it was a station in which the later special episcopal office might have taken root, yet it is by no means to be regarded as identical with it.

We have still less knowledge of the life of Titus than of that of Timothy. He also was a helper of Paul, and as such is first named, Gal. 2: 1, Paul mentioning, that on a journey to Jerusalem, undertaken fourteen years after his conversion, he took Titus with him. Though he was of heathen descent, Paul did not permit him to be circumcised, as he would not "give place" to his adversaries. When Paul had written the First Epistle to the Corinthians, he sent Titus to Corinth, so as to obtain information of the state of the church. After Paul had hoped in vain to find him at Troas, 2 Cor. 2: 12, he met him in Macedonia, 2 Cor. 7: 6. The notices which Titus brought, occasioned the writing of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. With this epistle he sent Titus the second time to Corinth, where he was to complete the collections for the poor saints at Jerusalem, which had been before commenced, 2 Cor. 8: 6. 16: 23. When Paul was imprisoned at Rome, Titus had gone to Dalmatia, 2 Tim. 4: 10.

From the epistle itself, we learn, that Titus had aided the apostle in his missionary labors in Crete, and was left there by him, in order to finish what was further needed for the church, Tit. 1: 5. In ch. 3: 12, Paul directs him to come to him at Nicopolis, where he expected "to winter." As the apostle calls him his "genuine son, according to the common faith," it would appear that he was converted by Paul.

Ecclesiastical tradition makes Titus the first bishop of Crete. Eusebius, after stating in regard to Timothy, what we have already quoted, goes on to say, "As Titus, who was over the churches in Crete."¹ Titus is said to have died in Crete, in his 94th year, and to have been buried there.

TIME OF WRITING THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

First Epistle to Timothy. In respect to the time of the authorship of this epistle, different views have prevailed from an early period, as it is difficult to bring it, in accordance with the internal indications, within the sphere of Paul's life known to us. According to the notices in the epistle, Paul and Timothy were together for a long time

¹ Hist. Eccl. III. 4. Comp. Hieron. Catal. Script. Eccl., Theodoret in 1 Tim. III. Theophylact, Proem. ad Tit., Const. Apos. VII. 46.

in Ephesus; then Paul journeyed to Macedonia, and left Timothy in Ephesus, to oppose the false doctrines taught there. Probably Paul wrote to him this epistle from Macedonia, in which he reminds him of his service in Ephesus, and gives him the instructions already mentioned; for if he hoped immediately to return to Ephesus, still he might think that delay was possible. According to the Acts, Paul was twice in Ephesus, the first time on his second missionary tour from Antioch, as he returned from Corinth to Antioch, Acts 18: 19. In the first instance, he stopped there but a short time, as he wished to be at Jerusalem at the approaching feast. During this period, we cannot at all place the authorship. Paul was at Ephesus the second time, on his third missionary tour. He remained there between two and three years, and, after the commotion caused by Demetrius, travelled to Macedonia and Greece. Theodoret, and many other interpreters after him, suppose that Paul wrote the First Epistle to Timothy, on this journey to Macedonia, or in Macedonia, Acts 20: 1, 2. Still, the following circumstances are adverse to this view: 1. According to Acts 19: 20, Paul had already sent Timothy to Macedonia, before his own departure from Ephesus. That Timothy, who had a commission to go to Corinth, 1 Cor. 4: 17, returned to Ephesus before the apostle left that city, as the latter certainly may have expected, 1 Cor. 16: 11, is not stated. 2. When Paul undertook the journey to Macedonia, he seems by no means to have designed to return immediately to Ephesus, as he decidedly hoped to do, when he wrote the epistle, 1 Tim. 3: 14, for, on his return from Greece, he passed from Troas without stopping at Ephesus, Acts 20: 16. We must, therefore, if this theory is correct, conclude that Paul afterwards altered the determination which he still cherished in Macedonia; yet, of such alteration there is not the smallest trace, but, according to 1 Cor. 16: 3, 4 and Rom. 15: 23-5, he had already designed, on his travels through Macedonia to Corinth, and then in Corinth itself, to travel thence as rapidly as possible to Jerusalem. 3. According to 2 Cor. 1: 1, Timothy was with Paul when the latter wrote his second epistle to the Corinthians, from Macedonia, and according to Acts 20: 4, he accompanied the apostle in his journey from Corinth to Philippi. Consequently Timothy, after Paul's departure from Ephesus, must likewise have left that city, though the apostle had directed him to remain there till his return, which still can with difficulty be supposed. All these reasons show that the journey of the apostle from Ephesus to Macedonia, mentioned Acts 20: 1, cannot be the same of which he speaks 1 Tim. 1: 3.

In order to reconcile the authorship of the epistle with the relations known to us from the Acts, some interpreters, particularly Bertholdt and Matthies, have recourse to Acts 20: 3-5. They suppose that Timothy left Corinth before the apostle, and then went to Ephesus, (which Luke indeed does not mention,) where he received the epistle from Paul. Matthies seeks to fortify this opinion, by inferring from 1 Tim. 1: 3, that Paul had directed Timothy to go to Macedonia, thence to proceed and to stop in Ephesus. But this explanation cannot in any manner be justified; the passage rather makes decidedly against it. But leaving this out of the account, the theory can be maintained only by charging on Luke, as Bertholdt does, an historical inaccuracy. "I believe," he says, "that Acts 20: 4, 5, puts us on the right track, only I think, at the same time, that Luke has not given the account with entire accuracy. His notice that Timothy preceded Paul to Asia Minor, is indeed perfectly correct, but there is an inaccuracy in the account that Timothy journeyed in company with Sopater, Aristarchus, etc., and with them awaited Paul at Troas. It is in the highest degree probable that Timothy started from Corinth with these helpers of Paul, but that he took the direct course to Ephesus." Since Luke states definitely that Timothy accompanied the apostle to Asia, together with other friends, (*συνέπειο αὐτὸν ἄλλοι τῆς Ἀσίας*), that Timothy went first to Troas, and that Paul met them¹ in Troas, then has Luke, if Bertholdt is correct, not only given an inaccurate, but an entirely false account. Should his notice not be considered as a falsification of the fact, then we must suppose that Paul had instructed Timothy to go to Ephesus, etc. But this is contradicted by 1 Tim. 3: 14, since Paul then had no intention to go to Ephesus; besides, it is not conceivable why Paul in this case did not give his instructions to Timothy verbally, rather than communicate them in writing *immediately* after his departure, which would seem the more strange, as he himself would go to Ephesus *forthwith*. Still more untenable are the hypotheses of Paulus, that the epistle was written during the Apostle's imprisonment at Caesarea; of Schneckenburger, that it was written in Jerusalem at the time mentioned Acts 21: 26; of Böttger, at Patara, Acts 21: 1, or in Miletus, Acts 20: 17. Against all these hypotheses is the fact, that they alike render necessary an arbitrary handling of 1 Tim. 1: 3.

If one will not allow himself in these arbitrary interpretations,

¹ *Οἱ τοὶ* v. 5, refers obviously to all the persons before named, consequently also to Timothy.

there then remains (supposing that the Epistle was written in that portion of Paul's life recorded by Luke in the Acts), only the supposition that the journey of the apostle from Ephesus to Macedonia, mentioned 1 Tim. 1: 3, when Timothy was left behind at Ephesus, occurred during the two or three years' abode of Paul in Ephesus, without being mentioned by Luke. This supposition, which Mosheim and Schrader favored, Wieseler (*Chronologie des Apostolischen Zeitalters*), setting aside the manifest errors with which they connected it, has endeavored to prove as the only one which is correct. The possibility is allowed, that Luke may have omitted to mention not merely one journey of the apostle; several passages in the Epistles to the Corinthians, (1 Cor. 16: 17. 2 Cor. 2: 1. 12: 14. 13: 1, 2. 12: 21,) place it beyond doubt, that Paul, before he wrote the Epistles to the Corinthians, had been in Corinth not once but twice, though in the second instance he stayed but a short time. For this journey, of which Luke says nothing, there is no other place in the history of the Apostle, except during his abode in Ephesus (Wies. pp. 233 seq.), so that it is necessary to regard the journey to Macedonia mentioned 1 Tim. 1: 3, as identical with the one to Corinth, and to conclude that the first Epistle to Timothy was written on this journey from Macedonia. But there are several objections to this theory. Against the suggestion that the organization of the church presupposed in the epistle, as well as the requisition that the *ἐπίσκοπος* should not be a *νεόφυτος*, imply a longer existence of the church, Wieseler indeed remarks that that journey was undertaken by the apostle just before the close of his residence in Ephesus, so that the church there had been in existence long enough to justify the presupposed organization and the requisition in regard to the "elders;" but this supposition again has its difficulty from the fact that according to it, the apostle *himself* was in Corinth *shortly* before he wrote the first epistle to the Corinthians, and that consequently there could have been no sufficient occasion for *writing* to the church there. Besides, Acts 20: 29, 30 is against Wieseler's view. According to the epistle, false doctrines had already penetrated into the Ephesian church, but, according to the passage in Acts, Paul describes the introduction of false doctrines as to be expected in the future. If we allow that the words *εἰς ὑμῶν ἀνθρώπων* refer not to the church, but only to the elders assembled at Miletus, still *εἰς ὑμᾶς*, v. 29, is to be understood of the Ephesian Christians generally; and assuredly Paul, in his address to the elders, would not omit to mention the presence of false teachers if he knew that the church were so seriously threatened by them, that he had

thought it necessary at an earlier day to warn Timothy against them, as he has done in his Epistle to him. Besides, according to Wieseler's view, Paul had been separated from Timothy only a *short time*, and after his return to Ephesus, must have sent him *forthwith* from that city. But how does this agree with the entire character of the Epistle? The instructions which Paul gives to Timothy manifestly show that the latter was to *labor* long in the church, and the more threatening to the church the false doctrines were, the more unlikely it appears that Paul, so soon after the communication of those instructions, should have withdrawn Timothy from his labors in the church.

The Epistle to Titus. The historical relations to which the epistle points are these: After Paul had labored in Crete, he left Titus there; then he wrote to him the epistle, which he probably sent by Zenas and Apollos, Tit. 3: 13, in which he directs him as soon as he had sent Artemas and Tychicus to him, to hasten himself to come to the Apostle at Nicopolis, where he had concluded to pass the winter.—The Epistle contains nothing definite on the first planting of Christianity in Crete, nothing on the duration and extent of the Apostle's labors there, nothing on the length of time between the departure of the Apostle from Crete and the writing of the epistle; but it is probable that the Gospel was not first preached in Crete by any other apostle, as it was Paul's maxim, not to enter into another's labors. Paul had probably labored in Crete some time, for 1: 5 presupposes that when Paul wrote the epistle, there were Christians in the principal cities, at least in a number of cities; it is probable that the epistle was written by Paul not long after his departure, for it could not be supposed that he would leave his substitute long without written instructions; finally, it is probable that Paul had given Titus these instructions a long time before winter, for only on the supposition that Paul had allotted a considerable time to Titus for labor on the island, would he have given these instructions.

If we suppose that the epistle was written during that part of Paul's life recorded in the Acts, then we may inquire whether his visit in Crete and the writing of the epistle took place *before* or *after* or *during* his two or three years' abode in Ephesus. Each supposition has had its supporters.

Those who place both the visit and the writing *previously* to Paul's residence in Ephesus, fix either on the time during which Paul was first in Corinth, Acts 18: 1—8, or while he was going from Corinth to Ephesus, Acts 18: 19, or after he had passed through Galatia and Phrygia at the commencement of his third missionary journey, before

he went thence to Ephesus, Acts 18: 23. But in opposition to all these views alike, is the circumstance that Apollos could not have been Paul's helper before Paul's second visit at Ephesus, Acts 18: 24 — 19: 1, but as he is named as such in our epistle, then we must suppose that another Apollos is here meant — a supposition which is wholly arbitrary. Besides, against the *first* view, according to which Paul journeyed from Corinth to Crete, thence to Nicopolis in Epirus, Tit. 3: 12, and thence back to Corinth, is the fact that the *second* abode of Paul in Corinth, mentioned 1 Cor. 16: 7. 2 Cor. 2: 1, etc., could not have occurred *then*, but must be placed *afterwards*. Against the *second* opinion is not only the fact that the journey from Corinth to Jerusalem was undertaken with a certain haste, so that there was hardly time for any labor in Crete, but also the circumstance that, according to this view, by Nicopolis, a city in Cilicia is meant, when it is not obvious why Paul would winter there and not in Antioch. Against the *third* view is the fact, that Paul, in his third missionary tour, had chosen Ephesus as the goal of his labors, Acts 18: 21; his labors up to the time of reaching that city were confined to "strengthening the disciples," Acts 18: 23. How would it accord with this, if Paul, instead of going at once to Ephesus, had gone from Phrygia to Crete and Corinth, and had there determined to winter in Nicopolis in Cilicia, and then go to Ephesus?

Less probable is the opinion that Paul went to Crete at the time mentioned Acts 15: 41, and that later, during his two or three years' abode in Ephesus, wrote the epistle. Against the former supposition is the circumstance that the definite route is given in Acts 15: 41 and 16: 1; against the latter, that almost the whole of the second and a part of the third missionary journey of Paul would lie between the beginning of the independent labors of Titus in Crete and the sending of the epistle to him.

Some, who place the visit and the writing of the epistle *after* the residence in Ephesus, think that Paul on the journey from Ephesus to Greece went from Macedonia, vs. 1, 2, to Crete; in that case Titus, after finishing his second mission to Corinth returned again to the apostle in Macedonia; Paul with him then made a journey to Crete; then Paul returned alone to Macedonia, then wrote the epistle from Macedonia, and then first betook himself to Corinth. Thus Paul, after he had written the second Epistle to the Corinthians, must have twice passed Corinth without stopping, yet from the last notices which he had received from Corinth, he must have felt constrained not to delay his journey there. Others think that he visited Crete during his

three months' abode in Greece, Acts 20: 3. But these were winter months, in which a journey to Crete and back was not to be thought of.

The *third* supposition, that Paul undertook the journey to Crete from Ephesus, before his departure to Macedonia, and from thence wrote the epistle to Titus, has been defended by Wieseler with great acuteness. According to this view, Paul, having remained something over two years in Ephesus; journeyed, through Macedonia, 1 Tim. 1: 3, (namely the second journey, not mentioned in Acts) to Corinth; on this journey, which was *short*, Titus accompanied him; with Titus he went to Crete; on his departure he left Titus there; he returned to Ephesus, and there wrote the epistle to Titus; then he sent Timothy to Macedonia, directing him to go to Corinth, and thereupon wrote our first Epistle to the Corinthians. Then he sent Tychicus and Artemas to Crete, and directed Titus to come to him; he thereupon sent Titus to Corinth. With the hope of meeting him in Troas, he commenced his journey to Macedonia; he first met with Titus, not in Troas, but in Macedonia; he now sent him the second time to Corinth; after he had written our second Epistle to the Corinthians, he went through Macedonia to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he spent the first winter months, and then went to Corinth.

But in opposition to this theory, the following reasons may be adduced: 1. If Paul made his second journey to Corinth at the time here fixed upon, he could have spent upon it only a short time; how then is it conceivable, that he could at the same time have performed a missionary labor in Crete? 2. Paul wrote to Titus, that he should stay in Crete till he had sent to him Tychicus and Artemas, that then he should himself come to Paul at Nicopolis. According to Wieseler, Paul must have altered this plan, for he caused Titus to come to him at Ephesus; still it is hardly conceivable, that the apostle, when he had just committed to Titus an important service in Crete, should have so soon withdrawn him from it. 3. It is not probable that Paul would have fixed on a city as a winter residence, in which he had not been before, and where he could not know what reception he should find; his determination seems rather to presuppose, that he had already labored in Nicopolis. 4. In 1 Cor. 16: 6, Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "With you, perchance, I shall remain, yea even tarry through the winter;" according to Wieseler, the words *πρὸς ὑμᾶς* are to be referred not to the Corinthians only, but in general to the Christians in Achaia, to whom, 1: 2, the epistle was directed; since now, according to Tacitus, Ann. 2, 53, Nicopolis in

Epirus was reckoned to Achaia, Wieseler supposes that the hope expressed by the apostle in that passage was fulfilled; but though the epistle was not directed solely to the church in Corinth, still it especially referred to that, so that the readers would assuredly interpret those words only of an intended residence of Paul in Corinth, and not of a place so far removed from this city. That Paul could not possibly have thought of Nicopolis, is obvious from the fact that when he wrote these words, as Wieseler himself holds, he had not been in Nicopolis, but made known the gospel there at a later time. Paul conceived of *Christians* only as the readers of his epistle, but not those who might be afterwards converted to Christianity. Finally, if Augustus extended the name Achaia even to Epirus, it does not follow that in common usage, Nicopolis was considered as lying in Achaia. Besides, Paul, according to Wieseler, did not carry out the plan mentioned Tit. 8: 18, since he remained in Nicopolis only two winter months; and thus must have travelled to Corinth in the midst of winter. Though some subordinate circumstances may favor Wieseler's view, and give an air of probability to it, as that Apollos was with Paul in Ephesus, 1 Cor. 16: 12. Tit. 3: 13, still the correctness of the view can, thereby, by no means be shown.

Second Epistle to Timothy. From the epistle we learn that it was written by the Apostle, when he was imprisoned, and written in Rome, 1: 8, 12, 16, 17, etc. The New Testament mentions only *one* imprisonment of the Apostle in Rome. We are then to inquire, whether it was during this period, that the epistle was written. Since Timothy was with Paul when he wrote the epistles to the Colossians, Philippians, and to Philemon, then our epistle must have been written to Timothy either *before* or *after* those epistles. According to the more common opinion, it was written *before*; but this is contradicted not only by the entire tone of it, but by the following particular dates: 1. In Acts 27: 2, Luke expressly names Aristarchus, besides himself, as the companion of Paul to Rome; when the epistles to the Colossians and Philemon were written, Aristarchus was still with him; but when our epistle was composed, he was not with Paul. 2. At the time the two epistles were written, Demas was with Paul, but when he wrote to Timothy, he had forsaken him, "having loved the present world;" one might indeed say that at the time of the writing of the two epistles, he had penitently returned to Paul, but this would be a very improbable hypothesis. 3. According to 2 Tim. 4: 6, Paul apprehended the end of his life to be very near; on this account clearly he desired Timothy to come to him immediately; in the other

epistles written during the imprisonment recorded in Acts, he nowhere represents his situation as having been earlier more afflictive and later more favorable as he does in the second Epistle to Timothy; now if the imprisonment closed with the death of the Apostle, then it is manifestly more probable that the martyrdom took place immediately after this epistle was written, than immediately after the authorship of the others.

The second theory, that our epistle was written *later* than the three referred to [during the imprisonment mentioned in Acts], has been particularly advocated by Wieseler. But several objections lie against this. First, the passage, 2 Tim. 4: 18, is adverse. Paul could have left the cloak, together with the books and parchments at Troas only during his third missionary tour. Now it would be singular that he should first wish to obtain these articles after the lapse of something like five years, for that he had left them with Carpus for his special use, is an hypothesis which has nothing in its favor, but rather the word *ἀνέλιπον* against it. Still more decidedly adverse is the passage, 2 Tim. 4: 20. An unbiassed reader would gather nothing else from it, than that Paul journeyed from Corinth, Erastus stayed behind in Corinth, and Paul, on his departure from Miletus, left Trophimus there sick. Since now Paul on his journey from Cæsarea to Rome, was neither in Corinth, nor in Miletus, so the journey here spoken of could be only the journey which the apostle made before his imprisonment in Jerusalem. But how can it be supposed that Paul should have made mention for the first time of these circumstances to Timothy, in a written form five years afterwards, though Timothy, within this interval, had been with Paul? In order to deprive this passage of its weight, Wieseler supposes that it is to be understood of Paul's experience as a prisoner. Trophimus, says Wieseler, was not left at Miletus by Paul on his missionary journey, for according to Acts 21: 29, he was with Paul in Jerusalem. Paul embarked in a ship sailing to Adramyttium near Troas. In this he sailed to Myra in Lycia, and there went aboard another, sailing direct to Italy. Trophimus accompanied him to Myra; there, on account of his sickness, he left him and went in the Adramyttium ship to Miletus, where he would remain as his conjectured home. But aside from the artificial character of this hypothesis, and the inexactness at least in which it involves the language of the apostle, all this, if it actually so occurred, must have been necessarily known a long time to Timothy, who had been with Paul in Rome, and so much the more, if, with Wieseler, we suppose, that Paul wished to take Trophimus to Rome that he might be a witness for him against his Jewish accusers.

The idea that the emphasis is to be laid on the words *Trophimus* and *sick*, and that Paul by that would remind Timothy only of the *sickness* of Trophimus, which might still hinder him from coming to Rome, is an unsatisfactory artifice, since the whole sentence involves nothing less than a wish to remind Timothy of the facts. Wieseler thinks that Erastus was an important witness for Paul, whom he had sent for to come to Rome, summoned either through Timothy, or Onesiphorus, but that, notwithstanding, he remained in Corinth, and that it was this, which Paul now communicated to Timothy; but of such a summons there is not the smallest trace. Besides, v. 20 has not at all the position which it would probably have if it were written in relation to the judicial proceedings. These are referred to in vs. 16, 17. If the notices in v. 20, refer to the same things, they must have been placed in connection with vs. 16, 17; but they are wholly separated by the salutation in v. 19. On the other hand, they stand in immediate connection with the direction to Timothy to hasten to him before winter. It is more than probable that vs. 20, 21, stand in a like relation to each other as vs. 9, 10. Timothy supposed that Demas, Crescens and Titus were with Paul in Rome; Paul now informs him that they had left him; he conjectured that Erastus and Trophimus had accompanied Paul to Rome; Paul now tells him that they had not. So the whole stands in a simple, natural connection. Thus the epistle cannot have been written by the Apostle *after* the writing of the Epistles to the Colossians, etc. during that imprisonment in Rome, of which the Acts makes mention.

From the above considerations, it is evident, that these three epistles could not have been written in the part of Paul's life described in the Acts; and in spite of the opposing difficulties, should it be thought not absolutely impossible, that one or another of them might have been written in the period in question, still, the fact is of peculiar weight, that the placing of the authorship in that period is alike difficult in respect to *all the three epistles*, and to accomplish the same, more or less improbable and artificial combinations are necessary. Besides, the events and circumstances in the life of the Apostle, which are presupposed in *these* epistles, are certainly omitted in the Acts, which is not the case, in general, of any other of Paul's epistles. Still, if one wholly dissents from the above, there are other weighty reasons, arising from the nature of the epistles themselves, adverse to the theory in question. If we look at the contents of the three epistles, we find that in all alike, an attack is made on certain false teachers. These are of an entirely different kind from those with

whom Paul had to do in the epistles to the Romans and Galatians ; they are like those who are opposed in the Epistle to the Colossians — such false teachers as could have originated only at a later period. Paul, also, in his address to the Ephesian elders at Miletus, speaks of the appearance of such teachers in the church as something future. Christianity must have already become a powerful principle before such a mixing of the Christian element with the oriental-Jewish speculation, as is shown in those false teachers, could have taken place. If we look at the form of the three epistles and their peculiar diction, we find that the coloring is manifestly different from that of the other Pauline epistles.

According to Wieseler's theory, which, aside from this, has the most probability in its favor, the first Epistle to Timothy was written between the first and the second Epistles to the Corinthians, after that to the Galatians and before that to the Romans. But it cannot be denied from an unprejudiced examination, that the entire mode of exhibition in the epistles is adverse to such a view. Whoever estimates, not simply the external relations, but the nature, the internal evidence, must consider it impossible, that Paul could have written the first Epistle to Timothy at the same time in which he wrote the other epistles alluded to. Besides, the character peculiar to this epistle is entirely like that of the other two pastoral epistles. The inward connection between them is at least as great, if it is not greater, than that between the Epistle to the Colossians and the Ephesians. If one is compelled, on account of this relationship, to place the authorship of these two at the same time, then we must certainly come to the same conclusion in regard to the pastoral epistles. According to Wieseler, indeed, there was no long interval between the first Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to Titus, though the first to the Corinthians is to be placed between them, which still is attended with much difficulty ; but the second to Timothy which has entirely the same character with the first, is put more than five years later, during which time not only the second Epistle to the Corinthians and that to the Romans, but also those to the Ephesians, Colossians, etc. were written ! To rend from one another things so related, cannot possibly be justified.

As a result, it stands sure, 1. that all three epistles belong to one and the same period in the life of the Apostle, and 2. that this period cannot fall in that section of the Apostle's life, which is known to us by the Acts, and by the rest of Paul's epistles. The writing of them must, accordingly, belong to a later portion of his life. But this is

possible only on the ground that Paul was liberated from the Roman imprisonment related by Luke, and was subsequently imprisoned in Rome.

The notice in the Acts cannot be made to hold good against the historical probability of a liberation and subsequent imprisonment, since the martyr-death of the Apostle at the close of the imprisonment mentioned by Luke is not less an hypothesis than the liberation. We must resort to the statements of the ancient church fathers. Still, it is not to be overlooked, that they give only a few notices respecting the apostles. Not so much an historical, as a parenetical or doctrinal interest lies at the basis of their writings. They looked at existing needs, and only occasionally at past facts. Hence we cannot wonder if they communicate only a few facts in regard to Paul, and those few only in the form of hints.

The first clear and definite notice that Paul was liberated from the imprisonment mentioned by Luke, is found in Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 22, 22, and is as follows: "Then (namely, after the lapse of the two years, mentioned Acts 28: 30) after pleading his cause, the Apostle is reported to have gone again on the ministry of preaching, and that having come a second time to the same city, he finished his course by martyrdom under him [Nero]. While he was in bonds, he wrote his second Epistle to Timothy, signifying at the same time his first defence, and his impending death."¹ Still, the testimony of Eusebius has not remained unassailed. The attempt has been made to invalidate it, 1st, because Eusebius himself does not rely on competent vouchers, but only on the report, λόγος, and 2nd, because his conviction of the correctness of this report rests only on the second Epistle to Timothy itself, and particularly on his interpretation of 2 Tim. 4: 16, 17. But, on the other hand, it is to be remarked, that Eusebius, by the phrase, λόγος ἔχει, never denotes an uncertain and doubtful report or myth, appearing only occasionally, but rather, the general, prevalent conviction, as such, so that it appears from his testimony, if nothing more, that at his time, the view generally prevailed that Paul was set at liberty from that imprisonment. Since now Eusebius met with this account, so the condition of the second epistle was a proof to him, that it was written in the second imprisonment in Rome, indicated by

¹ Τότε μὲν οὖν ἀπολογησάμενον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ κηρύγματος διακονίαν λόγος ἔχει σταλασθῆναι τὸν ἀπέστολον, δεύτερον δ' ἐπιβάντα τῇ αὐτῇ πάλιν τῷ κατ' αὐτὸν τελειωθῆναι μαρτυρίῳ· ἐν ᾧ θερμοῖς ἰσχυμένοι τὴν πρὸς Τιμόθεον δευτέραν ἐπιστολὴν συντάττει, ἑαυτοῦ σημαίνων τὴν τε πρότεραν αὐτῷ γενομένην ἀπολογίαν καὶ τὴν παραπέδους τελειώσειν.

the tradition. On the other hand, the assertion, that Eusebius inferred the liberation and subsequent imprisonment only from the second Epistle to Timothy, is without foundation and is in opposition to the words of Eusebius. The circumstance that Eusebius adduces no testimony from an older church writer for the truth of that tradition, may be taken as a proof that there was no witness; so, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that no opposing testimony was known to him. In favor of the truth of that tradition, there appear, if not direct, yet indirect proofs, and that too of an earlier time.

First, the passage in the first epistle of Clemens Romanus to the Corinthians, c. v. The text of the Cod. Alex., the only remaining text, as amended by the editor, Junius, is: "Through zeal Paul received the reward of patience ——. Having been a preacher in the east and in the west, he obtained the excellent reward of his faith. Having taught righteousness through the whole world, and even to the boundary of the west, having come and testified before governors, so he was released from the world."¹ Wieseler remarks, that on the supposition that the text so restored is the actual original of Clement, only the extreme west may be understood by *τέμα της δύσεως*, since, he thinks, that Clement could have so written, even if he knew only of the Apostle's residence in Rome — and not in Spain. In proof he relies on Rom. 10: 18. But it is not to be overlooked that these words are cited from the Old Testament; at the same time they answer Paul's object, since to him Rome was the city representing the west. Entirely analogous is the passage, Acts 2: 5, where Luke says that Jews were present at the Pentecost "from every nation under heaven," and afterwards he names the Romans as the representatives of all the western nations, (not indeed, as Wieseler thinks, "as the farthest people of the west.") These passages show, indeed, that Clement's phrases, "in the east and in the west," and the "whole world," do not necessarily point to countries beyond Rome. But it is otherwise with the expression, *καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέμα της δύσεως*. It would be difficult to show that Rome, in the view of the orientals, lay at the utmost boundary of the west; how much less would this be the case in the view of the occidentals? But it is wholly impossible that a man who lived in Rome itself, and thence wrote these words, could have thought of Rome by that expression. Besides, the posi-

¹ *Αὐτὸς ἦν [ὁ] Παῦλος ὑπομενῆς βραβεῖον [ἐπεσχη]εν —, πῆρξ [γενόμε]νος ἐν τῇ ἀιολογῇ καὶ ἐν [τῇ] δύσει, τὸν γενναῖον τῆς πίστewς αὐτοῦ κλλος ἔλαβεν· δικαιοσύνην διδάξας ὅλον τον κόσμον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέμα της δύσεως ἐλθὼν καὶ μαρτυρήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων, οὕτως ἀπηλλογῃ τοῦ κόσμου.*

tion of these words gives them a special emphasis; if Clement had not intended to refer to countries beyond Rome, he would assuredly have been content with the expressions first used, as these would have perfectly indicated the labors of the Apostle in the west, and consequently in Rome. Accordingly, if this passage is rightly restored by Junius, it bears decided testimony in favor of a journey of the apostle to Spain; yet, certainly not for a *course of labor* there; this rather seems to be excluded by the use of the simple *ἐλθών*. But Wieseler doubts the correctness of this restoration of the text, since he believes that the original text was not *καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέγμα*, etc., but *καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ τέγμα*, etc., and the translation would be, "after he had taught righteousness through the whole world, and *had appeared before the supreme power of the West*, and had testified before the rulers," etc. That *τὸ τέγμα* may mean the sovereignty and even the highest imperial authority, is certainly granted; but with this meaning, the words *ὑπὸ* — *ἐχέσθαι* do not well accord; besides, in opposition to this conjecture and its explanation, is the fact, that thereby the highest imperial authority would be designated only as that of the West, while its power likewise extended over the East. Certainly Clement, who, according to Wieseler's own expression, "sounded a panegyric on Paul," could have by no means described that highest authority in so limited a manner; he would certainly, if he had understood *τὸ τέγμα* in that sense, have not merely added *τῆς δύσεως*, but, in conformity to fact, *τῆς ἀνατολῆς καὶ τῆς δύσεως*. So the restitution of the text by Junius, must stand, and it must be granted that Clement in this passage actually refers to a journey of the Apostle to Spain.

The second passage is found in the Canon of Muratori, formed about A. D. 170, "Acta autem omnium apostolorum sub uno libro scribta sunt. Lucas obtime Theophile comprindit, quia sub praesentia ejus singula gerebantur, sicuti et semote passionem Petri evidenter declarat, sed profectionem Pauli ab urbe ad Spaniam proficiscentis." That these words contain a contradiction of the position that Paul made a journey to Spain, is by no means the fact; for if it is probable, as Wieseler correctly supposes, that after proficiscentis the word *omittit* has fallen out, then the fragmentist would only say, that Luke did not mention that journey, but he does not say that it did not occur, or that it was doubtful, or was controverted. But however these words may be explained, so much stands irrefutable, that that journey was a matter of tradition at the time the fragmentist wrote.

If it appears from these passages, that tradition preserved the

knowledge of a journey of the Apostle to Spain, (not of *labors* there,) then the liberation from the imprisonment in Rome mentioned by Luke, would fall in with this tradition (confirmed by the λόγος ἔχει of Eusebius,) since that journey could take place only on the supposition that Paul was liberated. As no decisive argument can be urged against the truth of this tradition, by which its impossibility, or even improbability can be shown, then the result may be rightfully used in settling the time in which our Epistles were written. For, if in the life of Paul up to his first imprisonment in Rome, no fit time can be found in which to place their authorship, and if, at the same time, the authorship of the three must necessarily belong to one and the same time in the life of the Apostle, (while the contents of the epistles point to a late period,) then the supposition is authorized that the epistles were written after the imprisonment mentioned in Acts; the first to Timothy and that to Titus in the interval between the two imprisonments, and the second to Timothy during this second imprisonment. This view, which presupposes the genuineness of the epistles, is the only tenable one, according to the foregoing investigation, and hence it has been received in the most recent times by the defenders of the authenticity, except Matthies and Wieseler.

If now we suppose, as can hardly be doubted after Wieseler's inquiries, that Paul first came to Rome in the spring of A. D. 61, then the epistles were not written — as the imprisonment lasted somewhere about two years — till after the spring of 63. The time, however, may probably be determined more exactly. In the summer of 64, Rome was burnt at the instigation of Nero; a general persecution of the Christians was connected with it. Since in the epistles there is not the slightest allusion to these events, it is very probable that they were written before these events, and that the martyrdom of the Apostle, which is sufficiently vouched for by tradition,¹ took place either before, or at the latest, during that persecution. Since it cannot be supposed that the Apostle's first defence would have terminated so favorably for him, as is mentioned 2 Tim. 4: 17, if it had

¹ The tradition which testifies to the manner of his death — beheading by a sword — conflicts, it is thought, with the view, that he was put to death in that persecution. But this is by no means the case, since we are not informed that this kind of capital infliction was not in use at that time. Allowing that it is improbable that the mode of his death by beheading was an indulgence to his rights as a Roman citizen, still there may have been other reasons which are unknown to us. That Paul was beheaded towards the end of Nero's reign, A. D. 67 or 68, has no sure support in tradition. Had his labors, after his first imprisonment, lasted so long, tradition would have preserved some notice of it.

been made *after* the burning of the city, then this defence is probably to be placed before the burning, somewhere about July, 64. If these conjectures are correct, then it is the interval between the spring of 63 and the summer of 64, in which the pastoral epistles were written, and in which the events took place, which are mentioned in the epistles as belonging to the same time. This interval was indeed short, but not *too* short. They may have happened in the following order. In the spring of 63, Paul departed from Rome, landed in Crete, where he staid some time, and then left Titus there; he then went to Ephesus, where he met Timothy. After he had stayed here a short time, he travelled to Macedonia. From hence he wrote the first Epistle to Timothy, and somewhat later, after he had come to the conclusion to "winter" at Nicopolis in Epirus, he wrote the Epistle to Titus, to whom he communicated that conclusion. After he had passed the winter in that city, he returned, near the end of it, to Ephesus. Without stopping here, he went through Miletus, where he left Trophimus sick, to Corinth. Without taking Erastus with him from this place, as he hoped, he sailed to Spain. Unknown circumstances induced him to leave Spain immediately for Rome. Perhaps he was apprehended in Spain, and taken as a prisoner to Rome. Thus he might have reached Rome in May or June; at the beginning of July, his first defence might have been made. Immediately, he wrote the second Epistle to Timothy, and then suffered martyrdom, either before or shortly after the conflagration.

GENUINENESS — EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

The external evidence in favor of the genuineness of the three pastoral epistles, is very decisive. Eusebius reckons them among the *Homologoumena*, since not the smallest doubt of their genuineness prevailed in the Catholic church. They are found as Pauline epistles not only in the Canon of Muratori and in the Pesheto, but are repeatedly cited as such by Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria. If they are not expressly quoted by the earlier church fathers, yet by allusions, hints, or at least reminiscences, they seem not to have been less known to them than the other Pauline epistles. Clement of Rome uses the word *εὐσέβεια*, so common in the pastoral epistles, to denote "godliness." In his first Epistle to Corinthians, ch. ii, he writes, "ready to every good work," see Tit 3: 1. Ignatius, in the Epistle to the Magnesians, ch. viii: "Be not led away with strange doctrines, neither with old fables, which are unprofitable," 1 Tim. 1:

4, Tit. 3: 9. Some places in Polycarp's epistles, have a very striking correspondence, e. g., "The beginning of all evils is the love of money; knowing, then, that we brought nothing into the world, and have nothing to carry out, let us be armed with the armor of righteousness," 1 Tim. 6: 7, 10. Justin, in his *Dial. C. Tryph.* 47, copies the words, Tit. 3: 4, "the kindness and philanthropy of God." There are, also, allusions or quotations more or less direct in Hegesippus, Theophilus of Antioch, and Antheuagoras.

But, with the Gnostic heretics, these epistles shared a different fate. That they are not found in Marcion's Canon, does not prove that he was ignorant of their existence. Jerome, in the *Introduction* to his *Commentary* on Titus, charges him and the other heretics with having arbitrarily rejected them. It is well known how capriciously Marcion treated some of the New Testament writings admitted by him as genuine. It is in entire harmony with this, when he excludes from the Canon, epistles that so decidedly war against the Gnostic errors. The reason why Tatian receives the Epistle to Titus, as genuine, while he rejects those to Timothy, may be owing to the fact that the heretical teachers are more definitely named as Jewish in Titus than in Timothy.

Since the time of Tatian, the genuineness of these epistles was not doubted till the beginning of this century. J. E. C. Schmidt suggested doubts in regard to the first Epistle to Timothy; Schleiermacher, 1807, decidedly rejected it, but received the other two. The first epistle was defended by Planck, Wegscheider and Beckhaus. Eichhorn then attacked the genuineness of all three, in which he was followed, though with some wavering, by De Wette, in his *Introduction* to the New Testament, 1826. While De Wette's criticism was rather of a negative kind, Eichhorn sought to prove that the epistles were written by a disciple of Paul. Schott, 1830, very arbitrarily describes Luke as the author. The epistles have been defended with more or less ability, partly in special treatises, partly in works of a more general kind, by Hug, Bertholdt, Feilmoser, Guericke, Böhl, Curtius, Kling, Heidenreich, Mack, and others. Baur, Tübingen, 1835, supposes that they originated at the time of the Marcion heretics, from an author, who, without being able to rid himself of Gnostic notions, was in the interest of the Pauline party, and put his attacks on the Gnostic errors into the mouth of Paul. Baumgarten, Böttger, Matthies, and others, have refuted Baur. Even De Wette does not accord with him, but, in his *Commentary*, 1844, thinks that the epistles were written near the end of the first century.

GENUINENESS — INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

The genuineness of the Epistles has been assailed mainly on three grounds:

I. The historical difficulty of fixing on any time in Paul's life when they could have been written. But this difficulty presupposes that a liberation of the Apostle from his imprisonment at Rome, mentioned in Acts, did not take place. But since it has been shown that this presupposition is not well founded, the difficulty falls to the ground.

II. The introduction of some points, which indicate a later age than the apostolic. These are three in number.

1. The heretics attacked in all three of the epistles.

The passages in the first Epistle to Timothy, which refer directly to the heretics, are 1: 8, 4, 6, 7, 19. 4: 1-7. 6: 3 seq., 20. The heretics are characterized in these passages as follows: They favored the emanation theory; they put believers under the yoke of laws, particularly in respect to certain kinds of food, and also marriage; they were given to a tiresome love of disputing, and thereby boasted of a special knowledge; they made use of their supposed godliness as a cloak to gain earthly possessions. Besides, the passages 1: 17. 2: 4, 5, 15. 3: 16. 4: 10. 6: 15, 16, seem to stand in opposition to the heretics. If this be the case, then their theology did not embrace the absolute idea of the Divine Being, which well agrees with the emanation theory; they denied the universality of the Divine grace in regard to salvation, as, perhaps, they referred it only to a class of mankind, the "spiritual," *πνευματικοί*; they favored Docetism, since they rejected the truth of the human nature of Christ, and viewed the *σεξουγοσία* of women as something in itself to be rejected, which would accord specially with their prohibition of marriage, and in general with their view of the nature of matter. Less definite is the second epistle to Timothy in regard to the heretics. The passages are 2: 16-23. 4: 6-9, 13. 4: 4, and perhaps 2: 8. Only one peculiarity is brought out, namely, that they maintained that the resurrection was already past, which was in manifest opposition to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. In the epistle to Titus, the heretics are referred to in 1: 10, 11, 14, 16. 3: 9, 10. The characteristics perfectly agree with those in 1 Timothy, except that here the Judaizing element is particularly prominent, since the *μύθοι* are described as Jewish, and the *μάχαι* as of the law.

It is manifest that these heretics are wholly different from the Judaizers, whom Paul attacks in the Epistles to the Galatians and

Romans, for if both were characterized by a "legal" spirit at war with the evangelical life, yet the one class were entirely different from the other. The "legal" spirit of the heretics of the pastoral epistles, not only went beyond the Mosaic law, but had a different ground from that of the Judaizers. Its quality is indeed not formally stated in the pastoral epistles, but it cannot be denied that it lay in its fantastic, speculative theories on the being of God and his relation to the world. These heretics more resemble those attacked in the Epistle to the Colossians, than they do the Judaizers. There is no sufficient ground for the supposition that our epistles attack *different* heretics from those referred to in the Colossians. All the traits much more perfectly agree in *one* likeness, and this likeness corresponds to that which later meets us in Gnosticism. Still, an essential difference is not to be overlooked. Gnosticism was found in a stronger or weaker opposition to Judaism, while the heresy here described has a *Jewish character*. We have not then sufficient grounds to find in this heresy the first germ of Gnosticism. The same fantastic, speculative tendency is certainly common to both, but here we see this tendency in connection with Jewish-Christianity, there, on the contrary, with Gentile-Christianity. That Judeo-Christian speculation was not so fully developed as Gnosticism, is naturally accounted for from the fact that the Jewish type of Christianity was wholly absorbed in the Gentile type; only in Ebionitism and in the Clementine system did a tendency, at least similar, continue. The more we look at this heresy and that of the later Gnosticism, the more will the semblance of an argument disappear in favor of the position that the former could not have belonged to the apostolic age, especially as then the existing Judaism likewise showed tendencies to the same speculations.

Baur thinks that the heresy referred to in the pastoral epistles is the Marcionite Gnosticism; but his position is not tenable. According to him, in 1 Tim. 1: 8, the heretics would express the sentiment "that the law was not good," but a sound interpretation would draw exactly the opposite from the passage, as the word *νομοδιόσκαλοι* shows. From Tit. 3: 9, Baur infers the Antinomian character of the false teachers; but if this were correct, it would not prove the Marcionite character of it, for Antinomianism, as is known, was found with other Gnostics. The passages 1 Tim. 4: 3 connected with Tit. 1: 14, certainly show that the prohibitions by the heretics here stated, e. g. forbidding to marry, had their ground in a dualistic conception of the world; but it is manifestly too much to say, that this dualism is to be found only, or in its most definite form in Marcion, for the same,

though with modifications, is an essential element in Gnosticism in general. Baur also thinks, that the author of the epistles was infected with Gnosticism; but it is hardly worth while to refute him. We may exclaim with De Wetze, "how artificial!" How blind must Irenæus and Tertullian have been, that they—the most decided opponents of Marcion—did not discover the manifest traces of the Marcionite system in these epistles? This discovery was reserved for a Tübingen professor 1600 years later! De Wetze is compelled to place the authorship of the epistles not later than the end of the first century; but it may just as well be placed in the apostolic times, for proper Gnosticism, in its developed form, was as foreign to the close of the first century, as it was to apostolic times.

2. The church organization. Those, who have attacked the genuineness of the epistles, especially Baur and De Wetze, object that the strengthening and development of the hierarchy which are indicated in the epistles, could not have been the work of the apostle Paul. Baur, in his earlier work on the Pastoral Epistles, remarks, that in the genuine Pauline epistles, there is no trace of particular officers for the guidance of the churches, while, according to the pastoral epistles, these officers are so organized, that *ἐπίσκοποι*, *πρεσβύτεροι* and *διάκονοι* come out prominently; in connection with which he supposes that the plural, *πρεσβύτεροι*, in the collective sense designates the single overseers, one of whom, under the name *ἐπίσκοπος*, had the oversight of single churches. In his later work on Paul, Baur maintains, that the Gnostics, as they were properly the earliest heretics, first gave occasion for the establishing of the episcopal organization. It is granted, that they were thus actually organized, yet in this we may certainly find a proof for the earlier authorship of our epistles than the period of Gnosticism, for in the epistles there is not a trace of the peculiar episcopal organization; yea, even if Baur's view on the relation of the expressions *πρεσβύτεροι* and *ἐπίσκοποι*, were correct, still the meaning of *ἐπίσκοπος* here would be essentially different from what it was later in the proper episcopal organization. In our epistles, we meet with the simplest form of church order. The institute of deacons originated in the earliest apostolic period; and if the time when the "presbytery" had its origin and the manner in which it was introduced, are not handed down by tradition, still, it must, apart from all the testimonies of the Acts, have originated very early, since no church could be conceived of without a government. Now in all the precepts which are given in our epistles on the presbyters and deacons, the writer has obviously in view nothing else than

that such men only should be taken for this work, who by their previous conduct were worthy of the confidence of the church, and were fitted for successful labor. Where is there aught hierarchical in this? How different in this respect are the Ignatian epistles? If one thinks it strange, that, while, in the eight epistles of Paul acknowledged as genuine, such references are not found, they should be met with in our epistles, he is to consider that these epistles, if genuine, belong to the last period of Paul's life, when he was near the end of his labors. It must have been natural for him, especially when he saw a heresy, destructive to the churches, beginning to extend, to turn attention to church institutions and also to men, that, to a certain extent, would take his place in care for the churches. That Paul had not the smallest interest in ecclesiastical institutions, and that this want had its deep foundation in the spirit and character of the Pauline Christianity, is an absolutely groundless idea, as it stands in the most decided contrast with what we know in the Acts, of the Apostle's labors.

3. Institute of widows. Schleiermacher takes *χήραι*, 1 Tim. 5: 9 seq., in the sense of *deaconesses*, and adduces it as a testimony of the later origin of this epistle. Baur supposes, that by this expression, according to its usage in the church in the second century, those females were denoted, who adopted an ascetic mode of life, and, in this character, gradually formed a peculiar ecclesiastical order, closely connected with that of the bishops, presbyters and deacons, on account of which the name *deaconesses* was given them. Baur adds, that they were not so much actual widows, as nominally such. But he allows, however, that widows only were first received; later, the unmarried were admitted, while the name remained unchanged. But, if *χήραι* indicates a peculiar kind of ecclesiastical persons, it would prove nothing against the apostolical origin of the epistle. It would well accord with apostolic times, and with the spirit of Paul. That virgins were admitted into the number of widows, or that the widows were devoted to an ascetic life, cannot be proved from 1 Tim. 5: 11, as Baur thinks. But it is still a question whether the word *χήραι* here means *deaconesses*. Mosheim and De Wette contend that it does not. According to the former, the "*deaconesses*" waited on the women, without performing spiritual duties, while the "*widows*" had an honorable place in the assemblies, exercised a kind of superintendence over other women, and attended to the education of the orphan children that were supported by the church. If this view be correct, such an arrangement in regard to widows might have properly been made in the apostolic church. De Wette objects to the regular and

formal choice of these widows, as something foreign to that period, but there is nothing said in the entire passage of a formal choice; *ἡλικιωσέως* does not imply it. That the widow must have been the "wife of one husband," i. e. married only once, by no means indicates that a second marriage was not regarded as Christian. The ground of the precept may have been, that the widows might have a "good report" among "those without," the heathen considering it as an honor not to marry the second time.

The manner in which Paul speaks of Timothy, in his epistles to him, is regarded by some as an objection to the genuineness. According to De Wette, Timothy must have been at least thirty-five years of age, having labored ten years with Paul. He is represented as a timid youth, needing, in his inexperience, many instructions. But we should infer from the first account of him, Acts 16: 1 seq., that he was much below twenty-five years. Then, the difference between his age and position, and those of Paul, would render it proper for the latter to speak of him as his son, as a young man, and to address him as one needing exhortation and encouragement, especially as he was to take the oversight of an important church, in which there were many "elders."

III. The last objection to the genuineness of the epistles, relates to the peculiarities of expression and modes of thought. We are to inquire, whether these are of such a kind as to preclude the apostolic origin of the epistles. That they contain a multitude of peculiar words, *ἀπαξ λεγόμενα*, manifestly decides nothing, for each of Paul's epistles contains a greater or less number of such expressions. These phrases would be a proof of the spuriousness of the epistles, only as it should be shown that they belonged to a later period, or were borrowed from other writings.

It is urged as an objection against the three epistles, that some passages have a coloring peculiar only from the fact, that they are borrowed from other New Testament epistles, and in fact can be explained only by means of these epistles. Instances are found 1 Tim. 1: 12-14, "and I thank Christ Jesus our Lord," etc., compared with 1 Cor. 15: 9, 10; 1 Tim. 2: 11, 12, "Let the women learn," etc., with 1 Cor. 14: 34, 35, "Let your women keep silence," etc.; also 2 Tim. 1: 3-5, with Rom. 1: 8 seq.; 2 Tim. 2: 5, with 1 Cor. 9: 24, and others. The resemblance is undeniable, but it cannot constitute an objection. The agreement is not complete. There are some deviations. In that case, the objector must suppose that the author of the pastoral epistles either designedly deviated from the text lying before

him, so as artfully to conceal his deception, or that he had almost unwillingly admitted these urgent reminiscences. Still, it may be supposed that the Apostle himself, while he was treating kindred subjects, might use similar expressions, when, on the whole, his diction had a coloring different from what was earlier peculiar to him. Besides, instances of agreement of the same kind are found in other epistles of Paul, without invalidating the genuineness of any of them. That these passages cannot be understood without reference to similar expressions in other epistles, is decidedly incorrect.

But how do we explain the often observed difference between the diction of these epistles and that of the other Pauline epistles? The opposers of the genuineness hold, that the author was an impostor of the post-Apostolic age, who had indeed imbibed not a little of the Pauline mode of conception and expression, but who could not conceal his own peculiar manner. Baur has pointed out some post-Apostolic phrases, which are used in attacking the heretics. But these prove nothing, since the position that the heresy here attacked originated after the apostolic age, has no sure support. The influence of these attacks on heresy, is not to be confined merely to the proper polemic passages, for not only did the Jews and heathen, but also the heretical Christians furnish material for the expression of Christian ideas; this "polemic" gave occasion to ideas and phrases which could not otherwise have been formed in this peculiar manner, out of the simple Christian consciousness. This holds not merely of the later church teachers, but of the apostles. As instances, we refer to John's idea of the Logos, and Paul's of *δικαιοσύνη*. Let it be granted, that at the time of the apostles, there was a heresy akin to Gnosticism, which our epistles presuppose, still there is nothing unapostolic in the fact that the mode of describing the heresy, revealed an effect of that heresy, as is the case in the words *παρεστῶν, ἐπιφάνεια, πῶς ἀρροῦσιν*, etc.

Besides these, there are expressions which, it is urged, belong to the church language of the second and third centuries, e. g. "man of God," "husband of one wife," *ἐνσίβυα, Βασιλεῖς* (the last to be explained from a custom introduced by Hadrian.) But it may be replied, that the later writers may have borrowed them from the apostolic — especially as some are found in the writings of the so-called apostolic fathers.

These epistles differ from the other Pauline epistles, not only in single expressions, but in the mode in which the thoughts are developed, though there are points of agreement. Is this peculiarity un-

worthy of Paul? The answer will vary according to the subjective feelings. Schleiermacher finds no fault with the second Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to Titus. De Wette denies to the second epistle all good grammatical and logical connection, as well as a true tact for what is befitting, while he thinks that Schleiermacher exaggerates what is objectionable in the first epistle, and did not penetrate sufficiently into the spirit of the author, and saw want of sense and connection where a fundamental interpreter must have judged otherwise. Baur even thinks that the first epistle is not wanting in unity and the carrying through of a definite idea. De Wette objects to the transition of the thoughts; "but prejudice was so strong in him," "that where all is in the most perfect order, he would find some things unworthy of the Apostle."

If these epistles bear a stamp different from that of the Galatians, Romans and Corinthians, it is to be considered that Paul would not resort to a dialectic development in pastoral letters, — private epistles to his assistants. Where this peculiarity does not prevail, the course of thought is not so different as some have maintained. Even the peculiarity in respect to general truths, urged by De Wette, is seen in the other Pauline epistles; comp. Rom. 13: 10. 14: 9, 17. 1 Cor. 4: 20. 6: 7. 7: 19. The reason urged against the genuineness from the prevailing view of practical morality will not hold. The same view is by no means less prominent in the other Pauline epistles. A perfect agreement exists in all, in the fact that faith is the deepest ground of a moral life, and faith also in the atoning death of Christ. The morality taught in 1 Tim. 2: 15. 3: 13. 4: 8. 6: 18, 19, is not in opposition to Paul's doctrine of grace. It is, also, urged that the contents of the epistles are not so rich and weighty as those of the other Pauline epistles; the thoughts are too general, are feeble, etc. But it is to be considered, that Timothy and Titus needed only general precepts; such discussions as those in the Galatians were not demanded.

As the result of a careful examination, we find: 1. That the external evidence furnishes no ground to doubt the genuineness of the epistles; 2. That the difficulty of bringing the authorship of the epistles within the period of Paul's life, disappears on the theory of his second imprisonment in Rome; there is no adequate reason for not admitting this imprisonment; 3. That the internal peculiarities of the epistles, in regard to the subjects handled, the development of thought and mode of expression, show indeed some things of an unusual character, but still not of a kind to have any decided weight against the

genuineness; and 4. That it would be far more difficult to show, both in general and in particulars, how an impostor could have prepared three such epistles as these are, both in contents and in form, and foisted in the name of the Apostle Paul, than it is to prove their genuineness. No evidences for their post-apostolic origin exist; they accordingly hold their place in the Canon as Pauline epistles.

ARTICLE V.

HICKOK'S RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

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[Concluded from p. 217.]

THE rapid sketch we proposed to make of this work was brought down, in the previous number, to the Second Division of the Second Part, or the Understanding in its Objective Law. The survey then taken of the first portion will give the reader a fair view of the writer's method. It may, therefore, be sufficient here to state in the most cursory manner, that the general plan is carried out, in all the mental departments, with the same rigid intellectual symmetry. The investigation of the understanding in its idea is concluded by two chapters of the highest interest — "The *à priori* Principles in a Nature of Things," and an "Exposition of False Systems of a Universal Nature." We have then, as in the sense, The Understanding in its Objective Law, followed by an ontological demonstration of the valid being of the notional and its objects.

The same method again meets us in the study of the Reason. We have, first, the idea, secondly, the law, and thirdly, the ontological demonstration of the absolute verity of those objects of which reason takes direct and exclusive cognizance, or, in other words, of the supernatural. The sense envisages, or distinguishes quality and conjoins quantity in space into phenomena; the understanding substantiates, by connecting phenomena into a nature of things; the reason gives meaning to, and comprehends, the whole operation of both, and the objects of both.

To comprehend nature, we must obtain for nature an origin and an

end, and thus some existence, not only before nature, and above nature, but reaching beyond it. In the sense we had the pure intuition, in the understanding, the pure notional, and here we must attain the pure idea, or the ideal. This must rise above space and time, and because it would comprehend the natural must be supernatural (ch. II.). Again,—in the sense we found our first *à priori* position in the primitive intuition of space and time remaining indestructible for the intellect after the abstraction of all that has come into consciousness through sensation; in the understanding we took our second *à priori* position on the notion of the space-filling force, remaining indestructible for the intellect after a like abstraction of everything involved in the conceptions of substance and causality that had come to us through experience; and here, in the reason, we obtain our third and highest *à priori* position in an idea which resolves into its own simplicity the duality of the space-filling force, and gives origin to the substance of nature. This is the idea of The Absolute.

Next for the elements of comprehension. Here the trine method again presents itself. In the sense operation of conjunction, the three *à priori* elements were unity, plurality, and totality. In the operation of connection in the understanding they were found to be, 1st, substance in space or source and event in time, 2nd, cause and effect, and, 3rd, reciprocity in action and reaction. In like manner the elements of this higher operation of comprehension are found to be, pure spontaneity, pure autonomy, and pure liberty. Pure spontaneity is simple act standing above all conditions of force, and thus not under a necessity as nature; although essential to personality it is not of itself sufficient for it. Pure autonomy is end above nature, a law to its own action found in the behest of its own intrinsic worthiness. In the syntheses of these three is found something distinct from both, making the third element, or pure liberty. In these we have a completed personality determined *à priori* to the Absolute (Sec. II.); and in this pure personality of the Absolute we have the *à priori* comprehension of nature. This pure personality, we may remark, altogether transcends the first cause of the naturalist, and this comprehension of nature is a distinct thing altogether transcending all natural science. It is a comprehension of nature, not only in its beginning, but in its continuance and its consummation. It is the highest rationality that the Absolute Reason be himself the end of all ends. This is, too, the opposite of pantheism. It is pure holiness, or perfect separation from nature, not only as originating power, but also in the finalities, whether moral or artistic, for which it acts. It is,

in other words, in the language of the Bible, the catechisms, and the old theology,—the glory of God.

To sum up then briefly the substance of several sections—Sense conjoins into phenomena, but cannot tell whence they came, nor whither they go,—in other words what they *are*. The understanding connects phenomena in their substances and causes, but cannot tell what they mean. Something within us affirms that they have a meaning, and that this meaning and the elements of its comprehension, may be thus found in the ideal of an Absolute Personality and finite personalities, and the relations existing between them,—in other words, in God, the soul, and immortality.

Thus we have the reason in its idea. We have, or may have, this ideal comprehension of nature and the universe. It is a glorious idea. Without it existence is an enigma, nature thick darkness, and man a dream. To some minds there would be, in this thought alone, proof abundant of its objective realization. But in the consummation of his admirably sustained scheme, the author next proceeds to an examination of the facts which go to verify this idea in its objective law. These are traced, 1st, in respect to a finite, and, 2nd, The Absolute Personality. Under both of these, without noticing the divisions and subdivisions in which they are arranged, we have aesthetic facts, mathematical facts, philosophical facts, psychological facts, and higher than all, ethical facts. There are, moreover, the ready assent to the fact of final causes in nature as a reaching forth to something beyond nature, although it may not carry us out of nature,—the easy recognition, in all ages of miraculous interpositions,—the order of nature's formation by a combining of natural development with the addition, from time to time, of new forces from the supernatural, as evinced in geological facts,—the recognition of a free personality in humanity—the comprehending facts of an ethical system. In these we have the reason in its law.¹

To the whole is appended an ontological demonstration of the solid being of the supernatural as deduced from the harmony of such a law of facts with such an idea. It is briefly presented under three heads, the valid existence of God, the valid being of the soul, and the validity of the soul's immortality. For the valid being of the soul, there are two sources of argumentation. 1. The fact of a comprehending agency. 2. The facts as given in an ethical experience. For the

¹ In this, which is one of the most interesting sections of the work, the author has anticipated some of the most striking arguments of a late remarkable volume entitled "The Footprints of the Creator."

valid existence of God, there are three lines of demonstration. 1. The fact that all atheistic speculations are from the autonomy of the discursive faculty as understanding. 2. The fact of new forces originating in nature. 3. The fact that an ethical system is in being. For the soul's immortality, the line of argument is briefly this: God is, — a future state, in view of the moral demands of this soul, *ought* to be; the existence of God is a guarantee that what *ought* to be, *will* be. And thus we have the science of our entire being, including the functions of the sense, the understanding, and the reason: in other words, a *Rational Psychology*.

On the argument against the materialist, we have already dwelt. The confutation of the idealist is a work of far more difficulty. We will state concisely what, unless we have utterly mistaken his meaning, we must regard as the substance of the author's proof of an objective world, as given under both the sense and the understanding. He shows how perception is possible, and how, if it is at all, it must be. The same demonstration is given in respect to an experience. If there is an objective world, thus, and thus, will its phenomena be perceived by us, and thus, and thus, will its things and events, its substances and causalities, become the objects of our experience. Sensation and experience have put us in a position to construct such a proof, but the proof, when found, is also found, just as conclusively, not to depend for its certainty on either, but to exist in indissoluble connection with certain intuitions, notions, or knowledges, which we cannot separate from the mind itself, and which we cannot even conceive of as separate. Hence, such proof, *in regard to the soul*, is justly called *à priori* and necessary.

But, secondly — thus do we actually perceive; and such is really our experience. The objective law which we find the soul actually following, corresponds precisely to the *à priori* idea which had before been thus conclusively proved, as not only a possibility, but the only possible process. But this involves the conception of an external world as a necessary part of the ideal theory. The objective world, therefore, which *seems* to enter into the actual perception and experience, is as real and necessary a part of such experience, as the hypothetical or ideal objective world (if we may use the strange expression) which actually entered, and necessarily entered into the *à priori* idea (thus found) of the sense and the understanding.

This certainly proves that an objective world *may* be; but does it show that it *actually is*? One cause is adequate to the effect; does this exclude every other? Is the actuality, and, in a certain sense,

the objectivity, of the perceiving and experiencing, the actuality or reality of their apparent objects? In other words, does the hypothetical objectivity necessarily make perception and experience what they are, or might they not have been, or is it impossible to show that they might not have been, just what they are without any corresponding real objectivity? Now, we *know* that there may be perceptions, *to all appearance*, and experiences, which have every known characteristic of objectiveness, and yet wholly subjective. There are the cases which have been presented from the time of Heraclitus down to Hume, such as the phenomena and experiences of dreams, of revery, of disease, of madness, and, in short, of all that are called false perceptions. "Have you never heard," says Socrates to his pupil, — as though it were a question which had come down from the olden time, and was familiar to all who had ever thought — "have you never heard it asked what proof we can give that we are not now sleeping, and that what we now say and do, may be but a dream, from which we may hereafter awake and find it so? and do you not see that the same ground may be taken in respect to madness and disease?"¹ In all these cases, then, are conjunctions of quantity, and distinctions of quality, and notional connections of substance and causality, and yet they have, in themselves, no mark by which they can be distinguished from those that are supposed to have a real objective ground. They may differ in many respects from other states of the soul, but in nothing on which we can rest as a distinct characteristic of true outward objectiveness. They may appear less rational, less coherent, less vivid, but these, it may be said, are but their *appearances* to some other subjective state, and such judgments may be, after all, but the delusions of one subjective condition of the soul claiming to decide upon the experience of another.

We are compelled to say, that we do not perceive the conclusiveness of the author's reasoning on this head. He makes a distinction between what he calls an ideal and an actual phenomenon, p. 303. The first only *seems*, the last actually *appears*. But what is there which makes one a *seeming* and the other an actual *appearing*? It is not anything in the phenomena or experiences themselves. There are the same conjunctions, the same distinctions, the same connections in both. Is it, then, something in the constructing mind itself, and which transcends all these operations? In the case of an ideal circle, (which is the author's example,) the mind, it is said, "has given a product which stands out separate from the agency that pro-

¹ Plat. Theætetus, 158 B.

duced it, and, as other than itself, is object to itself in its own intuition," p. 301. "But, is there no difference," he proceeds to ask, "between this ideal form and the phenomenon of a material ring with its given content in the sensation," that is, "no difference in the consciousness?" Is there not, however, some content in sensation even in the case of the ideal form, only by an inverted process of the mind upon the sensorium, instead of having come from without, as we endeavored to show in the previous number of our review, (note, page 187,) and is not the statement too strong that "no intellectual (or spiritual) act can give content to avoid sensibility?" Again, says the author, "the intellect has given all it may to the pure form to make it objective, and yet *most manifestly* the phenomenal ring has something more in its objectiveness than the pure circle, and this something more must have been given to it from some other than a mere intellectual operation." We have been so carried along with the author's general method of investigation; we have become so intensely interested in his work, that it is, with feelings of strong disappointment, we find ourselves unable to follow him in any of his conclusions; but we can only say, it is not most manifest to us. It seems, on the contrary, the very thing to be proved. Again he says, "in the ideal, however complete in the construction and vivid in the imagination, there is not what the real phenomenon possesses." But wherein do they differ, quasi phenomena, if alike in completeness and vividness, and of course in the power of accompanying belief, though it be but for a moment? They have both been constructed by the same laws. Both, according to their vividness, exclude other objects, whether actual or ideal. Both, whilst they exist, limit alike all our thinking respecting them. We cannot think anything inconsistent with the ideal, any more than with what we call the real circle.

The difference then, if it exist at all, must be in their origin, and here there does seem to be something of which consciousness may claim to take cognizance. One is cognized as being with volition, the other without. Both meet in the sensorium, but, to use the author's expression of the difference, "one is *produced* by the intellect, the other is *found* by the intellect." True, here is a difference which may be traced in certain cases. It is, however, even here, a difference, not in the phenomena, but in the mind's, or rather the will's, relation to them. Still it does not seem to reach the idealist's position. He maintains that sense is the intellect giving objectivity to its own creations. This is sometimes done with volition; and then we seem to be conscious of the process. But may not the spiritual

energy do the same, or a similar thing, without volition, or without a consciousness of volition; and then the perception would appear to be *first*. It would, too, be according to those laws of construction which are the same for all cases, and then how are they to be distinguished? There are ideal creations of the soul which seem to come without our volition, just as much as those we choose to style real perceptions. We know that this is sometimes so; why may it not then be done in all cases that would seem to involve objectivity? If men had never dreamed,—if there had never been such a thing as false perception, the proof might have been deemed (for us) satisfactory, if not conclusive against all possibilities. But we have had dreams, and consciousness at the time, has had no doubt of their real objectivity. Consciousness has had no doubt of the reality of the madman's subjective world. And yet, all these dreams, and all the false perceptions of that subjective world, have been constructed and connected in strictest obedience to the *à priori* scheme of the sense and the understanding which the author has so scientifically demonstrated.

Had there never been, we say, these strange phenomena in our strange existence, had there never been distinct and vivid subjective states to which we know there was no outward, idealism might with some justice be regarded as that absurd thing which certain schools would represent it. But with such facts forming so large a part (almost one half we were tempted to say) of our existence, there is a natural ground for the mode of thinking which has led to such conceptions. There is much in this life of ours to lead the soul, at times, to the thought that "man walketh in a vain show," and that we need some other assurance of reality than can be found *alone* in the sense and the understanding.

We wonder not, therefore, that there has always been in the world a tendency to such idealism. He can hardly be called a thinking man who has not, at some periods of his life, been more or less drawn to the indulgence of some of its peculiar contemplations. We have no doubt that it has often been the dream of musing childhood, and that it has not unseldom come over the soul of the aged when he looks back upon his long sojourn in this seeming land of shadows, and begins to live almost wholly in a subjective recalling of the past. It has ever, too, been a speculation more or less attractive to men of an introspective or philosophical habit of thought; and it is not, therefore, to be driven out of the world by any such stubborn dogmatism as that of Reid and Brown, nor by any such superficial witticisms as those of the Rev. Sidney Smith. It can never be laughed away by

any ridicule of Berkeley, neither will it regard as a conclusive answer the stale joke, such a favorite among a certain class of writers, about running ideal heads against ideal posts.

And so also, we may say in respect to the doctrine of mediate or representative perception. It still keeps its place in the world. It appears in the structure of all languages. It has created metaphors, instead of having been derived from them, according to the easy explanation so often given. They are the natural offspring of this innate and universal *pre-judice* of a representative correspondence between the soul and the outward world. Hence, too, the thought, noticed by the earliest writers, and which must have occurred to every man who thinks, that our sensations, though unvarying correspondences for the same sentient, may be very different for different sentiments;¹ so that as far as the sense is concerned the dogma ascribed in the Theaetetus to Protagoras, τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον μόνον δοξάζειν, that each man has his own seemings, may be strictly true. It is a striking fact, too, that those who show so much contempt for the old and universal doctrine, cannot state their own positions without running into inconsistencies of thought and language,—a sure evidence that they are at war with nature and the laws of the human mind. The witty Sidney Smith thinks it as easy to make Berkeley ridiculous as to raise a vulgar laugh against the noble Carey and the Baptist mission. And yet after a lecture devoted to these “images from the moon” we find him gravely making this distinction between the senses of sight and hearing. “In the latter,” he says with all seriousness, “we hear only a sound which experience leads us to refer to the bell as its cause.” But why may we not hear an external world, if it make a noise, and even smell an external world, as well as see an external world? An affection, then, produced in us through undulations in the air only authorizes us to infer a cause; an affection produced in us through undulations in a finer medium is thereby raised to the rank of an immediate perception; in reading a book we are conversing directly with an outward world; in hearing a speaker, we are following an association of ideas through which we infer its existence. And yet this writer attempts to be facetious about “metaphysical lunatics,” as the best name he can bestow upon all those to whom such nonsense as his own is utterly inconceivable!

To return, however, to the general position of the idealist—the

¹ Ἦν διανοησάμενος ἐν ὧς αἶσιν σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον ἰδέσθαι τοιοῦτον καὶ κατὰ καὶ ὁπποῦν ὥς; ΘΕΑΙ. Μα δὲ οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ; Theaet. 154, A.

method of argument our author employs against it, is of a much higher and more serious kind, and as far as it goes we are willing to yield our assent to its force, if not to its conclusiveness. Taking the general view we presented several pages back, it might be maintained, that although it fails, or seems to fail, in respect to the sense and the understanding, there is about it a conviction of conclusiveness when viewed in reference to the department and objects of the reason. An idea of a process of perception and experience, although it includes the hypothesis of an objective world, is not proof of such objective world, however exactly such idea may seem to agree with an actual law of perception and experience. The law of perceiving may be in itself real and actual, in one sense, and yet wholly subjective; or the law and the idea may be but two aspects of a coinciding unity. It is because such objectivity, although included in the idea, is not included as an absolute necessity. It is yet to be ranked among contingencies. The seeming, or the appearance even, may come from some unknown operations of our minds acting instinctively, or without volition, and without consciousness, or they may be produced by some higher mind acting upon our sensorium. In other words, the idea of a sense and an understanding may be consistent, we think, with the contingency of their objects. But in respect to the reason, the case would seem to be carried, or rather, to carry itself, to a higher tribunal. Here the very idea would appear to include the non-contingency of its objects, either on the ground of necessity or impossibility. Certainly may this be said of the highest of them. The true thought of Deity as the Absolute, would seem to necessitate (for our mind) its actual existence. The Glorious Idea must have objectivity, on the ground of there being (for our minds, we say again) no alternative between its actual reality and its impossibility. What we call nature, *may be*, or *may not be*. So, also, as a *fact* merely, some most exalted being, far higher than man, yet still finite and imperfect, may be or may not be. But that which, if true, is the highest of all truths, the source of all truth, the truest of all truths, if truth admit of degree, cannot itself belong to the class of contingent verities. We do not put it forth as any mystical or transcending thought. It seems to us, that if one place the mind intently and steadily upon it, he must see it, in its own light, as a certain and intuitive axiom. It cannot, we say, belong to the class of contingent verities. If not contingent, it must be necessary or impossible. If not impossible, therefore, it must be actual. In other words, if we cannot affirm its impossibility, as we certainly cannot, then are we

driven to the belief of its reality. Or to present the statement more formally: If God, the Absolute, the Infinite, the All-perfect, the All-wise, the All-good, the All-holy, *may be*, HE IS, because *necessity* of being, beth by itself, and as included in *perfection* of being, is involved in the very idea, as it is not in the ideas of sense and nature. The proposition, GOD IS, must surely be of as high a rank as the one that maintains that *the sphere is two thirds of its circumscribing cylinder*, and if so, it cannot be *dependent* for its proof, to any mind, on any inductive or *à posteriori* reasoning.¹

The argument against the materialist, we have said, is comparatively easy. There is that in the perception, which could not have come from the sense. We ask him, whence it is, and he cannot tell us. Here, however, the position is reversed. There are some things in the perception, or experience, that could not have come from the mind. This we affirm against the idealist, but it is not so easy to maintain it, as the other proposition. He brings up certain facts, and very startling facts, too, which go to show that there may be perceptions and experiences possessing in consciousness every known *appearance*, or characteristic of objectivity, and yet known to have no other origin than the mind itself.

Let us, then, endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain what consciousness truly reveals. If it cannot affirm directly that some phe-

¹ This argument which we have here presented in our own way, and in the most concise form, may be found more fully stated in Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, Vol. III. p. 390, Eng. ed., where it is given as a modification of the Cartesian. The closest examination has never enabled us to detect its fallacy. There is another which has been suggested to us by a passage in the *Parmenides*. *Truth* is inseparable from *thought*; thought is inseparable from a *thinker*. The first is inconceivable without the second; the second is inconceivable without the third. There are certain truths which the laws of our minds (out of which we cannot think) compel us to regard as independent of time and space, and all created things; in other words, as necessary and eternal. Necessary and eternal truth cannot be conceived of by us, except as necessary and eternal thought; necessary and eternal thought is inconceivable by us except in connection with an eternal thinker, or rather with an eternal intelligence. If we think steadily upon it, we shall find that by the laws of our minds, we cannot take the one without taking the other. But we are compelled to take the one; therefore we must take the other. If we sever the chain, all collapses and falls to the ground, the first proposition as well as the second. The word, *truth*, loses its meaning, and only gets vitality again by connecting it with *thought* and *mind*. Οὐκ ἔχει λόγον νοήματα ὄντα, ἀνόητα εἶναι (132 c). And again, ἀδύνατον νόημα εἶναι, νόημα δὲ οὐδένος. The view is just as conclusive, whether we regard οὐδένος here as expressing the *object* or the *subject*. There cannot be *truth*, except as νοητὸν; there cannot be νοητὸν without Νοῦς.

moments are from without, it certainly does lie within its power and acknowledged office to make distinctions between those that lie within the spiritual realm, whether some of them come originally from without, or not. And this it surely does. We know it by an internal light ("a lumine aliquo interiori ostendente verum,") as Descartes calls it in distinction from a blind impetus, "*spontaneo quodam impetu me ferente ad credendum.*" There are certain constructions, envisagings, etc., which the mind knows to have been preceded by its own volitions; others have had no known connection with the will. All *may* be from the mind. Consciousness can utter no denial of this. But all are not from the soul's direct volition. That she knows and affirms. Here, then, is an interior difference which is well stated by Descartes, in the passage to which we have already referred, and where he sums up the whole in this distinction of voluntary and involuntary. "*Ita videor doctus a natura, et præterea experior illas non a mea voluntate pendere. Sæpe enim vel invito observantur, ut jam sive velim sive nolim sentio calorem, etc. . . . Deinde quamvis ideæ illæ a voluntate mea non pendeant, non ideo constat ipsas a rebus extra me positas necessario procedere; ut enim impetus illi de quibus mox loquebar, quamvis in me sint, a voluntate tamen mea diversi esse videntur, ita forte etiam aliqua alia est in me facultas nondum mihi satis cognita istarum idearum effectrix, ut hactenus semper visum est illas, dum somnio, absque ulla rerum externarum ope in me formari.*"¹

Speaking of the Berkeleyian hypothesis, that all sensation is itself purely mental the author says: "This is affirmed from the want of such an *à priori* cognition of sensation as may make it competent to show that no possible intellectual subjective agency can induce sensation, nor give to any ideal creations the characteristics of real objective phenomena." But has this been shown, or can it be shown? Are there not startling facts in our being which show just the contrary? Is there not real sensation in dreams? We mean not the half-felt bodily states of which we are more or less conscious in slumber, but sensation connected directly with the visions and perceptions of the subjective dream itself. Is there not often, not only sight and hearing, accompanied, as we have every reason to believe, with an affection of the sensorium, but also intense pleasure in the sentiency and intense pain. Is there not sensation (a real affection even of the *material* sensorium) in false perceptions, in spectre-seeing, in imagi-

¹ See Reid's view of Descartes's doctrine, ch. VIII p. 140.

ned sounds,—and this not arising merely from a diseased condition of the material organ, but derived from the previous originating action of the spiritual mind? We mean, is there not, in all these cases, or may there not be, an affection in that very same sensorium which is the seat of all sentiency derived from without? In other words, may not the soul by thinking *make the body feel*, or produce an actual content in the sensibility? This is the hinge question, on which the validity of the demonstration must wholly turn. But there is this difference, it may be said,—the subjective states, so called, are imitations, suggestions, or reminiscences which imply a *previous* objectivity and would never have been without it. This, however, would be assuming that the objective is already proved on independent grounds; otherwise, as was said before, it is only the judgment of one state upon another, both of which may be equally subjective, equally destitute of any ground for deciding upon their mutual relations.

We come back, therefore, to the distinction before taken, and which is the only one we can find. Some perceptions or rather some constructions of the sense (for the propriety of the word perception may be denied) have been preceded by an exercise of will, others have not. Of these latter, some have, for a time, all the seeming characteristics of what we call objectiveness; afterwards they take the appearance of subjectiveness (that is, when another seeming objective world is in possession of the mind) and are recognized as such. In others, the “objective characteristics,” to use the author’s phrase, endure for a longer period; but certainly this is not a question to be determined by longer or shorter continuance; otherwise an indefinitely prolonged dream would, by that very circumstance, become reality.

The distinction of consciousness, then, is not between constructions *ab extra* and from within; but surveying them all as lying within the mind, and in this respect alike, she acts within her own province in pronouncing some voluntary, and others involuntary. It is not, then, so much a direct recognition of a world *without* us, in the first place, as of a power *above* us,—of something which is independent of our will. There has been an attempt to cut the knot of the difficulty by maintaining that perception directly involves an antithesis. There is the famous German flourish of the *me* and the *not-me*. But this is only the dogmatism of another school. It escapes no difficulty as long as we admit that the subject may create its own object, and give to it all the appearance of objectiveness, or that there *may* be real

acts of the soul which are nevertheless without volition. But *will* and *not-will* is a distinction falling within the spirit regarded as embracing all its objects, and within the direct light of consciousness. It is not a direct cognition of an external world, but it is a direct cognition of something which is not my will, and through this there is a path to the recognition, if not the proof, of another and a higher will by which my perceptions are affected, whether through an objective world, or through laws and operations of my mind which although carried on by me are not under my will, and must therefore have received their origin and their action from another.

Thus there springs up in the soul the *thought* of a causality *above* us rather than of a world *without* us. If there were no external world, a variation in the soul's own subjective states, running back to a period of not being, would suggest the same idea of a power which is not our power. It may be objected that this is giving precedence to the later and more metaphysical conception. And yet the notion of causality may be the origin of that of outwardness, although the latter, when born, grows much more rapidly, and by being thus more early and distinctly developed, comes, at last, to be regarded as the first-born, whilst the former is comparatively obscured, and therefore placed among later and more difficult conceptions. The ideas of space and time present a similar case. The latter, as connected with the inner sense, precedes the former which belongs more to the outer, and yet the intuition of space is sooner developed in distinctness, and thereby assumes the appearance of having been more original and fundamental in the soul.

A similar method is employed in the work, to prove the valid being of the notional, and of the objects of the understanding. The law corresponds to the idea. Nature is as we are compelled to think her. That is, if there is an objective nature, thus, and in no other way, can we have an experience of her, or understand her to be. This is proved in a series of demonstrations exceedingly clear, beautifully illustrated, and without a flaw that we can detect. Yet still we have a difficulty similar to that which met us in the field of the sense. There might have been, or rather, it is impossible to show that there might not have been, just such notionals, just such an understanding, comprising just such an experience, and yet wholly subjective. Can the soul by its own energy create content in the sensibility? That was the turning point before. Can the soul, by its own energy, create within its own experience, a phenomenal of an-

*tagonism*¹ which shall correspond to the understanding conception of *force*? That is the hinge-question here. If the negative of this can be shown, the author's argument is perfect. It not only proves a possibility, but invincibly shuts out all opposing possibilities.

On page 489 there is a distinction very strongly and clearly stated between the subjective experience of our dreams and our waking objectivity. "We cannot," it is said, "bring the times of our dreams into one connected whole of a dreaming time, or identify the times passing in our dreams with one objective universal time, except as we have some substantial source for phenomenal succession, and subject the times of our dreams to this one common standard which marks the progress of one universal time for all." This we think too strongly stated. We cannot, it is true, when in what we call the waking state, bring our dreaming into one such connected whole; but we cannot say there may not be, even in the same subject, a consciousness in which this is done, or which may connect into one universal time of its own all our dreaming experience, wild and incoherent as it may seem to be. What forbids there being in this way double or triple consciousness belonging to one subject (if we take something back of consciousness as the real personal self, or ground of identity) and yet so separate, that they never intermingle, and we know not in one state what we have known, as we knew it, in the other. On such a supposition, the experience of one state perduces *through*, or rather *across* all the intervals, and bridges over and connects all its chasms, however much they may seem to be severed by the intervention of others. That such a supposition, instead of being altogether a chimera, has some ground of possibility in our most mysterious being, would be shown by those facts (if facts) which are to be found related in certain books under the head of double consciousness. Such facts, however, should be attested by the highest evidence. None that we have ever read of have a profounder connection with some of the most important and fundamental positions in psychology.

We should like to dwell upon our author's very striking comparison of subjective time to mirrored spaces, either existing separately, or themselves regarded as appearing in one constant mirror supposed to contain them all. We can only refer the reader to it, and the simile of the current in the same chapter, as presenting matter of great interest, and as excelling in beauty and pertinency anything we ever met with in any similar work. But the limits of our review forbid.

¹ Not only a subjective *not-me*, but something further—that which is *opposed to me*.

The argument for a real objective time, as law to the idea, may be condensed into the following statement.

It is a fact that we *somehow* determine time to be perpetual and to have been continually passing during sleep and other interruptions.

This can be no intuition of the sense; it cannot come from any conjoining agency; I cannot *perceive* time passing, nor myself in the current.

Therefore I must *think* it discursively through some medium as data which lie beyond the subjective experience.

And finally, all the *facts* in our determination of the interrupted periods of our experience to be in one perpetual time, are brought in colligation by the notion of *perducing* source as time-filling substance.

This proves the notional, as a fixed part of our spiritual constitution; but does it prove its truth, or that it tells the truth. The notion says there is an outward *perducing* time, and we must either have no experience, or one that conforms to it. As clearly as the sense informs us that we are sailing on a river, so does this more interior oracle assure us that we are sailing down one steady stream of time. But one is no more infallible than the other. The notion is within us and may dream. Neither is it helped when another mind is brought to testify, not only to the existence of the same subjective notion, but to its outward realization in some fixed standard, through which alone the otherwise independent consciousnesses of the two can be reconciled. But this other mind is without us. How can we know its existence? All other men may be but phantoms floating in our subjective sensorium, or imaged in the glass of our minds, or we may be all mutually enmirrored and contained in the all inclusive mirror of Spinoza's dream.

The strong point, if it can be proved, is the necessity of some common objective standard which shall give "one time for us all." Otherwise there might be as many times as consciousnesses, or the same seeming objects might be for different subjects, in different subjective times, and yet, somehow, strangely thought into one, or what might seem to be, one common experience. And yet who knows, the sceptic might say, but that it is so? May they not be thought into one time, just as phenomena in all parts of differing spaces may be mirrored into one common space? I do this in my dreams. Scenes and events and thoughts long past I bring up and mingle with the present, without allowing a consciousness of separation. Nay more, I create a past wholly my own, wholly new in itself, and yet I somehow strangely invest it with that character we call *familiarity*, and which

is supposed to be the result alone of long experience. I people my subjective realm with other conscious agents, new yet seemingly well known. I fill it with space-filling forces. I give to all its associations the required consistency with their and my own one seeming common experience. I bring all this into simultaneousness, and thus clothe it with every characteristic of reality. Now can we certainly affirm that such may not be the simultaneousness of what we call our waking state? We may compare it to the effect produced upon our phenomenal experience by the varying periods occupied in the transmission of light; and by the operation of which a universe of past events, belonging to all periods of past time, may be now passing before us with all the apparent simultaneousness that may be claimed as belonging to our objective experience. It may be said that it is not, in that case, the past we now see,—for that would contradict the notionals of our understanding—but the present representation. And yet a whole experience may thus be made up of representations of what now *is not*, and never *had been* during the whole life of that experience. The comparison may be imperfect, and yet it is sufficient to show, that even in a physical world of admitted objectivity there may be such an arrangement, or organization, that what we regard as near in space and present in time, may, in one sense, be billions of leagues distant for the one, and billions of centuries remote for the other.¹

These very terms, distance, remoteness, it may be said, show a law of our minds compelling us to recognize this notional of a one universal space, and a one universal time, as involving an objective reference. True, it shows the validity of the notional, and it is much to prove this as involving something more than Hume's association, and Brown's voice of ceaseless prophecy. But still it proves only the notional, we think, and then we must go out of the sense, and out of the understanding, to that "behest of the reason" which requires faith in the Absolute, as the ultimate and sure ground of confidence in both. It is much in this sense, to prove the validity of the notional. So distinct, so uniform, so decided an utterance of the soul,

¹ What shall we say of the subjective vision of the prophets? Sometimes they received verbal messages; sometimes they saw signs; at others they seem to be represented as beholding the real scene before it *was*. As in Num. 24: 17, "I see it, but it is not now; I behold it, but it is not near." The form of the tense in the passage would denote a present *seeing of the future*, rather than a prediction of a *future seeing*. What shall we say too of what is called the second sight? or is this all fable?

although *in itself* not infallible, could not have been given to deceive us with a mere show of substance and causality, if, after all, they are nothing but phenomena and sequences. Such a world might furnish an extensive science of shadows for the soul and for the understanding, too, but it would have no *meaning* for the reason or for faith. In one sense, "man walketh indeed in a vain show," (עָלָהּ, *év alóh,*) but all is substantial when he truly believes in God.

If there is any truth in the view we have taken, we are indebted for it, and for much in the manner of stating it, to ideas received from the author's book: although we may have seemed to find difficulty in some parts of his argument. A regard to the symmetry of his work may have led him to attribute too much, we will not say to the sense and the understanding, but to considerations drawn solely from them. The ontological verity of their objects cannot, we think, be proved *by them*, nor *from them*. Taken, however, in connection with the higher department of the soul, it does seem to us that he has settled the great question of the reality of an objective universe. God meant that we should *ordinarily* trust the phenomena of the senses and the notionals of our understandings, as giving true intelligence of an outward world; but then, with all reverence be it said, we think we can see a reason why there were allowed to be those strange facts in our existence which would prevent an implicit reliance. The validity of the notional well settled, as not the mere offspring of association, or of a blind belief, but as a distinct part of our mental constitution, we are kept *ordinarily steady*, notwithstanding our dreams, to the common apprehension of our substantial external world, our space, our time, our universal common ground of experience for all. But, then, when we are compelled to think about it, the ultimate trust is not so much *in* the notional, as *through* the notional, in something higher. When the question comes before us in all its seriousness, we find, on the other hand, enough of a dreamy and subjective experience to make us flee to this strong hold, and feel, that as "*the Lord liveth*," so is the assurance that "*our soul liveth*," and that the objects of our senses and of our understanding have a true, and substantial, and *perduring* being.

This is not Cartesianism. The author's exceptions to that theory are well taken, and conclusively maintained. In it, "the Deity," as he shows, "is degraded to a physical force as cause in an understanding conception." "The divinity of the supernatural is brought down to the perpetual servitude of the natural;" or, in other words, "the Deity is needed only for holding nature in its place." A similar ob-

jection is also well taken to the "occasional causes," to which the doctrine of Descartes was carried by his religious follower, Malebranche. And yet, we think, there is a vast difference between them and the view on which we have been insisting. It is one thing to sink Deity into nature, or to elevate nature to Deity; it is another thing to derive from the idea of God a proof of the objective reality of nature, and of a real separate substance and causality in nature, as involved in the truthfulness of the notionals he has given us. A conviction thus derived, that there is a real nature of things with its real immanent powers aside from immediate divine agency, is very different from that hyper-pietism of Malebranche and others, which, in its making everything in the natural world proceed from the direct act of God, would confound Deity with nature, by absorbing the natural in the supernatural, just as certainly as Spinoza does, by developing nature out of the Deity.

God has given us these perceptions, and these notionals, and we therefore believe that there are real phenomena corresponding to the one, and real substance and real causation corresponding to the other. Thus viewed, the author's argument seems to us conclusive. With this thought ever held in connection, the proved correspondence of the idea and the law (which is his great argument) does give us, notwithstanding our occasional dreams, a real world, an *established* nature of things, with its conjunctions, its connections, its chain of efficiencies, its contexture of reciprocal influences, in distinction from the continual miracle or supernatural of one school, the mere development, or extension of a first cause which characterizes another, and the mere empty phenomena and unconnected sequences of a third.

In this way our philosophizing brings us round to the old doctrine of the Scriptures and the Catechism — a true creation of a true nature of things, and a work of Providence since carried on (with occasional miraculous interventions) *through* and *by* this nature of things. In other words, God made a nature, — originated its substances, — gave being to its dynamical agencies, so as to have immanent and *perdurant* efficiency in themselves, or during their unhindered operations, and then implanted in the human spirituality, trustworthy notions corresponding. The Malebranche theory may seem very pious in thus ascribing everything to the direct act of God, but besides the objection before mentioned, it is directly opposed to the Scripture. Even with its continual recognition of an ever present Deity, the Bible everywhere assumes the fact of a nature of things distinct from God, and to which powers belong that are supposed to *remain* in it, and to act

by their own efficiency thus given. Even the *first* productions of our renovated earth were through an imparted dynamical agency, instead of proceeding from the immediate energy of God. The new forces were working already, according to an *immanent* law. We gather this, not so much from the causal form of the Hebrew verbs employed, as from the general aspect of the scriptural declaration. "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass (אֶרֶץ); and the earth *caused* to come forth (אֶרֶץ) the herb yielding seed (זֶרַע), or *causing* the growth of seed, after its kind."

If there can be a proof of the reality of an objective world, or of an objective nature of things, we do not say, by the understanding, but by considerations drawn solely from the field of the understanding, then it would follow, that there might be such proof even in an atheistic hypothesis. But can this be so? Can man, or the soul of man, be anything but an enigma, can our perceptions and our notions be anything else but dreams,—can the world have any other reality than that of coming and departing phenomena and unconnected sequences—can there be any real unity of nature, or any harmony of the universe, to a mind for which the highest reality is supposed to have no meaning, and the absolute ground of all truth and all being no objectivity?

If it be demanded what this real *substance* (or hypostasis) is, which thus *stands*, or, to use a more convenient metaphor, lies beneath nature, and which the notional of our understanding claims to represent, we can conceive of nothing that better answers its conditions than our author's "space-filling force." This has its difficulties, but every other view we attempt to take has still greater; that is if we *will* think upon what matter is, and cannot satisfy our minds with the Johnsonian argument of kicking the foot against a stone. Our main trouble is with the originating conception. That once mastered, or assumed, the beauty of its applications, and the harmony of the scheme deduced from it are the great arguments for its absolute verity. The author makes the following distinction between it and *pure act*.

"This, being in one direction, and suiting no other action, could have nothing answering to the conception of force. Except as action meets action, and thereby *counteraction* takes place, no generation of force is conceivable; and hence all conception of force is not original *pure act*, but a product of an antagonism. At the point of contingency, as pure notion in the understanding, shall we first attain the conception of force as pure understanding conception. Such a point becomes an occupied position in *space resisting* all displacement; and to the extent to which the diverse

points in space are continuously occupied by pure forces is there a filling of space, and a resistance to all foreign intrusion within such space." p. 386.

But how is this — an antagonism of an antagonism, each of which, if there is nothing conceived of as lying under by way of hypostasis, is an absolute nihility without the other! — a counteraction of a counteraction! We confess that we are quite lost.

Neither is the difficulty wholly cleared up by what is said, p. 608, of creation, or the origination of such force by the Absolute.

"As incorporeal and uncreated reason and will, the Absolute has his own spring of action within himself, and in this a power in liberty which is wholly above and separate from all force in nature. He may originate simple acts which in their own simplicity have no counter-agency, and can, therefore, never be brought under any of the conditions of space, and time, and nature. From his own inner self-determination, he may designedly put forth simple acts in counteraction, and here a force begins which takes position in space, and occupies an instant in time. There is a beginning in something where nothing was, and this has position, instant, and *permanence*. This *perpetuated* energy and counteraction is creation in *progress*. A space is filled, a time is occupied; there is an impenetrable substance which may give content in a sensibility, and be conjoined in definite phenomena. *Above* that point of counteraction, all is simple activity, unphenomenal, unsubstantial, and having all its essentiality in the power of the supernatural as will in liberty. *In* and below that point, all is *force*, phenomenal in the sense, substance and cause, from its antagonism, in the understanding, and existing as physical nature in its essential conditions."

Our author is one of the last writers that can be justly charged with using words for nothing. Whenever we do follow him, although it has been sometimes with difficulty, we have always found his sentences opening into clear and definite significance. We have derived from him too much light to believe that he has not here, as elsewhere, a meaning distinctly apprehended by his own mind. But we must confess our perplexity. The proportions are all clear if we can only draw a true line between the dualistic *force* which is *in* nature, as the beginning and continuation of nature, and the duality of simple *activities* which are *in* the supernatural above it. Otherwise this *perpetuated* energizing in counteraction would seem to resemble the very thing which is charged upon the Cartesian hypothesis, — namely, the "bringing down the divinity of the supernatural to the perpetual servitude of the natural."

And yet the difficulties are increased by the conception of matter as *inert* substance excluding all thought of force, or tendency, except

as superinduced *ab extra*. It would be, as the author elsewhere says, a mere *caput mortuum*, and all attempts to show from it how it could become causality, would be in vain. It could give no content in a sensibility; it could exhibit no varied modes of being, so as to appear as events, except by some *ab extra* efficiency. It would *do* nothing, and, therefore, as notion for ground or source, would be¹ nothing; the *ab extra* efficiency accomplishing all without it. There would still be required the Divine activity *immanent* in space, as constant causality and immediate source for every event. Now the understanding may be satisfied with its force, or its matter, let it get the conception whence it may. But the reason demands a separation of nature from God, although not its entire independence of origin and termination. It demands it as the only means of preventing us from falling into that abyss of pantheism, which is just as subversive of the moral and the supernatural, as the most atheistic naturalism. Hence, if it could get nothing better, it would be content with the *fact*, however it might transcend every conception we might attempt to form of the manner in which it was accomplished. And here the Scripture coincides with this highest behest of the reason. "*Lo, I call to them; they stand together.*"² It gives us the origination, and the subsequent perdurance, as though by a separate inherent force, once imparted and then self-exercised through its own immanent law. "*He commanded, and they stood fast,*"³ is the sublime language of another passage. What was the *commanding*, and what was the *standing*, or *standing fast*, are not explained to us, and perhaps we could never know; but the fact, as a fact, may be admitted, and once received, it makes all the separation between God and nature which the reason demands, and on which the understanding can rest. We may accept, therefore, the author's space-filling force as the nearest approach that can perhaps be made to the absolute and ineffable verity, regarding, however, its origin and its perpetuation as among the mysteries which pass all understanding, and all powers of adequate representation in human speech.

Taking, however, this conception of force, as the mother of matter, or as itself matter enough for all substantial⁴ purposes, (seeing

¹ It may be doubted whether we can ever wholly separate the thought of *being* from that of *power*. Can anything truly be which *does* nothing? or is not this, as Plato says in the *Sophista*, the very *ōpos* or definition of it? *Τίθεται γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζεν τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἀλλὰ τι πλὴν ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ—εἴτε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὄντιον, εἴτε εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον.* *Sophista*, 247, E.

² Isaiah 48: 13.

³ Psalm 33: 9.

⁴ A view very similar to that of Dr. Hickok, has been given in a late mathe-

there is no event or phenomenon of matter that may not be deduced from it,) and taking, too, this perpetuated antagonism or counteraction as once assumed, we may go on to those interesting results which are presented as its legitimate deductions.

"Past a doubt," says the author speaking (p. 555) of an *à priori* law running through all distinguishable forces in nature, "past a doubt such a law exists, and determines how each distinguishable substance *must be*." This *à priori* law would be the exact correlation of the developed ideal contained in the understanding conception of the first substance in nature and of the added forces that may be in harmony with it. In other words, just as in the pure intuition of *space*, the intellectual energy, (call it by what name we will,) finds all mathematical truth, so in the pure conception of *force*, an intellect strong enough and clear enough, and with a keenness of vision that could be sustained long enough, would see involved all physical science. This is very different from the belief that nature, in itself, is necessary. It *may be*, or it may not be. It may be empirical or purely ideal. God may originate it, or he may not; he may allow it to continue or he may cause it to cease, just as he pleases.¹ But if it *is*, it *does* something; and, in that case, he has given an understanding and a reason to see, that in certain initiatory conceptions are to be found its most general conditioning principles, and which compel us to affirm, even when from the tiring of the intellectual energy we cannot see and cannot understand, that in those first conceptions, and those first conditioning principles, there is somehow certainly contained the science of the most minute operations that fall under the notice of our senses.

Past a doubt physical knowledge has its *à priori* axioms, necessitated (for us) by the laws of our understanding, as well as the mathematics. Nor does this drive us to the conclusion that *all that now is* in the natural world grew by development out of the first force, or as a work which since its origination by the Absolute has been going on without him. It is perfectly consistent with the idea of new forces implanted by God in nature at different periods, or from time to time coming into nature from the supernatural; — which new forces, also, when once sown by the Divine hand, have their own conditioning

mathematical work, entitled, *The Calculus of Operations*, by John Patterson, A. M., a production presenting a rare union of high mathematical and metaphysical talent.

¹ Pure *space*, pure *force*, pure *will* in personality. In this ascending series we have the initiatory cognitions for the phenomenal, the physical and the supernatural.

principles and the understanding conceptions connected with them by an ideal or *à priori* bond. There is more in nature now than there was in the beginning. This appears from the rock bound volumes of geological science, as is most conclusively shown in the examination which the author gives of "the order of nature's formation." Sec. II. Ch. II. Part III.

It is perfectly consistent, too, with the belief of the miraculous and the providential. In other words, it may admit, as coming from the Supernatural Power, not only new forces *added* in nature, and afterwards becoming a part of nature, but also new *directions* of forces already existing, turning them to results they would not otherwise have produced; and, moreover, sudden *interventions* breaking up any particular action of any particular force, or putting an end to all nature herself with all her forces. Yet still we must agree with the author, that as a nature undiverted, unimpeded, it is *à priori* determinable; — determinable (we would say by way of qualification) in its first general conditioning principles by our intellects — determinable downward, even to its ultimate operations, by an intellect of a given energy.

The expression is not too strong. Past a doubt, we find the conviction in our souls, if we will look for it, that nature, thus viewed by herself to the exclusion of *ab extra* considerations, is *one*, and *must* be *one*. Even to the most common mind it is the security (although there may not be a direct consciousness of it) against that dissolving view which would represent the universe as a mere collocation of phenomena, or a mere succession of arbitrary unconnected sequences. The mind demands some such conception as that of the universal space-filling force, as the support of its very natural, if not in-born, idea of a one nature, or one kosmos, an undivided plenum, instead of a phantasmagoric series of *events* which after all are not *e-events* because they come *out* of nothing, or a ghost-like procession of magical *occasions* with voids of all power, and, therefore, of all being between them.

There is a letter of Newton to Bentley, in which this great philosopher says, that "it is inconceivable to him how one thing should act upon another through a vacuum," — that is, not a mere exhaustion of the air pump, but a vacuity of all being; such as our author has set forth (p. 369) where he regards the space-filling force, although with its added modifications forming higher or lower degrees of substance, in particular places, yet in its primary state as pervading the universe. Instead of being a scholastic subtlety, the axiom that "nothing could

act but *when* it is and *where* it is," was one out of which Newton could not think. Dugald Stewart, however, and others of that school, find no difficulty with what appeared to Newton so inconceivable; and in their doctrine of occasions and sequences, there certainly is no such difficulty. They have in this respect greatly the advantage of the author of the *Principia*. If one thing is but the occasion, the antecedent, or the sign of another, without any inherent causality or efficiency, then, *ex vi terminorum*, they may be parted, not only by distances and periods, occupied with reciprocally acting *influences*, or *contiguously* impulsive forces, but by any chasms of nihility both in space and time. Newton could not conceive of this. His great mind, like the most common mind, could not divest itself of that conception of causality which God had made part of its constitution, — an imperative law of its thinking. He felt himself compelled to follow that vulgar notion of impulse through an intervening medium, (whether we call it matter, or fluid, or force, or anything else,) as of a real *ens* in space, in distinction from *non-ens*; and the result was his sublime doctrine of universal gravitation. That false Baconianism which is everlastingly talking about bare *facts* and sequences, as being the only object of science, or of philosophical investigation, would never have seen the one-ness of the kosmos in the fall of the apple. To the sound understanding of Newton, nothing possessed the dignity of a fact unless it could be held to be what the word truly imports, a something *done* (factum) an *effect*, an *e-vent*, coming *out* of an efficiency, and that connected with all the physical efficiency of the universe.

Thus regarded, the smallest change in nature is a witness to this universal efficiency. There is before me on my table a beautiful toy, which does as well for this purpose as the most extensive philosophical apparatus. It is an elegant representation of a ship with its masts and sails all rocking upon a point, and brought to an equilibrium by a weight suspended below the frame on which it is supported, and directly underneath its centre of gravity. As it swings gracefully upon its pivot, or rests calmly in the repose of its equilibrium, it answers every purpose of an intellectual sedative. I gaze upon it as an object not only of sensitive but of ideal beauty. It represents visibly to me this great truth, — the unity of nature, the unbroken plenum of causality, the perfect reciprocity of dynamical influence, not only through all the space but all the time occupied by the natural universe. All that ever has been, all that is now, and all that ever will be, is here — here, as an assumed centre of all previous

causality, of all present efficiency, of all future effect. In other words, it may be taken as the symbolical embodiment of the necessary *à priori* conviction of all rationalized understandings, that, as far as nature is concerned, (we mean nature uninterrupted and undiverted,) no one thing would now be what it *is*, if all things were not what they *are*, and had not from the beginning been just what they *were*. Why do we feel that the mind is compelled by an inward law to make this affirmation? Why is it a necessity of our thinking, unless God has implanted it in the organization of our souls as a witness to the outward truth to which it corresponds, and made such a connection between them, that, the conception of nature's unity once broken, the conceived unity of our own existence suffers a shock, if it is not wholly broken up with it into a fragmentary succession of sequences, occasions, and phenomena, to the exclusion of all substance from our spiritual as well as our material being?

Nature abhors a vacuum. This intense and far-reaching affirmation of the ancient mind has long enough been the stale jest of superficial lecturers. It is, however, some satisfaction to know that the best modern science is slowly but surely coming round to it again. There is a law of the understanding which makes it a necessary part of our thinking, as long as we remain true to the innate notions of cause and effect; and it is one great recommendation of the author's doctrine of the space-filling force, that in it we find the best scientific expression for such a law. Nature is a plenum. The universe is full. Whatever may be the limits which God assigned to it in the beginning, when He created the heavens and the earth, — however remote may be that frontier where utter non-existence commences — still, within those limits there is no part or point of space in which there is not something which is truly *ens*, in distinction from non-ens. It is a plenum, not of that which is capable of affecting *our* senses, but of something conceived by the understanding as a space-filling entity, and which, as the author maintains, might give content in the sensibility to beings of a higher and more refined organization.¹ The differences would be differences of intensity, (*πένεσις καὶ μέγεθος*, to use Aristotle's terms,²) and that of every degree from zero upwards, as the author says, p. 388. He must mean, however, as far

¹ Thus Aristotle gives two senses in which the word *κενόν* or *vacuum*, may be taken, "Some say it is that *ἐν ᾧ μηδέν ἐστι σῶμα αἰσθητόν* in which there is nothing sensible; others say it is that *ἐν ᾧ ὅλως μηδέν ἐστι*, in which there is nothing at all." *Phys. Ausc., Lib. IV. 6, 3.*

² *Ibid.* 9, 5.

as the occupation of space was concerned, without denying that there might be other differences. But nowhere within these bounds of the created universe is there absolute nothingness. Everywhere is there the *ראש קצרתו חבל*, the highest or first part of the dust of the world, as the architectural Wisdom styles it, Prov. 8: 26. If we admit at all the idea of nihility, then is nature severed, and equally severed, whether the chasm be thinner than the almost invisible leaf of beaten gold, or wider than the widest bounds of stellar systems; whether below the keenest search of the microscope, or extending to a distance immensely beyond where the telescope has ever reached.

In this conception of nature, too, as the author shows, there necessarily comes in, not merely a *chain* of causality, or the conception of many chains tending ever in one direction of progress, but a wide woven contexture of reciprocal influences. It is not only up and down, but transverse and athwart. Nature is a web, and every point in space and time may be taken, at pleasure, as the centre on which all her past and present influences may be regarded as being brought to bear. Although pressed for space, we cannot omit giving an extract to this effect from the volume we are reviewing. It is presented not only for the great value of the thought, but as one specimen, out of many that might be offered, of the writer's admirable power of language.

"With this conception of the *reciprocity of influence* throughout nature, and that no one thing can be changed in its inner modifications, but it has been acted upon by all, and that thus one portion of nature acts through every other portion, while every other portion is also acting through it, we have the analytical judgment *à priori*, and thus a primitive principle of nature, that it can be no *coëxercation* of particular things which are merely in *opposition* in space; nor yet a mere *concatenation* of various series of things in independent lines of cause and effect; but that which all have a *perpetual* source, and a conditioned order of *succession*, this warp of all lines of causation is also woven across with the *connecting* woof of reciprocal influences, and thus that nature has its complete *contexture* which may be held as one web of a determined experience, and which no more *adheres continuously*, than it also *coheres transversely*."

We would only remark, that the etymological precision so striking here, especially in the words we have italicised, is everywhere a constant characteristic of the author's style. When it is difficult to follow him, it is because the region through which he takes us is dark, or it has been but little visited, or, which is more likely, it has become intricate in consequence of being traversed by the confused

paths and cross-roads which more careless writers have made in every direction upon its surface, and not from the want of the utmost caution of the author in setting upon it guide-posts at every point exposed to the danger of error. The reader accustomed to the confused platitudes of Dugald Stewart, or the loose exuberance of Brown, or the smirking common-places of Sydney Smith, or it may be, the spectral twilight of the mystical and idealistic schools, is not prepared for the exact simplicity of terms employed throughout this book. Thus in reading the above extract, (although we do not select it as presenting any unusual difficulty) one may see no emphasis in such words as *particular, series, perpetual, connecting*, etc., to say nothing of the more unusual and therefore striking expressions. He may even regard some of them as redundancies, when a close examination would show in respect to every one, not only a distinct thought, but a thoughtful selection,— would show, not only their adaptedness, but that no others would have answered in their place. A still more careless reader might take it as some common sentence in which words are often used for their rhetorical flow, or to round a period. Another critic might condemn it for its length and apparent complication, without being aware that this is sometimes the only mode of securing the utmost conciseness and the utmost perspicuity. In the above extract alone there is truth and thought enough to furnish some writers with material for half a dozen chapters. It might, in that way, too, require much less study, but what it would gain in ease it would lose in force and clearness. If, on the other hand, it were cut up into short periods, it would lose that *con-vincing* power which it can only possess when the whole thought, with all its *complications*, is presented as a unity.

The easiest reading is not always the most perspicuous,— certainly not the most conspicuous. One who reads Dr. Hickok's work as it ought to be read, will find, often, that it requires great steadiness and concentration to follow him; but he will also find, that there is meaning there, and that when discovered nothing could be more transparent. He will often, too, be satisfied that in no other manner could the thought have been presented without some deficiency, or some redundancy, or some less eligible arrangement of its parts that would have detracted from its force no less than from its significance. In these respects we do not deem it extravagant to compare him with some of the master minds of antiquity. His sentences must be studied; and so must those of Bacon, of Plato, and of Aristotle. But if the text of these writers be not corrupt, we are sure of a meaning, and

when we discover that meaning we are sure that we have it, and not only that, but as with a flash of light comes the conviction, that, much as its deciphering may have cost us, there is no other way in which that meaning could have been so well expressed. We see that their sentences have been the result of great pains and carefulness on their part, and that only by a like process could the thought, in all its completeness, and all its unity, be mirrored in the reader's soul.

It may appear to some a strange assertion, and yet it is strictly true, that Dr. Hickok's style is deeply metaphorical. We refer not now to the formal figure or comparison, although some of his illustrations of this kind are marked by great force and beauty, but to that hidden metaphor which is contained in the most important terms in language, and in no department more than in that which is representative of psychological processes. They are the metaphors involved in the primary senses of words, and which were originally brought into use, not for purposes of adornment and illustration, like the figurative language of later times, but through a necessity of the soul striving to find the best outward expression of the inward action, and thus the safest representative of all we can truly know respecting it. They are a development, a formation of the soul acting spontaneously without a philosophical consciousness, and thus are they the best exponents of its laws, just as any physical product is the most exact outward expression of the interior force to which it owes its formation.¹

Seldom do we find more of this etymological precision than in the work before us. The author has proceeded, and proceeded safely, on the principle that in the primary senses and metaphors contained in the most truly philosophical as well as in the most common language (and the most philosophical ever resolves itself etymologically into what was once the most common, although long since passed from an ordinary to a scientific use), we have the most direct guide to those original notions of the human soul *out of which we cannot think* without a logical contradiction. How different this from the course of some of the more popular writers on psychology whose works are used as text-books in our colleges, and who are ever telling us that this or that idea is but a "*pre-judice* generated in unphilosophical minds by the unfortunate use of metaphorical language." But whence

¹ It would be enough to suggest, for example, to any reader of the book, how much depends on getting a clear view of the etymological distinction between the words *conjunction* and *connection*, and how much of what is said of the different action of the sense and the understanding would otherwise appear pointless and unmeaning.

came the metaphor? and is it the child or the parent of the prejudice? This question they never think of answering; or should they attempt the solution of the difficulty, they would doubtless maintain that they had poured upon it all needed light, by resolving it, as they do all causality, into some unaccountable sequence of the human mind, or some inexplicable *occasion* through which, without any *conceivable* necessity therefor, it is ever running into falsehood and absurdity.

A science of psychology, says Morell, is still a desideratum. We will however hazard the assertion that in this book of Dr. Hickok such desideratum is supplied. Whatever may be thought of its completeness, it is the *science* of psychology — the science itself, instead of that mere writing *about* it, or those rambling semi-historical, semi-philosophical discussions of certain topics connected with it which form the substance of most of the treatises used in our schools and colleges. Abstract indeed the author is, but there is an intellectual beauty in the mathematical straight-forwardness with which he carries us on from section to section through every part of his condensed and well-arranged system. Independent of the truths presented, there is awakened a scientific interest allied to the aesthetic emotion called out by contemplating an exquisite work of art. It is as though some splendid and harmonious structure were rising before the eye, as we observe him, preparing for his after-work by the most exact definition, commencing next with consciousness in order to make a pure and perfect abstraction of all its content except the indestructible intuitions which, by remaining, show themselves to have been *à priori* conditions for all experience, — then, after thus going down to the foundation, returning step by step, and *building up* through the aid of these shaping intuitions an *à priori* science, every part of which has been as rigidly demonstrated as any theorem in geometry, — and lastly, going back to experience, not now for the purpose of emptying it in order to get at the underlying cognitions, but to show how its *whole* content is *actually filled up* by a law in exact correspondence with the before constructed *à priori* idea.

Nothing diverts the attention from that rigid method the writer has marked out for himself. He suffers himself to be led away by none of that fondness for illustrative discussion, or still more idle philosophical story-telling which characterizes such writers as Brown and Abercrombie. In proof of this it may be observed, as a striking fact, that in this large volume, there is not a single note from beginning to end. Whatever came not directly within the field of sci-

tific demonstration is not allowed to divert the attention even to a passing marginal remark. Could the book be introduced into the higher classes in our colleges, it would, no doubt, possess a value, even as a means of mental training, or a course of intellectual gymnastics, equal to, if not surpassing any that is afforded by the most accurate instruction in mathematics or philology.

We can, however, very readily anticipate an objection arising from its very title page. 'A Rational Psychology—The Subjective Idea and the Objective Law. These, and the very common use of the words *à priori*, to the shame of our philosophy be it said, are sufficient to frighten many readers, and to give others a ground for condemning the work at once. It must be all transcendental moonshine, or German idealism, or Hegelianism, or something worse. Facts—give us facts. This is the law of philosophizing since the time of the great Bacon whom every body quotes. Facts says Dugald Stewart,—facts says Brown,—facts says Sidney Smith,—facts says Macaulay,—facts say the Edinburgh and Westminster reviews,—facts, say all the popular lecturers—this is now the demand of science, of philosophy, of theology. "With facts," says the writer of a late most valuable essay, "philosophy begins, proceeds, and ends; ideas and ideal systems however profound must give way to realities." There are so many rich trains of thought in the treatise to which we now refer, that its author, we hope, will pardon our slight criticism on the passage, should it meet his eye. We should not have chosen it, had it not come in so appositely to the view we are taking. We introduce it to show that although one who thinks, and thinks profoundly, may fall into this style, he must very soon be led by the *à priori* necessities of his own mind, to qualify, in some way, the barrenness of such a statement. We read on—"These the mind seeks in the realm both of matter and spirit, and as thus fact after fact, and principle after principle, discovers itself in *beautiful harmony*, the soul rejoices, etc." But where is the scale which is to guide the ear in resolving noise into tune and proper music? In other words, what is it which converts a "fact" into a "principle," and whence the "harmony" that shapes these facts, the spirit that hovers over them, and without which they would ever remain in chaos? How are they ever to arise from the *toku* and *bohu* which becomes darker and deeper with their accumulation, unless there is an *ideal* light in the soul that shines down upon them, and which is *à priori* to the facts themselves. We must somehow have the harmony, or who shall tell, or how shall we tell, whether they truly "rise in harmony" or not.

On the other hand, nothing can be more opposed, than the method of this book, to a smoky and mystical idealism. As the result of the most diligent study we are prepared to pronounce the author one of the *most* common sense writers we ever read — in other words, most in accordance with the *vrai équilibre*, the *semper ubique et ab omnibus* of the universal human soul. The whole design of his book is to give a substantial ground for all our knowledge; and the result of our own individual experience in this very feeling of substantiality as opposed to all that is dreamy and sceptical. We rise from its perusal with the thought that we are on solid ground, — with a clearer conviction of a one substantial nature, a true human soul and a true human body, — a dread Absolute Personality, and a moral accountability tremendously real.

It is on these accounts we feel warranted in describing this work by an epithet which is seldom applied to similar productions. It is a very *serious* book. Although so purely speculative there is, at times, something almost fearful in the views it presents, of the superiority of the ethical to the aesthetical and the philosophical, of our ethical relations to the Absolute Right, and the awful doom and degradation which must await the related finite personality when it irrecoverably sinks the spiritual and the supernatural into the sentient and the natural.

Should we make any objection to this part of the work, it would be to point out what seems to us an omission rather than an error. The author, we think, is led by the peculiar course of his argument to find sin too exclusively in the sentiency, or the region which connects our spirituality with nature. Certainly he would not deny a soul-sin, or a pure sin of the spirit, having its seat in the supernatural will above all temptibility from nature, and deriving an immensely enhanced malignancy from this very fact. By such sin fell the angels. By such a sin of the spirit must our first parents have *first* fallen, or Satan never could have tempted them through that poor sentiency on which some, theologians as well as philosophers, are so much disposed to throw the blame of all our depravity. The author's mind was too exclusively drawn to the relation of the natural to the supernatural. We regret that he did not enter into the analysis of such soul-sin; as he might well have done in connection with what he says of the aesthetic and philosophic characteristics. Such an analysis might have made the subject of one of his richest chapters.

But our space will not permit us to dwell on these important themes. Instead of giving even a summary of them we must content

ourselves with calling attention to a few of the admirable positions the volume furnishes for assailing some of the worst errors of the day. It is in its later chapters a complete armory of weapons against the scientific naturalism of such books as the *Vestiges of Creation*, and that still worse thing, the spurious ethical naturalism which sinks all ethics into physics, making the great end of human existence obedience to physical laws, and that too, through a continual exchanging of one physical good for another, as Socrates says, teaching men to be temperate through intemperance and to be brave through fear, or which has no idea of self-denial except as a means of avoiding a greater pain or securing a greater pleasure. So, also, its strong maintaining of the *inherent* merit of righteousness, and of course, the *inherent* demerit of sin irrespective of all physical consequences, leads directly to the *inherent desert* of punishment, and presents one of the best grounds of argument against all such theories (now so rife) that would resolve it into cure, or prevention, or a police contrivance for the preservation of order in God's political universe. For the same reason, we may say, its whole spirit is in point blank opposition to that monstrous system of theological Benthamism which makes the universe a grand sentient democracy in a *state of nature*, where all law and all morality are nothing more than a summed expression for the *majority*, or balance, of "pleasing sensations" (as a late writer defines happiness), and God is to be had in respect and deferred to, mainly as being a greater sentiency, or as having a greater *capacity* for happiness than all lower *natures* in existence.

But we must bring our long review to a close. Deeply impressed with a conviction of the value of the book, we have attempted, as well as we could, to convey that conviction, and the grounds of it, to others. In doing so we have endeavored also to discharge a debt of gratitude for the rich instruction received from its perusal. After weeks of intense study, we laid it down with the impression that it must be henceforth one of our few books, to be kept as a settled standard for future thinking. We believe the same feeling of substantiality will be left upon the mind of every intelligent man who will give it that close study which is the only worthy tribute to its intrinsic excellence.

ARTICLE VI.

DR. JONAS KING'S EXPOSITION OF AN APOSTOLICAL CHURCH.¹

THIS brief but lucid and, to us, satisfactory exposition of an Apostolical Church, is designed for such Greeks as are more or less convinced that the religion of their church is not the religion of the Bible, the source, and the only source, of all true religion. The following summary will give the reader a good idea of its contents.

The true Disciples of Jesus Christ — Their Religious Guide — Nature of the Christian Church — Its Government — Bond of Union — The Pastor — His Support — His Principal Duties — His Titles — His Dress — Equality of Pastors — Deacons — The Lord's Supper — Nature of the Bread and Wine — Baptism — Sponsors — Mode of Baptism — Church Discipline — Anathemas, Curses, Excommunication — Prayer — Fasts — Divorce — Recreations — The Lord's Day — Worship of Saints and Angels — Offerings — Pictures and Images — Theatrical Representations of the Sufferings and Death of Christ — Holy Relics — Crosses — Amulets — Prayers for the Dead — The Seven Sacraments — Confession of Faith — Of God — The Fall of Man and his Moral Corruption — The Incarnation of Christ — Salvation through Him — Faith and Works — Regeneration — Mediation of Christ — The Holy Scriptures — State of the Soul after Death — The Resurrection and Judgment of the Dead — Everlasting Life and Punishment — Canonical Books of the Bible.

It is now more than twenty years since Dr. Jonas King settled as a missionary at Athens, the capital of that small and unhappy portion of Greece, usually known as Greece Independent. Like a servant faithful to his Master, he has labored hard for the spiritual welfare of the people among whom he lives, and his rewards have been, constant disappointment, anathemas, and curses fulminated against him by the heads of the church, insults, persecution, and many other vexations which bigotry, superstition, unprincipledness, envy and malice could devise. A Protestant missionary in Greece is, by the bigoted, hated and shunned as an accursed heretic, the enemy of the Mother of God; by the infidels, that is, by the majority of those who are

¹Ἐκθεσις Ἀποστολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας. Ἐπὶ Ἰωνᾷ Κίγγ. Ἐν Κανταβρυγίᾳ τῆς Νέας Ἀγγλίας, ΑΩΜΑ. [An Exposition of an Apostolical Church. By Jonas King. Cambridge, New England, 1851.]

more or less educated, he must be prepared to be regarded as a hypocrite or fanatic. Protestantism in that country is, by a singular confusion of ideas, confounded with Freemasonry, which, in its turn, is imagined to be systematic atheism. And because the Protestant missionaries who first settled there, were Americans, the term *American* is now synonymous with *Freemason* (*Φαμασόρος*), or *Atheist*. We should not be surprised, therefore, if this publication subjected its author to new trials. Still, we cannot but hope that the successors of Annas and Caiaphas will profit by his advice, "not to employ against him their usual weapons, namely, anathemas, curses and insults, but to refute his errors by the Word of God," if they can.

It has often been asserted that the Greeks are very violent in their opposition to the Bible, and numerous facts have been adduced in support of this position. We would suggest, however, to those who make this statement, that hostility to the Word of God, is not peculiar to the Greeks as a nation. In Greece, the blind lead the blind; the masses are like *πρόβατα ποιμένα μὴ ἔχοντα*, and the individual is like *κάλαιμος ὑπὸ ἀνέμου σαλευόμενος*, too ignorant to oppose anything. The head-quarters of the opposition are at Constantinople, *τὸ κατωκηγίριον τῶν δαιμόνων*, ὅπου ὁ θρόνος τοῦ Σατανᾶ, the residence of the most influential High Priests and other sons of those who crucified the GREAT MISSIONARY. The causes of this apparently obstinate resistance to divine truth are numerous. We submit the following:

First. The natural depravity of the human heart, *διότι τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐχθρὰ εἰς Θεόν*· *τωῖ γὰρ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται*. This indeed would be enough of itself to account for all hostility to revealed truth; but we must add,

Secondly. The religion of the Bible requires natural honesty, reflection, and sobriety, qualities of rare occurrence in Greece, where unfortunately, thoughtlessness passes for genius, sincerity for hypocrisy, honesty for stupidity, and where adulation, lying, and meanness are believed to be necessary to success. How can religious knowledge make much progress in a country where lying and speaking the truth are regarded by most of the instructors of youth as in themselves indifferent things, good when they benefit, bad when they injure? The fountain-head of lying, however, is the church, in other words, the higher clergy, who, in fact, constitute the church, the common people having no voice in its government. Among other kinds of deception, it almost daily causes pictures of saints, and especially of the virgin, to perform extraordinary cures, which are adduced as

irrefragable proofs in favor of the orthodox faith. The most remarkable of these pictures, are those painted by Luke the Evangelist, who, according to Paul's testimony, was a physician, and if so, he might have been also a painter, and therefore he was a painter. Besides, say the hierarchs, if Luke did not paint these miracle-working pictures, who did paint them? As to their number, he might have painted seventy, for the Bible speaks of three score and ten palm trees, and of seventy disciples; therefore, he did paint seventy, three or four of which have already been discovered, and are doing wonders. Such arguments are very conclusive in the East, although to some of our readers they may appear nonsensical. The church, moreover, has sanctioned many of the popular errors, such as the effects of the evil eye (*βασκανία*), for which she has provided appropriate prayers.

Thirdly. We have already intimated that the chief opposition to the spread of Biblical knowledge, comes from the higher clergy, whom the ignorant masses believe to be the lineal successors of the Apostles. And although they may despise their character, yet they dread their anathemas, and consequently they dare not disobey their impious mandates. They are early taught to distinguish between the character of the man, and that mysterious power supposed to reside in him; the result of which illusion is, that the clergy in general, and the higher clergy in particular, are looked upon as a superior order of beings, having the power of binding and loosing (*τοῦ δεσμεῖν καὶ λύειν*.) by which the ignorant understand, that when a man has been anathematized or otherwise cursed by a Bishop or Priest, his body remains unchanged after death, which shows that his soul is, in an inexplicable manner, *bound* to its tabernacle, and is consequently miserable, until the same, or any other ecclesiastic causes the body to be *loosed*, that is, decomposed, by reading over it the prayers entitled, *Εὐχαὶ συγχωρητικαὶ εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρὰν καὶ ἀφορισμὸν εἰς τεθνεῶτα ἀναγινώσκομεναι παρὰ ἀρχιερέως ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρὰ πνευματικοῦ πατρὸς*; *εἰ οὐ πάρεστιν ἀρχιερεύς*, for which he charges a pretty round sum of money. And here the classical scholar will naturally be reminded of the Homeric verses, (Il. 23, 71-74):

Θάπτε με ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω,
Τῇλέ με εἰργουσι ψυχαί, εἰδῶλα καμόντων,
Οὐδέ μὲ πω μίσγέσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῖο ἔωσιν·
Ἄλλ' αὐτως ἀλάλῃμαι ἂν' εὐρυπυλὲς Ἀΐδος δαΐ.

Let my pale corse the rites of burial know,
And give me entrance in the realms below:

Till then, the spirit finds no resting place,
But here and there the unbodied spectres chase
The vagrant dead around the dark abode,
Forbid to cross the irremeable flood.

Pope's Translation.

Fourthly. In Greece and Turkey, religion is, with the individual, a point of *honor*. If the missionary intimates to a Greek, directly or indirectly, that his church is in error, especially if he attempts to confirm his position by a quotation from the Bible or the early Fathers, the person thus addressed is apt to take it for a personal as well as national insult. When a Moslem intends to offer the highest insult to a Greek, he aims at his cross; the Greek, under similar circumstances, abuses his Mohammed. The technical terms used in theological disputes of this nature, are too gross to be mentioned here; besides, they are fortunately untranslatable.

Fifthly. The illusion of the restoration of the Byzantine empire, has been one of the most serious obstacles to the progress of Scriptural religion among the Greeks. And as the church in its present form is the only thing that can bind them together as a nation — for, as soon as a Greek changes his religion, he loses his nationality — all their politicians are systematically opposed to religious controversies of any kind whatsoever. In view of the realization of this dream, even the disciple of Voltaire is heard to talk loudly about his holy religion.

Sixthly. The Greek church virtually, if not formally, regards the Canons of the Seven Œcumenical Councils, as the highest court of appeal in all religious matters. The bare text of the Scriptures is looked upon as an obscure oracular response, having no meaning without the explanations of the divinely instructed (*θεόσοφοι*) Fathers, the only legitimate expounders of the Word of God. This is one of the most formidable enemies the Evangelical missionary has to contend with. He must convince the Greeks, that the rules of the Bible alone are binding upon Christians, before he can make the least progress in his work. And the book before us, we hope, will do considerable towards accomplishing this object.

For the benefit of those who wish to know something about the leading peculiarities of the Greek church in its present state, we add the following remarks. In its external form, it is a compound of Heathenism and Judaism, the former being the basis of it. Its religion consists of little else than a series of bodily motions, including the motion of the tongue, and abstinence from certain kinds of food on certain stated days. The chief object of worship, in a practical

point of view, is MARY, the mother of Jesus, who although a historical personage, is the latest phase of Rhea, Athene, and Artemis united into one being. The progress of *Mariolatry* in this church seems to be this: "The blessed among women" was a virgin when she became the mother of the Son of man. About the early part of the third century, some persons, confounding her probably with Athene, imagined that she remained a virgin after the birth of the Anointed. About the latter part of the fourth century, the second Œcumenical Council contrived to have her name inserted in the creed, usually but incorrectly styled the *Nicene Creed*. This, however, does her but little honor, since in the same creed, Pontius Pilate also figures. By the third Œcumenical Council, held about fifty years after the second, she was most solemnly declared to be *The Mother of God* (*Θεοτόκος*). After that, she continued to gain glory very rapidly, until finally she has virtually supplanted the worship of God in Christ. The God of the Bible is indeed still regarded theoretically as superior to Mary, but for all human purposes the latter is all-sufficient. Is a Greek in distress? he usually cries, *Παραγία Θεοτόκε, βοήθει μοι*. God, in fact, belongs to a religious system now become obsolete. He is to Mary what, with the ancients, Kronos was to Zeus. She is now *Παραγία Θεοτόκος, Αειπάρεθος, Νύμφη ἀνύμφευτος, Μητήρ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ Ὑψίστου, Τιμωτέρα τῶν Χερουβὶμ, Ἐνδοξοτέρα τῶν Σεραφίμ, Ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς καὶ προστασία τῶν πιστῶν*, and an endless variety of similar absurd and blasphemous titles. Protestants are commonly shocked at the heathenish expression, "The Mother of God;" but what will they do when they are informed that the Greek church has provided also a *Grandmother* and *Grandfather* for him? We are aware that very few will be disposed to credit our statement, and therefore refer those who doubt its accuracy to the Greek Calendar (*Ἡρολόγιον*), where they will find under September 9th, *Τῶν ἁγίων καὶ δικαίων Θεοπατόρων Ἰωακείμ καὶ Ἄννης*, The feast of the holy and just parents of God Joakeim and Anna, they being the traditional parents of Mary. Under July 25th, *Ἡ κοιμήσις τῆς ἁγίας Ἄννης, μητρὸς τῆς Θεοτόκου*, The feast of the sleep (death) of Saint Anna, the mother of the Mother of God. Anna is called also *Θεοπομήτωρ*, The Grandmother of God!

The language of the "Exposition" is now spoken, or rather written, by such Greeks as are more or less acquainted with the authors of ancient Greece. This language resembles the ancient in most of its forms, but the meaning of many of its words is not to be found in the classical authors, and its syntax and versification are entirely modern;

and the more it approaches the ancient as to its exterior, the more it departs from its spirit. It is in fact little else than modern ideas, chiefly French, in Greek dress. As a specimen take the following extract from one of the leading Journals published at Athens :

Ἡ κυβέρνησίς μας σήμερα φέρει ὅλα τὰ σημεῖα καὶ ὅλας τὰς ἀθλιότητας τῆς παρακμῆς. Ἡ παρατήρησις αὕτη ἤρκει, νομίζομεν, νὰ πείσῃ τοὺς διευθύνοντας τὰ πράγματά μας ὅτι τὸ σύστημα τοῦ Κωλέττου εἶναι ὀλέθριον καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς καὶ διὰ τὸν τόπον. Ὁ μηχανισμὸς τοῦ Συντάγματος δὲν ἐκπληροῖ πλέον τὰς λειτουργίας του. Ἡ Βασιλεῖα ἐταπεινώθη, ὁ λαὸς ἔπεσεν εἰς χαμέρπειαν, ὁ μηχανισμὸς τοῦ Συντάγματος ἐκπληροῖ ἐργασίαν δυσώδη, καὶ ὑνπαράν, ἀνακινεῖ καὶ σηκώνει βόρβορον, μ' ἄλλους λόγους, τὸ Σύνταγμα κατήντησε ἀληθῆς βορβοροφάγος.

To the uneducated, that is, to the mass of the nation, this dialect is almost unintelligible, partly because its words are often different from those in common use, but much because the vocabulary of the illiterate is as meagre in Greece as in any other country. For philological purposes, however, the language of the common people is infinitely more important than that of the educated. Add to this the fact that the most valuable portion of Romaic literature has appeared in this dialect.

We observe here that the inhabitants of Boeotia, Attica, Megaris, Argolis, Poros, Hydra, and Spetsais are mostly Albanians, and speak a language as different from the Romaic, as the Slavonic is from the Greek. Further, in Tsakonia, a small district of Lakonia, a curious jargon is spoken by the common people. Some learned Germans regard it as a branch of the Doric; we have no doubt it is a barbarous Romaic. Take this specimen :

Τὸν τσερέ 'πού μᾶ ἔχουντε τὸν πόλεμο μὲ τὰ κοτσονὶ καβαλάριδε, τὰ μούτσουνά σου δὲ σ' ὀράκαμα. Γκιὰ ἔσα τότε, τσὲ ἔδαρι ἐκάνε ῥεογὶ τσὲ μᾶς ταρασούμενε ; Οὐ ! τὰ χαθῆρε, ὄνε ! That is, in common Romaic: *Τὸν καιρὸ ὅπου ἡμεῖς εἶχαμε τὸν πόλεμο μὲ τοὺς Τούρκους, τὰ μούτσουνά σου δὲν τὰ εἶδαμε. Ποῦ ἦσαν τότε, καὶ τώρα μᾶς ἤλθες καὶ μᾶς κουνίσαι ; Οὐ ! τὰ χαθῆς, γάδαρε !*

It is more than probable that in a few generations both jargons will disappear from Greece.

ARTICLE VII.

LIFE AND CHARACTER OF DR. NEANDER.¹

By George M. Adams, Castine, Me.

JOHANN AUGUST WILHELM NEANDER was born on the 16th of January, 1789, at Göttingen in the present kingdom of Hanover. He was the child of Jewish parents of the name of Mendel, and accordingly bore that name during his early years. His father was a wealthy merchant at Göttingen, but while Augustus was yet a child, was reduced by misfortunes in business to comparative poverty and removed with his family to Hamburg. He had five children; of whom one son studied medicine, but died young; another became a merchant in Russia; a richly gifted daughter after many vicissitudes of fortune became insane; and another daughter, Johanna, shared to the last the fortunes of the son of whom we have chiefly to speak.

Augustus was distinguished in the family from his earliest youth by a decided fondness for study. His progress was remarkably rapid. When eight years old he could learn nothing more from his private teacher. It is told that at this time a worthy bookseller in Hamburg, "was struck with the frequent visits to his shop of a bashful, ungainly boy, who used to steal in and seize upon some erudite volume that no one else would touch, and utterly lose himself for hours together in study." At the preparatory school and at the Gymnasium, Neander won the lasting favor of his instructors, especially of Johann Gurlitt, then Director of the Gymnasium at Hamburg, and esteemed throughout Germany for his services in the cause of education. This worthy man was a second father to his favorite pupil, and his kindness to him did not end with their connection at the Gymnasium. The mutual attachment formed here continued through the lifetime of the teacher. Gurlitt, though not free from the reigning rationalism of the age, was a man of high moral principle, and we should naturally attribute to him an important part in developing in Neander that extreme conscientiousness which distinguished him as a Jew, and which was always

¹ We are indebted for many particulars of the early life of Neander, to the kindness of a friend in Berlin, Candidate Carl Fischon, who had access to sources not open to the public. The account of the illness and death is condensed from "Neanders Heimgang" by Licentiate Rauh in the publication: "Zum Gedächtniss August Neanders." Berlin, 1850.

among the prominent traits of his character. And doubtless something was here due to the teacher, but more to the mother of Neander, who had a deep, earnest religious character and seems to have exerted over him a commanding influence. His youthful associates speak of the peculiar tenderness with which he always alluded to her. And all the readers of his *History* will remember the manifest predilection with which he delineates the character and maternal influence of Anthonia, Monica, and other eminent mothers.

We come to the latter part of his life at the Gymnasium, the year 1805-6. A valuable insight into his inward history at this period is furnished in a few letters from him to Chamisso, published some years since in connection with the biography of the poet, and translated in part for the fourth volume of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.¹ These letters indicate a mind remarkably mature, thoughtful and introverted, closely studying but not yet able fully to understand itself, and accordingly self-distrustful and timid. He had, as he says, hitherto found no one among his associates "of similar tastes with whom he could form an intimacy, and was disinclined to seek for one." The prejudices against his race and religion had doubtless helped to keep him inwardly aloof from his companions. Indeed, there must have been few boys in the Gymnasium mature enough to sympathize with the young philosopher. And his kind teacher, Gurlitt, was too far from him in age to be the confidant of all his heart. So his mind had been developing in solitude, confirming itself in its native introversion.

He now found at length the needed sympathy from some young men several years older than himself, who had come from Berlin to complete at Hamburg their preparation for the university: Varnhagen Von Ense, who has since distinguished himself in German literature, and Wilhelm Neumann. These enthusiastic students, though it is hardly probable that they fully understood Neander's religious struggles, yet recognized and admired the depth and richness of his mind and the simple earnestness of his character. He was on his part as delicately responsive to the voice of sympathy, as he had been timid in seeking it, and an intimate friendship grew up between him and them. They made him a member of the Society of the North Star, a literary fraternity which had been formed at Berlin, including besides themselves, Chamisso and others. This served as an introduction between Neander and Chamisso, and without ever having seen each other they corresponded occasionally for several years. It is

¹ Pages 336-402.

the letters of Neander in this correspondence, to which we have alluded. He seems to have lavished upon his new found friends all the long pent up frankness and affection of his nature, and perhaps drew them nearer to his heart than the degree of affinity in character and aims would have induced under other circumstances. This intimacy was of much advantage to him. Without it his speculations and struggles, shut up too closely within himself, would soon have become morbid. "From that time," he writes to Chamisso, "I can truly say that many things became clear and intelligible to me which before were obscure and seen as it were in the distance. I now understood myself better. No one really comes to *feel* that which he is blindly in pursuit of, till he is brought in contact with others who are like himself."

We have alluded to his religious struggles. We wish to trace their progress more closely. They had commenced and proceeded far, before he met with Varnhagen and Neumann. We find no intimation of any strong influence exerted upon him from without, by circumstances or by associates, to which the commencement of this inward conflict is to be ascribed. It seems rather to have originated in the movements of his own reflective soul, seeking, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit as we must believe, satisfaction of its spiritual wants. The Judaism in which he had been brought up could not satisfy him. He felt the need of a religious life. *That* offered him only dead, cold forms which had forgotten the truths and feelings they once expressed. His classical studies made him acquainted with Plato and he became deeply interested in him. He found much in him which harmonized with his own intense nature. There is a reflective earnestness in the strugglings of that noble mind after the truth which stirred all the sympathies of the young Jew. Here was what he had most painfully missed in the formal religion of his fathers, and he embraced the great philosopher as a friend who had read his soul. Neumann, with whom his acquaintance was now commencing, writes of him to Chamisso: "Plato is his idol and his perpetual watchword. He pores over that author night and day, and there are probably few who receive him so completely into the very sanctuary of the soul." But when the glow of his first love had passed away, he found that though Plato had read his wants, he had not satisfied them. The Spirit of God had now awakened within him a deeper want, which philosophy has no means to supply. He demanded a voice more mighty than that of Plato to lay the "demons which infested his soul." In short, he was convicted of sin.

The struggle was long. All the sacred associations of childhood conspired with the suggestions of corrupt nature to blind him to the truth. At this period—as he told his friends in later years, and always with the deepest grateful emotion—while his mind was groping in the darkness, he read Schleiermacher's *Reden über die Religion*, and soon the Sun of Righteousness rose upon him. What he had sought in vain in the teachings of Plato, he found in the teachings of Christ,—in Christ himself. For it was eminently a personal relation to the Saviour in which he henceforth stood. His native character and the peculiarity of the process through which his soul had passed, had prepared him to seize with delight upon this distinguishing feature of Christianity. He embraced Christ with the ardor of a soul that had sounded the depths of its own wants. So in later years, he contended with a severity quite foreign to his nature, against the Pantheistic philosophy which would rob men of a personal God and Saviour.

Early in the year 1806, at the age of seventeen, he joined the Christian church, assuming at his baptism the significant name Neander (*νεανίσκος*). His mother and his sister Johanna soon followed him in professing the Christian faith.

He completed his course at the Gymnasium with distinguished honor. On leaving he delivered an address on the subject of the Possibility of the Admission of Jews to the Offices of the State, which indicated it is said, “how deeply the youthful writer had thought out the relation of Judaism to Christianity.” It produced so much impression that it was immediately printed,—a rare honor in those days.

As his father was unable to give him much pecuniary assistance, Gurlitt and the Baron von Stieglitz, a Jewish banker, who was a distant relative of the Mendel family, furnished him means to study at the university, and in accordance with their wishes he proposed to study Law. His friends Varnhagen and Neumann were going to Halle, and he concluded to yield his preferences, which had been for Göttingen, and go with them. They entered the university at the commencement of the summer semester, 1806. The study of the law grew more and more unsatisfying to Neander, and soon after reaching Halle, by earnest entreaty he persuaded his patrons to allow him to give it up and devote himself to Theology. He writes to Chamisso, “I have made up my mind to study Theology. May God give me strength, as I desire and shall endeavor to do to proclaim to erring men the only true God in a spiritual way, which the unassisted intel-

lect can never comprehend." This was henceforth the purpose of his life. It would not be easy to express it more fully and truly in a few words. There was need of such efforts. The commencement of the present century was the period of greatest religious declension in Germany. Rationalism had reached its supremacy. It had swept away all faith in things supernatural, all enthusiasm, all that belongs to the heart, and sought to satisfy men with moral precepts drawn from and addressed solely to the understanding. But when Neander commenced his theological career, there were some indications of a reaction against this system, at least an indefinite longing in the hearts of many for something more living than Rationalism could afford. Neander was fired with the thought of being one who should help to meet this want of the age with the proclamation of a spiritual faith. He too had wandered through the dry places of intellectual morality vainly seeking rest, and he longed to lead others to the loving Saviour he had found.

The University of Halle was at this time one of the most distinguished in Germany, and shared largely in the new life that was beginning to be felt in all branches of literature and science. F. A. Wolf, the philologist, was there in the bloom of his reputation and influence. Schleiermacher, now at the age of thirty-seven entering upon his more distinctively theological stadium, had recently been called thither. Steffens, the genial, spirited poet and philosopher, had at the same time come from Copenhagen to take the chair of natural philosophy in the rising Prussian University. At the head of the medical faculty, and hardly less eminent in his department than Wolf and Schleiermacher in theirs, was Johann Christian Reil. Around these four men, who adopted a more comprehensive and liberal method of instruction than had been before known in the university, gathered a circle of students comprising the flower of the institution. Among them were Karl von Raumer, Bekker, Boeckh, and Friedrich Strauss.¹ Professors and students here alike forgot the difference of "Faculties" in the sympathy of spirit which pervaded them all. Indeed the distinction between professor and student was by no means sharply defined. They met every week at the table of one of the four professors, where the utmost freedom reigned. Earnestness and enthusiasm in study characterized the members of the circle. Into this circle Neander at once entered, though probably by some years the youngest of its number. Thus he came into

¹ G. F. A. Strauss, now Professor of Theology at Berlin, — not to be confounded with David Friedrich Strauss, author of the *Life of Christ*.

contact with the best minds of the university, and was led to a comprehensive course of thought and study. Here with Wolf, and afterwards under the direction of Creuzer and Boeckh at Heidelberg, he gave special attention to classical antiquity, to which indeed his love for Plato had already introduced him. But this only in subordination to the theological studies in which his soul was absorbed. Schleiermacher, Knapp and Steffens were his teachers and advisers. To the latter he became much attached. Steffens was the youngest of the professors we have named, indeed one of those men who never grow old; and his deeply religious spirit fitted him to sympathize most fully with Neander. They were firm friends from this time until the death of Steffens in 1845. It was also without doubt religious sympathy that drew Neander to Knapp, then the only remaining representative at Halle of the Pietistic school which had once held sway in the university. He was then delivering to his classes those Lectures on Theology which in a translation have since found so much currency in this country. But Schleiermacher was the professor who most of all attracted Neander. His mighty intellect, his earnest Christian spirit, the new direction and impulse he was giving to theological study would under any circumstances have attracted Neander as they did many others. But Schleiermacher was the author of the "Discourses upon Religion" which had pointed him to the Saviour. Of course he felt a peculiar reverence for him as in some sense his spiritual father, and he soon learned to admire and love him personally. It has been sometimes represented that Schleiermacher gave form and direction to Neander's character. Doubtless his influence upon him was great, greater than that of any other man, and it may have modified some of his opinions and habits of thought at this early period. But it did not at all *mould* his character. What Neander was in his maturity, that he had been essentially in his youth. The first glance which we obtain into his inward life, in the letter of Neumann to Chamisso noticed above, reveals the germs of his later development; and so in his own earliest letters to Chamisso we see him searching after the essence of truth, disregarding — too contemptuously perhaps, disregarding — all that is merely formal, incidental, external. Neander's studies in this commencement of his theological education, were of course chiefly exegetical. He began, however, already to study the history of early Christianity, especially in its connection on the one hand with Judaism and on the other with the Platonic philosophy.

But this quiet life was suddenly and rudely interrupted. The vic-

tory of Napoleon over the Prussian army at Jena, Oct. 14, 1806, left the country helpless. Oct. 17, marshal Bernadotte took Halle, after slight resistance, and three days later Napoleon came, and, vexed by the independent bearing of the students, suspended the university, and drove the students,¹ at twenty-four hours warning, out of the city.

Neander and Neumann started afoot for Göttingen, Varnhagen venturing to remain in Halle. Neander was delicate in health, from the effects of undue application. Uncalculating charity soon exhausted his purse. He fell ill by the way, and might have perished in the confusion, but for Dr. Gesenius, who found him suffering, and brought him in a carriage to Göttingen. Here he remained about three years, and completed his university course. With earnest study, and oftentimes severe inward wrestling, he wrought out independently his system of theological belief. The change was a sad one to him, from the genial circle at Halle, to the cold Rationalistic atmosphere of Göttingen. But it proved a valuable part of his religious as well as of his intellectual discipline, and he recognized it as such. "It was well," he says, "and I thank God for it. In no other way could I have made such progress. From every human mediator, from every agreeable association, must one be torn away, in order that he may learn to hang only and entirely on the eternal Mediator, who is Man and God in one person, and who, suffering and dying, has won for himself all those who in faith yield their inmost being to his suffering and death." In the letters written from Göttingen, humility and childlike submission are especially discernible. Alluding to the intellectual struggles through which he was seeking the "light" of truth, he writes to Chamisso: "God give to me, beholding the light in my own soul, also with a loving sympathy to receive the beams of that light everywhere, though refracted and distorted in an earthly atmosphere; and at length, when His time has come, may I send out the collected rays to illuminate others, and to be reflected back again upon myself; — God grant it, or grant it *not*; His will be done. So, my heartily dear friend, similar storms and trials, proceeding in the case of one of us more from the inner, in case of the other, more from the outer world, have brought us both into distress which has but one relief; they point us both to the one Refuge which will be secure in all perils of inward and outward life, to him who places no proud reliance upon that even which is highest and

¹ It is told, among other things, that a student to whom he spoke, replied to him with the address, "*Monsieur.*"

noblest and eternal in man, but humbly trusts in God, and resigns himself entirely to His will, even when He seems to forsake him; He *seems* only to do it; He lets the ground sink under us, and (as at present he is doing with our generation,) leaves us to a sickly life, only that death may destroy death, and that life may come to life; *ὅσον ὅσον ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἤξει καὶ οὐ χρονίζει!*" In the latter part of this extract, he alludes to a conflict, partly at least of a religious nature, through which Chamisso was passing. Neander wrote to him repeatedly, with reference to it, and did his utmost to lead him to the Saviour. He closes such a letter, as follows: "Would that I might be with you, and embrace you before the cross of Christ, and with you behold His glory! May it be with you as I pray and desire. Yes, I believe that it will be so. I press your hand and commend you to the love of God and of Christ, for present and eternal salvation. May you live as you desire, in God. His blessing upon all that you undertake. Amen! Amen!"

Neander completed his university studies at Göttingen, in the year 1809, and returned to Hamburg, with the intention of entering upon the life of a pastor. After the necessary private study, he had passed the severe examination with much honor, when the whole course of his future life was somewhat unexpectedly changed.

The city of Hamburg had a small fund, the income of which was devoted to the support of one of its young theologians, as lecturer at the university of Heidelberg. Gurlitt succeeded in obtaining this stipend for Neander. And in 1811, the latter commenced his career as an instructor, by a course of lectures on Church History, in that ancient university. His promotion to the higher academic offices was remarkably rapid. In 1812, he was made Professor *Extraordinarius* at Heidelberg, in acknowledgment of the historical talent evinced in his first published work, the monograph upon the Emperor Julian and his Times. In 1813, at the age of twenty-four, he was called as Professor *Ordinarius* (the highest academic rank) to the new university at Berlin, where the Prussian king was collecting the best talent of Germany. Schleiermacher, De Wette and Marheinecke were already there. With the former, Neander stood in the most friendly relations. With De Wette, as is shown in a late Number of this Review, he lived "on terms of high mutual respect, but not of intimate friendship." De Wette, at this period of his life, inclined too far towards Rationalistic views, to gain Neander's full confidence and sympathy.

Here at Berlin, Neander spent the remainder of his life. His
VOL. VIII. No. 30.

external history during these thirty-seven years, presents but few points to arrest attention. In 1818, he was made a member of the Supreme Consistory, which has the direction of the affairs of the church in the Prussian kingdom. In 1830, he came into a controversy (if the honest and Christian discussion of differing opinions deserves so harsh a name) with Hengstenberg, the editor of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*. Neander's name had been announced as one of the contributors to that journal. Some severe attacks appeared in it upon Schleiermacher, and also upon Geseuius and Wegscheider. Neander published a protest against these articles, and withdrew his name from the journal, though with full expression of his personal affection towards the editor, and of respect for the honest but, as he thought, mistaken principles upon which he had acted. Neander did not defend the views attacked, but objected to criticism of the opinions of individual theologians in a popular journal. He has sometimes been blamed for this course, as apparently in opposition to his principles of Christian union and catholicity; and Geseuius and Wegscheider were certainly exerting a baneful influence by their Rationalistic sentiments. But Neander thought that the rules of Christian charity required more forbearance with them, than had been exhibited; and it is to be remembered, that he was bound by ties of peculiar gratitude to Geseuius as well as to Schleiermacher. Several years later, when controversy waxed warm between the Hengstenberg party and the more liberal school, who respect, without closely following Schleiermacher, Neander refused to take sides in it, but sought to act the part of a peacemaker. It would not be right to infer from Neander's charity towards Geseuius and Wegscheider, that he had now lost any of the opposition to Rationalism, with which in one of his early letters to Chamisso, he proclaimed "against such a system, against everything which it holds sacred, its gods and its temples—eternal war." Against the system, he contended constantly, vigorously, effectively. To him, among the first after Schleiermacher, does Germany owe her deliverance (which now seems accomplished) from that chilling form of error. It is against another and more subtle infidelity, that the evangelical theologians of Germany have now to contend—the Pantheism of Hegel, Bruno Bauer, and Strauss. Here Neander was most earnest and decided. Indeed, if in anything he was liable to overstep the limits of Christian charity and mildness, it was in his opposition to this entire tendency. It was evil, and only evil, in his eyes. Any one who has spent an hour with him, during the last ten years, has almost certainly heard a vigorous expression

of his antipathy against this modern Gnosticism. He regarded it as the chief source of the great social and political evils under which his country is now suffering. For, in common with very many pious men in Germany, Neander considered the revolutions there, during the past three years, as religious no less than political movements, revolutions against the restraints of Christianity, no less than against those of monarchy. And it is a significant fact, that perhaps without an exception, the leaders of the democratic movement in Germany, the Heckers, and Blums, and Vogts, have been men of infidel principles. They have assumed, that liberty and atheism belong together; that the fear of God and the fear of kings are inseparable. Neander wrote to the editor of the *Deutsche Kirchenfreund*, under date of October 28, 1849: "What by many has been called freedom in our father land, during the mournful year that is past, is something very different from that which the spirit, sprung from the bloom of Puritan piety in your America, seeks and intends. It was here a contest between atheism and Christianity, between Vandalism and true culture. Already tens of years ago I foretold it, that the philosophy of a distorted logic, of intellectual fanaticism and self idolatry, must lead in its-consistent development, to these consequences — which it has now reached by infusing itself into the popular mind. We stand on the brink of an abyss, of the destruction of European culture, or on the boundaries where a new creative era shall make itself a path through manifold storms, — a new, grand act in the world-transforming process of Christianity. We will hope the *latter* from the mercy of a long-suffering God."

Strong as were these *private* expressions of his opposition to the ideal philosophy, Neander confined himself in his efforts against it, to strictly scientific means. He believed that it could be overcome only on the open field of free discussion. So, when Strauss's *Life of Christ* was published, and the Prussian government was disposed to prohibit its sale in that country, Neander, whose advice was asked, said emphatically, "No! it must be put down by the truth." Neander's life at Berlin was a very laborious one. He discharged the responsible duties of a member of the Consistory; he delivered not less than fifteen lectures a week, on subjects varying in successive semesters, so as to cover almost the entire field of theological study; he conducted in private the exercises of the class in Church History; and during his thirty-seven years there, he published more than twenty-five volumes, and left additional ones nearly ready for the press.¹

¹ Neander's principal works are, "*Julian and his Times*," "*St. Bernard and*

He was never married. The maiden sister Johanna, of whom we have already spoken, kept his house and watched over him with affectionate solicitude. With much practical wisdom and tact, of which he had nothing, she directed all his worldly affairs. It is not easy to see how he could have lived without her. He submitted cheerfully and gratefully to her direction. In only two points did he claim unyieldingly the right of acting for himself: he *would* study more closely than she wished in her care for his health, and he would give no account of the money he spent in charity. Next to his affection for his sister was that for his pupils. His attachment to them became proverbial. He never seemed so happy as when in the midst of them. When his physician advised him to leave for a time the anxieties of the university, he replied, and no doubt with literal truth, that he should pine if denied the opportunity of associating with and aiding and directing youth. He was accustomed to gather a circle of students about him every Saturday evening in his study, where he accommodated himself to their thoughts and feelings, and became so entirely one of them in the affectionateness and simplicity of his heart, that it was hard to be always mindful of the deference due to his years and genius. We remember some of those social occasions with peculiar satisfaction. The number present was from eight to twelve, of the young men most closely attached to Neander, including often one or two French, Scotch or American students. As each one entered, Neander rose and gave him the hand with some word of welcome or friendly inquiry which came evidently from the heart. The walls of the study were lined with books; books were scattered on window-seats, sofa, tables and chairs, and here and there stacks of them upon the floor. We made our way among them as best we might, and took seats about a table on which stood a shaded study-lamp. Around the study, above the book-cases, hung portraits of distinguished scholars. Neander sat in his study-gown, with nothing in his own manner to distinguish him from the rest. A servant soon brought in tea, the books and papers were pushed to one side of the table to make room for the tray, one of the students (the sister Johanna was never present on these occasions), passed the cups and a

his *Times*," "Development of the principal Gnostic Systems," "Chrysostom and the Church in his Age," "Memorabilia from the History of Christianity and the Christian Life," "Anti-Gnosticus: Genius of Tertullian," "Planting and Training of the Church," "Life of Christ;" all these preparatory or incidental to the great work of his life, "The General History of the Christian Religion and Church," which he brought down to the fifteenth century. Of the manuscripts which he left behind him, some account will be found in a later note.

basket of plain cake, and the simple meal was despatched without interrupting the conversation. This was perfectly free and informal, guided altogether by the inclinations of those present. If it was left to Neander to direct it, he usually asked, especially from the foreign students, for anything of interest to the cause of Christ which they might be able to communicate. We recollect that on one of these occasions, a student read aloud at Neander's request the Introduction to De Wette's last work, the Commentary upon the Apocalypse which had then just appeared; in which the author expresses more decidedly than ever before, his faith in spiritual religion. After alluding to the dangers which were threatening the church, De Wette says: "In my labors upon the Apocalypse I have not learned to prophesy, and the vision of St. John did not reach to our times. I therefore cannot know what the fate of our dear Protestant church will be. Only this I know,—that in no other name shall we find salvation, but in the name of Jesus Christ and him crucified." And we shall never forget the glow of joy which lighted up Neander's countenance, and the tear which stole down his wrinkled cheek, as these words were read. It cheered his pious heart to receive this evidence of a return to the truth, in one whose soul had so long been torn with the inward struggle between Rationalism and Faith.

It was a chief object with Neander at these times, to draw out and answer the theological or practical difficulties of those who resorted to him, and he did this with the utmost regard and tenderness. But upon this point, as well as with respect to the whole-hearted, admiring love with which his German students returned his kindness, we let one of their own number speak:¹

"From this time I attended regularly his Saturday evening assemblies—delightful, ever-memorable hours. However different might be the company, Neander remained the same, always simple, cordial, mild. He entered into the views of every one; in the presence of minds the most rigid and unbending, his affectionate tolerance, his humility, shone only the more brightly. How he could ask, persuade, nay, even beg, when he suspected there were yet doubts and difficulties remaining; how winning was his bending attitude, his tone and look, when he asked, 'Do you not think so? to me at least it appears so; or, do you think differently?' And yet how entirely free from everything which looked like urging his own opinions upon another! If he saw that the inquirer manifested judgment and an earnest will,

¹ Hermann Rosel, in his "*Leben und hinterlassene Schriften.*" Berlin, 1847.

he would kindle into a youthful fervor. I remember that once he was engaged in conversation with a student who sat at some distance from him, and little by little he drew his chair nearer, till he found himself close before the speaker. When the point was settled, and the conversation gradually became less animated, he moved himself backwards in the same manner to his place again. Of that stately bearing and outward dignity, and all the substitutes for true, inward dignity, which little minds, and often alas, even great ones, think they must assume—of this, Neander had just nothing. He sat among us as a father, as an old friend. Rank and circumstance were nothing for him; he spoke with the student as with the professor, and he would not have spoken differently with a prince. He expressed assent and dissent, without respect of person, according to the naked, undisguised truth. For this very reason, the youth almost idolized him. Under many a plain student-coat, beat a heart that would have poured out its last drop for Neander.

“One evening we were assembled at Neander’s, when a pastor from the neighborhood of Düsseldorf was announced. An early scholar of Neander’s he with others had often sat around him, just as we were now sitting. He was a slender man, and his head was already growing gray; yet he had sat at the feet of Neander, who now with jet black hair and in the fulness of his strength stood up and gave his hand to his former pupil. Joyfully he took it and held it pressed in both his own; his voice trembled as he expressed to Neander how very glad he was to be permitted once more in his life to stand thus before him. With eager eyes he hung upon the countenance of his teacher, as if he would drink in his whole appearance, the familiar, loving tone of voice, the indescribably mild look. How glad he would have been now to find that Neander also remembered him, and how heartily glad would Neander have been to afford him this pleasure. But it could not be. He tried hard to remember; by hints and the mention of accompanying circumstances he could almost reach it, but then he lost the trace, and he was too candid to conceal it. It made a sorrowful impression on us to see hope sink on the countenance of the stranger. In further conversation his strong attachment showed itself by unmistakable signs. He seemed to be a well-meaning man, but of narrow views, so that on almost every point he found himself opposed to Neander. Against any other man he would have maintained his opinion stiffly, nay, perhaps with a blind zeal; but here his heart was too much on the side of his opponent. With timid love he softened down every difference; and when he ventured

to express his own views, he did it with evident anxiety, although Neander was always so kind and ready to assent to everything; yet for all that, he could not find it in his heart to oppose Neander.

"What Neander so finely exhibited in these evening interviews, the sacred truthfulness of his entire being and life, and the most affectionate regard for the feelings of others, — this was always the soul of his social life. Open-hearted, inoffensive as a child, he stood before the world, separated only from every rude contact by the breath of heavenliness which surrounded him. With noble natures he thus came easily into close connection. As if by a magnetic influence one knew, without hearing him speak, what he thought and felt, was himself attracted by him, and drawn into the peaceful motion of his inward life. And what a heavenly composure descended then upon all his thinking and feeling! Amid the whirling impulses of the times, in the conflict of strangest contradictions, where the noblest feelings of humanity are staggered, where heart and nature are silenced before the brawl and babble of dialectical subtilty, how safe did one feel, how sound in mind and heart, how simple and clear did his soul become in Neander's sacred presence.

"This simplicity it was, which led Neander into the heart of things; nothing with him was mere form. What other men do more or less from habit and according to the fashion of the times, received from him the spirit in which it originated. When he greeted any one, gave his hand, or inquired after the health of a person, it was always an expression of truth. At a simple 'How do you do?' from his mouth, one could not preserve that placid indifference with which such inquiries are usually received; that he was truly solicitous appeared plainly in word and mien. If any one who visited Neander was in trouble, he was sure to perceive it and would ask, 'Is there anything the matter with you? You look so cast down, — you are not unwell, I hope?' One could not do otherwise than answer, 'Oh no, I am very well.' While a look and tone so soothing, so healing, entered the heart, one felt that he really was very well.

"Never shall I forget the impression which his manner towards a blind young man made upon me. He was a poor youth, who, because he had not the means to pursue a liberal course of study, wished to educate himself for the business of teaching. For this purpose he attended Neander's lectures, although he was but poorly acquainted with the ancient languages. Pale and worn, he sat always in the same seat, attentively listening, and repeating over to himself, with silent motion of the lips, those parts which pleased him most.

If he found any one afterwards, with whom he could go over again, in his childlike way, what he had heard, he was perfectly happy. He was truly one of those of whom it is written, that they are poor in spirit, and of a lowly mind. To see now this man, sickly and silent, stand before Neander, whom he so heartily revered, but whom he could not see, and to hear the tone with which Neander asked him, 'How do you do?'—I was obliged to turn away, the tears started into my eyes. Oh, how many of those forsaken by all the world, would be happy, at least for one hour in their solitary life, if they could stand before Neander, and hear him ask them, 'How do you do?' To see and hear him, is to believe and know that it will yet be better, that it will be well. How could one thus blessed by his kind words, fail to be reminded of the Heavenly Friend, who says to all that labor and are heavy-laden, 'Come unto me, and I will give you rest.'"

This might be thought the partial view of a devoted friend, but a theological opponent says of him, in a hostile criticism of one of his works:¹ "It were not easy to find among the prominent characters of our time, a person whose life is so true a mirror of the principle which actuates him, as is that of Neander. What he is, that he is wholly. There is in him no ostentation, no striving after effect, not a trace of the current hypocrisy. Herein lies the cause of the great influence which Neander has gained over the life and consciousness of the age; here the ground of the satisfaction which men of the most opposite views find in his works. For the smallest of them is a revelation of his pious heart, every subject that he touches becomes the lovely mirror of his soul, and is thus, to those who sympathize with him, a translation of their own inward life—to those who differ from him, an object of hearty enjoyment."

It may not be uninteresting to refer more particularly to the personal appearance of Neander. He was one of those men who seem to be sent into the world, to teach us the superiority of the soul to the dull clay into which God has breathed it. That mind which made itself felt wherever Christianity is known, was encased in a body as frail and untutored as that of a child. He was of medium height, rather slender and meagre, with a dark complexion, and the whole cast of features plainly Jewish. His hair long, and as black as a raven, hung carelessly over the high forehead. The eyes were almost hid by jutting, bushy brows, and nearly closed lids; but now

¹ Georgii, in the "*Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst.*" April, 1839.

and then one caught a look into them, deep, dark, sparkling as a shaded fountain. His voice was full and deep, swelling and sinking with his delicate sensibilities. But his whole outward appearance gave a certain impression of helplessness, fitted at first to excite compassion. He walked when alone, which was seldom, with an uncertain, distrustful step.

A stranger who should have found himself unexpectedly in Neander's lecture room, would have been ready to believe that the professor was spending an hour in abstracted reflection, and that the students had stolen in to hear him think aloud. Leaning upon a high desk which, when excited, he now and then tilted forward, threatening to plunge with it into the midst of his audience, his eyes apparently closed, his face turned sometimes to the floor, sometimes to the wall behind him, but never towards his hearers, his fingers mechanically twisting and twirling a pen, — there was nothing to indicate his consciousness of the presence of others, and one was surprised to see that he retained connection enough with the outward world, to heed the bell which marked the close of the hour. The stories which are told of his appearing at the lecture room in his study dress, of his complaining of lameness when he had unconsciously walked home with but one foot upon the sidewalk, and the like, may be exaggerations; but if not true, they are truthful; none of them would seem strange to one who had known the professor's extreme abstractedness.

But in all this there was not the slightest trace of affectation. His whole nature was the very opposite of that. And, moreover, all the first impressions of the ludicrous excited by his appearance passed away after one began to give attention to what he said, and to catch the earnest spirit of his soul. Indeed we almost regret having dwelt so long on these peculiarities. They *are not* what one remembers most in Neander.

His health was always poor. A rheumatic disease lurked in his system from the time of his illness at Göttingen. He held it in check by the most conscientious regard to diet and exercise, but chiefly by the power of an iron will. Many men with his constitution would have given up active life and died years ago. Three years since, the disease turned upon his eyes and reduced him almost to blindness. But he toiled on by the help of readers and amanuenses, delivering his lectures regularly and carrying forward, though slowly, his great work, the History of Christianity. He felt more and more, during these years of declining health, the desire to exert a direct influence

upon the religious life of the community, and published brief practical commentaries upon the Epistle to the Philippians and the Epistle of James. He also, in connection with Nitzsch of Berlin and Julius Müller of Halle founded a weekly religious Journal, the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft und christliches Leben*, intended, as its name indicates, to bring the results of theological learning and science to bear upon and promote practical piety.

But his health was constantly failing. When we received his touching farewell two years ago, his hand was nerveless and tremulous, and his whole appearance suggested sad apprehensions. It seemed impossible that even his firm resolution could sustain him much longer against the disease which had been perceptibly wasting his strength for months.

The end of the struggle came in July last. Monday, July 8th, he was worse than usual, and as the weather was unpleasant, he was urged to postpone his lecture. But he could not be persuaded to do so. In the midst of the lecture his voice failed him more than once, but he forced himself on to the end of the hour. Completely exhausted, he reached home with difficulty by assistance of the students. In the evening the disease assumed a more alarming aspect. His first thought was for his troubled sister. He called her to the bedside and said tenderly, "Don't feel anxious, my dear sister, 'tis only temporary. I know my nature." But that nature was at length unyielding to the stern will which had so long ruled it. After a night of pain, it was with a touching sadness that he inquired: "I shall hardly be able to lecture to-day, shall I?" He expressly desired that his lectures should be postponed "only for to-day," believing that on the next day he should surely be able to resume them, and feeling that life, and labor for the youth who were to be led to Christ, were to him one and the same.

On the afternoon of Tuesday he suddenly asked for his reader, and desired that the work on which he had been last employed (*Ritter's Palestine*), should be still further read to him; he impatiently censured the care of his friends who had prematurely sent the reader home, supposing he would not be wanted. Then, according to his daily custom, he had the newspaper read to him by another of his pupils. With eager attention he observed what was read. Later in the afternoon, while suffering much pain, he was solicitous lest he should occasion trouble to those around him, and with earnest entreaty begged his sister to "go and get some sleep." During the night his pains were much alleviated, and this awakened on the fol-

lowing day the almost expiring hopes of his friends. He begged to be allowed to rise from his bed. The unconquerable will which had so often been victorious over the infirmities of his physical nature, he believed would yet exercise its wonted power. The following night his disease assumed the appearance of cholera, and those spasmodic hiccoughs came on which are almost certain premonitions of dissolution. And although a happy ignorance of the nature of these symptoms prevented any unusual alarm on the part of his hoping friends, yet the impression of a power which even the will of a Neander could not overcome, occasioned anxious forebodings. Meanwhile the spirit, which through long-continued habit had gained the power of quieting the storms of bodily disease, remained clear and bright. He distinctly recognized all who surrounded him. With that touching modesty and self-forgetfulness which had always been the garment of his kingly spirit, he turned aside the proffered aid of those whose love to him would call them away from their usual employment, and with failing voice he expressed his cordial thanks for the least assistance. The frequent repetition of those dreadful hiccoughs, interrupted his slumbers as soon as begun. With deeply moving, though feeble voice, he prayed: "*Gott, ich möchte schlafen,*" (God, would I might sleep!) The Lord heard his prayer beyond his expectation.

On Saturday his sufferings were still more intense, but his desire to rise from the bed to make a trial of his strength, broke forth with more eagerness than before. The gentle man, from whom his attendants had never heard a harsh word, now peremptorily commanded his servant to bring him his clothes, that he might rise and try to resume his holy work. With difficulty could a student who was watching with him persuade him to recall the order. The will of the sick man was not completely subdued until his sister who had been called, said to him: "Think, dear Augustus, what you have often said to me when I have resisted the orders of the physician,—'it comes from God, therefore we must willingly submit.'" "That is true," replied he, with a tone of voice suddenly growing quiet, "it all comes from God, and we must thank him for it."

A little later, the physicians, giving up all hope of saving his life, determined to resort to extreme measures to sustain him for a few hours. A bath of wine and strong herbs was prepared, which procured for him the joy of being able to rise. They led him out of the dark bed-room in which he had hitherto lain, into the sunny chamber which, for twenty years, had been the witness of his unwearied

labors in the kingdom of God. The sight of the familiar apartment, the lofty spirits which were wont in friendly confidence to talk with him from the walls around, repressed even now the demand for final repose. With earnest effort rising from his seat, he began in regular discourse, a lecture on New Testament exegesis. Next, a new image rose before his excited vision: the meetings of his beloved class in history; and he called for the reading of an essay recently assigned to one of their number. And as if he would in his struggles with resisting nature, produce the impossible, he dictated the subjects of the lectures which he proposed to give during the following semester, among them, "The Gospel of John, considered from the true historical point of view." And finally, as his earliest efforts in the cause of sacred science had been designed to present a picture of those glorious results which the spirit of Christianity has produced in ages past, so his last thoughts amid the phantom visions of the decisive struggle were devoted to this work of his life. Beginning a dictation precisely at the point of his Church History, at which he had left off before his sickness, he described the peculiar character of the so-called "Friends of God" of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and their relations to the church generally. When he had come to the close of a section, he asked what time it was. They replied, "It is half-past nine," (Saturday evening.) "I am weary," repeated the well tried man, "I will now go to sleep;" and while he suffered himself to be laid by friendly hands, to his last repose, he whispered with a love-breathing voice which thrilled through heart and nerve of all present, "Good night, good night." And as if the Lord would give a witness that the stern conflict of this Christian sufferer was designed only to introduce him to a so much the more undisturbed Sabbath of rest, he slumbered four hours, receiving even in a literal sense, the answer to the prayer pressed from him by the tortures of disease, and only the gradually fainter and fainter breathing gave signs that a living soul was passing into that realm, which we shortsighted mortals call death. It was the weekly festal day of the resurrection of our Lord on which his cross-bearing disciple entered into his closer fellowship. And yet perhaps one might not regard this as specially significant in Neander's departure. It was a Sabbath day wherever his soul drew breath, for he thirsted for God and lived in God. He died as he lived, and well he might, for he had lived as a citizen of a heavenly world.

The funeral was attended on Wednesday, July 17th, with a sympathy more general than had been known at Berlin since the funeral

of Schleiermacher. Early in the morning a crowd gathered about the house in Markgrafen street. At the university some hundreds of the students assembled and walked in procession to the door of the dwelling. The house was filled with the professors, the clergy, high officers of government, and students. Professor Strauss, a friend of Neander since the time of their student life together at Halle, delivered the funeral discourse. The body lay there in the study which had been its home, decked with flowers and surrounded with lighted candles, the placid countenance uncovered.

"It hath pleased the Almighty Disposer of life and death," commenced the venerable speaker, "to call home his blessed servant, our beloved friend. Thousands in our city and in our German fatherland share at this moment our grief, and soon will the whole evangelical world join in it. It is a mighty company of mourners. We who stand around his body form the visible centre of the great invisible funeral assembly. Human words may not now express the fullness of our feelings.

"We turn to the Word of God. With irresistible power presses itself upon our minds a passage from that Gospel most dear to the heart of our departed friend, and with respect to the Apostle whom he most resembled: 'Then said that disciple whom Jesus loved, It is the Lord!' (John 21: 7). In this word lies the essence of the character of the Evangelist,—of the character of him who followed the Evangelist in his life. Our Neander was a 'disciple whom Jesus loved;' that may be traced in all the way through which his Saviour led him. 'It is the Lord!'—this the message, it was the object of his life to proclaim."

A vast procession followed the body to the grave. A whole city paused in its busy life to join the mourning. The hearse was surrounded by students carrying lighted candles; in advance was borne that greater light which had illuminated the life of the departed, his own much worn Bible. At the grave a lofty choral was sung by a thousand voices. The pious, eloquent Krummacher spoke touching words of the loss which the learning and the life of the church had suffered. One of the deputation sent from the University of Halle to assist in these last honors made an address in the name of his fellow-students. After a prayer and benediction, flowers were strown upon the coffin which had been lowered to its long resting place, and each one present, according to a beautiful German custom, threw a handful of earth into the grave. In the same hour, in a neighboring city, was laid the foundation of a most appropriate monument to the

memory of the departed.¹ The day closed at Berlin with an address in the Aula of the University by Professor Nitzsch, setting forth the important services of his colleague to the institution and to theology.²

We had proposed to gather from our own impressions and from other sources at command, the more prominent characteristics of Neander. Most of those we shall name, have already been sufficiently illustrated; others we will develop briefly.

Some of his more striking traits of mind and manner, are grouped in and around what Rosell calls "the sacred *truthfulness* of his entire being and life." Here are, in the inner circle, child-like simplicity, openness and honesty; and farther away on the other side, humility

¹ The meeting of the Conference of pastors and delegates annually holden near Cüstrin, fifty miles east of Berlin, fell in the last year upon the 17th of July. It had been proposed among them to found an asylum for the care and moral training of vagrant children, on the plan of the noted "rauhe Haus" at Hamburg. The proposition was adopted with the warmest interest, and a committee was appointed to issue a circular and collect subscriptions. During the discussion one of the pastors, so deeply moved that his voice often failed him, said: "They are now bearing to his burial the man to whom I owe so unspeakably much, who was my spiritual father in Christ. Allow me, as a testimonial of my reverential love and gratitude towards him, to subscribe one hundred dollars for the proposed asylum." Upon this the suggestion was made and adopted by acclamation to give to the asylum, if by God's blessing it should be established, the name "Neanders Haus."

² Neander left no will. His sister — now suffering much under her affliction — inherits his little property. She will doubtless realize a considerable sum from his posthumous works. For the present she is assisted by the king. The publication of the manuscripts is conducted by a commission at the head of which is Dr. Twisten, Professor of Theology at Berlin. The other members, selected with reference to their intimate acquaintance with Neander's labors, are: K. F. T. Schneider, editor of the *Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft*, with which Neander was closely connected, Prof. J. L. Jacobi, and Licentiate Rauh. There will probably be published — the lectures upon Systematic Theology, Ethics, History of Ethics, History of Doctrines, Outlines of Church History, Contrast of Catholicism and Protestantism, and upon Exegesis including the whole New Testament to the Apocalypse; of that, only the epistles to the Seven Churches; finally, an additional volume of the Church History, (a part of it, indeed, only in outline,) bringing the work down to the death of Huss, in the 15th century.

As to Neander's successor in the Professorship of History, nothing was definitely determined at the date of our last advices. The theological Faculty had proposed to the Government four candidates: Professors Liebner of Kiel, Haase of Jena, Ullmann of Heidelberg, and Niedner of Leipsic. The political opinions of the candidates, will have considerable influence upon the decision. It was thought that the choice would probably fall upon Liebner, author of the monograph, "Hugo of St. Victor," and of a Christology.

and implicit submission to the Divine Will; in another direction, strict conscientiousness. His humility was touchingly exhibited a few years since, on the occasion of his birth-day, when the students testified to him in the strongest manner which the customs of German student-life admit, their esteem and affection, by a torch-light procession. They paused under his windows, the band peaking out a lively greeting; they sang in full, deafening chorus, a song in his honor, and then one of their number addressed him, expressing in strong terms their admiration and love. At the close, torches were tossed aloft in the fulness of youthful enthusiasm, and cheers rent the air. It was too much for Neander. He felt he did not deserve this. Tears filled his eyes. He approached the window, unmindful of everything but what filled his heart, and begged them not to speak so of him, for he was a poor, weak sinner, hoping forgiveness only through the blood of Christ. "Oh, Divine Love," he exclaimed, "I have never loved thee strongly, deeply, warmly enough!" Of his conscientiousness, we add a single illustration. The students tell, that three years since, when disease attacked his eyes, he was unwilling to suspend his labors in the university. When friends urged him to leave for a while, he replied, that his lectures had been announced, students had come to Berlin to listen to him, it was his duty to go on, and God would give him strength. But, as the disease increased, almost destroying his sight, and the students assembled and formally voted that they were willing to release him from his obligations to them, and begged him to regard his health, he reluctantly yielded, and hurried away to a distant city to consult a skilful oculist. As soon as he arrived, he sent at once for the surgeon, and still fearing that he had needlessly deserted his post, demanded to know if there was any radical difficulty with his eyes. "Alas, there is, Sir Professor," he replied. "So then, it's all right," exclaimed Neander, now relieved of his scruples.

Not far distant among his characteristics from the group we have named, is another constellation, in the centre of which lies his disposition to grasp the essential point of any subject, disregarding comparatively, everything incidental or formal, — his regard for the *Spirit above the Letter*. We have seen indications of such a feeling in the history of his religious experience. His youthful dissatisfaction with Judaism, his deep sympathy with Plato, the subjective type of his conversion all show the native bent of his mind. But it was the reception of Christianity as a spiritual system, which especially developed this trait in him. To his soul, wearied with the heartless forms

of an external worship, and oppressed by its own unsatisfied longings, Christ appeared as indeed a deliverer. He saved him from the yoke of the law, He removed the burden of his sin, not by any outward appliances, by no priestly rites or forms of words, but by implanting an inward life; and from that day forth he cast Judaism, under whatever name, forever behind him. If ever his meek spirit showed signs of contempt, it was in view of efforts to reinstate formalism in the Church. He had seen deeper into truth. He had looked through and through all the forms, in which it is represented to the senses or to the intellect, and it was so plain to him, that these are subordinate, that he could hardly preserve his proverbial forbearance towards those, who would yet place them higher than faith and love.

Closely connected with his disregard for the mere forms and names of Christianity, was his catholicity of spirit. He was ready to recognize the image of Christ wherever he found it, and though connected with much which he must dissent from — much that he must even condemn. He felt, that all our knowledge is but fragmentary, and that it is absurd for those, who agree in essential points, to waste their energies and their Christian graces in contending, because one sees this side, and the other that, of the same great eternal truth, which none but God can symmetrically comprehend. In one of the last lectures which Neander delivered — only eight days before his death — he said with allusion to efforts which Dr. Gutzlaff was then making at Berlin, in behalf of missions to the Chinese, “What we need in China, is not a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Calvinistic, nor a Moravian religion, but the religion of Christ, which is fitted to all situations, to all nationalities, to all people, which under peculiar social and political conditions, may assume the form most appropriate, and in this form may become the herald and creator of a new era.”

Neander respected the opinions of other men, though they differed from his own. He had the rare faculty of placing himself in the position of others, and looking upon a subject from their point of view. He thus appreciated the difficulties under which they labored, and was ready to embrace them in his broad charity. “Far be it from me,” he says,¹ “to judge the heart of any man; in this regard, each must be his own accuser. A man that knows he serves a truth above the range of the human mind, knows at the same time how far below it he himself stands, and how, on the other hand, others, whose individual culture, modified by the spirit of the age, has laid

¹ “*Life of Christ.*” Preface to the third edition.

them open to error, may in heart, be raised above their error.* But this did not make him consciously indifferent to the truth. In the same connection, he adopts the "golden words" of Niebuhr: "The man who does not hold Christ's earthly life, with all its miracles, to be as properly and really historical as any event in the sphere of history, and who does not receive all points of the Apostolic Creed, with the fullest conviction, I do not conceive to be a Protestant Christian. And as for that Christianity which is such according to the fashion of the modern philosophers and Pantheists, without a personal God, without immortality, without an individuality of man, without historical faith—it may be a very ingenious and subtle philosophy, but it is no Christianity at all. Again and again have I said, that I know not what to do with a metaphysical God; and that I will have no other but the God of the Bible, who is *heart to heart*. Whoever can reconcile the metaphysical God with the God of the Bible, may try it, and write symbolical books to suit all ages; but he who admits the absolute inexplicability of the main point, which can only be approached by asymptotes, will never grieve at the impossibility of possessing any *system* of religion." Neander was sensible of the one-sided, speculative tendency of the entire German character and theology; and once expressed to one of the editors of this Review, his conviction, that what was most indispensably needed among them was, a large infusion of the practical element of the English mind. We have already spoken of his efforts in his last years, to promote this end.

As his preëminent regard for the essential above the formal, led Neander to a large tolerance towards others, so it was connected with what one of his friends has called 'a spirit of apostolic, free manliness,' in conducting his own investigations. That he carried what is here meant, somewhat too far, cannot be denied; that this tendency in him, gained him the confidence of sceptical minds, and so won them in very many instances to the truth, is equally certain.

We turn to the outermost limits of the constellation we are observing, to notice Neander's whole-hearted, generous confidence in the self-sustaining power of the truth; or, as the sum and essence of the truth most important to men was in his view the truth which Christ taught and was,—his unlimited faith in the power and progress of Christianity. That familiar passage will here occur to every one, in which he lays at the foundation of his History the principle enunciated by our Saviour in the twin-parables of the Mustard grain and

of the Leaven; and represents Christianity as growing through the course of the centuries, from the small seed up to the mighty tree which is destined to overshadow the earth, and under the branches of which, all its people are to find a safe habitation. Unlike most of the evangelical theologians of Germany, Neander desired for the truth no support from the State. All that the church has to ask of earthly powers, in his view, is, to be let alone. Nay, "the *persecution* of the State, is better for the church than its patronage," as he once remarked; "all history shows it."

But the sun,—rather, the great central Pleiad of his mental heavens, was *love*. All else in him moved in subordination to its invisible law. All within him and without him felt those sweet influences which none can bind.

When the writer was asking at Berlin which of Neander's courses of lectures he should attend, the students, who had heard him most, said: "Neander is excellent in all departments; but, if you want to know the man, hear him in Ethics or Church History, where his feelings will have scope." And no one could hear those lectures without feeling, that there was in the blind old man before him, ready to gush out at every crevice of the subject, an exhaustless fountain of Christian love. The science of Christian morals became in his hands an attractive representation of the life, actuated by love,—warm, genial, glowing, from a heart which had felt it all. And what interest he thus threw around the history of the church we all know, but none so well as those, who have heard his tones, and seen emotion glow in his countenance and shine through all his uncouth but expressive gestures, making the pen twirl faster in his fingers, and the desk reel more heavily under him. He follows into its retirements the Christian life and feeling, which underlie the outward history of the church. An acute sympathy with all that is Christ-like conducts him through cloistered cells, to the caves of hermits, and the mountain retreats of persecuted sects, into the retired abodes of humble men and women, and detects for him unsuspected indications of faith and love, and even of missionary zeal in the ages which seem darkest.

We need not undertake to point out the manifold developments of this fundamental principle of love in all Neander's life and action. The preceding narrative of his life has already suggested them. His unbounded charity alone demands a moment's notice. Unbounded it truly was. But for his sister's greater prudence they would often

have been reduced to actual want. Besides his salary,¹ the income from his published works was large, but he never had anything in reserve. All the property that he left behind, exclusive of his books,² amounted to two thousand rix dollars (\$1400); while among his papers were found receipts for the fees remitted to poor students during his residence at Berlin, amounting to sixty-five thousand rix dollars (\$45,500). He founded among the students a Union devoted to the care of the poor and sick among their own number, and gave to it the copyright of several of his works. It is now steadily pursuing its humane object under the name of the Neander'sche Krankenverein.

His native kindness was manifest in the manner of his charities. "I was myself witness," says Prof. Jacobi, "of a case in which he entreated a young man with affectionate urgency, I may say even imploringly, to accept from him a gift of money in an hour of need. Seeing that the young man's sense of independence was so strong as to humiliate him in view of receiving such relief, he reminded him with touching delicacy, that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and entreated him to accept the gift for love's sake." Many of his charities will never be known among men. He sedulously concealed them. Here and there some of them come to light since his death. One of these instances relates to the youthful Rossel, whose glowing description of Neander we have quoted above, p. 395. He lay weak and suffering under an illness which proved to be his last. He was too poor to obtain all that was needful for his comfort in this condition. The friend who took care of him, went in his trouble with a heavy heart to Neander. As he approached the subject diffidently, Neander interrupted him, and begged to know precisely how Rossel was situated. The student named the sum which he needed. Neander wrung his hands in anxiety and distress. He had as usual no money at his command. He walked about the study looking upon his books, one after the other, as a father upon his children. Suddenly he stopped before a huge volume in gilt, one of the most valuable books in his library, the more precious, as but few copies had been printed and distributed by the author among his friends. He seized the book, put it into the hands of the student, and said: "I have no money, but take this and try to sell it. But I beg you, do it secretly; nobody must know it!" The seal is now removed from the lips which it held so long closed. Only he, as the narrator remarks, who knows

¹ German professors are supported in part by a moderate salary, in part by fees received from the students who attend their lectures.

² About four thousand volumes.

what Neander's books were to him, how he, who spared almost what was necessary from his person, became a prodigal with regard to books, how a bond of love and gratitude bound him to them,—only he can appreciate the greatness of the sacrifice.

Such was Neander as he appeared to us; a great, a good, a lovely man. He was not indeed perfect. He had errors,—serious, dangerous errors. We have no disposition to conceal them. Who that has known Neander, his truthfulness, his humility, would dare to represent him as he was not? His views with regard to the nature and extent of inspiration, and upon some other points, were such as could not be approved among us. His *Life of Christ*, which has done so much good in Germany, and here too, has so much aroused independent thought, has yet exerted an evil influence upon some minds among us. It bears marks of the struggles that brought it forth. These deficiencies, though of little comparative importance in Germany, over against the sweeping, annihilating infidelity it opposed, greatly impede its usefulness here.

It is to be noticed farther, that the errors which in Neander and some of his eminent contemporaries have seemed to exert no deleterious influence upon their Christian character, will not remain so harmless among us. There, theory and life are in a great degree distinct. Here they interpenetrate and affect each other constantly. An error in the one, becomes at once vice in the other. Not that the lax views of German Theology have been without their evil effect upon German practical life. If in some cases not so immediately perceived in the individual, this effect is yet deeply and sadly manifest in the community at large. And many of the friends of Christ there are beginning to acknowledge this, and to feel and express their new gained but earnest conviction, that Germany cannot overcome her present social evils, her infidelity and vice so rife among the lower classes, without higher doctrinal views upon certain points.

It were easy to point to the tendencies in Neander which have doubtless led him into some of his peculiar views. As we have already intimated, his admirable attachment to the one essential point in everything, has sometimes passed over into undue neglect of minor but not unimportant particulars. So in his ardent desires for the union of all true Christians, his judgment may sometimes have followed his heart farther than was prudent or just, over the space which divided him from errorists. When he believed that fundamental truth was not at stake, he has been ready to waive all disputed points,

or to reëxamine, to seek some common ground — *anything*, rather than be divided from those who are united with Christ. His unlimited confidence too, in the power and progress of Christianity, may sometimes have betrayed him. There is a certain carelessness with regard to the exact limits of truth, which naturally enough associates itself to the assurance that her territory is broad and secure. One is tempted sometimes generously to yield a disputed point, while sure that there is enough beyond candid doubt or dispute. Why contend bitterly for pebbles, while the rock-fortress towers impregnable?

These, and such as these, may be the reasons, to which we must attribute Neander's deviations in some points from views which we believe to be essential to the truth. His errors are errors of the head, not of the heart. This ought, in justice to him, to be fully understood. It ought to be acknowledged by those who dissent most from his views, — as it is surely most deeply felt by all who have known him personally, — that there was in him so far as man can perceive, not the slightest ambition to build up a school; no pride of opinion, no conscious unwillingness to bow to the word of God. His errors have not proceeded from these causes. They are those into which an humble seeker after the truth has unconsciously fallen. Let us remember with what humility he confesses to his 'Christian Brethren in America,' that he is "conscious of the dimness which surrounds him, growing out of the errors and defects of an age just freeing itself from a distracting infidelity." Notwithstanding his errors, — his earnest love for Christ, and his unwearied labors have brought hundreds, perhaps thousands, to the truth as it is in Jesus. Through that labor, in that love, to his holy rest may we follow him! *Ave pia anima!*

ARTICLE VIII.

THE NATURE AND WORTH OF THE SCIENCE OF CHURCH HISTORY.

An Inaugural Address, by Prof. H. B. Smith, Union Theol. Sem., New York.

IN addressing the Directors of the Union Theological Seminary and this respected audience, upon an occasion of such solemn interest to myself, and so closely connected with the welfare of the institution which they guard and cherish, I would, if possible, forget my own unfitness for the office to which I have been called, and accept its duties in the name and for the sake of the Great Head of the Church. It is the history of his church which I am to teach. And if the guidance of his wisdom is needed at all times by all his disciples, it is especially needed by his ministry; yet more by those called to train men for his ministry, and in some peculiar respects by one who is to narrate the history of his kingdom to its future preachers in our age and country.

The history of the church is not the straightforward narrative of the fortunes of an isolated community with inferior ends in view, but it is an account of the rise, the changes and the growth of the most wonderful economy the world has known, embracing the most comprehensive purposes which human thought can grasp. It has maintained itself in the historic progress of the race, as has no empire. It has been aggressive, attacked, progressive and diffusive as has no other community. It has moved through States, intertwined itself with institutions, changed politics, shaped national and individual character, affected all moral and social interests, and been interwoven with the whole web of human destiny. He who would know the principles which have really controlled human thought and action, will, if he be wise, explore the records of that kingdom which has had the longest duration and the strongest influence. On human grounds alone it may challenge the most earnest study of every thoughtful mind. But this history is invested with a solemn, a sublime interest, when it is viewed as the record of a divine economy, established in an apostate world, centering in the incarnation of the Son of God, and having for its object the redemption of the race, through the might of the Holy Spirit. As such, it contains the most antagonistic elements. For, though the origin of this kingdom be

divine, and though its consummation will be the glorious and untroubled manifestation of God's grace and wisdom, yet, between the origin and the consummation there is a theatre of strife, where the strongest energies of good and ill, all the forces of a supernatural, and all the forces of a natural kingdom wage perpetual warfare. It is in the vanquishing of mighty and subtle foes that the kingdom of Christ has shown its superior and supreme authority. There is progress, but it is progress through conflict. There are the victories of faith, there is also the partial success of unbelief, there is advance in spiritual freedom, there is the exaltation of spiritual despotism; there are enemies without, and feuds within; there is the growth, there is also the perversion of Christian doctrine; there is the church separate from the world, and the church contending against submission to, and domineering over, States and empires; and all this, not in one land, or one century, but from East to West, through many centuries, in the most puissant nations of the earth. And if it is chiefly in the conflicts of the race that we are to read the destiny of the race, then through these, its mightiest conflicts, may we be taught, that he who would reach forth his hand to grasp the solemn urn that holds the oracles of human fate can find it only in the Christian church. And if Lord Bacon could say in view of the visible creation: "God forbid that we give forth the dream of our fancy as the model of the world, but may he rather vouchsafe us his grace that we may indite a revelation and true vision of the march and signet of the Creator impressed upon creation;" much more ought he, who explores the revelations of God in his new and spiritual creation, to feel the constant need of that divine illumination which can alone enable him to distinguish what is from God and what is from man, what is transient, and what is worthy of lasting veneration; which can alone enable him to get above all these contests, so as to read their meaning, and so to read their meaning as to see the march and signet of redemptive grace impressed upon the moral history of our earth.

While the position of a teacher of Church History is thus, from the nature of the case, always responsible and arduous, it is especially so to one who is called to discharge the functions of this office in our age and in our land. There are advantages, indeed, as well as disadvantages, but both the advantages and the disadvantages increase the measure of his toil. There is an accumulation of historical materials, and this is an advantage; but they are more than sufficient to task the freshest powers in the longest life. There are now better digests of the materials than were even imagined possible, half a cen-

tury ago, but the teacher must verify their details and try their principles. The presumptuous and ignorant assaults of a base philosophy against the Christian church, have well nigh spent their force; no sane and instructed mind would now dare to represent it as injurious to humanity, as the work of priestcraft, as a complex of endless and useless logomachy, and as sterile of all rational interest. These vulgar objections had their origin in schools which imagined that matter was more intelligible than mind, and in countries where the history of Christianity was identified with the progress of Romish corruptions; and they now live only in the souls that are the fitting receptacles of the veriest dregs of human thought. They have been refuted in part by the very progress of Christianity, as well as by a better philosophy, and a more comprehensive view of man's history. But these larger views of human history bring with them still graver duties to the historian of the church, because most of them assign to the church a subordinate position in the development of the race, and thus impose the necessity of giving a more philosophical character to the exposition of that history, so that it shall be seen to embrace all, as well as the spiritual interests of humanity.

There are also disadvantages in the study of this branch of learning, springing from our systems of education and national habits of thought. As a people, we are more deficient in historical training than in almost any other branch of scientific research. We live in an earnest and tumultuous present, looking to a vague future, and comparatively cut off from the prolific past—which is still the mother of us all. We forget that the youngest people are also the oldest, and should therefore be most habituated to those “fearless and reverent questionings of the sages of other times, which,” as Jeffrey well says, “is the permitted necromancy of the wise.” We love the abstractions of political theories and of theology better than we do the concrete realities of history. Church history has been studied from a sort of general notion that it ought to be very useful, rather than from any lively conviction of its inherent worth. History is to us the driest of studies; and the history of the church is the driest of the dry—a collection of bare names, and facts, and lifeless dates. It is learned by rote, and kept by mnemonic helps. Whole tracts of its course realize to us the notion of the philosopher in Addison, who used to maintain the existence of tenebrific stars, whose peculiar office it was to ray out positive darkness. Its sources are buried in the dust of alcoves, and when exhumed, it is seldom with the insignia of a resurrection. They are investigated for aid in present

polemics, not to know the past but to conquer in an emergency ; as if one should run over American history only in view of incorporating a bank, or passing a tariff-bill. While we all confess that there are sources of sublime interest in the study of the visible heavens, and that no research is too deep into the successive strata of the solid earth, we are slow to believe that in the course of human history, we are to find the revelation of the sublimities of a spiritual kingdom, and the registry of the successive epochs of that new creation, in which divine wisdom and love are manifested and mirrored forth, as they cannot be in the orbits of lifeless stars, or in the growth of the unconscious earth.

While I attempt, then, as a subject appropriate to the occasion, to set forth the Nature and Worth of the Science of Church History, I would also crave the indulgence of this audience to my seeming exaggerations of an unfamiliar theme, in the belief that its inherent dignity will commend it to their favorable regard.

And I propose to speak in the first place, of the nature or true idea of the science of church history ; and, in the second place, to show its worth as a part of theological training especially in our times.

I. The nature of the science of church history. What is, then, church history as a science ? What is the true idea of this branch of theological learning ?

The different departments of theological study are usually and most appropriately grouped under the four divisions of exegetical, doctrinal, historical and practical theology. The scope of each branch is well defined by the term applied to it. Historical theology embraces all that pertains to the historic progress of the church, under the historical point of view. Doctrines and polity as well as external facts belong to it, yet not as doctrines and not as polity, but as the history of doctrines and polity, reproducing them with impartiality and critical sagacity in the order in which they have really existed. The church historian ought indeed so to teach, as, by his instructions, to confirm soundness in faith and attachment to ecclesiastical order ; he ought to apply to history at all points the test of that word which alone is inspired and authoritative ; but in order to do this, his first duty is to present the facts themselves in the order of their occurrence. Then he may judge them in their bearings on the great ends for which the church was instituted. And all the facts in both the external and internal history of the church, its progress and its reverses, its constitution, doctrines and ritual, its theologies and its spiritual life, its effects on nations and the influence of races upon

itself, its contests with human thought in all the phases of philosophy, its bearings on social, moral and political well-being, its relations to art and culture, all these points fall, in their historical aspects, under the department of historical theology, they constitute the materials of the science of church history.

What is, then, the true idea of this science? We may answer this inquiry by considering these three points: that it is history, that it is church history, and that it is the science of church history.

1. It is, in the first place, history with which we have to do; and the history of the church falls under the conditions and laws, and has the dignity of all history. It is what has been transacted on the theatre of the world in its past centuries through human agencies, made known to us by means of monuments and testimony. It is a body of facts, but specifically of facts about the human race. It is with man that history has to do; we can talk of a history of animals or of nature only by courtesy. It is with men collectively that history has to do, and not as individuals; historical personages are historical because they are the actors in events which affect the general good. The life of an individual is a biography; the life of a community is its history. And such a history is made up of a *series* of events, an orderly succession, no one of which can be understood except in its connections with the rest. And it is a series of events containing all the great and permanent interests of humanity. Human history in its real character is not an account of kings and of wars; it is the unfolding of the moral, the political, the artistic, the social, and the spiritual progress of the human family. The time will yet come when the names of dynasties and of battles shall not form the titles to its chapters. And the events of history are great, because they are freighted with the weal and woe of States, with the social and moral welfare of mankind. Historical facts have not only an existence in space and time, but they have also a moral life, they are instinct with the vitality of human interests. The whole movements of past centuries, and the whole momentum of centuries yet unborn may meet upon a single plain, a single day, a single will. And of such epochs is the history of our earth made up in its majestic course, as the historic races of the human family have come one after another into the van of that uncounted and ever advancing host which started from its cradle in the East, swarmed through the plains of the Orient, skirted all the outline of the Mediterranean, toiled with slow advance from southern Europe even to its Northern shores, leaped the flaming walls of the old world, and now finds its largest

theatre in this our Western continent, whither all nations, tribes and tongues are congregating, bearing with them the elements, from which, it may be, the highest destiny of man is to be wrought out.

The greatness of history consists then, essentially, in these two things: that it is a body of facts, and that these facts are a means of leading us to a knowledge of the great realities of human welfare, and of the actual development of the race under the pressure of all its vital interests. Its solidity is in its facts; it is above the sphere of mere speculation, as much as is nature, though it is a proper and the highest object of speculative inquiry. And it is impossible to get at a comprehensive view of man's nature and destiny, without the lights and monuments of the past. The most speculative nation of modern times, in its reaction from the unsatisfying results of its universal and abstract philosophical systems, has thrown itself with ardor into the most elaborate historical investigations. The most imposing pantheistic system which was ever framed, the most compact and consistent, was bereft of its power, chiefly in its attempt to reconstruct the moral and religious history of mankind in conformity with its desolating principles. It fell upon this stone and was broken. It touched the monuments of time and became impotent. Fiction may be great, but history is grand. Philosophy is noble, but history is its test.

It is now the province of the historian to revivify the past. Its successive periods are to live again upon the historic page. "Even what from its antiquity is but little known," says Harris in his *Hermes*, "may, on that very account, have all the charm of novelty." It will have this, if the historian gives us, not dead facts, but living men, and broad human interests. Of that high art which thus makes the past present and the absent real, Gibbon is the greatest English master, though his vision reached only to the confines of the central kingdom of our earth. The historian is also to reproduce events, so that we may read them better than did the very actors in them; for he who is fighting in the thick of the conflict sees but a small part of the movements of the army, and even the general who directs the host cannot foresee the results of his victory or disaster. But in the results the historian is to read the causes. He is to teach us the events in the light of their principles and laws. These he is to seek out with a patient, a sympathizing, a reverential, and a truly inductive spirit. And his true office is not completed, if he gives us only partial principles and laws, but only as he gives us those which truly explain the greatest results of the greatest events. It is indeed true

that historical causes are so manifold, that nothing is easier than to build up some brilliant and partial theory, and cite facts in its confirmation, but it only requires a more thorough study of history to disclose the deception, just as it only needs an open vision to see that a Grecian temple, or a Gothic cathedral or a phalanstery is not the whole of the landscape, though it may engross the meditations of some rapt enthusiast. He who thus reads history in the light of all its impregnable facts, to get from them its laws, will be led along to see that human motives and interests do not embrace the whole of it, but that it is also the sphere of a divine justice, and the theatre of a divine kingdom.

2. And this leads us to our second point, and that is, that the subject of our science is not only history, but church history, that is, the record of the progress of the kingdom of God, intermingling with and acting upon all the other interests of the human race, and shaping its destiny.

That man looks with limited or with sealed vision upon the annals of the human race, who does not descry, running through all its course, underlying it, and prominent above it, the workings of a spiritual kingdom, whose influence, in one or another form, has defined the metes and bounds of history. To the rest of history it bears the same relation that the granite does to the earth's strata, it is both deepest and highest, it supports by its solidity beneath, and juts out in its sublimity in the loftiest summits.

The character of a people is shaped in part by its geographical position, whether along the lines of rivers, or among the mountains; it is formed in part by the influence of climate, and in the same climate, by diversities of race; political institutions serve to make men submissive or independent; social influences act with keener energy, reaching to the very fireside; more potent still are strictly moral causes, the degree in which right or wrong is practically applied; but that which shapes the whole character, and determines the final destiny of a people, that which has always done this, and from the nature of the case must do this, is its religious faith. For here are the highest objects acting on the deepest and most permanent wants of the human heart. And in the whole history of man we can trace the course of one shaping, o'ermastering and progressive power, before which all others have bowed, and that is the spiritual kingdom of God, having for its object the redemption of man from the ruins of the apostasy.

This kingdom gives us the three ideas in whose light we may best

read the history of our race, and they are sin, holiness and redemption.

If we could but fully realize the majestic simplicity of this kingdom, its spiritual nature and sublime intent, if we could make present to us the full idea of it, which is not an idea alone, but also a reality; if we could see that holiness is the great end of our being, and that sin is its very opposite, and that redemption is for the removal of sin, and the establishment of a holy kingdom, then were we in the right position for reading, in their highest meaning, all the records of our race.

To narrate the history of this kingdom is the object of church history. And it brings us at once to the very centre and life of all history. By its light we may discern the very structure of human history, even as it is said that the anatomist may dissect the Brazilian fire-fly by the light which it emits. It runs through the chronicles of recorded time, from the beginning even until now. It has educated the race. It was revealed in the first promise; it survived the flood of waters; it was made a special covenant in the family of Abraham; the law given on Sinai was to prepare for its full manifestation; the Jewish people was secluded that it might bear it safe in type and prophecy, and in their very lineage, in the midst of the corruptions of Pagan idolatries; the heathen nations came under one empire, and through them was diffused one language, that they might be prepared for its complete advent; and it was brought to its full establishment, and invested with all its functions and powers, when the Son of God became incarnate, that He might die for our redemption; and from this, the era of the Incarnation, this kingdom has gone on, conflicting and conquering, with each century binding new trophies upon its victorious brow, adding strength to its loins and swiftness to its feet; and now it remains, still militant, hopeful as in its earliest youth, and wiser in its matured vigor, diffusing far and wide its innumerable blessings, and bearing in its divine powers and sacred truths the hopes and destiny of the human race.

The true idea of church history then embraces these points: God has made a revelation of himself to man, having for its object the redemption of man. "What education is to the individual, that is revelation to the race." This revelation is made in a real, instituted, historical economy. This economy centres in the Person and Work of our Lord, who is the living Head of a new creation. Of the life, the doctrines and the growth of this new creation, the elect church, he is the source, through the energy of his Spirit. And the history

of the church tells us how far the redemptive purposes of God have been accomplished in the actual course of human events. That history, in its actual course has been a connected series, all its facts being bound together by their common reference to Christ and his kingdom. That history has been a developing process, not only in the way of external diffusion, subduing the nations, not only in its external politics, changing to meet the exigencies of the times, not only in the application of its principles more deeply and sharply to all the relations and institutions of society, but also in its doctrines which have been unfolded, defined and systematized, so as to ward off objections, and to bring the Christian system into harmony with all other truth as a scientific whole. This developing process is not arbitrary, but it has its laws, and also its tests, both of which it is the duty of the historian to set forth. He is to exhibit all the elements which constitute the Christian church, in their just relations, doctrines, polity, spiritual life, and external events acting upon each other, and all working together in the unfolding of the kingdom of God. And this history does not stand alone; it is a part of universal history, containing its central and controlling elements; so that as a mere matter of historic justice, he who would study the records of the race with a humility like that which animates the true minister and interpreter of nature, will find impressed upon them the principles and laws of that supernatural kingdom whose final glories shall be hymned in anthems of exulting praise in that heavenly realm where the triumphant church shall celebrate the centuries of its jubilee.

This is the general idea of church history. And here I cannot forbear citing a passage from the works of the elder Edwards, our greatest American divine, which, taken for all in all, is perhaps the most remarkable he ever penned, and which shows the clearest insight into the real nature of the Christian church. In his letter to the Trustees of Princeton College, when they invited him to their presidency, he says: "I have on my mind and heart a great work, which I call a History of Redemption, a body of divinity in an entire new method, being thrown into the form of a history, considering the affair of Christian theology, as the whole of it, in each part, stands in reference to the great work of Redemption by Jesus Christ; which I suppose to be of all others the grand design of God, and the summum and ultimum of all the divine operations and decrees; particularly considering all parts of the grand scheme in their historical order; the order of their existence or their being brought forth to view in the course of divine dispensations, or the wonderful series of

successive acts and events ; beginning from eternity and descending from thence to the great work and successive dispensations of the infinitely wise God, in time ; considering the chief events coming to pass in the church of God, and revolutions in the world of mankind, affecting the state of the church, and the affair of redemption, which we have an account of in history or prophecy, till at last we come to the general resurrection, last judgment and consummation of all things, when it shall be said : ‘ It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end ;’ concluding my work with a consideration of that perfect state of things which shall be finally settled, to last for eternity. This history will be carried on with regard to all three worlds, heaven, earth and hell, considering the connected, successive events and alterations in each, so far as the Scriptures give any light ; introducing all parts of divinity in that order which is most scriptural and most natural ; a method which appears to me the most beautiful and entertaining, wherein every divine doctrine will appear to the greatest advantage, in the brightest light, in the most striking manner, showing the admirable contexture and harmony of the whole.” In this most striking sketch, which is only partially carried out in Edwards’s Posthumous History of Redemption, and in which the very involutions of the style show the presence of the ideas that are struggling for utterance, we have an outline of the history of the church, as noble as any man ever sketched, as yet unrivalled in the English tongue, and which, of the men of his age, Jonathan Edwards alone could fully conceive : *solus sed sic sol*.

3. The third point necessary to an understanding of the true nature of our subject is, that church history is to be exhibited in a scientific form. It is history, it is church history, and it is the science of church history. It ought to be studied in a scientific method, in accordance with true scientific principles.

That exhibition of a subject, properly called scientific, consists essentially in this — that its facts are brought under their legitimate laws or principles, and that they are viewed in their connections with the causes which have produced them, and the ends to be accomplished by them. The basis of all science is facts ; the first process is to bring these facts under their appropriate general laws. Many philosophers, especially in the natural sciences, stop here, neglecting both the efficient and final causes, scouting them as metaphysical, or banishing them to what they esteem a barren theology. This view not only limits science, but it favors pantheism. And it is essentially unphilosophical, for the inquiry after the really efficient causes, and

the ends of phenomena is as philosophical as the inquiry after their immediate antecedents.

And what we here claim is that the history of the Christian church ought to be presented in a scientific method. As so presented, it is one of the noblest objects to which human thought can be directed. And this is now of special importance, in consequence of the prevalence of partial and unchristian speculations about the history and destiny of the human race.

The time is past when history could be viewed as a bare narrative of events, without any purpose or deductions. Every body now-a-days speculates about events, more or less, well, badly or still worse. That style of treating history too, which consisted in explaining all great events by merely personal motives, is tolerably antiquated, as if the Reformation broke out because Luther wished to marry Catherine von Bora, or Mohammedanism sprang up because Mohammed was ambitious and had visions in epilepsy. It has even been found that steam, electricity, gunpowder and printing are not sufficient to account for the whole of modern civilization, and we only wonder at the enthusiastic admirer of the typographic art, who exclaimed: "Be not deceived, Luther was great, but Gutenberg was greater." All thinking men must and will seek for higher and better causes for the great events of time. At the same time, many a brilliant and partial generalization of the facts of history, which protrudes some social or political object as the great end of the race, is seducing even earnest and thoughtful minds from the simplicity and sublimity of the Christian faith. And hence we say it is well to present the history of the church in a truly scientific way, that the superiority of Christianity may be evinced. Church history is now to be conducted and taught in comparison and contrast with the false philosophy of history. And, as thus taught, it is the best philosophy of history which can be written, the best vindication of the ways of God with man. It is the true philosophy of human history.

What is necessary to such a view of it we will proceed to state in the light of that definition of science which has been already given. According to this, the scientific exhibition of the history of the church would consist in the presentation of all the facts that concern the kingdom of God in Christ, in their orderly succession, with their causes, whether proximate or ultimate, and in their bearings on the divine purpose for the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ, which purpose will be fulfilled in the perfect fellowship of a divine kingdom, where justice shall adjust and love harmonize the relations of all its members.

For the sake of distinctness, it may be well to bring out more definitely the points embraced in this statement.

Church history rests upon a broad basis of facts, given in the Revelation on which it reposes, or in the course of its history. This is the basis of the science.

These facts are to be presented, as they occurred, in orderly succession, grouped around the signal epochs in which the combined interests and relations of the church have undergone some decisive change. Such points of convergence and divergence are, for example, the age of Constantine and the Reformation. This would give us the real historic course and main epochs of the history.

Here, then, we have a series of events, comprising the great and decisive interests of the human race. The inquiry next suggested is, what are the principles and laws upon which this development has proceeded, what are the actual principles, and what is their inherent worth? The proximate principles, now, are unquestionably the motives and feelings of the actors in the events. But the motives of the actors are determined by more general causes, inherent in the times and the institutions in the midst of which they live and act.

And in determining these more general causes, Christian philosophy runs counter to all naturalistic or pantheistic schemes. The latter find them in an impersonal reason, in universal ideas, in human interests or rights, in abstract laws, in social impulses. The former refers them ultimately to the purpose of God, to a real personal Providence, to an Incarnate Redeemer, to the living agencies in a divine kingdom. The one makes them to be from God, the other from reason; the one speaks of a real manifestation of God, the other of an advance in human freedom. The latter equally with the former must concede the actual existence of the church and its history; but he tries to explain this history without God, or Christ, or the Spirit's influences, and without assuming the reality of the truths which centre in this kingdom. Christian philosophy does not deny that men are animated by ideas of justice and freedom, by political and social rights, for this were unwise and contrary to fact, but it says that the facts of history are not fully and rationally explained by them alone, that they demand more than this. It does not deny that there is in history a mixture of causes, some good and some evil, but it says that the overruling ones have been for good, and chiefly through the church of Christ, and wholly through the providence of God. It claims that the very facts of church history, which all must grant to be a part of human history, cannot be rationally accounted

for, excepting on the supposition of the historic reality of the grand revelation of God in Christ and his kingdom.

Abstract ideas, or human interests, or both combined, will not account for the rise and growth of such an economy as is the Christian church. It has been admirably said: "There is one symbolical book of the Christian faith, which will ever do despite to the attacks of a negative criticism, and this is the history of the world. In proportion as historical investigations are elaborated into an universal historical science, in the same proportion will Christ be acknowledged as the eternal and divine substance of the whole historical life of the world, and his sacred person will greet us everywhere on the historic page, as it also greets us everywhere in the Scriptures of our faith."¹

But to explain aright this historical progress of the church, we need a test as well as a cause; we need to ask for the value and authority of the facts. For without such a test we are in utter confusion, and must take all as it comes, for better or worse. We may become the prey of any system of delusion under the vague notion that it is a part of the historical development. Rome might claim us, for she has been developed; all the systems of philosophy might claim us, for all the systems of philosophy have been developed; all the sects in Christendom might invoke our homage, for all the sects in Christendom have been developed; all the parties out of Christendom might claim us, for all the parties out of Christendom have been developed. And if we were divided among them all, little of faith or reason would be left to us.

No idea more vague or unsubstantial has ever been more current than has that of a mere development. It is not merely pernicious, it is also worthless, unless we can show what it is that is developed, what are the laws that regulate the development, and what are the tests by which it is to be tried. And here is where the philosophy of history must differ from the philosophy of nature. In studying nature we may be content with generalizing the facts, thus getting at its laws; although a rigid and complete method would compel us to carry our speculations still farther. But in studying history, in the investigation of moral causes, we need a test by which to try the facts and the principles; for sin is in history as well as holiness, error as well as truth, man as well as God. We need a test, and one not taken at random, but approved as such by the very course of history itself.

And to the believer in a divine revelation, such a test is given in

¹ So, for substance, Professor Brandis of Bonn, in his *History of Philosophy*.

the sacred Scriptures. By its truths and doctrines all history, and especially the history of the church, is to be judged. And that this test is not an arbitrary one may be inferred, not only from the proof of the inspiration of the Bible, but also from the actual course of human history. As a matter of fact, the truths revealed in the Bible have been the touch-stone which has tried men's spirits. Human speculation has not gone beyond, has not even fathomed its wonderful revelations. It has been the historical arbiter of Christian controversy. Its perversions have been judgments, and its truths light and life. It is a marvellous thing to see the supremacy of this Revelation in the actual course of human history. It is instructive to read the history of the church, and all human history, by its light. For, as a matter of simple fact, the whole history of the church might be summed up with saying that it consists in pouring into the human race the treasures of this volume, there to germinate, until the kingdom revealed in word and promise shall be fully manifested in its reality and power.

To complete the philosophical view of Christian history, one additional point is needed, and that is the exhibition of the end or object to which the history is tending. Of anything living and spiritual, we do not have the true conception, until we know the end for which it was made, as well as the actual course and laws of its growth. We understand man fully only in the light of the ends of his being. We have no intelligent apprehension of the true nature of the Christian church, until we see not only the course and laws of its history, but also *how* the whole course of its history bears on the great object for which it was instituted. That object is the bringing the race back to union with God, through the grace of Christ, by the influences of the Spirit, and in the fellowship of men one with another. And this object can only be achieved by the application of the principles of God's kingdom to all human relations and institutions, bringing them all under its divine supremacy, in accordance with justice and in subordination to love. It is the bringing all inferior ends into subjection to the highest end, it is the making the laws of a divine kingdom supreme over all lower laws. Church history shows how far this end has been actually accomplished, and it ought to make us both wise and earnest in carrying on the church still further towards the same great object.

In the greatness and grandeur of the end which Christianity thus holds out to man, the superiority of the Christian system over all other systems is most fully manifested. It embraces more than they

all, and what is more adapted to human wants, and what is more consistent with the facts of history. For the most current and fascinating of these schemes represents some purely human or social interests, some organization for the promotion of "humanitarian" ends, as the great object for which the race has been toiling, as the grand secret so long hidden in the womb of parturient time, with which she has been in travail these six thousand years, and of which she is soon to be delivered. But never was there so long a labor for so slight a progeny. This toil of all the nations, these conflicts of the church, this slow advance through strife, only to issue in the securing of political rights and a better social state! If any view could lead us to despair of Providence and of man, it is such a view of human history as this. All the great labors and conflicts of the past have been for unreal objects. And this is the view of those who believe in man alone, and in the supremacy of reason; they are the very ones who find the least of truth in history, and nothing of permanency in the church, which still has been made up of rational men.

But while protesting against such philosophemes and such a view of human history, as essentially defective, and contrary to fact, we should also be careful not to err on the other extreme, and deny human rights and human reason, and be indifferent to social progress. It is a dishonor to the church to suppose that it can be indifferent to these questions. One of the ends of Christianity, not its highest end, but necessary thereto, is to elevate reason, to secure freedom, and to enhance all social blessings. To take any other ground is to leave Christianity in the back ground. The Christian church must set itself right with these, or it loses its hold of the age, as did Rome, three centuries ago. It must show its superiority to all other systems, chiefly by showing that only on its basis can human rights be safely adjusted, human welfare promoted, and a higher social state introduced among mankind. Christianity is designed to make this world fairer, and wiser, and happier. It must show its supremacy, by laboring for all human interests with the wisest zeal and the calmest energy, and the most assured conviction, keeping them subordinate in theory and in life, to the one comprehensive purpose which includes all the others, and that is, redemption from sin. Without haste, but without rest, earnestly, yet wisely, protesting against all that is unjust, and laboring for its eradication, with an intense sympathy for all who suffer, and bear the burdens, and know the wretchedness of our mortal life, giving with the largest charity, having the very spirit of self-sacrifice in heart and in life, ever working for

truth and righteousness, and believing that they will come, using, as has been said, the very ruins of our earth, to build up the temple of our Lord, — in such a spirit, and with such ends, must the church of the redeemed labor, if it is to set forth the inherent superiority of the Christian system; and under such aspects must it be viewed, that it may realize the full idea of the kingdom of Christ, as a holy society exhibiting, the manifest glory of the supreme God in the redemption of mankind from *all* the consequences of the great apostasy.

Such is the sublime view of the great objects at which God is aiming, and of the final destiny of the race, which is given us in the Christian church and its history. All the interests of the human race are garnered up in its comprehensive purposes. It has principles so universal and efficient, that they alone can reconcile the conflicts and restore the disorders of our fallen state. It gives us the most elevated and inspiring view of the ultimate destiny of the human race. It gives us not a speculation, but a real historical economy; not a merely projected scheme, but one which has endured and conquered, one which has thus far approved itself as adapted to human wants and to human welfare. It gives us a kingdom which reaches forward through the world, beyond the world, even to the eternity of our being. It is a kingdom, too, in which are first adjusted the highest antagonisms, as the means of harmonizing all our lesser conflicts. It gives us agencies sufficient to carry all these ends into fulfilment. This kingdom, reposing for its foundation upon the purpose of the Father, centering in the God-man, divine and human both, animated by the living energy of the Holy Spirit, adjusting the relations between a holy God and a sinful world, intended to reconcile men with each other as well as with God, and having for its object the final redemption of mankind, — such a kingdom is as far superior in its majesty and rightful authority to any merely philosophical speculation about the destiny of the race, as fact is superior to theory, and as a divinely-revealed system is superior to the one-sided excogitations of the poor sciolist, who talks as if humanity were all, and as if his own speculations were the first light that has ever illumined the earth.

This exhibition of the great ends to be wrought out by the church completes the scientific view of its history, and gives to it fulness and roundness; that which was from the beginning in the purpose of the Father is that which is realized in the end in the kingdom of his Son. And thus the circle is completed, the end returns to the beginning, and God is all in all.

And if the inquiry about the ends for which the race was made is a necessary inquiry, if no science can be complete which does not answer it, and if that science is best, which answers it from the point of view which embraces all the relations of man, then, on the basis of the Christian revelation, may we erect the best science of human history, for here we know by the sure word of prophecy, what is the great end set before the human race.

Such a scientific view of the history of the church as is that, whose outline we have thus attempted to sketch, gives us the real philosophy of human history, and that, too, not on speculative but on historical grounds. That there is such a philosophy not all the vagaries and delusions of infidel speculations should lead us to deny. They should rather induce us to use the old prerogative of our faith, that of turning the weapons forged in the camp of its enemies, into the means of its own defence and victory. They should lead us to show that that view of human nature and destiny, which is given by the light of Christianity, is immeasurably more comprehensive and elevating, more friendly to real progress and rights, more accordant with the whole welfare of mankind, and more consistent with all the facts of history than any scheme which infidel speculation is capable of projecting. Until any one can propound a system, which shall propose to do more, and what is more needed, than the redemption of a sinful world through an incarnate God, in an eternal kingdom, whose blessings are bestowed on all who will accept them, the supremacy of Christianity as a system must needs be conceded. And this is our confidence—either Christianity is to go on, and do its work, and redeem the race—or it will be superseded by something higher and better, and if so,—by what?

And it is our conviction that if any would really study the history of our earth in a truly philosophical and docile spirit, even if he began from the merely human point of view, asking only what has actually approved itself as best and highest to man, that he would be led through the race above the race; that from the very facts of the case he would come to the recognition of the existence, and authority and need of just such a kingdom, and of just such a view of human history, as is given us in the records of the Christian church. If any do not come to such a result, it is because they do not study history in a truly inductive spirit, or else they study it with some preconceived bias against Christianity. Those who think metaphysics to be the highest of blessings, and abstractions to be the great realities, might come to different results. But this is because they have neither

reverence for facts, nor a right method of interpreting them. They do not study history to learn, but to try their own schemes upon it. They destroy the substance of the facts to make out their theories. There was once a statue of Isis, veiled, in the hall of a priest's temple at Memphis. His son, longing to see the face, struck off the veil with hammer and chisel, and found only a block of raw, shapeless stone. And this wise child is no unapt representative of those who study history without reverence, and without taking into account the fact that man is a religious being; they may strike off the veil of the divinity, and then say there is no divinity there; but they have not studied the statue, they have only tried the power of a hammer and a chisel. If we reverence the divinity that is in history, we shall see it through its veil, we shall feel and know its power, we shall see that there is a divinity which shapes man's ends, rough-hew them as he may.

I should be doing a silent injustice to the memory of a venerable and beloved teacher, if I closed this part of my subject without acknowledging my indebtedness for a right view of church history to the teachings and writings of the most eminent church historian of our day, the venerated and beloved Neander. His favorite motto, inscribed under his likeness was—Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face. In this spirit he lived and studied, and now, we trust, he sees face to face, taken, alas! too soon, as we vainly say, in the midst of his gigantic toil upon his incomparable history. Still can we see that familiar and bent frame, that countenance so Jewish in outline, and so Christian in expression when he let out upon you the full light of his eyes, usually veiled. The records of the Christian church were the study of his life, and his works are a monument to the dignity of its history. He explored the dark mines and brought to light radiant treasures. He united the most laborious research, with the most genial sympathy for all that is human, for all that is Christian. We almost forget that he may have been too lenient, when we remember how easy it is to be too intolerant. We think less that he fails in the graphic narrative of detail, because we feel so deeply the richness of that spirit, which could make the whole of Christian history so dear to our hearts, and so elevating to our faith. While we would ever judge his particular opinions only by the highest standard, we would speak of himself as we ought to speak of a man, who passed through all the conflicts of his age and country, and kept firm and high his conviction of the supernatural origin of Christianity, and had a living sense of Christ's

grace, and in all his life and writings exemplified the power of that faith which overcometh the world, and of that charity which is the greatest of the virtues. And the unobtrusiveness of his studious life has been equalled only by the extent of his growing influence. His memorial shall not depart away, and his name shall live from generation to generation.

II. The Worth of the Science of Church History. If the view we have given of the science of church history be correct, we can hardly over-estimate its value for all who are interested in the great problems of human destiny, and especially for those who are to be the preachers of the gospel of Christ, in our age and country.

1. And it has, in the first place, an inherent dignity. It is valuable for its own sake.

If man was made to know, so that all knowledge is good, then must that history be of an elevating influence, and most worthy of regard, which reveals to us what the race is for, what it has been and is to be, and which brings us into the heart of all its conflicts. There is something admirable, worthy even of our wonder, in seeing the might and progress of a spiritual kingdom in a sinful world. There is no history to be compared with it in its intrinsic interest and grandeur. Beginning among the hills of Judea, it went forth amid the chaos of pagan idolatries, and within a century its churches were planted, in spite of persecution, in all the chief cities of the Roman empire. It became strong through suffering. The succession to its chief churches was, as Ranke says, a succession to martyrdom, as well as to office, but the succession was always full. It fought in the shade, only because the air was filled with the arrows of its foes. It became so strong in Rome, that neither a Nero nor a Decius could quench its fires in blood. The persecutions of a Diocletian through the whole empire, only served to reveal its hidden might. As Dante says of the Pope, that his adversity was great, until he became great in his adversity, so was it with the early church; and when it became great in its adversity, and the emperors could not suppress it, then they bowed before it. It had existed in the catacombs, but under Constantine it was established upon the throne of the Caesars, and its worship was celebrated in the basilicas of Constantinople. It changed the whole face of the ancient world. When the northern barbarian hordes desolated the empire, the church was consolidated and prepared for their coming; so that although Italy was laid waste, the kingdom of Christ subdued these fierce foes unto herself. This irruption of the North upon the South, was the providential means

of spreading Christianity from the south to the north of Europe. The church converted the Teutonic races, which, under its auspices, have been the regenerating element in modern civilization. When the balance of the political power of Europe was transferred from the south to the north, the Papacy of the south resisted and subdued the imperial encroachments, in that long strife between Guelph and Ghibelline. It gave to Europe strength to resist that Moslem zeal which strove to scale its battlements. It influenced the prowess of that honorable yet corrupt chivalry, which showed both its might and its blindness, in regaining the sepulchre of our Lord. Through its very successes, the church had now become almost inebriated; and in the pride of its power, it usurped the place due only to its Head. Yet, even in the night of the middle ages, its scholars were giving needed shape and precision to its theological systems. The learning which it brought from the East, awakened a new spirit of inquiry; its despotism provoked national resistance; its Pelagianism called out the spiritual prowess of the heroes of the Reformation, and the old Gospel was spoken anew in their mother tongues, to the waiting nations. Rome was left in the south; and, among the free and investigating nations of the north, the church exhibited itself in new forms, to meet the exigencies of that new spirit which was spreading among the people. It was a new trial for the Christian church, whether it could maintain its authority in the midst of freedom of thought and of philosophical research. And Protestantism has proved to us that it can,—the thoughtful Protestantism of the Lutheran churches, and the aggressive and advancing Protestantism of the Reformed churches. To the latter was vouchsafed the office of maintaining the supremacy of Christianity among the freest, the most commercial nations of the earth. The aggressive and progressive portion of modern church history, belongs to this branch of the church. And nobly has it fulfilled its office, both in the old world and in the new. Calvin, once said the greatest living German historian, was the virtual founder of the United States of America. And here the Christian church still lies at the basis of our institutions, and sustains them by its power, which we feel the less, because it is so equally diffused. It has grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength. That sacred kingdom which began its contesting course at the city of Jerusalem, and passed victorious from Asia to Europe, and from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, which crossed the Atlantic in adventurous barks, has extended itself through the length and breadth of our land, and is now planted on the borders of the vast Pacific, to

carry back, it may be, the treasures of its grace, from island to island, in a returning course, to the continent and the hills whence it first sprung, and fill Jerusalem with a higher praise.

And what other history can tell such a tale, or knows such marvels, such conflicts, and such victories?

And there is not only this, its external life, — there is also its hidden, spiritual life, — there are its spiritual heroes. It has its array of martyrs and confessors. There is the refiner's fire, and in it the molten gold. It perpetually renews the story of the burning bush that is not consumed. It tells us of those who have taken poverty for their bride, and, for the good of souls, gone to the ends of the earth. It tells us of those who "have done things worthy to be written, and written what is worthy to be read." There are rivers of peace, gently flowing, "life, love and joy still gliding through;" through its whole history runs the river of God, whose depths are ever peaceful, though its surface be torn by the storms. And thus, from the history of Christ's church we may draw such spiritual lessons, that it shall be to us indeed a "book of holy doctrine," nourishing our hearts in the truth and love of God."

2. Another point of view under which the value of church history may be considered, to which our limits allow us only to advert, is its bearings on the vindication of God's providence in his moral government of the world. The strongest objections to God's providential rule, are on the field of history; and in the history and progress of the Christian church, with the aims it has in view, we have our best basis for a reply to the objections. Without the light of Christianity, human history is dark indeed, and hardly intelligible to any serious mind. And though difficulties may be left even from the Christian point of view, yet the most perplexing questions are solved, and solved not in the way of bare possibility and speculation, but on the ground of actual facts, on the basis of a revealed economy, which is full of blessings and of grace for the human race. This gives us points that "throb with light," in the midst of all the darkness. God's government of the world is thus seen to vindicate itself. As the scientific study of nature has given the best reply to the well-known Lucretian objection, "*stat tanta prædita culpa*," so the thorough study of history will reveal to us a wisdom in the divine dealings, which is the best answer to inconsiderate objections to the moral government of God. But we cannot dwell upon this topic further, because for our present objects it is more needful to consider a third aspect under which the value of church history may be considered.

8. And that is, its general doctrinal bearings. Church history comprises the history of doctrines. This is its more important portion. It gives us the real internal life of the church. And it is a field more fruitful in interest than is almost any other portion of this history. Here we have that greatest of controversies, between philosophy and faith, of which all external conflicts are but the symbol. Here we are taught how Christianity approves itself as the highest reason. Here, too, we see that

" Truth crushed to earth shall rise again,
The eternal life of God is hers,
But error, wounded, writhes in pain,
And dies amid her worshippers."

It is animating to follow this record, and note the stadia of that grand process through which the church has been passing, in order to come to a full comprehension of God's revealed will, and to reconcile the verities of Christianity with all other known truth. Each age has here had its special office. It is as if no one period had been able to grasp the full meaning of revelation; the first age was devoted to the Incarnation and the Trinity; the next to sin and grace; the next more especially to the polity and the sacraments; the age of scholasticism to a systematizing of the previous labors. The Reformation brought out into bold relief the doctrine of justification, and the true idea of the church, while it delivered the church from an usurped ecclesiastical authority, and it produced the largest body of symbols and confessions. Then came the period of the conflict of Christianity at all points, even to its foundations, with criticism and philosophy, its contests with all the forms of infidelity, and the great attempt—in the midst of which we now stand—to reconcile the whole of Christianity with all the thoughts and interests of the race, to bring all our knowledge of human and divine things into one self-consistent system.

And whoever reads this inspiring record in a right spirit, will find it to have a two-fold value; it guards against heresy, and it confirms the essential truths of Christianity.

It is a preservative against error, according to the maxim, "forewarned, forearmed." Many an objection made against what are called the formulas of doctrine, would vanish, if the history of those formulas were known. And, in fact, they cannot be thoroughly understood excepting in the light of their history, which tells us the reason for almost every word in the chief definitions. The formula then

becomes full of life. If it is seen how Arius, and Pelagius, and Sabellius, were conquered, we shall give less heed to the attenuated repetition of their thrice slain objections. It is a wise saying, "that only he who is able to trace an error to its roots, can tear it up by the roots." If we get at the roots, we need not spend so much time on the new sprouts of heresy. We shall thus be less apt to quake at every objection to the truth, and we shall have more of that calmness which is one prognostic of victory.

Of equal service is the history of doctrines, in confirming us in the truth. If, in the year 1384, Wyckliffe could write, "Truly aware I am, that the doctrine of the gospel may, for a season, be trampled under foot, and even suppressed by the threatenings of Antichrist, but equally sure I am that it shall never be extinguished, for it is the recording of the truth itself," much more may we say this now, with a faith confirmed by the history of almost five subsequent centuries. There have been, and there will be, conflicts; but those truths which are both old and new, which are always and never old, which are always and never new, have still maintained their vantage ground. Those very truths, against which human reason has brought the subtlest objections, the Incarnation, the Trinity, Atonement, Justification and Regeneration, those very truths, which to the superficial view seem contrary to reason, because they are above mere natural reason, are the ones which have received the strongest additional confirmation, in the progress of doctrinal discussion, which have approved themselves as fundamental in the Christian system. Thus, for example, the doctrine respecting the Person of our Lord, the union of the human and divine natures in his sacred person, that central doctrine of Christianity, has been assailed by every imaginable objection; some have denied his divinity, at the expense of his humanity; others, his humanity at the expense of his divinity; others still, have feigned a nature neither human nor divine; some have confounded the natures; others have divided the person; every form of philosophy, in each successive age, has done battle against this most vital and most comprehensive truth—and almost every form of philosophy has come at last to pay it obeisance. It has maintained its hold, so that in every century men have bowed at the name of Jesus, with such love and faith, as none but a suffering God-man could inspire. And the history of this truth reveals to us its sublimity and authority, and shows us the great practical end to be gained by a review of past controversy, and that is, in the mutations of human opinions to see the immutability and progress of divine truth.

4. This study of church history is of importance, not only in these general doctrinal aspects, but also, in the fourth place, in its application to present controversy.

We live in an age and in a country of sects and of controversies, and this is not so bad as an age of indifference or of spiritual bondage. Sects are better than coercion, and controversy than thoughtlessness.

But this variety of opinions imposes the necessity of a broader theological culture, so that we may know the grounds of difference and the points of agreement. The study of the history of opinions contributes to this.

All present controversy has a tendency to sharpen and limit the vision; the study of history has a tendency "to inbreed within us," what Milton calls, "that generous and Christianly reverence one of another, which is the very nurse and guardian of Christian charity." It gives a position above the controversy which is of inestimable value, especially to him who is involved in the controversy. Thus can we best distinguish between the essential and the contingent.

All intense doctrinal discussion has, likewise, a tendency to run back upon metaphysical distinctions, and to make these appear of too great relative importance; and as these distinctions are not so readily apprehended by the popular mind, there is a strong disposition on the part of the polemic, for the sake of popular effect, really to misinterpret his opponent, and to say that he denies the whole of a truth, when he only objects to some one of the forms in which it may be stated. And this, too, in forgetfulness of the fact that phraseology, which to the popular mind is definite, has become indefinite among theologians through the stress of controversy. The study of doctrinal history does not make any one less scrupulous in the use of terms, but rather more so; and it also shows the value of nice distinctions, and that is, that they are rather scientific than practical; and it makes one averse to the petty and easy art of the unscrupulous polemic, who appeals to popular prejudice to sustain a cause which he is in danger of losing in argument. He, who knows the full history of controversy, will be as little disposed as any one, to tamper with the truth for the sake of novelty; he will see the wisdom of the forms in which it is embodied; but he ought also to acquire such breadth of vision, that he will not unnecessarily exalt minor points of difference, even for the sake of displaying his own orthodoxy. It is easy to gain the notoriety of a polemic—little knowledge is needed to that; it is easy to exalt the difference between Old School and New, between Presbyterians and Congregationalists; but it is wiser and better to

work together for our common good, and against our common foes. A state of things in our American churches, which should lead to more serious collisions between those so substantially at one as are Congregationalists and Presbyterians, which should annul that old Christian freedom and brotherhood, which made transitions from one to the other easy and unnoticed, could not be too much deplored. Far distant be the time, when it can be said, that he who would go from hence thither cannot, neither ought any man to come hither from thence.

But the controversies among Protestants are not those in which church history has the most solid and needed lessons to convey. There is the still more important and urgent controversy between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic communions. While the political power of Rome is dying out at the heart, its spiritual claims are exalted at the extremities. And from the very nature of the Romish polity, this spiritual includes a political claim, wherever it can be enforced. Its dignitaries may praise republicanism, and toleration, and rights of conscience, and the social compact, in republican cathedrals and in the halls of Congress; but, behind the rights of man are the rights of the church, the toleration they invoke is for them and not for mankind, the inviolable conscience is the Roman Catholic conscience; and, above all social compacts, is a sovereign and infallible church. They catch the popular ear by words, which when interpreted in the light of their full system, are abhorrent to the popular ear. It may be, that they will yet be plagued by their own inventions, and that what is policy in the leaders may become conviction in the followers.

And this church invites us to a conflict, which cannot long be put off. It throws down the gauntlet, and boasts of our decline, perverting the facts of modern history, as it forged donations and decretals of all. And there is need among our ministry of a more thorough study of its real character, for the flowing lines by which we now vaguely define its differences from us, are not the real lines on which the battle is to be fought. Rivers are said to be good for the boundaries of peaceful States, but bad for the defence of armies. If we would learn the real power and strategy of Rome we must away from the rivers, to its hills and encampments.

The strength of Rome is in its completeness and consistency as an organic system. The Roman Catholic system is the most comprehensive, subtle, self-consistent, flexible and inflexible polity, which the mind of man ever wrought out for purposes of spiritual and tem-

poral authority. Its parts are knit together. Doctrines, polity and rites—they are all members of one body, an organized, aggressive and zealous spiritual hierarchy, whose claims run through all the relations of life, trespass upon the sanctity of the family, unbind the oaths of political allegiance, and know no human or civil rights, which are not subordinate. From the cradle to the grave it accompanies each of its members with its mystical sacraments. It changes its astute policy at each emergency; as has been said, “it neutralized Aristotelianism by scholasticism, printing by art, the Albigenses by the Franciscan order, and a Luther by a Loyola.” It is wise even to wiliness, and when it seems to succumb, it is just preparing to strike. It has something of that insatiable variety which Cicero attributes to nature, and also of that complex order, which modern science finds everywhere in nature. It can afford to be inconsistent for a moment, that it may be consistent in the end; it can outbid any other system with both the populace and the politician. It is by turns servile and despotic. And its systematic power is rivalled only by its zeal, and its zeal is not greater than is its adaptedness to almost all moods and classes of mind. It awes by its power those whom it cannot enchant by its flatteries; it is harmless to the submissive, meek to the inquiring, and intolerant to every adversary. It appeals to all the senses in its varied rites; it charms the understanding by the consistency of its system, and it subdues reason itself by its claims to infallibility. It is seductive to the barbarian, and alluring to the imaginative; its later converts have been among cultivated minds, who have lost sympathy with human rights, and despaired of reason, and were glad to submit to a venerable authority, which was strong through its traditions, and unfaltering in its aspirations. And all its policy and efforts look forward to one great end, that of a spiritual domination, embracing all the great temporal interests; the supremacy of a single see, having its seat in that ancient, venerable Rome, which, having conquered the whole of the old world, and been supreme in mediæval times, would also give the law to the whole modern world, and make of Rome the centre of the earth.

While the strength of the Roman Catholic system is thus to be found in its consistency, and completeness and pliancy as an organized whole, the arguments in its favor, and its means of defence against assault are chiefly on historical grounds. From the nature of the case, its claims to unity, infallibility and supremacy stand or fall with its tradition. This open foe of all our Protestantism, and this covert foe of all our civil rights can be thoroughly undermined only

on the historic field. The wisdom of the Reformers was seen as conspicuously in the production of the *Magdeburg Centuries*, as in any other of their works, and the *Annales of Baronius*, with all its continuations, have not filled up the breaches which were then made in the Roman bulwarks. A superficial study of history may be favorable to the Papacy, but a thorough exploration reveals the gaps in its assumed successions, destroys the figments of its traditions, shows the arts by which it came to power, and the gradual rise of its corruptions until Christ was hidden, and Christianity externalized and materialized, and the whole ecclesiastical system wrought out under Pelagian views of human nature and carnal views of Christ's spiritual kingdom. And the modern portion of that history exhibits the judgment that has been passed upon this usurping hierarchy. Even if, on historical grounds, Rome might prove itself fit for the middle ages, on the same grounds it can be proved unfit for the modern world. What might have been Catholic in mediæval times, is sectarian in modern times. Its history since the Reformation contains an argument against it as strong as is that derived from the record of the growth of its previous corruptions. Under the ardent of the attack, it did indeed at first exhibit the revival of missionary zeal; but its Eastern missions have died away, and its churches in South America are among the most corrupt forms of Christianity. In Europe, its intolerance has provoked all the great religious wars; it has armed the Inquisition with new powers; it has published the decrees of Trent; and it has produced, denounced and welcomed back the society of the Jesuits. The decrees of Trent and the Jesuits are the great products of Rome since the Reformation; and in these decrees it has petrified itself in its doctrinal corruptions, and in the Society of Jesus we have a body, all whose spirit does violence to the sacred name it bears. In our own country we might have more hope of its reform, were it not that its leading advocates are so thoroughly hostile to our general spirit as a people, and so ultra-montane in all their tendencies.

And it is also worthy of remark, that in all the great contests of Christianity with its modern foes, Rome has kept in the back-ground. Once it led. But from the very nature of its system, it is not able to meet manfully the questions between science and revelation, between philosophy and faith, between the past and the present. The honor of these conflicts has been given to Protestantism; all the controversies between materialism and pantheism on the one side, and Christianity on the other, have been conducted under Protestant auspices.

Rome does not know how to reconcile Christianity with popular rights, nor reason with revelation. It cannot do this on the basis of its system. It has said something about these things, but it has not discussed them. It can enforce duties, but it cannot recognize rights. It does not know man as man. Nor does it know, nor is it able to satisfy the highest spiritual wants of man. It is not fitted to grapple with the great social problems of modern life. And while the whole of modern society is stirred to its depths by these great questions, which must be met and answered, this venerable hierarchy, in its great councils, is busying itself most intensely with that most important theological inquiry, upon which so much can be said and so little known — the immaculate conception of the virgin.

A review of the whole history of the Roman Catholic Church is thus one of the best means for refuting its claims, showing us that what it attempts in theory never has been realized in fact; that, if in its grandeur, it be like the venerable cathedrals in which its service is chanted, it is also like the greatest of these cathedrals in another respect, and that is, it has never been completed, — as also in another point, that however grand they are, they are not large enough to hold, nor strong enough to bind that spiritual Christianity, which rests in Christ and not in the church, in justification and not in works, and which is ever favorable to human reason and to human rights.

5. That same history of the Church, which may thus be of use in respect to present controversy, is also of value in preparing us for the future. It has a prophetic office. It bids us look forward to the progress of the church, and to the unity of the church.

"It is a maxim in the military art," once said Napoleon, "that the army which remains in its entrenchments is beaten," and eminently does this hold true of the moral conflicts of the race. And as we read the record of the past victories of the church, we realize more fully its missionary character, and acquire greater confidence in the reality of the scriptural promise that the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ.

And for the future unity of the church, as well as for its missionary expansion, the study of church history may serve to prepare us.

If any lesson is written broad and deep upon the whole course of Christ's militant church, it is this, that the unity of the church is to be the consummation of the church, and not the means of its consummation. This unity is to be attained by means of its inward life, and not by means of its outward forms. External unity is not Christian union. Nothing is more conspicuous in Christian history, than the

disdain with which external forms and successions have been treated when they cramped the spiritual power and progress of the Christian church. Nor is such unity to be found in a sacrifice of faith to feeling, though without the feeling it cannot be realized. There must indeed be more of Christian charity, and a more whole-souled faith, living in the great spiritual realities of God's kingdom in Christ. But there must also be — and here is where the study of the doctrinal history of the church has its important bearings, — a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole course of Christian theology, so that each sect and each doctrine may be judged in the light of the great central truths of the Christian system, and receive its true relative position. Put the church question, and the sacramental question, and the inquiries concerning divine sovereignty and free agency; put the doctrines of atonement, and justification, and regeneration, in their real relations to Christ the living Head; exalt his person and work, and his intimate relations to believers; make him the centre of our systems, as he is of our faith, as he is of the divine revelation, as he is of the history of the church, as he is of the whole history of our fallen race, as he is of the whole kingdom of God in time and in eternity, and we are advancing farthest and fastest towards that unity of the church which is to be its hallowed consummation. And that he is this centre, the whole history of his church, next to the Scriptures, gives the most convincing evidence.

In the spirit in which I have now attempted to set forth the nature and the worth of the science of Church History, it will be my aim to teach it, as the Lord may give me strength, in training in this school of the prophets such a ministry as our American churches now need. If ever churches needed a thoroughly trained ministry, it is our American churches in their present position and conflicts. If all the wisdom and fulness of the Christian system ever needed to be poured into the very heart of any society, ours is that society, — so united in a few great political and religious convictions, and so divided on all other points. Though the mariner has a richly-freighted bark, and all the powers of steam, and even the terrestrial magnet, he needs more than ever the stars and the sun, and the best instruments of science to tell him where he is. No theological education can be too thorough for our ministry, which does not interfere with the higher moral and spiritual qualifications for the ministerial work. And the most thorough intellectual discipline does not do this, though an inferior culture may. For the most sublime truths of the Christian sys-

tem are those which have the greatest practical efficiency ; and the most comprehensive study of these truths will enable the preacher to apply them most directly and wisely to the heart and life, and such study alone can qualify him to answer all the objections which he must encounter. Only he who knows the times in which he lives, can act upon the times ; and only he who has studied the past, can know the present, and act wisely for the future.

We need a ministry trained for conflict and discussion, and trained through investigation and discussion ; for on the field of open controversy all the great questions which come thick and fast upon us are to be adjusted. We need a ministry qualified to refute error by showing its grounds, and to advance truth by displaying its symmetry ; which can meet argument by argument, a vain philosophy by a higher wisdom, novel speculations by showing either that they are too novel or too antiquated, pretended ecclesiastical claims by pointing to the gaps in the succession, and the assumptions of an infallible church by the documents that prove its fallibility. We need a ministry which shall be conservative without bigotry, and progressive without lawlessness ; which shall neither nail the conscious needle to the north, nor strive to watch without the needle's guidance ; which shall hold the truth in its fulness, and the truth in its simplicity, and the truth in its symmetry, and the truth in its power ; which shall sympathize with all human wants and woes, and which above all temporal wants shall labor for the spiritual welfare of immortal souls ; which shall be ready to live and to die for the church as the body of Christ, and for Christ as the Head of the church, and for all men for the sake of Christ and his kingdom.

We need a ministry filled with the powers of the world to come ; living in the grand realities of God's spiritual kingdom, and really believing that it is the Lord's ; that he hath not forsaken it, that he will not forget it ; that though a woman may forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb, yet God will not forget his Zion. Behold, he says, I have graven it upon the palms of my hands, and thy walls are continually before me. Fear not, for I am with thee. I will bring thy seed from the East, and gather thee from the West ; I will say to the North give up, and to the South keep not back ; bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. SEDGWICK'S DISCOURSE.¹

IN the Numbers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1850, and Jan., 1851, we adverted to the systems of education pursued at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and to the reforms proposed, or now carrying into effect. The great question in regard to those venerable seats of learning, as well as in respect to the American colleges, founded on the English model, is, Shall they be reformed or revolutionized? Shall the discipline and course of studies be radically altered, or shall salutary, yet not fundamental, changes be effected, from time to time, as the wants of advancing civilization and knowledge shall demand? Many persons, both in England and in this country, are calling for a reorganization of the college system, so that it may conform more or less to the German university course, rather than to the English, and so that physical and mechanical science may become a prominent, if not the absorbing subject of study. We have endeavored to show (and we may do it more at length, hereafter) that no such reorganization is demanded. The study of the mathematics and classics must remain as the basis of the system. No substitute, as regards their effect in disciplining the mind, will ever be found. Besides, no wise man would sever these collegiate systems from the Past. They are rich—especially the English universities—in historic fame. Their present means of doing good, depends in no small degree, on these historical associations. Much of the best education acquired at these seats of knowledge, is the effect of silent and intangible influences, which a radical reform would sweep away.

We have also shown, that the university of Cambridge, whatever may be said of Oxford, has not been inattentive to the new claims made upon it in the progress of society. It has undergone great changes, and adopted many improvements within the last fifty years. In confirmation of previous testimonies which we have adduced, we are glad to quote some facts from Prof. Sedgwick. These are of great value, as they come from one eminent in natural science, always in favor of judicious reforms, (now acting as a member of the royal university commission,) and perfectly competent to testify, as he has been almost half a century resident in the university, as an undergraduate, or fellow, and professor.

¹ A Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge. By Adam Sedgwick, M. A., F. R. S., Woodwardian Professor of Geology, and Fellow of Trinity College. Fifth edition, with additions, and a Preliminary Dissertation. London, 1850. pp. ccccxlii, and 322. This edition may be regarded as a new work, the fourth edition containing only 169 pages. A large portion of the new edition is taken up in refuting the views advanced in the *Vestiges of Creation*. The whole volume is full of interest to the general reader.

Since the general peace of Europe, the numbers at Cambridge are more than double what they were before. Thirty years are gone since the formation of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. In the Transactions, there is hardly a subject which has engaged the attention of the great mathematicians of Europe, that is not discussed in original papers of great value. All the powers of high analysis have been brought to bear on the most severe and knotty questions of physica. The only great discoveries in physical astronomy, made by Englishmen since Newton, have been made at Cambridge, Mr. Airy's discovery of the long period of perturbation in the earth's orbit, by the planet Venus, and Mr. Adams's theoretic discovery of a planet external to Uranus, both the results of enormous labor and consummate mathematical skill. In the early part of the last century, Queen Anne dined in Trinity College, and conferred the honor of knighthood on Newton. In 1847, Queen Victoria offered the same honor to Mr. Adams. On the same occasion, Sir John Herschel presented to Prince Albert, the chancellor, the first bound copy of his *Astronomical Observations*, made at the Cape of Good Hope, and the *Completion of the Telescopic Survey of the whole Surface of the visible Heavens*, begun in 1825.

Prof. Sedgwick goes on to say that, during the last four years, in the Fellowship examinations at Trinity College, he has found that some of the younger men have shown a very exact knowledge of the Aristotelian logic and other kindred works, of the best metaphysical authors of the last century, and of the bold speculations of the modern German school. Annual courses of public lectures are now given in Chemistry, Mineralogy, Geology, Botany, Anatomy, Physiology, three courses in Divinity, also one course each in the Hebrew, Arabic, and Greek languages. Forty years ago, only one course in Divinity was given, and none in the three languages just named. Now, in these six departments, "public lectures are read to good and earnest classes of young men." The moral and metaphysical lectures of Dr. Whewell, form an entirely new part of the academic course.

During the last half century, the external aspect of the university has been greatly changed. The foundation of Downing College was laid in 1807. Large additions, at great cost, have been made to several of these colleges. St. John's, with its new quadrangle, etc., stands preëminent. A noble observatory, stocked with first-rate instruments, has been built from the corporate funds of the university, aided by private subscriptions. Fourteen quarto volumes of *reduced* observations, attest its activity. One side of a new quadrangle has been added to the public library. The upper floor will hold 100,000 volumes. The number of volumes has been trebled within the present century. Five or six thousand volumes are in constant circulation from the library, besides the thousands from the individual college libraries. A site for a new botanic garden has been purchased. An excellent anatomical museum has been collected. Two large collections in mineralogy and geology have also been added. A magnificent museum of art has also arisen from the bequest of Viscount Fitzwilliam.

The social and religious changes have not been less marked. "Intempe-

rance and convivial brawlings have ceased to disgrace the colleges." "Intemperance is now regarded as disgraceful, and ill befitting the manners of any one who wishes to pass under the name of a Christian and gentleman." "We now see more earnestness, and decency, and gravity, in the conduct of our sons, than was seen in the early years of this century." Bishop Wilson of Calcutta, in his last visit to England, spent some time at Cambridge, and expressed again and again, in very strong words, his conviction of the great social and moral benefits of the Cambridge training. La Place, a few days before his death, in conversation with Prof. Sedgwick, used these remarkable words: "When I was a young man, I had not the means of travelling; then came the terrible war of the Revolution; and now I am too old to travel, and I must die without seeing the place where Newton made his great discoveries." "I think your teaching right, and were I in your place, I should deprecate any great organic change; for I have lived long enough to know, what we did not at one time believe, that society cannot be upheld in happiness and honor, without the sentiments of religion." Prof. Sedgwick speaks in decided opposition to the Romanizing spirit of the Oxford Tracts, and asserts that they have not made a deep impression at Cambridge. In proof, he mentions the dissolution of the Camden Society, and adds, that no individual who was at all prominent at Cambridge, has apostatized to Rome.

II. WOODBURY'S GERMAN GRAMMAR.¹

Most of the dictionaries and grammars of the German language for the use of the English student have been written by Germans. They resemble many commentaries on the Bible, copious on all the points which occasion no difficulty, brief and unsatisfactory on the harder passages. In studying a foreign language, we need clear and exact information on all the *peculiar* idioms, on the points where the language deviates from our own, not difficult for a native, but perplexing for a foreigner. The technical and colloquial expressions, the proverbs, the pithy sentences, should be fully illustrated. In German dictionaries, many compound words are omitted, where it is difficult, especially for a beginner, to ascertain the shade of thought from the simple forms, or we are perplexed for want of a case in point. A single remark might have solved the difficulty. But the example or the illustration is not furnished, and the poor translator ends his wearisome search over eight or ten lexicons and grammars, no wiser than when he begun. The truth is, that these elementary books should be made by those who have experienced all the practical difficulties of learning the language, i. e. by Englishmen or Americans. We do not need any English-German part in the lexicon. In the grammar we would dispense with all remarks on the German dialects, if we could be enlightened fully on the difficult sounds and constructions,

¹ A New Method of Learning the German Language, embracing both the Analytic and Synthetic Modes of Instruction. By W. H. Woodbury. Second edition. New York: M. H. Newman & Co., 1851. pp. 504.

and idioms, on the little words, *also, so, denn, dann, auch, noch, sollen, dürfen, nämlich*, etc. which are real and great stumbling-blocks to a beginner.

The grammar before us seems to have been prepared by one who knew what was needed. He has not sought an opportunity to display his knowledge, or to construct theories on the forms and syntax, to weary his readers by superfluity in one part, and leave them thirsting for information in another. Ollendorff's plan has great excellencies, as is proved by the many copies and imitations of it. But it is liable to the exception of being too practical. It has too much of a good thing. Children may study it for a long time, and not become deeply interested in the language. They need something more difficult, some mixture of abstract rules or propositions. Mr. Woodbury's fundamental idea is to unite the practical and theoretical, to blend the principle and the application, the doctrine and the illustration. For example, in the fourth lesson, the definite article, and the present tense singular of *haben* affirmatively and interrogatively, are declined; then follows an exercise, in which these two words are clearly illustrated. Thus the author proceeds from the simpler to the more difficult, till he has laid a good basis for the acquisition of this noble language. We are particularly glad to see the care which has been bestowed on the irregular verbs. They are fully conjugated, and then follow elucidating remarks on *dürfen, können, mögen, sollen, wollen*, etc. There is an important section on the collocation of words. In another section, between two and three hundred idiomatic phrases are explained. The knotty conjunctions, also, come in for a good share of attention. The book concludes with fifty-four pages of reading lessons and a vocabulary. In conclusion, we can confidently commend this grammar as one of the best we have seen on any modern language. It bears the marks of intelligent and conscientious labor on every page. The paper, type, etc. are all which could be desired. We observe that it is highly spoken of by educated Germans among us.

III. EUROPE PAST AND PRESENT.¹

This is a convenient and valuable compilation, by an educated continental scholar, who seems to have lately taken up his abode in this country. It is introduced by some general remarks on the history and statistics, the geography and present condition of the European States. Then follow classified facts in regard to each State, in considerable detail. Most of the nations of Europe furnish copious and systematic information at shorter or longer intervals, by means of a statistical bureau or some special provision for the purpose. To this information, the author appears to have had free access. The work is quite seasonable, as the people of this country have never felt so deep an interest in the social and religious condition of Europe, as they

¹ Europe, Past and Present; a Comprehensive Manual of European Geography and History. By Francis H. Ungewitter, LL. D. New York: George P. Putnam, 1850. pp. 671.

have since 1848. Accurate and reliable information even in regard to such small districts as Holstein and Hesse Cassel, is eagerly sought. The present volume will do much to satisfy this want. Still, it is susceptible of many improvements. It should have been revised by one familiar with the English idioms. The author has not quite mastered the peculiarities of our intractable language. Some things might be omitted without any loss, e. g. the details in regard to the orders of knighthood, which even Germans begin to look upon as baubles. We would also suggest whether a large amount of the minute statistics in regard to hundreds of unimportant towns might not be left out, or compressed into a tabular form. This would allow space for a more satisfying description of the prominent objects. Instead of being told that such and such towns are noted for possessing remarkable cathedrals, or monuments, or picture-galleries, we wish to know in what respects they are remarkable, or are distinguished from similar objects elsewhere. An indefinite statement, or a mere generalization, is tantalizing. We might well dispense with many details, if we could be favored with expanded and discriminating views in regard to the actual resources and prospects of the old world. The author is obviously a staunch friend of the old régime; the rulers are in the right; the poor republicans are in the wrong; the former have abundant sympathy at his hand; the latter none. He speaks of the *benevolent* designs of Austria towards Hungary. The infamous partition of Poland has not a word of condemnation. On p. 291, he takes occasion to indicate the total lack of practical capacity on the part of many German scholars. But, what is the cause of this helplessness, but the endless and vexatious interference of the governments with the liberties of the subjects? The principal cause of the distress of the Germans, according to our author, p. 306, is over population, and the consequent want of subsistence; there being, for example, in the grand duchy of Baden, 233 inhabitants to a square mile. Yet Belgium, which has one of the most liberal governments in Europe, has 381 inhabitants to a square mile. The crowded population in Belgium are not compelled to emigrate for want of employment or subsistence. "In the means of education," says the author, p. 505, "Austria rivals any other European country, and it is distinguished both for eminence in literature and science, and for the general diffusion of knowledge, with the single exception of Hungary!" "In the higher branches of knowledge, Russia rivals the rest of Europe!" p. 586. Such statements are incorrect, and conflict with what the author mentions elsewhere. Austria surely cannot rival Prussia or Saxony either in the possession or diffusion of knowledge. In what branch of knowledge does Russia rival the rest of Europe? For trustworthy political knowledge, or for impartial views of the different States of Christendom, we should be slow to trust either an absolutist or a radical.

IV. SMITH'S NEW CLASSICAL DICTIONARY.¹

We may name the following as the principal merits of this Dictionary:

1. The form, small octavo, is convenient and portable. It is printed in double columns, on good paper, and with clear type. The titles of the articles are in small capitals, and are sufficiently distinct to catch the eye. The proof-reading, which in such a volume, is a most anxious and laborious affair, has been well attended to, so far as we can judge from reading some of the longer articles.
2. The amount of matter under the different titles, seems to be well proportioned to the importance of the topics.
3. The information communicated comprises the substance of what is known, according to the latest and most exact inquiries. The extensive and profound studies of a multitude of German scholars have illuminated almost every corner of this vast field. Judicious and abundant use has been made of these ample stores. Special acknowledgments seem to be due to Pauly's admirable *Encyclopædia of Classical Antiquity*, now carried on by Waltz and Teuffel. The influence of the great work of Niebuhr is seen, directly or indirectly, on almost every page.
4. The truth is well sifted from the mass of matters often conflicting, and is stated with precision. In a volume, designed for laids in part, exactness of phraseology and directness of statement, are indispensable. In this respect the dictionary has great merits.
5. The moral tone of the work is unobjectionable. The wretched stories, and the unguarded statements, which disfigure or injure some of the old lexicons, find no place in this. The volume may be safely put into the hands of the young.
6. The appendices, filling eighty pages of small print, are of special utility. They include chronological tables of Greek history, parallel years of the Christian, Roman and Greek eras, a list of the Athenian Archons, list of kings of various countries, and sixteen tables of measures, weights and money.
7. Dr. Anthon's additions, corrections, etc. impart much value to the dictionary. His additions are enclosed in brackets, and amount to 1400 independent articles, besides adding to or correcting articles already in the work. In the department of bibliography, many improvements have been made. Special pains have also been taken by the American editor, to accentuate the Greek words and to secure a correct typography.

We have one or two suggestions for future editions. In some cases the statements might have been more exact and discriminating. Thus, in the article on Saint Jerome, that father is stated to "have had a profound knowledge of the Latin, Greek and Hebrew languages." This remark would need qualification, were he compared with modern philologists. And we should hardly apply the word "profound" at all, to his knowledge. Again,

¹ A New Classical Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, Mythology, and Geography, partly founded upon the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology; by William Smith, LL. D. Revised with numerous Corrections and Additions, by Charles Anthon, LL. D. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1851. pp. 1089. 8vo.

a fuller list of the best editions of works of different authors, and of works illustrating the life of individuals and the topography of places, would be highly serviceable. Indeed there are few objects in a classical dictionary more important. The inquisitive scholar, though young, wishes to be directed to larger sources of information. Thus under "Cicero," we observe no reference to the excellent edition of the Orations by Klotz; under Chrysostom, no allusion to Neander's volume, or the able work of Paniel on Christian Eloquence; under Plato, no reference to the excellent editions of some of his works by our American scholars; under Melite, no use made of Mr. Smith's admirable volume. Our last remark we will introduce with an extract. "As a statesman and citizen, Cicero cannot command our respect. He did good service to his country by the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy; but this was almost the only occasion on which he showed vigor and decision of character. His own letters condemn him. In them his inordinate vanity, pusillanimity, and political tergiversation appear in the clearest colors." Now this condemnation is much too sweeping. It should have been added, that persons well qualified to judge, have formed a far more favorable opinion of the great orator. "He was not a man of weak character," says Niebuhr; "Whenever there was need of it, he showed the greatest firmness and resolution. What makes him appear weak is his sensitive nature; a thing which he thought an indignity (*indignum*) completely annihilated him." "His pure mind was above all baseness, and it was only the consequence of his noble ambition that he wished to show himself in the most brilliant light."¹

V. VIEWS OF A PAINTER IN PALESTINE.²

Sir David Wilkie was one of the best painters of the modern English School. He was the son of a Presbyterian minister at Culter, Fifeshire, Scotland, — was born Nov. 18, 1785, and died near Gibraltar, on his return from a visit to the East, June 1, 1841. In search of health and for the purposes of his profession, he travelled extensively, and resided several years abroad. We have been quite interested with the journal of his tour in Syria and Egypt. We have here condensed a few of his observations on some of the objects and scenery in the Holy Land. They have value, coming from an acute observer, and an accomplished artist. "Great as the assistance," remarks Sir David, "I might say the inspiration, which the art of painting has derived from the illustration of Christianity, and great as the talent and genius have been, which this high walk of art has called into being, yet it is remarkable that none of the great painters to whom the world has hitherto looked for the visible appearance of Scripture scenes and feelings, have ever visited the Holy Land. Though Paul Veronese, Titian, Giorgione and Sebastian del Piombo, all Venetians, have by commerce and

¹ Niebuhr's Lectures on Roman History, Lond. 1849, Vol. III. pp. 19, 27.

² The Life of Sir David Wilkie, with a Selection from his Correspondence By Allan Cunningham, in three vols. London, 1843.

immediate intercourse with the Levant, succeeded in giving their works a nearer verisimilitude to an eastern people, yet who is there that cannot imagine that such minds as Raphael and Da Vinci, great as they are, might have not derived a help had they dwelt and studied in the same land which Moses and the Prophets, the evangelists and apostles have so powerfully and graphically described?"

"The walls which encompass Jerusalem on every side, are higher and more superb than any city walls I have ever seen. The square towers of her gates recall those of Windsor castle; while their lengthened elevation, with the spires and cupolas they enclose, would have arrested the Poussins and Claudes in preference to all other cities. Her streets are stone-built, massive, surmounted by arches, through which the solemn vista claims the painter's art, though by that art still unknown and unrepresented; and the people, the Jew and Arab, and the more humble and destitute, who never change, recall, by their appearance, a period of antiquity in everything removed from the present time."

"The impression produced by first arriving in Jerusalem, by first walking her streets and viewing her massive buildings, the enduring rocks on which she is placed, the deep ravines, valleys and hills, by which she is surrounded, is beyond what can be again felt in any other place in the world. It is not merely in what they might have supplied to art, if they had been known to the artist, or in what they might furnish, if seen by the student, or commentator of Scripture, but as the *originals* in conjunction with the great events that have there occurred, from which the sacred writers have drawn their narratives. I understand that a leading foreign painter was here, and regretted that Raphael and Domenichino had not in their day seen the place and people, which, with all their power, they had but vainly tried to imagine." "Here the people, as well as their situation, lead one to ages long passed away. The Jewish synagogue is in their miserable quarter of the city, but it is on *Mount Zion*, where it can be seen now only with the most touching interest; and excluded from the rock and stone walls of their own temple, they still believe that the tables of the law and the tabernacle, supposed to be buried in its ruins, will yet one day be found, and restored to them. The Arabs, who form the mass of the poor people, looked as if they had never changed since the time of Abraham."

"Roberts has done much; but I almost wish he had done more, and had been here longer. For a landscape painter, the road from Jericho, as you come nigh to Jerusalem, and as you pass 'the valley' right over against you, and begin to descend by the Mount of Olives, combines a scene which Claude Lorraine and the Poussins would have indeed delighted in." "Whoever has been accustomed to walk through the streets, lanes, walls, rocks, hills, valleys, brooks and fountains of Jerusalem, where the scripture events have taken place, will be convinced that he sees before him a part of the original material whence the inspired writers drew their narratives; at once satisfying him of the accuracy, while it gives a perfect idea of the situation, of the details. The art of painting in Italy has arisen and triumphed in her devotion

to such scenes, with scarcely a reference or resemblance to these obvious localities."

VI. A DEVOTIONAL EXPOSITION OF THE PSALMS.¹

This work is strictly what it purports to be, a *devotional exposition* of the Book of Psalms. It is conducted on a plan somewhat novel, and highly advantageous, we think, to the simple object of the work. The usual plan of *notes* at the bottom of the page, which all who read for devotional purposes find not a little inconvenient and often cumbersome, is discarded. The *results* of learned inquiry and investigation in the various matters bearing on criticism, and on the development and illustration of the true meaning of the text, are embodied in a Paraphrase. On the right side of the page is a column containing Suggestive Remarks, and on the left, one for Scripture Testimony, in which striking parallel scriptures are cited at length. The titles of the Psalms are partially expanded and explained, and placed before the Argument; but the type of each department is of such a character that the eye detects at a glance the intention of the arrangement. The text adopted is that of the common English version. It is printed in *italics*, while the paraphrastic part is in Roman letters, so that (the type being bold and clear) the text can be read by itself with facility, or in connection with all the necessary light of criticism and exposition, without the slightest interruption or inconvenience.

In our judgment, the work is admirably executed. It cannot fail to be useful. We hope to see the work introduced into this country. The mechanical execution of this edition is in the very best style of the London books.

J. M. S.

VII. THE CHRONOLOGICAL TESTAMENT.²

Whatever labors increase the facilities for studying the Word of God—for comparing scripture with scripture to ascertain what is the mind of the Spirit—lay the Christian community under obligation. The work before us is of this character. The plan is, in many of its features, new and admirable, and so far as we have been able to examine it critically, is wisely and ably executed. The editor has evidently spent much time and careful and patient labor upon the work. It is confined to the New Testament, which it gives in the authorized version, without "note or comment." The plan embraces the following features: The text is divided into Paragraphs

¹ A Devotional Exposition of the Psalms, containing an Argument to each Psalm, a Paraphrase, Suggestive Remarks, and Parallel Scriptures at length. By Rev. J. Edwards, King's College, London. 8vo. London: James Darling, 1850.

² The Chronological Testament, according to the Authorized Version, newly divided into Paragraphs and Sections, with the dates and places of transactions marked, and many illustrative Parallel Passages printed at length. London: Robert B. Blackader, 1851.

and Sections, rather than Chapters, with the dates and places of transaction marked, and each is headed with its subject matter, and bears a figure which indicates its place in the order of time. The marginal readings are given, and parallel passages are printed in full, in separate columns; and letters are added to aid the reader in the work of self-examination. These are only a part of the novel features of this arrangement. On the whole, we are greatly pleased with it, especially for devotional reading. It simplifies the search of the Scriptures. It is a harmony and a concordance woven into the text, so that the mind takes in at a glance, the date, the occasion, the place, and all the parallel passages, without labor or inconvenience. It is printed, too, in large, clear type, so that aged persons can read it without difficulty.

J. M. S.

VIII. DR. BELLAMY'S WORKS.¹

The writings of Dr. Bellamy are well known to our readers on both sides of the Atlantic. To commend them were an act of supererogation. We prefer to congratulate the theological public, that the American Doctrinal Tract and Book Society have commenced the republication of such standard works. Our national honor demands this enterprise. We have no right, as good patriots, to allow the productions of our old divines to lie, some of them unpublished, some of them forgotten. They are valuable in their intrinsic character. They are useful as developing the history of theological opinion. They will instruct and gratify many private Christians, while they task the energies of clergymen and scholars. Where are the sermons and treatises of Dr. Samuel Spring of Newburyport, and Dr. Samuel Austin of Burlington College?

IX. NEW VOLUME OF DR. EMMONS'S WORKS.²

In his Autobiography Dr. Emmons remarks: "I read deep, well written tragedies, for the sake of real improvement in the art of preaching. They appeared to me the very best works to teach true eloquence. They are designed to make the deepest impression on the human mind, and many of them are excellently calculated to produce this effect. A preacher can scarcely find a better model for constructing a popular, practical, pathetic discourse than a good tragedy; which all along prepares the mind for the grand catastrophe, without discovering it, till the whole soul is wrought into a proper frame to feel the final impression." No attentive reader of this new volume of Dr. Emmons's discourses can fail to perceive the influence of the author's style of reading. He constructs his sermons on such a plan as to

¹ The Works of Joseph Bellamy, D. D., First Pastor of the Church in Bethlem, Conn. With a Memoir of his Life and Character. In two volumes. Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, 1850.

² The Works of Nathaniel Emmons, D. D., late Pastor of the Church in Franklin, Mass. With a Memoir of his Life. Edited by Jacob Ide, D. D. Vol. VII.

surprise his readers with some sudden inference or practical remark. For one instance; the eighth sermon in this volume is on the text, "O taste and see that the Lord is good." The first division defines the goodness of God; the second explains the act of tasting the goodness of God. Christians exercise true benevolence; this benevolence has the same nature with God's benevolence; they know their own benevolence, and therein know the nature of God's benevolence, and thus *taste* it. In their holy love they are partakers of the divine goodness, and as they taste their own love they taste the divine goodness of which they partake. The third division enumerates the effects produced by this taste, and the first head of the "Improvement" explains "what is properly to be understood by a *moral taste*, principle or disposition." It is not a "dead, dormant, inactive, natural principle, but an active, voluntary, moral exercise," and thus we are surprised into a discussion of the notorious "taste scheme."

Another well known peculiarity of Dr. Emmons's discourses is, a strict adherence to his definitions. Not one of the Reviewers who have opposed him, has, so far as we are informed, understood him; and the reason seems to be, that his antagonists have not attended to his definitions. He has a sermon in the present volume on "sins without law," and he shows, first, that the heathen are without law; secondly, that they sin without law; and thirdly, that they must perish without law. Hence he remarks in his "Improvement:" "It is easy to see how all the posterity of Adam became sinners without law." A superficial reader might thus infer, that Dr. Emmons, in contradiction to the entire spirit of his theology, believed in the existence of sin where there is no knowledge of a rule of conduct. But at the commencement of his discussion he defines law to be not a mere rule of conduct, but "a rule of conduct given by proper authority, and sanctioned by precept and penalty." He thus defines law to be something more than a mere standard of moral obligation, something communicated by other means than the human conscience. He is discoursing on the written law, as distinct from the known rule of duty. His remarks seem thus to be perfectly just, rigidly consistent with his definition, and startling by their exact conformity with a definition somewhat peculiar. It is to this feature of Dr. Emmons's discourses that we must ascribe their power to arrest attention, and also their tendency to be misunderstood by inaccurate readers. The 24th sermon in this volume is one of great interest, derived in no small degree from the apparent contradiction between it and the well known views of its author. The appearance of contradiction vanishes, when we detect the precise meaning which he attaches to the more important terms used in the discourse. He demands close attention, or he will not be appreciated. Hence the mental discipline derived from perusing his sermons.

He preached to a congregation of farmers; he very rarely wrote a sermon for the press; and yet in one of these discourses, we find him discussing the principles of Mr. Locke with regard to the distinction between rational and irrational animals; in another, examining the old scholastic distinction between the merit of *condignity* and the merit of *congruity*, etc. Yet he was

well understood by his auditors. He made them intelligent. To him was this power given. He was a remarkable man, and a benefactor to his race. May the excellent editor of these volumes be enabled to add still other discourses to the rich collection which he has already given us. The next age cannot afford to lose the sermons of so original and profound a thinker as Dr. Emmons.

X. M'COSH ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.¹

This volume has been received in Scotland with much enthusiasm. The *Banner of Ulster* regards it as "fixing a marked era in the history of philosophical and ethical inquiry in Great Britain." Its author was a pupil of Dr. Chalmers, and his present effort seems to be his introduction into the philosophical world; for the *North British Review* characterizes him as one who "has thus by a single stride secured for himself a position in literature such as few ever reached by a first publication."

In many respects, the metaphysical style of the Scottish writers seems inferior to that of their predecessors in the last century. The luminous page of Adam Smith has certainly not been outshone by any that have succeeded it. Reid, Hume, Beattie, and Campbell were precise and definite in their phraseology. Adam Ferguson sometimes wearies us by his uniformity of regular yet transparent periods. Dugald Stewart brought into the present century the neat and accurate diction which had distinguished Robertson, Blair and Walker, in the Scottish pulpit. At the present day, however, we miss the nice adjustment and the punctilious correctness of phrases for which the older philosophical treatises of Scotland are so widely celebrated, and which are so important for a distinctively metaphysical style. In compensation for this loss, the recent Scottish metaphysicians give us more vigor and energy of diction, a more animated and glowing imagery. The style of Mr. M'Cosh is bold and nervous. It abounds with fresh illustrations, and indicates an extensive acquaintance with the popular literature, as well as the physical and mental science of the day. He is by no means a narrow minded theologian, but has ranged over the wide fields of philosophy, and has collected thence rich arguments for the truth of the evangelical system. We are often surprised at his carelessness in the structure of sentences, but we presume that many of his ungrammatical phrases are the errors of the typographer, rather than of the author.

The work is divided into five Books. The first contains a "General View of the Divine Government, as fitted to throw light on the character of God." The second contains a "Particular Inquiry into the Method of the Divine Government in the Physical World." The third contains a "Particular Inquiry into the Principles of the Human Mind, through which God governs mankind." Here the author gives his view of the will as a "self-acting" power, and of holiness as the act of the will, or as the man willing. He

¹ The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral. By Rev. James M'Cosh. American edition. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 285 Broadway, 1851. pp. 515 8vo.

says, "Mind is a self-acting substance, and hence its activity and independence." "Now, we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact, and one of great importance, that the true determining cause of any given volition is not any mere anterior incitement, but the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will." "A mere incitement can become a motive, only so far as sanctioned by the will; so that it is not so much the motive that determines the will, as the will that gives strength to the motive." He says that *Pseudo necessarians*, perverting the proper doctrine of philosophical necessity, have represented man as having all his thoughts and feelings determined by an external cause, and thus as the mere creatures of circumstances." He advises the true necessarians to drop "the word necessity as ambiguous, (to say the least of it,) and as unhappily associated," etc. He admits, however, that the law of cause and effect extends to the will, and "reigns over it," and he is a stout advocate for the certainty of sinful volitions in the unregenerate. If we might be allowed to indulge in our national vanity, we would suggest that our author's phraseology might be much improved by the perusal of our American treatises on this subject.

Mr. M'Cosh supposes that conscience judges "of acts of the will, and acts of the will exclusively;" that all moral character belongs to the will as distinguished from the sensibilities; that our natural emotions and natural affections are neither virtuous nor vicious in themselves, etc. He thus distinguishes between the doctrine of total depravity, as presented in the Scriptures, and the doctrine of total depravity, as exhibited by Helvetius and Rochefoucauld. Holiness he defines as "something more than the mere love of promoting happiness. It is not so much the love of promoting happiness as the love of that pure love which seeks the promotion of happiness." Notwithstanding his verbal difference from Pres. Edwards, on the nature of true virtue, it is easy to see that the difference is merely verbal, and that in fact he coincides on this theme with our countryman, whom he denominates "a philosophic divine, whose intellectual and spiritual clearness of perception in theological subjects appears to approach nearer the angelic, than has been the attainment of any other in these latter days."

In the Fourth Book, the author sums up the results of the preceding, and considers the "Reconciliation of God and Man." Notwithstanding a few errors, this, and the foregoing Books, are in harmony with the general spirit of the evangelical scheme, and evince a love of manly discussion, and no small degree of philosophical acumen.

XI. RELIGIOUS REVIVAL AMONG THE ARMENIANS.¹

Asia Minor, next to Palestine and Greece, is perhaps the most interesting country in the world. But, besides all its natural advantages, and its historical associations, it is now specially interesting to the people of this country,

¹ Christianity revived in the East; or, a Narrative of the Work of God among the Armenians of Turkey. By H. G. O. Dwight, Missionary at Constantinople. New York: Baker & Scribner, 1850. pp. 390

from the fact that it is the seat of a flourishing Christian mission, or rather missions. The light of the Gospel is reilluminating its old seats. A cordon of missionary posts is establishing around the whole of this vast region, from Constantinople to Tocat, Trebizond, Erzurum, Oroomiah, the mountains of Kûrdistan, the ancient Nineveh, Tarsus, Aleppo, Antioch, and Smyrna, in addition to innumerable lesser lights that native hands are kindling in the interior. If we are not mistaken in providential signs, the garden of the Lord, in a physical sense, is soon to become a paradise in spiritual beauty. Everything betokens a brighter day. The most active parts of the native population, those which have the most physical and intellectual stamina, are fast becoming acquainted with Christian truth, and throwing off the superstitions of ages. Armenians and Nestorians, if not Jews and Greeks, seem to be destined to become the illuminators of the regions in which they live and traffic. Mr. Dwight's volume gives a faithful and trustworthy account of the origin and progress of these wondrous changes among the Armenian communities. Its simple details are fraught with interest, not only to the Christian, but to the scholar and the philanthropist, who rejoice in the spread of civilization and knowledge. To the student of church history, too, the book will be specially attractive. Mr. Dwight is a veteran in the service, having accompanied Rev. Eli Smith in a tour of observation in Armenia and Persia, in 1830. He has also been an eye-witness of much which he records.

XII. LYELL'S GEOLOGY.¹

We refer to Sir Charles Lyell's works, from the interest taken in geology by many biblical students. The *Manual* and the *Principles of Geology*, (8th edition, thoroughly revised, 1850,) are the standard treatises on the science. The author has visited larger portions of the earth's surface, than perhaps any other geologist, except it may be the venerable Humboldt. American readers will take a deeper interest in his treatises than in those of most others, from the fact of personal acquaintance, or from his numerous illustrations drawn from our continent. His style is easy and unencumbered, while it does not lack the precision of science. The common reader who does not desire to plunge into the technicalities of geology, will find many pages of pleasant reading. The traveller among the Alleghanies, or the White Hills, who wishes to make the most of his time, would do well to have in his memory some of the main facts and features of this science. The author writes in a strictly scientific spirit, but it were to be wished that he would occasionally refer to those "final causes," which characterize Hugh Miller's treatises, showing that He who weighed the mountains and holds the sea in his hand, is not forgotten by the student of his works. The two vol-

¹ *A Manual of Elementary Geology; or, the Ancient Changes of the Earth and its Inhabitants, as illustrated by geological monuments.* By Sir Charles Lyell, M. A., F. R. S. Third and entirely revised edition. London: John Murray. 1851. pp. 512, 8vo.

umes of Lyell appear in beautiful form, and with apposite and abundant illustrations. The catalogue price of the *Manual* is 12 shillings, that of the *Principles*, 18 shillings.

ARTICLE X.

SELECT BIBLICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

UNITED STATES.

THE biblical and theological works lately published, or in press, so far as we know, are not numerous. A great proportion of the educated talent of the country is employed, as would be expected, on books for day schools and Sabbath schools, on works of a practically religious character, on occasional addresses, sermons, lectures, etc., and on newspapers and periodical publications. The number of works of an elaborate character, and of permanent value, is consequently small.

Professor Stuart's *Commentary on Ecclesiastes*, in a duodecimo volume of 350 or 400 pages, will soon be published by Mr. Putnam of New York. The Introduction fills 103 pages, and discusses the general nature of the book, its special design and method, diction, author, credit and general history, ancient and modern versions and commentaries. The book of *Ecclesiastes* is of a practical, moral and religious character, from the position of an Israelite, not of a Greek or of an Egyptian. Its great theme is the vanity and nothingness of all earthly efforts, pursuits and objects. The writer gives a picture of the conflicts and struggles which he passed through in his inquiries. The final conclusions to which he comes, (not the objections which he considers,) are to be taken as the index of his ultimate and established opinions. It is not the treatise of a sceptic, or of an Epicurean, but of a practical, religious, Jewish philosopher. There can be no doubt but that the whole proceeds from one writer. It has every mark of unity. The diction is that of the later Hebrew, with some mixture of Chaldaisms. Solomon does not appear to have been the author of the book, as he is introduced as only occasionally, not constantly, speaking; the general condition of things indicates a period very unlike that of Solomon; the style and diction are quite different from those of the *Proverbs* written by Solomon. Who the author was, we have no means of knowing. The time in which the book was written was perhaps between 585 and 455 B. C. Among the mass of commentators, Knobel, 1836, and Hitzig, 1847, are decidedly the best, and "in a critical respect are worth all the rest." The commentary is strictly and minutely exegetical.

Prof. Hackett's Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles will be published in a few weeks by John P. Jewett & Co. of Boston, in an octavo of 400 or 450 pages.

It is stated, that Dr. J. A. Alexander of Princeton is about to publish a new edition of his Commentary on Isaiah in a condensed form.

Pres. Hitchcock of Amherst College has in press a work entitled "The Religion of Geology and its Collateral Sciences."

An edition of the Philippic Orations of Demosthenes is in the press at Cambridge, under the editorial care of Prof. M. J. Smead of William and Mary College, Va.

The edition of Horace by Prof. Lincoln of Brown University, with various readings, notes, etc. will soon be published. The text is printed with great beauty and correctness.

Dr. E. A. Andrews's Latin Lexicon, on the basis of Freund's great work, and on which he and his assistants, Prof. Robbins of Middlebury College and Prof. Turner of Union Theol. Seminary, have been employed several years, is published. We shall endeavor to furnish a brief review of it in our next Number.

A Selection of Reading Lessons in Greek, with explanatory Notes, is preparing by Prof. Felton of Cambridge. The selection will be entirely new, and will introduce the student to a wider acquaintance with Greek literature than has been common in works of this character.

Prof. Owen of New York has in preparation a new edition of the Iliad.

A new edition of Kühner's Latin Grammar, with Exercises, a Latin Reader and Vocabularies, translated by Prof. Champlin, has been published. The same author's Preparatory Latin Exercise Book, being an Introduction to the Latin Grammar, translated by Prof. Champlin, is in press.

Schmitz and Zumpt's classical series of books, reprinted by Lea and Blanchard of Philadelphia, consists of Livy, I., II., XXI. and XXII. books, Caesar's Commentaries, Virgil, Sallust, Curtius de Alexandri Gestis, a Latin Grammar, and Kaltschmidt's Latin Lexicon. It is furnished at a very cheap rate.

A new edition of the Index to Periodical Literature, published about two years ago, under the auspices of a literary society in Yale College, is prepared and will soon appear. The author, Mr. F. Poole of Danvers, Ms., has enlarged the plan, so as to cover the whole ground of the leading periodicals, without regard to the General Indexes published by the proprietors of some of them. It will make an 8vo. volume of 600 or 700 pages, and will doubtless be welcomed by all libraries, and by many individuals.

Libraries. The number of books added to Harvard College Library, during the year ending July, 1850, was 1751, besides 2219 pamphlets. To the Massachusetts State Library in 1850, 365 volumes and 46 pamphlets and plans were added. The Astor Library, New York, now has 28,369 volumes; the State Library at Albany, more than 20,000 volumes, valued at \$100,000; about half are law books. During the last year 1600 volumes were added to the library of the Philotechnian Society in Williams College, see Bib. Sac.

1850, p. 404. An effort is now making with encouraging success, to procure a library for Amherst College.

The prosperity of oriental and biblical studies in this country is essentially depending on the prosperity of the Theological Schools. The elementary study of Hebrew is as yet mostly confined within their walls. Accordingly, their condition is a good index of the interest which is felt in the study of the original languages of the Bible, as well as of systematic theology. We here put on record a statement of the numbers at the principal theological schools in the United States at the beginning of the half century.

| | | <i>Jun.</i> | <i>Mid.</i> | <i>Sen.</i> | <i>Total.</i> |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| Bangor, Me. | Congregational. | 8 | 16 | 8 | 32. |
| Andover, Ms. | " | 27 | 28 | 29 | 84. |
| Cambridge, Ms. | Unitarian Cong'l. | 5 | 11 | 7 | 23. |
| Newton, Ms. | Baptist. | 9 | 10 | 17 | 36. |
| New Haven, Ct. | Congregational. | 8 | 12 | 11 | 31. |
| East Windsor, Ct. | " (1850) | 5 | 8 | 9 | 22. |
| Union Seminary, N. Y. | Presbyterian. | 20 | 28 | 25 | 73. |
| General Theol. Sem., N. Y. | Prot. Episcopal. | 13 | 15 | 15 | 43. |
| Princeton Theol. Sem. | Presbyterian. | 34 | 53 | 53 | 140. |
| Auburn, N. Y. | " | 20 | 23 | 10 | 53. |
| Oxford, Ohio. | Ass. Ref. Pres. | | | | 17. |
| Alleghany City, Pa. | Presbyterian. | | | | 35. |
| Sem'ry near Alexandria, Va. | Prot. Episcopal. | 5 | 15 | 13 | 33. |
| Lane, Cincinnati, Ohio. | Presbyterian. | 4 | 4 | 6 | 14. |
| Western Res. Theol. Dep. | Pres. and Cong. | | | | 14. |

Total, 650.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The entire reading public have been absorbed for several months with the papal question. In one month, 180 books and pamphlets appeared, besides newspaper articles without number. To us, who live three or four thousand miles from the strife, there is something not a little amusing in this new-born and overpowering zeal, especially considering the apathy with which the strong papal tendencies in the church of England have been regarded for many years. We apprehend now that the subject will not be probed to the bottom. The papal question needs to be considered as an European question; the elements of the strength and weakness of the Catholic church should be viewed apart from all local controversies; the bearings of the union of the church and State in England on the growth of Catholicism, the elements in the English church favorable to that growth, the position of Ireland as affecting the general question, etc., should be carefully investigated.

Dr. S. T. Bloomfield has published a supplementary volume to his *Critical, Philological and Explanatory Annotations on the New Testament*. He speaks of having collated a large number of MSS., either before wholly unknown, or but little known, and only partially examined. He has revised the whole text. He differs "almost in toto" from Lachmann, and in a great

measure from Tischendorf. He has paid great attention to the Gospel of John, to the Acts, and to the text of the Apocalypse.

A Greek Testament on a similar plan to that of Dr. Bloomfield has been commenced by Rev. Henry Alford. It contains a critically revised text, a digest of various readings, marginal references to verbal and idiomatic usage, and a copious critical and exegetical commentary. Vol. I. only is published, at the high price of 24 shillings.

Dr. Kitto's *Journal of Sacred Literature* for Jan. 1851, contains, among other articles, Nineveh, Remains of Jansenism in Holland, Human Progression, Letter and Spirit of the Old Testament, Calvin, and an Exposition of 1 Cor. 7: 35—40.

Olshausen on Acts has been translated by Rev. W. Lindsay, D. D., with additional notes by the translator.

On p. 600 of the last volume of the *Bib. Sac.* we mentioned that a royal commission was about to be appointed to inquire into the state of the English universities. The commission, since appointed, consists of the following members, viz: for Oxford, Dr. Hinds, bishop of Norwich, Dr. Tait, dean of Carlisle, and late master of Rugby school, Dr. Jeune, master of Pembroke College, Oxford, H. G. Liddell, one of the authors of the *Greek Lexicon*, and master of Westminster school, Rev. Baden Powell, professor of geometry in Oxford, Rev. H. S. Johnson, of Queen's College, Oxford, and J. L. Dampier, Esq.; for Cambridge, the bishop of Chester, Dr. Peacock, dean of Ely, Sir John F. W. Herschel, Sir John Romilly, attorney general, and Rev. Adam Sedgwick, professor of geology, Cambridge. The Oxford commission sent a Circular to the authorities of the university, requesting information on the following, among other points: The possibility of diminishing the ordinary expenses of the university; The sufficiency of the power of the university to enforce discipline; The power of the university to make, repeal, or alter statutes; the mode of appointing the vice-chancellor and proctors; The government of the university, and its relation to the colleges as finally settled by Laud's statutes; the means of extending to a larger number of students the privileges of the university, by erecting new colleges and halls, by permitting undergraduates to lodge in private houses more than at present, by allowing students to be educated at Oxford without the expense of becoming members of a particular college, and by permitting persons to attend the professors' lectures, without any other connection with the university; The expediency of requiring an examination previous to matriculation, of diminishing the time required for the first degree, and of rendering the higher degrees real tests of merit; The expediency of combining the professorial with the tutorial system, of rendering the present professorships more available, of increasing their number, and of providing pensions for retired professors; The most eligible mode of appointing professors; The existing limitations in the election to fellowships; The expediency of abolishing the distinction between noblemen, gentlemen commoners, and other students; To provide means for more fully qualifying students for holy orders, without the necessity of establishing other schools; The system

of private tuition; How the Bodleian library may be made more efficient; and, The expediency of laying periodical statements of the condition of the university before the convocation. Other questions were also addressed to the professors, and a series was sent to other persons who were able and disposed to reply. It is understood that both commissions will soon be prepared to report.

The works which are now publishing in England, on the history and literature of ancient Greece, are a striking proof of the utility of combining the extensive and profound investigations of German scholars, with the taste, the good sense, the clear and vigorous style and the political wisdom which characterize English writers. Grote, Thirlwall, and Mure show on almost every page how much they owe to the varied researches of their German cousins. Equally prominent in these works are the good sense, the spirit of independent investigation, uninfluenced by theory, and the large and practical views of social and political life, which have been sadly wanting in the speculations of many German scholars. The *Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece*, by Col. William Mure, of Caldwell, M. P. for Renfrewshire, Scotland, extends to three volumes. These comprise the first two of the six periods (the Mythical and Poetical) into which the author divides the literary history of Greece. The subject is brought to the age of Solon. His analysis of Homer's Poems is said by the *Quarterly Review* to be more keen and searching, as well as genial and liberal than they, or perhaps any uninspired writings of antiquity, ever underwent before.

The 6th volume of the new edition of Thirlwall's *History of Greece* is in press. An abridgment of the whole work, for schools, in one volume, has been made by Dr. Schmitz of Edinburgh. The 8th volume of Grote's *History of Greece*, the last published, closes with the death of Socrates. Several additional volumes are in preparation. A new edition of the first volumes is passing through the press. This, we are happy to say, is reprinting, in a cheap and handsome form, volume for volume, by J. D. Flagg of Andover. Published by J. P. Jewett & Co. of Boston.

The third volume of Dr. Chalmers's *Life* is in preparation. The author's works, as edited by himself, amount to 25 volumes. The posthumous works, 9 volumes, and 4 volumes of the memoir, will make in all 38 volumes. The first part of the 2d volume of Traill's *Josephus*, interrupted by the lamented death of the translator, is published, under the editorial charge of Isaac Taylor. It is illustrated with nine plates. We also observe a notice of the third edition of Dr. R. G. Latham on the *English Language*, "the result of much solid learning and acute criticism;" also, *Addresses and Charges of the late Dr. Stanley, Bishop of Norwich*, with a *Memoir* by his son, Rev. A. P. Stanley; and the *Architecture of Ancient Egypt* illustrated and described, by Sir Gardner Wilkinson, eighteen plates, with descriptive text.

In the use which English classical scholars have made of German resources, two stages are to be noticed. In the first place, we have direct, unaltered translations, e. g. the Greek grammars of Matthiae, Rost, Thiersch, the Ro-

man History of Niebuhr, Böckh's Economy of Athens, Müller on the Dorians, Ritter's History of Philosophy, etc., and secondly, where the knowledge drawn from German sources is worked over and incorporated, so as to result in the production of works more or less independent. In some cases, the multifarious materials have not only been wisely selected, but incorporated with English modes of thought and expression, so as to lose their foreign air. Independent scholarship and sound judgment have shaped and transformed the entire mass. A conspicuous instance of this is the Greek Lexicon of Liddell and Scott. We may name as another instance the Classical Dictionaries of Dr. William Smith. They are constructed with so much judgment and learning, and come out in a form so attractive, that they will probably soon displace all other works of the kind in the language. Dr. Smith studied some time in Germany; subsequently he has had several years' experience as a writer, and a teacher of the classics. He is now the classical professor in the new Dissenting College in St. John's Wood in London.

The first work in the series is a Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities in one volume, 8vo., with 500 wood-cuts. The second edition contains large additions and many improvements. Prof. George Long contributed the articles relating to Roman Law. Dr. S. was aided by seventeen writers, some of them eminent in particular departments. The second work in the series is the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, in 3 vols., 8vo., 3700 pages in all. To say that the work is superior to any of the kind in the language is not saying much, for all previous attempts were very meagre. The work embraces History, not only of Greece and Rome, but of the Asiatic kingdoms, down to A. D. 1453; Literature, or a full account of the lives and writings of the Greek and Roman Authors, including the Byzantine; Ecclesiastical writers, lives of the Greek and Latin fathers; Arts, lives of painters, sculptors and architects, with an account of their principal works, so far as known; and Mythology. Some of the articles are of considerable length, e. g. Euclid 22 pages, Aristotle 52 pages, Cicero 74 columns, Phidias 24 columns. The last work of the series, now in the press, is a Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography, or rather of Ancient Geography, not excluding Scriptural Names. It will include an account of the political history both of countries and cities, the history of the more important public buildings, and an historical atlas, containing, in many cases, several maps of the same country. It will probably be published during the present year. An abridgment of the Dictionary of Antiquities has been published in 16mo., for the use of junior pupils; also an Abridgment of the Dictionary of Biography and Mythology, which is noticed on p. 447.

The following is the series of Rev. J. E. Riddle's Latin Lexicons: 1. A Copious and Critical Latin-English Lexicon, founded on the work of Dr. Freund, 50 shillings, quarto; 2. English-Latin and Latin-English Lexicon, 86s. 6d. 8vo.; 3. Young Scholar's English-Latin and Latin-English Lexicon, 12s. 12mo. bound; 4. Diamond Latin-English Lexicon, 4s. 32mo. bound.

Dr. Donaldson, master of the grammar school at Bury St. Edmunds, has published the 6th edition of his "Theatre of the Greeks," and the second

edition, one vol. 8vo. 694 pages, of the "New Cratylus, or Contributions towards a more accurate Knowledge of the Greek Language."

Mr. Barnes's Commentaries continue to have an undiminished sale in England. It is stated that nearly 100,000 copies of "Cobbin's edition" have been sold. The Isaiah and the New Testament, in 12 vols., are sold for \$5.00. We hope that the sense of justice and honesty on the American side of the Atlantic will soon be strong enough to lead to an international copyright law.

GERMANY.

As the "paternal" sovereigns of Germany are becoming more firmly seated on their thrones, and the inconvenient disturbances of 1848, are subsiding, the number of political books and pamphlets is diminishing, while the general book trade is increasing. After the convulsive efforts to construct political systems, the Germans are retiring to the abstract realms, where kings and ministers will allow them to be unmolested. The catalogue of the last Leipsic book-fair contained 5023 works.

The last annual meeting of the German Oriental Society was held in Berlin, from Sept. 30th to Oct. 4, 1850. The opening address by Böckh, the president, was "splendid and masterly." Some of the high functionaries were present, and took part. After the reading of the annual report by Prof. Rödiger, Humboldt made some remarks in his "usual instructive and kind manner." The *Antigone* of Sophocles was acted before the Society, by order of the king. The number of members present was 353. These are interesting, social, as well as literary reunions. The Germans enter into the matter with the whole heart.

We are glad to perceive that the Commentary begun by Dr. Hermann Olshausen, is to be completed. The Epistles to the Philippians, to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, have been explained by Licentiate Augustus Wiesinger, in a volume of 743 pages; and the Epistle to the Hebrews, in a volume of 496 pages, by the well known professor Ebrard of Erlangen, some time a colleague of Olshausen. The Commentary of the latter, in 5 vols. and two parts, is in the process of translation, in Clark's Theological Library, Edinburgh. The translation of the Gospels and Acts, is in 4 vols., Romans in one vol., and the two epistles to the Corinthians, in one vol. Price of the six volumes is about fifteen dollars.

Among the most entertaining works which have lately appeared is Hagenbach's "Lectures on the Church History of the 18th and 19th Centuries, viewed from the position of Evangelical Protestantism." The second edition in two moderately sized octavos was published in 1848, 1849. The first volume contains twenty-two lectures, the second, twenty. The view is of course mostly confined to Germany, yet some interesting sketches are given of the religious history of England, France, Holland, etc. The author, who is a German Swiss, and since the death of De Wette, the best known of the theological professors in the university of Basil, writes in a lively manner, with considerable power of imagination, with a happy intermixture of anec-

notes and biographical incidents, and, as far as we can judge, with a very commendable degree of fairness towards the different schools and parties. Certain aspects of church life, e. g. the propagation of Christianity, History of Missions, etc., he proposes to consider in a separate work.

Dr. Thenius of Dresden, author of the *Commentary on the Books of Samuel and Kings*, in the "*Condensed Exegetical Manual of the Old Testament*," is evidently a painstaking and thorough scholar, familiar with the stores of philology, deeply interested in his subject, and anxious that the reader should be so also. But the commentary hardly meets the wants of the English and American student. The extreme condensation, the crowding together of textual, verbal and grammatical criticism and of historical and exegetical remarks, into so small a compass, without paragraphs, and with many abbreviations, disfigure the page and weary and perplex the reader. On the difficult texts, a more extended commentary is needed. We wish also to have the author's own view stated more distinctly, unmixed with the speculations of others. If he cannot solve a problem, let him give the best light which he has, and inform us precisely where the difficulty lies. Thenius, too, belongs to the class of subjective critics, who can divide a book into fragments, and determine what is historical, what traditional, etc., as though he had been recorder to Josiah, or one of Ezra's assistants. In this dislocating process, we have little faith. Still, the commentary is important to the practised philologist. It has materials which a skilful architect could shape into a goodly edifice. The volume on the *Kings* was published in 1849, in 471 pages, besides an appendix of 45 pages, describing Jerusalem and the temple, as they were before the captivity. There are several plates and a chronological table.

The second edition of Meyer's *Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1849, pp. 364, is "amended and enlarged." The author speaks of having carefully consulted not only the most recent commentaries and monographs, but of having thoroughly reviewed the earlier interpreters, the Greek and Latin Fathers, etc. He alludes in terms of high commendation to the labors of Tischendorf on the text of the New Testament. Several writers, e. g. Rodatz, Schenkel, Rabiger, Goldhorn, Dähne, Kniewel, have lately discussed some special topics in this epistle, with more or less ability. The excellencies of the author as a commentator, exact philological knowledge, acuteness, and in general sound judgment in marking the connections of the discourse, apposite historical and antiquarian illustrations, an independent use of other commentators, etc., are conspicuous in this revised labor. The author is now at work on the *Apocalypse*.

Dr. Lünemann's *Commentary on the two epistles to the Thessalonians*, 1850, pp. 233, appears to be thoroughly elaborated. "The commentators from the earliest to the most recent times, have been compared with independent care, and in greater number than was possible for my predecessors, in consequence of the rich treasures of the university library here at Göttingen." Koch has lately written a *Commentary on the First Epistle*. Dr. L. concludes that the first epistle was written at the beginning of Paul's resi-

dence in Corinth, A. D. 53, about six months after he left Macedonia; and the second epistle in the same city, probably in the beginning of 54. The genuineness of the epistles is successfully vindicated against Baur and others. The price of this volume, unbound, is about 50 cents; that of Meyer on the first epistle to the Corinthians, 90 cents.

Dr. R. Stier, Berlin, (1850, pp. 126,) has published a Commentary on the "epistle of Jude, the brother of the Lord, as a prophetic warning to all believers of our times who would be watchful." Stier maintains, with Herder, that the epistle was not written by an apostle, but by a son of Mary, and brother of our Lord. It was very probably written before the destruction of Jerusalem. Stier supposes that the author had before his eyes both of the epistles of Peter, which accounts for the resemblance and citations. The statements in regard to Michael, the body of Moses, etc., v. 9, Dr. Stier supposes were drawn from the Jewish tradition, either oral or written, from which, Paul, 2 Tim. 3: 8, appears to have derived the names of the Egyptian magicians. The Spirit who inspired the writers, could separate truth from fable in these traditions.

The first part of the second volume of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Apocalypse, Berlin, 1850, pp. 405, closes with the 20th chapter. The second part will contain the notes on the two concluding chapters, and various introductory matters. We shall endeavor, as soon as we receive it, to give a synopsis of the writer's views.

The Encyclopædia of Classical Antiquities, conducted for some years by Dr. Pauly, is now under the charge of professors Walz and Teuffel. It combines the results of a great amount of study, and is full of interesting and accurate information. The Dictionaries of Dr. William Smith are largely indebted to this work. The two last fasciculi, the 127th and 128th, extend from Trebia to Tullii. The whole number of pages published is 2240 octavo, at about 20 Thaler.

The Bibliotheca Græca, published at Gotha by Hennings, was commenced under the editorship of the late Frederic Jacobs, and of Rost, the Greek grammarian and lexicographer. Parts of this edition have deservedly had great celebrity. Some of the editors, e. g. Stallbaum, Dissen, Spitzner, Goetting, stand in the front rank of scholars. Stallbaum, the editor of Plato, has just published the third edition of the *Phædo*, "much improved and amended," being the 2d section of Vol. I. The ten or eleven volumes of Plato, bound, can be bought in Germany for ten or twelve dollars. Wunder, the editor of Sophocles, has just published the second edition of the *Trachiniae*, being the second section of Vol. II. Prof. Schneidewin of Göttingen, has published the second fasciculus, second section, second edition of Pindar, pp. 174-376. The first section contains the text and critical notes,—the second, the commentary. The edition was begun by Dissen.

A valuable History of Classical Philology (*Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie im Alterthum*) is publishing by Dr. A. Gräfenhan, teacher in the gymnasium at Eisleben. Four volumes have been published, the last in 1850. The First Part contains the history of philology from the earliest

times to the end of the fourth century; the Second will embrace the history of the philology of the Middle ages, from the beginning of the 5th century to the invention of printing; and the Third, from the last named epoch to the present time. The first four vols. are wholly occupied with the first part, and discuss the beginnings of philology among the Greeks, the history of philology from Aristotle to Augustus Caesar, and from Caesar to the end of the fourth century. Under the special history of philology, the author considers, 1, Grammar, embracing elements, forms, syntax, rhetoric, lexicography; 2, Exegesis, allegorical, learned, and practical; 3, Criticism, textual, higher, and aesthetic; and 4, Erudition, religion, politics, literature, and art. A great excellence of the book is the citations adduced in the margin in support of the positions in the text. It is full of bibliographical information. The four vols., bound and beautifully printed, cost in Germany about \$8.

The fifth edition of Pasow's Greek Lexicon, under the charge of Kott, Palma, and Kreuzler, is printed as far as the word *σάπας*. It will be comprised in two large quarto volumes. The ninth edition of Kühner's Elementary Greek Grammar, with a series of exercises for translation, and the seventh edition of his Elementary Latin Grammar, with exercises and a vocabulary, have been published. L. Döderlein's new Homeric Glossarium is in one volume of 274 pages. The new edition of Nägelsbach's Notes on the Iliad, with Excursus, has received some improvements. A second and enlarged edition of Prof. Hand's Practical Manual for exercises in Latin Style, has appeared. Prof. Klotz's Dictionary of the Latin language has been printed as far as the word *Condictio*, in all 1024 pages. The work of Freund, up to the same word, embraces 918 pages.

The entire works of Livy, under the editorship of William Weissenborn, have been published to the end of the 23d book. The first volume of the edition by Karl Hahn, of the complete works of Tacitus, embraces the *Annals* in 348 pages.

The most important perhaps of the German theological journals is the *Theologische Studien u. Kritiken*, conducted by Profs. Ullmann and Usserbreit of Heidelberg. It is published quarterly by Perthes of Hamburg, and costs in this country about \$4 per annum. The January number for 1851, contains the following articles: I. On the Regard to be paid to Majorities in the Church, by Dr. Ullmann,—an enlargement of an essay communicated by him at a meeting of the Baden clergy, May 30, 1850, an elaborate and temperate discussion of 58 pages. II. The Relation of the Morality of Classical Antiquity to the Christian Morality, illustrated by a comparative view of the doctrine of Love to Enemies, by G. Schaubach, superintendent at Meiningen. The topic is discussed, in 62 pages, with much learning and candor and in an eminently Christian spirit. The general conclusion is, that the doctrine of love to enemies is, in Christianity, founded on principle, it is nothing accidental; it proceeds necessarily from the tendency of the Christian life; it is absolutely inseparable from the nature of Christianity. In the classics we find passages apparently teaching the same doctrine. But the love to enemies which they teach does not rest on fundamental princi-

ples; it is not a heartfelt, paternal love. They lack the thought, "forgive, as God forgives thee." In Socrates, Plato and Antoninus, we see some approximation, but no resemblance in Aristotle and the Stoics. III. Johann Denk and his little book on the Law of God, by Heberle of Tübingen. It is an elaborate article of 74 pages, partly biographical, and partly an analysis of the book. Denk acquired much notoriety in the 16th century by his freedom in thinking and acting, often in opposition to the reformers. The essay is a valuable contribution to an extended history of those times. IV. On the Fragments of Pherecydes [of Syra, contemporary of Thales and teacher of Pythagoras] in the Church Fathers, by Prof. J. L. Jacobi of Berlin. V. Examination of the passage, Rom. 8: 18—23, with a special view to Prof. Zyro's exposition of the same, by Pastor Rupprecht of Krögelstein in Bavaria. VI. Survey of some works serving to make known the religious life of the Middle Ages, by Prof. Schmidt of Strasburg. VII. The Affliction of Joseph, church considerations, by Pastor Kienlen of Colmar in Alsace, a spirited discussion of some of the great practical questions, which now agitate German Christians.

We learn that the venerable geographer, Dr. Karl Ritter, is still earnestly engaged in his great work. He is said to be the life of the meetings of the Geographical Society, though he will be seventy-two years of age in August next. His views are carried out in this country with great ability in the lectures by his pupil, Prof. Arnold Guyot. The first Part of Vol. XV. of Ritter's geographical work has been published. It contains a general Introduction to Palestine, and a description of the entire system of the Jordan valley with the Dead Sea. The second Part, which will soon be published, will embrace the country east of the Jordan. It will be only of moderate extent, and will conclude with an Index to vols. XIV. and XV. Vol. XVI. will describe the western slope of Palestine, including Judea, Samaria, Galilee and northern Syria, together with an Index. Ritter acknowledges his obligations to the unpublished papers of Seetzen, who travelled in Palestine in the years 1805—7, to the communications of Schultz, Prussian consul in Jerusalem, who has made extensive tours in Galilee, and also to many Ms. notices, letters, etc. of the author's friends and correspondents. Prof. Ritter speaks of Dr. Robinson's Researches as constituting an epoch in biblical geography. His journey is distinguished from every former one "by combining the keenest observation of topographical and local relations, with much preparatory study, especially the learned study of the Bible and philological and historical criticism, and also a knowledge of the language of the country on the part of the younger traveller, Rev. Eli Smith, a missionary who had resided for many years at Beirut, and become thoroughly naturalized." Ritter, also, refers to the "Boston Missionary Herald" as containing a great treasure of special investigations on the upper Jordan region, especially in respect to the inhabitants. It is gratifying to notice the many references to and quotations from the Missionary Herald, the investigations of Lieut. Lynch, and the papers in our own Journal from the pens of Dr. Robinson, Messrs. Wolcott, Thomson, Smith, De Forest and others.

OTHER COUNTRIES.

Universities in Holland, 1850. The number of teachers and students was as follows:

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| Leyden, | 36 teachers, | 4 of theology, | 297 students. |
| Utrecht, | 26 " | 3 " | 342 " |
| Groningen, | 23 " | 5 " | 226 " |
| Amsterdam, (Athenaeum,) 15 | " | 1 " | 135 " |

The last named does not confer degrees; the students, on finishing their course, take their degrees at Leyden without further study. There is much to regret in the theological teaching of the universities, but it is gratifying to know, that the department of biblical literature in all, is in the hands of evangelical men. The literary men of Holland seem to be reposing on the reputation of their predecessors. The treasures of the Leyden library are suffered in a great measure to lie useless. Of her living scholars, Hamaker among the orientlists, and Bake and Peerlkamp, among the classical editors, are occasionally heard from.

A congress of delegates of the literary and scientific societies of the different provinces of France was held at the Luxembourg in Paris on the 20th of February, to consider the condition of the public libraries, the methods by which they can be rendered more useful, the state of the collections of fine arts, antiquities, etc., the ways in which a more effective connection may be established between the different societies, etc.

We regret to learn that the Chinese Repository, which has been published for the last nineteen years at Canton, China, was to be discontinued at the close of 1850. It has shared the fate of some other excellent periodical works, of enjoying lavish commendation and a very insufficient patronage. As a storehouse of authentic information in respect to the vast regions of China, Japan, Corea, etc., its value can hardly be overestimated. We hope that the managers of our public libraries will hasten to obtain possession of a complete set of this thesaurus. Application may be made to the publisher, S. Wells Williams, of Canton. A general index will be published with the last number.

The two German travellers, Drs. Barth and Overweg, who are attempting to enter the interior of Africa from the North, had reached, Aug. 24, 1850, the frontiers of the kingdom of Air, or Asben, i. e. about 20° 30' N. lat. and 9° 20' E. long., a point never before reached by Europeans. The adventurous missionary, Livingston, has discovered another large lake north of Ngami. Mr. Layard was about to explore, when last heard from, the ruins on and below the site of ancient Babylon. A subscription is making in England by individuals, in order to defray his expenses. Major Herbert Edwards, the hero of Upper India, has brought out in two thick volumes, a narrative of his perilous adventures and hair-breadth escapes, during the late war. They contain, in a very graphic and soldier-like style, much geo-

graphical and topographical information in regard to a country never before investigated by Europeans.

MISCELLANIES.

Helps for the Study of the Sanskrit.

The following list contains some of the more necessary works for the study of the Sanskrit language.

Wilson. *Sanskrit Grammar*, 2d ed. London, 1847. Price in this country, perhaps, \$4.50.

Bopp. *Kritische Grammatik der Sanscrita Sprache in kürzerer Fassung*, 2d edition. Berlin, 1845. Catalogue price, 2 1-2 rth. Wilson attaches himself more to the method of the native Indian grammarians. Bopp treats the subject according to the principles of his *Comparative Grammar*. Wilson's *Grammar* contains a compendious *Syntax*, and an exhibition of the peculiar dialectic forms of the *Védas*.

The only complete dictionary of the language, is that of Wilson. *Sanskrit and English Dictionary*, 2d ed. Calcutta, 1832. Price about \$30.00.

The roots of the language are best exhibited by Westergaard. *Radices Linguae Sanskritae*. Bonn, 1841. 8 1-2 rth. An admirable work, which contains the verbs both simple and compound, with definitions and illustrative citations.

The roots of the language are given also by Bopp. *Glossarium Sanscritum*. Berlin, 1847. 6 2-3 rth. With cognate forms of other Indo-European languages. This work gives also the derivatives which occur in several Sanskrit books, so as to form a pretty complete and satisfactory lexicon for the six following works:

Indrakīrtanagātham. Ardechna's *Reise zu Indra's Himmel*. Berlin, 1824. 4 rth.

Dilevium, cum tribus aliis MahāBhārati episodiis. Berlin, 1822. 2 2-3 rth.
Nala, MahāBhārati episodium. 2d ed. Berlin, 1832. 4 rth.

Bhagavad Gītā. Schlegel and Lassen. 2d ed. Bonn, 1846. 4 rth.

Hitopadeśa. Schlegel and Lassen. Bonn, 1831. 9 rth.

Urvasia, Fabula Calidasi. ed. Lenz. Berlin, 1833. 4 rth.

Bopp's edition of the *Nala* is accompanied by a very literal Latin translation, and a few notes; it forms an interesting text-book for the beginner.

The following work contains a large amount of Sanskrit texts at a very cheap rate; the *Lexicon* and *Grammar* promised in the *Preface* have not yet made their appearance. *Böhtlingk. Sanskrit-Chrestomathie*. Leipzig, 1845. 1 1-2 rth.

We subjoin a very few of the most important works on the *Comparative Philology* of the Indo-European languages.

Bopp. *Vergleichende Grammatik*. Parts 1--5. 14 5-6 rth. It is to be completed next summer by the publication of a sixth part; the first part, it is said, has been some time out of print. The five have been translated

into English, chiefly by Lieut. Eastwick, and in this form can be obtained in our country for about \$18.00.

Pott. *Etymologische Forschungen*. Lemgo, 1836. 5 1-2 rth.

Grimm. *Deutsche Grammatik*. Göttingen. 17 1-4 rth.

Grimm. *Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache*. Leipzig, 1848. 6 2-3 rth.

Curtius. *Tempora und Modi im Griech. und Lat.* Berlin, 1846. 1 1-2 rth.

Schleicher. *Die Sprachen Europa's, in systematischer Uebersicht*. Bonn, 1850. 1 1-2 rth.

Helps for the Study of Arabic.

Petermann's Arabic Grammar, Berlin, 1840, gives a list of sixty Arabic grammars, lexicons and chrestomathies. A number have been published since that time. The most important in the list are the grammar of Erpenius, 3rd edition, Leyden, 1638; subsequent editions of the same by Albert Schultens; Tychsen's Grammar, Rostock, 1792; De Sacy's *Grammaire Arabe*, 2nd edition, 1831, two volumes, six hundred large octavo pages each, closely printed; Rosenmüller's *Institutiones*, Leipsic, 1818; Oberleitner's *Fundamenta Linguae Arab.*, Vienna, 1823; and Ewald's *Critical Grammar*, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1831-33. The last named is a learned and original work, and considers the language in connection with the sister dialects. It is, however, wholly unfitted for the beginner. De Sacy's grammar is the storehouse from which most of the later grammars have been drawn. Its great merits are universally recognized. Still, from its large size, from its being printed in a solid form, so that the more important parts are not distinguished by the type, etc. it does not answer the purposes of the young scholar. He would only become confused in its immense details. The two latest grammars which have appeared are Caspari's *Grammatica Arabica*, in Latin, one volume, Leipsic, 1848, pp. 350, and *Grammaire Arabe*, in French, by Ch. Schier, Leipsic, 1849, pp. 466. "Both are essentially dependent on De Sacy and Ewald." Yet they are useful compends, and may be recommended to the young student in the Arabic language. We have Richardson's Grammar, which is now nearly obsolete, as it proceeded on a totally erroneous system; the grammar of Mr. Lumsden of Calcutta, which is incomplete, and unfitted for beginners; and the *Practical Arabic Grammar* of Duncan Stewart, London, 1841, pp. 302, catalogue price 16 shillings, which may be recommended, as "calculated for the use of those, who, not making the study of languages the chief pursuit of life, learn Arabic, less for the purpose of reading the many valuable books which it contains, than for its bearing on the religion and law of the Mohammedans," and for other practical purposes.

An excellent book for beginners is Locman's *Fables*, with notes and a glossary, edited by Prof. Rödiger, 2nd edition, 1839, 75 cents. There are, also, the Arabic Chrestomathy of De Sacy, a thesaurus of materials, 2nd edition, 1827, 3 vols., 63 francs; Oberleitner's Arabic Chrestomathy, 2 vols., Vienna, 1823-4, 7 rth.; Freytag's Arabic Chrestomathy, Bonn, one vol.,

1 rth., 28 agr.; Kosegarten's Arabic Chrestomathy, collected from MSS., with notes and a lexicon, Leipsic, 1828, 4 Thlr., and many others.

We have the Lexicon of Golius, 1 vol. folio, Leyden, 1653; of Willmet, for the Koran, the Life of Hariri, and the Life of Timour, Rotterdam, 1784, quarto, very useful, price about \$8; Freytag's great work, in 4 vols., quarto, Halle, 1830-37, catalogue price, about \$20; and an Abridgment of the last named, for the use of beginners, quarto, Halle, 1836, about \$6.

Helps in the Study of the Syriac Language.

The Syriac Grammars are, A. T. Hoffmann's, Halle, quarto, 1827; F. Uhlemann's (*Elementarlehre der Syrischen Sprache*), 8vo., Berlin, 1829; Rev. George Phillips's *Elements of Syriac Grammar*, 2d ed., 8vo., London, 1845, pp. 208, catalogue price, \$3, containing lessons for exercise, analysis, etc. As reading books, may be named the Syriac New Testament of Leusden and Schaaf, Leyden, 1717, and the Syriac Chrestomathy, with a glossary and grammatical tables, by Prof. Rödiger, Halle, 1838. Schaaf published a Syriac Lexicon of the New Testament, Leyden, 1717. Dr. Bernstein of Breslau, is now engaged in preparing a complete Lexicon of the Syriac language, partly from MSS. sources.

ERRATA.—A few errata in the present and last Nos. of this work, escaped the vigilance of the proof-reader, owing in part to the circumstances in which the *Bibliotheca Sacra* and the *American Biblical Repository* were united. Page 105, l. 13, for causes r. *cause*; 108, last l., for divine r. *diverse*; 109, 10, and 11, for which r. *whom*; 119, l. 1, put a colon instead of a period before *Aristotle*; 121, l. 83, for then r. *their*; 126, l. 5, for Telesos r. *Telestos*; 180, l. 8, for Cloyné r. *Cloyne*; 183, l. 33, for producing r. *perduring*; 211, l. 1, for atom r. *color*; 337, for ἀνδρῶν r. *ἀνδρα*; 347, l. 29, for three r. *there*; 348, l. 32, for solid r. *valid*; 349, l. 2, for antonymy r. *antinomy*; 351, l. 10, for avoid r. *a void*; 359, l. 23, for perduces r. *perdures*; 360, l. 11 and 19, ditto; 362, l. 4, for soul r. *sense*; do. l. 26 and 27, for our r. *one four times*; 364, l. 34, for suiting r. *meeting*; 365, l. 32, for proportions r. *propositions*; 370, l. 39, for μᾶλλον r. *μᾶλλον*; 371, l. 5, for architectural r. *architectural*; do. l. 80, for which r. *while*; 376, l. 8, for in r. *is*.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
NO. XXXI.
AND
AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,
NO. LXXXIII.

JULY, 1851.

ARTICLE I.

THE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE MIND,
FOR A FUTURE JUDGMENT AND RETRIBUTION.

By George B. Cheever, D. D., New York.

IN tracing the materials and agencies in the human mind for a future judgment and retribution, we find, next after Remembrance, the article and operation of Remorse. We are first to find the law, under which this operation of a guilty nature acts. And this is one of the plainest, best developed, and most unquestionable of the facts and laws of our being. It is the faculty and law of Conscience.

There is within the soul a silent, invisible, but ever present witness of all thoughts, feelings, words, and actions. This witness is named in our language, Conscience. The first and literal meaning of the Greek word, *συνείδησις*, is a *knowing with one's self*, a consciousness. This is also the etymological, elemental meaning of our English word conscience, *con-science*, *knowing with*. Add to this the idea of the discernment and judging of right and wrong, with the approval or disapproval of the same, and we shall have the full definition of the faculty of Conscience. It is a word perhaps to be found in all languages, and it has the same meaning, all the world over.

The conscience is sometimes called our Moral Sense, that is, an inward sense of moral qualities and actions, a sense of right and wrong, answering to our outward senses; and as these distinguish the qualities of external objects, distinguishing in like manner the qualities of moral objects, or the difference between moral qualities. Conscience is the judgment of the mind in regard to all the acts and

movements of our being. Sometimes it is so slight as not to be noticed, being merely a consciousness, general and indefinite, that does not take shape in a particular judgment.

There are five grand points, in reference to which we shall consider this faculty: 1. As universal in its existence; 2. Unceasing in its action; 3. Retrospective in its operations; 4. As affected by habit, and susceptible of perversion; 5. As eternal in its power.

First then, this faculty of conscience is a universal possession of mankind. It is doubtless a part of our essential being as made in the image of God. The sense of right and wrong in ourselves, and the judgment of right and wrong in others is an experience and a process familiar, in some degree, to every man. The development, education, and action of this faculty are determined very much by men's circumstances; and it is a faculty which acts according to the degree of light that has been enjoyed in regard to duty. But in some degree the possession and action of conscience are to be distinguished everywhere, and the faculty is as surely a part of every man's being as the faculty of memory, or the power of reason.

We inquire, to make this plainer, What would be the condition of the world without this faculty of conscience as a part of the human constitution? Conceive, if we can, of a man, an intelligent being, actually without a conscience. All sense of the difference between good and evil, right and wrong, would disappear from such a man's experience. Convenience and pleasure, self-enjoyment, present and to come, would be his only law. Utility would be his guide, and whatever was pleasurable would be regarded as useful, and the highest utility would be the production of pleasure for himself. All regard to God would cease, and all regard to man, save that of prudence in watching for his own interests, which would always, in his estimation, be above those of all other men in importance.

There would also be no sense of guilt or crime in others, no condemnation passed upon others, except merely as a matter of utility or profit. The condemnation which we pass on others arises solely from the same constitution of our being which produces the consciousness of guilt in ourselves, the displeasure of our own moral sense at our own conduct. If this introspective conscience did not exist, there would be no circumspective conscience, no such thing as a moral sense or judgment of the qualities of other men's actions. The same act of our moral being which justifies or condemns another, and renders the character of our neighbor pleasing or displeasing to us in a moral point of view, is the power that acts upon ourselves; it is the

same power. It would not act upon others, if it did not act upon ourselves.

Without this faculty, there would be, in morals, no distinction of colors. As to a blind man, white, black, red, green, or blue, all are the same; so in a moral sense, without the faculty of conscience, would be all the qualities of actions to the soul. As to one who had lost the sense of taste, it were a matter of indifference what element his food were composed of, since wood, iron, stones, fruit, meat, bread, vegetables, all would be the same, so would it be to one who has lost the faculty of conscience with the moral character and qualities of all feeling, thought and action. The sun strikes upon all objects, and the reflection of his rays produces the variety of nature; but there is no perception of such variety by a blind man; just so, the moral sun shines upon all qualities, and is reflected back, but there is no perception of this by a being without a conscience. There would be, in such a case, no response to God's Word, no sense of obligation. There would be merely the sense of profit. There would be no gratitude. Favors received would be absorbed as a dry soil absorbs the rain, or as a tree receives nourishment from earth, air, and the elements; but there would be no return, no feeling of love, no sense of obligation. Parental kindness would beget no affection but that founded on self-interest; so far as a parent could be useful, so far he would be cherished, cared for, cultivated, but no farther. Just so it would be in regard to God. The idea of Deity itself, of the Creator, Benefactor, Judge, of the All-merciful, All-wise, just God, would be merely the idea of a vast utility; or, as self would be predominant and absorbing, the idea of an enemy, the idea of a being too vast to be controlled and used for selfish purposes, and therefore opposed to self-interest and an enemy. Take away conscience, and leave only utility, and you make every man, in his own view, God, every man to himself the centre of the universe. And that too without any sense of guilt, that too with the blind, straightforward, unchecked, unceasing, unrelenting instinct of selfishness, which, whatever stood in its way, be it man or beast, God or nature, would sacrifice and tread down all. If the world were filled with such beings, the world would be a hell, without hell's sense of sin; a chaos of conflict, where the strife, if it went on, would depopulate the globe, and where the only stop to it would be the universal experience of its misery, and the mutual agreement of restraint and check as a matter of sheer utility, expediency and necessity. Such would man be, such would the world be, without conscience. But conscience is universal.

It is as universal as the ideas of right and wrong. There is a conscience of good and evil in mankind, with reference to those ideas, and because those ideas are necessary results of the activity of the human reason. The ideas of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, are ultimate facts and fixtures of the mind, or creations of the pure reason, as necessarily and unalterably as the pure truths of geometry. Truth, for example, is regarded as right, not with reference to any standard of utility, but as an instant, inevitable, immutable affirmation of the mind. Truth is right, and is commanded of conscience, not because it is useful, for the affirmation is instant and universal, without reference to, or waiting for, that inquiry; and falsehood is wrong, not because it is injurious, but because, in itself and from eternity, there is this difference of quality, and the human reason is so constituted of God in his image, that it makes the affirmation instantly, and cannot help it. The truths of geometry are right, are absolute truths, not because they are good to build houses by, or to make calculations upon, but because they are realities of nature, as constituted of God. So it is with moral principles, holiness, justice, truth, which are right, not because they are expedient, but expedient because they are right. A thing is not morally good because it is useful, but useful because it is good. The mind never, naturally, and without sophistry, confounds or introverts these positions. A thing that is right, must be useful because it is right; and the reason why it is right, the ultimate reason, is not because it is useful, but because it is accordant, either directly, or by deduction of principles, with the attributes of God.

Hence the truth, stated by Coleridge, better perhaps than by any other writer, that he who fulfils the conditions required by conscience, takes the surest way of answering the purposes of Prudence. Conscience put first, and obeyed, may bring him into harmony with God; prudence consulted, may not, for his prudence may be founded upon selfishness, may, in fact, be nothing but selfishness — and compared with a pure conscience, may be opposed to it and to God. For man is a short-sighted being, and God has given him principles to act upon, by which his axioms of prudence must be tested. He can see and understand the principles, even when he cannot see the consequences, or can foresee them but a very little way, and overlook but a very little of their extent and variety. Principles are for him, as Coleridge has beautifully said, *Prudence in short-hand or cipher*, because “the distinct foresight of consequences belongs exclusively to that Infinite Wisdom which is one with that Almighty Will on which all consequences depend.”

Hence Coleridge says, in the fourth Essay of the second part of his *Friend* — and it is a passage as true and admirable as it is masterly — “A pure conscience, that inward something, that θεός οὐκείος, which, being absolutely *unique*, no man can *describe*, because every man is bound to *know*, and even in the eye of the law, is held to be a *person* no longer than he may be supposed to know it. The conscience, I say, bears the same relation to God as an accurate time-piece bears to the sun. The time-piece merely indicates the relative path of the sun, yet we can regulate our plans and proceedings by it with the same confidence, as if it was itself the efficient cause of light, heat, and the revolving seasons; on the self-evident axiom that in whatever sense two things are both equal to a third thing, they are in the same sense equal to one another. Cunning is circuitous folly. In plain English, to act the knave, is but a roundabout way of playing the fool; and the man who will not permit himself to call an action by its proper name, without a previous calculation of all its probable consequences, may indeed be only a coxcomb, who is looking at his fingers through an opera-glass; but he runs no small risk of becoming a knave. The chances are against him. Though he should *begin* by calculating the consequences with regard to others, yet by the mere habit of never contemplating an action in its own proportions and immediate relations to his moral being, it is scarcely possible but that he must *end* in selfishness; for the *YOU* and the *THEY* will stand on different occasions for a thousand different persons, while the *I* is one only, and recurs in every calculation. Or grant that the principle of expediency should prompt to the same outward *deeds* as are commanded by the law of reason, yet the doer himself is debased.”

Right and wrong spring from God's existence, and cannot be conceived as having any being apart from God, right being what God is, wrong what God is not; hence we must refer, and by the command and operation of conscience do inevitably refer to what God is, and to the principles drawn from his own attributes, which he has given us for our guidance. Right and wrong are not such because God makes or wills them such, but because right is from eternity right, and all that coincides not with God's essence, is wrong. This distinction, eternal and essential, is affirmed by the human reason, which, in God's image, develops the ideas of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, duty, responsibility, essential and eternal morality; and conscience acts with reference to all these realities, and is as universal as all these ideas. There is no nation, nor race of beings, that

ever confounded truth and falsehood, as to the obligation of one, and the infamy of the other.

Now, if conscience acts vividly and powerfully in this world, in reference to these ideas and realities, much more must it in the eternal world, when these ideas and realities will be seen as they are, without any disguise, sophistry, veil, fog, or obscurity. There the divine attributes will appear, and the soul will know; will see and know their application to the paths of this world, and the application of the principles given forth from them for man's guidance, and affirmed by his reason. It will not be with reference to men's perverted or blinded habits, and conceptions of right or wrong, that conscience will act, but with reference to the realities, and to the measure and demonstration of right and wrong in what God himself is. All the ideas of truth and duty here developed, in regard to which conscience acts, will be developed and illustrated in the light of God's attributes as they are, with an intensity and power of brightness, of which we now hardly form a conception. Conscience in itself can even now make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven; how much more in that world where moral distinctions will be as clearly and as piercingly seen and felt, as the existence of the Deity.

Now, the final cause of this faculty, the final purpose for which it was so constituted in the human mind, may certainly to a great degree be determined by the manner of its operation. It was not *merely* as a guide to human conduct that it was given; for a great part of its operations are after-thoughts, looking to a judgment to come; and it is with reference to that judgment, that its action is most powerful. Nay, without the prediction and presumed certainty of that judgment, conscience would be comparatively lifeless and powerless; powerless as a guide, lifeless as an avenger. Conscience has not merely the operation of a time-piece for man's life, or a barometer to tell him the state of the weather, and warn him what to do; but it has within itself an arrangement, a power, by which the storm itself is evoked, if the pilot do not mind the warnings, and a retribution is inflicted for what he has done. Hence a great conclusion as to the universal office of conscience in the future world.

In the second place, the action of Conscience is unceasing. With most men Conscience seems to be asleep, but it is not. All our faculties acquire by use, a surprising facility and rapidity of operation. The will, for example, is so minute and rapid in its movements, that it is not possible to trace them. The Divine Omniscience alone can note them. There is a separate movement of the will, a distinct and

separate volition, with every movement of the hand, the foot, the eye, the body; but the movements which we do not notice, compared to those which we do, are perhaps as a million to one. Philosophers have entered into a curious investigation and analysis of this matter. Dugald Stewart has observed, that in the most rapid reading of a book to one's self, there is a distinct volition for every word, every syllable, though it may seem sometimes that the mind gathers up the page almost with a single glance of the eye. Thus the play of the will is habitual, imperceptible, yet none the less actual, and made up of distinct intervals. So it must be with the conscience. There is a judgment of the conscience upon everything. It may be so rapid, so transitory, swifter than the lightning, so brief as the most evanescent, imperceptible shade of thought, that it is not distinctly noticed, and cannot be, except by some supernatural arrest of the being fixing it on the last momentary act or interval; but it exists, as truly as the will exists, although its separate movements may not be noticed.

A wheel composed of a great many spokes may go round with such rapidity, that to the eye it shall appear to be a solid mass, like a millstone; nay, it may go round with such incredible swiftness, that the possibility of detecting the motion by the eye shall be lost, it shall seem to be perfectly still; and yet every one of its revolutions is distinctly made, in a distinct interval of time, and may be numbered. So it is with the conscience. It may seem asleep, but this may be only because its acts are so rapid, so brief, so innumerable, that they are not noticed. It may seem asleep, yet there must be a judgment of the conscience upon everything, even every idle word. We may not trace it, but God may. And our habit of neglect of the monitions of conscience, producing insensibility to its operation is no excuse for sin committed without apparent reproach, or remorse, or restraint from our own being; inasmuch as we have formed the habit voluntarily, and should not have done it, had we lived habitually as under God's inspection, in God's sight, with a perpetual regard to God's approbation.

Now it is evident that the more a man's conscience is unheeded now, the more a man puts in reserve to be heeded hereafter. The greater the number of the revolutions of this wheel within our souls unnoticed now, the greater the number to be counted hereafter. A man of insensibility, a man of a hardened conscience, is so far from being secured against the operations of conscience, that he is only accumulating work for himself to do by and by. He is like a man

falling in debt, who strives to keep off the sense of his liabilities, by keeping no account current, but going on in his business just as if he were every day starting fair with an unincumbered capital. Every unrecorded debt is a step to his ruin. It is a weight upon his fortunes, that, so far from being lighter because it is not now felt, is growing heavier every day that it is unnoticed. By and by, the crash will be inevitable, and overwhelming.

These silent, unheeded movements of the conscience are every one of them witnesses for man's guilt, and securities of God's justice. They are God's vouchers for so much truth, so much remonstrance, delivered to the soul, so much instruction and light and mercy, abused and wasted. They are God's vouchers, and must be produced. Their inspection will be requisite, to see both God's justice and mercy, and the man's guilt. The man must feel that guilt himself; so, by and by, he is to travel over the ground of his past experiences, and examine them as it were at leisure; he is to look at his past self, step by step; he is to judge calmly and slowly, what he acted rapidly, heedlessly, insensibly, while conscience judged as swiftly as could keep pace with his actions, but so swiftly that he then disregarded its judgments. God shall take him, as it were, and stand with him at the wheel in its revolutions, and it shall be stopped for his deliberate view, and he shall see what it was, what he himself was, what he was doing, what feeling, what in character, in habit, in relation to himself, and in relation to God. He shall see how much conscience did for him, how much he did against conscience.

This we conceive must be a part of the process of judgment. Thus much is necessarily included in the Saviour's declaration, that for every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment. The man shall tell how it was uttered, when, where, in what state of mind, how occupied, for what purpose, with what motives, with how much knowledge of good and evil, after how long acquaintance with God and duty, after what providential interpositions, what manifestations of truth, what efforts of God's Spirit.

Thus, in the third place, conscience is not merely introspective, but retrospective in its operations. It is not only a knowing with, but a knowing back, not merely a witness at the moment, but long after. A man may dream, because conscience does not trouble him now, that there shall be no retrospective action hereafter, or may dream that every step he travels from the date and the scene of his sins, conscience will be weaker, and he more secure from its power. But it is never so, and sometimes the very contrary seems to be the

case. Sometimes the longer a man's insensibility as to his course of sin continues, and the more effectual its concealment, the more terrible is the power of conscience at the last. So that at the judgment this retrospective power of conscience will be greater than it was at the moment of the commission of sin; greater the longer the interval of time and forgetfulness that has elapsed. Sometimes the faculty of conscience does this work of retrospection and conviction *now*, with an appalling power. The whole being is arrested, petrified, as it were, in a single attitude of crime, projected beyond itself, and brought to gaze upon itself, to judge and condemn itself, with a power of self-anguish, self-retribution, self-misery, that, if it were exercised upon others, would be deemed a stern and awful vengeance; but no man accuses it of cruelty, no man accuses himself or God of injustice, when writhing under the agony of a wrathful conscience. And the reason why this retrospective work of conscience in some great things, some great crimes, is wrought with a power so immeasurably greater than in the ordinary instances of its exercise, so that it seems to rouse up as a new creation of the mind, a new faculty before unheard of, is not merely because of the so much greater heinousness and glare of guilt in some crimes than in others, though that is a great thing, but also because of the deliberation with which such crimes are generally committed. A man comes to the act, fighting against conscience all the way. A man revolves it in his thoughts, plans its execution, prepares for it, forecasts the result, provides for after action, advances to it circumspectly, with full time to deliberate, and conscience keeps pace with him all the way. So, when it is done, the whole power of conscience falls back upon him, in the weight and avengement of all previous outrage and resistance, all stifling and searing, all disregard of inward and external voices, all perseverance and obstinacy in sin, against light, love, mercy, providence and grace. Conscience falls back to her work of retrospection armed at all these points, with her power increased tenfold by previous neglect and opposition.

A man tracks a traveller over a wild moor. He knew that he had a purse of gold about him. He planned the outrage, the theft, the murder, deliberately. He saw him at the last inn. He forecast the attack and the avoidance of pursuit. He waited on his movements, and followed him till he came to the place most suited to his dreadful purpose. He struggled with him, stabbed him, and with the coveted gold in his hand, fled swiftly from his victim. It was not a sudden surprisal, temptation, or betrayal into crime. It was murder, deliberate,

cool-blooded, avaricious murder. And now the reign of conscience commences. Now as fast and as far as he flies, the work of retrospection hurries him back. Now the clouds of retributive vengeance lower around his soul. Now he would give the world, if he could take the place of his victim. The moment the dread deed was accomplished, the iron entered into his own soul. It was not the traveller whom he struck, but himself. It was not a *man*, whom he thrust out of existence, but a *conscience into it*. The sense of guilt and of inexorable retribution, waits upon him. Nemesis, the prediction and in part the experience of justice, is behind him, within him, around him. The whole world is a moor, a wilderness, across which, with a burning hand upon his heart, he flies. He flies from justice, from himself, from Conscience, from God, but he meets them all! Miserable man! they are everywhere! His crime is everywhere, his punishment is everywhere. Miserable, miserable man!

But Justice, calm, noiseless, unimpassioned, nay, with a face almost of compassion, of deep melancholy, flies over him. His brow is dark as a thunder-cloud in the darkness of his soul. Nemesis, with her hour-glass and her sword, as steady as inexorable fate, pursues him close through every lane of life, to the appointed moment of her blow. Can the murderer escape? Can he fly into a world, where there is no Nemesis? Nay, can he fly into a world, where the past realities of his being can be annihilated, and the constitution of his being changed?

Here, in such an instance, the retrospective, retributive power of conscience is seen, felt, known. It is a glaring instance. Now there is no reason to believe that this power of conscience will be less in the future world, when the soul is made to travel back, and judge the deeds, thoughts, feelings, of its life in the light of God and eternity. There is no reason to suppose that conscience will act with less power in regard to any sin against God, than in regard to deliberate and aggravated guilt against man. Nay, if there be a difference, it must be the sins against God that conscience will visit in the most tremendous gloom, and will exercise in regard to them the severest power of retribution with which the Maker of our frame has armed this fearful penalty.

Here comes in the farther consideration of the power and operation of conscience as affected by habit, in the goings on of our moral nature, and as susceptible of a temporary perversion. The vigor and intensity of its exercise are very much influenced by our habits, at present, both of association and of action. When, for example, an

evil habit is formed, conscience ceases to reiterate her judgment so loudly in regard to every particular time in which the evil habit is indulged, but speaks more loudly at times in regard to the habit itself. Thus the conscience of an intemperate man may have ceased to torment him with every instance in which he gratifies his appetite, but sometimes in regard to the habit of intemperance which he has formed, stings and condemns him severely. Just so with a profane swearer; conscience, that at first made every oath recoil upon himself, now scarcely can keep pace with his profane expressions; he drops them without thinking of it; but yet in regard to the habit thus formed, conscience sometimes makes a dreadful outcry. In regard to particular sins conscience may seem thus for a time to be seared, and insensible, and indeed no judgment of the mind may pass in the repetition of such sins; but then, such a judgment is absolutely inevitable, when, in the light of truth, the mind reviews the habits and actions of existence.

Conscience may be lulled to sleep for a season, but the energies of this faculty are not, on this account, weakened in the least degree, their exercise being simply put off to some future period of light and conviction, perhaps a dying bed, perhaps the day of judgment. Conscience depends much upon light and training; a conscience trained in the light of God's Word acts more powerfully than the conscience of a man who is ignorant of it; but if a man be wilfully ignorant of it, this will not prevent the future and vigorous action of conscience when that man's deeds come to be reviewed in the light of it. Conscience may be perverted, and sometimes is fearfully so, by habits of wickedness, so as to put evil for good and darkness for light. Now in such a case evil deeds may really be committed under the impression that they are good deeds; but it is manifest this only shows how dreadfully evil such a man has become; and by and by, when in the light of truth those deeds are reviewed, the action of conscience in regard to them will be just as terribly severe as if they had been performed in that light. Paul speaks of some, whose very mind and conscience were defiled; the darkening, perverting, defiling power of their evil courses of action having reached to the movements of their intellect, their understanding, and moral sense. He speaks of some in their wickedness left to so strong delusion, as really to believe a lie. Now the steps, in every case, by which men arrive at such delusion, are well known and gradual; to the eye of God they are distinct, and though they may not at present be remembered by the mind, there will be a day when they will be seen as clearly as God

sees them ; and then the judgment of conscience in regard to all the acts that followed such delusion will be terribly severe.

For example, a man may be so deluded by the Devil and his own evil heart, as to deem it his duty to murder his own child ; some among the heathen practise this crime with very little if any compunction. Now a man who has ever read the Bible could not possibly come to this conclusion without perverting or rejecting its teachings ; and a man who has never seen or heard of the Scriptures, could not come to that conclusion, without doing violence to his moral nature. By and by the steps by which this violence was accomplished, and this perversion and blindness reached, will be traced, and then conscience will speak. Suppose that a man in a fit of intemperance, while actually insane under the influence of liquor, should murder his child. Are we not sure that when he becomes sober, supposing that his parental feelings have not been destroyed, his conscience will arraign him as a murderer, and do the work of remorse in regard to that crime ?

Suppose, now, that a man really and truly *believes* such an act to be his duty ; what can he do in such a case ? He will violate his conscience if he does *not* perform the act ; he will commit an enormous crime if he *does* perform it. Will he do wrong, if he refuses to perform it, while believing it to be a duty ? It may be answered in the first place, that he has neglected to use the means of enlightening himself in regard to his duty, and is responsible for all the consequences of such neglect. If he had access to the Word of God, he should have made that Word his supreme rule of duty, and it would certainly have led him right. If he were a heathen, it is certain that he has, by a previous process of sin, darkened the light of his own being, and the light, whatever it be, which has shone upon him in the goodness and the works of God. But such a case, and it is not merely imaginary, affords a dreadful instance of the war and chaos which sin may introduce into a man's being ; so that, whether he follow or reject the dictates of his conscience in a given case, he is sure to go wrong. It is a species of insanity, but not such insanity as excuses crime, but simply proves the great wickedness which the man has arrived at. When his course is reviewed in the light of truth, every step of evil he took, being known, and its consequences, the processes of the mind in regard to it, and the light disregarded and sinned against, then the things done under the rule of a perverted and darkened conscience, will be judged not by that conscience, but by conscience in the light ; and that perversion of conscience, and all

its dreadful consequences, will be the source of unfathomable remorse.

Conscience is much affected by the *example of others*, and it is sometimes silenced or perverted in multitudes together, when it would have spoken loudly and rightly in individuals. Hence that very striking injunction in the Word of God, *Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil*. A multitude support and justify one another in courses which, if the same multitude were to see one man alone pursuing, they would perhaps put him to death. This is the source of that wicked, reckless hardihood, with which nations will rush into crimes, from which almost every individual in the nation would start back aghast. There is not, perhaps, a single individual engaged in an unjust war, or voting in its favor, who would dare take the life of a fellow-creature for the non-payment of a sum of money, or still worse, to gain possession of such a sum. And yet, an unjust war, a war whose object is conquest and territory, taken by force from an independent kingdom, is murder and robbery, is unquestionably nothing else; and all the glory acquired in such an unjust war, is no more than an accumulation of the glory which a remorseless and successful bandit acquires, who rushes desperately upon an armed traveler, and overcomes and kills him. Such a murderer may show great strength, dexterity, and daring; and among his own set of fellow-murderers, he would be applauded as having covered himself with glory. And it is just such glory, and nothing better, which a nation acquires, that conquers in an unjust war. But conscience is perverted, or beneath the mad outcry of glory, is not permitted to be heard.

In much the same way, that kind of blindness and insensibility to the requirements of justice and mercy is induced, under which corporations or hierarchies will burn human beings alive, or imprison them in dungeons, for their religious faith—a thing which no single man would ever have dared to do, except under the example and command of a conclave, without considering himself a murderer. If an adherent of the Church of Rome, having heard another man declare himself an unbeliever in that Church and against the Pope, should fall upon him in a lonely place and kill him, he could not accomplish this crime without being convicted of murder. But just let a corporation of intolerant inquisitors, such as a few years ago condemned men to death in Portugal for renouncing Romanism, meet to compass the destruction of a heretic, and then every individual conscience seems to be consigned to silence or insensibility, and the crime is committed in gloomy bigotry, without remorse.

Sometimes the blindness and silence of a perverted conscience continue almost uninterrupted even to the hour of death; but generally the light of truth breaks in upon the soul, and conscience shows her power in remorse, when remorse is all that the soul seems capable of. There are some striking and impressive instances in history, and one which is related by Hume himself, in a manner that would seem to indicate in his own mind some serious belief in that future existence and retribution at which he afterwards scoffed. It was the end of Henry VII., a monarch of England, distinguished for his insatiable avarice. "When he found he could live no longer, he began," says Hume, "to cast his eye towards that future existence, which the iniquities and severities of his reign rendered a very dismal prospect to him. To allay the terrors under which he labored, he endeavored by distributing alms and founding religious houses, to make atonement for his crimes, and to purchase by the sacrifice of a part of his ill-gotten treasures, a reconciliation with his offended Maker. Remorse even seized him at intervals, for the abuse of his authority by Empson and Dudley, but not sufficient to make him stop the rapacious hand of those oppressors." Poor rich monarch! beneath the terrors of an angry conscience, of what avail were all thine ill-gotten possessions? How gladly at that hour would the king have changed places with the beggar, for a mind at peace with God!

Such an instance reveals impressively one of the most undoubted laws under which conscience acts, and that is, the impulse of restitution, and the feeling of the soul's need of an atonement. The soul, indeed, that does not flee to Christ, endeavors to *make* an atonement *by* restitution; but that never gives peace, never can. The soul that rests on Christ's forgiving love, seeks to make restitution, not as an atonement, or for the purchase of pardon, but out of the impulse of love itself and humble sorrow. Thus we read of Zaccheus, that as soon as he came to Christ, he made restitution fourfold; but not as any purchase of peace to his conscience, or of acceptance with his Saviour, but as the fruit of a loving, repentant heart. So we read, from time to time, of instances of restitution performed secretly, money sent back where it has been fraudulently taken; but whether as the mere work of a guilty conscience, or the fruit of a contrite spirit, we cannot tell.

Without the light of God's Word, a man's conscience may easily become perverted, so as to be, in many cases, no safe guide; but it becomes so because of his own sin. Whatever light is disregarded, whether it be the light of nature or of the Scriptures, conscience is defrauded, and there will be a time of revenge. If light

admitted to the conscience arms it with present authority, light rejected, or voluntarily withheld, arms it with a future authority and terror, when that light shall be made to shine upon the soul. The light of nature and the light of God's Word may be so completely neglected, or so shut out by long habits of ignorance and sin, that the light of conscience itself may be turned into darkness, as in the cases supposed; and it is to such a state of the mind that Christ's words refer, *If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!* How dreadful that degree of wickedness, which could come to such a point!

A great multitude of men's sins are committed in the dark, or in the absence of that light, which would have condemned them beforehand, and perhaps prevented them, or rather we should say, without the notice of that light, for it is always shining, but men form the habit of disregarding it, the habit of insensibility to its presence. The fact, for instance, is always known, that the eye of God is upon us, but how few men remember this fact, and in their evil deliberations, or dealings, or neglects of duty, proceed under the consciousness of it. They become insensible to it, and live and act as if God did not see them. If every man proceeded in the direct beams of God's eye, if in the moment of temptation he saw and felt the light of God's countenance, the eye of God fixed upon him, he could not do that wickedness. If the evil deed before him were under the intensity of a direct flash of the Almighty's countenance, as the beams of the sun direct and intense upon an object before the physical sight, the most hardened man, it would seem, could no more advance to that evil deed, than he would take in his hand a coiled and deadly serpent, or a coal of living fire. But this sense of God, his presence, his light, his eye, upon the heart and on the life, most men do not possess, or endeavor to cultivate. Yet it does not follow from this that their evil deeds are committed in ignorance, darkness, or forgetfulness. There is a general light, in which all men live, and it is like the light of open day, which we do not particularly notice, it is so common, though if a shaft of light, direct light, were falling from the sun upon us, or an object in our path, we should notice it.

Now the point of importance in regard to the operations of conscience is this; that though those operations may not be active now, in the midst of the mind's insensibility, and voluntary blindness towards God, they will be as active, by and by, as they would or could have been, if the mind, even in the commission of sin, had been conscious of God's eye direct upon the deed. The light that is now dis-

regarded is to shine again ; the evil thought, deed, word, is to be seen in that light ; the neglect of duty, whatever it was, is to be judged in that light ; and that light will be one of the materials for remorse. Men ought not, therefore, to comfort themselves in their wickedness, in their neglect of prayer, in their insensibility towards God and eternity, by the fact that they are not now convicted, do not see things now as God sees them, or that conscience sleeps ; for conscience will awake, and all this light that has been rejected will be round about her, arming her with authority, while all this cloud, in which the soul had wrapped itself in a world of time and sense, will be dispersed, and everything will be seen as it is, as God has always seen it, as the soul would have seen it, if passion had not stood in the way.

The operations of conscience will be conducted in reference to four things. There will be a judgment of the mind, first, in regard to right and wrong in itself, and the sense of this distinction in the mind ; second, in regard to the motive, the aim and disposition of the soul, out of which issued the course of a man's life and conduct ; third, in regard to the law of God, the light which shone from it ; and fourth, in regard to God himself and his own holiness. As to the first point, there is the idea with which we started, of the distinction between right and wrong in the soul, and it is eternal ; there is a sense of right and wrong, and it can never be obliterated, though it may for a season be greatly obscured and perverted by sin. It is not factitious, not artificial, not dependent upon external teachings, being the very thing to which external teachings, even the teachings of God's Word, appeal. Thus, when Christ says, Do to others as ye would they should do to you, this precept has weight with us, not merely because he has given it, but because by the very constitution which he has given us beforehand, we feel and know that it is right. In teaching it to us, and giving it the authority of a special command, in addition to the authority of conscience, arising from our own constitution, he appeals to the sense of right and wrong within us. So when he says, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc., here again, the precept is not *merely* authoritative, because it is his command, but because it is just and right, and we feel and know it to be so, by the very necessity of the constitution he has given us. We are not merely taught this from abroad, but this teaching makes its appeal to the sense of right and wrong, which God has made eternal in our own souls. Thus the most important external precepts for the regulation of our hearts and lives are merely a reproduction, in a direct external form, of the laws of our own being. Or if not such, they so appeal to the sense

of right and wrong, the idea of what is just and good within us, that this sense repeats and sanctions those precepts.

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God is such a precept as grows inevitably out of the mind's own sense of its obligations of gratitude and love to the Author of our being and the Giver of all our mercies. Now the utterance of that precept in the mind, for example, of a heathen, may have been prevented, or rendered indistinct and dim by long habits of sin, but when it comes to be enforced by external teaching, when it comes as a command of God, it is sure, unless there be the most dreadful blindness and perversion, to meet a response in the soul's own sense of what is right. In some minds this sense seems to be stronger than others, but in all it is strong enough to form a basis for the operations of conscience, a fundamental rule, in regard to which this faculty will proceed in its judgments. And if this were all, if the operations of conscience stopped here, there would be still abundant material for condemnation, for conviction, for Remorse. If we all were to be judged merely for our violations of our own sense of right and wrong, it would be a fearful judgment that we should have to go through. And if Memory had no other business but to bring before us these instances, and Remorse no other materials to play upon, if the sight and sense of these things were continued with us, this alone would render us eternally miserable.

That there is within us this instinct and arrangement of self-retribution, no man can doubt, who calmly and impartially examines his own experience. But in the present state, it has been remarked by a profound writer, the infatuations of self-love defend every mind from the application to itself of the desire of retribution, just as the principle of animal life defends the vital organs of a body from the chemical action of its own caustic secretions. And we may add, just as all men think all men mortal but themselves. When these infatuations are quite dispersed in the eternal world, then the instinct of justice, perhaps the most potent of all the elements of spiritual life, will turn inward upon each consciously guilty heart, so that every such heart shall become the prey of a reflected rage, intense and corrosive as the most virulent revenge. Whoever is now hurrying on without thought of consequences through a course of crimes, would do well to imagine the condition of a being left without relief to breathe upon itself the flames of insatiable hatred.

Now it is doubtless the instinctive premonition, when men are on the verge of dying, that this process of judgment and of self-revenge is about to commence, together with all the retributive operations on

the part of God, ever predicted by conscience, that makes the terror of Remorse so active at the close of the sinner's life. It is one of the clearest, most invariable laws under which conscience acts, that the hour of dying for the mortal frame is the hour of quickened life and energy for this tremendous faculty. Conscience almost always rouses up at the approach of death, and resumes its power as the soul nears the eternal world, just as the master of a pirate ship, who has retired to the cabin in calm weather, takes the helm in a storm, when the vessel is rushing to destruction. So a storm is the element of conscience; the rapids, the breakers, the midnight tempest, the passage from time into eternity, are the scene of her command. If the soul be not sprinkled with atoning blood, it is the command of despair. All is hurry, confusion, wild outcry and unconquerable terror. And the revelation of the power of conscience at such an hour demonstrates its fearfulness as an eternal possession of the soul.

We have said that this penalty of conscience, if one man could visit it upon others, would be deemed a stern and awful vengeance; but no man accuses it of cruelty, no man accuses either himself or God of injustice, when writhing under the agony of a wrathful conscience. And this is a most instructive warning to those blind fools of an unbelieving philosophy, who would exclude the idea and the reality of punishment from human and Divine theology and government, calling it revengeful and unjust. And why do ye not, ye blind guides, ye fools of nature, and of the blinding god of this world, why do ye not accuse men themselves of vengeance and injustice, when the elements of their own being execute upon themselves a retribution more terrible than the energies, sagacities, and contrivances of the material universe could summon up! A retribution compared with which, if it could be removed, if conscience could be silenced and lulled, all the tortures that men or devils could inflict, would be nothing. Why do ye not accuse God himself of injustice and revenge, because he has made men so fearfully and wonderfully, with such inevitable powers and certainties of self-punishment and retribution? Ye blind guides! Reasoning against retribution, when retribution is at work within you! Reasoning against the government of God and eternal justice, when you are doing upon yourselves the very work of the Divine government, and the sorest part of retributive vengeance. Ye may heave up against this great doctrine of a judgment to come, and a final retribution, but ye cannot pass out from under it; it falls back upon you, and ye do its work upon yourselves. Ye may reason against retribution, but it is a necessity as inexorable as

the memory of sin. Ye might as well reason against the fact of your own existence, as the fact of a retributive punishment; there is no denying it; it exists, even in this world.

But, in this world, who does not know, who does not feel, that it is imperfect; that it is but a shadow, a forecasting, a prediction, of the judgment and the perfect retribution to come? It is real, because God would have us know, from experience as well as his Word, what is before us, and so be urged to flee from the wrath to come. It is partial and imperfect, because there is mercy, mercy in Christ for whomsoever it be who will avail himself of it; because it is meant not now as retribution, but warning, because the executed full righteousness of it, would be everlasting destruction — the experience of it would be hell itself. It is imperfect now, because this is a world of probation, in which salvation is offered on coming to a Redeemer, by whom God invites us to escape that great retribution, of which this lower one is but a type, a warning, a foretaste; that last, overwhelming evil, of which this small, imperfect shadow, is God's admonitory messenger of love.

This was our last point of consideration, the power of conscience eternal. And here there is no room for questioning, or doubt, or denial. There is no faculty of our immortal nature, which will not be a part of our immortal existence. As man was formed in the image of God, so will he come before God in judgment. Every intelligent being in the eternal world, will possess a conscience in the fullest, clearest light and power of its operation. Those operations will have a decisiveness, a majesty, a glory like the voice of God, and an irreversible certainty, admitting no possibility of mistake, or darkness, or alteration, or appeal. But a conscience at peace with God, and working in the light of God's countenance, in harmony with God's love, is not to be dreaded in the eternal world, nor in this world. It is a sinful conscience, the operations of which are so terrible, when eternal. But, admit the possibility of a man dying in his sins, and you have him dying with conscience for his enemy. You have him with his sins in the next world, and conscience there also doing the work of retribution. That men die in their sins, is a fact as well established, as that they live in sin here; and that some men die, knowing and declaring that the fire of conscience is an eternal fire, is a fact as well established as that men are ever convinced of sin at all.

Will conscience stop, because the soul, throwing off its covering of clay, has gone into the presence of a holy God? Will conscience

stop, because it has gone where all the witnesses of secret as well as open sins are gathered together, where every crime will be known, every step of life visible, every sin against God and man, with every aggravating circumstance? Or will conscience stop when the judgment goes on, and condemnation is pronounced, and the sentence is uttered, and the destiny of the soul is closed up forever? Will conscience stop, because despair takes the place of hope, because all is lost, and there is no more possibility of a remedy? Will not the triumph, and the power, and the retribution of conscience then be inexorable and eternal, when it has to say to the sinner, You have finished your work of self-destruction? You have gone beyond the limits, where God's compassionate forbearance had waited for you, and up to which you might have repented and been saved. You have made your last rejection of Christ, wasted your last opportunity of mercy, and ruined yourself beyond the power of conscience, or of providence, or of truth, or of grace itself to save you. O undone, undone soul! What would it not give to step back, one little hour, into this world of mercy, and hear Christ's voice of mercy, saying, Come unto me!

The faculty of conscience is eternal, its power is eternal; and yet, in this world that power is exercised in condemnation, simply that the soul may be induced to escape from its eternal exercise. The penal power of conscience in this world, inflicting such terror and distress, is God's own merciful arrangement to arouse the soul and send it to Christ, that in him it may find a refuge from the accusing power and penal operation of conscience through eternity. When the soul, fleeing to him from the wrath to come, hears his gracious voice, Thy sins be forgiven thee, and is washed in the fountain of his atoning blood, then, and not till then, is the conscience at peace with God; then, and not till then, can conviction of sin be anything but anguish. In Christ it may be changed into gratitude and love; in Christ it may and must immeasurably deepen the sense of the greatness of his redeeming mercy; it may be the material, out of which his matchless dying love brings a living blessedness. It is God's school-master, with his own law, to bring the soul to Christ, and make it feel, as it never could otherwise do, the greatness, the preciousness, the glory of his love. Out of Christ, away from Christ, unforgiven, it reveals nothing but the righteous penalty of sin, the wrath of God, the misery of the soul, and no escape, no remedy. In Christ it reveals the depths of forgiving mercy, the love of God, the unsearchable riches of Christ, the boundless glory of redemption. **Amazing**

mercy! wondrous grace, which can thus change death into life, and make the assurance of being the very chief of sinners, the foundation of endless, inexhaustible bliss, of which the rule is, that the deeper the conviction of guilt, the greater the experience and knowledge of the glory and happiness of deliverance! Such was the experience of Paul; such is the experience of every redeemed sinner, now, and in glory everlasting.

ARTICLE II.

THE RELATION OF STYLE TO THOUGHT.

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In a previous article¹ we endeavored to specify the general relation of language to thought, and to maintain the truth of that theory which regards human language as springing spontaneously from the nature and wants of man. The connection that exists between language and the thought conveyed by it was conceived to be that which exists between any, and every, living principle, and the sensible form, in which it appears to the senses — a *vital* and *organic* connection. Although it was freely conceded that it would perhaps be impossible, to detect this *vitality* of connection with the particular thought expressed, in the case of every word in the language, it was yet maintained that language as a whole, is characterized by a propriety and fitness for the purpose for which it exists which must have sprung from some deeper and more living ground than custom and the principle of association. It was also thought that the theory is a fruitful one in itself, both for the philologist and the philosopher, and that it furnishes the best clue to that more vital, and consequently less easily explicable, use of language, employed by the poet and the orator.

Indeed, the truth and fruitfulness of the theory in question, are nowhere more apparent than in the department of rhetoric and criticism. This department takes special cognizance of the more living and animated forms of speech — of the glow of the poet, and the fire of the orator. It also investigates all those peculiarities of construction and form in human composition that spring out of individual

¹ Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. V. No. XX.

characteristics. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that a theory of language, which recognises a power in human thought to organise and vivify and modify the forms in which it appears, will afford the best light in which to examine those forms; just as it is natural to suppose that the commonly received theory of physical life, will furnish a better light in which to examine vegetable and animal productions, than a theory like that of Descartes, e. g. which maintains that the forms and functions in the animal kingdom are the result of a mechanical principle. Life itself is the best light in which to contemplate living things.

We propose in the present article to follow the same general method pursued in the preceding, and examine the nature of style, by pointing out its relation to thought.

Style is the particular manner in which thought flows out, in the case of the individual mind, and upon a particular subject. When, therefore, it has, as it always should have, a free and spontaneous origin, it partakes of the peculiarity, both of the individual and of the topic upon which he thinks. A genuine style, therefore, is the free and pure expression of the individuality of the thinker and the speciality of the subject of thought. Uniformity of style is consequently found in the productions of the same general cast of mind, applied to the same general class of subjects, so that there is no distinguishable period in the history of a nation's literature, but what exhibits a style of its own. The spirit of the age appears in the general style of its literary composition, and the spirit of the individual — the tone of his mind — nowhere comes out more clearly than in his manner of handling a subject. The grave, lofty and calm style of the Elizabethan age is an exact representation of the spirit of its thinking men. The intellectual temperament of the age of Queen Anne flows out in the clear, but diffuse and nerveless style of the essayists.

From this it is easy to see that style, like language, has a spontaneous and natural origin, and a living connection with thought. It is not a manner of composing, arbitrarily or even designedly chosen, but rises of its own accord, and in its own way, in the general process of mental development. The more unconscious its origin, and the more strongly it partakes of the individuality of the mind, the more genuine is style. Only let it be carefully observed in this connection, that a *pure* and *sincere* expression of the individual peculiarity is intended.* Affectation of originality and studied effort after peculiarity produce *mannerism*, in distinction from that manner of pure nature, which alone merits the name of style.

If this be true, it is evident that the union of all styles, or of a portion of them, would not constitute a perfect style. On the contrary, the excellence of style consists in its having a bold and determined character of its own — in its bearing the genuine image and superscription of an individual mind at work upon a particular subject. In a union of many different styles, there would be nothing simple, bold, and individual. The union would be a mixture, rather than a union, in which each ingredient would be neutralized by all, and all by each, leaving a residuum characterless, spiritless, and lifeless.

Style, in proportion as it is genuine and excellent, is sincere and artless. It is the free and unconscious emanation of the individual nature. It alters as the individual alters. In early life it is ardent and adorned; in mature life it is calm and grave. In youth it is flushed with fancy and feeling; in manhood it is sobered by reason and reflection. But in both periods it is the genuine expression of the man. The gay manner of *L'Allegro* and *Comus* is as truly natural and spontaneous, as the grave and stately style of *Paradise Regained* and *Samson Agonistes*. The individuality of a man like *Milton* passes through great varieties of culture and of mood, and there is seen a corresponding variety in the ways in which it communicates itself; yet through this variety there runs the unity of nature; each sort of style is the sincere and pure manner of the same individual taken in a particular stage of his development.

No one style, therefore, can be said to be the best of all absolutely, but only relatively. That is the best style relatively to the individual, in which his particular cast of thought best utters itself, and in which the peculiarity of the individual has the fullest and freest play. That may be called a good style generally, in which every word *tells* — in which the language is full of thought, and alive with thought, and so fresh and vigorous as to seem to have been just created — while at the same time the characteristics of the mind that is pouring out in this particular manner, are all in every part, as the constructing and vivifying principle.

The truth of this view of style is both confirmed and illustrated by considering the unity in variety exhibited by the human mind itself. The mind of man is one and the same in its constitution and necessary laws, so that the human race may be said to be possessed of one universal intelligence. In the language of one of the most elegant and philosophic of English critics,¹ "It is no unpleasing speculation

¹ Harris. Preface to *Hermes*.

to see how the *same reason*, has at all times prevailed : how there is *one truth*, like one sun, that has enlightened human intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness of sophistry and error." Upon this sameness of intelligence rest all absolute statements, and all universal appeals. Over against this universal human mind, as its corresponding object and counterpart, stands truth universal in its nature and one and the same in its essence.

But besides this unity of the universal, there is the variety of the individual, mind. Truth, consequently, coming into consciousness in the form of thought in an individual mind, undergoes modifications. It is now contemplated not as universal and abstract, but as concrete and in its practical relations. It is, moreover, seen, not as an unity, but in its parts, and one side at a time. Philosophical truth in Plato differs from philosophical truth in Aristotle, by a very marked modification. Poetical truth is one thing in Homer and another in Virgil. Religious truth assumes a strikingly different form in Paul and Luther, from that which it wears in John and Melancthon. And yet poetry, philosophy, and religion, have each their universal principles—their one abstract nature. Each, however, *appears* in the form imposed upon it by the individual mind ; each wears that tinge of the mind through which it has passed, which is denominated style.

No man has yet appeared whose individuality was so comprehensive and universal, and who was such a master of form, that he exhausted the whole material of poetry, or philosophy, or religion, and exhibited it in a style and form absolutely universal and final. Enough is ever left of truth, even after the most comprehensive presentation, for another individuality to show it in still a new and original form. For there is no limit to the manner of contemplating infinite and universal truth. Provided only there be a peculiarity—a particular type of the human mind—there will be a peculiarity of intuition, and consequently of exhibition.

The most comprehensive and universal individual mind was that of Shakspeare, and hence his productions have less of style, of peculiar manner, than all other literary productions. Who can describe the style of Shakspeare? Who is aware of his style? The style of Milton is apparent in every line, for he was one of the most *suigenerie* of men. But the form which truth takes in Shakspeare, is as comprehensive and universal as the drama, as all mankind. This is owing to that Protean power by which, for the purposes of dramatic art, he converts himself into other men, takes their consciousness, and thereby temporarily loses his own limited individuality.

But that Shakspeare was an individual — that a peculiar type of humanity formed the basis of his personal being, and that he had a style of thought of his own, it would be absurd to doubt. And had he attempted other species of composition than the drama, (which by its very nature requires that the individuality of the author be sunk and lost entirely in the various characters,) had he taken like Milton a particular theme as the “great argument” for his poetic power, doubtless the *man*, the *individual*, would have come into sight.¹

Style of expression thus springing out of the style of thought, is therefore immediately connected with the structure and character of the individual mind. It consequently has an unconscious origin. On the basis laid in the individual's characteristics, and by and through the individual's mental growth, his manner of expression is formed. There is a certain style which fits the individual — which, and no other, is his style. It is that manner of presenting thought, into which he naturally falls, when his mind is deeply absorbed in a subject, and when he gives no heed to the form into which his thought is running.

It is not to be inferred from this, that style has no connection with culture. It has a most immediate and vital connection with the individual's education. Not only all that he is by nature, but all that he becomes by culture, tends to form his style of thought and expression; but, be it observed, *unconsciously* to him. For an incessant aim, a conscious, anxious effort to form a given style, is the destruction of style. Under such an inspection and oversight, Nature cannot work, even if the mind, under such circumstances, could absorb itself in the theme of reflection. There must be no consciousness during the time and process of composing, but of the subject. The subject being all in all, for the thinker, the form into which his thought runs, with all the modification and coloring which it really, though *unconsciously* to him, receives from his individualism, and from the whole past of his education, is his *style* — his genuine and true manner.

The point to be observed here is, that style is the *consequent*, so far as it is related to culture. For, the culture itself takes its direction and character from the original tendency of the individual, (for everyone in the end obtains a mental development coincident with his

¹ In corroboration of this, it may be remarked that we have far more sense of the *individuality* of Shakspeare, while perusing his poems and sonnets, than while studying his dramas.

mental bias,) and style is but the unconscious manifestation of this culture. Style—genuine style—can never be the conscious antecedent of culture. It cannot be first selected, and then the whole individuality of the mind, and the whole course of education, be forced to contribute to its realization. One cannot antecedently choose the style of Burke, e. g. as that which he would have for his own, and then deliberately realize his choice. It is true that a mind similar to that of Burke in its structure, and in sympathy with him through a similarly fruitful and opulent culture, would spontaneously form its style upon, and with, his. But the process, in this case, would not be a deliberate and conscious imitation, but an unconscious and genial reproduction. It would be the consequent of nature and of culture, and not the antecedent. The individual would not distinctly know that his was the style of Burke, until it became apparent to others that it actually was.

Here, too, as in every sphere in which the *living* soul of man works, do we find the genuine and beautiful product, originating freely, spontaneously, and unconsciously. Freely, for it might have been a false and deformed product, yet spontaneously and unconsciously—for it cannot be the subject of reflection and matter of distinct knowledge, until *after* it has come into existence. By the thronging stress and tendency of the human soul, which is so created as to contain within itself the principle and direction of its own movement, is the product originated, which then, and not till then, is the possible and legitimate subject of consciousness, analysis, and criticism. The style of a thinking mind is no exception to this universal law. It is formed, when formed according to nature—when formed as it was destined to be, by that creative idea which prescribes the whole never-ending development of the creature—it is formed out of what is laid in the individual constitution, and through what is brought in by the individual culture, unconsciously to the subject of the process, and yet freely, so far as his nature and constitution are concerned.

If the view that has been taken of style, be correct, it is evident, that in the formation of style, no attempt should be made to change the fundamental character imposed upon it by the individual constitution. The type is fixed by nature, and no one should strive, by forcing nature, to obtain a manner essentially alien and foreign to him. The sort of style which belongs to the individual, by his intellectual constitution is to be taken as given. The direction which all culture in this relation takes, should proceed from this as a point of

departure, and all discipline and effort should end in an acquisition that is homogeneous with this *substantial ground* of style. Or still more accurately, the individuality itself is to be deepened and made more capacious and distinct, by culture, and is then to be poured forth in that *heartly, unconscious* purity of manner which is its proper and genuine style.

And this leads us to consider the true method of forming and cultivating style.

If the general view that has been presented of the nature, both of language and style, be correct, it is plain that the mind itself, rather than the style itself, should receive the formation and the cultivation. Both language and style are but *forms* in which the human mind embodies its thought, and therefore the mind, considered as the originating power — as that which is to find an utterance and expression — should be the chief object of culture, even in relation to style. A cultivated mind contains within itself resources sufficient for all its purposes. The direct cultivation of the mind, is the indirect cultivation of all that stands connected with it.

And this is eminently true of the formal, in distinction from the material departments of knowledge — of those “organic (or instrumental) acts,” as Milton calls them, “which enable men to discourse and write perspicuously, elegantly, and according to the fitted style of lofty, mean or lowly.” For inasmuch as these formal departments of knowledge are not self-sufficient but derive their substance from the material departments, it is plain that they can be cultivated* with power and success only through the cultivation of these latter. Rhetoric, in order to be anything more than an idle play with words and figures of speech — in order to a substantial existence, and an energetic power, must spring out of logic; and logic again, in order to be something more than a dry and useless permutation of the members of syllogisms, must be grounded in the necessary laws of thought, and so become but the inevitable and living movement of reason. Thus are we led in from the external to the internal as the solid ground of action and origination, and are made to see that culture must begin here, in every instance, and work out. All these arts and sciences are the architecture of the rational and thinking mind of man, and all changes in them, either in the way of growth or decline, proceed from a change that has first taken place in their originating ground. They are in reality the index of the human mind and show with most delicate sensibility all that is passing, in this ever-moving principle. What are the languages, literatures, laws, governments, and (with

one exception) religions of the globe, but the history of the human mind — the outstanding monument of what it has *thought*!

It may be said with perfect truth, therefore, that the formation and cultivation of the mind, is the true method of forming and cultivating style. And there are two qualities in mental culture which exert such a direct and powerful influence upon style as to merit in this connection a particular and close examination. They are depth and clearness.

(1) By depth of culture is meant that development of the mind *from its centre*, which enables it to exert its very best power and to accomplish the utmost of which it is capable. The individual mind differs in respect to innate capacity. Some men are created with a richer and more powerful intellectual constitution than others. But all are capable of a *profound* culture; of a development that shall bring out the entire contents and capacity, be they more or less. By going to the centre of the mind — by setting into play those profounder faculties which though differing in degree, are yet the same in kind, in every man, a culture is attained that exerts a most powerful and excellent influence upon style. Such mental education gives *body* to style. It furnishes the material which is to *fill* the language and *solidify* the discourse. The form in which a profoundly cultivated mind expresses itself is never hollow; the language which it employs not being alone — mere words — is never dead. It may, perhaps, be silent at times, for such a mind is not necessarily fluent, but when it *does* speak, the product has a marked character. The thought and its expression form an identity; are coined at one stroke.

For a deeply educated mind spontaneously seeks to know truth in its reality and to express it in its simplicity. Unconsciously, because it is its nature to do so, it penetrates to the heart of a subject, and discourses upon it with a simplicity and directness which precludes any separation between the thought and the words in which it is conveyed. The mind which has but a superficial knowledge of the subject-matter of its discourse cannot render the language it employs *consubstantial* with its thought. We feel that the words have been *hunted up* by a vacant mind, instead of *prompted* by a full one. Thought and language stand apart, because thought has not reached that degree of profundity, and that point of clear intuition, and that height of energy, in consciousness, at which it utters itself in language that is truly one with itself, and alive with itself. Whenever a profoundly cultivated mind directs itself to an object of contemplation it becomes identical with it, while in the act of contemplation. The

distinction between the contemplating subject, and the contemplated object, vanishes for the time being; the mind, as we say popularly, and yet with strict philosophic truth, is *lost* in the theme, and the theme during this temporary process, becomes but a particular state of the mind. The object of contemplation, which at first was *before* the mind is now *in* the mind; that to which the mind came up as to a thing objective and extant, has now been transmuted into the very consciousness of the mind itself, and is therefore the mind itself, *taken and held in this temporary process*.¹ It follows, consequently, that the *style* in which this fusion of truth with intellect flows out, must be as near the perfection of form as it can be. The style of such a mind is similar to the style of the Infinite mind, as it is seen in nature. It is characterized by the simplicity and freedom of nature itself. Nor let this be regarded either as irreverent or extravagant. We are confessedly within the sphere of the finite and the created, and therefore are at an infinite remove from Him "who is wonderful in working," and yet there is something strongly resembling the workings of creative power, in the operations of a mind deeply absorbed in truth and full of the idea. As the Divine idea becomes a phenomenon — manifests itself in external nature — by its own movement and guidance, it necessarily assumes the very perfection of manner. The great attributes of nature, the sublimity and beauty of creation, arise from the oneness of the form with the idea — of the transfusion of mind into matter. In like manner, though in an infinitely lower sphere and degree, the human idea, profound, full, and clear in consciousness, throws itself out into language, in a style, free, simple, beautiful, and it may be, sublime like nature itself. And all this arises because thought does its own perfect work — because truth arrived at in the consciousness of the profound thinker is simply suffered to exercise its own vitality and to organize itself into existence.

¹ The doctrine of the identity of subject and object in the act of consciousness is a true and safe one, it seems to us, only when stated with the limitation above; only when the identity is regarded as merely *relative* — as existing only *in, and during the act of consciousness*. If, however, the identity is regarded as *absolute and essential* — if apart from consciousness and back of consciousness the subject and object — the mind and the truth — are absolutely but one essence, then we see no difference between the doctrine and that of the "*substantia una et unica*" of Spinoza. The identity in this case, notwithstanding the disclaimer of Schelling, is *sameness* of substance, and there is but one substance in the universe. The truth is, that subject and object are not absolutely, one essence, but two; but *become* one temporarily, in the act of consciousness, by virtue of a *homogeneity*, rather than an absolute identity of essence.

It is not so much because the individual makes an effort to embody the results of his meditation, as because these results have their own way, and take their own form, that the style of their appearance is so grand. It has been asserted above, that style, in its most abstract definition, is the universal, appearing in the particular. In other words, it is the particular and peculiar manner, in which the individual mind conceives and expresses truth, which is universal. Now it is only by and through *depth* of mental cultivation, that truth, in its absolute reality and in its vital energy, is reached at all. A superficial education never reaches the heart of a subject — never brings the mind into contact and fusion with the real substance of the topic of discourse. Of course, a mind thus superficially educated, in reality has nothing to express. It has not reached that depth of apprehension, that central point, where the solid and real truth lies, at which, and only at which, it is qualified to discourse. It may, it is true, speak *about* the given topic, but before it can speak it *out*, in a grand, impressive style, and in discourse which, while it is weighty and solid, also dilates and thrills and glows with the living verity, it must, by deep thought, have effected that *mental union* with it, of which we have spoken.

A mind, on the contrary, that has received a central development, and whose power of contemplation is strong, instead of working at the surface, and about the accidents, strikes down into the heart and essence, and obtains an actual view of truth; and under the impulse imparted by it, and by the light radiated from it at all points, simply represents it. In all this there is no effort at expression — no endeavor at style — on the part of the individual. He is but the medium of communication, now that by his own voluntary thought, the union between his mind and truth, has been brought about. All that he needs to do is, to absorb himself still more profoundly in the great theme, and to let it use him as its organ. It will flow through his individualism, and take form and hue from it, as inevitably as the formless and colorless light, acquires both form and color, by coming into the beautiful arch of the sky.

(2) By clearness, as an element in culture, is meant such an education of the mind, as arms it with a penetrating and clear vision, so that it beholds objects in distinct outline. When united with depth of culture, this element is of great worth, and diffuses through the productions of the mind, some of the most desirable qualities. Depth, without clearness of intuition, is obscurity. Though there may be substantial thinking, and real truth may be reached by the

mind, yet, like the *élan* out of which the material universe was formed, according to the ancient philosophy, it needs to be irradiated by light, before it becomes a defined, distinct, and beautiful form. Indeed, without clearness of intuition, truth must remain in the depths of the mind, and cannot be really expressed. The mind, without close and clear thinking, is but a dark chaos of ideas, intimations, and feelings. It is true, that in these is the substance of truth, for the human mind is, by its constitution, full of truth; yet these its contents need to be *elaborated*. These undefined ideas need to become clear conceptions; these dark and pregnant intimations need to be converted into substantial verities; and these swelling but vague feelings must acquire definition and shape, not merely that the consciousness of one mind may be conveyed over into that of another, but also in order to the mind's full understanding of itself.

And such culture manifests itself in the purity and perspicuity of the style in which it conveys its thoughts. Having a distinctly clear apprehension of truth, the mind utters its conceptions with all that simplicity and pertinence of language which characterizes the narrative of an honest eye-witness. Nothing intervenes between thought and expression. The clear, direct view, *instantaneously* becomes the clear, direct statement. And when the clear conception is thus united with the profound intuition, thought assumes its most perfect form. The form in which it appears, is full and round with solid truth, and yet distinct and transparent. The immaterial principle is embodied in just the right amount of matter; the former does not overflow, nor does the latter overlay. The discourse exhibits the same opposite and counterbalancing excellencies, which we see in the forms of nature — the simplicity and the richness, the negligence and the niceness, the solid opacity and the aerial transparency.¹

¹ Shakspeare affords innumerable exemplifications of the characteristic here spoken of. In the following passages notice the *purity* and *cleanliness* of the style in which he exhibits his thought. As in a perfect embodiment in nature, there is nothing ragged, or to be sloughed off:

* * * Chaste as the icicle

That's curdled by the frost from purest snow,
And hangs on Dian's temple.

Coriolanus, V. 3.

* * * * * This hand

As soft as dove's down, and as white as it;
Or Ethiopian's tooth, or the fann'd snow,
That's bolted by the northern blasts twice o'er.

Winter's Tale, IV. 3.

It is rare to find such a union of the two main elements of culture, and consequently rare to find them in style. A profoundly contemplative mind is often mystic and vague in its discourse, because it has not come to a clear, as well as profound consciousness—because distinctness has not gone along with depth of apprehension. The discourse of such a mind is thoughtful and suggestive it may be, but is lacking in that scientific, logical power which penetrates and illumines. It has warmth and glow, it may be, but it is the warmth of the stove (to use the comparison of another)—warmth without light.

On the other hand it often happens that the culture of the mind is clear but shallow. In this case nothing but the merest and most obvious commonplace is uttered, in a manner intelligible and plain enough to be sure, but without force or weight, or even genuine fire, of style. Shallow waters show a very clear bottom, and but little intensity of light is needed in order to display the pebbles and clean sand. That must be a “purest ray serene”—a pencil of strongest light—which discloses the black, rich, wreck-strown depths. For the clearness of depth is very different from the clearness of shallowness. The former is a positive quality. It is the positive and powerful irradiation of that which is solid and dark, by that which is ethereal and light. The latter is a negative quality. It is the mere absence of darkness, because there is no substance to be dark—no body in which (if we may be allowed the expression) darkness can inhere. Nothing is more luminous than solid fire; nothing is more flashy than an ignited void.

These two fundamental characteristics of mental culture, lie at the foundation of style. Even if the secondary qualities of style could exist, without the weightiness and clearness of manner which spring from the union of profound with distinct apprehension, they would exist in vain. The ornament is worthless, if there is nothing to sustain it. The bas-relief is worthless without the slab to support it.

Or if that surly spirit, melancholy,
Had baked thy blood, and made it heavy, thick;
Which else runs tickling up and down the veins.

King John, III. 2.

And I, of ladies most defect and wretched,
That sucked the honey of his music vows,
Now see that noble and most sovereign reason,
Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune, and harsh.

Hamlet, III. 1.

But, these secondary qualities of style—the beauty, and the elegance, and the harmony—derive all their charm and power from springing out of the primary qualities, and in this way ultimately, out of the deep and clear culture of the mind itself—from being the white flower of the black root.

Style, when having this mental and natural origin, is to be put into the first class of fine forms. It is the form of thought; and, as a piece of art, is as worthy of study and admiration, as those glorious material forms which embody the ideas of Phidias, Michael Angelo, and Raphael. It is the form in which the human mind manifests its freest, purest, and most mysterious activity—its thought. There is nothing mechanical in its origin, or stale in its nature. It is plastic and fresh as the immortal energy, of which it is the air and bearing.

ARTICLE III.

THE FOUR GOSPELS AS WE NOW HAVE THEM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, AND THE HEGELIAN ASSAULTS UPON THEM.

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IN this essay I propose to discuss the following topics:

I. The value of the four gospels as we now have them in the New Testament.

II. Religious character of the Hegelian philosophy.

III. Analysis and characteristics of the principal Hegelian assaults on the gospels.

IV. The real importance to be attributed to these assaults.

V. Comparison of the canonical gospels with the apocryphal gospels still extant.

VI. Comparison of the canonical gospels with the fragments of gospels supposed to be lost.

VII. What may be actually known as to the genuineness and incorruptness of the gospels as we now have them in the New Testament.

VIII. General results of the whole discussion.

For the benefit of the reader who may wish to pursue the investigation, I will also select, from the very copious literature of the subject, a few of the best and most instructive works on both sides.

1. Strauss (Dav. Fred.), Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet. 2te Auflage, 2 Theile, Tübingen, 1839. 2. Weisse (Chr. Herm.), Die evangelische Geschichte kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet. Leipzig, 1838. 3. Gfrörer (Aug. F.), Geschichte des Urchristenthums. 5 Theile, Stuttgart, 1838. 1 and 2 Das Jahrhundert des Heils. 3 and 4 Die Heilige Sage. 5 Das Heiligthum und die Wahrheit. 4. Gfrörer (Ang. F.), Philo und die Alexandrinische Theosophie, oder von Einfluss der jüdisch-egyptische Schule auf die Lehre des Neuen Testament, 2te Auflage, Stuttgart, 1835. 5. Bauer (Bruno), Kritik des Evangeliums Johannis. Bremen, 1840. 6. Bauer (Bruno), Kritik der Evangel. Geschichte der Synoptiker. 3 Theile, Leipzig and Braunschweig, 1841-42. 7. Feuerbach (L.), Das Wesen des Christenthums, vierte, vermehrte und umgearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig, 1849. 8. Neander (Aug.), Das Leben Jesu. Hamburg, 1837. 9. Tholuck (Aug.), Die Glaubwürdigkeit der evangelischen Geschichte. Hamburg, 1837. 10. Ullmann (C.), Historisch oder Mythisch? Hamburg, 1838. 11. Ebrard (A.), Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte. Frankfurt a. M., 1842. 12. Dasselbe — Zweite gänzlich umgearbeitete Auflage. Erlangen, 1850. 13. Guericke (H. E. F.), Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das Neue Testament. Leipzig, 1843. 14. Lange (P.), Das Leben Jesu nach den Evangelien dargestellt. Heidelberg, 1844. 15. Sepp (J. W.), Das Leben Christi. Mit einer Vorrede von Jos. von Görres, 4 Bde. Regensburg, 1843-45.

I. THE VALUE OF THE FOUR GOSPELS, AS WE NOW HAVE THEM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

To every man who feels the need of religion, and cannot surrender his reason to the tyrannical and preposterous claims of the papacy, the four gospels, as we now have them in the New Testament, are of priceless value. The human soul, in its wants and sorrows and conscious weaknesses, in view of its brief existence on earth, and the dread unknown which awaits it beyond the grave, is greatly in want of some *objective truth* to rest upon; and without it, the only wise philosophy is that which says, *Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die*. If the four gospels be received as objectively true; if Jesus Christ, as therein described, be an actually existing personage, and our ever-living, ever-present friend and guide, then we have what we need; then the soul can rest and rejoice; then the spiritual can gain a permanent victory over the physical; our life on earth can be

made a time of usefulness and peace, and our death a season of triumph and joy. Moreover, having Jesus and the gospels objectively true, on their authority we have also the other writings of the New Testament, and the historians, the poets, and the prophets of the Old; and now, with an unmutated, unimpeachable Bible in our hands, we, like our fathers, can march through the world with heads erect, and a joyous courage, bidding defiance to Satan, and sorrow, and wicked men.

But weaken our confidence in the gospels; let them be regarded as a jumble of traditions, partly true and partly false, then the chief effect of the Christian religion is, to raise our hopes only to sink us the deeper in despair; to increase our fears, without showing us definitely our danger, or teaching us how to escape it; our life on earth is equally unfitted for sensual pleasure and for spiritual enjoyment; and beyond the grave we have only just light enough to make the darkness visible. With the mere mockery of a revelation which is then left us, there are but two classes of men who can be satisfied with life as it now exists — namely, those whose desires and aspirations never go beyond the physical comforts of the external world, and the proud, cold, self-sufficient thinkers, whose chief pleasure it is to despise the weaknesses of their fellow creatures, and think themselves above them.

Entertaining such views, I confess I never can read, or listen to a critique on the sacred writings, and especially on the gospels, without deep feeling. If indifference as to the result, be an essential qualification for a good investigator of the Scriptures, then I must give up all hope of ever being one. To the result I cannot be indifferent if I would, for there are all my hopes. Who would be expected to be indifferent, if the object of the investigation on which he is obliged to enter, were to ascertain whether his father were a cheat, or his son a thief, or his wife false?

‘But we must have a zeal for science; we must let truth work its way; we must be willing that every falsehood, and every mistake, however long and lovingly cherished, should be torn from our embrace.’ Very true, so we must; but does a proper regard for science, a proper love of truth, a proper hatred of error, require the sacrifice of every humanizing and ennobling feeling? Is man, or is he required to be, all intellect and no heart? To honor the mind, must we crucify the soul? Is he the only anatomist who can lay bare to his knife the body of a beloved sister, with the same indifference with which he would hack upon the carcass of an unknown culprit just snatched from its dishonored grave? I believe no such thing;

and while Christ is to me more than father or mother, more than wife or child, or my own life even, I do not believe that sound philosophy requires me to see that holy gospel, which contains all that I know of him, treated by an irreverent critic, as the greedy swine would treat a beautiful field of growing corn. Nor do I believe that an irreverent, ungodly critic is the man to do justice to the gospels, or tell the truth about them fairly, in any sense. He may investigate their language, and examine their history, and give correctly the results of his verbal criticisms; but the real substance of the gospels is far above, out of his sight; he can have no sympathy with Christ; he can have no conception of the motives which influenced the apostles; he can have no idea of the feelings which animated the sacred writers; he is a total stranger to the whole soul of that which he criticises. When a man who has never seen, can accurately describe colors, or one who has never had the sense of hearing, can give a good account of sounds, or a horse with iron-shod hoofs can play tunes on a church organ, then I will not refuse to believe that an ungodly critic can write a reliable book on the New Testament. It is only the very lowest part of the work, that such a critic can perform; and when he comes to the higher criticism, the interior life of the word, he is wholly out of his sphere. How can a man with no poetry in his soul, review a poem? How can a man with no mathematics, properly estimate a treatise on fluxions? How can one destitute of the first principles of taste, be a critic in the fine arts? And how can a man wholly irreligious, be a fit judge of the most religious of all books? Let the gospels be estimated according to their real worth, and the writers upon them according to their real worth, and then justice will be done on both sides. We will refuse no help, and we will repel no truth, though it come from the most ungodly; but we will not idolize intellect which has no heart, nor allow profane hands to filch from us our choicest treasures.

There is a decided tendency, in our times, to award peculiar consideration and deference to profane writers on sacred subjects. If an author with the spirit and principles and talent of Voltaire, were to write a life of Christ, or a commentary on the gospels, or especially an introduction to the Old Testament, it would be just in accordance with the spirit of the age to study and quote such works with more profound respect than is awarded to the writings of Luther, or Calvin, or Bengel, or any other writer who loves and venerates the Word of God. This whole tendency is most particularly to be despised or deplored.

II. RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The recent assaults on the gospels have proceeded almost entirely from the Hegelian school of philosophy. The influence of this philosophy extends far beyond the circle of its professed disciples. It is found where the very name of Hegel is almost unknown, and where not a syllable of his writings has ever been read. It invades Christian and even orthodox pulpits, and sometimes neutralizes the power of the Gospel under the most evangelical forms. It is a proud and godless philosophy; and, like a cholera miasma in the atmosphere, often deals desolation and death where its very existence is unsuspected. Though the most abstruse of all speculations, it never exists as a mere speculation, but immediately proceeds to action — and its first acts are the annihilation of human responsibility, and of the spiritual world, and of God himself. While in some cases it retains the words and phrases of the most evangelical faith, it expels from them all their meaning, and leaves them the mere hieroglyphs of an atheistic mystery.

In thus describing the religious character of this philosophy, I am far from intending a personal attack on its great founder. In many of the qualities which make up a man, he was among the noblest of men, — a fine physical organization, a prodigious intellect, and a generous heart; and he would probably himself be one of the first to protest against the atheistic extremes of some of his followers. Nor are his disciples all alike. There is the *extreme right*, the *central*, and the *extreme left* — or, as I would characterize them, the *religious*, the *non-religious*, and the *anti-religious*. On the *extreme right* was Marheineke, a clear-headed and sound-hearted Christian theologian and preacher, one of the best of historians and one of the most accurate of reasoners; and how he could be a Hegelian and the author of such works as his *History of the Reformation* and his *Christian Symbolik* was always a mystery to me. There, too, is Goeschel, a truly pious and eminent jurist; but inasmuch as he could find in Goethe an apostle of Christianity, and in the Faust a high development of the Christian spirit, it is not so surprising that he can see in Hegel the Christian philosopher. Dörner, too, one of the best of men, one of the most learned, conscientious and reliable of writers, the author of that most admirable work, the *Development-history of the Doctrines respecting the Person of Christ*, is said to be a Hegelian of this class.

The assaults on the gospels have proceeded from the *extreme left*,
VOL. VIII. No. 31.

represented by such men as the younger Feuerbach, and Strauss and Bruno Bauer. This, I suppose, is the legitimate result of the Hegelian philosophy, and these men, whatever Hegel himself might think of them, I regard as his true followers.

But what is the Hegelian philosophy? I have been admonished more than once to treat this philosophy with respect, to admire it at least as an "exquisite work of art if not a system of absolute truth." I shall do my best in this particular. I have acknowledged before, and here repeat the acknowledgment, that I have no very definite knowledge of it. It stands before me, in its bulk and its unintelligibility, as a huge, shapeless, threatening spectre, most fitly described in the words of Virgil:

Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.
(A monster, horrid, hideous, huge and blind.)

But when I think of the tremendous influence it exerts, and the mighty mischief it is making, it assumes, to me, (in the language of Milton,)

"The other shape,
If shape it may be called, which shape has none
Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb;
Or substance may be called that shadow seems,
For each seems either; black it stands as night,
Fierce as ten furies, terrible as hell,
And shakes a dreadful dart; and what seems its head
The likeness of a kingly crown has on."

We speak here of the Hegelian philosophy only in its connection with religion, and as it now exists. Whatever of obscurity may rest over some of its speculations, its principal bearings on religion are perfectly intelligible, and are carried out to their extreme consequences with a cool audacity that is almost frightful. According to Hegelianism the *subjective* is not only more than the *objective*, but the subjective is the whole, it is the entire substance, and the *objective* has no existence except as the shadow or reflection or creation of the *subjective*. The great discovery boasted by Hegel and his followers, the great first principle of all truth, the honor of whose development Schelling in vain attempted to dispute with Hegel, is the *absolute identity of subject and object*, that is, I suppose, the thing perceiving and the thing perceived are one and the same thing.

Admitting this as a fundamental principle, what is God? Is God the creator of man, or is man the creator of God? The latter of course. The human mind is the only development of God,—only by the

workings of the human soul does God arrive at self-consciousness ; and if there were no men there could be no God. There seems to be recognized a sort of *natura naturans*, a sort of blind, unconscious, fermenting leaven, constantly working ; but this never attains to personality or consciousness except in the human soul.

We will not ourselves undertake to make the statements of the doctrines of this sect—we will take them just as they are made by one of the most able and active of the living advocates of the system, in his work entitled *Das Wesen des Christenthums*. This is a favorite book among the Germans of our own country, and can be obtained in any quantities at our principal German bookstores. A brief, but very satisfactory, notice of it has been given in the *Christian Examiner* published in Boston, No. CLXI.

Says this writer, "The absolute Being, the God of man, is man's own being." "Since God is but our own being, the power of any object over us, is the might of our own being. In willing, loving, feeling, etc., there is no influence but of ourselves over ourselves." "All limiting of the reason rests on error." "Every being is all-sufficient to itself." "It is delusion to suppose the nature of man a limited nature." "Religion is the consciousness of the infinite ; it is and can be nothing but man's consciousness of his own infinite being." "If you think infinity, or feel infinity, it is the infinity of thought and feeling, nothing else. The knowledge of God is the knowledge of ourselves ; for the religious object is within us." "God is man's revealed inner nature — his pronounced self. Religion is the solemn unveiling of the concealed treasures of humanity, the disclosure of its secret thoughts, the confession of its dearest secrets. The Christian religion is the relation of man to his own being as to another being." "Religion is the dream of the human soul."

This is not caricature, nor ridicule, nor misrepresentation. It is just a plain statement of some of the prominent doctrines of the system, by one of its most able advocates. There is no God ; and the devout man, when he thinks he is worshipping God, is simply worshipping himself. There is no accountability ; there is no individual immortality ; when a man dies, his soul is reabsorbed into the great mass of being, by the *natura naturans* to be again, perhaps, in time developed, and so on from eternity to eternity. These principles are boldly and openly avowed, and find able and popular advocates both in Germany and in this country. One of the most eminent of the German republicans, Dr. Voight of Giessen, during the summer of 1848, declared publicly in the Frankfort parliament, that there could

be no permanent freedom, till the idea of God and of all responsibility to God were entirely banished from the human mind. No wonder that the German revolution, with such men to lead it, proved a miserable failure. No wonder that the pious, intelligent, sober men of Europe, viewed the whole movement with distrust, and finally abandoned it altogether. Atheistic liberty is the worst kind of tyranny. An editorial article in a political newspaper published in Cincinnati during the present year, says, "Religion is the cause of all the oppression which exists; inasmuch as it cajoles poor sufferers with the chimerical idea of a heaven hereafter; and the source of religion is want of education, ignorance. This is the origin of all evil." The same principles, with a little more regard to a religious public sentiment, and partially disguised under a garb of specious phrasology, are zealously propagated in New England, and infect large numbers especially of our educated young men. Before they begin to feel the need of religion, the foundation of religious faith is taken away. For this work of ruin, the genius of Hegelianism has peculiar facilities. It can approach unperceived, and accomplish its purpose before its presence is suspected. It can use the language of any theology, even the most orthodox, and convey its own ideas in the words of an evangelical faith.

One of the phrases already quoted from Feuerbach, may serve as an example of the deceptive manner in which language may be used. It is this, "God is man's inner nature, his pronounced self." Here, it may be alleged, is the New Testament doctrine of the Logos, the God-man, God revealed; and in like manner we may get the Holy Ghost, as that may be considered to be the inner nature of man reflecting upon itself, and this may be called that spiritual influence with good men crave and pray for. Thus can the Hegelian atheist, with most conscientious deceptiveness, use all the language of the Trinitarian christian. For the Trinity of Hegel, see the last Number of the Bibliotheca, p. 293.

With this philosophy, testimony is nothing, objective narrative is nothing, history is not to be learned from external sources, it must be developed from within — facts must not be sought for, they must be made; and on this principle they act with great consistency and vigor, as we shall see when we come to examine their theories of the gospel history. Another of the principles of this philosophy is eminently a practical one, namely, that "man is God, and must worship himself." This the Hegelians do with the most enthusiastic devotion. Such self-worship was never before witnessed on earth. The exor-

mous self-conceit of these men, the self-conceit of Hegel himself, the pitiful folly of his admirers who pronounced their eulogies over his grave, are among the greatest monstrosities which ever existed on this planet of monsters, comparable to nothing but the lizards larger than ten whales, and the frogs bigger than elephants, which are said to have existed on the pre-Adamite earth. Self-conceit is a symptom of the disease. The venerated Neander, in a letter to Prof. Schaff of Mercersburg, justly characterizes the system as "the philosophy of a one-sided logic, of intellectual fanaticism, and of *self-deification*." My respected friend, Prof. S., himself, I am happy to see, takes no exceptions to this view of the subject. Indeed, he himself calls this kind of Hegelianism, an "arrogant pantheism, different from atheism only in form" — "a lifeless formalism of the understanding, that destroys at last all soul in man, and turns him into a pure speculator on the open heath, an unfruitful thinker of thinking, a heartless critic and fault-finder." (Schaff's *Kirchenfreund* for Jan., 1851, also *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. III. p. 81, ff.)

There is no disinterestedness in this philosophy, there is no veneration, there is no love. Each being is all-sufficient to itself, and each revolves around itself as its own centre, and each is at the same time both planet and sun, both axis and orbit. And what can come of such kind of principles, but selfishness, and animalism, and every evil work?

Now, it is such philosophers as these, who presume to sit in judgment on the New Testament, to estimate the characters therein portrayed, to determine as to what is, and what is not, fitting in a revelation from God to man; to decide with solemn majesty, *à priori*, from internal marks only, out of the depths of their own consciousness, and with nothing else to aid them, as to what is spurious, and what is genuine, in the sacred writings! How well they succeed, we shall see under our next head; and we will only say here, that if opposites are the best judges of opposites, if goats are the best judges of perfumes, if worms have suitable qualifications to decide on the merits of eagles, then are these men qualified to sit in judgment on Jesus, and the apostles, and the writers of the gospels. Yet their writings are published, translated into different languages, and extensively read. In various ways they exert a great influence even over those who never read them; the echoes of their voice reverberate from many a newspaper and popular periodical; their sound is heard in many a lyceum, and mechanics' institute, and mercantile association, and debating club; they inflate the vanity, and heighten the

self-conceit, and set loose the passions of many a young man in our institutions of learning, and produce extensively a ruinous infection in the whole intellectual atmosphere — not sparing even the theological school, the ministerial study, or the Christian pulpit.

So many ingenious ways do poor short-lived men devise, and such infinite pains do they take, to rid themselves of God their heavenly Father, of Christ their gracious and only Saviour. It is often and justly remarked of rogues and freebooters, that they employ far more ingenuity, and energy, and perseverance, to get a living by dishonesty, than would be necessary to make them securely and reputably wealthy in an honorable calling; yet, they are always poor, and in constant dread of detection and punishment. So these proud thinkers tax their minds and hearts more severely to be irreligious, than would be necessary to secure an eminent place in the Christian walk; while they can look only for the *wages of sin*, which is *death*, while *the gift of God*, and that only, is *life and peace*. According to the Scripture, it is *the fool who hath said in his heart, there is no God*; and the same Scripture says, *The fool is wiser in his own conceit, than seven men that can render a reason*; and, *though you bray a fool in a mortar with a pestle among wheat, yet will not his folly depart from him*. How wonderfully descriptive of the foolishness of Hegelian pantheistic atheism!

III. ANALYSIS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRINCIPAL HEGELIAN ASSAULTS ON THE GOSPELS.

The four gospels exist, they have for ages existed in all the languages of the civilized world, they have produced the most astonishing revolutions, they lie at the foundation of all modern civilization; they did not arise in a remote antiquity nor in a fabulous era, but in the zenith of the Roman empire and in immediate contact with the Grecian culture. The problem of the philosophic sceptic is to account for all this, on any other supposition than that of the historical truth of the gospel narrative and the reality of miraculous interposition. The first regular, systematic, Hegelian attempt towards the solution of this great problem was made in 1836 by David Frederic Strauss, then a young man just commencing his career as a teacher in the university of Tübingen. We were in Germany at the time when Strauss's *Life of Jesus* first appeared, and it was exciting as great a commotion among the learned of Germany then, as a few years after the prophecies of the millenarian Miller excited among the unlearned in

America. That was the year fixed on by Bengel for the end of the world; and many who had no faith in Bengel or the apostle John, yet devoutly believing in Strauss, thought surely the end of Christianity had come. Prof. Tholuck told us he considered it the most formidable attack the New Testament had ever sustained, and he was right heartily at work in answering it, and soon after published his excellent book on the Credibility of the Gospel History. The answers to Strauss were numerous, almost numberless, the controversy raged with great vigor for some six or eight years; but now Strauss, before he is an old man, finds himself an obsolete and antiquated writer; as much so as was, when he began, the old Paulus whom he treated so cavalierly. But though Strauss is already intellectually dead and buried, never to rise again, among the Germans, he just begins to live among those who use the English language, and translations of his book are read with the most innocent wonderment by many of our young men, who have no knowledge of the fact that it has long since been thoroughly exposed and exploded in the land of its birth. In the track of Strauss, with more or less of divergency, followed Weiss, Gfrörer, Bruno Bauer, Wilke, Schweitzer, Schwegler, Luetzelberger, F. C. Baur, and many, many others; the greater part of whom *remain unto this present*, though, as to any influence, they have already mostly *fallen asleep*; for even *the eighth is of the seven, and goeth unto perdition*.

In analyzing some of the principal Hegelian hypotheses of the gospel history, as specimens of the whole, we shall avail ourselves liberally of the labors of Ebrard, who, in his admirable work, entitled *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte*, has with great industry, skill and fairness, epitomized, arranged, and made them intelligible.

(1) *Hypothesis of Strauss.*

(a) *The facts out of which the gospel narratives have arisen.* These, according to Strauss, were very few, and mainly the following: The Jewish nation, during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, had the expectation of a national Messiah, predicted in the Old Testament, who would be a political deliverer and work miracles greater than Moses wrought. At this period there was a Jew born at Nazareth in Galilee named Jeschuah, (the sceptic sometimes gains considerably by simply changing the orthography of a well-known name); and another Jew, by the name of John, became a celebrated ascetic preacher and baptizer. Jeschuah attached himself to John as one of

his disciples; and after the imprisonment of the latter, prosecuted the same work, and gathered disciples of his own. Jeschuah now formed the design of effecting by his doctrine the moral regeneration of his countrymen; and being under the influence of the supernatural prejudices of his times, imagined that God would interpose to help him in so worthy an attempt, and to reëstablish the kingdom of David. This idea corresponded very nearly to the Messianic expectations of the Jews; and they, hearing him preach from time to time, began to think whether he might not be the expected Messiah. At first, Jeschuah shrunk from such a thought, but gradually became reconciled to it, and at length it gained full possession of his mind. He was, however, entirely destitute of the means of carrying out this idea in practice, for he had no political influence nor any power of working miracles. He saw that the all-powerful priest party was daily becoming more and more incensed against him; the unhappy fate of the persecuted prophets of the Old Testament dwelt on his mind; some texts of the Old Testament, as he began to think, indicated a suffering and dying Messiah; and, on the whole, he at length anticipated a violent death from the hands of his enemies. His anticipations were realized, and he perished on the cross in early life.

This, according to Strauss, is the whole of the historical basis of the gospels. There were no miracles wrought, nor even pretended to be wrought, during the lifetime of Jesus; nor did he, at the commencement of his career, imagine himself to be the Messiah, nor anticipate the sad fate which at length overtook him.

(b) *Origin of the miraculous stories of the gospels.* The disciples of Jeschuah believed him to be the Messiah; and when the first shock of his terrible end and of their own bitter disappointment was past, they set themselves to devise some method of reconciling actual facts with their cherished expectations, and especially to see if they could not in some way get the idea of suffering and death into their notion of the Messiah. They searched the Old Testament, and found many passages which represented men of God as plagued, persecuted and slain; and these answered to them for Messianic predictions. The Messiah, then, though departed, was not lost; he had only gone into his glory; he must still love and care for his own. This idea took such complete possession of their minds, that some of the women began to imagine they had actually seen him after his burial, and they so said to the men — and the whole company became so excited and talked about the matter so much, and got their imaginations so inflamed, that two or three times, when they were gathered together,

some object dimly seen in the mountain mist, or some unknown person approaching them, gave them the impression that they had actually seen the Lord in bodily presence.

The great miracle of the resurrection, being thus generated and born and brought into the world, becomes the fruitful parent of other miracles. According to the expectation of the Jews, the Messiah must work miracles, and if Jesus had wrought no miracles, how could he be the Messiah? The matter was anxiously thought of, and the remembered words and deeds of Jesus were scrutinized to see if they might contain any germs out of which miraculous narratives could naturally grow. He had told them they should be *fishers of men* — happy reminiscence! what more natural than that out of this should grow the story of the miraculous draught of fishes? He had said the unfruitful tree should be cut down; and here we have the nucleus of the fig-tree which was cursed and withered away. True, the apostles could not themselves imagine that they had with their own eyes seen these miracles; but knowing as they did, that the Messiah must work miracles, they could not doubt that such miracles actually occurred. At least, if this was not the idea of the apostles, it must have occurred to those who had seen but little of Christ while he was on earth, and became the popular belief of most of the Christian congregations.

The miracles being thus set on growing by Strauss, their increase is very rapid, and many a scion from the Old Testament tree is grafted into the New, and immediately bears fruit. The hand of Moses, the face of Miriam, the body of Naaman, had been leprous, and were cured at a word; and the Messiah of course could heal leprosy as well as Moses and Elijah, and therefore he did. As Jordan occasioned miraculous cures in the Old Testament, so Siloam in the New; as Elijah struck men with blindness in the Old Testament, so Christ cured blind men in the New; as Jeroboam's withered hand was restored in the Old Testament, so Christ healed withered hands in the New; as Moses divided the Red Sea, so Christ stilled the Galilean Sea; as Moses turned water into blood, so Christ turned water into wine — and so all the miracles of the Old Testament find parallels in the New; and this accounts for very many of the miraculous narratives of the New Testament. But Strauss does not so clearly tell us how to account for these miracles of the Old Testament. On his principles, however, it is very easy to invent methods, and any invention is preferable to the plain, simple, matter-of-fact truth.

As with the doings of Christ, so with his sayings; those which

stand recorded are compositions, amplifications, from brief hints of his remembered apothegms.

Now we have the materials of the gospel story, and after a while, one and another writer works up these materials into a written narrative, of which we have four still extant, ascribed severally to Matthew and Mark, to Luke and John.

(c) *Estimate of this hypothesis.* Such is the hypothesis of Strauss; and this sort of stuff forms the staple of two thick, heavy volumes, written with great energy, clearness and show of learning, apparently in the most sober earnest, and giving evidence of untiring industry. And these volumes have set the world on fire, and in the opinion of many have demolished the very foundations of Christianity, and left the world without a Saviour, and almost without a God. What a monstrosity; in every view of it a monstrosity! The church of Christ is an accomplished fact, a most mighty, efficient, working fact—a fact which confessedly began at the time alleged—and does the hypothesis of Strauss give us means in the least degree adequate to account for this fact? The African who imagines that when the moon is in an eclipse, there is a great serpent attempting to swallow her, and the child who supposes that when it thunders, God is riding in a big waggon over a tin bridge, are philosophers of the highest order in comparison with Strauss as he exhibits himself in his *Leben Jesu*.

What an inexplicable enigma is that Jeschuah, for whose existence we are indebted solely to the imagination of Strauss. What unheard of, unaccountable compounds of knavery and goodness, of silliness and greatness, are Strauss's disciples of Jeschuah! What wonderful proficient in stupidity must have been the men of that generation, and the generation immediately succeeding! How could *myths* arise and gain credence, in the manner and to the extent which he dreams of, in the same generation and the same country wherein the facts are alleged to have occurred? This difficulty is felt by Strauss, and he attempts to get rid of it by supposing that the stories originated mostly in those parts of Palestine east of the Jordan, where Christ had personally seldom appeared. The whole of Palestine was not so large as the State of Maine; and can men in Maine lie with impunity, by going east of the Penobscot? That was an active, enlightened, revolutionizing, realistic age. The whole world was in motion, nations intermingled with each other, languages were cultivated—commerce, literature, the arts, military operations, kept every thing a-stir, and there was neither sluggishness, nor stagnation,

nor mental stupor to favor the growth of a new mythology. One might as well look for the growth of mushrooms at midday on the pavement of the Royal Exchange in London, under the tread of the thousands of feet which daily there perambulate, as expect the prosperous development of such myths as Strauss dreams of, in such an age and country as that which witnessed the lives and deeds of Christ and his disciples.

Again, how does Strauss know that matters came about in the way which he represents? Who told him? or was he there to see? What authority does he bring, that we should postpone to his single statement the testimony of prophets and apostles and martyrs? Ah! he knows it by the Hegelian power of intuition — by means of which history is constructed subjectively, instead of being objectively learned from the proper sources. In such constructive history, or rather theories of history, we have no confidence.

Yet there is in Strauss's book not a little of learning, and a great amount of acuteness and ingenuity. He starts many difficulties in the gospel narrative, which it requires a clear head and a steady hand and a thorough acquaintance with the subject, effectually to obviate. His book has exerted a great and pernicious influence in Europe, and is doing the same in this country. By means of English translations he is in the hands of many young men who are greedily reading him without any sufficient knowledge of the subject to detect the groundlessness of his assumptions or the fallaciousness of his reasonings; and without dreaming that he has already been thoroughly refuted and antiquated in his own country. In the German bookstores the *critical writings* of Strauss and the *theological writings* of Tom Paine stand on the same shelf, and are apparently held in equal honor. Why should it not be so with us? In what respects is Strauss so much better than Paine, that he should be respected while Paine is despised? If he has more learning and more decency than Paine, he certainly has much less of sound, practical, common sense. And we are sorry to be obliged to add, that much of what De Wette has said about the Old Testament (made current among us by Parker's translations) is very little better than what Strauss says about the New.

(2) *Hypothesis of Weiss.*

Chr. Herm. Weiss is an older man than Strauss, a philosopher of no mean pretensions, and a metaphysician. He had published a work on the *Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics*, another on the

Idea of God, a System of Aesthetics, etc.; and in 1838, awakened by the celebrity of Strauss, he publishes a book entitled the *Gospel History critically and philosophically investigated* (*bearbeitet, belabored.*) Weiss understands animal magnetism, and all the mysteries of clairvoyance.

(a) *The facts out of which the gospel narratives have arisen.* There lived in Palestine during the reign of Tiberius a good man, one Jesus of Nazareth, who, among other happy gifts, possessed the magnetic power of healing. He was in fact a full-charged galvanic battery, ready at any touch to be discharged. He went about Galilee preaching, collecting disciples, and applying his magnetic power to the healing of diseases and the quieting of demoniacs; so that he very naturally gained the affections of the Galileans, who recognised in him the Messiah, and would have been glad to make him king. But, though he felt his Messiahship, he had no political ambition, and sought rather the moral elevation of the people; and in prosecution of this purpose he uttered many parables. Thus he represented the blessed effects of his ministry under the image of the opening of the heavens and the descent of a dove; the strong faith which men should exercise in the grace of God, by the parable of a Canaanitish woman seeking help of a Jew, and taking no denial; the judgment which is to come upon men spiritually unfruitful, by the image of a barren fig-tree cursed and withered; the regeneration of the world by his word he compares to turning water into wine, etc. He once occasioned great excitement by awakening a maiden who had fallen into a swoon and was supposed to be dead. He never went to Jerusalem but once, and that was at the feast of the passover, when he was immediately apprehended and crucified. We have no reason to believe that he prayed aloud the night before his apprehension; or that he said when they were nailing him to the cross, *Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.* During his crucifixion there was an accidental obscurity of the heavens which made much talk. He was buried, and his body remained in the tomb; but his *nervo-magnetic* spirit once appeared to his disciples and passed up into the clouds.

(b) *Origin of the miraculous stories.* These all came very naturally. After the death of Jesus, his parables were turned into stories, and men thought they were actual occurrences. (How many times has this happened in respect to *Æsop's fables*!) These stories were not propagated by the apostles; they busied themselves only with teaching the doctrines of their Master, and said nothing about his biography. But somebody told the stories and found people to

believe them; and other stories were made from very trivial circumstances. From what he once casually said, that *he whose feet are washed is every whit clean*, arose the story of his having washed his disciples' feet; the apostles practised baptism, and after a while began to think (Weisse does not tell us why) that Jesus had instituted such a rite. Once, after Jesus' death, when the apostles were at supper together, they became greatly excited with the idea of prosecuting the work which he had left unfinished; and this gave rise to the story that Christ himself had instituted the Lord's Supper; and also to the tradition, so much like the theophanies of Homer, of his supping with the two disciples at Emmaus after his crucifixion.

(c) *Origin of the written Gospels.* According to the testimony of Papias, (says Weisse,) the Apostle Matthew wrote in the Hebrew of that time, a collection of the *discourses* of Jesus. According to the same authority, Mark, a scholar of Peter, wrote a *biography* of Jesus, as he had heard Peter relate it; and afterwards this narrative of Mark was combined with Matthew's collection of discourses, (now translated into Greek,) and this compilation is our present Greek Gospel of Matthew. Meanwhile, Luke, the companion of Paul, had written another biography from independent sources. Here we have the first three gospels. As to the fourth gospel, ascribed to John, it was not originally intended for a biography at all; but the Apostle John, when he was a very old man, continually pondering over his ideal of the life of Christ, (now growing very dim and shadowy,) that he might not lose entirely this image out of his mind, wrote down fragmentary notices, as they happened to occur to him, without any view to publication, and not even intending any real *objective* biography, but merely for the purpose of defining and fixing his own *subjective ideal*. But, after the good apostle's death, some unlucky elders found these papers in his study, and imagining they were written as an actual memoir of Jesus, arranged them for publication, and gave them to the world, with such modifications, additions, and connecting sentences, as the exigencies of the case seemed to require. Thus we have our present Gospel of John.

(d) *Estimate of this hypothesis.* The reader must understand that Weisse does not even pretend to have any testimony as to the facts being as he states them. He would think it unworthy of a philosopher like him to come at a historical result in that way. It is but a specimen of the developing of history from internal consciousness, instead of learning it from external evidence. To illustrate the safety and accuracy of this method of developing historical facts, let

us try it in reference to some book of American biography. Marshall's Life of Washington, as we now have it, was not written by Judge Marshall, except detached portions of it, nor has the book been seen in the United States, till within a few months past. The origin of the work was this: During the nullification excitement of 1827, Hon. John Holmes of Maine amused himself by writing notes across the Senate Chamber, to Hon. T. H. Benton of Missouri. Mr. Benton preserved these notes, thinking he might sometime have occasion for them, and he added some of his own. Last winter, during Mr. Clay's compromise efforts, Mr. B., perceiving that his time had come, committed these papers to Hon. Amos Kendall, who, out of them and Judge Marshall's papers, forged the book called Marshall's Life of Washington. In consequence of this publication, Col. Benton was elected President of the United States, and Gen. Cass, amidst much noise and confusion, migrated to California! This, if not exactly like the Hegelian hypotheses of Scripture history, is just as good and just as true as the most of them.

(3) *Hypothesis of Gfrörer.*

Ang. Gfrörer is a countryman of Strauss, and a writer of reputation. His church history especially (published in 1841-45) is spoken of by competent judges as a work of great merit. He began (as he says) to meditate his theories earlier than Strauss, but they are no better, and if possible, in some respects even worse. The gospel of John he considers genuine, but the other three, spurious and mythical. A few miracles, such as the healing of the nobleman's son and the sick man of Bethesda, he admits, and does not sympathize with Strauss in his rejection of all miraculous narratives. The three synoptical gospels (Matthew, Mark and Luke), according to him, owe their origin to the influence of the writings of Philo and other Jews; and many ideas in them are derived directly from the Talmud, the Fourth Book of Esdras, the Book of Enoch, and other apocryphal writings. (The thing counterfeited owes its existence to the counterfeit.) He is at much pains to prove the antiquity of these apocryphal and Talmudic writings, to make them, if possible, seem older than the gospels, but with very indifferent success. Even granting him the antiquity he claims, the resemblances on which he relies for the support of his theory are marvellously unlike, as if one should derive the wigs of the English bishops and judges from the head-dress of the Feejee islanders.

To cite a few examples: According to the Jerusalem Talmud, one day when Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Jonathan were riding together, the former began to discourse, when the latter hastily dismounted from his ass, and said: "It is not reasonable that I should bear the honor of my Creator, and thereby ride on an ass." They both sat down under a tree, and there fell fire from heaven and surrounded them, (as a reward of their humility). From this and other similar passages, Gfrörer concludes that in the time of Christ the Jews held fire to be a necessary accompaniment of revelations from God. Hence arose the tradition that John Baptist had declared that Jesus should baptize with fire! In the same Talmud it is related that Deuteronomy came to God and said: "O Lord, thou hast written down thy law in me;" and then complained that Solomon, when he took to himself many wives, took away the *jod* out of the word *נשתי* in Deut. 19: 19. Then God answered Deuteronomy and said: "Solomon and a thousand like him shall perish; but not a vowel shall perish from thee." Hence arose the tradition that Jesus had said, that not one jot or one tittle of the law should fail. The Targum of Jonathan, in Zech. 14: 21, translates the word *כרעני* by *merchant*; hence the tradition that Christ drove the money-changers out of the temple! These derivations certainly exceed Knickerbocker's etymology of the word *mango* from the man Jeremiah King; for in this case the steps are quite obvious, thus: *Jeremiah King, Jerry King, Jerkin, Cucumber, Mango*.

The doctrine of the Trinity, Gfrörer thinks is of Rabbinic origin. The text, Zech. 14: 4, the predicted disruption of the Mount of Olives, is explained of the Messiah and his sister the Holy Ghost, who are both ninety-six miles high and twenty-four miles wide. Hence comes the whole Christian doctrine of the Trinity! O, Gfrörer, *thou art beside thyself; much learning hath made thee mad*.

Ebrard, in the first edition of his work, with great significancy certainly, if not with scrupulous delicacy, illustrates the probability of Gfrörer's hypothesis of the origin of the gospels, by the following figure: A company of leprous beggars wash themselves in a river, and from this river a beautiful young man is seen to emerge; the inference is certain that this young man was made of the beggars' scabs! How much more certain the inference when it is proved that the young man emerged from the river before the beggars had washed in it!!

(4) *Hypothesis of Bruno Bauer.*

Bruno Bauer is a younger man than Strauss, and he may well be

regarded as the *extreme extremity* of the extreme left wing of Hegelianism. In him self-deification and the annihilation of all objective truth have reached their culminating point. No subtlety or refinement or locomotive force of Hegelianism can ever go beyond Bruno Bauer. His thoughts are so misty, and his expressions so bombastic and overstrained, that it is exceedingly difficult to get his meaning, and still more difficult to give a translation of it in another language; for like very tenuous gasses, it all seems to evaporate as soon as it meets the air. It is, however, sufficiently plain that Bruno has a very high opinion of himself, a very low opinion of all theologians, and of God no opinion at all. At the very outset he annihilates all historical truth. There was indeed a Jesus, and there was a community in the Jewish nation which formed the nucleus of the Christian church; and this is nearly the whole of the historical basis which he is disposed to acknowledge. There were no Messianic prophecies or expectations among the Jews, there was no baptism of Jesus, there were no discourses, no miracles, no anything to give an objective foundation to the historical narratives in the gospels. These narratives are not records of facts which once actually occurred; but they are the spontaneous efflorescence of the innermost religious consciousness of the age. The writers did not even profess to themselves to record facts, nor did they pretend to make other people think they were recording facts. How it is that men could write long narratives without thinking they were facts and without intending to write fiction, Bauer himself explains in a way of his own. We will translate his language as well as we are able, and leave the reader to guess his meaning. Says Bauer: "The religious spirit is that disruption of the self-consciousness, in which the essential definiteness of the same steps over against the consciousness as a power separate from it. Before this power the self-consciousness must naturally lose itself; for it has therein cast out its own contents out of itself, and so far as it can still sustain itself as a Me for itself, it feels itself before that power as nothing, so as it must regard the same as the nothing of its own self. Nevertheless the Me as self-consciousness cannot entirely lose itself — in its subjective, secular thought filled with moral ends and its willing, it still maintains its freedom; and into this freedom also the religious consciousness and the historical development of the same are involuntarily drawn. Both the religious consciousness and the free self-consciousness thus come into contact, to interpenetration, without which the first could be neither individually living nor capable of a historical growth. But so as this livingness and growth, after their

first contact, become the subject of religious reflection, they are again torn from the self-consciousness, they step before the consciousness as the deed of another; and now also, necessarily, the interposition which had placed them in the self-consciousness as its own movement, becomes a machinery whose bands are guided in another world." (*Kritik der evang. Geschichte der Synoptiker*, I. 25 f.) Such is his explanation of this wonderful phenomenon, and doubtless it is very profound and satisfactory.

These principles being settled, the origin of the first three gospels, according to Bruno, was as follows: Somebody wrote the book which bears the name of Mark, and others very strangely mistook it for a veritable biography of Jesus. Another afterwards took this book in hand, and without thinking it was not historical, changed and modified it according to his own ideas, and thus we have the Gospel of Luke. Now comes a third, and compares these two writings together, seeks to reconcile the contradictions he finds, compiles and combines, reading first a verse in one and then a verse in the other. In this writer's reflection, subjectivity predominates; yet he, as well as his predecessors, is all unaware, that what he writes is simply the product of his own imagination, and not real, objective history. Here we have the Gospel of Matthew.

This Bruno is very confident, and feels great contempt for theologians. He says: "See how they (the theologians) stand there; how the theological hate glows from their eyes. Ha! would you grasp the thunder? Miserable mortals! well that it was not given to you!" "Now, after the above *exploitations*, ask them whether they really think their Jesuitism can hold on; whether they believe that their deception and lying will endure forever? When the time comes that their falsehood must be a conscious and determined lie, then their judgment is no longer far off."

This will do for Bruno Bauer; surely no one will undertake to refute him. We leave him alone with his glory.

It is scarcely necessary to give any specimens of Schwegler, F. C. Baur, and other critics of the Tübingen school. Though differing somewhat from the Hegelians already noticed, practically they belong to the same category. There is the same self-conceit and self-deification, the same reckless disregard of facts, the same extravagant baselessness and groundlessness of speculation. In one species of folly, they even exceed Gfrörer; for while they admit the writings of the apostolic fathers, Papias, Ignatius, Irenæus, etc., to be ancient and genuine, they affirm that the writings of the New Testament ascribed to

John, Paul, Peter, etc., are spurious, and the product of a later age. They have been abundantly refuted by Thiersch, Ebrard, Dörner, and other writers; and though they are the most recent representatives of the sceptical spirit in Germany, and some of them (as for example, Baur) accomplished scholars and powerful writers, they are already growing obsolete, and fast hastening to a deserved oblivion.

Truth alone is immutable and permanent; error has numberless forms, and in all of them it is transient, short-lived.

After all these assaults and speculations, the honest old Bible stands just where it did before, speaks the same language, exerts the same influence, and emits the same heavenly radiance. *This sure word of prophecy will remain, and we do well to take heed to it, as to a light that shineth in a dark place, till the day dawn, and the day star arise in our hearts.*

The enormous self-confidence and self-estimation of this whole class of gospel assailers, most forcibly reminds us of the words of holy writ: *Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit? there is more hope of a fool than of him. God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble.*

IV. THE REAL IMPORTANCE TO BE ATTACHED TO THESE ASSAULTS.

These assaults on the gospels consist of two parts, namely, 1, Objections to the historical truth of the gospels, derived from the narrative itself; and 2, Hypotheses to account for the existence and influence of the gospels, supposing them to be historically untrue. It is these hypotheses only which we have thus far considered. The objections are matters of detail, and must be considered in detail, and there is no room for them in a paper of this kind. A few will be selected as specimens of the whole, and answers given to them which will show how all the rest may be answered.

In considering these objections, we must always bear it in mind that the gospels are not, and do not profess to be, complete histories. They are simply detached memoirs, or select anecdotes, intended solely to illustrate the character and teachings of Christ, to show what kind of a teacher he was, and to give an idea of the substance and manner of his teaching. This, the writers themselves affirm in so many words. Says John, at the close of his narrative: *There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written.*

And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book. But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name. John 21: 25, 20: 30, 81.

Out of the countless multitude of events in our Saviour's life, and from his numberless teachings, the different evangelists select different transactions and different discourses for this purpose, all equally appropriate, as would also have been thousands of others which are left unrecorded. The evangelists sometimes repeat each other, but very often they do not; and none of them undertakes, or pretends, to give a complete narrative of all that Jesus did and said, but on the contrary, they carefully and expressly disclaim any such undertaking or intention.

The most plausible of the objections to which we allude, are derived from supposed contradictions in the gospel narrative; but such contradictions are *assumed* and *supposed*; they have never yet been *proved*.

For example, in Luke 7: 1-10, we are informed, that when Jesus was in Capernaum, a centurion there sent friends to him, requesting him to heal a sick servant of his, who was very dear to him.

In John 4: 46-53, we are told, that when Jesus was in Cana, a nobleman of Capernaum, whose son was sick, went himself to Jesus, and asked him to heal his son.

In both cases the sick person was restored without being seen by Jesus.

Because there are points of similarity in the two narratives, the objectors assume that they are intended as narratives of the same event; and then they point out the discrepancies between them, to show that the gospel history is unworthy of credit. The fallaciousness of this mode of reasoning, especially when considered in connection with the nature of the gospel narrative as already pointed out, is very easily demonstrated. We will suppose two discourses by two different authors, intended to illustrate American character by incidents of American history. One of these authors gives in illustration, the battle of Baltimore; the other, the battle of New Orleans. In these two battles there were remarkable coincidences, as well as remarkable diversities. They both took place during the same war; in both, an assault was made by a British army on an American city; in both, the British commander was killed, and his troops repulsed. But, in the one case there were cotton-bale intrenchments; in the other, there were none. In the one battle, Gen.

Jackson gained great celebrity; in the other, he was not present. One battle occurred on the southern border of the United States; the other, on the eastern. Some fifteen hundred or two thousand years hence, a Hegelian critic gets hold of these two discourses — and for the sake of destroying the credit of both, affirms that they both refer to the same battle; and gives the purpose and object of the writers, namely, the illustration of American character from American history, and states all the resemblances, to prove that they do both intend the same event; and then states all the discrepancies to show that they are not reliable historians. He will not hear to the suggestion that they may be giving accounts of different battles — the coincidences are too numerous and striking to admit of that idea; nor will he allow that one of the two narratives, after all, may be true, for the style and tone of the two are so exactly alike, that if one is false, the other must certainly be false also.

This is a fair illustration of a multitude of the most plausible and strongest of the objections of Strauss and his collaborators; and sometimes they are even tenfold more fallacious and absurd than this.

For example, Luke 17: 11–19, at the gate of the city of Nain, Jesus raises from the dead a young man, the only son of a widowed mother.

Mark 5: 35–43, in the house of Jairus, a ruler of the synagogue, Jesus raises from the dead a daughter of this Jairus, a little girl twelve years old.

Now, says Gfrörer, there are such resemblances in these narratives, that they must be identical, yet so diverse are they, that they destroy the historical credit of the writers. The difference of place, the difference of sex in both parent and child, the diversity of all the attending circumstances, prove, not that they were two different transactions, but that the writers are not truthful; for the resemblances are so strong, that the proof of identity is irresistible, whatever improbabilities may intervene. What are these resemblances which make the conclusion of identity so irresistible?

Why, these and these only — (1) they were both young people, (2) they each had a living parent, (3) they both died, and (4) they were both raised from the dead. By the same kind of argument we might prove irresistibly, and in spite of all inherent improbabilities, the identity of Gen. Jackson and Mr. Van Buren's grandmother, that they were one and the same person — for (1) they were both old people, (2) they were both very fond of Mr. Van Buren, (3) they both died, and (4) they neither of them ever rose from the dead — and the difference of sex, and name, and place of abode, and all things

of that kind, are merely the discrepancies of unreliable historians. (See Ebrard, first edition.)

Such is the character of the objections which these critics make — such is the kind of contradictions which they point out — and when we examine their *hypotheses*, we find them quite as baseless as their *objections*, and even more so. Their *positive* side is no more tenable than their *negative*. Their *constructive* efforts are even more decided failures than their *destructive*.

Their hypotheses have absolutely nothing to stand upon. They are made wholly out of air and fog, and the moment the sun shines on them they are gone. We can at any time and on any historical subject whatever, make a thousand suppositions, all false, yet all as plausible as any of these. That fine piece of burlesque by Archbishop Whately, entitled “Historical Doubts respecting Napoleon Bonaparte,” in which he shows how exceedingly improbable it is that any such person as Napoleon ever existed, is tenfold more plausible and sustained by arguments a thousandfold stronger than many of these Hegelian hypotheses of the gospel history.

In all their hypotheses they entirely mistake the times and the men wherein the gospel history originated. Their theories are such as could have arisen only in the minds of studious, speculative men, greatly in want of something to do, and driven to the necessity of inventing something to say that shall be new, striking and attractive, in order to draw attention to themselves and their sayings; and they seem to imagine that the early promoters of Christianity were very much the same kind of men and in very nearly the same circumstances as themselves. Their theories all smell very strongly of the shop. In their judgment of the evangelists, apostles and martyrs of the early church, they are quite as much out of the way, as an exquisite of the west end of London would be, if he were to undertake, from his own feelings, purposes and daily employments, to form an estimate of the feelings, purposes and daily employments of a backwoodsman in the Western States of America. Were they to ask me the question: “Why are we not qualified to write critiques of the gospel history?” — I would reply to them, as Henry More did to Southey, when he inquired: “Why am not I qualified to write a biography of John Wesley?” “Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep.”

To think of the Apostle John writing his gospel as Weiss supposes — or the early teachers of Christianity inventing myths as Strauss imagines — what can be conceived more utterly inappropriate

to the times and the men — more entirely beyond the limits of all inherent probability? Indeed, these German unbelievers do not intend to be probable, nor have they any serious purpose of discovering and advocating truth. They delight in a sort of intellectual gladiatorship, and nothing with them is too serious to be made a plaything of. They sport with God and eternity, with heaven and hell, with their own souls and the souls of their fellow-men; the while thinking only of the fine and fruitful subjects they are getting for lectures and books — but when their speculations are imported into this land of serious purpose and earnest endeavor and practical results, they become immediately matters of life and death, of eternal life and eternal death, to thousands. That which is a fashionable, though far from an innocent, amusement in Germany, is a deadly, death-dealing work in America.

But what are these *myths*, of which these assailants of the Gospel say so much? They suppose them to be fanciful or fabulous narratives, having but a remote resemblance to events of actual occurrence, and intended mainly to embody certain general ideas, which the inventors wished in this way to preserve for the world. According to Strauss, the myths of the gospel illustrate mainly the dominion of mind over nature. The very idea of such myths so near the time and the place of the alleged occurrence of the events, presents to the sober mind nothing but the aspect of a blank impossibility. According to Strauss's own showing, not a single generation had passed away, before the myths began to spring up like mushrooms on the very soil of Palestine itself. As well might we now have a mythical history of the last war with Great Britain, or myths of the presidential election in 1840 — and these poetical romances, these moral apologies, these elaborate fictions designed to illustrate great moral truths, invented and put in circulation by the hard old soldiers and the tough old politicians who took a leading part in the actual events, (whatever they might be) — and implicitly believed as actual matters of fact by the simple hearted people who did the fighting and the voting! Surely the legends and religious fables of the patristic and mediæval period do not equal in baselessness and extravagance the inventions and hypotheses of these philosophic gospel-assailers in the middle of the nineteenth century; and besides, the former have at least the advantage of being imbued with the spirit of veneration and the love of God, of which the latter have not a particle.

True, there were apocryphal gospels, containing romances and myths — but these, for the most part, were remote both in time and

place from the actual scenes of the gospel history, and written after men had begun to withdraw into deserts and caves and convents, to spend their lives in solitude and mortification, hoping thereby to gain the favor of God; instead of *going about doing good*, as Christ did, and as he taught all the early preachers of Christianity to do.

These apocryphal gospels will next engage our attention.

[To be concluded.]

ARTICLE IV.

TRANSLATIONS FROM ANSELM.

By J. S. Maginnis, D. D., Professor in the University of Rochester, N. Y.

PROSLGION OF ANSELM.

[THE author of the following Article was one of the founders of the scholastic Philosophy, and was regarded as the Metaphysician *par excellence* of the eleventh century. Piety and good sense everywhere characterize his writings. Such were his reputation and influence that he was denominated the Second Augustine.¹ His philosophical labors constituted an epoch in the history of the human mind. In theology, he did more than any other author from the days of the apostles up to his own times, to vindicate the object of the death of Christ as a *vicarious sacrifice for sin*. He was the first who effectively broke the spell of that absurd theory which had prevailed for so many centuries, both with the Greek and the Latin Fathers, and had been advocated even by such men as Ambrose and Augustine, and which represented the death of Christ as a ransom paid to Satan to redeem men from his power. His views on this subject are expressed in his tract, *Cur Deus Homo*; i. e. as he himself explains the title, *Qua ratione vel necessitate Deus homo factus sit*.

The Proslgion, a translation of which is here presented to the reader, is one of the most celebrated of his productions on account of the ontological argument it contains in proof of the existence of a

¹ Rixner Geschichte der Philosophie, Band II. S. 18.

God. It has obtained an honorable notice from every history of philosophy which has appeared since the age in which it was written. The argument it contains has been analyzed by Tennemann, Rixner, Reinhold and Ritter, and has commanded the respect of such thinkers as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Stillingfleet. In the progress of the discussion there may occur what may seem to us quaint expressions, absurd paradoxes, puerile illustrations; objections may be raised where none are needed, and difficulties started which may arise only from the form of expression in which they are stated. All this may be offensive to modern taste, and to a superficial judgment may create the necessity of some apology for introducing the Article into the pages of a literary or religious Review. No such apology, however, will be required by those who feel any interest in tracing the various steps by which the human mind has been advanced to its present strength and attainments. Such will recognize here and in the Monologion the movements of a great and vigorous intellect, the first awakenings of human thought after a slumber of ages — the first ripe fruit borne by the tree of knowledge after the desolating scourge of barbarism had swept away all that was fair and beautiful in the literature of the old world. The Prologion is here inserted for the purpose of convenient reference for theological students and others, who may wish to investigate the history of the proofs of the existence of a God, and who have not the opportunity or leisure to consult the original.

The Translator is not aware that there exists any version of this singular document in the English language. The only translation he has seen, is one into the French, undertaken by the advice of Cousin and published, in connection with the Monologion, under the title of CHRISTIAN RATIONALISM.¹ If Anselm deserves to be called a Rationalist, his was truly a *Christian rationalism*; and we could heartily wish that rationalism had remained just where he left it. He left it the humble pupil, but it has since become the critic and judge of divine revelation. In his view, we are not to make reason the sole judge of everything, and are not at liberty to reject a doctrine of revelation because we cannot comprehend it. He rose so far above the slavish dogmatism of his times as to admit that we ought, in all cases, so to exercise our intelligence as to seek for the *rational* grounds of our belief; and if we are so happy as to succeed, and

¹ Le Rationalisme chrétien à la fin du XIe Siècle traduit et précédé d'une introduction, par H. Bouchitté, Professeur d'Histoire au Collège Royal de Versailles.

should thus advance from faith to knowledge or understanding (intellectum) we ought to render thanks to Him who has endowed us with faculties capable of such attainments; but the doctrines of faith which we cannot comprehend, we are still bound to venerate and admire.¹ Even in his attempt to prove the existence of a God, Anselm piously disclaims seeking for any rational demonstration of this as a condition of adopting it as an article of his faith; but having once received it into his belief, this becomes a high and imperative reason why he should seek for its scientific proof. Indeed he intimates and very justly, that the mind which is not previously possessed with this belief; or a mind in a state of unbelief, is in the worst possible condition to perceive and appreciate the highest evidence that presents itself in favor of the divine existence. He says *Negus enim quero intelligere ut credam: sed credo, ut intelligam. Nam hoc credo, quia nisi credidero, non intelligam.*

His argument is, strictly speaking, included within the second, third and fourth chapters. He seems to adopt as his text, "The fool (insipiens) hath said in his heart there is no God." The validity of this argument was called in question by Gaunilon, a monk of his own times, who puts into the mouth of the fool a reply which he may properly make to the reasoning here employed against him; his tract was, therefore, entitled *Liber pro Insuperanti*, i. e. a book in behalf of the fool. Gaunilon's tract and Anselm's apology will both be presented to the reader.

It is not our design to pronounce upon the validity of this argument; in reference to this the reader must form his own judgment. But in explanation of the reasoning here employed, let it be observed that the author does not begin by attempting to prove the existence of God directly, but he attempts to prove the existence of some supreme thing, object or being conceived in the most absolute and unconditioned sense; after he supposes his object accomplished, he then identifies this supreme and highest conceivable being with our conception of God. Compare Chap. 3d of the Prosligion with Chap. 10 of Anselm's Apology. Postponing the question, therefore, whether this being is God or not, the first inquiry with Anselm is, does such a being exist? The whole force of his demonstration depends upon the peculiar nature of this being. Gaunilon has unques-

¹ De Fide Trinitatis. Nam christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere, aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere. Sed cum ad intellectum valet pertingere, delectatur, cum vero nequit, quod capere non potest, veneratur.

tionably constructed a close, powerful and unanswerable argument against the reasoning of Anselm, if we concede that he has the right conception of the being whose existence is to be proved. But the circumstance which evidently vitiates his whole reasoning, and which renders his beautiful illustration drawn from the lost island inapplicable, is, that he starts out with an entirely different conception from that which Anselm has in his mind. Gaunilo proceeds from the conception of a being *greater than all things else that exist*. This conception and form of expression do not necessarily forbid the supposition that a greater being than this may, at least be conceived. But Anselm starts with the conception of a being the greatest conceivable — that is, a being which must necessarily envelop and contain within itself every possible perfection, which, consequently, in its very conception implies not only possible and actual existence, but eternal and necessary existence. Apol. Chap. 5. Anselm freely admits that his reasoning can have no application to any different being from this. Apol. Chap. 3. His reasoning is designed to show that having once conceived of a being to whom necessary existence belongs, then to deny actual existence to such a being is a simple absurdity. It is easy to be seen that if we could be once assured of the actual existence of a necessary being, then, to ascribe to such a being the possibility of not existing, would be a contradiction in terms. But does the conception of this being prove his actual existence? Few, perhaps, are prepared to concede this. Whatever may be the reader's views on this subject, the author's reasons for the affirmative will be found expanded in his Apol., Chap. 1. See also Cudworth, Vol. II. p. 141. Clark: Being and Attributes of God, Prop. III. Also, Preface to his Discourse on Natural Religion. Stillingfleet's *Origines Sacræ*, B. III. Chap. 1.

Leibnitz thinks that Descartes borrowed his argument from Anselm, of whose writings he could not have been ignorant — having studied the Scholastic Philosophy so long at the *College des Jésuites de la Flèche*. He says, the Scholastics all misunderstood Anselm's argument, not even excepting their Doctor Angelic; he says, they represent it as a paralogism, but that it is not a paralogism, but only a defective demonstration; that all it wants for its completion is, first to show that the being in question is possible. He thinks it would follow that, if this being is possible, it exists — an argument, however, which will hold good only of the Deity.¹ If this be all that is necessary to the completion of Anselm's argument, we see not but

¹ *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain*, Liv. IV. § 7.

the defect is easily supplied. Everything is possible that is *conceivable*, and that implies no contradiction; but a perfect being is conceivable, and implies no contradiction; therefore, it is possible. Again, a perfect being is possible, otherwise it belongs to the very nature of being to be imperfect; in other words, the perfection of being would consist in its imperfection, which is absurd. The same reasoning is applicable to a self-existing being; this is possible, otherwise all being is dependent; on what, then, must it depend? On something that is not being? This would be absurd. If the *impossibility* of a perfect self-existing being is proved, atheism is of course established. If the *possibility* of such a being is proved, then its *actual* existence follows as a matter of necessity: for, if it does not now exist, its existence is plainly impossible—since any being that can hereafter be brought into existence, would not be perfect or self-existent. However untenable, therefore, the argument of Anselm may be, in the form in which he has left it, we conceive that an argument for the existence of a God may be constructed not merely from our conception of a *perfect being*, but from our conception of *right* and *wrong*, and from all our primary and necessary ideas. The untutored child may gaze long upon the starry heavens, and be delighted with the number and beauty of the objects it beholds, without ever making the reflection that the existence of these objects requires and presupposes the existence of space which surrounds and envelops them. So, those who are wiser than children, are too apt to speculate long and learnedly on our necessary mental conceptions, without reflecting that every one of these implies and proves the existence of God, just as certainly as the stars of heaven imply the existence of space. It is scarcely possible to start wrong, if we go in search of God. There is no point from which if we go out, we may not find Him. If it be true, as Inspiration teaches, that in Him we live and move and have our being, it is only necessary to have our eyes open in order to behold within us and around us the most direct and unequivocal proofs of the Divine existence, and we could no more doubt that there is a God, than the mariner could doubt the existence of the ocean, while his noble bark is gliding beautifully upon its bosom. — T. A.]

PROSLOGION, OR AN ALLOCUTION CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE
OF GOD.*Preface.*

Having, at the urgent solicitation of some of my brethren published a short treatise as an example of meditation in relation to the grounds of our faith, representing the solitary reasonings of one who is in search of what he is yet ignorant of; and reflecting that this treatise consisted of a connected chain of numerous arguments, I began to inquire whether it might not be possible to find a single argument, which, being complete in itself, would need the aid of no other for its confirmation, and which would alone suffice to prove that there is indeed a God, that he is the supreme good, that he is in need of nothing, but that all things else are in need of him in order to their existence and well-being—an argument, in fine, sufficient to prove all that we are accustomed to believe concerning the Divine Nature.

To this subject I repeatedly and carefully turned my attention; sometimes the object of my search seemed to be within my reach; at other times it utterly escaped the grasp of my mind; at length I resolved, in despair, to abandon the inquiry, fearing that I might be in search of something which it would be impossible to find. But when I endeavored to banish this thought entirely, lest, by occupying my mind in a fruitless search, it might detain me from other studies in which I might make some useful progress, then it began to press itself upon me the more, with a kind of importunity; and the more I resolved to defend myself against it the more importunate it became. Therefore on a certain day, while fatigued with violently resisting its importunity, and in the very conflict of my thoughts, that presented itself to me which I had despaired of finding; and the eagerness with which I embraced the idea was equalled only by the solicitude with which I had repelled it. Believing that what had interested me so much in the discovery, would, if committed to writing afford equal pleasure to the reader, I have composed upon this and other matters, the following treatise; in which I represent one as speaking who is endeavoring to raise his mind to the contemplation of God, and who seeks to understand what he believes. Although I regarded neither this, nor the treatise above mentioned, as deserving to be called a book, or to have the name of the author prefixed to it; yet it seemed improper to send them forth without some title, which might, in a degree, invite to a careful perusal of them, those into whose hands

they might fall. I therefore entitled the former *Exemplum meditando de ratione fidei*, "An example of meditation concerning the grounds of faith;" and the latter, *Fides quaerens intellectum*, "Faith seeking understanding." But as copies of each had already been multiplied, and that too with the above titles, many urged me to prefix to them my own name, and especially the Reverend Archbishop of Lyons, Hugo, the Apostolical Legate in Gaul, enjoined this upon me by his authoritative command. That this might be the more suitably done I have entitled the former MONOLOGIUM, that is, a Soliloque, and the latter PROSLOGION, that is, An Allocution.

PROSLOGION.

CHAPTER I. *Exhortation to the contemplation of God.*

O, vain man! flee now, for a little while from thine accustomed occupations; hide thyself for a brief moment from thy tumultuous thoughts; cast aside thy cares; postpone thy toilsome engagements; devote thyself awhile to God; repose for a moment in Him; enter into the sanctuary of thy soul, exclude thence all else but God, and whatever may aid thee in finding him; then, within the closed doors of thy retirement inquire after thy God. Say now, O my whole heart! say now to thy God: I seek thy face; thy face O Lord do I seek. Therefore now, O Lord, my God, teach thou my heart where and how it may seek for thee; where and how it may find thee. If thou art not here, O Lord, where, while thou art absent, shall I find thee? But if thou art everywhere, why do I not see thee present? Truly thou dwellest in light inaccessible! But where is this inaccessible light, or how can I approach to light inaccessible? Who will lead me and conduct me into it, that I may behold thee there? And then by what signs, or under what form shall I seek thee? I have never seen thee, O Lord my God; I know not thy face. What shall this thine exile do,—O Lord, Thou most High, what shall he do, banished so far from thee? What shall thy servant do, cast far away from thy presence, and yet in anguish with love for thy perfections? He pants to see thee, but thy face is too far from him; he desires to approach unto thee, but thy habitation is inaccessible; he longs to find thee, but knows not thine abode. He attempts to seek thee, but knows not thy face. O Lord, thou art my Lord and my God, yet I have never seen thee. Thou hast created and redeemed me, and hast conferred upon me all my goods, but as yet I know thee not.

In fine, I was created that I might behold thee; but I have not yet attained to the end of my creation. O miserable lot of man, since he has lost that for which he was created! O hard and cruel misfortune! Alas! what has he lost and what has he found? What has departed and what remains? He has lost the blessedness for which he was created; he has found misery for which he was not created. That has departed, without which there is no happiness; that remains, which, in itself, is nought but misery. Then man was accustomed to eat the bread of angels, for which he now hungers; now he eats the bread of sorrows, of which he was then ignorant. Alas! the common affliction of man, the universal wailing of the sons of Adam! The father of our race was filled to satiety, we pine, from hunger; he abounded, we are in want; he possessed happiness, but miserably deserted it; we are destitute of happiness, and pitifully long for it; but alas! our desires are unsatisfied. Why, since he could easily have done it, did he not preserve for us that which we should so greatly need? Why did he thus exclude from us the light and surround us with darkness? Why has he deprived us of life and inflicted death? Miserable beings! Whence have we been expelled? Whither are we driven? From what heights have we been precipitated? Into what abyss are we plunged? From our native land into exile; from the presence of God into the darkness which now envelops us; from the sweets of immortality into the bitterness and horror of death. — Unhappy change! — from good so great to evil so enormous! O heavy loss! heavy grief! heavy all! But alas! wretch that I am, miserable son of Eve, estranged from God, at what did I aim? what have I accomplished? Whither did I direct my course? Where have I arrived? To what did I aspire? for what do I now sigh? I sought for good, but behold confusion and trouble! I attempted to go to God, but I only stumbled upon myself. In my retirement I sought for rest, but in the depths of my heart I found tribulation and anguish. I desired to laugh by reason of the joy of my mind, but I am compelled to roar by reason of the disquietude of my heart. I hoped for happiness, but behold! from this my sighs are multiplied. And thou, O Lord, how long? How long O Lord wilt thou forget us? How long wilt thou turn thy face from us? When wilt thou have respect unto us and hear us? When wilt thou enlighten our eyes and show us thy face? When wilt thou restore thyself unto us? Have respect unto us, O Lord hear us, enlighten us, show thyself to us. Restore thyself unto us, that it may be well with us; it is so ill with us without thee. Have pity upon our toils

and our efforts after thee; we can do nothing without thee. Invite us; aid us. I beseech thee, O Lord, let me not despair in my longing; but let me be refreshed by hope.¹ My heart is embittered in its own desolation; assuage thou its sorrows by thy consolations. O Lord, oppressed with hunger I have commenced to seek thee; let me not cease till I am filled from thy bounty; famished, I have approached unto thee; let me not depart unfed; poor, I have come to thy riches; miserable, to thy compassion; let me not return empty and despised. And if, before I partake of this divine food, I long for it; grant, after my desires are excited that I may have sufficient to satisfy them. O Lord I am bowed down and can look only towards the earth; raise thou me, that I may look upwards. Mine iniquities have gone over my head; they cover me over, and as a heavy burden they bear me down. Set me free; deliver me from mine iniquities, lest their pit shall close upon me its mouth. Let me behold thy light, whether from the depth or from the distance. Teach me to seek thee; and while I seek show thyself to me; because, unless thou teach, I cannot seek thee; unless thou show thyself, I cannot find thee; let me seek thee by desiring thee; let me desire thee by seeking thee. Let me find thee by loving thee; let me love thee by finding thee. I confess, O Lord, and render thee thanks that thou hast created in me this thine image, that I may be mindful of thee, that I may contemplate and love thee; but it is so injured by contact with vice, so darkened by the vapor of sin, that it cannot attain to that for which it was created, unless thou wilt renew and reform it. I attempt not to penetrate to thy height, for with this my feeble intelligence can bear no comparison; but I desire, in some degree, to understand thy truth which my heart believes and loves. For I seek not to understand in order that I may believe; but I believe in order that I may understand, for I believe for this reason that unless I believe I cannot understand.

CHAPTER II. *That God truly exists, although the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.*

Therefore, O Lord, thou who dost impart understanding to faith, grant, so far as thou seest this knowledge would be expedient for me, that I may know that thou art as we believe, and that thou art this which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art something, than which nothing greater can be conceived. Shall we, therefore, conclude that there is no such Being, merely because the fool

¹ Ne desperem susperando; sed resperem sperando.

hath said in his heart, there is no God? But surely even this same fool, when he hears me announce that there is something than which nothing greater can be conceived, understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his conception, even if he does not know that it exists. For, it is one thing for an object to be in the conception, and another to know that it exists. For, when the painter conceives, beforehand, the picture which he is about to sketch, he has it, indeed, in his conception; but he knows that it does not yet exist, for he has not as yet executed it. But, after he has painted, he not only has in his conception what he has just produced, but he knows that it exists. Even the fool, therefore, is convinced that there exists in his conception, something than which nothing greater can be conceived; because, when he hears this mentioned, he understands it, or forms an idea of it, and whatever is understood, is in the intelligence. And surely that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, cannot exist in the intelligence alone. For, let it be supposed that it exists only in the intelligence; then something greater can be conceived; for it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be conceived, exists in the conception or intelligence alone, then that very thing, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is something than which a greater can be conceived, which is impossible. There exists, therefore, beyond doubt, both in the intelligence and in reality, something than which a greater cannot be conceived.

CHAPTER III. *That God cannot be conceived not to exist.*

Indeed, so truly does this exist, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to conceive of the existence of something which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than that which can be conceived not to exist. Wherefore, if that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, then this something, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is something than which a greater can be conceived; which is a contradiction. So truly, therefore, does something exist, than which a greater cannot be conceived, that it is impossible to conceive this not to exist. And this art thou, O Lord our God! So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist. For this there is the highest reason. For, if any mind could conceive of anything better than thou art, then the creature could ascend above the Creator, and become His judge; which is supremely absurd. Everything else, indeed, which exists besides thee, can be

conceived not to exist. Thou alone, therefore, of all things, hast being in the truest sense, and consequently in the highest degree ; for everything else that is, exists not so truly, and has, consequently, being only in an inferior degree. Why, therefore, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God ? since it is so manifest to an intelligent mind, that of all things thine existence is the highest reality. Why, unless because he is a fool, and destitute of reason ?

CHAPTER IV. *How it can be that the fool has said in his heart, what cannot be conceived.*

But how has the fool said in his heart, what he is not able to conceive ; or how is it that he is not able to conceive what he has said in his heart — since, to say in the heart and to conceive, is the same thing ? If it be true that he has said it in his heart, because he has conceived it, and at the same time, that he has not said it in his heart, because he cannot conceive it, then there are more senses than one in which a thing may be conceived, or may be said in the heart. For, a thing is conceived in one sense, when the word which designates it is conceived ; in another, when the thing itself is in its own nature understood and comprehended. In the former sense, therefore, God can be conceived not to exist ; in the latter, this is impossible. For no one who understands what fire is, and what water is, can conceive that fire is water in reality — though he may conceive this as to the mere sound of the words. So, therefore, no one who understands and comprehends what God is, can conceive that God is not — although he may say in his heart these words, either without any meaning, or in a sense foreign to the subject. For God is that, than which a greater cannot be conceived. He who properly understands this, understands also that this something so exists, that it cannot even in thought not exist. He, therefore, who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive him not to exist. Thanks be unto thee, O Lord, thanks be unto thee, that what I at first believed, through thine own endowment, I now understand, through thine illumination ; so that, even were I unwilling to believe that thou art, I cannot remain ignorant of thine existence !

CHAPTER V. *That God is whatever it is better to be than not to be ; and being alone self-existent, has created all things else from nothing.*

What art thou therefore, O Lord God than whom nothing greater can be conceived ? What art thou but that Being who is supreme

over all; who alone is self-existent, and has created all things else from nothing. For whatever is not this, is inferior to what can be conceived. But it is impossible to conceive of such inferiority in thee. What good, therefore, can be wanting to that Supreme Good from which all good flows? Thou art then just, true, happy; and whatsoever it is better to be than not to be; for it is better to be just than not just; happy than not happy.

CHAPTER VI. *How God can be sensible (sensibilis) since he is not body.*

But since it is better for thee to be sensible, omnipotent, compassionate, impassible than not to be; how art thou sensible if thou art not body; or omnipotent if thou canst not do all things or compassionate and at the same time impassible! For if corporeal beings only are sensible because their senses are around the body and in the body, how art thou sensible, since thou art not body but art the Supreme Mind, which is superior to body? But if to perceive sensibly (sentire) is nothing else than to know, and if the faculty of this perceiving is for no other purpose than the acquisition of knowledge—since he who sensibly perceives acquires knowledge just according to the nature of the sense he employs as a knowledge of colors by the sight, and of flavors by the taste—then any being may not improperly be said to perceive sensibly, which knows things in any manner whatever. Therefore, O Lord, though thou art not body, yet thou art truly in the highest degree sensible in this respect, that thou knowest all things perfectly; but not as an animal which acquires knowledge through the medium of the corporeal senses.

CHAPTER VII. *How God can be omnipotent since there are many things he cannot do.*

But how art thou also omnipotent if thou canst not do all things? Or, if thou canst not be corrupted, if thou canst not lie, if thou canst not make that which is true to be false, and that which is done to be not done, and many such things, how canst thou do all things? Is it that to be able to do those things is not power, but a weakness? For he that can do these things can do what is wrong and injurious to himself; and the greater his ability to do such things, the greater will be the power of adversity and evil over him, and the less will he be able to resist them. Whoever, therefore, has such ability, has it not from his power but from his weakness. For he is not said to be able to do such things, because he himself has power, but because his own

weakness gives something else a power over him ; or we adopt a mode of expression according to which many things are improperly said, as when we employ *is* for *is not* ; and *do* for a word which signifies *not to do* or *to do nothing*. For to one who denies that a certain thing is, we often say *thus it is*, as you say *it is*, when it would seem more strictly proper to say, *thus it is not*, as you say *it is not*. We also say, this one sits as that one does, or this one rests, as that one does ; when to sit is not to do anything ; and to rest is to do nothing. So, therefore, when any one is said to have the *power* of doing or of suffering what is wrong, or injurious to himself, weakness is to be understood by the term power ; because the more of this power he has, the greater must be the power which evil and adversity will exercise over him, and the less will he be able to resist them. Therefore, O Lord God, thou art, on this account, the more truly omnipotent, because thou canst do nothing through weakness, and nothing can have power over thee.

CHAPTER VIII. *How God is compassionate and yet impossible.*

But how art thou also at the same time compassionate and impossible ? For if thou art impossible thou dost not suffer with us ; and if thou dost not suffer with us, thy heart is not pained with sympathy for our misery, for this is to be compassionate. But if thou art not compassionate, whence so great consolation to the miserable ? How, therefore, O Lord, art thou compassionate and yet not compassionate, unless that thou art compassionate in relation to us, but not as implying any change in thee ? Thou art, indeed, compassionate to relieve, but not to experience our miseries. For when thou hast respect unto our miseries, we feel the effect of thy compassion, but no change is felt by thee. Thou art therefore compassionate, because thou dost save the miserable, and dost spare thine offending subjects ; and thou art not compassionate,¹ in so far as no compassion for misery can produce any change in thee.

¹ The term *misericordia* (compassion) has doubtless an objective as well as a subjective reference ; yet it implies a state of mind in a subject rather than relief conferred upon an object ; for compassion may be felt even where it is not manifested by bestowing relief upon the miserable. To deny, therefore, that there is anything subjective in God, to which the term compassionate is applicable, would be to deny one of the most essential attributes of the Divine nature. But no such denial is intimated by the author ; his language only implies that compassion in God, is of such a nature that it in no way conflicts with his immutability ; while at the same time it is all-sufficient for the wants of the wretched and miserable. In God there is compassion for the miserable, and mercy for the guilty. — Tn.

CHAPTER IX. *How a Being absolutely and supremely just, may spare the wicked, and that he may in accordance with his justice, exercise compassion towards them.*

But, how dost thou spare the wicked, if thou art absolutely and supremely just? For how can a Being of absolute and supreme justice, do anything which is not just? Or, what justice is there in bestowing eternal life on one who deserves eternal death? Whence comes it, O thou good and compassionate God, good to the evil as well as to the good; whence comes it that thou dost save the wicked, if this is not just, and thou dost not do anything not just? Is it because thy goodness is incomprehensible, that this lies hid in that inaccessible light which thou dost inhabit? Truly, within the deepest and most secret recesses of thy goodness, is concealed that fountain from which flows the river of thy mercy. For, although thou art absolutely and supremely just, yet thou art also propitious towards the guilty, for the reason that thou art absolutely and supremely good. For thou wouldst be less good, wert thou propitious to no sinner. For he is more truly good, whose favor extends both to the good and to the evil, than he whose favor extends to the good alone; and he is more truly good who is good both in punishing and in sparing the wicked, than he who is good in punishing alone. Thou art compassionate, therefore, for the reason that thou art absolutely and supremely good. And although the reason may be apparent why thou dost recompense good to the good, and evil to the evil, yet surely we have reason to be profoundly amazed, that thou who art supremely just, and in need of nothing, shouldst recompense good to thy sinful and guilty subjects. O, the depth of thy goodness! O, my God! The source of thy compassion is seen, but not fully understood. We see from whence the river flows, but our vision cannot penetrate to the bottom of the fountain from which it springs. For it is from the plenitude of thy goodness, that flows thy clemency to sinners; but in the depth of thy goodness the reason of this lies concealed. For although it is from thy goodness that thou dost recompense good to the good, and evil to the evil, yet this would seem to be required by considerations of justice. But when thou dost recompense good to the evil, we know that thy supreme goodness has willed it, but we are amazed that thy supreme justice could permit it! O what compassion! How rich the sweetness and how sweet the riches from which it flows to us! O the immensity of the divine goodness! how deserving of the affection and love of sinners! Thou

dost save the righteous, justice concurring; thou dost liberate the wicked, justice still, ruling; those, in accordance with their merits; these, notwithstanding their demerits; those, by recognizing in them the good which thou hast bestowed; these, by pardoning the evil which thou dost abhor. O, unbounded goodness, which so transcends all thought! Let this compassion which flows from thine inexhaustible fulness, come over my soul. Let those streams of mercy which spring from thy bosom, flow in upon my heart. Spare, through thy clemency; avenge not through thy justice. For, although it is difficult to conceive how thy mercy can be intimately united with thy justice, yet we are compelled to believe that it is by no means opposed to justice — because it flows from thy goodness, which is in perfect harmony with justice, and which otherwise could not be goodness. For, if thou art merciful only because thou art supremely good; and if thou art supremely good, only because thou art supremely just, therefore thou art truly merciful, for the reason that thou art supremely just. Aid thou me, O thou just and merciful God, whose light I seek; aid me that I may understand what I say. Truly thou art merciful, because thou art just. Does thy mercy, therefore, spring from thy justice? Is it, therefore, from justice that thou dost spare the wicked? If thus it is, O Lord, if thus it is, teach me how it is — Is it because it is just, that thou art so good and so powerful, that an increase of thy goodness and power cannot be conceived? For what is more just than this? Truly this could not be, if thou wert good only in punishing, and not in sparing; and if thou shouldst render good those who are only destitute of goodness, but not those who are positively wicked. Therefore, in so far as it accords with thy goodness, it is just that thou dost spare the wicked, and that thou dost render good those who are wicked. In fine, what is not done justly, ought not to be done; and what ought not to be done, is done unjustly. If, therefore, thou dost not justly compassionate the wicked, thou oughtest not to compassionate them. And if thou oughtest not to compassionate them, then thou dost compassionate them unjustly. But if it is impious to say this, then it is right to believe that thou dost justly compassionate the wicked.

CHAPTER X. *How He justly punishes and justly spares the wicked.*

But it is also just in thee to punish the wicked. For what is more just than for the righteous to receive good, and the wicked evil? How, therefore, is it just that thou shouldst punish, and just that thou shouldst spare the wicked. Dost thou in one sense justly punish the

wicked, and in another sense justly spare? For when thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, because this corresponds with their deserts; but when thou dost spare, it is just — not because it corresponds with their deserts, but because it is becoming thy goodness. In sparing the wicked, thou art just according to what is suitable to thee, but not according to what is deserved by us; in the same manner as thou art compassionate in the sense of relieving us, but not in the sense of changing thee. For as in saving us whom thou mightest justly destroy, thou art compassionate, not because thou art changed by compassion, but because we feel its effect; so also thou art just, not as rendering unto us that which is due, but as doing that which is becoming thy nature who art supremely good. Thus, therefore, without any contradiction, thou dost justly punish; and justly spare the wicked.

CHAPTER XI. *How all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, and yet He is just in all His ways.*

But is it not also just, O Lord, in a manner suitable to thee, that thou dost punish the wicked? For it is agreeable to our notions of thy justice that thou shouldst be so just that thou canst not be conceived more just; which thou couldst not by any means be, if thou shouldst render only good to the good and not evil to the evil. For he is more just who awards both to the good and to the evil their merits, than he who awards them to the good alone. It is just, therefore, according to thy nature, O thou just and benignant God, for thee to punish and to spare. Truly, therefore, all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, and yet the Lord is just in all his ways. And this surely without any contradiction to thy nature, for it is not just that they should be saved whom thou dost will to punish; nor is it just that they should be condemned whom thou dost will to spare. For that only is just which thou wilt; and that not just which thou wilt not. Thus, therefore, from thy justice springs thy compassion; because it is just that thou shouldst be good in such a sense as to spare; and it is perhaps for this reason that he who is supremely just can decree good to the evil. But even were it possible to understand why thou canst purpose to save the wicked, yet surely we can in no way comprehend why, of those who are equally wicked, thou dost, through thy supreme goodness, save some rather than others; and through thy supreme justice dost condemn these rather than those. Thus, therefore, thou art truly sensible, omnipotent, compassionate and impassible; even as thou art living, wise, good, happy, eternal, and whatsoever it is better to be than not to be.

CHAPTER XII. *That God is the life itself by which he lives ; and so of all his attributes.*

But truly whatsoever thou art, thou art this, not through something else, but through thyself alone. Thou art, therefore, the life itself by which thou dost live ; the wisdom by which thou art wise ; the goodness itself by which thou art good both to the evil and to the good ; and so of all thine attributes.

CHAPTER XIII. *How God alone is unlimited and eternal while other minds are unlimited and eternal.*

But everything which is in any degree enclosed by space or time, is less than that which no law of space or time controls. Since, therefore, nothing is greater than thou art, neither space nor time contains thee ; but thou art everywhere and always ; and because this can be said of thee alone, thou only art unlimited and eternal. How, therefore, are other minds said to be unlimited and eternal ? Indeed thou art alone eternal ; because as thou alone of all beings dost not cease, so thou dost not begin to be. But how art thou alone unlimited ? Is it that a created mind, when compared with thee is limited, but when compared with body is unlimited ? For that is certainly limited, which, when it is wholly in one particular place cannot be at the same time in any other place ; which is true only of corporeal things ; and that is unlimited which exists as a whole in every place at the same time ; this can be predicated of thee alone ; but that is limited and at the same time unlimited which, while it exists wholly in a certain place, exists at the same time wholly in some other place, and yet exists, not everywhere ; which is true only of created minds. For if the whole mind were not in each member of its body, the whole mind could not feel in each member. Thou, therefore, O Lord, art alone unlimited, and eternal, and yet other minds are both unlimited and eternal.

CHAPTER XIV. *How and why God is seen and not seen by those who seek him.*

Hast thou found, O my soul, what thou wast seeking ? Thou wast seeking God, thou hast found him to be something supreme over all, than which nothing more excellent can be conceived ; that this is life itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness, and blessed eternity ; and that this is everywhere and always. For if thou hast not found thy God, then he must be something different from that which

thou hast found, and cannot possess those perfections which the certain and necessary conceptions of thy reason have ascribed to him. But if thou hast found him why is it that thou dost not perceive what thou hast found? Why, O Lord God, does not my soul perceive thee, if it has found thee? Since it has found that which is light and truth has it not found thee? For how could it know this except by seeing the light and the truth? Or could it know anything whatever concerning thee except through thy light and thy truth? If, therefore, it has seen light and truth it has seen thee; if it has not seen thee it has seen neither light nor truth. Is that both light and truth which it has seen, and still has it not as yet seen thee, because it has seen thee only in part, but not as thou art? O Lord my God, my Creator and Regenerator, say to my longing soul, what else thou art than what it has seen, that it may clearly see what it desires. It strives to see more, but beyond what it has already seen, it sees nothing but darkness. Nay, rather, it sees not darkness, for there is no darkness in thee; but it sees itself unable to see more on account of its own darkness. Why this? O Lord, why this? Is its eye darkened by its own weakness, or dazzled by thy splendor? Surely it is both darkened in itself and dazzled by thee. It is also obscured by its own shortness of vision and oppressed by thine immensity. It is limited by its own narrow range, and is overpowered by thine amplitude. For how vast is that light from which every truth radiates that dawns upon the rational mind! How capacious is that truth which includes in itself everything that is true, and out of which there exists only nothingness and falsehood! How infinite the mind which sees at a single glance, all that has ever occurred; and which knows by whom and through whom and in what way all things have been created from nothing! What purity, what simplicity, what certitude, what glory is here! This surely transcends all that the created mind is able to comprehend.

CHAPTER XV. *That the greatness of God transcends conceptions.*

Therefore, O Lord, not only art thou that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but thy greatness transcends all conception. For since it is possible to conceive that there is something whose greatness transcends all conception, if thou art not this very thing, then something greater than thou art, can be conceived, which is impossible.

CHAPTER XVI. *That the light which God inhabits is inaccessible.*

Truly, O Lord, this is light inaccessible in which thou dwellest; for truly no other being can penetrate this light, to contemplate thee there. Truly, therefore, I look not upon it, for it is too resplendent for me; and yet it is through this that I see whatsoever I do see; just as a weak eye sees what it does see, through the light of the sun; while it is unable to gaze upon that light in the sun itself. My intelligence cannot approach to thy light, nor comprehend it. So great is its effulgence, nor can the eye of my mind long endure to gaze thereon. It is dazzled by its brightness, overpowered by its amplitude, oppressed by its immensity, confounded by its profusion. O, supreme and inaccessible light! O, perfect and blessed truth! How far thou art from me, who am so near to thee! How remote from my sight, who am so constantly in thine! Thou art everywhere present and entire, yet I see thee not. In thee I move, and in thee I am, and yet I am unable to approach unto thee. Thou art within me, and around me, yet I perceive thee not.

CHAPTER XVII. *That in God there is harmony, order, savor, polish, and beauty, in a manner ineffable and peculiar to Himself.*

As yet, O Lord, thou art concealed from my soul in thine own light and blessedness, and therefore it yet remains involved in its darkness and misery. For it looks around, but sees not thy beauty. It hearkens, but hears not thy harmony. It exercises the sense of smell, but perceives not thine odor; of taste, but it recognizes not thy savor; of touch, but it feels not thy polish. For thou hast in thyself, O Lord, in a manner ineffable and peculiar to thee, all those qualities which thou hast imparted, under the forms of sense, to the things which thou hast created; but the senses of my soul are benumbed, stupified, obstructed by the inveterate languor of sin.

CHAPTER XVIII. *That God is life, wisdom, eternity, and every real good.*

But, behold a new source of trouble! Behold, while seeking joy and gladness, I again encounter sorrow and grief. My soul was already expecting satiety, and behold! I am again oppressed with want. Already was I attempting to eat; but, behold! I hunger the more. I was endeavoring to rise to the light of God, but I have fallen back into my own darkness. Nay, not only have I fallen into it,

but I feel that I am quite enveloped by it. Before my mother conceived me, I fell. Surely in darkness was I conceived, and in darkness was I enveloped at my birth. Surely we have all fallen in him, in whom all have sinned. In him we have all been deprived of that good which he might have easily retained, but which he has so wickedly lost for himself and for us. When we wish to regain this, we know not the way; when we seek, we find it not; when we find, it is not what we seek. Help thou me for thy goodness sake, O Lord. I have sought thy face; thy face, O Lord, will I again seek. Turn not thou away from me. Raise me from myself to thee. Cleanse, heal, quicken, illuminate, the eye of my mind, that I may contemplate thee. Let my soul recover its energies, O Lord, that it may again, with all its powers, betake itself to thee. What art thou, O Lord, what art thou? Under what form shall my heart conceive of thee? Surely thou art life, thou art wisdom, thou art truth, thou art blessedness, thou art eternity, and thou art all that is truly good. But, these are multiform; my narrow intelligence cannot see them all at a single glance, so as to delight in them all at the same time. How, therefore, O Lord, art thou all these? Is it that all these are parts of thee, or is it rather that each one of these is all that thou art? For, whatever is composed of parts, is not a perfect unity, but is in some sense a plurality, diverse from itself, and susceptible of dissolution, either in fact or in conception — all of which is foreign to thee, thou than whom nothing more excellent can be conceived. Hence, in thee, O Lord, there are no parts, neither art thou multiform, but thou art in such a sense one and the same with thyself, that thou art in no respect dissimilar to thyself; nay, thou art unity itself, indivisible even in conception. Therefore, life, wisdom, and the other things enumerated, are not parts of thee, but all are one, and each is all that thou art, and all that the rest are. Therefore, as thou hast no parts, and as thine eternity which thou dost constitute, has no parts, so a part of thee and of thine eternity is never and nowhere; but thou art everywhere entire, and thine eternity is always complete.

CHAPTER XIX. *That God is neither in space nor in time, but that all things are in Him.*

But if, through thine eternity, thou wast, and art, and will be; and if to have been, is not to be about to be; and to be, is not to have been, nor to be about to be, how is thine eternity always complete? Is it that nothing of thine eternity passes away in such a sense as to

be no longer; and that nothing of it is yet to come as if it did not already exist? Therefore, thou wast not yesterday, nor wilt thou be to-morrow; but yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, *thou art*; nay, rather thou art neither yesterday, to-day, nor to-morrow, but simply *thou art*, irrespective of all time. For, yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, have an existence only in time; but, though nothing exists without thee, thou dost nevertheless exist neither in time nor in space, but time, and space, and all things, are in thee; for nothing contains thee, but thou containest all things.

CHAPTER XX. *That God is before all things, and beyond (ultra) all things, even things which are eternal.*

Therefore thou dost fill and embrace all things; thou art before and beyond all things. Before all things, because before they were brought forth, *thou art*. But, how art thou beyond all things? For, in what way art thou beyond things which have no end? Is it that these things can in no wise exist without thee, but that thou wouldst nevertheless exist even if these should return to nothing? For, in this way thou art in a certain sense beyond these things. Is it also that these things can be conceived to have an end, but that no end can be conceived of thee? For in this way they have an end in a certain sense, but in no sense can this be affirmed of thee. And surely that which, in no sense, has an end, is beyond that which has an end in some sense. Dost thou transcend all things, even eternal things, in this sense also, that thine entire eternity and theirs is present before thee; while of their eternity they see not as yet that which is to come, and behold no longer that which is past? For, in this way thou art always beyond these things; since thou art always present at that point, or rather that point is always present to thee, at which they have not yet arrived.

CHAPTER XXI. *Whether this is that which is expressed by the terms *Saeculum seculi* or *Secula seculorum*.*

Is this, therefore, what is meant by an age of age or ages of ages? For as an age of time contains all things pertaining to time, so thine eternity contains even ages of time themselves. Thine eternity is called an age, on account of its indivisible immensity. And although thou art so great, O Lord, that all things are full of thee, and in thee, yet thou art so entirely irrespective of all space that in thee there are neither parts nor proportions.

CHAPTER XXII. *That God alone is what he is and who he is.*

Thou alone, O Lord, art what thou art and who thou art. For that which is one thing in its whole and another in its parts, and in which there is anything mutable, is not what it is, in an absolute sense. And that which begins from non-existence and can be conceived of as not existing, and which unless it subsist through something else, must return to non-existence; also whatever has a past which is now no longer, and a future, which is yet to come, this does not exist in proper and absolute sense. But thou art what thou art; because whatsoever thou art at any time or in any manner, thou art this at all times and absolutely. And thou art who thou art properly and simply; because thou hast neither a past nor a future, but only a present, neither canst thou be conceived of as not existing at any moment. But thou art life and light and wisdom and blessedness and eternity, and many things good of this nature, and yet thou art none other than the one supreme Good, absolutely self-sufficient, needing nothing, but whom all things else need in order to their existence and well-being.

CHAPTER XXIII. *That this supreme Good is equally the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; that He is the only necessary Being; that He is the whole, the absolute, the only Good.*

Thou art this good, O God; the Father; and thy Word, that is thy Son, is this good. For in the Word, by which thou dost declare thyself, there can be nothing else than what thou art, nor anything either greater or less, since thy Word is as true as thou art veracious. And therefore thy Word is, as thou art, truth itself, and not another truth than thou art; and so simple art thou that nothing else than what thou art can spring from thee. This same good is Love identical with that which is common to thee and to thy Son, that is to say, it is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son. For this same Love is not inferior to thee nor to thy Son; for, so far as thou lovest thyself and the Son, and so far as the Son loves thee and himself, so great art thou and he; this cannot be anything different from thyself and thy Son, which is not unequal to thyself and to him; nor can anything proceed from absolute simplicity, but that itself from which it proceeds. But that which each is, this the whole trinity is, at one and the same time, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, since each is no other than simple and absolute unity, and supreme, absolute simplicity, which can neither be multiplied nor be now one thing and

then another. Moreover, there is but one necessary Being; and He in whom is all good is this one necessary Being; nay He is Himself the whole, the One supreme and the only Good.

CHAPTER XXIV. *An attempt to conceive the nature and vastness of this good.*

Now, O my soul, awake and arouse all thy powers; conceive, so far as thou canst, what and how great is thy good. For if all good things are pleasing, consider attentively how pleasing is that good which contains in itself the sweetness of all other things else that are good, and not such sweetness as we experienced in created things, but such as excels this as far as the Creator is superior to the creature. For if life created is good, how good is life creative? If salvation procured is pleasing, how pleasing is that healing power which has procured all salvation? If that wisdom is lovely which consists in a knowledge of things which are formed, how lovely is the wisdom which has formed all things from nothing? In fine, if things that are pleasing, afford great delight, what and how great the delight which He affords by whom these pleasing things themselves have been created?

CHAPTER XXV. *What and how great are the blessings of those who enjoy this good.*

O, who shall enjoy this good! What will he possess and what will he not possess? Surely he will have all that he desires, and nothing which he desires not. For here will be good for the body and for the mind, such as eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived. Why, therefore, O vain man, dost thou rove through a variety of things in search of pleasures for thy body, and for thy mind? Fix thy love upon this One Good which comprehends all other good, and it is sufficient. Direct thy desires to this single good which constitutes every species of good, and it is enough. For what dost thou love, O my body? What dost thou desire, O my soul? There, there alone is found whatsoever thou lovest and whatsoever thou desirest. If beauty delights; *the righteous shall shine as the sun.* If velocity, or strength, or corporeal freedom, which nothing can oppose; *they shall be like the angels of God;* for the body is *seen as an animal body and it is raised a spiritual body,* not indeed by nature, but by divine power. If a long and vigorous life; there is a healthful eternity, and eternal health; for *the righteous shall live forever;* and *the salvation of the righteous is of the Lord.* If complete satia-

faction ; they shall be satisfied *when the glory of God shall appear*. If satisfaction more than complete ; *they shall be abundantly satisfied from the fatness of thy house*. If melody delights thee ; there choirs of angels chant without cessation, their harmonious praises to God. If pleasure unmixed and free from all impurity ; thou shalt cause them to drink of the river of thy pleasure, O God. If wisdom ; there wisdom itself, even the wisdom of God presents itself to the contemplation of the righteous. If friendship ; they love God more than themselves, and each other as themselves ; and God loves them more than they love themselves ; because they love Him and themselves and each other through Him, and he loves himself and them through himself. If concord ; they have all one will, for they have no other than the will of God. If power ; the will of the righteous will be as omnipotent as that of God. For as God will be able to do whatever he shall will through himself, so they will be able to do whatsoever they shall will through him ; because as their will can differ nothing from his, so his will differ nothing from theirs ; and whatsoever he shall will must of necessity come to pass. If honor and riches ; God will make his good and faithful servants rulers over many things ; nay, he will constitute them his children and they shall be called gods ; and where his Son shall be, there shall they be ; heirs indeed, of God and joint heirs with Christ. If true security ; surely as the righteous will be certain that these good things, or rather that this one good will never, by any means fail them, so they will be certain that they will never of their own accord cast it away, that God who loves them will never deprive them of it against their will, and that there is nothing more powerful than God which can separate them from him against his will and their own. But what and how great is this joy, where such and great good is found ? O heart of man, poor and needy heart, inured to trouble and overwhelmed by misery ! how wouldst thou rejoice if thou could abound with all this ? Ask thy most inward depths if they could contain the joy which would flow from blessedness so great. But surely if any other, whom thou lovest altogether as thyself, should possess the same blessedness, thy joy would be double ; for thou wouldst rejoice not less for him than for thyself. But if two, three, or a still greater number should partake of the same, thou wouldst rejoice as much for each one as for thyself, if thou shouldst love each as thyself. Therefore in this perfected love of innumerable happy angels and men, where no one will love each other less than himself, each one will in like manner rejoice for the other as for himself. If, therefore, the heart of man can

scarcely contain its own joy, arising from this great good, how will it find room for the aggregate of such joys? And, indeed, since the more any one loves another, the more he will rejoice in his good; and since in this state of perfect felicity each will love God incomparably more than himself, and all others with him, so he will rejoice more beyond conception, in the felicity of God than in that of himself and of all others with him. But if they shall love God with all the heart, with all the mind and all the soul, so that all the heart and all the mind and all the soul would, notwithstanding, be insufficient for the greatness of their love; surely they will so rejoice with all the heart, with all the mind and with all the soul that the whole heart and mind and soul would be insufficient for the fulness of their joy.

CHAPTER XXVI. *Whether this is the fulness of joy which the Lord hath promised.*

My God and my Lord, my Hope, and the Joy of my heart, say to my soul, if this is the joy concerning which thou hast spoken to us through thy Son, ask and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full. For I have found a fulness of joy, and more than a fulness; for after it has filled the entire man, heart, mind, and soul, a fulness of joy beyond all measure will still remain. It is not, therefore, that all this joy will enter into those who rejoice, but all who are to rejoice will enter into this joy. Say, O Lord, say to the inmost heart of thy servant, if this is the joy into which thy servants are to enter, who enter into the joy of their Lord. But surely this joy in which the chosen shall rejoice, neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, nor hath the heart of man conceived. Therefore, O Lord, I have not as yet told, or even conceived, how great will be their joy who are blest of thee. Their joy will indeed be in proportion to their love, and their love will be in proportion to their knowledge. To what extent, then, O Lord, will they know thee, and how much will they love thee? Surely eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath the heart of man conceived in this life, the extent to which they will know and love thee in the life to come. O Lord, I beseech thee let me enter into the joy of the Lord who is God, three and one, blessed forever! Amen.

ARTICLE V.

AN INVESTIGATION IN SYRIAC PHILOLOGY.

By Rev. Benjamin Davies, Montreal.

THOSE who read with interest the article of Dr. Murdock on *The Syriac Words for Baptism*, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for Oct. 1850, may be inclined to inquire farther into the subject. The following remarks are respectfully offered in aid of that inquiry. It is indeed much to be wished, for the sake of Syriac philology, that an article on the question were contributed by one of the most learned and judicious of the American missionaries to the Nestorians, on whom chiefly the revival of Syriac literature may be said now legitimately to depend. But in the absence of such a contribution, the following may have its interest and its use.

The question may be thus stated. Is the Syriac ܥܡܕܐ, *to be baptised*, radically identical with the Hebrew עמד *to stand*, and therefore not properly expressive of the outward act indicated by βαπτίζω?

It is in the highest degree probable, that the Syrians had once a root עמד *to stand*; since ܥܡܕܐ *pillar* (Heb. עמוד) is clearly derived from it, and since all the cognate tongues (Heb., Chald., Samar., Arab. and Ethiopic) have it, with substantially the same meaning. But of the actual use of the verb in Syriac to denote *to stand*, no example has yet been found, as Michaelis (in his edition of Castell's *Syriac Lexicon sub voce*) observes, '*Standi* significatione, reliquis linguis Orientalibus communem, apud Syros non reperio.' Yet it has been the general opinion of Syriac scholars, that the word used for βαπτίζω had originally that very signification, as the same great Orientalist mentions, 'In hac baptizandi significatione conferunt hand pauci cum Hebraico עמד *stetit*, ita ut, *stare*, sit, *stare in flumine*, illoque *mergi*. In this opinion and explanation, even Gesenius concurred, as may be seen under עמד, in the second edition of his *Lexicon*, by Dr. Robinson. But it is not too much to say, that discreet philology will feel some difficulty in accepting this view; Michaelis at least felt it, and declared, "Mihi verisimilius, diversum plane ab עמד, litterarumque aliqua permutatione ortum ex غمر *submergere*. The existence of some difficulty in the case is also indicated and aptly illustrated by the great diversity which is manifest in the explanations offered by

those who agree in identifying the root in question with the Heb. קָמַן, to *stand*. We can point out at least four different explanations. 1. The one above-mentioned, as quoted by Michaelis, and approved by Gesenius. But here we are at a loss to comprehend what could have caused the ceremony to be named in reference to the *standing*, rather than to the *immersion*, in the water, seeing that the latter, and not the former, enters into the idea of baptism. Can a parallel be shown, where a transaction derives its name from one of its mere circumstances, rather than from a prominent and significant part of the process? The ecclesiastical use of Eucharist (*εὐχαριστία*) for the Lord's Supper, can scarcely be deemed a parallel; for the *blessing*, or *giving of thanks*, is an important part of the holy communion, the act being even twice repeated (1 Cor. 11: 24, 25; comp. chap. 10: 16). 2. Another view is, that the term means to *stand* at, or in, the water, in order to be *sprinkled*, or *poured upon*. So Dr. Henderson, perhaps on the authority of Schindler in *Lex. Pentaglotton*, who says, "*Stabant enim, qui baptizabantur.*" But the same difficulty as above, presses us here again. And even if they were baptized in a standing posture, they undoubtedly, as Dr. Murdock well observes (p. 739), *stood* up also in various other religious acts (e. g. singing); and therefore the verb might be used to indicate such acts just as well as baptism. But of such use of it, there is no instance known. Besides, in the case of young infants, how could the two scholars here concerned, apply their own idea, "*stabant enim, qui baptizabantur?*" 3. Others think the meaning arose thus: to *stand*, then, to *establish*, or *confirm*, and then to *be baptized*, the rite of confirmation being in the Syrian and other Eastern churches administered immediately after baptism, and by the same person. So Dr. Augusti, Dr. Lee of Cambridge, and Moses Stuart. But there is no proof that the rite of confirmation, as it is called, was practised so early as the apostolic days, when doubtless ܠܚܕܝܢ was already employed for βαπτίζεσθαι; or, if the apostles did practise that rite, it clearly was not always done immediately after baptism (see Acts 8: 14-17, 14: 21, 22). And besides, as Dr. M. justly argues (p. 740), if this verb in the causative conjugation, *Aphel* (ܠܚܕܝܢ), to *cause to stand*, to *confirm*, served to express the *administering* of baptism, we should certainly expect the *passive* form of that conjugation, (ܠܚܕܝܢ), to *be caused to stand*, to *be confirmed*, to express the *receiving* of baptism; whereas there is no instance of this form, but

on the contrary, the simple intransitive form (ܡܢܢ) is employed in that sense, though by hypothesis it properly means, *to stand*. 4. Lastly, we have Dr. Murdock's theory (p. 740), "that the early Syrian Christians, in conformity, very probably, with apostolic example and usage, employed the neuter verb ܡܢܢ [*to stand*], to denote the *reception of Baptism*, because they associated with that the idea of *coming to a stand*, or of *taking a public and decisive stand*, on the side of Christianity." This original suggestion has certainly been set forth in a pleasing manner, and is theologically very acceptable; but yet it appears to be philologically beset with difficulties, in common with the foregoing theories. Nor is it easy to see how it could apply to infant baptism. Could tender babes and little children be supposed "to take a public and decisive stand on the side of Christianity?"

One thing is very clear, namely, that if either of the above views be correct, it must follow that the use of ܡܢܢ and its derivatives, as expressive of baptism, was strictly technical, or peculiar to the language of the church, whilst the ordinary or secular meaning was simply, *to stand*, or some modification of that idea, and had no correspondence to βαπτίζω, as found in classical Greek. Indeed, Dr. M. (p. 736) goes even farther than this, and affirms that the Syrian Christians, from the first, appropriated the verb exclusively to the baptismal rite, and that consequently we cannot expect to find it used in any other sense, in any of the existing Syriac books, except in the term for *pillar*, which he considers to be derived from it. But, now, let us see whether these conclusions be philologically correct. Are they warranted by facts, in the usage of the language?

The most ancient Syriac work now extant, is the Peshito version of the Bible, made early in the second century; and in it we find undeniable proofs, that ܡܢܢ and its derivatives were actually used where neither the *baptismal rite*, nor any sort of *standing*, was intended. The verb occurs once in the Old Testament, in Num. 31: 23, where it means something like *plunging*: "All that abideth not the fire, ye shall make go through the water." Here the Hebrew תַּקְרִירוּ בַּמַּיִם is rendered ܡܢܢ ܡܢܢ ܡܢܢ i. e. *plunge it in water*. Surely the religious idea of *confirmation* or of *bringing to a stand* will not apply in this case, where mere things are spoken of. In the New Testament we find several instances besides those in which the rite of baptism is intended. See John 5: 2, 4, 7, and 9: 7, where in each verse κολυμβήθρα, *pool*, or properly *swimming-place*, is expressed by the

derivative ܠܕܢܚܝܬܐ, which clearly has not here its ecclesiastical meaning of *baptism* or *baptistery*, a notable instance of which is found in Heb. 6: 4, where *κατακλύσεις* *enlightened* is explained in the very same terms that denote 'went down into the pool' in John 5: 4. No doubt the translator in Heb. 6: 4 intended to express 'who have once gone down into the baptistery,' and not 'who have once come to baptism;' nor 'who have descended into baptism,' as it is translated in a work called *Horræ Aramaicæ*, Lond. 1843. In Heb. 9: 10 the same derivative stands for *βαπτισμός* in the sense of *washing* or Jewish *ablution*; so also in Mark 7: 4, 8. The verb is found in Luke 11: 38 and Mark 7: 4 for *βαπτίζουμαι* in its non-ecclesiastical sense of *bathing*. Dr. M. mentions (p. 736), that in these places in Mark and Luke, the Modern Syriac Version by the American Missionaries, has substituted other terms for those of the Peshito to express *ablution*. Such a change is open to at least one objection, viz., that it takes away from the Syrian reader so many clear proofs that ܠܕܢܚܝܬܐ is not a purely ecclesiastical term, any more than the Greek *βαπτίζω*. One other class of passages remains to be mentioned, viz., those which speak of sufferings as *overwhelming*, which idea is conveyed by this very verb and a derivative from it, answering to *βαπτίζουμαι* and *βάπτισμα*; see Matt. 20: 22, 23, Mark 10: 38, 39, Luke 12: 50. It turns out then that upwards of ten passages are to be found in the Peshito Bible, in which the Syriac words, elsewhere employed in that version for baptism, do not signify the Christian rite, and where they cannot mean anything like *standing*. The verb occurs in two or three instances also in the Apocrypha: in Judith 12: 7 it reads that Judith 'went forth to the valley of Bethphalu by night and *bathed* (ܠܕܢܚܝܬܐ ܠܕܢܚܝܬܐ) in the fountain of water,' where the Vulgate has 'et baptizabat se in fonte aquæ,' and the Greek καὶ ἐβαπτίζετο ἐν τῇ παρυμβολῇ ἐπὶ τῆς πηγῆς τοῦ ὕδατος. And in Susanna 13: 15 the verb occurs in the same sense three times, and here the Greek has *λούουμαι* and the Latin *lavor*. The passage is found in the Versio Syriaca Altera of Walton's Polyglott.

We may here inquire in passing, what in ecclesiastical usage is the force of this verb? In regard to this, it is worthy of notice that Syrian church writers in speaking of baptism distinguish several kinds besides that of Christ, the first of which is called the baptism of the *flood* (see Assemani Bibliotheca Orientalis, III. p. 574) or ordinary *bathing* (Ibid. p. 357). This mode of speaking clearly recognizes a non-ritual use of the term ܠܕܢܚܝܬܐ and serves to indi-

eats its real meaning to be *immersion*. But it is urged that if this were the real meaning understood by the Syrians, they would have used a different word, ܠܬܒܝܠ or ܬܒܝܠ, which is admitted by all to signify *to immerse*. Now the fact is, they have used this word also for the baptismal rite, see in Castell's Lexicon under ܬܒܝܠ. We have farther proof of this in their Forms of Service for the administration of the rite. In the Nestorian Ritual, compiled by Jesubabus Adiabenus about A. D. 650 (Assemani *loc. cit.* pp. 118, 140), the officiating priest is represented as taking the child and dipping him in the water ܬܒܝܠܐ ܕܗܘ ܕܡܕܒܝܠܐ and saying *such a one is baptized* ܕܡܕܒܝܠܐ ܕܗܘ ܕܡܕܒܝܠܐ in the name of the Father, etc., and then causing him to ascend from the water ܬܒܝܠܐ ܕܗܘ ܕܡܕܒܝܠܐ, see Assemani Bib. Orient. IV. (or part 2 of III.), p. 243. Compare with this the Anglican Rubric directing the priest to take the child and "dip it in the water discreetly and warily, saying, I baptize thee in the name," etc. There is another Syriac Ritual printed in a small 4to vol. at Antwerp, 1572, with the title *Liber Rituum Severi Patriarchæ*, etc. which Assemani does not mention at all in his great work. If this Ritual be authentic and now in actual use, it must be among the Jacobite or Monophysite Syrians, to whose party Severus belonged (Bib. Orient. II. p. 321). In this Baptismal Service we are told (p. 26) that the Son bowed down his head and was baptized ܬܒܝܠܐ ܕܡܕܒܝܠܐ; and he is invoked (p. 36) in these words, "we beseech thee, who dippedst thy head in the water ܬܒܝܠܐ ܕܗܘ ܕܡܕܒܝܠܐ and toiledst and broughtest up the whole world from the depth of sin: we invoke thee, who wast as a son of man baptized by John and receivedst testimony from thy Father and wast declared by the Holy Ghost: we invoke thee, who by thy holy baptism (ܬܒܝܠܐ) openedst heaven which was before closed on account of our sins."¹

But to return to the non-ecclesiastical use of ܬܒܝܠ and its derivatives, — we have now to add examples from other writings. In general Syriac literature, only very few works have as yet been printed,

¹ On the usage of the terms in question in the Peshito Bible and the Syrian Fathers, there is much light thrown in a small work of rare philological merit, called *A Critical Examination of the Rendering of βαπτίζω in the Ancient and many Modern Versions of the New Testament*, by F. W. Gotch, A. M., Trin. Coll., Dublin. London, 1841. The celebrated Prof. Ewald once spoke of the scholarship of this work in terms of great praise.

though very many are known to exist in MS., and are deposited chiefly in the great libraries of the Vatican, of Oxford, and of the British Museum.¹ In the printed works, the writer's very limited reading has met with two note-worthy passages, affecting the present inquiry. One is in Book I. sect. 17 of the Theophania of Eusebius, edited by Prof. Lee of Cambridge, London, 1842, from a MS. which is believed to take its date from A. D. 411. The whole passage is rendered by the distinguished editor himself in a Translation of the work, published at Cambridge, 1843, in these words: "This self-same Word of God also *immersed* [ܡܚܬܝܡ] even into the depths of the sea, and determined those swimming natures: and here again he made the myriads of forms which are innumerable, with every various kind of living creature." The other place is in Kirschii Chrestomathia Syriaca, ed. Bernstein, Lipsiæ, 1832, on page 209, where the crocodile, or the leviathan of Job 41: 1, is spoken of by Bar-Hebræus as "*plunging* (ܡܚܬܝܡ) in the depth of the sea." It is needless to observe, that in both these examples the verb can express neither the *baptismal rite* nor the idea of *standing*. Dr. Lee has, however, noticed its use in the Theophania as something remarkable (which it certainly is on his theory), and added this note (Translation, p. 9): "This is one of those cases, in which a verb takes a new sense from a metonymical use of it in the first instance. It is taken to signify *baptizing*, because *baptism* and *confirmation* are administered at the same time in the East. And as it is so taken to signify *baptizing*, so it is subsequently to imply *immersion*." But where are the parallel cases to illustrate and prove this theory? In the Slavonic languages a word meaning *to cross* is used for *baptizing*, from the making of the sign of the cross in the ceremony; but is it used also for *immersion*? The process of change here supposed would, at least, require a long period of time for its development: first changing *standing* into *confirming*, then *confirming* into *baptizing*, and finally *baptizing* into *dipping*. But it has been shown above, that this last named meaning or one akin to it was, at least, *cœval* with that of *baptizing*, both being found in the Peshito, the oldest Syriac work extant and dated early in the second century.

To the preceding evidences regarding the usage of the language,

¹ The rich collection of Syriac MSS. in the B. M. is now fortunately under the care of a most learned and laborious scholar, the Rev. W. Cureton, A. M., who has already earned great and just fame by editing the Syriac Epistles of Ignatius and some other important works found in that collection. Long may he live a promoter in chief of oriental literature!

is to be added the testimony of native Syriac lexicographers. The most celebrated of these were Bar-Ali and Bar-Bahlul, whose Syro-Arabic Lexicons still exist in MS. in the Bodleian and other libraries. Bar-Ali was a physician and flourished in literature about A. D. 885, see Bib. Orientalis, III. p. 257. The following complete extract is from his Lexicon in the Bodleian, MS. Hunt. 163. For convenience of reference, we may here affix numbers to the Syriac terms explained.

1. ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
2. ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
3. ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
4. ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ
5. ܡܚܡܐ ܐܨܬܒܝܥ ܐܥܬܒܐ ܐܝܨܐ ܐܢܓܬܐܨ ܡܢܗ ܝܩܐܠ

Of these Arabic explanations the following is the best translation the writer can submit, as he enjoys only the poor help of Freytag's very meagre Lexicon Arabico-Latinum in usum Tironum, 1837: 1. *An immersing, a bathing, also a dipping, and from it is named the dipping on the festival of Epiphany.* 2. *He was immersed, he was baptized.* 3. *Baptism or immersion.* 4. *Pillar, column; pillar of light.* 5. *He who dives or bathes.* It will be observed that the Syriac word is the same in Nos. 1 and 3; but in the latter it is explained in its ritual sense, while in the former it appears to have its non-ritual meaning. The Syriac vowel points are not used in the MS. except on Nos. 4 and 5 as above. It may be mentioned here also, that the Syriac word, No. 5, is often used to denote a person *receiving baptism*; see Castell's Lexicon *sub voce*, and examples occur in Bib. Orientalis, IV. pp. 256, 259.

Bar-Bahlul flourished about a century later than Bar-Ali. Assemani (Bib. Orient. III. p. 257) simply says: 'vivebat anno Christi 963.' His lexicon is considered the best, as he had the advantage of using several others; and the best MS. of it is said to be in the Bodleian, Hunt. 157, from which the extract below was copied.¹

¹ See an interesting account of this and some other Syriac works in a letter from Prof. Bernstein of Breslau, published in Bib. Sacra for 1848, p. 390. It is greatly to be wished that the learned Professor's long-promised and much needed lexicon would soon appear.

year, to publish the *first* and *best* grammar ever produced in England for that tongue; see at the end of the *Epistola Dedicatoria* in his *Grammatica Syriaca*, Londini, 1658.

No doubt a diligent search in Syriac works, in print and in MS., would furnish many more examples to the same effect as the above. There is, for instance, a small Syro-Arabic Lexicon of the 18th century, preserved in MS. in the British Museum, which exhibits the words numbered 1 and 5 in the above lists, and explains the former by *اصطباغ* *immersing*, and the latter by *غواص* *diver*, in harmony with Bar-Ali and Bar-Bahlul.

Perhaps, however, the above evidence may suffice to make every scholar say with Michaelis, in reference to *חָפַץ*, βαπτίζεσθαι, "Mihi verisimilius, diversum [esse] plane ab *פָּרַד* stare." So thinks also Prof. Bernstein, who is considered the best Syriac scholar now living. He, however, does not, with Michaelis, trace the verb to the Arabic *غَبَطَ* *submergere*, but compares it with *غَبَدَ*, "quod transl. habet significationem *immersit, immisit* aliquid, *recondidit* gladium in vaginam;" see under *حَف* in Bernstein's *Lexicon Syriacum* to Kirsch's *Chrestomathia Syriaca*, Lips., 1836. Yet there is no essential difference in the affinities suggested by these two great lexicographers; for in fact these two Arabic verbs, with two others, are, in all probability, radically identical, namely, *غَمَدَ*, *غَبَطَ*, *غَمَر* and *غَمَسَ* *submersers*. In this last form the root exists also in Syriac, in *חָפַץ* to *dive*, and in the Coptic *Ⲭⲙⲥ*, βαπτίζω, καταποντίζω, (see Tattam's *Lexicon Aegyptiaco-Latinum*, Oxon., 1835.) It will be observed that the only difference in the four Arabic verbs, is in the final letters; but these are well known in comparative philology to be interchangeable: thus under *פָּרַד*, Gesenius gives as radically identical the verbs *פָּרַד*, *פָּרַח*, *פָּרַר*, and *פָּרַשׁ*, all conveying originally the idea of *breaking*. A list very similar to this, might be exhibited also in Arabic and Syriac, with the primary sense of *breaking*, or *separating*, e. g. *فَرَسَ*, *فَرَضَ*, *فَرَر*, *فَرَسَ*; *فَرَسَ*, *فَرَسَ*, *فَرَسَ*. And now, lest it be urged that *חָפַץ* cannot be akin to *غَمَدَ*, etc., because the Arabic root has *غ* *Ghain*, and not *ع* *Ain*, we may observe that the Heb. ע and the Syr. ܥ are used for *both* forms of the Arabic letter (Gesenius's *Lexicon* under ע,) and that the identity of *חָפַץ*

with غُتِس is unquestionable, though the apparent dissimilarity in the letters be even greater than between حَصَم and غُتِس. Finally, if it be asked why the Syrians, having the choice of حَصَم or غُتِس as well as حَصَم to denote *immerse*, used the former only occasionally, but the latter habitually, for *baptism*, the reason may possibly have been, as suggested by Augusti, (*Handbuch der Christlichen Archäologie* II. p. 811,) that the former word had been already appropriated by the Zabians or Hamerobaptists, (حَصَمَة *dippers*, see Michaelis under حَصَم in his edition of Castell,) a half-Jewish sect in the East, supposed to have come down from John the Baptist, and hence called also Disciples of John (*Mendai Jahia*). The Syrian Christians would naturally wish not to be confounded with such a party, and hence might have adopted another equally appropriate term to denote the baptismal act.

ARTICLE VI.

LIFE OF ZWINGLI.¹

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Birth-place, Lineage and Childhood of Zwingli.

THE first day of January, 1484, was the birth-day of Ulric Zwingli, the pioneer of the reformation in Switzerland. Not quite two months before, on St. Martin's eve, in the cottage of a poor miner at Eisleben, Luther was born. The place of the birth of Zwingli was a lowly

¹ The works principally consulted in the preparation of this sketch of the Life of Zwingli, are: "Life of Ulric Zwingli, the Swiss Reformer, by J. G. Hess; translated by Lucy Aiken." "Huldreich Zwingli, Geschichte seiner Bildung zum Reformator des Vaterlandes, von J. M. Schuler, Zürich, 1819." "Huldreich Zwingli Opera, completa ed. prim. cur. M. Schuler et Jo. Schultessio," 13 volumes. "Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, by John Scott, London, 1833." "D'Aubigne's History of Reformation," Carter's edition, 1846. Several other works also are occasionally referred to as will appear from the notes.

shepherd's cot in the little village of Wildhaus in the country of Tockenbourg. The name, Wildhaus, given to this small hamlet, seems to have fitly characterized its position, in a valley more than 2000 feet above the Lake of Zurich, with surrounding mountains and overhanging cliffs, toward the north-west of Switzerland. The river Thur has its source in this valley, and the little stream finds its way out at its eastern extremity, where the morning rays of the sun gain entrance to this secluded spot. Far away through this cleft in the mountains, some of the lofty peaks of the snow-capped Alps may be seen painted on the eastern sky. In this elevated region, garden vegetables, corn and fruit-trees are scarcely known, but the thousand cattle upon the hill sides give evidence of, as well as furnish a beautiful contrast to, the living green with which the earth is everywhere clothed. A little higher up, verdure gives place to barrenness, and rugged piles of broken rocks with threatening mien brood over the life and freshness beneath them.

At a short distance from the parish church of Wildhaus, there was standing but a short time since, a house by a cow-path leading to the pastures beyond, where the Zuinglis long resided, and where Ulric with his brothers and sisters, "a virtuous household," received their first impressions of this goodly world which we 'inhabit.' The father of the reformer was the bailiff of the village and honored by all who knew him. Indeed, his family was an ancient one, and in high esteem among the mountaineers for hereditary services to the village, and for active virtues,

"Pure livers were they all, austere and grave,
And fearing God; the very children taught
Stern self-respect, a reverence for God's word,
And an habitual piety."

Their occupation, as that of their neighbors, was the care of cattle, almost the only wealth of the district.

— "On a small hereditary farm,
An unproductive slip of rugged ground,
His parents with their numerous offspring dwelt."

A brother of the bailiff, however, had been appointed first curate of Wildhaus after it had been constituted an independent parish, which office he held until 1487, when he was preferred to Wesen, the market town of the region around.

The wife of Ulric Zuingli, the elder, Margaret Meili, was also of an old and honored stock. Her brother, John Meili, was abbot of

the convent of Fischingen, in Thurgovia, from 1510 until 1523. The subject of the present narrative according to Schuler,¹ was the sixth son of his father, and he had two brothers and a sister younger than himself. The elder brothers remained in the same employment with their father, who might justly have been denominated in later life the patriarch of Tockenburg. The sister married Leonard Tresp, who became a zealous friend of the Gospel in Berne. The two younger brothers were subsequently committed to the care of Ulric, who aided in giving them the best advantages for education that the times afforded. The eldest of the two was sent in 1513 to Vienna to study with Vadian. He there became a monk, and as early as 1518, died and was buried in the cloister. The youngest brother was with Zuingli when the plague made its appearance in Zurich in 1520, and was sent by him to Wildhaus, and afterward to Glaris, to escape it; but in vain. He was seized with it, and died that same year, to the great grief of Ulric, who felt for the promising youth the kindness of a brother and the love and care of a father.

It cannot be doubted that the place of birth, and circumstances attending the early years of Zuingli, had much influence upon his subsequent development. There will be found to be a mingling of different elements in his character, not unfitly represented by the scenery and associations of early days. There is an under-current of gentle serenity, of quiet, self-possession in him, that reminds one of the peaceful valley, cut off from the noise, and tumult, and agitations of the city, or maritime and thickly settled country. In his mind and heart, too, there is a freshness and richness not less pleasing than the fresh and living green that skirts the base of his native mountains. Ever and anon we also discover rough points in his character, such as would naturally have been fostered by viewing the craggy rocks and beetling cliffs far above and around him. There is in him, too, an elevation of character, an open frankness, a freedom from anything low and vulgar, an unwavering adherence to the honorable and right, which is not less indicative of the pure blood in his veins, than of the wholesome and genial training that he received. The simplicity of his character, like that of David, may be traced to his early associations with the sheep-fold or summer pasture-grounds, where his father, and brothers, and neighbors were left to commune with nature from early morn to dewy eve. In fine, strength, freedom, a lofty simplicity, and simple greatness were breathed upon

¹ Leben, S. 2.

him and diffused over him from his very cradle; and when he had grown to man's estate, they became abiding qualities.

The independent political position of the Tockenburg valley, was not without its influence upon the youthful feelings. Often, it may be supposed, the story of former oppression and cruelty was repeated around the hearth-stone of the chief man of the place, as one and another who had borne the burden and heat of the day, came in to pass the long winter evenings. The contrast of present peace and quiet, in consequence of the Swiss alliance, was undoubtedly the frequent theme of remark. It is said, that "if a word were uttered against the confederated cantons, on such occasions, the child would immediately rise, and with simple earnestness, undertake their defence."¹ Thus, with his earliest thoughts and feelings, were blended the interests of the Swiss Confederacy, and they grew with his growth and strengthened with his strength. The equality of the people of his native district, as of all pastoral communities where the extremes of poverty and wealth were unknown, was also not without its influence upon the reformer, who recognized no ground of distinction among his fellow-men, but that caused by integrity combined with intelligence.

School-days of Zwingli.

Born in so retired a situation, where the people were so secluded from the rest of the world, and one of so large a family, it is probable that the young Ulric would have passed his days in obscurity, and never have stepped beyond the narrow sphere of his village, had not the promising disposition of his childhood, determined his father to consecrate him to the church, and to procure him the means of a learned education."² His uncles, too, proffered their aid and encouragement. The abbot of Fischingen early discovered the latent talents of the young boy, and felt for him affection, and extended to him the care of an own child. His solicitude for him only ended with his life. But his father's brother, who had, when Ulric was a mere child, left Wildhaus for Wesen, was especially observant of the indications of a noble nature exhibited in the first developments of his mental powers, and at the request of his father, took the charge of his education. With his first teacher he made such progress, that

¹ Quoted from Schuler, in D'Aubigne's *Hist. Reform.*, p. 321.

² Hess. *Life of Zwingli*, p. 2.

he soon passed the bounds of his ability to teach; and his father and uncle, pleased with his love for, and success in, study, determined to give him the best advantages that were then afforded.

Basle had already become somewhat celebrated for its advantages and appliances for the education of youth. A university had been established there near the middle of the fifteenth century. Printing presses had been set up, for the resuscitation of the ancient worthies in literature. Learned men, worthy forerunners of Erasmus,¹ the Wittenbachs and others, were beginning to congregate there. The fame of these things had even reached Wildhaus, and the uncle of Zuingli was familiar with the advantages of this place. Ulric was accordingly, when in his tenth year, sent there, to the Theodora school, under the care of Gregory Binzli. This man was distinguished not only for his learning, but for a gentleness of character, which was not lost in its effects upon the young pupil. The country lad made such diligent use of the time and opportunities afforded him that he soon not only surpassed all his school-fellows, young and old, but even all the youth of the town where so much superior advantages had been enjoyed. He especially distinguished himself in the discussions, in which the young students were accustomed to try their skill and measure their strength with one another; and victory was almost sure to be upon the side which he advocated. He also soon exhibited a talent for music, both vocal and instrumental, which was unusual in one so young. The correct deportment as well as ready acquisitions of the pupil won the heart of his teacher, but excited the envy of his fellow pupils, especially the older ones, who saw themselves so far outstripped by one so much younger and with many less advantages than they had enjoyed. The principal of the school, with a magnanimity and faithfulness not always exhibited by those in similar stations, feeling that the young Ulric needed instruction of a higher grade than could be given in his school, sent him home with the urgent solicitation that he might go where he could obtain instruction more suited to his capacity and acquirements, than would be given in his own classes. Years after, when the pupil had become a champion for the truth, and celebrated as reformer of papal abuses, he had not forgotten, as it appears from his letters, this teacher, who had so early discovered in him the elements of future greatness.²

His father and uncle were not slow to act in accordance with the

¹ Erasmus visited Basle in 1514, and was received by its bishop with every expression of esteem. — D'Aubigne, *Hist.* p. 328.

² Schuler, S. 10, 11.

expressed wishes of his former teacher. A school of polite literature had just been established at Berne, under the care of Henry Lupulus, one of the most cultivated men then in Switzerland. The choice of this school for his nephew, was an indication of the wisdom of the uncle, and probably determined the character of the pupil for the rest of life. He devoted the most of his time at this school, to the study of the Latin language, in the immortal works of its best authors. He was not only taught to appreciate their beauties, but formed his style upon them as models. Hess says of his instructions in the school of Berne, that they "were principally in Latin; and his masters were not content with giving him a grammatical knowledge of the language; they also taught him to feel the beauties of the classical authors, and caused him to study the rules of eloquence and poetry, in the models left us by the ancients. This study long continued, greatly assisted in unfolding the talents of the young Zuingli."¹ Hess adds what, although very obvious, is sometimes forgotten in these days: "Nothing is better calculated to expand the intellectual faculties, than the well directed study of the dead languages, from the tenderest age. The continued application of the rules, perpetually revives the attention of the scholar; the necessity of clothing the same idea under different forms, and the choice of expressions more or less elegant, noble, or energetic, exercises at once the taste and the judgment, without fatiguing young minds with a chain of ideas above their comprehension."

His teacher also instructed him in writing poetry, and in the just appreciation of the poetical works of others. Zuingli retained for this teacher also, the most tender regard and unchanging friendship, while he lived. This was enhanced by the active part which Lupulus subsequently took in the work of the Reformation. He outlived Zuingli, and honored him after his death, with an epitaph in verse.

One circumstance occurred during the abode of Zuingli at Berne, which, but for the interference of his father, guided by Him who seeth the end from the beginning, might have changed the whole course of his life, and deprived the church and the world of his exertions as a reformer. The Dominicans exerted a great influence at that time in Berne, both by preaching and more private labors. They, with characteristic wisdom, especially desired to attach to themselves young men who gave signs of future eminence. As soon as

¹ Hess follows in these remarks, Myconius: *De Vita et Obitu Zwinglii*; and Schuler, in his *Life*, represents substantially the same things, S. 11, 12.

they had learned of the excellent endowments of Zuingli, they laid their snare for him, and prevailed upon him to go and reside in their convent, until he had arrived at the age requisite for entering upon the novitiate: not doubting that they should be able, in the mean time, to so attach him to themselves, that he would join their order. But, they were frustrated in their designs. His father disapproved of this step of his son. His good sense gave him such an aversion to irrevocable engagements in early life, that he felt it necessary, in order to break entirely the connection of the youth with the Dominicans, to remove him from the circle of their influence.¹

Zuingli at the University.

Zuingli had been about two years at Berne, when his uncle and father decided, in consequence of occurrences before-mentioned, that he should be sent to Vienna, whose university had become somewhat distinguished. It is not strange that the study of philosophy, as taught in the schools of that day, was somewhat irksome at first to the student, whose taste had been formed and his pleasures derived from the perusal of classical authors. Philosophy, as then pursued, was "nothing but a mass of definitions of things indefinable; of subtleties, the more admired, the less they were understood." "So barren a study," Hess continues, "would have no charms for the mind of Zuingli, which had been nourishing itself on the works of the ancients."² It is, doubtless, fortunate that the young scholar was not entangled in the mazes of scholasticism, at the beginning of his course. It would perhaps have given him a distaste for study, and sent him back to follow the plough, or to watch his father's flocks. But as it was, its intricacies and barrenness only incited him to greater exertions, not only to overcome its difficulties, but his own distaste for it. And this discipline not only gave him strength and acuteness of mind for comprehending truth, but also enabled him to foil his opposers with the weapons which they used. Neither did he confine his attention to philosophy, while at Vienna, but also, as it should seem by his subsequent writings, devoted much time to astronomy and general physics, as then pursued.³

The two years of Zuingli's abode at Vienna, were long remembered by him. The reminiscences of a happy school life at the college or

¹ See Hess, p. 4, Schuler, S. 13, and Bullinger's *Schweitz*, Chron. Ms. T. III.

² *Life of Zuingli*, p. 5.

³ In illustration of this, see his work, *De Providentia*, and Hess p. 15.

university, are as enduring as existence itself. And in the struggles and turmoil of subsequent days, they come fraught with balmy odors, and gilded with bright colors. The axioms of mathematics, the principles of philosophy, and the facts of science, may fade from the memory, but the friendly guidance, the sweet soul-communion of kindred spirits, only brighten as life wears away. But, Zuingli had good reason to remember many of those with whom he was associated at Vienna. The numerous and warm-hearted letters of Joachim von Watt of St. Gall,¹ and Henry Loriti of Mollis, as preserved in the collection of the works of Zuingli, show an attachment equally honorable to both parties. With Eck and Faber, he was also pleasantly associated in study and amusement, but was none the less backward to battle against them, at the bidding of truth and principle. Although the latter long remained his friend, yet the noble hearted Zuingli was so outraged by his subsequent conduct, that he visits his indignation and contempt upon him with great severity.

Zuingli, as Teacher at Basle and Student in Theology.

Zuingli was not long contented to remain at home, where he had returned from Vienna. He was neither satisfied with present attainments, nor willing to hide the little light he had received. He soon went back to Basle where he had first studied, and as a situation of teacher of languages was vacant, he, a youth of scarcely eighteen years and a stranger, was offered it. His father had, although not rich, hitherto kindly and ungrudgingly afforded him the means of pursuing his studies, but he now was enabled to defray his own expenses. "He labored," says one of his biographers, "with success to facilitate and encourage the study of the ancient languages, that study which prepared the revival of letters in the fifteenth century and which will at all times afford the best basis for a liberal education." But "the duties of his situation by no means absorbed the whole active mind of Zuingli; he continued to learn as well as to teach. Among the authors which now engaged his attention we shall content ourselves with enumerating Horace, Sallust, Pliny, and [subsequently when he had become more familiar with Greek] Aristotle, Plato and Demosthenes. — This labor gave him vigor to break the bands in which scholastic philosophy had, to a certain degree, fettered his understanding; it elevated him above his age, and preserved him from the narrowness of most of his contemporaries; it diffused a noble

¹ Generally called Vadianus.

freedom through all his opinions, taught him to make use of his reason, and kindled in his soul a love of truth, and an ardent desire to promote its triumph over error."¹ It is probable, however, that he did not now entirely relinquish his scholastic pursuits. Too sensible had he become, that the battle of the true scholar was to be fought on this arena. Music too, in which he was so much skilled, was a solace of his lonely hours,² when wearied with more laborious pursuits, as well as a means of pleasant companionship. D'Aubigne says: "Often the joyous student of the mountains of the Sentis was seen suddenly to shake off the dust of the schools, and exchanging his philosophic toils for amusement, take the lute, harp, violin, flute, dulcimer or hunting horn, and pour forth gladsome strains as in the meadows of Lisighaus, making his apartment, or the houses of his friends echo with the airs of his beloved country, and accompanying them with his own songs. In his love of music he was a true son of Tocken-burg, a master among many. He played the instruments we have named, and others beside. Enthusiastically attached to the art, he diffused a taste for it through the university, not that he relished dissipation, but because he loved relaxation from the fatigue of graver studies, and its power of restoring him with fresh strength for close application."³ Yet he had no need of this art to draw friends and companions around him and bind them to him with indissoluble bonds. His comely person, good nature, sportiveness and wit,⁴ his gentleness and simplicity of manner and frank generosity, scholarly habits and attainments, were stronger than all the charms of necromancy and magic.

In the meantime, Zuingli was not forgetful that his father had destined him to the study of theology. He was not a stranger to the barbarous terminology, the useless disquisitions upon more useless themes, the almost profane speculations which, at that day, were current under the name of theology. The unmeaning propositions of Duns Scotus, Occam or Albertus Magnus, who were preferred to Paul and John, had often sounded in his ears, or been presented to

¹ Hess, p. 7.

² It should be noticed here, that this art formed at that time an important part of the education of ecclesiastics. "Zuingli," says Hess, "regarded it as an amusement calculated to refresh the mind after fatiguing exertion, and thus to give it new strength, while it softened a too great austerity of disposition; he therefore frequently recommended it to men devoted to a laborious and sedentary life."—*Ib.* p. 13.

³ *Hist. Reformation*, p. 324.

⁴ See Schuler, S. 19.

his eye. But they had little to do with the heart, and offered few attractions to the young student.¹ His good sense as well as liberal training, prevented him from being carried away by the general current. Still it is difficult to say what the exact result might have been but for one fortunate circumstance.

Near the end of the year 1505, Thomas Wittenbach came to Basle from Tübingen, as teacher of theology and the higher branches of learning in the school there. He had previously lectured at the university of Tübingen, and had been associated with such men as Reuchlin, Pellican and Gabriel Biel. From Reuchlin he had imbibed a glowing enthusiasm for classical and biblical study. He had also listened to Pellican's elucidations of Scripture, and Biel's defence and exposition of the schoolmen. He was indeed learned in all the arts and sciences and literature of the day. From Wittenbach, Zuingli obtained almost his first correct ideas of Scripture doctrine and interpretation, and the primary principles of true reform. Wittenbach had already begun to speak publicly against the sale of indulgences, as a mere device of the Pope, of the corruption of the church in morals and doctrine, and of the death of Christ as the only price of man's redemption.² Indeed Zuingli ever after, says Schuler,³ felt that Wittenbach was his first teacher and guide in true Christian Theology, and in the right knowledge of Scripture which finally led him out of the mazes of Scholastic theology, into the clear light of Christian truth as exhibited in the Gospel. Wittenbach was accustomed to say to his pupils in private, that the time was near, when the scholastic theology must be abolished and the simple teachings of the primitive church revived. He also first led Zuingli to a more accurate study of Greek, and awakened in him a zeal for it which he never lost. The friendship now begun between these men, did not end with their short abode together at Basle. Zuingli ever retained the most lively regard and friendship for this teacher, and highly valued the correspondence that was kept up between them in after years; and in hours of struggle and conflict was sustained and strengthened by his sympathy and counsel. And Zuingli in turn, when Wittenbach in 1523 expressed regret that he had wasted so many valuable hours in scholastic trifling, consoled him by the suggestion that it was not so much

¹ Hess says, p. 11: "The knowledge of classical authors acquired in his early youth, had so far opened his understanding that he would no longer suffer it to be brought into blind subjection."

² See Schroeckh, *Christliche Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation*, Zweit. Th. I. Buch, V. Absch., S. 106.

³ *Geschichte*, 22.

his fault as that of the age, and that his example would hereafter afford a warning to noble minds to free themselves sooner from such shackles.

Next to Wittenbach, perhaps Leo Juda was the most valuable of the acquaintances¹ made at this time, and the most influential in respect to Zuingli's subsequent life. He combined consummate spirit, zeal and power with gentleness and kindness. Small in stature,² weak and diseased in body, he was the most efficient aid of Zuingli in later years, and a most unfailing support of the cause of truth, after the reformer's death. He excelled in his knowledge of classical authors, was acquainted with medicine, and had great taste for and skill in music, especially vocal music. Zuingli also had many other warm friends among the younger and educated portion of the inhabitants of Basle. Thus, says Schuler,³ the alliance of the noble and free was constantly extended. Indeed, every youth of promise in Basle who paid homage to the rising light of human culture, was a friend of Zuingli.

Zuingli is appointed Pastor of Glaris and enters upon his duties.

When Zuingli had been four years at Basle, in 1506, he received an invitation to go to Glaris, and take the place of the village pastor who had just died. The fame of his ability and acquisitions had spread somewhat widely; but it is not probable that he would have been sufficiently known to the people of this parish, as he had not yet taken priest's orders, although he had received a master's degree at Basle, but for their acquaintance with his paternal uncle, who was pastor at Wesen, the market town of the Glarians. His friend, Henry Loriti of Mollis,⁴ who was already becoming celebrated for his learning, had also, doubtless, sounded abroad his praise among his fellow citizens. The place was contested by Henry Goeldli, from Zurich, who claimed from the pope the privilege of disposing of this

¹ Schroeckh, Kirchengeschich. Bd. 37, S. 108.

² Zuingli eut pour Vicaire dans ce bien-la Léon de Juda, originaire d'Alsace, petit homme mais savant et plein de zèle. Ruchat, p. 11.

³ Schuler, S. 24.

⁴ Better known as Glarionus. He was pendant quelques années admirateur et ami de Zuingle. Il était savant, et bon poète; il apprit à Paris la langue Grecque de Lascaris, et la langue Hébraïque d'un Eveque. Il parut d'abord avoir de bons sentiments; mais la persécution, étant survenue, il abandonna la Parti Réformé, ayant, comme Demas, aimé le présent siècle. Ruchat, Hist. Reform. Suisse, Liv. I. p. 2.

parish. But the Glarians maintained successfully their right of independent choice, and Zwingli, now twenty-two years old, finally accepted the place.

On his journey home from Basle, Zwingli preached his first sermon at Rapperschweil, in the canton of Zurich, and on St. Michael's day of the same year read the mass, for the first time, to his own townsmen of Wildhaus, "holy orders" having been conferred upon him by the bishop of Constance, in whose diocese Glaris was situated. Toward the end of the year, he entered upon his duties at Glaris. The parish was large and required much industry as well as judgment in its management. The manner in which he devoted himself to his work is well described by his faithful biographer Myconius, and cannot be without interest to those entering on similar duties: "He becomes a priest! how entirely counter to the manner of most priests, he devoted himself unceasingly to study, especially the study of theology. He had not before rightly understood how much he needs to know, to whom the people look for instruction in divine truth. Not theological knowledge alone is requisite, but the power of ready and graceful elocution is necessary in order to minister acceptably and profitably to all. So zealously did he devote himself to these studies that no one for many years past can be compared with him, and no one, not even the best orator of our time, is so perfectly master of the art of speaking as he was. Yet he did not attempt to express himself in the manner of Cicero, nor in accordance with the rules of the ancients, but freely, naturally, in the manner which his age and the people of his care required. Thus he met with the same success among us that Tully did among his own countrymen."¹

We cannot trace the course of Zwingli at Glaris without admiration of his practical wisdom and good sense and scholarly feeling; nor less can we fail to recognize the guiding hand of omnipotent wisdom. When we take into account the age in which he lived, and the work in which he was destined subsequently to engage, we can hardly see how he could have entered upon a course of study and labor, better suited to prepare him for his work. To many in our day, these years of his life may seem to have been wasted. He ought, they would say, to have cried aloud and spared not, the moment that the least glimmering of light met his eye. They in their sapience, forgetting that they may not have in their keeping all the wisdom that descendeth from on high, would have gone into the highways and byways and cried: "Ye serpents! ye generation of vipers!" "ye stiff-necked

¹ Quoted in Schuler, S. 29, 30.

and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost;" or directed their face toward Rome and expected that her walls would have fallen down before she had even been seven times encompassed, or the ram's horn sounded the seventh time. They would forsooth penetrate the papal palace and stun papal ears. But Zuingli thought not so, neither did the guiding hand of God thus direct. He felt the need of study, of close and protracted study. He must himself be sure of the ground on which he stood, before he attempted to drive others from their strong holds, albeit they were in the enemies' country.

His Theological, Biblical, and Classical Studies at Glaris.

Zuingli marked out a plan of study for himself, after he went to Glaris, and pursued it with iron diligence. The Bible he felt to be the source of all theological knowledge. He could not trust human speculations, unless he could trace them to their source in God's word. His work and his delight was, to study the Bible in the languages in which it was originally written. This was his daily, his untiring employment. He soon acquired the reputation of great knowledge of Scripture, and great skill in its interpretation. The assistants to Greek study, in those days, were few and unsatisfactory. He could procure the aid of no Grammar of any value, until his friend Glarianus obtained for him the "Isagoge of Chrysolaras," which we should think but an inadequate help. He found in Vadianus also, sympathy in his pursuits, to whom he wrote in 1518, that nothing but God should ever induce him to forego the study of the Greek language, not because he expected to acquire fame thereby, but from a love of divine learning. A manuscript copy in Greek, of the Apostle Paul's Epistles, with marginal notes and illustrations from Erasmus, Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, and others, by his hand, is yet to be seen in the Zurich library. This he undertook for the sake of familiarizing himself with these writings. He also, his biographer says,¹ did the same with the rest of the books of the New Testament, and afterward proceeded with those of the Old Testament. He did this with no careless or vain-glorying spirit. For Myconius justly says of him: "Since he learned from Peter, that Scripture is not of private interpretation, he directed his eyes upward to heaven, seeking the Spirit for his teacher; supplicating in earnest prayer to be taught in what manner best to search out the sense of the Divine

¹ Schuler, S. 31.

word."¹ Yet he did not expect that prayer and pious desires would, as if by magic, give him directly all knowledge and understanding in interpreting Scripture. Too clear a head he had, and too strong sense, to be led away by any such imagination."

"Zuingli," says Hess, "thought it inexcusable in a man appointed to instruct his fellow Christians to rest upon the decision of others, on points that he might himself examine. He therefore followed the only method of discovering the true sense of an author, which consists in interpreting an obscure passage by a similar and clearer one; and an unusual word, by one more familiar — regard being had to time, place, the intention of the writer, and a number of other circumstances which modify and often change the signification of words."² He always felt, that wisdom is the key by which to open the chambers of the Spirit.³ He did not, however, disregard the interpretations of others, but proved them by his own judgment, and reference to Scripture itself. He read the church fathers, and Erasmus, much, and made copious notes from them, as has been before intimated. He seems to have especially valued Augustin, with whose thorough knowledge of human nature, bold and clear thoughts, and impassioned eloquence, he fully sympathized, as well as in his dogmas in regard to faith and redemption in opposition to penances. Still, he called no man master. Our Lord Jesus Christ alone spoke the words of unerring truth. He felt, however, that it was not useless to the theologian to trace the manners and customs of the early Christians in the writings of the fathers — to learn of their life and practices, in order to compare them, as well as their doctrines, with the church of his own time. Neither was he discouraged in tracing the history of the church through the scholastic ages. Although neither his taste or piety was particularly gratified, yet he would not lose the accurate knowledge, which could only thus be obtained, of the state of the church during those ages. Even the name of heretic did not terrify him. "In the midst of a field covered with noxious weeds," he said, "salutary herbs may sometimes be found." He accordingly read Ratram, a monk of the ninth century, on the Eucharist,⁴ Peter Waldus and John Huss upon the papal power, Wickliff against the invocation of saints and monastic vows, Picus of Mirandola, and others.

It will readily be seen that Zuingli in practice had adopted the

¹ Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 6.

² P. 15.

³ Annotations in Nov. Test., p. 283.

⁴ His work had been formally condemned.

dogmas of the Reformation. In his private study he rigidly adhered to the very principles of biblical interpretation which at this day distinguish Protestants from Catholics. He maintained that all understanding and explanation of the Bible, with the use of all external and internal means, under the guidance of the reason, free from all authority, must be drawn from itself. It must be explained by itself. It required no sanction of church councils or papal bulls. At a later time, he says to Eck, "Who was judge when our Lord and Saviour put the Sadducees and Pharisees to silence, so that they could no longer gainsay him? Or who was judge when Paul everywhere in the synagogue shut the mouths of his opposers! Was it not the truth, which contains its sanction in itself?"¹ The independence and self-reliance of Zuingli, too, early exhibited itself. "In the writings of the faithful, I notice the weeds," he says, "in those of heretics, the elements of good, and everywhere I find the one and the other." The thought and feeling with which he read any author was, that "the right is from God, the wrong to be discarded."

It might be supposed that Zuingli with such an extended course of theological and biblical study marked out and rigidly pursued, in addition to parish duties, could have found little time for communion with the masters of antiquity, who in previous years had been so constantly his companions. But it was not so. Schuler says: "Zuingli's free love for all truth, beauty and goodness led him to those rich fountains which God has opened for the culture of man in the master works of the Greeks and Romans. He united continual study of the classics with that of the Holy Scriptures; for he found even in them a revelation of God to man. From them he explained many Scripture phrases and ideas; by them he learned to make historical allusions with skill; they formed his style of writing, but especially of speaking; they furnished him with ideals of higher excellence, and presented the most noble of the human race crowned with undying honor. This brought every desire for the great and noble which was in his character into life, power and action; the superiority of these writings kept him from self-gratulation and vanity; and finally they served to this man who was eloquent by nature, physically beautiful, warm-hearted and joyous as a guide in friendly, courteous and winning intercourse."

He made, it should seem, extensive collections of classical passages that were illustrative of history.² His remarks upon particular authors and the use he made of them, as given for substance by Schuler,

¹ Schuler, S. 25.² Hottinger.

are worthy of notice, and show not only his estimation of, but also the benefits received from them: "Plato," he says, "drank from a divine fountain." In admiring Plato's power, brilliancy and sublimity, he did not forget the acuteness, clearness and learning of Aristotle, whom he preferred in some respects. He made use of many of Cicero's definitions, as of religion, law, etc., and adopted as his own some of his philosophical tenets. "By the mouth of Cato," he says, "God spake to the Romans. Pindar is the prince of poets. He has a true, pure, holy, noble, uncorrupted soul. Every expression that he uses, if in itself common, he elevates. One can neither add to him or take away without injury. In him we find a worthy, elevated picture of the ancient world, which he presents us in living, brilliant colors before our sight. How fruitful his invention and yet how pure and chaste his language! How rich his imagery! What a treasury of apothegms! He excites to virtue; he unites with commendation the most delicate rebukes. His poetry flows on like a clear stream; everything in it is redolent of learning, is gentle, pure, sincere, antique, acute, elevated, attractive, far seeing—perfect! So loftily and reverently does he speak of the gods, that we easily see that he designates under that term the one divine, heavenly power. No Greek writer aids so much as he in the interpretation of the Bible, especially the Psalms and Job, which rival him in poetic beauty." And he adds what we think will meet with a response from every true scholar of the present day: "I do not trouble myself about those croakers, to whom purity is impure, who think that no heathen poet should be read. I do not exhort to the reading of every poet—but I do advise the perusal of this one as an explainer of the Scriptures. Antiquity (and indeed every age) has its peculiarities which can be understood only by a familiar acquaintance with the ancients, and therein Pindar is the best model. God grant that you who are familiar with the truth through the heathen poets, may understand that contained among the Hebrews and indeed among all nations."¹

Zuingli as Pastor at Glaris.

We have seen Zuingli in his study; we will now inquire concerning his ministrations to the inhabitants of Glaris. He did not dwell upon the abuses of the church or its ministers. He did not at first inveigh against the pope or his emissaries; but he confined himself mainly to the doctrines which he found from personal examination to be con-

¹ S. 39—41.

tained in the Scriptures, and the moral precepts to be drawn from them. He often and plainly inculcated the belief that the Scriptures are the sufficient and only sure guide in matters of faith and doctrine. The time had not yet come to make known all the practical bearings of this principle upon the church as then constituted. The insisting upon the practice of the Christian virtues, he believed to be the best way for preparing the minds of his people for renouncing the current errors of the day. But the difference between this preaching and that of most of his contemporaries who inculcated nothing but the external exercises of devotion, soon attracted notice, and with his studious, pure and blameless life and great learning, aroused the opposition and envy of many of his colleagues. They could not however charge him with preaching heresy. They were obliged to dwell mainly in their accusations upon his neglect to inculcate many usages sanctioned by the church. He dwelt forsooth upon the necessity of imitating the holy lives of the saints, rather than upon their miracles. Fasts and pilgrimages were of less account with him than lives of usefulness and purity. It was better to worship the living and true God than images and relics, albeit most of the wealth of the church was derived from them. But these reproaches were of little moment to him or to the people of his charge, to such a degree had his amiable conduct, pleasing address, extensive learning and faithful discharge of duty gained the heads and hearts of the principal men of Glaris. Thus the minds of the people were gradually but surely prepared for the glorious reformation which shortly ensued.

It is necessary in order to a just estimate of the character of Zuingli to compare with him the mass of the clergy of the time in Switzerland. The general corruptions and ignorance of the priesthood in the age preceding the Reformation need not a remark. The complaints of the popes, and the councils assembled for remedying the evil, are well known. The Swiss did not escape the general contagion. They were almost necessarily ignorant, so few and so poor were the educational institutions of the time. The monks, who were themselves ignorant and narrow minded, could not impart to those who came to the convents for instruction, as most of the priests did, a thorough and liberal training. Bullinger thus describes them: "In a synod composed of the rural deans of Switzerland, only three were found who had read the Bible: the others confessed that they were scarcely acquainted even with the New Testament. What could be expected of such preachers? Their sermons were miserable amplifications of the legend enlivened with buffooneries worthy the stage of

a mountebank, or absurd declamations on the merit and utility of certain superstitious practices. Those who possessed some learning, more occupied with the purpose of displaying it, than of edifying their audience, mingled in a whimsical manner the metaphysics of Aristotle with the doctrine of Christ. Most of the secular priests were either incapable of composing a discourse, or would not give themselves the trouble. They contented themselves with learning sermons written by monks, which they retailed again without regard to time or place, to the circumstances, or the wants of their flocks. In the other functions of their office they took no interest except inasmuch as they tended to augment their revenues; and irregularity of morals was so frequent among them, that they did not even attempt to conceal their deviations."¹

Zuingli could not behold all this ignorance and abuse of privilege, without making some exertions for its remedy. He began wisely with the youth of his parish, and the effect of his labors was long felt in influence upon the people of the region of his labors, as we may subsequently have occasion to notice. He, with his friend Glarianus,² gathered around him the youth of the neighborhood, and laid open to them the fountains of knowledge, especially in the study of classical authors. This resulted in the establishment of a Latin school, which was assisted from the public treasury. "Zuingli," says Schuler, "breathed into the souls of these youth, the threefold spirit of love of learning,³ freedom of thought, and a sincere, active faith. He himself, also, who led them to a knowledge and love of the writings and deeds of the noble of the ancient world, was himself also in spirit and character, one of those noble men who are an honor and blessing to mankind."

Some extracts of correspondence which show the mutual regard and affection subsisting between him and his pupils, would not be without interest, as unfolding one phase of a most admirable character; but our limits do not allow us at present scarcely to enter upon this alluring field of research.⁴ One of them, Valentine Tschudi,

¹ Hess, pp. 23, 24.

² Glarianus did not, however, remain long with him, but became teacher in the high school at Basle, and afterwards went to Paris. Schuler, S. 52.

³ Son exemple animait plusieurs autres personnes du Canton de Glaris, à étudier aussi la langue Grecque, et à méditer l'écriture avec attention. On compte dans ce nombre Fridolin Brunner, Valentin, Pierre et Aegidius Ischoudi, dont les deux premiers sont regardés comme les Reformateurs de Glaris. Buchat, p. 7.

⁴ See Schuler, S. 52 sq. and Correspondence, Vol. VII. & VIII. of his works.

who had studied at Vienna, Basle, and Paris, under the most celebrated teachers of the time, writes to Zuingli, "You have offered me not only your books, but (what is better) yourself." And again, "I have never met with any one who explains the classics with so much justness of thought and depth of understanding as yourself." The testimony of others is no less indicative of affection and regard.

Zuingli accompanies the Swiss Troops to Italy.

During Zuingli's abode at Glaris, he went twice with the army of his native district into Italy. It was customary with the Swiss to take with them on their warlike expeditions "ministers of the altar;" "to celebrate divine service, and assist the dying, and that they might diminish by their presence and exhortations the disorders to which the warriors of those times were but too much inclined."¹ The biographers of Zuingli give us but few particulars of his conduct while upon these expeditions, and his name is scarcely mentioned in the accounts especially of the first contest, probably, for the good reason that he had little to do with the contest itself, but confined his efforts mainly to the specific office of his mission, the performance of spiritual duties. A general account of these expeditions of the Swiss and the reasons that influenced them to take arms for the pope and against France cannot here be entered upon. "Their success at first was signal, and Julius II. sent by the Cardinal of Sion, as a pledge of gratitude, a ducal hat, on which was embroidered in pearls a dove, representing the Holy Spirit; a consecrated sword, two banners with the arms of the Holy See, and a standard for each of the thirteen Cantons. The pope added to these presents his permission to them to assume in future the title of 'Defenders of the Church,' and at the same time the officers and soldiers received their pay, and some extraordinary gratifications. The cardinal, in order to afford Zuingli a proof of his esteem and confidence, charged him with the distribution of the gifts of the pope."² At the suggestion of Schinner without doubt, Zuingli had also received from the pope a yearly pension of fifty gulden to induce him to favor the papal cause. He himself speaks of this in a way to show the openness of his character and honesty of purpose.

This pension he renounced in 1520, and two years after thus writes to his brothers: "I acknowledge myself prone to many sins, but if any of my adversaries charge me with avarice or bad faith, and with teaching false doctrines under the influence of bribes, do not believe

¹ Hess, pp. 25, 26.

² Hess, pp. 33, 34.

them, though they assert it on oath; for there is no person to whom I am under any engagement for favors conferred on me. I do not deny that formerly I received certain pensions from the pope, but these I have done with for some time past. I then thought it lawful and right to accept the pope's bounty, while it appeared to me a pious and holy thing to support his religion with all my powers. But when my knowledge of sin (as St. Paul speaks) increased, I soon bade a long farewell to the Roman pontiff and his gifts." It appears that Zuingli, although he did not in the least compromise his own honesty or honor by accepting the pension, yet afterwards felt it not altogether right. He did not, any more than Luther, when he perceived the corruptions of the church, feel bound to relinquish it at once, but to labor for its reformation.¹

It may not be uninteresting to notice, that Zuingli's renunciation of the pension granted by the pope, and the condemnation of Luther's writings, took place about the same time.² Zuingli, it should seem, was not an indifferent spectator to what was occurring in Germany. He in a letter to Myconius expresses the hope that Luther will not be excommunicated, and his intention to use his influence with the papal legate against it; but, he adds, "If it is issued, I anticipate that the pope and his excommunication will be alike despised by the Germans."³

The second march of the Swiss into Italy was as disastrous as the preceding was successful. The Swiss historian of the expedition praises the zeal of Zuingli for the honor and prosperity of his native land. A short time before the disastrous battle of Marignano, when the Swiss troops had retired to Monza near Milan, he lifted up his warning voice in the midst of the camp, to which if his countrymen had listened, they would have avoided much disaster and disgrace. But warriors intoxicated with former success and persuaded that they were irresistible, gave little heed to even his warnings. He depicted the danger of their situation, exhorted leaders to harmony of purpose and counsel, soldiers to ready obedience, and all to union. He warned them not to yield unthinkingly to the proposals of the French king, but to consult for their own and their country's honor. But the result is too well known to require description. The report of the loss of the flower of the Swiss troops soon reverberated through the Swiss mountains, and caused loud lamentation and bitter regrets.

¹ See Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 29.

² The condemnatory bull was dated June 15, 1520.

³ Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 29.

The results of Zuingli's experience and observation in these campaigns, he gives subsequently in a letter to the canton of Schweitz, which is so illustrative of the strong sense, love of right, and enlightened views of its author, that we cannot forbear to quote it here: "The emissaries of the pope," he says, pretend "that it is unworthy of men so robust and valiant as the Swiss, to spend their strength in cultivating barren rocks; that they have only to enlist under the banner of some foreign prince, and they will soon be laden with riches and honor." Nothing can be more false than such promises; remember the words of the Saviour, "You shall know them by their fruits; do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" They have no object but their own interest, or that of the powers who hire them; they abuse your simplicity; they expose you to a thousand evils, and gratify the ambition and tyranny of princes, at the expense of your labors, your dangers, your blood. It would not have cost you so much to defend your substance, your country, your wives, and your children, as you every day squander in the service of strangers. Think how many of your fellow citizens have perished in the wars of Naples, in the battles of Navarre and Milan. What rivers of blood have you not shed! What would you say, were you to see the mercenary soldier hired with gold, whom you had never injured, appearing at your gates, felling your woods, destroying your vines, carrying off your flocks, massacring your children, violating your maidens, unaffected by the tears of your wives and your fathers! butchering them before your eyes, and setting fire to your dwellings. Would you not call for fire from heaven to fall on them? and if you were not heard, be tempted to believe that there is no God? Yet this is what yourselves do, allured by the charm of riches and property unjustly acquired. Those who plead for this system, say that war is an instrument of punishment in the hands of God, and that God must employ for his purpose the ministry of men. It is true; but do you not remember this saying of Christ, "Woe to him by whom the offence cometh?" Woe unto them who, without call, become the instrument of Divine vengeance; for, after having employed them in the punishment of others, God often punishes them in their turn. But, add these interested advocates, the wars in which we engage, are just — they are intended to reduce rebels to obedience. If they were always thus directed, nothing could be more reasonable; but in general they are undertaken for the support of tyranny, the gratification of avarice, or the satisfaction of the boundless ambition of princes; and of what princes? Of those who ought to

rule their subjects by persuasion only, of those who ought to set an example of justice and moderation, of the *pope, bishops, and abbés*. But what! say the partizans of foreign powers, our country cannot support its inhabitants; we are forced to leave it, and seek subsistence in other lands. It is true, it cannot support a luxury which is never satisfied, or an unbounded love of pleasure. But never was there a country more able to support a laborious, modest, and sober people. A moment's attention to the fertility of its plains, and the abundance of its fruits, may convince us of this; but you despise common blessings; you allow yourselves to be deluded by the promises of men who wish your ruin. Need I speak of the fatal effects which our wars daily produce among us? Of the perpetual violations of justice, the contempt of the laws, and insubordination carried to such a height, that scarcely a single citizen can be found, who respects his magistrates! Need I speak of the corruption of manners that even warriors bring back with them; of the jealousy and envy, inseparable companions of the favors with which our neighbors pay for the blood of our children; and of the disorders resulting from these bad passions which expose the independence of our common country to the utmost danger? Oh! if you still have any care of your ancient glory; if you yet remember your forefathers, and the dangers they have braved in the defence of their liberty; if the welfare of your country is dear to you, reject the fatal gifts of aspiring princes, reject them before it is too late; suffer yourselves neither to be deceived by the promises of some, nor intimidated by the menaces of others. I know that I shall draw on myself the indignation of formidable enemies, but I will not on this account be silent. I condemn your agreement with the pope, whom you have furnished with troops, because it is my duty to condemn it. You rob yourselves of your natural security, by losing your best troops, and expose yourselves to the power of your enemies; and after having served to gratify their ambition and their avarice, you run the risk of becoming also their victims."¹

Efforts for political and religious Reform.

Amidst the party spirit, jealousies and disorders consequent upon

¹ This address of Zuingli is by some of his biographers attributed to a later period of his life, and perhaps with justice; and yet it cannot be doubted, that there was at this time an address of a like character, if not the identical one here quoted.

foreign expeditions and internal divisions, which threatened the overthrow of the Helvetic confederacy, Zuingli, feeling the evil, with a spirit of true patriotism composed two allegorical poems, hoping in this way to exert an influence which he could not do by more direct admonition. The first of these, "The Labyrinth," was in all probability composed in the first half of 1510, and the last, "The Oxen and some wild Animals," not until some time after.¹ They were written in the German language of the age; in measure and rhythm there is no great indication of care or labor, although as much as the taste of the time demanded. The language however not only indicates the classical culture of the author, but a natural consequence of the right study of the ancient languages, a love for and thorough power over his mother tongue. In expression, says Schuler, "The Labyrinth is sententious and compressed, often picturesque; in invention full of wit; throughout spirited; the whole, as it is easy to see, is a hasty sketch, and not a work polished by time and leisure, since the author exerts himself more to express his thoughts than to gain poetic laurels."² Both of these pieces are composed in a spirit of freedom and independence that sufficiently mark the early stages of a spirit of reform, and might have revealed to a critical investigator what the final results of such free inquiry and expression would be.

Several particulars deserve notice before we proceed with the Life of Zuingli in the new sphere of action to which he was called in the latter part of this year (1516). And first, we notice the time of these efforts for reform as early as 1516, and ere the name of Luther had become known in Switzerland; and then, the manner of his beginning, with moderation yet plainness; without personality yet with faithfulness. He desires and labors for the adoption of right principles of action. It is the inculcation of truth and the right action that is consequent upon it, for which he labors. "We believe," he says, "the truth is for the spirit of men what the sun is for the world." "Faith is the offspring of the truth, for one has confidence only in that which he believes to be true." Pallavicini says with at least some semblance of truth, that the reformation of Luther took its rise from indulgences, but that of Zuingli began earlier, and from more important causes; for Zuingli's starting point was: "The superiority of the authority of the Bible to all human authority." Scrip-

¹ Zuingli, Werke, II Bde. 2 Abtheil. S. 244, 257.

² For a full analysis of these political poems, see Schuler, S. 100—137.

ture must be interpreted by Scripture, free preaching of the Gospel must be permitted, and by it under the direction of the Pope and the Hierarchy the church must be reformed. The Pope then brought under the power of the Gospel, would become instead of a Lord of the church, the first minister or servant of the Gospel. This was the feeling with which he first went forth to the work of reformation, and it need not surprise us that he met with so little opposition, compared with Luther.

The question of priority in laboring for the Reformation, between Luther and Zuingli, is one of little importance. That they labored for a time independently, is certain. It is equally true that Zuingli had, before 1517, far more fundamental knowledge of the true principles upon which the church must be reformed, and did more for the dissemination of this knowledge. He himself says, "I began to preach in 1516, a time when the very name of Luther was unknown in Switzerland, and even when we continued to use the Roman missals. The gospel which is contained in the missal I proposed to explain to the people—to explain not by the comments of men, but by comparing scripture with scripture. The truth of this, the illustrious Geroldseck, minister of the Hermitage (at Einsiedeln,) will readily attest."¹ Capito, too, says that Zuingli and himself had consulted together in reference to opposing the power of the pope, before Luther had made his appearance.² Bullinger declares that Zuingli preceded Luther as reformer, at least a year and a half. The testimony of Ruchat, too, is explicit in reference to the time before which he had begun to preach the reformed doctrine.³

His acquaintance with Erasmus and Myconius.

Among the acquaintances which Zuingli made while at Glaris, none influenced him more than that with Erasmus. His writings had long been among the best incentives and aids to classical study,

¹ Life of Zuingli, published by Presbyterian Board of Publication, p. 37.

² Zuingli Opp., Vol. VII., note to page 67-8, "*Antequam Lutherus in lucem emerasset, Zuinglius et ego inter nos communicavimus de Pontifice objiciendo. Etiam dum ille vitam degeret in Eremitorio. Nam utrique ex Erasmi consuetudine et lectione bonorum authorum qualecumque indicium tum subolescebat.*"

³ Déjà dès l'an 1516, ce grand homme avait prêché avec beaucoup de pureté la doctrine de l'évangile, enseignement à ses auditeurs à chercher le pardon de leurs péchés, et la vie éternelle, non point auprès de la Sainte Vierge, mais dans le mérite et l'intercession de Jésus Christ. P. 41.

to which Zuingli had access. As early as 1514, when Erasmus was at Basle, a correspondence had been commenced between them,¹ in which Erasmus, the prince of the literary men of the day, shows that he fully appreciated the young student and priest of Glaris. He says: "I greatly rejoice that my lucubrations are looked upon with favor by you, who are so highly esteemed; and on this account they will be less displeasing to me. I congratulate the Swiss people that you and those of kindred spirit are exerting yourselves to cultivate and ennoble it both by your studies and conduct, which are worthy of all admiration," etc.

In April of the following year, Zuingli wrote to Erasmus, expressing his warm regard for him, and his delight at having seen him at Basle, whither he had gone for that purpose; "glorying," he says, "in nothing more than in having seen Erasmus, a man most worthy of honor both for his literary attainments and his knowledge of Scripture, who is so much in favor both with gods and men, that whatever praise is bestowed upon literature, it is thought should be bestowed upon him: for whom, also, all ought to supplicate the God who is over all, that he may keep him safely, so that sacred learning, reclaimed by him from barbarism and sophistry, may grow up to mature age, and not, deprived of its natural parent, be reared with too much rigor and severity."

By this interview with Erasmus, Zuingli received a new impulse in the right direction; and happy would it have been if Erasmus had not subsequently turned aside from the course which he was at this time pursuing, and forgotten the injunction which he himself made, "We must seek Jesus Christ alone in the Holy Scriptures."

It was during this visit to Basle, that Zuingli first became acquainted with Oswald Myconius, then twenty-seven years of age, and principal of St. Peter's school at Basle. Both Zuingli and Erasmus bestowed the highest praises upon him; but he, in his humility, was accustomed to reply, "I have hitherto but learned to creep upon the ground, and by nature there has been something lowly about me from the cradle." We shall afterwards have occasion to mention him in connection with Zuingli's abode at Zurich.

Another of the friends of Erasmus who afterward became prominent, was Wolfgang Fabricius Capito,² who had been called to the

¹ This correspondence was commenced through the influence of Glarianus, for Erasmus says, *Hoc scripsi a coena impulsore Glariano, cui nil negare possum, etiamsi nudum saltare jubeat.* *Zuin. Opp.*, Vol. VII. p. 10.

² Capito — Basileæ Theologiam didicit, tum Medicinam, deinde iterum The-

cathedral church in Basle, in 1512, and had obtained a degree in each of the three faculties, Theology, Law, and Medicine. Through his influence Oecolampadius also had been called to Basle as a preacher in 1515, just before Zuingli's visit there. He, too, was destined to act a prominent part in connection with Zuingli, in reforming Switzerland.

Einsiedeln, — Zuingli's Removal and first Labors there.

In a small and somewhat sterile valley in the Canton of Schweitz, surrounded with willow groves and overlooked by lofty mountain peaks, a hermitage had been established about the middle of the ninth century. The circumstances attending its establishment and support, were somewhat peculiar. A benedictine monk, named Meinrad, descended from the ancient and wealthy family of Hohenzollern, who had founded a monastery in a small town¹ on the eastern border of the Lake of Zurich not sufficiently retired, penetrated the Gloomy Forest, as it was called, and built a hermitage and chapel, where he passed twenty-six years "in the austerities of the highest devotion." But some robbers, hoping to find ornaments in his chapel, or treasures in his cell, stole upon him amidst his devotions and murdered him. Although no mortal eye beheld the murderous act, yet according to the tradition, two crows who had been reared and kindly cared for by the monk, would not see their companion and friend thus removed without their revenge. They pursued, it is said, the murderers as far as Zurich, where the sinister notes of the birds excited suspicion against them, which led to their examination, in the progress of which they became confused and confessed the crime.² The untimely end of Meinrad had less influence in deterring others from establishing themselves in this place than the supposed divine interference for the punishment of the offenders had in consecrating the spot. About the middle of the tenth century a wealthy canon of Strasburg formed the design of spending his days in the Gloomy Forest, and replaced the hermitage by a monastery. He enclosed the ancient chapel of Meinrad in the new church, which he dedicated to the virgin and the

ologiam, tandem jura, atque in omnibus tribus facultatibus Doctoris gradum est consecutus. Friburgi in Brigovia docuit scholasticam Theologiam secundum Scotum. Hinc Episcopus Spirensis enim pastorem vocavit Bruchsalum. Heidelbergæ in notitiam venit Oecolampadii, unde amicitia in supremum diem duravit.

¹ Rapperschweil.

² Hess, Life, p. 51.

martyrs of the Theban Legion. The bishop of Constance and several of the neighboring prelates were called to its dedication. When they were engaged in their devotions during the night previous to the day of consecration, they heard sweet sounds from the chapel, as if angel voices there were blended in worship. The dignitaries were unwilling the next day to enter upon the ceremony of consecration, lest by their actions they should make that to seem unclean which God had pronounced holy. But when in compliance with urgent solicitations they were about to proceed to the usual solemnities, a voice was three times heard saying: "Cease, cease, God has already made it holy."¹ The bishop accordingly pronounced the church to be consecrated by the Lord Christ himself, assisted by angels, the apostles and saints, whilst the holy virgin, gleaming like lightning, stationed herself at the altar. This event is attested by a bull of Pope Leo VIII. in the year 964, found recorded in the Annals of Einsiedeln. A festival was subsequently observed in commemoration of this miracle, called the "Consecration of the Angels," at which time, pontifical bulls grant to all pilgrims hither a full absolution for all sin, even those which are generally reserved for the absolution of the apostolic See.²

The new monastery was soon enriched by the donations of the nobility of Switzerland and Germany. Popes and emperors vied with each other in endowing it with spiritual and temporal privileges. Pope Innocent IV. bestowed a bishop's mitre, and the emperor Rodolph of Hapsburg, the title and rights of prince of the empire upon the abbot. The most ancient and noble families eagerly sought a place in this retreat for their sons, as a sure means of preferment in the church. When the voluntary contributions began to diminish in the fourteenth century, a new source of gain was discovered. An image of the Virgin miraculously bestowed upon the convent, heaped numberless favors upon pilgrims, who in turn poured treasures into the coffers of the cloister. We are assured by the faithful that since the advent of this image, miracles have never ceased. Crowds of all

¹ Cessa, cessa, frater, divinitus capella consecrata est. Hartm. Ann. Einsied. p. 51, quoted by Hess, Life, p. 52.

² As we should naturally suppose, pilgrims flocked to Einsiedeln from every quarter, and Hess says: "This special grace still, even in our times, attracts thither a number of pilgrims from the Catholic Cantons," etc. The legends even say that our Saviour, in order to commemorate this event, "impressed with the fingers of his right hand a stone at the entrance of the chapel. These miraculous marks were objects of adoration to pilgrims during three centuries, and subsisted till 1802, when a part of the chapel was destroyed." Hess, Life, p. 53.

ranks and ages down to the present century have visited this sacred seat, to present their offerings and "receive a full remission of all their sins." Dr. Coxe, who visited Einsiedeln near the close of the last century, says "that he himself saw several hundreds in groups of different numbers approach the place," and in one case, even "a whole parish, attended by their spiritual pastor, was there." As incredible as it may appear to us, he says: "It is computed that upon the most moderate calculation, their number amounts yearly to a hundred thousand."¹

Such, in brief, was the place to which Zuingli was called soon after his return from the second expedition into Italy. It undoubtedly cost him a struggle to break away from the people of Glaris, between whom, especially the more intelligent and better part of them, and himself, a mutual sympathy and regard had ever existed. But the prospect of more extended usefulness among the multitudes who flocked to Einsiedeln from every quarter, more leisure, and greater advantages for study in connection with the library and scholars of the monastery, did not permit him to hesitate long in regard to the acceptance of the place. The people of Glaris, however, could not give him up even after he had left, but kept his place vacant more than two years, hoping for his return.

He thus writes to Stapfer: "Peacefully and in friendship I passed my days with the men of Glaris. Never was I involved in controversy with them; in so much favor was I when I was removed from them, that they, for two years after I left, gave me the income of the benefices, hoping that I should again return to them; and in this they would not have been disappointed if I had not been called to Zurich; even then, they made me a present in proof of their love." In his turn, in 1523, as an indication of his regard and gratitude, Zuingli dedicated to the people of Glaris one of his principal works: "Explanation and Defence of Articles of Belief;" and in his inscription to the magistrates, council and whole people of Glaris, he says for substance: "To you, once my flock, but now my honored friends and dear brethren in Christ, I have dedicated this my work, in order to show my gratitude for your faithfulness and honorable conduct to me. Let not the doctrine of Christ terrify you as if it were some new thing, for it will surely shine forth in our age as clearly and conspicuously as in the time of the apostles. Let the word of God be clearly preached, so that God may rule among you. See to it that you are not the last to welcome the returning word of God. Believe and obey

¹ Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 14.

your teachers and strive for Christian freedom, which is especially befitting an independent community.¹

Zuingli, when he took up his abode at Einsiedeln, was closely associated with Theobald von Geroldseck, the administrator of the abbey, and by virtue of his office a prince of the empire, and Conrad of Rechenberg, the abbot of Our Lady of the Eremites. The latter was a man, descended from an ancient family, of genuine independence, frankness and honesty, and endowed with too clear a reason to be subject to superstitious or blind faith. He on one occasion replied to the visitors of the convent, who reproached him with omitting the reading of the mass and other irregularities in respect to the prescribed ceremonies: "I am master of my own religious house, and not you; leave me to manage my own affairs." Of the mass he also said: "If Jesus Christ is really present in the host, I am unworthy to look upon him, much less to offer him in sacrifice to the Father; and if he is not there present, we unto me if I present bread to the people as the object of worship instead of God — now let me alone, and I will so manage my cloister that I can answer for it; go your ways." Conrad was also a friend of learning, although not himself highly educated. Still he was "persuaded that monasteries had been founded to serve as asylums for men devoted to study, and schools to form a priesthood," and was desirous of restoring his abbey to its proper destination. With how much pleasure must Zuingli have associated with a man of so kindred a spirit and devoted to such objects of life. Theobald was a man of equal independence of thought with Conrad, but of a milder spirit and more cultivated mind. He had labored zealously and perseveringly to secure the favor and freedom of his cloister. His great object, too, was to attract men of learning around him, and consequently was specially desirous of the co-operation and influence of Zuingli.

All preliminaries being settled in reference to duties and compensation, Zuingli repaired to Einsiedeln in the fall of 1516. In addition to the individuals previously mentioned, he found there Francis Zingk, a native of Einsiedeln and chaplain of the apostolic see. Zuingli himself designates him as a man distinguished for his learning, wisdom and piety, and a worthy and sincere friend. Their common love of, and skill in music was an additional bond of union. "Whenever," says Zuingli, "Zingk was not with us (himself and Geroldseck), we felt that something was wanting to us, so dear and

¹ Schuler, S. 228.

close was the union between us three, contrary to the proverb that, among three friends there is always one too many." Zingk, however, was not so well fitted to exert a general influence; his forte was rather as a student and teacher in private. He was not, as it was proved, wanting in courage and sturdiness of principle; for he turned away in contempt at all the promises and allurements held out by the papal legate to gain him over to his cause. Truth and friendship were not to be put into the scale with emolument and office. He died in 1529, a true friend of freedom of thought and belief.¹ Another of his early associates here was John Oechslein, also a native of Einsiedeln, who likewise endured persecution for the truth as a good soldier.

How pleasant it is to trace the guidance of the Divine hand in bringing together such men as those assembled in the library of the time-honored chapel, which had in the eye of the papist been signalized by miraculous exhibitions of Divine power! How pleasant to know that the first object of these men is not to study the scholastic subtleties of the middle ages, or the decrees of councils, or to look for guidance from papal bulls, and the records of superstition and bigotry! Already had a light dawned in these dark walls, when immediately after Zuingli's arrival, they sat down together to investigate God's Word. Zuingli soon communicated to the others something of his zeal in study. With the light of his learning, says Schuler, the *living* power of his reason, the high excellence of his character, he not only gained the love and esteem of all the monks and priests of the cloister, but also — which was his first object — won them, with the exception of one Judas, to the reception of evangelical truth. This was a community of true religious persons! They read the Holy Scriptures and the Church Fathers. Zuingli imparted to the others of the pearls which he had collected from the wise men of ancient Greece and Rome. With this they connected the reading of the writings of those who were laboring for the revival of literature, and the opponents of scholastic barbarism and monkish follies.² Zuingli inculcated upon Geroldseck the reading of Jerome and some others of the Fathers, as an aid in understanding the Bible. "But," he says, "the time will soon come, if God will, when neither the writings of Jerome, nor any other, will avail much, but the Holy Scriptures alone." With eagerness they devoured the works of Reuchlin, Erasmus, and others.

One favorite object of Zuingli and his associates was, to increase

¹ Schuler, S. 237-8.

² Ibid, 238.

the library of Einsiedeln, and thus enlarge the circle of their studies. Zuingli's correspondents were now becoming somewhat numerous, and through these, as Glarianus and Capito, at Basle, he obtained costly editions of Jerome and Erasmus, and also many other classical and patristical works. We frequently see mention made in letters, of books ordered or purchased, and sent to him.¹ But the friends did not merely read and study, and accumulate literary treasures, for private gratification. They examined and discussed the views of such men as Erasmus and Reuchlin, traced them to their ultimate results, and thus gradually acquired clear views and strength of purpose for the work before them. "Each," says Hess, "viewed the object in a different light; what escaped one, was perceived by another; and thus they were mutually enlightened and assisted. All were animated by that ardor which is only found at those periods when men awake from the slumber of barbarism and ignorance. When minds capable of beholding truth in all its splendor, have caught some faint beams of it, they can no longer endure the night of superstition and prejudice; they burn to emerge completely — and the resistance they experience, the obstacles they encounter, by irritating, do but augment their force and inflame their courage."²

But, Zuingli's mission was not accomplished, when he had merely excited a spirit of study, and the investigation of truth among the three or four with whom he was more immediately connected. He used his influence with the administrator, to bring about several reforms. It was not difficult to convince him of the impossibility of procuring the pardon of sin, by the payment of a stipulated sum of money, or indeed by any external practices, and accordingly of the profaneness, or at least the mere mockery of the inscription over the entrance of the abbey: "Here, plenary remission of all sins is obtained." The worship of the relics of saints and martyrs, too, was soon seen to be contrary to the spirit of Christianity.

The administration of a convent of nuns was also changed under his direction, and by means of his influence. "He established new rules, abolished several observances, and obliged the nuns to read the New Testament in German, instead of reciting "the Hours." He required of them an irreproachable life, but permitted such as did not feel in themselves a decided vocation to a religious life, to "enter again into the world and contract a legal union."³

[To be continued.]

¹ Hess, *Life*, p. 59.

² *Ibid.* p. 61.

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ARTICLE VII.

UNITY AMID DIVERSITIES OF BELIEF. EVEN ON IMPUTED
AND INVOLUNTARY SIN;WITH COMMENTS ON A SECOND ARTICLE IN THE PRINCETON REVIEW
RELATING TO A CONVENTION SERMON.*Nonnull*
By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary.

It is a grateful anticipation of all believers, that the leopard will one day lie down with the kid. It is also a consoling idea, that even now many wranglers in the church are disputing less on theology than on lexicography. The inward union of good men will soon be, and indeed already is more extensive than we imagine. In our bellicose propensities, we magnify the rumors of war. "Among those who admit the atoning death of Christ as the organic principle of their faith, there are differences, some of them more important, but many far less important, than they seem to be."¹ There are differences. It were idle to attempt an entire fusion of our evangelical creeds into one. These differences are important. All truth is important. The more exact our ideas of the Gospel, so much the more worthy will be our imaginative illustrations of it. Just in proportion as the theology of the head is the more complete, may the theology of the heart be the more copious and impressive, and the whole religious life may be the more in unison with heaven. Every new truth may call out some new grace, and if we have no idea of law, we can have no motive of obedience.² But let us not plunge into extremes. Let us not infer that pious men, believing "the doctrines which centre in and around a vicarious atonement,"³ must either become latitudinarian and care nothing for their differences, or else denounce each other as Pelagian, and magnify their minor disagree-

¹ Convention Sermon, Bib. Soc. Vol. VII. p. 559.

² See Convention Sermon, pp. 542—546. Notwithstanding all that is here said on the necessity of religious knowledge for the culture of religious feeling, our critic devotes several pages of his last Review (Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, Vol. XXIII. pp. 333—348) to prove, that this sermon is founded on a theory which rests on the principle that religion is a "blind feeling"! Is not the Reviewer in haste? He contradicts himself by elsewhere condemning the sermon for its theory that all moral character consists in a choice to obey or disobey a known law!

³ Convention Sermon, p. 544.

ments. At the present day, when Christians long for a more obvious unity in the faith, it is cheering to reflect on the particulars and on the methods in which they do harmonize, notwithstanding their frequent discords.

And, first, it is a delightful idea that the great majority of good Christians have received their faith immediately from the Bible, and have therefore agreed in adopting its essential truths. The men who trouble Israel are not the fair-minded theologians, but the polemic divines. It is these who go around beating the drum, brandishing the sword, crying "To arms," and already have their quarrels filled the world with spiritual orphans; but the women and children who pray in the vales and in the mountain fastnesses, have not understood the meaning of the war-cry; they have been called Lutherans, or Calvinists, or Zuinglians, or Baptists, or Methodists, or Presbyterians, and have scarcely known wherefore, but one thing they have known, and this has been their chief joy — that "Blessed is the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world." "The great mass of believers have never embraced the metaphysical refinements of creeds, useful as these refinements are; but have singled out and fastened upon and held firm those cardinal truths which the Bible has lifted up and turned over in so many different lights as to make them the more conspicuous by their very alternations of figure and hue."¹ We insist on the usefulness of these metaphysical refinements, and being so understood we shall not be accused of undervaluing any truth when we say with our worthy Reviewer, that "the mass of true Christians, in all denominations, get their religion directly from the Bible, and are but little affected by the peculiarities of their creeds."²

As yet, then, being in some measure harmonious with our critic, let us proceed to a second remark: pious men often adopt systems which agree with each other in their essential principles, but are irreconcilable in subordinate particulars. Augustinism is essentially right, notwithstanding its theory of baptismal regeneration; and Pelagianism is essentially wrong, notwithstanding its acknowledgment of Christ's divinity. The doctrinal system of Pictet, is different from that of Bellamy, but the difference is superficial, not fundamental. The great truths involved in the atonement of our blessed Lord, overpower various errors in philosophy, which may be fabricated around it; and every system which includes and is formed mainly

¹ Convention Sermon, p. 560.

² Bib. Repertory, Vol. XVII. p. 85. This article is generally imputed to our Reviewer.

upon these truths, has the right substance, even although it may have some unsightly protuberances. These doctrines are the requisites for a faith which saves. They are welcomed by various sects. In a late Convention sermon, it was therefore said, that there is an "identity in the essence of many truths which are run in scientific or aesthetic moulds, unlike each other."¹ This ought not to have been understood as meaning, that the moulds, i. e. *the scientific theories*, are the same, but that the substance of the *religious truth* cast into them, is the same. The truth that Christ was a vicarious sacrifice in suffering the most expressive pain for sinners, is not *philosophically* identical with the notion that he suffered the exact punishment of sinners; yet, the general system of Dr. Edwards, which includes the vicarious sacrifice in one of its philosophical forms, is *essentially* like the general system of Abraham Booth, which includes the same doctrine in another of its philosophical forms. It was not said in the above named sermon, that *all* systems were alike, but that *many* are. Our earnest Reviewer perseveres in confounding "many" with "all." He says of the author: "When he stood up—to forestall the blending of *all* creeds into one colorless ray;" but the author said for himself: "*Many* various forms of faith will yet be blended into a consistent knowledge, like the colors in a single ray."²

Thirdly, we are also pleased to observe, that good men often contend about modes of presenting truth, when they agree in the truth presented. The same doctrines presented in certain forms constitute the theology of the intellect, and presented in other forms constitute the theology of the heart.³ This latter theology often "indulges in

¹ Convention Sermon, p. 559.

² Compare Bib. Rep., XXIII. p. 341, with Bib. Sac. VII. p. 561.

³ A form of a truth involves *that* truth in *that* form. Modes of theological exhibition are theological doctrines exhibited in certain modes. A style of theology is theology in a particular style. It is immaterial whether we say that the theology of the intellect is a kind of theological representation, or that it is the theology represented in a certain method. "The theology of the intellect and feelings" is one system of truths exhibited in two modes. This is the single theory of the sermon under review. The attempt of the Reviewer, in Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 333—339, to prove that there is another and a "German" theory, can serve no other purpose than to link the sermon with the (to many persons) "*hard name*" of Schleiermacher. It is an unworthy attempt. Had he given a fair exhibition of either the German theory or the sermon, he could not have failed to show their antagonism. He pretends that the sermon grows out of the indirect idea that "right moral feeling may express itself in *wrong intellectual forms*," by which he means, *false statements literally understood*. No such thing. The contrary is asserted throughout the discourse. If the Reviewer will take the trouble

a style of remark which for sober prose would be unbecoming, or even when associated in certain ways, irreverent;" "in language which we fear to repeat."¹ The Princeton Reviewer, for example, makes the following remark: "Paul says that Christ, though he knew no sin, was made sin; i. e. a sinner."² If Paul *had* said that Christ was made a sinner, we would reverently repeat the words, even as we say with awe, "Then the Lord awaked as out of sleep, and like a mighty man that shouteth by reason of wine."³ But inspired men never venture upon the declaration that our blessed Lord was made a sinner; and if uninspired authors wish to invent such phrases, they should do it with caution, and should step on this perilous ground with their shoes from off their feet. We hope, indeed, that our Reviewer means to express a *truth* by such a bold declaration, and that he here deviates from New England theology in respect of taste rather than doctrine. We believe also that other divines have, in certain states of mind, a right idea concealed under their dangerous, intense phraseology, when they say, as does the excellent Dr. Crisp, "Christ himself becomes the transgressor in the room and stead of the person that had transgressed; so that in respect of the reality of being a transgressor, Christ is as really the transgressor as the man that did commit it was, before he took it upon him."⁴ Interpreted as bold metaphors, such expressions may sometimes, but always with extreme peril, be borne for a moment in the theology of excited feeling; but when literally interpreted, they belong neither to the theology of a sound head nor to that of a good heart, but are the occasions of infidelity and sin.

Fourthly, it is also a pleasant reflection, that good men often believe in a false doctrine as logically deduced from certain premises, and reject it in their pious meditations. They disagree as logicians with the advocate of truth, but as devotional Christians, they agree

to examine the discourse, he will see that the word "intellectual" is one of his own interpolations, and is an unwarrantable gloss.

¹ Conv. Sermon, Bib. Sac. VII. p. 538.

² Bib. Rep. VII. p. 426.

³ Psalm 78: 65.

⁴ See Crisp's *Sermons*, edited by Dr. Gill, Vol. I. pp. 429, 431, 437, 440, 261—264, 301, etc. We must believe that this good man does, in certain moods of feeling, use these terms in a figurative sense, although he denies that he so uses them here. "To affirm," he says, p. 438, "that the Lord laid upon Christ the guilt of sin and not the sin itself, is directly contrary to Scripture; for you have many testimonies affirming that the Lord lays sin upon him; what presumption then is it for a man to say, he lays on Christ the guilt, and not the sin itself?" "See how careful the Spirit of God is to take away all suspicion of a figure in the text," (he here cites the sins of many). p. 430.

with him. "Dogmas of the most revolting shape, have no sooner been cast into the alembic of a regenerated heart, than their more jagged angles have been melted away."¹ Lest our Reviewer suspect this remark of Germanism, let him have the goodness to reperuse his own saying: "this is a doctrine which can only be held as a *theory*. It is in conflict with the most intimate moral convictions of men;" and further, "it is a product of the *mere* understanding, and does violence to the instinctive moral judgment of men;"² and further still: "even among those who make theology a study there is often one form of doctrine for speculation, and another simpler and truer for the closet. [!] Metaphysical distinctions are forgotten in prayer, or under the pressure of real conviction of sin, and need of pardon, and of divine assistance. Hence it is that the devotional writings of Christians agree far more than their creeds."³ Our critic here agrees very happily with the *Schleiermacherian* sermon, which declares that "in unnumbered cases, the real faith of Christians has been purer than their written statements of it."⁴

Sometimes, however, the erroneous formulas of the metaphysician are not "*forgotten*" in his prayers, but are merged into a merely intense expression of practical truth. In his study he regards them as literal statements; in his closet he uses the same words as bold metaphors. While his heart is cold, he adopts them as a theology of the intellect; but when his heart is warm, he changes them into *the* theology of feeling.⁵ The ice mountain in which he is frozen up as a scholar, melts into pure and refreshing water around him when he is in the glow of devotion. Imagine, if you can, that an exemplary divine should exclaim in his address to God: "I have 'done as well as I could do;' 'I have had no more power to change my disposition than to annihilate myself,' therefore 'I have lived up to the very extent of my ability,' but 'my debt has been fully paid,' and now 'it

¹ Conv. Sermon, p. 560.

² Bib. Rep. XVII. pp. 91, 87. Here, and throughout this Article, the *italics* are made by the author of the Article.

³ Bib. Rep. Vol. XVII. p. 85.

⁴ Conv. Sermon, p. 560.

⁵ Our earnest Reviewer not only confounds "*many*" with "*all*," but also "*a*" with "*the*." *The* theology of the intellect is not, as he seems to think, Pelagianism, but it is the theology of a *sound* mind, i. e. it is the truth. *The* theology of feeling is not a class of doctrines adapted to a *wrong* heart, but to a *right* one; i. e. it is the truth, the same in substance but not in form with the preceding. On the other hand, a theology of intellect may be any form of religious error, and a theology of feeling may be any kind of injurious theological statement. See Conv. Sermon, Note B. Not all the expressions of our Reviewer belong to *the* theology of feeling.

would be unjust to punish me;’ ‘I claim heaven as my right’—could there be any doubt that he used this language in a metaphorical sense, and that he meant something entirely different from the proper import of his words? Will a broken-hearted sinner use such phrases at the throne of grace, otherwise than as eloquent exhibitions of a truth which they do not *literally* express? Will not the false theories with which these phrases are allied, vanish into poetical illustrations of sacred doctrine, when the man, as *right-hearted*, becomes stronger than the man, as *wrong-headed*?

Fifthly, it is also cheering to know that when divines act as *men*, instead of theorists, they often relinquish their erroneous notions, and agree with the advocates of right doctrine. Not only as good Christians, but also as unsophisticated human beings, they accept the truth. Thus there is an habitual unity while there is a scholastic difference among many theologians. Human nature is too strong for bad logic. As children gaze at the sun until their eyes are darkened, so metaphysicians often reflect on a theme until their minds are *bewildered*. They see it in a blur. They have disordered, by straining, their vision. They are confident, pugnacious, but in their practical moods they think like other folks; Berkeley and Hume made but little use of their scepticism when out of doors. The absurdities of divines often fall off from them around the domestic hearth or in the circle of social prayer. So far as the theology of New England is a distinctive system, differing from that which has been so nobly opposed by Edwards and Dwight of Connecticut, it is the theology of the Bible explained by common sense. It is theology conformed to the fundamental laws of human belief. It is the theology which all good men adopt when they act in the capacity of men, in distinction from mere scholars or polemicists. This is its glory. The church has ever been for it in its substance, even when against it in its forms. It is in fact nothing new, save in the precision and consistency of its statements. It is “the great granitic formation,” if we may venture to use the strong words of our Reviewer, on which the fathers before and after Augustine, and even that imperial divine himself loved to build their practical religion. It has been, we are glad that it has been, grown over with rich mosses, and beautiful wild flowers, and fragrant briars and medicinal herbs. But we are sorry that distant observers fasten their gaze upon the surface, and mistake the beautiful drapery for the very rock itself, and think to build their triangular turrets upon the flowers, which were never meant to be crushed and bruised under the artificial masonry.

Let us give one illustration of the fact that men *must* often, whether they will or not, obey those principles of common sense by which He who inspired the Bible meant that we should explain it, and by which the New England divinity has been shaped into its distinctive form. Andrew Fuller says: "I have proved that *natural strength* is the *measure* of men's *obligation* to love God," and he often repeats, "we are only *required* to love God with all our strength."¹ But our worthy Reviewer regards this as one radical principle of Pelagianism, and remarks: "If there is anything of which the sinner has an intimate conviction, it is that the heart, the affections, his inherent moral dispositions are beyond his reach; that he can no more change his nature than he can annihilate it."² Does this gentleman, then, who will, we trust, admit the sinner's obligation to be holy, agree with the advocates of "ability commensurate with obligation?" No, not always, not in some of his theorizings, not at the moment of his controverting that truth. But what will he say as a *man*? Can a child be under obligation to lift up a mountain with his unaided hand, or to see through the globe with his unaided eye, or to hear the conversation of the antipodes with his unaided ear? 'By no means,' our critic will respond, 'for the maxim that ability is commensurate with obligation *does* apply to external acts.'³ Very well. The first step is gained. Can a child be under obligation, then, to learn all the languages of the world in one day, or to understand all the sciences in one hour? 'By no means,' our Reviewer will answer, 'that old maxim *does* apply to intellectual operations.' Very well. Then a second step is gained. Now for the third. You say that "the maxim has no more to do with the obligations of moral agents in reference to moral acts than the axioms of geometry have;"⁴ nothing at all, then, to do with moral acts! This is sweeping enough. But let us see. Can a man be under moral obligation to love God this moment with a love *infinitely* more ardent than that of the highest angel? Can he be under moral obligation to love the universe with a benevolence equal to that of God himself? Can the infant of a day be under moral obligation to exercise as much of holy feeling as is exercised by Him who is omnipotent? Are not these *moral* acts? You have wisely conceded that a creature cannot "be required to create a world, nor an idiot to reason correctly."⁵ Why not? Because in *these things* power must be equal to duty. But can a creature be under obligation to *annihilate* the world, or to *annihilate* his own nature?

¹ Fuller's Works, Vol. II. pp. 538, 656, and frequently elsewhere.

² Bib. Rep. XVII. pp. 329, 330.

³ Ib. p. 329.

⁴ Ib.

⁵ Ib.

Is he able to annihilate himself? No. And yet he is equally unable to make himself a new heart! Is he then required to perform this impossibility? And if not required to repent, does he disobey any requisition in not repenting? Does he sin? Now we *know* that we shall get the right answer at last. We know that there is in every man a *vis medicatrix*, curing the soul as well as the body of its disorders, and working itself through all sorts of metaphysics, and now it forces from the Biblical Repertory the following words, which "end the strife:" "*Man cannot be under obligation to do what requires powers which do not belong to his nature and constitution.*"¹ Still again it affirms, in language more unguarded than we have ever employed: "The unfortunate and *improper* use of the word 'necessity' by Edwards and his followers, has done more to prejudice the minds of *sensible* men against his system than all other causes. According to the *proper* usage of language, liberty and necessity are diametrically opposite; and to say a thing is necessary and at the same time free, is a *contradiction in terms*. Certainty and necessity are not the same; for although everything necessary is certain, everything certain is not necessary. Volitions, in certain given circumstances, may be as certain as any physical effects, but volitions are free in their very nature. A *necessary* volition is an absurdity, a thing *inconceivable*. To call this certainty a 'moral necessity,' a 'philosophical necessity,' will forever mislead, and produce confusion of ideas in the most *exact* thinkers."² These words are indeed rather extravagant, but their main import is satisfactory, and they show that divines writing as *men* and not as partizans, are *compelled* to admit the whole theory of natural power which our Reviewer has condemned as Pelagian, when found in a "practical" sermon. And yet will he abide by these principles? Will he not sometimes violate the fundamental laws of human belief? On pp. 329, 330, of his Reply to our Remarks, he asserts the doctrine of necessity with as much force as it was ever asserted by Hobbes or Belsham. And does he mean what the Repertory elsewhere affirms, that this necessity is a certainty *rather* than necessity?³ If so, why does he condemn a New England sermon for uttering the same truth? That sermon represents a sinner to be as unable to repent as he is to annihilate both himself and the universe — in the figurative sense which Jonathan Edwards and Andrew Fuller attach to the word *unable*. But the fact is, our Reviewer is misled by his strong language. Instead of using

¹ Bib. Rep. VII. p. 372.

² Ib. XVII. p. 638.

³ Ib. XV. pp. 46, 47, and in many other passages.

it, he allows himself to be used by it, and in criticising a New England sermon he does really think that a just God requires men under penalty of eternal death, to accomplish literal impossibilities! But his mind is too elastic to be always overpowered by this metaphysics; and just so truly as he is a man, not merely a good or great man, but a *man*, he does and must often pay allegiance to the fundamental law of human belief, that a being will never feel remorse or suffer a moral punishment for doing what he was literally and invincibly necessitated to do, or for not doing what was as strictly impossible as to annihilate himself.

Sixthly, not merely in their pious meditations, nor in their capacity as men in distinction from theorists, do certain advocates of error come over upon the side of truth; they do so in some of their speculative moods. In the devious paths of false doctrine, they must now and then double their track. For the sake of maintaining one theory, they will gainsay what they had advanced in maintaining another. Our critic has given several interesting examples of an occasional harmony even in speculation with the men whom he opposes.

It is often said by Dr. Crisp, that it would not be just, or even "honest," for the Deity to exact of us a payment of the debt which Christ has already paid for us; "that the Lord hath no more to lay to the charge of an elect person, yet in the height of iniquity, and in the excess of riot, and committing all the abominations that can be committed; I say, even then, when an elect person runs such a course, the Lord hath no more to lay to his charge, than he hath to lay to the charge of a believer; nay, he hath no more to lay to the charge of such a person, than he hath to lay to the charge of a saint triumphant in glory."¹ In an attempt to explain such statements, it was said in a late Convention Sermon, that the intellect, *left to its own guidance*, "would never suggest the *unqualified* remark, that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, for it declares that this debt may justly be claimed from them; nor that he has suffered the whole punishment which they deserve—for it teaches that this punishment may still be righteously inflicted on themselves."² But our Reviewer answers, that each of the above named "unqualified" remarks is true, and here he was outright in collision with the sermon.³ We

¹ Crisp's Sermons, edited by Dr. Gill, Vol. I., p. 570. See the same idea advanced in equally or more perilous language, on pp. 261, 262, 264, 463, 487, 557, 572, etc.

² Bib. Sac., Vol. VII., p. 535.

³ Bib. Rep., Vol. XXII., pp. 648, 649.

then commented on his answer ;¹ and in his Reply, he has taken pains to qualify the original statements, and he now says : " Christ has paid the debt of sinners *in such a sense* that it would be unjust to exact its payment from *those who believe* ;" " Christ has suffered the punishment of sin, *in such a sense* that it would be unjust to exact that punishment of those *who accept his righteousness*." ² He thus gives up the word *sinners*, and substitutes *believers* ! This is *one* interesting qualification. How, then, does the matter stand ? Justice and merit are correlative terms. Where one is, the other must be ; where one is not, the other cannot be. If it be unjust to punish a man, that man deserves no punishment. If he deserve no punishment, he is not sinful. But every man has been sinful and ill-deserving. What has become of his sin and demerit ? Are they annihilated ? If they do not belong to him, they must belong to another. Hence, we have been told, they are " transferred," " communicated," " imputed " to Christ. Therefore, the adorable Saviour is a sinner. This has been said a thousand times. But is he *morally* a sinner ? No ! our critic will answer. Is he, then, morally undeserving ? No. Are our sins *morally* imputed to him ? No, " not morally but juridically." Then, do they not morally belong to us ? Yes. Then, are we not morally undeserving ? Yes. Then, would it not be morally just to punish us ? Yes. And to exact our debt of us ? Yes. Then that " unqualified " phrase is qualified the second time, and it now stands : The punishment of sinners cannot be justly inflicted on them, provided that the sinners are believers, and the justice spoken of, is not a *moral* justice, but external and legal. In his Reply, our critic expresses his second qualification thus : " In *themselves*, they [believers] are hell-deserving ; to *them*, their acceptance is a matter of grace, because it is not their own righteousness, but the righteousness of another, that is the ground of their justification." ³ We are happy to see, then, that he agrees with us in acknowledging, not only in his confessions at the throne of grace, but also in some of his speculations, that eternal punishment is justly due to us, and may be justly inflicted upon us, so far forth as we are considered to be or to have been sinful ; but that so far forth as we are considered to be believers, this punishment cannot be inflicted upon us in consistency with what

¹ Bib. Sac., Vol. VIII, pp. 161 — 163.

² Bib. Rep., Vol. XXIII. p. 331. The Reviewer is speaking of retributive justice, as he regards it a serious heresy to resolve (with Pres. Edwards, Dr. Dwight, and others) real justice into benevolence.

³ Bib. Rep., XXIII. p. 332.

is due to our Redeemer.¹ We certainly sympathize with the learned critic, when after twice qualifying an "unqualified" phrase, he comes over to the true faith; and even while he adheres to a false speculation, we cordially repeat the words with which himself is familiar, and which, considering their source, he will be slow to suspect of Schleiermacherism: "There is a region a little lower than the *head*, a little *deeper* than the reach of *speculation*, in which those who *think* they differ, or differ in *thinking*, may yet rejoice in Christian fellowship!"²

We now make a seventh and a general remark, that for various reasons, obvious and occult, theologians are often inconsistent with themselves; and while they would never come together if each were to follow out a few of his "radical principles," yet they are not always consecutive, and they often coincide by virtue of their inconsequent reasonings. Thus our Reviewer takes three "radical principles," viz. that "moral character is confined to acts, that liberty supposes power to the contrary [by which he means a natural, not a moral power, to choose right when one does choose wrong], and that ability limits responsibility,"³ and from these principles he constructs, by a species of "comparative anatomy," a theological system, to which, as *he* says, the sermon under review belongs. In that system he declares that "the sovereignty of God in the salvation of men must of necessity be given up," and he contrasts with it his own system which "has for its object the vindication of the divine supremacy and sovereignty in the salvation of men."⁴ But lo! a few minutes afterward he affirms, that in the system to which the sermon belongs, "the acceptance of the sinner is the act of a Sovereign, dispensing with the demands of the law!"⁵ and herein it is said to be in *contrast* with his own system, which on a preceding page was said to exalt the divine sovereignty while the other excluded it! And this contrast he makes yet more pointed on p. 330, where he affirms that "according to the one system [*his* own, making *much* of sovereignty] the deliverance of a believer from condemnation is the act of a *judge*; according to the other [*our* own as *he* says, and one which makes *nothing* of sovereignty] it is the act of a Sovereign!" What will this gentleman say next? Those

¹ "The atonement has such a relation to the whole moral government of God, as to make it consistent with the honor of his legislative and retributive justice, to save all men, and to make it *essential* to the highest honor of his benevolence or general justice, to renew and save some." Convention Sermon, p. 562.

² Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, Vol. XX. p. 140.

³ Bib. Rep. Vol. XXIII. p. 323.

⁴ Ib. pp. 308, 311.

⁵ Ib. p. 312.

three "radical principles," that liberty supposes a natural not a moral power of choosing right when one does choose wrong, and that this natural power limits responsibility, and that moral character is confined to acts, are the principles of our old *Hopkinsian* divines; and did those sturdy men overlook the sovereignty of God? The stale objection to them was, that they thought and talked and preached of nothing else! And the historical fact is, that this precious doctrine was never insisted on with so much force and frequency and safety, as in the pulpits where it has been combined with those three "radical principles." It never was and never can be preached as it ought to be, where the New England doctrine of "natural ability" is not also preached. Ministers and people "shrink from" it, without its complement of human freedom. We thank our Reviewer for so frankly letting out the truth that the system which is not his own *does* exalt the divine sovereignty in the salvation of men; and if his own system does the same, then so far forth both systems agree; and when he denies that the system which is not his own exalts the divine sovereignty, then he contradicts himself, and of course in one of his statements he must agree with us.¹

Again, the conductors of the Princeton Review, "or which is the same thing, our historian,"² assert: "Now we confess ourselves to

¹ The Reviewer represents the doctrines logically growing out of the three above-named "radical principles" as *Pelagianism*, and he repeatedly declares that the sermon under review advocates those Pelagian doctrines as literally correct and as essentially the same with the Augustinian! See Bib. Rep. XXIII. pp. 319, 320, 322, 326, 328, etc. Now the truth is, that a disbelief in those three "radical principles" as they are stated in the sermon, is far more logically connected with Baptismal Regeneration, Transubstantiation and other Romish absurdities, than a belief in them is with Pelagianism. We might far more honorably attempt to associate the Reviewer with Romanists, with infidel and Mohammedan fatalists, than he has attempted to associate us with Pelagians. It has long been an artifice of polemic divines to tie up the system of their adversaries with some unpopular scheme, as Mezentius bound his enemies face to face with the bodies of the dead. But it is too late. This whole style of disputing, or rather *nicknaming*, is what we may call, "for want of a better name," *Moral Pelagianism*. We make allowances, however, for our critic, as he evidently writes in a "language of feeling;" see, for example, his assertion on p. 326, that if the author of the Convention Sermon has not represented the Augustinian and Pelagian systems as both true and reconcilable, "he must be set down as either the most unfortunate or the most unintelligible writer of modern times." Hegel is one writer of modern times, and he said in his last days, that only one man in Europe understood him, and that one misunderstood him. To be more unintelligible than Hegel is "unfortunate."

² See Bib. Rep. Vol. VI. p. 431, and 92, 93.

be of the number of those who believe, whatever reproach it may bring upon us from a certain quarter, that if the doctrine of imputation be given up, the whole doctrine of original sin must be abandoned; and if this doctrine be relinquished, then the whole doctrine of Redemption must fall, and what may then be left of Christianity, they may contend for that will; but for ourselves we shall be of opinion that what remains will not be worth a serious struggle." On p. 455 of the same volume it is said of President Edwards: "As he had rejected all of imputation but the name, it is no matter of surprise that his followers soon discarded the term itself." And the same Review declares that Hopkins, as well as Dwight, "rejects the doctrine." And yet our Reviewer, doubtless considers that President Edwards, (who has been termed "the prince of American divines,") even at the time of abandoning this fundamental theory, was "in the main" correct, and preserved his essential orthodoxy by his logical inconsistency! And his followers, too, the Smalleys and the Robert Halls, did they make an utter shipwreck of the faith? Or if some of them did, can there be no hope that "the rest, some on boards and some on broken pieces of the ship escaped all safe to land?" Really, our critic must either save himself from pronouncing an absurd censure on those good men by a plea that he has exaggerated the importance of their deviations from his faith, or else he must allow that these mighty logicians were enabled to save their own orthodoxy by their logical blunders. To whichever horn of this dilemma our Reviewer may betake himself, he proves what we assert, that men may be so inconsistent with themselves as to agree on the substance of a creed, while they differ on important articles of it, and may preserve either their essential Calvinism, or their Christian charity by a self-contradiction.

Once more, our Reviewer says that in his own system, (irreconcilable with the sermon which he condemns,) Christ is not regarded "as simply rendering it consistent in God to bestow blessings upon sinners, so that we can come to the Father, of ourselves, with a mere obeisance to the Lord Jesus for having opened the door."! We read in Andrew Fuller's Gospel its own Witness, p. 194, Ed. 1801: "If we say, a way was opened by the death of Christ for the free and consistent exercise of mercy in all the methods which Sovereign wisdom saw fit to adopt, perhaps we shall include every material idea which the Scriptures give us of that important event." And did this meek divine, when he was received home to his Father's house, merely make his obeisance to his once suffering Friend "for having opened the door?" Has this been the superficial, not to say profane piety of

the beloved missionaries of the cross who have received the teachings of Andrew Fuller? We see here this great man's view of the Atonement. We have already seen his view of our natural ability. He asserts again and again that we are never personally blamable without "the concurrence of our wills." Our critic confesses that Fuller was a disciple of Edwards, and that the disciples of Edwards renounced the *fundamental* doctrine of imputation. But has it come to this, that Andrew Fuller will be accused of "philosophizing away" the Gospel (if we may be indulged in one of our critic's chosen words)? "Although we judge him in the main to be truly orthodox," says the Princeton Review, Vol. XVIII. pp. 553, 554, "yet there are minor points on which we should take the liberty of differing from him." "We have made up our minds never to contend with any man for agreeing in doctrinal points with Andrew Fuller." The mind of that Review, then, is *made up*. So much is *fixed*. It will never contend with any man merely for his advocating the — "*radical principles of Pelagianism*."! There is a certain "practical" sermon which has uttered a few words in favor of natural ability, and against an inevitable sin, but — "Nolo contendere, for Andrew Fuller said the same, and said it fifty times where the sermon has said it once." — Not sleep itself gives more occasional rest to a polemic divine, than do his own inconsistencies. "Blessed be the man that first invented sleep," and — contradictions.

Having now shown the particulars and the methods in which *some* men who dispute for opposing systems, may *sometimes* be more harmonious than their creeds, and some creeds may harmonize not in all respects but in "substance of doctrine," let us apply these familiar, not "German," principles, to the doctrines of imputed and of involuntary sin. These doctrines are singled out for various reasons. First, they have been imagined to be *the* fundamental doctrines of the Bible: see p. 606 above. Secondly, it is more difficult to reconcile the New England with the old Calvinism on these subjects than on any other. If we can succeed here, we can succeed everywhere; and above all, on the doctrines of imputed righteousness, atonement, inability. Thirdly, the style of the old Calvinistic writers is here eminently instructive, and the manner in which they often explained it may illustrate the meaning of the phrase "theology of feeling."

On the subject of Imputed Sin let us consider, first, what is the true doctrine in regard to the influence of Adam upon his descendants: Our benevolent Creator formed a constitution, according to which Adam was to be the head of our race, and the state of his

posterity was so far suspended upon the conduct of their representative, that they were to be born like him in nature and condition. Because he sinned, they are subjected to manifold pains in this life, and are so constituted and circumstanced that, left to themselves, they will sin and only sin in all their moral acts. Even if they should not do wrong, they would suffer evil in consequence of his transgression; but as they do wrong uniformly, they not only endure pains in this world, but will, unless forgiven, be punished forever in the world to come. As they are condemned to eternal death, in consequence of their own sin, and as they are certain to sin in consequence of their corrupt nature, and as they receive this evil nature in consequence of Adam's disobedience, it may be said by an ellipsis only that they are condemned to eternal punishment as an ultimate result of the first disobedience. The Deity had benevolent reasons for making our character and condition thus dependent on him who was on probation for the race. We know not fully what these reasons are. We presume that they affect kindly the whole intelligent universe. We bow down before the Sovereign Author of this arrangement and say, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." Here is one theory, and that critic must be in a peculiar state, who sees no essential difference between it and the Pelagian error that Adam's sin did not injure his descendants at all, or at most that it only presented an evil example for their imitation.

But in the second place, let us inquire what is the old theory, antagonistic to the preceding, in regard to Adam's influence upon his descendants. Its first and fundamental principle is, that God is influenced by retributive justice toward men in causing them to be born with an evil and suffering nature. The calamities which attend men at their very first formation are punishments, inflicted by God, acting not as a Sovereign but as a Judge; exercising justice not toward Adam alone, but toward the infants who have not yet seen the light. "For ourselves," says the Princeton Reviewer¹ (in language which when dying he will wish to blot), "we are free to confess that we instinctively shrink from the idea, that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon his creatures, while we bow submissively at the thought of their being penal inflictions for a sin committed by our natural head and representative, and in violation of a covenant in which by a benevolent appointment of God we were included." In the immediate context he censures those New England divines who represent "that as a matter of sovereignty which we

¹ Bib. Rep. Vol. VI. p. 435.

regard as a matter of justice." And elsewhere he repeatedly condemns the theory which refers the calamities of our race to the "arbitrary appointment of God," by which phrase he means the sovereign appointment of Him who afflicts but does not punish us directly for Adam's sin.¹ Rivetus in his learned Treatise on the Protestant doctrine of Imputation, a Treatise which has been highly applauded by the most eminent theologians of modern times, by the Leyden Professors, by the great Torretin himself (Theol. Pars I. 691), has cited many authorities which ascribe the suffering of unborn infants to the exercise of retributive justice upon them.² On pp. 800, 807, 808, 809 of Riv. Opp., Tom. III. will be found the following and similar authorities :

Videllius affirms, that "the reason why God imputes the fall of Adam to his posterity, is the *justice* of God, but not his mere will, as the Arminians teach." Gomar says, that the fall of Adam "is ours by a *just* imputation." The synopsis of the four Leyden Professors, teaches, that Adam's "disobedience and fault with its consequent guilt, are *justly* imputed to all his descendants by God the Judge." "The proximate cause of original sin," says Wollebius, "is the guilt of Adam's first sin, in respect of which the punishment of God is most just." "The Catholic Church," says Vossius, "has always decided that the first offence [of our original ancestors] is imputed to all; that is, by the *just judgment* of God, it is *transmitted* to all the children of Adam, as to all its effects." Is this figurative justice, or literal and moral? What does the *argument*, as well as the phraseology, require?

This first and ground-principle being admitted, that Jehovah is influenced by punitive justice toward men, when he afflicts them before and independently of their own individual sin, it follows that they, without having ever acted in their own proper persons, *deserve* to be thus punished. God afflicts them justly; of course according to their proper merits. In Riv. Opp. III. pp. 802, 811, 812, 814, 817, will be found, unless otherwise specified, the following and other like authorities.

Aurelius teaches, that Adam's "first sin makes us *guilty* before God; *then*

¹ See, for one instance, Dr. Hodge's Commentary on Rom. 5: 12—21. How does the learned commentator justify himself in describing the divine sovereignty as *arbitrary* and in *shrinking* from it, when he avows that the distinctive aim of his theology is to exalt this doctrine, as we saw on p. 604 above?

² We prefer the citations from Rivetus to an equal number of British and American authorities, because the Princeton Review has often appealed to these citations as decisive. They are so. They are the true and the best representatives of the old theory of Imputation. The authors mentioned, were all eminently learned and useful men. The Treatise of Rivetus is entitled: *Decretum Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformaturum Galliae initio 1645 de imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami Posteris, cum Ecclesiarum et doctorum protestantium consensu, ex scriptis eorum, ab Andraea Riveto, collecto.*

it transfuses into us the corruption which has followed guilt in Adam; from which corruption now really inhering in us, we are *again* guilty by ourselves, and as infected with our own vitiosity, vile, spotted, and hateful to God, *not only* in Adam, or as we are regarded in him as the fountain and root of the human race, but as we are considered by ourselves and of ourselves, now so corrupted."—"The guilt and punishment of Adam's sin have passed over to all the posterity of Adam and Eve, Christ excepted." "For the opinion is false of those who teach that only the *punishment* of Adam's sin flowed into us, and not also the *guilt and fault* of that sin. For then we *should be punished as undeserving*. But the fault *first*, and then the punishment, passes over into us, and is cast upon us." Says Altingius, the sin of Adam "is imputed most deservedly, [*meritissime*, to his descendants] because all sinned in him as their stock and root" Crocius teaches, "that the disobedience of Adam is the *meritorious* cause of our condemnation; it is imputed to us, and on account of him, we are constituted sinners." Adam is called "the *meritorious* cause" of our ruin, by Fewbornius also. Speaking of the evils which we receive on account of our progenitor, Martin Bucer says, that these "evils are sent upon no man undeservedly." And even Calvin affirms that, "in his [Adam's] corruption, the entire human race was *deservedly* (merito) vitiated."¹ Was this *ill-desert*, which is the correlate of the Divine justice, a figurative ill-desert, or literal and moral? Reëxamine the phraseology, but mind well the demands of the argument.

This second principle being allowed, that men deserved to be formed with an evil and suffering nature, it follows that some moral offence must have been justly imputed to them before their own personal existence. They merited the evils which enter into their very *make*; of course they cannot *deserve* such an afflicted nature, unless they be justly chargeable with a sin antecedent to their personal formation. A just God imputes the sin, and therefore he imputes justly. He commits no mistake; (see Haldane on Rom. 5: 12, 29.)

Calvin says often, that "there could have been no condemnation without guilt," and "it is contrary to the equity of the divine government to punish an innocent man for the fault of another;" and that "by Adam's sin we are not condemned by imputation *alone*, as if the punishment of another's fault were exacted of us, but we bear his punishment for this reason, that we are also guilty of fault; for as our nature is vitiated in him, it is with God bound by the guilt of iniquity." Inst. Lib. II. Cap. VIII. § 19, Cap. I. § 8, and Com. on Rom. 5: 17, 18, 19. On the remark that "the imputation of Christ's righteousness is of grace, but the imputation of sin is of justice," Turretin says, "Grace can, but justice *cannot* ascribe to another that which does not belong to him; because grace bestows favor upon the undeserving, justice does not inflict punishment except on the deserving. For in the imputation of Adam's sin, the justice of God does not inflict punishment on the *undeserving* but on the *deserving*, if not on account of the proper and personal, yet on account of the participated and common desert, which is founded on the natural and federal union existing between us and Adam." Turretin Theol. Elenct. Pars I. p. 587. Zanchius writes: "We therefore affirm that [Adam's] disobedience, although it could not pass over to us [as persons] in act [i. e. personal act], yet did pass over in fault and guilt by imputation, since

¹ Cal. Inst., Lib. II. cap. I. 26.

God (imputes) that sin of Adam as the head, to us as the members, and he imputes it most justly." Lubbertus teaches that "when Adam in a total apostasy revolted from God, he became guilty of death, and all his posterity are implicated in the same guilt, no otherwise than if they had all perpetrated the crime of treason against their Creator." Meisnerus says that "guilt could not be propagated to us [from Adam] unless the *imputation* of (his sinful) act had preceded, seeing that this imputation is the *ground* of that guilt. Wherefore St. Bernard writes that 'Adam's disobedience belonged to another, because we all sinned in *him*; but it also belonged to us, because we sinned although in another, and the disobedience was imputed to us by the just although hidden judgment of God.'" N. Hunnius, denying the bare imputation of Adam's sin to his descendants, affirms that "at the same time the fault and the guilt, together with the *resulting* punishment, are transfused (transfundi) into (his) posterity; nor by any means is the guilt separated from the punishment; therefore we judge it heterodox to believe that one can be a partaker of the punishment who was not also a partaker of the sin." Steegmannus writes that "no one can be exposed to a punishment unless he be guilty of a fault; and it is contrary to the justice of God that he should punish one for sins which another committed; wherefore the Scripture expressly asserts that punishment passed over from the first pair [to us, our ante-natal] guilt intervening." See Riveti Opp. Tom. III. pp. 809, 810, 816, 817, 818, for most of the preceding quotations.

Futile is the attempt to evade the preceding argument by the plea, that the word guilt, *reatus*, denotes a mere liableness or exposure to punishment. It has this meaning sometimes, but not in the statement of the Calvinistic theory. For, first, we are said to be guilty (*reus*) of Adam's crime and also exposed to his punishment; guilty of his fault and likewise of his death; exposed and obligated (*obnoxii et obligati*) to suffer his penalty. In the second place, the ambiguous word *reatus* is not the only word used in the argument. Turretin repeatedly affirms that the guilt of Adam's sin "passes over to all" his descendants, and "makes them *deserving* of his punishment" (*dignos poena* ea). Inst. Theol. Pars I. pp. 678, 690. Lubbertus and others write, "The same guilt [*reatum* with Adam's] or *which is the same thing*, the same crime [*delictum*] by which guilt is incurred, is imputed to all his posterity;" Riv. Opp. III. 809. Thirdly, the argument requires that the word guilt, as used in this theory, have its appropriate meaning of moral ill-desert. Substitute the phrase "exposure to punishment" for the word "guilt" in the preceding quotations, and they become mock-logic. "You cannot but perceive," says Augustine to Julian, "how *unjust* it would be to inflict punishment where there is no — [exposure to punishment? That will never do, but] *guilt*," i. e. ill-desert. Does the Westminster Confession speak of the exposure to punishment *whereby* we are exposed to punishment, when it speaks of the guilt *whereby* we are bound over to the wrath of God? If the word *guilt* be thus emptied of its moral import, the reasoning of the Calvinistic divines on this theme must go for little or nothing.

This third principle being admitted, that a moral offence has been justly imputed to men before their own personal existence, it follows that they must have sinned before they began to exist personally. If it be punitive justice which sends upon us our first calamities, then we deserve those calamities, and if we deserve them, then we deserve to have a moral offence imputed to us, and if we merit this imputation, then we must have committed that offence. This is the logical sequence, whether it have or have not been adopted by those who admit the premise. Now has it been adopted? It was an old Jewish notion that all his descendants existed in the body of Adam. Tertullian, who believed in the propagation of the soul, asserted that all human beings formed a part of the first man, and sinned in him. Ambrose and some other fathers asserted the same; but Augustine, influenced in part by a Realistic philosophy, in part by the Rabbinical fancies, in part also by the Vulgate's mistranslation of Rom. 5: 12, "*in whom all have sinned*," reduced the theory of our oneness with Adam to a more definite form, and made it a standard doctrine of the church. He repeats in a hundred different ways, that Adam was all men, and all men were Adam; they and he forming one person, he being the entire human race, his act being theirs, and they sinning in him. Wiggers, in his *Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism*, has clearly exhibited this predominating theory. In accordance with it, as it has been more or less modified, we find among the divines of and after the Reformation, unnumbered testimonies to the doctrine that, in the language of the learned Thomas Boston, "Adam's sin is imputed to us *because* it is ours; for God doth not reckon a thing ours which is not so."¹ Our sin precedes the imputation, and the imputation does not precede the sin. If we were regarded as guilty before we had sinned, we should be so regarded by a mistake, but Omniscience cannot err.

Chamierus teaches, that "all men are not only made sinners by Adam, but also are said to have sinned in him, *which is a very different thing*." "It is certain both that all men are constituted *really* unrighteous by Adam, and all the faithful are constituted *really* righteous by Christ." Bishop Davenant says, that "the sin of Adam is imputed to us for our condemnation, *no less* than if it were something formally inhering in us." But, on what principle can Adam's sin be rightly ascribed to us, just as if (*aeque, pariter*) we had actually committed it, unless we did really sin in him? In explaining Rom. 5: 12, W. Musculus says: "Some interpret the words, '*all have sinned*,' to mean, '*all have been ruined, or virtually made sinners, on account of [Adam's] offence*.' This is indeed true. But still nothing forbids our understanding by the words, the fact that all men existing in Adam's loins, did sin in his actual sin." Hundreds of times it is said by the standard Calvinistic writ-

¹ Boston's *Body of Divinity*, Vol. I. pp. 302, 303, 322, etc.

ers, "We were in Adam's loins when he sinned," "we sinned while we were in his loins," "we sinned with him and in him," "the whole race were deposited in him," "God placed us all in his body as a mass," "all his posterity sinned when he sinned, with him and by him, for all were comprehended in him." The following expression of John Junius has been generally credited, and is but one specimen of a large class: "In the sum of the matter, all the Reformed Churches agree, and teach with unanimous consent, agreeably to the sacred Scriptures and the general opinion of antiquity, that the sin of Adam was not a personal one, but was the sin of the whole human race, since this race was included in his loins, and it sinned in him the first parent of all, and the root of the entire human family." A volume might be filled with the repetitions of the following argument of Occitanus: "As the Levites who were to descend from Abraham, paid tithes in the person of their father, (as the Apostle teaches in Heb. 7: 9,) although they ought to receive tithes afterwards from their brethren; so likewise men who ought by natural generation to descend from Adam, were made guilty in the loins of their father, and were condemned to suffer the punishment of his disobedience; for his fall was the general fall of men who in the loss sustained by their ancestor, lost all the riches with which they ought (debuissent) to have been endowed." Meisnerus teaches, that "the sin of Adam was not personal, but universal, and was the act of the entire race, which existed in him as in a common stock, and therefore sinned at the same time with him, and died" (or was condemned). Martin Bucer teaches that infants are rightly represented as having sinned, and "since on account of that fault of disobedience which they all committed in Adam, they are born with such profound ignorance that they cannot understand the precepts of God their Maker, and with such rebellion of nature that they all resist these precepts; by the same law of obedience proposed not so much to Adam the father of the human race as to the whole race itself, they are justly condemned." Nothing can be plainer than the words of Turretin, (*Inst. Theol. Pars I. p. 680*), speaking of the common punishments which flow to us as well as to Adam from the first sin, — They "cannot justly be inflicted, unless there be supposed a common law and a common guilt; for if the punishment of the broken covenant be extended to all, the covenant also and the law ought to extend to all." The remark of Zanchius is often repeated, that "the command, together with its penalty, was not addressed to the person of Adam alone, but to the whole human family." "As God," says Francis Junius, "in the order of his creation placed the whole human race in Adam by nature, so in the order of his justice, he said to the whole human race in Adam, (in whom we sinned,) In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." And not only did all men transgress the law enforced upon them in our first parent, but also all men transgressed it voluntarily in him." This peculiar metaphysics was pushed along in a straight line; and it is often said that "all men lost their freedom by sinning, *of their own accord*, in Adam." (See the fifth subdivision of the following, the second head.) Some excellent divines have gone so far as to teach not only that we willed to eat the forbidden fruit, but even had natural power to avoid willing it! Our ante-natal sin is described in numerous other forms. It is affirmed in scores of instances, that all men must have participated in the first offence, because "a just participation in the punishment of that sin, presupposes a participation in the sin itself." Thus, the proof of the doctrine accompanies the statement of it. "Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity," we are told by Silesius, "includes these three deadly evils, the actual fault, legal guilt, or penalty of death, and the depravation or deformity of nature. For these meet together around the first sin in the parent and in his posterity; with this difference only, that

Adam sinning, was the *principal* agent committing the fault, deserving the penalty, casting off the image of God, and corrupting himself, [while] all these belong to his posterity, by *participation*,¹ *imputation*, and generation from a corrupted parent." "In the mass, they (his posterity) committed the same sin, and *therefore* it is imputed to all." For, says Fewbournius, "it is repugnant to the Divine justice, that any one should be a partaker in another's punishment, without a participation (*cooperatio*) in that other's fault," and then he proceeds to show, that if Adam's posterity did not partake of his sin, they would not be ill-deserving, and if not ill-deserving, they could not be equitably punished. "By what right," says Scultetus, "are the descendants punished for the sin of their ancestors?" Paul answers, 'Because all sinned in the first parents.' (See Riveti Opp., Tom. III. pp. 799, 800, 804-8, 810-12, 814-17.) In like manner, the great Quenstedt (Theol. Didac., Pars II. p. 53) declares that "not only the first parents were the subjects of the first sin, but also all of their descendants," and he also says, that "not by a bare imputation, nor at all events by imitation, are we constituted sinners by Adam's crime, but also by the imputation of real guilt, and by propagation of natural depravity, and by participation in actual fault. And therefore the proximate cause why, the first man sinning, all his posterity have sinned, is the existence of the whole human species in the person of the first man." This is the reason why "God imputes the sin of Adam to them, most justly, for their condemnation." Our own President Edwards (Works II. p. 544, 546, 558, etc.) affirms, that Adam and all his posterity constituted "as it were, one complex person, or one moral whole." "And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them." He appeals to Stapfer, who teaches that "the sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in which they are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore, the sin of Adam is rightly imputed to his posterity." Stapfer also affirms that the "chief divines" are of the same mind with him.

Let not the reader feel *bewildered* by this recital, for the theory which he is considering is often called "the *simplicity* of the faith," and all doubts concerning it are stigmatized as the results of "philosophizing," and as signs of a propensity "*oblique pelagianizere*." Suffer then a word or two of further explanation.

We shall always misinterpret the old authors, unless we be mindful of the distinction between the personal existence of men as individuals, and their common existence in their progenitor. Thus many authors who contend for our real ill-desert on account of Adam's sin, do yet insist that we are thus ill-deserving not "personally," but only in our "common" union with him, not "*individually*" but "*originally*," not "*formally*" but by a "*real imputation*," not "*separately*" but "*virtually*," "*potentially*," "*radically*," "*seminally*," "*hereditarily*," etc. It is as *real* an ill-desert as if it were a separate one. In one respect the first sin is properly our own (*cujusque est proprium*); in a dif-

¹ The partaker, the accomplice, the accessory; is thought to be as really culpable as the primary offender.

ferent respect it is properly the sin of another person. In one view it is a foreign sin; in a different view it is ours. In one aspect it belongs to Adam alone; in another aspect it belongs to us as really as to him. It is not common to others in such a sense that it is not our own, nor is it our own in such a sense that it is not common to others. Therefore, says Lansbergius, "we are not guilty on account of a sin in which we have no participation (*alienum*), but on account of a sin which is our own (*proprium*) committed while we were in Adam's loins," etc. When some of the old Calvinists assert, therefore, that we could not have actually sinned thousands of years before our birth, they mean that we could not then have sinned in our distinct personality; but they do not mean that we were then free from fault; and the demerit which existed in us as parts of Adam, is now "communicated," "propagated," "transferred" to us as separate individuals. See Riveti, *Opp. Tom. III.* pp. 807, 808, 809, 815, etc. And Turretin says, in repeated instances, that the covenant in which we were involved with Adam, was a "moral" covenant, that Adam's sin was "morally" communicated to us, that his sinful choice although not ours personally, was ours "morally."¹ The whole dispensation with regard to the fall is a moral one. The judgment of God is a moral judgment. We need not suppose, then, that Turretin contradicts himself when he affirms, that our sin in Adam was not a moral one, i. e. in the sense of its being blameworthy in our own *persons*, just as it was not voluntary in the sense of its being our own individual, separate volition.²

Here, now, is the old theory of imputation; and in the third place let us inquire how it can be reconciled with the doctrine which we have previously (see pp. 607, 608, above) described as the true one. If we regard the old theory as expressed in literal terms, it cannot be harmonized with the truth. No one ever pretended that it could be. It is false, belonging neither to the theology of a sound intellect, nor to that of a right heart. But still, many who contend for this theoretic error have *substantially*, at least in their practical meditations, the same general faith with those who receive the pure truth, just as two men may have substantially the same nature, although one has, and the other has not, a horn growing out of his head.

But, this is not all; for, in the first place, the ground-principle which sustains this theory of our literal ill-desert for Adam's sin, is at times abandoned by the advocates of it, and the ground-principle

¹ Theol. Inst. Pars I. pp. 678, 679, 686, 689, 690.

² *Ib.* p. 716.

of the opposite doctrine is at times sanctioned by them. Their self-contradiction weakens the influence of their theory. In fact, their theory, *so far forth as it is contradicted*, is the same with its opposite. Its spirit is at last exchanged for that of its antagonist. Thus, when the question is put, how does God exercise retributive justice rather than sovereignty toward us, in causing us to suffer for a crime, long since consummated in Eden, we are often told that God imputed this crime to us *partly* because we are and were "of one blood" with Adam, i. e. we have and have had a "natural union" with him, but *principally* because God "willed" to form a covenant with Adam, according to which, the first man was to act for all his descendants, and his sin was to become theirs.¹ In part, and in *chief* part, then, his sin is imputed to us, because we were comprehended in the covenant which God made with Adam before the fall. Some divines go further still, and suppose this covenant to be the *whole* ground of the imputation. Adam represented us, and so we sinned in him, not naturally, but "representatively." Did we at that time deserve to be thus exposed to ruin? Did we really merit our subjection to the peril (how great, the Deity well knew) of that fall? Had we sinned in Adam *before* his sin? Surely this covenant was made not by retributive justice toward us, but by sovereign benevolence toward the universe. It constituted (according to the theory as now modified) a main reason for the justice of ascribing to us that ancient crime, and making us ill-deserving on account of it. Now, of course, the reason or ground for this justice, precedes and is distinct from the justice itself. It is a reason of sovereignty preparing the way for a strict retribution. That Turretin here supposed it to be a sovereign arrangement, is obvious from his pleading the authority of Calvin, who says, as often elsewhere: "Whence is it that the fall of Adam involves without remedy so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, unless because it so seemed good to Jehovah? *Decretum quidem horribile fateor.*"² This general ruin occurred, says Calvin on Job xiv, "because we were all included in his [Adam's] person by the *will* of God." Even the same gentleman who 'shrinks from the idea that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon us,' does yet in the same breath confess that God inflicts these evils by virtue of a "covenant in which by a benevolent appointment of God we were included."³ This benevolent appointment is a sovereign appointment; for all our Father's sovereignty is

¹ Turretini Inst. Theol., Pars I. pp. 678, 679.

² Cal. Inst., Lib. II. Cap. XXIII § 7.

³ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 465.

benevolence, and all his specific benevolence is sovereignty. And so the Reviewer comes at the end of a sentence, to the same principle from which he recoiled at the beginning. Our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of Heaven, we say, directly; he says, indirectly; we say, without any intervening links; he says, with the intermediate links of imputation, guilt, etc. We say that infants are exposed to their first calamities, by the sovereign constitution of their Maker. The Reviewer says, that this would be unjust, but infants must first be charged with a sin which they never personally committed! They cannot be treated justly unless accused of a crime which was perpetrated in a place which they never saw, and at a time which preceded the birth of their first-born ancestor! We then ask, why are they so accused? Because they were comprehended in the covenant with Adam, says the Reviewer. But we press the question, why were they thus comprehended? Because they deserved to be? Here the Reviewer is compelled to admit the distinctive principle of the New England theology, and to abandon the distinctive principle of his own; and the only dispute is, whether we shall come a few minutes sooner or a few minutes later to the same thing, i. e. to the Divine Sovereignty. So far forth, then, he has united the two schemes, by dismissing the genetic principle of his favorite one. Now, we might ask, what kind of ill-desert is that which is occasioned within us by a sovereign arrangement, irrespectively of our personal fault? We can understand how a wise parent may afflict us, without our antecedent misdemeanor; but to suppose that he subjects us to a demerit which precedes all personal disobedience, is one of the many contradictions involved in this theory, which, however, is saved by its contradictions.¹

Nor is this all; for in the second place, the doctrine that we are literally and morally responsible for Adam's sin is sometimes altogether explained away by men who contend for it at other times. Not only practical Christians, but even polemic divines, who insist upon the justice of imputing to us the sin of Paradise, are often found to have forgotten their artificial theory, and to interpret its phrases as the mere language of emotion. It is natural for us, creatures of feeling, to use such language on so great a theme. Intent upon the

¹ It is an interesting fact that some European divines, staggering under their favorite doctrine of a literal imputation, have pronounced it utterly impossible to conjecture how or why the Deity has made such an imputation, and have *avowedly* resolved the whole into the mystery of a mere sovereign act, without any allusion to our sinning in Adam — naturally or representatively.

thought of our intimate connection with Adam, we are unsatisfied with calm words, and we exclaim "his blood flows in our veins and so our blood once formed a part of his body; his nature has been drawn forth into ours and so our nature was once involved in his; we were actually in his loins of old; what he did we did; we sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression." And what do we mean by these intense utterances? Nothing more than that Adam's offence was the reason why our Sovereign so made us and so placed us, as to cause the certainty of our suffering evil, and of our uniform sinful preferences. In order to express with emphasis the truth that we not only imitate our first progenitor in disobeying God, but likewise that on account of his apostasy, we are fashioned so that we sin and are circumstanced so that we suffer, we are sometimes incited to say, careless of the peril attending such words, "God imputes to us the transgression of Adam; his anger continues to burn against us for it." Feeling the dreadfulness of the woes to which it has exposed us, we confess that "we are guilty of the original crime." Sensitive to the fitness of the arrangement by which we are doomed to these evils as the insignia of the hatefulness of that crime, some men may venture in certain peculiar moods, upon the strong expressions, "We were ill-deserving in that first sin; we are justly afflicted for it." These afflictions illustrate so vividly the regard of Jehovah for his law that we call them by the forcible word, *punishment*. And thus we go on from strength to strength, until some scholastic philosopher becomes "*bewildered*," and mistakes these vehement expressions of feeling for the accurate statements of science. Metamorphosing these poetical and eloquent utterances into the literal language of the schools, he constructs his severe system: "We are justly punished for Adam's sin; therefore we were ill-deserving in it; therefore we committed it."

Now we maintain that while it is natural for a good man to use these bold metaphors sometimes in the *enforcement* of truth, he is unable to persevere in uniformly employing them as literal phrases. A theorist may urge himself onward to such a use, while fabricating or defending an artificial creed; but tired nature will give out, and in his unguarded moments he will drop his forced logic. His conscience may be overborne by the theory during his hours of system-making, but it will right itself in his hours of leisure and will reassert the truth. While, then, we concede that many theologians have believed that our moral guilt for the Paradisiacal crime is a legitimate inference from our suffering on account of it, we still maintain that

these theologians have often abandoned this belief in their hours of clearer vision, and of religious as distinct from controversial interest. Not seldom have they lost their hold of it in their controversies even. As a theory, it is too absurd to be retained in the mind without an unnatural effort, and such an effort must be intermittent. Accordingly, in all their theological treatises, we detect the frequent signs of a "falling away." Expelled nature forces herself back. While they framed a logical theory on the strict import of justice, ill-desert and punishment, they often exchanged this import during their practical reflections, for a looser meaning; justice being a sense of *fitness*, guilt and ill-desert being a *fit* exposure to evil;¹ and punishment being the fit evil, and thus they often rested in that wise and deep scheme of truth which, since thier time, has been defended by the ablest of our New England divines.

And now, in defiance of *Blair's Rhetoric*, or, as the Reviewer says (in the language of feeling), "the Scotch Principal's dull lectures," we forewarn our readers that we are going to be interesting. Our critic says that the author whom he condemns, "has undertaken a great work" in attempting to reconcile opposing sects and creeds, and he adds: "when we reflect on what is necessarily even though unconsciously [?] assumed in this attempt, when we raise our eyes to the height to which it is necessary the author should ascend before all these things could appear alike to him, we are bewildered."² But so far as this "fundamental" doctrine of imputation is concerned we see no valid reason why our critic should be thus *bewildered*. For he himself goes further than we go in "*explaining away*" the ancient creeds. While we affirm that *often* the standard Calvinistic divines disown the doctrine of our proper ill-desert for the first sin, he affirms that they never believed the doctrine; that in their writings the sin of Adam "is never said to be in us (truly sin) *verè peccatum*;" the guilt of it is not said to arise "out of the moral character" of men; it is not *moral* guilt; it is not even so much as a *fit* exposure to punishment, but a mere exposure to it; the phrases, "we sinned in Adam," "were sinners in him," were "ill-deserving," have "demerit,"³ etc., do not imply our "moral pollution," express nothing with regard to

¹ Often, at least, the word *guilt* meant not a mere exposure to evil, but a *fit* exposure.

² Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 526.

³ One of these phrases is "*ought*," "*ought not*," as we have seen above. Of course, if the Reviewer explains all these words as figurative, he will give the same explanations of imputed righteousness, etc.

our "moral turpitude." Notwithstanding all that we have heard about the sin of Adam being "transfused," "transferred," "passing over," being "communicated to us," he denies that Calvinists, as a class, have ever believed in "a transfer of moral character." And as to our oneness with Adam, which formerly was so "mystical" and "mysterious," the Reviewer sweeps away all the mystery of it, and says that it is and was all a figure of speech. "We were in Adam," he remarks, "as Levi was in Abraham. Was this literally?"—"We 'were in him as branches in a root,' 'as the members are in the head.' Well, what does this mean? Literal oneness? Surely not. Does every writer who speaks of a father as the root of his family, hold to the idea of a 'literal oneness' between them? You may make as little or as much as you please out of such figurative expressions taken by themselves."¹ Now Turretin, who according to our Reviewer, "is universally regarded as having adhered strictly to the common Calvinistic system," denies that the words in Heb. 7: 9 "intimate a tropical and figurative thing, as if Levi were said to have been tithed only in a figure and not properly in Abraham."² Here then is a figurative ill-desert³ and a figurative sin, which is in plain truth (*verè*) no sin at all, the punishment for it therefore cannot be a moral, but must be a figurative punishment; and the justice which inflicts it cannot be a moral, but must be a figurative justice; and that moral attribute of God which is justice only by a metaphor, must be his sovereign benevolence. So far as the "substance of doctrine" is concerned, the Reviewer admits all that we can ask of him. He denies all that we deny. He avows every article of the Pelagianism which he has discovered in the Convention sermon in regard to imputed guilt. If that sermon "eviscerates" the ancient standards, its Reviewer does so yet more fatally. Very true; he insists that Adam's sin is ours, but still not "personally or properly;" that it is imputed to us, but not so as to be a "ground of remorse."⁴ In what way then is the first sin imputed to us? Only in this way; "we are regarded and treated as sinners" on account of it, while it never affects our "moral character."⁵ But how are we, while not sinners, regarded as sinners by him who regards all men precisely as they

¹ Bib. Repertory, VII. p. 436. For the preceding references, see pages 413, 414, 415, 422, 424, 426, 434, 436—438, etc., and Dr. Hodge on Rom. 5: 12, sq.

² Turret. Theol. Pars I. p. 687.

³ We are not responsible for the word *figurative*, in this connection. The Reviewer has forced it upon us. See Convention Sermon, pp. 8, 41, 2d Pamph. Ed.

⁴ Dr. Hodge's Com. on Rom. p. 221, 1st Ed.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 225.

are? The Reviewer modifies again, and says that "*nothing more* is meant by the imputation of sin than to cause one man to bear the iniquity [i. e. the punishment] of another.¹ But how are we punished for that primal transgression? In any way which implies that we are blamed for it by the Deity? No. Or condemned by our own conscience? No. Are we punished in the "most rigid and proper meaning" of the term? No. In what sense then? We are made to suffer evil "by a Judge, in execution of a sentence, and with a view to support the authority of the law."² But *was* He literally the moral judge of us, while we were only figuratively in existence? Was it literally a moral sentence, addressed to us centuries before we had any moral desert? Was it a moral law literally applied to us as moral beings, while we were moral beings only by a bold figure of speech? If the Reviewer regards all this as literal, he contradicts himself. Besides, *when* was this punishment inflicted upon us, irrespectively of our own sin? At a period preceding our personal life; for, says Dr. Hodge, "eternal misery is [not] inflicted on any man for the sin of Adam, irrespectively of inherent depravity or actual transgression." That first "sin was the ground of the loss of the divine favor, the withholding of divine influence, and the *consequent* corruption of our nature."³ And when does he suppose that this corruption of our nature begins? With the very beginning of that nature itself. The punishment therefore must be logically, if not chronologically, antecedent to this beginning, for our corruption is *consequent* to the punishment. But how can one be punished in the order of nature before one's existence? And what kind of a *sin* is

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. pp. 459, 462, 472. Hodge's Com. on Rom., First Ed. p. 226, etc.

² Bib. Repertory, VII. p. 442. The dispute turns chiefly on this word, punishment, and is *merely* verbal. We suppose the punishment which God inflicts to be moral, and to imply the ill-desert of the person punished. The old writers often used the word loosely to denote any evil inflicted by God for the purpose of improving the character of his subjects, or of sustaining the honor of his law. Thus Calvin says that "creation bears part of the punishment deserved by man," Inst. Lib. II. Cap. I. § 5. And again, Com. on Rom. 8: 21, "All created things in themselves blameless, both on earth and in the visible heaven, undergo punishment for our sins; for it has not happened through their own fault that they are liable to corruption." Can we doubt that men are punished for Adam's crime, and that Christ was punished for ours, when the term is used with this loose signification? The Hopkinsians will agree with the Calvinists, except on the propriety of using an important word with so much looseness in a didactic treatise; for in this vague sense God punishes as a Sovereign.

³ Hodge's Com. on Romans, First Ed. p. 229.

that which will not be followed by the second death, unless some other sin be added? It is a putative punishment, as the sin which occasions it is a putative sin. It is no proper punishment at all. The whole is a metaphorical, and in some states of mind an interesting mode of expressing the solemn truth, that God as a Sovereign has connected our destiny with Adam's character. We agree with our Reviewer, so far forth as he advocates the distinctive theology of New England. Nothing but a reverence for our mother tongue prevents us from saying with him, what we believe as "substantially" as he does: "That there is a very just and proper (?) sense in which we should *repent* of the sin of Adam we readily admit; and are perfectly aware that old writers insist much upon the duty. Not, however, on the principle that his sin is personally ours, or that its moral turpitude is transferred from him to us; but on the principle that a child is *humbled* and *grieved* at the misconduct of a father."¹ Now this use of humility for penitence, of grieving for repenting, is intensely figurative; it belongs to the theology of the heart, and in a didactic treatise would be condemned by Dr. Blair.

We do not mean to imply, that we always find our Reviewer in agreement with ourselves, or with himself. For, like other men, circumvented with technical, especially when figurative, terms, he often becomes entangled in them, so as to plunge into an error like that of our moral guilt for sinning before the flood. He has a sliding scale of definitions, down which he lapses from the high Calvinism of other times, into the biblical Calvinism of New England. At least five meanings of imputation are given by him. First, we find that manly one by which imputation is the antecedent ground of our being regarded and treated otherwise than we are in ourselves. This is Dr. Owen's view; and according to it, the imputation includes two things, the "grant or donation of a property," and then the consequent "dealing with us according unto that which is so made ours."² Thus, our Reviewer says, "His [Christ's] merit is so given, reckoned, or imputed to them, that they are regarded and treated as right-

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VII. pp. 460, 461. This article is universally imputed to our Reviewer.

² Owen's Works. Vol. XI. p. 207, etc. It is a great mistake of modern writers to suppose that, according to the old standards, imputation of holiness or sin, is merely the regarding and treating of men as if they were holy or sinful. Imputation involves the *ground* of their being thus regarded and treated. See Riveti Opp., Tom. III. pp. 799, 806, 812-16, etc.; also Gill's Body of Divinity, Vol. I. p. 522, and Andrew Fuller's Works, Vol. III. p. 722. "To bear the punishment of sin, is not the same as to have sinned" in Adam, says Bucer.

eous.”¹ To be so regarded and treated, *follows* the imputation. But, secondly, we find that this grant or donation is dropped, and imputation comes to mean merely the result, the regarding and treating us otherwise than we are in ourselves.² But, thirdly, even this is soon modified, and the imputation of the first sin means the regarding us sinful, *in such a way*, or *so far forth*, as to treat us like sinners.³ Still, fourthly, we have a new amendment, and this imputation is “nothing more nor less” than for one man to bear the iniquity [i. e. the punishment] of another.”⁴ And then, fifthly, we learn that the word punishment is not used here in its “most strict and rigid” meaning, and does not imply any moral demerit in us.⁵ Now, we avow before the wide world our hearty belief that our ancestor’s crime is *so* communicated to us, that we are regarded and treated as sinners on account of it; by all which we mean simply that we are regarded and treated as sinners for it; by which we mean that we are regarded sinful only so far as to be treated like sinners; by which we mean no more than that we are punished for it; by which we mean, *at length*, that we are not punished in the most proper sense, but are merely afflicted with evils which are designed by our Judge to vindicate the sanctity of the law broken, not by ourselves, but by Adam. And thus, after so long a time, we come out of this forest of improper terms, venerable for its shade, and *bewildering* by its mazes, into the clear and open sunshine, where both the Reviewer and the author meet and walk in the same straight path of New England theology. When out of the underbrush of that forest, neither of them looks like a *Pelagian*. That word belongs to a “language of feeling.” Both of them adopt “for substance” the teachings of Emmons and Dwight in regard to this theme. Soon after that amiable and excellent divine had gone home to his kindred in the skies, the Princeton Review contained an elaborate criticism upon “old Dr. Emmons,” as it denominated the venerable saint, and while it charged him with “*confusion of ideas*,” and of course with “*Pelagianism*,” it was compelled to acknowledge for a time that his doctrine concerning our relation to Adam, contains “*the very thing* which the old Calvinists called the imputation of Adam’s sin,” and that “it is *really nothing*

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XVII. p. 87. Dr. Hodge on Rom., p. 228, first ed.

² Dr. Hodge on Rom., p. 221, etc..

³ Dr. Hodge on Rom., p. 226. “For if the word [impute] means *so* to ascribe an action to a man as to treat him as the author of it.”

⁴ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 459.

⁵ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 441.

short of the imputation of his first sin.”¹ Now that doctrine of Emmons is in essence the same which we have advocated in this discussion, (Bib. Sac. VIII. pp. 174-5); but our doctrine is Pelagianism according to the Princeton Review, and therefore, according to the same authority, Pelagianism “is *nothing short* of” Augustinism on this “fundamental” doctrine, and contains “the *very thing* which the old Calvinists *meant* ;” and hence our Reviewer lapses in one point when he says of our own assertions: “It is now asserted, for the *first time*, so far as we know, *since the world began*, that these two modes of representation [the Augustinian and Pelagian] mean the same thing.”² When *did* the world begin? Eight years before the sermon was conceived to which that assertion has been falsely imputed, the Princeton Review asserted, (and *not* for the first time, *so far as we know*), that the doctrine which is now termed Pelagian means “nothing short” of the doctrine which is now termed Calvinistic. For ourselves we have uniformly believed that Pelagianism differs in essence from theories like those of Dwight and Spring, and that while the old Calvinists have, as practical Christians, been satisfied with such theories, they have as metaphysicians demanded a different scheme.

The learned Reviewer is in a trilemma. Either he believes that the old Calvinists, acting as logicians and as practical men, said what they meant in literal terms; in which case he contradicts himself; or, secondly, he believes, that as logicians, they said literally what they meant, and as practical men, they merged their language into bold figures; in which case he agrees with the proscribed sermon, and this will never do; or, thirdly, he believes, that both as logicians and as practical men, they used the language of their creeds as intensely figurative; in which case, he is as much more latitudinarian than the sermon, as he supposes the sermon to be more latitudinarian than the system of Dr. Gill. And he does in fact go beyond that discourse in thus “philosophizing away” the ancient standards. For, according to his theory, we must conceive of the giants of Calvinism as arguing, in their philosophical treatises, that we cannot be rightly punished unless we be previously exposed to punishment, that the liability to an infliction secures the justness of that infliction, that we

¹ See Bib. Repertory, XIV. pp. 543, 544. That Review also avers that Dr. Emmons and all the New Divinity men “not only reject the doctrine, but speak of it in the same contemptuous manner as did the Pelagians,” p. 542. This is only one specimen of the self-contradictions into which a “figurative theology” winds its course.

² Bib. Repertory, XXIII. 128.

should not have been thus "exposed to punishment," i. e. guilty, unless we had "sinned in Adam;" or, which is the same thing, unless we had been "treated as sinners;" or, which is the same thing, unless we had been punished! And did the sturdy Calvinism of the schools swing thus backward and forward in an incessant motion, without progress? Did those stern metaphysicians *think* that they were inferring man's exposure to punishment, i. e. his guilt, from the fact that man was punished, i. e. was treated as a sinner?¹ If so, then we have a new proof of the tendency of bold metaphors to "*bewilder*" a theorist? In his Commentary on Romans 5: 12, "Wherefore as by one man," etc., Dr. Hodge has exhibited what he regards as the metaphysical, as well as the practical, view of those dialectical writers. The word "sin," in the first phrase, "*by one man sin entered into the world*," means imputed sin, and thus the entire phrase means, "On his [Adam's] account all men are regarded and treated as sinners!"² The word "death" in the phrase, "*and death by sin*," means "the penalty of the law, or the evils threatened as the punishment of sin."³ "Of course, as sin means imputed sin, this second phrase means: Because all men are regarded and treated as sinners, i. e. punished, therefore all men are exposed to "the penalty of the law, or the evils threatened as the punishment of sin." The third phrase, "*and so death passed upon all men*," means, "All men became exposed to penal evils, or the penalty due to sin."⁴ The fourth phrase, "*for that all have sinned*," means, "All men are regarded and treated as sinners!"⁵ Combining, then, the four phrases, we have the following argument: On account of one man, all men are regarded and punished as sinners; and because they are regarded and punished as sinners, they are subjected to punishment; and so all men become exposed to punishment, because all men are regarded and punished as sinners! Now, *if this be* the didactic Calvinism of the creeds, can we blame the New England writers for aiming to clear up the *phraseology* of those creeds? And can we avoid the necessity of admitting, that a calm intellect would never have devised such a metaphorical style for repeating over and over the same idea, and also that "the well schooled divine *may*, although he seldom *does*, escape the confusing ('bewildering') influence of this ambiguous nomenclature?" (Conv. Sermon, p. 567.) *Is it not true* by our Reviewer's

¹ Even in their practical meditations, they did not always *thus* denude their argument of meaning, but used justice, etc., for fitness, etc. See pp. 618, 621, above.

² Com. on Rom, First ed. pp. 180, 190.

³ *Ib.*, p. 181.

⁴ *Ib.*, pp. 180, 190.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 183.

own showing, that if men be over-charmed with favorite words, they will see Pelagianism where these words are missed, and if they only hear the grateful sounds they will care too little for the "*substance* of doctrine, and will be sometimes led to nullify the internal signs of inspiration, by emasculating the vigorous thought which it embodies? The plain fact is, that our Reviewer does not often venture to expose the old theory of imputation; nor even to state the biblical truth in the clear language of Mr. Stuart and Mr. Barnes, and he therefore hides the doctrine within a *nest* of technical terms. He uses the ancient phraseology, and denudes it of its theoretic meaning; he tacitly yields to the objections of New England divines, but like the ancient buyer, he cries, "it is naught, it is naught," and hurls at these divines the hard epithets of Neology, Rationalism, Röhr, and especially Pelagius; and all this, while he likens himself to "a man behind the walls of Gibraltar, or of Ehrenbreitstein." Bib. Repertory, XXIII. p. 319.

Having now seen that the old writers, in their better hours, have been wont to give up their doctrine of a literally imputed sin, let us pass to the doctrine of involuntary sin. This includes the second and third parts of original sin, as anciently defined. The three parts were, first, our participation in Adam's offence; secondly, our involuntary want of original righteousness, and thirdly, our involuntary depravation of nature, (see pp. 609—614 above). These last two divisions constitute original sin in its more recent and restricted meaning. They are sometimes called inherent and passive, in distinction from active and imputed transgression.

In the first place, let us inquire, What is the true doctrine with regard to the nature of sin? Both Inspiration and common sense reply: Sin is that which in and of itself, apart from its causes and results, deserves to be condemned by the conscience, to be repented of, to receive the eternal punishment inflicted by the Judge at the last day; and it consists in the choice or preference of that which the conscience requires us to refuse, or in the voluntary refusal of that which the conscience requires us to prefer.—When it is said that sin is the transgression of the law, the objector replies that sin lies deeper than in an outward, overt act. Very true, it involves the covert, deep preference for a wrong outward act. But the objector adds, it lies deeper still; not in the executive volition but in the inclination, disposition, propensity to choose wrong. Very true. It does not lie in the executive volition, but in the inclination, disposi-

tion, propensity to choose wrong, provided that these words be used, as they often are, to denote a generic choice or preference, lying deeper than the specific choices. The objector misrepresents this doctrine, when he supposes that it confines moral agency to the individual, subordinate preferences, or, still worse, to the imperative volitions. By no means. It asserts that sin consists in all preferences which the conscience condemns, and especially in those ultimate governing, predominating preferences which are often termed, loosely however, inclination, disposition, propensity. Every choice which the conscience disapproves, deserves eternal punishment, and it only is sin. But the objector replies, Sin goes deeper still; it belongs to the *man* who sins, and not to his acts alone. Just so; for acts *alone* cannot be conceived of. An act of a man is the man himself acting, just as "a form of theology is theology in a certain form." This is the distinctive New England divinity.

The fact that all men previously to Regeneration do sin and only sin in all their moral acts, implies, what our consciousness also teaches, that there is, lying back of our sinful choices and occasioning them, a disordered state of the sensibilities, or an involuntary corruption.¹ Part of this is called by Storr, Flatt, Reinhard and many others, "a preponderance of the propensities of our nature for the objects and pleasures of sense." The whole of it is called by Turretin, Calvin, and others, "vitiosity," "the depravation of nature formerly good and pure," "natural, native, hereditary depravity," the "disorder of nature," the insubordination of the lower to the higher nature, the disease, sickness of the soul, *luxes*, *fomes*, *ἀταξία*, etc. A man is sinful in harboring, indulging, complying with his evil tendencies, but he is not sinful for the mere fact of their natural existence, of their existence antecedent to his choice. "Mankind are not themselves to be blamed for being born with a depraved nature."² Still this nature is so odious in itself and so pernicious in its influence, that our emotions often prompt us to stigmatize it as itself sin.³ It is wholesome to form this con-

¹ Our critic has more than once confounded this truth with the Pelagian error, that all men have a nature precisely like that of Adam before he sinned! He also declares, p. 311, that in logical accordance with the sermon under review, Regeneration "cannot be the production of a new nature," but must "consist in some act of the soul."! A moment's reflection will convince him, that according to that sermon, the nature inclining to mere sin is changed in regeneration into a nature inclining to holiness, and that by the omnipotence of the regenerating Spirit.

² Storr and Flatt, B. III. § 57.

³ "That inherent depravity is truly and properly sin, is a different intellectual

ception at certain times, even more so than to conceive of corporeal acts as themselves blamable, or of a cathedral or a chalice at the altar, or a baptismal font as themselves holy.— But these effusions of a pious heart are congealed by some into the stiff and literal expressions of a theory unlike the preceding. Therefore,

We will, in the second place, inquire, What is the theory of passive, inherent, involuntary sin. Our Reviewer frankly defines this doctrine, when he says, that we have “an innate, hereditary sinful corruption of nature;” that we have derived from Adam “a nature not merely diseased, weakened or predisposed to evil, but which is ‘itself’ as well as ‘all the motions thereof truly and properly sin.’”¹ Having already admitted that many theologians have believed in our moral guilt for the crime of Adam, we also admit that some have believed in our moral guilt for the very *make* of our souls. The two themes have been by some indissolubly blended, and it has been, therefore, maintained that our inherent as well as our imputed sin is ill-deserving, and is justly punishable with the second death. Men have spoken of this inherent sin as propagated from parent to child, and have characterized it, in this relation, as the sin of nature distinct from the sin of person; “because the immediate subject of this [propagated] sin is not a person, but human nature vitiated by the actual transgression of a person; which nature being communicated to posterity, there is also communicated in it this inherent corruption. As therefore in Adam the *person* corrupts the nature, so in his posterity the *nature* corrupts the *person*.”²

In the third place let us inquire, how can these two theories be harmonized? As two theories literally stated they cannot be; for the notion of a literally passive sin belongs to the theology neither of a right intellect nor of a right heart. Still the evangelical system which includes the one doctrine, may be essentially like that which includes

proposition from the statement that it is not properly sin.” Bib. Rep. XXIII. 338. In this sentence, as also on p. 341, our Reviewer soberly represents us as endeavoring to show, that sinful and not sinful mean the same thing; and in the next sentence, that ability and inability mean the same thing! No wonder, that, having invented this design for us, he should find it necessary to say that we made use of some German theory to accomplish this design. The truth is, that we have represented the word “cannot” as often meaning the same with “*will not*,” and the word “sinful” as often meaning the same with “odious and certainly inducing sin.” Does not the Reviewer perceive his misstatements on this subject? They are but one specimen of the general style of his *critique*.

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 310, 311, 314, 315.

² Turretin, Inst. Theol. Elinct. Pars I. p. 701.

the other, just as Homer and Milton were essentially like Virgil and Cowper, although the two former were blind, and the two latter could see the sunlight.

But this is not all. We rejoice in the assurance that multitudes who believe at times in the strict sinfulness of our involuntary and passive states, do still at other and better times contradict themselves, merge their proposition back into the mere language of feeling, whence it first came out, and then they agree with their adversaries. As architecture has been called "frozen music," so many a scholastic proposition may be called frozen eloquence, or poetry which often melts again into its primitive and impressive form. The following are some proofs of the substantial unity among disputants on this theme.

First, many who insist that our passive sin is the punishment for our imputed sin, do yet often betray a belief that it is not so in any proper sense of the terms, for they often affirm that one sin is never the punishment of another. What! does a pure Father inflict iniquity upon his children? The very phrase "God inflicts sin" is, as Sir James Mackintosh would say, one of those "uncouth and jarring forms of speech not unfitly representing a violent departure from the general judgment of mankind." Will a wise God punish sinners by sentencing them to sin, the very state which as sinners they love more than all things else! Yet if there is one expression of technical theologians, more common than another, it is, that God inflicts our in-born iniquity upon us as a punishment for our iniquity in Adam. Spiritual death is a punishment for our imputed sin; our native corruption is part of our spiritual death; this corruption is sin, therefore sin is the punishment of sin.

Dr. Twiss, the learned Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, justifies the declaration that "the original sin which the children of Adam contract is a punishment of the actual sin committed by the same man." Beza says, "There are three things which make man guilty before God; first, the fault flowing from the fact that we all sinned in the first man; secondly, the corruption which is a punishment of that fault, and was imposed upon Adam as well as upon his descendants," etc. The renowned Chamierus writes: "Whence also Augustine calls original sin *the punishment of the first sin*. But how can it be a punishment, unless that first sin itself be imputed to us." Strackius describes "the actual defection of all the descendants of Adam, who assuredly, in the loins of their progenitor, revolted from God to the devil; and on account of that revolt a corruption or vitiosity of nature has been *inflicted* on man by the Deity in just judgment; both of which make man miserable and obnoxious to the anger of God, and to eternal damnation," etc. etc. See Riveti Opp. Tom. III. pp. 802, 804, 806, 809. Turretin (Inst. Theol. Elenct. Pars I. p. 693) quotes with approbation the words of Peter Martyr, "when he teaches that our original corruption is a punishment for the sin of Adam:

'Truly there is no one who doubts,' says Martyr, 'that original sin is inflicted upon us for avenging and punishing the first offence.' The learned Thomas Boston says (*Body of Divinity*, Vol. I. p. 308): "This want of original righteousness is a sin:—it is also a punishment of sin, and so is justly inflicted by God." See also Bp. Burgess on Original Sin, P. I. ch. 9. sec. 2.

Notwithstanding all the light reflected on this subject by New England divines, our Reviewer often adheres to the old representations. He says, "According to this view, hereditary depravity follows as a *penal* evil, from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation to men. This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially the old Calvinistic doctrine. *This is our doctrine*, and the doctrine of the standards of our church."¹ Again, after quoting with approbation the old Lutheran creeds, which declare that our defects and our concupiscence are punishments, the Reviewer sums up the whole by saying, "Hence, the loss of original righteousness, and corruption of nature, are *penal* evils. This, we are persuaded, is the common Calvinistic doctrine on this subject."² He often says, that our native corruption is the "effect," "result," consequence," of God's withdrawing His Spirit from our race; and all this is explained by the remark: "We think the position of Storr is *perfectly* correct, that the consequences of punishment are themselves punishment, in so far as they were taken into view by the Judge in passing sentence, and came within the scope of his design."³ The Reviewer, then, is resolute at times in clinging to the old statement that original sin is the punishment of sin. But, are there not better hours in which his reverence for the moral government of God prevails over this artificial logic? He takes great pains to say in repeated instances, "*We do not teach, however, that sin is the punishment of sin.*" The punishment we suffer for Adam's sin, is abandonment on the part of God, the withholding of Divine influences; corruption is consequent on this abandonment."⁴ And what are we to believe? *Now*, original sin is a penal evil, but *then* "we do not teach that sin is penal? *Here* it is, as Melancthon says, a punishment, but *there* "we *hardly* teach" that it is a punishment. (*Bib. Rep.*, Vol. VI. p. 456.) In

¹ *Bib. Repertory*, Vol. VII. p. 410.

² *Bib. Repertory*, Vol. VII. p. 430, 431.

³ *Bib. Repertory*, Vol. VI. p. 464. This article is also unanimously ascribed to our Reviewer.

⁴ *Bib. Repertory*, Vol. VI. p. 453. It is interesting to remember that Augustine abounds with repetitions of the remark, that *sin is the punishment of sin*; see Wiggers's *Hist. Presentation*, Ch. V. VI. *Pelagius* denied it. What does our Reviewer infer, whenever he detects a New England divine in any agreement with Pelagius?

conflict with one objection, original sin is "truly and properly sin," *deserving* the Divine wrath; in conflict with another, it is a consequence of a penal abandonment; and with still another, the foreseen intended consequence of a punishment is itself a punishment; but still, human nature at last breaks down this frail metaphysics, and the Reviewer has the manliness to avow that "sin is not the punishment of sin." We knew that he did not practically believe it to be a real punishment, when he asserted that it was so. A good man can never hold out in such a belief. He may adopt various modes of explaining his inconsistencies, but the true mode is to confess that a pious heart triumphs over erring syllogisms. If any pious divine should venture to say in his prayers,¹ "Thou hast inflicted sin upon me, as a punishment for my having a previous sin imputed to me," he would mean that the primal sin was imputed to him in a figure, and the inflicted sin is likewise metaphorical, and the punishment is equally a trope, and the solemn import of the whole is, that a holy Sovereign, in testimony of his opposition to Adam's crime, has entailed appropriate evils upon all Adam's descendants. And in this style often impressive, but alas! how far from the "simplicity of the Gospel," we believe with tears, that our Judge has inflicted a peculiar kind of sin (i. e. evil) upon us in a peculiar kind of punishment (i. e. appropriate suffering), for another kind of sin which was in a peculiar way chargeable upon us, before "the first man-child was born into the world."

Secondly, divines who contend that our passive nature is itself sin, often disown their doctrine by affirming that God is not the author of any sin. This argument is in a short compass. Our Reviewer says, "that we have derived from Adam a nature not merely diseased, weakened, or predisposed to evil, but which is '*itself*' as well as all the motions thereof '*truly and properly sin.*'"² The first question is, Who made our nature? Did Adam create us? Did we create ourselves? The general belief of Calvinists is that God creates every human soul. Does not then the involuntary, inborn nature of the soul belong to the soul when made? It is the soul. The Maker of the spirit is the Maker of that nature. If that nature be sin itself, He is the author of sin. Does our Reviewer, in his calm hours, believe that? We presume not. Why not? Only because, in his calm hours, he does not believe that our nature as distinct from its

¹ Whatever is strictly true, may be expressed to the God of truth.

² Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 314, 315.

"motions" is "truly and properly sin." Every body knows that when Calvinists are charged with making God the author of sin, they deny that our nature is sin, just as positively as our Reviewer has affirmed it. When Pelagius accused Augustine of believing in a "natural sin," the pious bishop resented the accusation, and would not even sanction the phrase "natural," but insisted on the phrase "original sin." Turretin is clear in avowing that "the Bible makes a distinction between *nature* and the *sin* adhering to it," that "human nature is termed lawless, *not because it is itself sin*, but because having sin in itself it is well denominated sinful," and that such phrases as imply that our nature itself is sin are used "for expressing the magnitude of our corruption the more *forcibly*,"¹ i. e. they belong to the theology of feeling. So the sharp-sighted Pictet denies, just as pointedly as our Reviewer affirms, that the nature of man is itself sin; for he says that if it be sin, the author of our nature must be the author of sin; see *La Theologie Chretienne*, Liv. VI. chap. VII., VIII. Will our Reviewer, in order to reconcile himself with these Genevan divines, admit that he spoke in the language of feeling?

Thirdly, many who dispute for the doctrine of passive transgression, expose their habitual want of faith in it, by denying that we can strictly feel either penitence or remorse for it, or deserve on account of it the condemnatory sentence of the last day. What kind of iniquity is that in view of which we are to have no repentance or compunction? This involuntary sin is said to be the "causal iniquity from which all other comes, and which is therefore more dreadful than any other." Bishop Burgess calls it "in some respects more grievous and heavy than actual sins," and yet he makes the following confession: "Now in this strict sense, though it be our duty with sorrow to be humbled for original sin, yet we cannot be properly said to repent of it, because it was not a sin ever committed by us *personally*, or through our own *actual* will. So that although we may not so properly (it may be) exhort men to repent of this original sin, yet we must press them to a deep and daily humiliation under it, and that not as a punishment or an affliction only, but as a true and proper sin."² Is not Pictet an authority on this subject? When an-

¹ See, among other passages, Turretin, *Inst. Theol. Elemet.* Pars I. p. 768. Still, Turretin admits occasionally into his dogmatic style the same improper use of terms which we find in our Reviewer. But what does he mean in his more considerate hours? — Augustine contradicted himself in the same way.

² *Treatise on Original Sin*, Part I. Ch. II. Sect. 8. "Men," says Bishop Burgess, "may use words as they please."

overing the objection that we have no conspunction of conscience on account of Adam's or our own involuntary sin, he says, "that as we ordinarily feel remorse on account of that only which we have done ourselves, when we see that we could have abstained from it, we must not be surprised if we feel no remorse on account of this original corruption."¹ Hundreds of the like confessions are to be found among such polemic writers even. They agree in declaring that the evil which God himself has inflicted on our natures, and inserted within them, is to be mourned over, but not repented of; that it calls for humiliation, but not remorse. This evil is therefore a very peculiar kind of sin, if it be sin at all. And, we put it to the conscience of preachers, What must be the moral influence of saying, in didactic style, that there is a real and literal *wickedness* of which men both *cannot* and *need* not properly repent. Does Inspiration thus speak of any *enigma* "which needeth not to be repented of?"

It follows, of course, that if our native and passive state deserve not to be viewed with remorse in this world, it will not be punished with remorse in the world to come. The sure test of wickedness is, its moral desert of the condemning sentence at the last day. If any condition do not merit the final sentence it is not criminal. A nature may be intimately associated with iniquity, and as such may, like an instrument of death, be viewed with dread. But if it be precisely such as God made it, and if it have never transgressed any rule of action, how will it be condemned to the punishment which the law threatens? Where is the verse of the chapter which specifies the legal penalty threatened for no act of disobedience? Imagine that a new-born or an unborn child has never indulged or felt one wrong emotion;—such a state can be imagined, whether it have or have not been ever real;—and *in that state* the infant is summoned before its Judge, to give an account of itself just as it was made. In what words would be pronounced its sentence to an eternity of strict punishment? Repeat the words of its moral condemnation to the remorse which is the worm that never dies.—"Because I was an hungred, and thou gavest me no meat!"—"Inasmuch as thou didst it not to one of the least of these my brethren, thou didst it not unto me!"

In order to maintain the *ill-desert* of infants as soon as born, some divines especially in New England have maintained, with Clement, Origen and other Greek Fathers, that an infant commences its actual transgression on the very day of its birth. Thus they renounce the theory of a passive sin. Others maintain that an infant will de-

¹ La Theologie Chretienne, Liv. VI. Chap. VII.

velop its evil nature as soon as it leaves the world, and will deserve to be punished for this development, and so *they* renounce the theory that the undeveloped nature deserves to be strictly punished. Others maintain that an infant merits the penalty of the law, because and only because it actively sinned in Adam, and thus *they* too renounce the theory of a passive sin, ill-deserving in itself. Some affirm with Augustine, who has been named *durus pater infantum*, "that infants dying without baptism will, on account of their imputed sin, be in the mildest punishment (in *mitissima damnatione*);" but the great majority of modern Calvinists are indignant at being accused of believing that infants *will* be punished at all. Whence come these doubts? If infants are guilty of real wickedness before their own personal choice, why will they not be punished for it? Are men who found their whole theology upon "justice," to be shocked at the idea that justice will be executed? Is not this attribute an amiable and a glorious one? Shall Calvinists recoil from it? And besides, men speak of original sin as the source, the fountain of all pollution, and therefore as in many respects the most flagitious of all. From it all our choices derive their vile character. They would be innocent, if it were not for this. Why is it, then, that this fontal sin deserves less punishment than do the outflowings of it? Why is the superlative transgression to be most mildly avenged? The plain truth is, that human nature and sanctified nature give out under the notion of a criminality in which the criminal has had no choice, and every sign of shrinking from the idea that infants will be punished for their passive wickedness, is a sign of a practical unbelief that such wickedness deserves punishment. The Hopkinsian theory that they choose wrong as soon as they are born, is indispensable to the fixed conviction that they are ill-deserving as soon as born. Without that theory their ill-desert is a mere fitness for receiving certain insignia of disgrace; their punishment is that disgrace; it is appropriate suffering inflicted, like the pains of this life, by a sovereign for the sake of manifesting abhorrence for all the occasions and concomitants of sin. If infants have *not* transgressed the law, they will certainly transgress it, unless saved by him who came to rescue the *lost*, and in this view they need the blood of the sacrifice. Now it is easy to see that such a loose idea of ill-desert and punishment is very common among those who deny the actual, and contend for the passive wickedness of infants. It is an idea which meets the moral taste. When Cranmer, exclaiming, "This right hand has offended," thrust it into the flames, he illustrated this vague and poetical notion of

penalty. The fire consuming that hand first of all, emitted light on the ediousness of the wrong choice which had prompted the evil movement of that hand. It was *justice* as a sense of fitness, which inflicted this evil upon the erring member. The sin of the hand was figurative, the punishment figurative, the justice figurative; but it is this very kind of punishment, justice, and sin which Calvinists often mean when they speak of the just penalties of involuntary sin. Their theology on this theme is often the sound theology of the heart.¹

Fourthly, many who contend, with our Reviewer, that our "nature itself" and "all the motions thereof," are "truly and properly sin," evince their practical disbelief of their doctrine, by confessing that we have by nature many amiable sentiments. Is there an amiable species of wickedness? They confess that Christ loved the unregenerate young man. Did he love sin? Is it to be said in a figure, that our great High Priest "was a sinner," and then literally that he loved a person whose "nature itself" and *all* whose motions, were "truly and properly sin"? The fearful question arises, *what* did Christ love in such a person? There is a limit, beyond which our Reviewer must not indulge in such extravagant language. When unguarded, it is full of danger. It drives men into Pelagianism. It has ruined thousands of souls. He must and will modify it into the assertion that Christ was pleased with a man whose nature was *on the whole* unlovely, and all whose VOLUNTARY "motions" were sin, but many of whose instinctive feelings were beautiful. What does the Princeton Review itself declare, when it approaches the truth "*at another angle*"? It says more than once, as in Vol. XI. p. 389, "*Every one performs a multitude of acts, because they are right.*" But every one is not regenerate. Therefore, millions of unregenerate men, whose nature itself and "*all* whose motions are sin," perform right acts. Hence, as that Review divides original sin into imputed and inherent, and then subdivides inherent sin into negative and positive, it must complete its analysis by dividing our actual sin into right sin and wrong sin. That Review insists that its theology is not "philosophical." It is not; but it is far more philosophical than biblical, save when it turns back its theories into "intense expressions of the New England divinity."

Fifthly, many who contend for the doctrine of involuntary sin, virtually confess that they use the term, sin, in a metaphorical sense. Our Reviewer has abundantly shown that this word is often used as a figure of speech; for the whole doctrine of imputed sin is, accord-

¹ See pp. 618, 619 above.

ing to him, a doctrine of sin without any moral demerit. If, then, the first and fundamental part of original sin, be thus metaphorical, it is easy to show that the second and third parts of it have the same nature with their foundation.¹

Many use the word, *sin*, to denote the occasion of a wicked choice. When asked whether the involuntary occasion, apart from the choice itself, deserves eternal punishment, they will often reply, or rather, He who made them, replies through them, No. We say the same. The natural tendency of an excited mind is, to indulge in the metaphor of "the cause for the effect." Thus we speak of a cannon as cruel, on account of the pain which results from it. Much more, then, may we speak of our disordered nature as sinful, because it so infallibly tempts us to transgression. But of such a style we say in our calmer hours, as Turretin says of Ezekiel 18: 20, "*Non est absolute et simpliciter intelligendus prout sonat.*" Alcohol tempts men to iniquity, and is itself iniquity — in a figure of speech. Turretin, conceding that the law does not prohibit our being born with inherent corruption, yet affirms that this corruption is legally condemned, "because it opposes that righteousness and sanctity which the law does exact of all;" ² i. e. the law requires holiness, but not a *native* freedom from corruption, *in and of itself*. It is a sin, because it opposes holiness, i. e. because of its tendencies, not its nature. The renowned Pictet has the following note-worthy passage: "It is objected that God has not, in his law, forbidden original corruption, and therefore it is no sin. I reply, that *we must not be surprised if the law has not at all forbidden original corruption, because the law supposes*

¹ Here we may observe, in passing, that none are more inclined than our Reviewer to interpret certain phrases as figurative, and none are more inclined to complain of others for doing the same thing. He sometimes evades, for example, the biblical doctrine of General Atonement, by pleading the metaphorical character of the passages in which it is plainly taught. He opposes the commentators who do not infer from the Bible, that Christ was literally punished. But, why? Because the Bible plainly declares that he was punished. In what passages? "He bore our *sins*," etc. Are those passages literal? Then some venerable divines are right in affirming that Christ literally took upon him our *iniquities*; see p. 598 above. But, no, our Reviewer says, those passages are figurative; sin is used in a *metaphor*, for the punishment of sin. Indeed! Then the very phrases which affirm that Christ was literally punished, are, after all, metaphorical! Why was not this thought of before? So turns the kaleidoscope. Nothing, however, can be more natural than all this. It is a proverb, that we are willing to speak of our own favorite words or friends, as we are unwilling to hear others speak of them.

² Theol. Inst., Pars I. p. 699.

*man innocent, and it forbids only actual sins, such as Adam could commit. Further, it cannot be denied that the law requires perfect holiness, to which this corruption is adverse."*¹ What are we to infer? Plainly that our passive sin becomes a transgression of the law, merely as it induces that which *only* is a transgression of the law, and which *only* is sin in the biblical sense. This is the theology of the Convention Sermon.

But, again; these divines often confess that they use the term passive sin, to denote a mere result of wrong preference. When asked whether the result, apart from that choice, merits everlasting punishment, they will often give way to the inspirations of Heaven, and answer, just as we answer. No. Nothing is more natural than for a man, grieving over the dire effects of his perverse will, to exclaim, they are sinful effects, just as he speaks of the peace flowing from a good life, as a holy peace, just as he uses, in any other instance, the metaphor of the "effect for the cause." In this manner our involuntary evil propensities are termed sinful, because we have voluntarily indulged, and thereby strengthened them. If we had uniformly resisted them from the earliest period of our moral agency, we should have secured that aid by which we should have subdued these inward foes. Our sin lies in not choosing to resist, in preferring to gratify, in harboring them, in adopting them as our own, and this sin is metaphorically extended to the objects which it cherishes.²

It is psychologically interesting to see how often our native corruption is termed sin because, according to the ancient Calvinistic theory, it is the result of our own ante-natal offence. It is so termed, not because apart from its occasion it deserves the penalty of the moral law, but because it presupposes that ourselves have in some way performed an act which deserves the penalty of that law. The judgment of man will at last wind itself through all sorts of theories into the belief that nothing can be blamable, save as it stands related to a choice. It is because original sin involves our choice in Adam, that many Calvinists have supposed it to be our real sin. It is not our inherent, as separate from our justly imputed wickedness that condemns us; but it is original sin in the large sense, including our primitive volition to incur all our present evils.³ In Riv. Opp. Tom.

¹ La Théologie Chrétienne, Liv. VI. Chap. VII.

² So likewise it has been pretended, that we are morally guilty of Adam's sin, because we acknowledge that sin as our own, by every act of voluntary transgression. We adopt it, and so far forth are voluntary in it.

³ No source of mistake is more copious than this. We are apt to suppose that

III. pp. 801, 803, 813, 815, 817, 820 will be found nearly all the following citations, which are no less important for the mere psychologist than for the theologian.

It is not only said by Cardinal Toletus that "all in Adam were forbidden to eat of the tree," but Protestant Molinaeus declares that "we sinned in Adam and therefore in him we *willed* this depravation." N. Humanus teaches, that as the first sin "was committed voluntarily by Adam, so likewise it was committed *voluntarily* by all individuals, and as all were voluntarily made sinners in Adam, so all coming from him are born voluntary sinners." "They who pronounce that sin (of all men in one) simply involuntary," says Francis Junius, "are very much deceived, since the same thing may be said to be voluntary and involuntary in various respects, whether you regard its generation or its constitution. For, on account of our common origin, it was the voluntary offence of all men in Adam sinning (although it was not voluntary in respect of our individual origin); and it is voluntary in respect of ourselves as individuals on account of what we are, (although it arose from a corrupt nature brought upon us and not from our own will); that is, from the origin of our individual nature and not from our volition." Grossius, speaking of the sin which *all human nature* committed in and with the first pair, says "For the will of the progenitors was the will of their descendants, and the descendants *willed* in their progenitors, in whom as in the root of the entire human race, the descendants sinned and transgressed the law." Pfeilen says, that the sin of the first man, which may be regarded as a sin of nature rather than of a person, "cannot be termed involuntary in respect of infants, because it took its origin from a vicious will, and the first will of sinning man was, as it were, the will of the entire human race." The phrase "as it were" means that the will was that of the race virtually, though not in their separate individuality; see pp. 614-15 above. The noted Transylvanian

when the old writers ascribe a bad moral quality to our passive nature, they always do it without regard to our having willed that nature. Sometimes they do so; but the *theory* is, that original sin as a whole is blameworthy, because it involves our Paradisiacal choice.

There is another theory which may here be mentioned as illustrating the fundamental law of human belief, by which men are *compelled* to admit the indispensable connection between all blameworthiness and choice. It is the theory of the *scientia Dei media*, according to which God foresaw how all men would have acted, if they had been in Adam's place, and he therefore holds them ill-deserving for what they would have done if they had existed then, there, and in those circumstances. He *interpreted* Adam's act as if it had been theirs, because it would have been theirs if they had been in the condition to perform it, and thus they did perform it "*interpretatively*," and are punished justly! This theory is often resorted to as a temporary refuge from the absurdities of our really sinning in Adam. But why flee to these fictions of a *presumed* or a *real* choice? Why not say, that we are guilty without any choice, real or presumed? It is because every body knows, *maugre* all his theories, that our choice is *essential* to our guilt. Suppose it be said that we cannot be blameworthy, unless we be poets. Would our divines endeavor to prove that all men are poets in Adam, or were *presumed* to be poets? Why not? Because there is no law of the mind *demanding* such a belief. All these fictions of our Paradisiacal sin are the signs of our constitutional tendency to believe in the voluntariness of all sin.

Catechism expresses the doctrine with singular clearness. The question stands: "Is original sin a punishment or a sin?" The answer follows: "*It is a sin (culpa), if you consider the whole human race to have been in Adam as the root, (Rom. 5: 12); but it is a punishment if you regard the corruption which inheres in each individual.*" That is; it is a sin so far forth as, and in the sense in which we existed in Adam, but as our individual attribute it is not a sin but a punishment. As a mere passive state it is not blamable, but as involving our original choice it is so. That stout English champion for inherent sin, Bishop Burgess, frequently contradicts himself by admitting that it "*doth necessarily imply,*" has "*an inseparable connection*" with, and "*is always to be looked upon as a relative to*" imputed voluntary sin. Bishop Burgess on Original Sin, Part I. Chap. 9. Sect. III.; also Chap. 2. Sect. X.

Did such great men practically believe, that we had put forth a moral choice before the birth of Cain? Believe it? They believed it, just as they believed that an equitable ruler requires us to accomplish literal impossibilities, and will punish us eternally for not doing what no being in the universe can do; for not even an omnipotent Being can accomplish impossibilities. Believe it? They founded a theory upon it. They reasoned at times as if it were true; and their theory was, that "our voluntary participation in the crime of our first parents" is the cause of our inborn corruption, and therefore we are blamable for that corruption, and that corruption is our sin, so far forth as it is the result of our own voluntary sin, for all our sin is voluntary in its origin, voluntary on our part, and all our corruption is sin only as it was thus originally willed by us. That original will being given up, the corruption ceases to be our sin. The wickedness of the cause was thus metaphorically extended to and over the result. Even the diluted Calvinism with which our Reviewer contents himself, recognizes the principle that our evil nature is the effect of our antecedent sin, of a voluntary sin *imputed* to us. So far forth as it is imputed, it is our own voluntary transgression, and the cause of our corruption. Therefore he says, "if the doctrine of imputation be given up, the whole doctrine of original sin must fall."¹ Why so? No other reason can be divined, than that our disordered nature is not sin except as related to our causal imputed crime; i. e. it is not sin in and of itself. We are born with this disordered nature. This is a fact. No metaphysics can explain the fact away. Is this nature sin? '*It is sin, if the doctrine of imputation be true; it is not sin, unless that doctrine be true.*' Exactly right. The passive sin depends on the imputed sin, and our Reviewer confesses *at times* that the sin, as imputed, is not a moral, ill-deserving one; and therefore, if he be self-consistent, he must confess that the passive sin has the same figu-

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 93. See also Dr. Hodge on Rom. 5: 12—21.

rative character. It is reprehensible, just as our sinning in Adam was reprehensible, and our critic, in certain states of mind, abandons the doctrine that our Paradisiacal crime was a reprehensible one. By a single application of his match, he has exploded that ingeniously articulated system of imputation which ancient theorists imagined would be more durable than the Kremlin itself; and now he must not attempt to hold firm the superstructure of an edifice which he has shattered to its foundations. It is a plain case. There is no help for our Reviewer. He must agree with us so long as he does not retract his reiterated concessions. Here it stands. Is sin a transgression of the law? Yes. What law was addressed to our nature before our birth? No law except that addressed to our nature in Adam. Then there was no real sin, except as we were once in Adam. But our Adamic life was figurative, as our critic admits; then the resultant sin is figurative; and this is our passive sin. How can there be a literal transgression of a figurative law? How can the embryo child be undeserving for its nature, viewed as opposed to a command addressed to it impersonally, i. e. metaphorically? We by no means imply, that the masters of Calvinism have never represented a passive state to be blamable, apart from its voluntary origin. They have done so. Often, too often. But they have not seldom detected the absurdity of the representation, and have then allied the passive with the first voluntary sin, and have derived from the latter all the guilt of the former. They have conceded, that the nature was culpable because the result of a blameworthy cause; and if the voluntariness of the cause be denied, the criminality of the effect ceases. If a corporeal movement is wicked, merely as the result of an antecedent will, then it is not wicked in itself; and if our senses and intellect and entire nature are wicked, merely as related to the crime which we virtually committed in Eden, then they are not wicked in themselves. Here again Calvinism and Hopkinsianism coalesce in denying the criminality of any state which does not involve our own choice. Here, too, we see the inconsistency of those who believe in a passive, in-born wickedness apart from our own fault in the first man. They sever the branch from its root. They cherish the result of a principle while they discard the principle from which alone that result can rightly spring.

But again, and more in general, the believers in a passive sin often virtually confess, that they use the term *sin* to denote all the concomitants of transgression; not only the cause and the result, but also the other adjuncts of it. Deep emotion prompts us to call a plot of

ground holy, when it is connected with holiness, and to call a nature sinful, when it is connected with sin. Unregenerate children are termed "holy," in 1 Cor. 7: 14, by the metaphor of an adjunct for the main subject; much more, then, may an uninspired man venture on the same metaphor, and term such children criminal, when in point of fact, "they have done neither good nor evil," Rom. 9: 11. Now, that standard writers have often employed the phrase, *inherent sin*, in this tropical sense, is obvious from the fact, that they represent this sin as existing in the reason, the judgment, the appetites, indeed in all the powers and states of the intellect and body. Sin is in our blood. Augustine often describes our wickedness, as belonging not merely to the soul, but to the "whole man," soul and body.¹ Calvin speaks of the intellect, will, and *flesh*, the entire person, as being "nothing else than concupiscence," which is sin;² and he speaks of sin as "spread over our senses and affections," and "all parts of our nature," "every part, without exception,"³ of course physical and intellectual. Turretin often calls the body corrupt, and calls corruption sin; he denies that sin is propagated either into the body or the soul, as separate from each other; he denies that the body, apart from the soul, is the subject of sin formally and completely, but he affirms that it is so, initiatively and radically.⁴ The Symbols of the Reformers describe original sin as "a corruption of the whole nature, and of all the powers, but *especially* of the higher and principal faculties of the soul, in mind, intellect, heart, and will;" "the mass out of which men are now made by God, has been corrupted and perverted in Adam;" the elements of our bodies are "contaminated by sin;" "concupiscence is not only a corruption of the corporeal qualities, but also," etc.⁵ Bishop Burgess not only "anatomizes the sinfulness of the memory, and other intellectual powers," but he also admits the sinfulness of "the whole body." Sometimes, however, he explains himself to mean that "sin is not properly, till the soul be united to the body, yet because that (the body) is part of man, sin is there inchoatively and imperfectly, because it is in tendency to make up man," etc.⁶

Our respect for the good sense of these writers, forbids us to be-

¹ Wiggers's Hist. Pres., Ch. V.

² Inst. L. II. C. 1, § 8, 9.

³ Com. on Rom., 7: 24.

⁴ See among other places, Tur. Inst. Theol., Part I pp. 706-710.

⁵ Form. Con., pp. 640, 647. Con. Aug., 55, [25.]

⁶ Treatise on Original Sin, Part I. Ch. I. § 1. See also Boston's Body of Divinity, Vol. I. pp. 309-321. Gill's Body of Divinity, Vol. I. pp. 523, 529, 530.

lieve that they fell into the habitual absurdity of supposing the intellect or the body to be sinful in the literal sense. In fact, they *could* not have forced their minds up to such an anomalous conviction, without long intervals of rest. Nature will not bear it. For a man to act on the principle that his nerves and bones are in themselves criminal, is no more consistent with mental sanity, than for him to act on the principle that they are intelligent; and, out of Laputa, a man can no more persevere in practically believing his mere intellect to be criminal, than in believing a rock or a clod to be so. And yet, a thorough Calvinist can no more believe in the passive sin of the heart, than he can believe in the sin of the muscles and veins. It must habitually be regarded as a figurative sin.¹

Sixthly, the advocates of the doctrine that our nature is itself sin, often virtually confess that they use the word *nature* in a figurative sense. Properly it denotes that which is distinct from action and, above all, from voluntary action. It denotes either our faculties and sensibilities themselves, or the mutual relation between them, or both. But when divines affirm that this nature is criminal, they often tacitly conjoin with it a state of action, and especially of voluntary action. Thus they all appeal to "the flesh" and to the "law of the members," in Gal. 5: 17 and Rom. 7: 23, as illustrations of the corrupt nature; but this "flesh" and this "law in the members" are not generally conceived of as a dormant state or condition, but rather as an energetic principle, not indeed identical with a wicked choice, but yet intimately allied with it, and often comprehending it. At times we distinguish the tendency from the preference. In general we confound them. It is very difficult, especially for untrained minds, to imagine the youngest infant as altogether inactive and involuntary. Andrew Fuller goes farther than this, too far, and substitutes *impossible* for *difficult*. "To talk of an involuntary propensity in the mind of a rational being," he says,² "is to talk without meaning, and in direct contradiction to the plainest dictates of common sense. If, then, the concurrence of the will denominates a thing blameworthy, we need have no more dispute whether an evil disposition in a rational being be in itself blameworthy; seeing the concurrence of the will is included in the very nature of a propensity." This, although an extreme statement, is yet sufficient to show the tendency of men to

¹ Pres. Appleton says, "Intellects, simply considered, are not the seat of moral disorder, [i. e. sin.] The understanding, if we speak with precision, cannot be depraved, [i. e. sinful.] Lectures, Vol. I. pp. 443, 444, 447, etc.

² Fuller's Works, Vol. II. p. 527.

include a choice in a propension, and to ascribe the sin of the propension to the choice which it includes, rather than to an involuntary state.

Seventhly, many who dispute for a sin of nature as distinct from one of choice, expressly declare, that they do not mean by sin a moral quality. What was the opinion of that authoritative bishop from whom, more than from any other man, the doctrine of original sin has been derived? Augustine, especially during his later years, taught, with as much emphasis as our Hopkinsian divines, that all moral character consists in preferences; that all iniquity has and must have its origin in the will;¹ also, that the "sin in the members" of the baptized "is not called sin in the sense of making us guilty, but because it was produced by the guilt of the first man; and because, by rebelling, it strives to draw us into guilt," etc. etc. "As far as respects us, we should always be without sin, until the evil (our concupiscence) were cured, if we were never to consent to evil."² He often denominates this evil an infirmity, but not of itself our fault; and says of concupiscence that "though called sin, it is not so called because it is itself sin, but because it is produced by sin, just as writing is called the HAND of some one, because the hand produced it. But sins are what are unlawfully done, said, or thought, according to carnal concupiscence or ignorance, and when committed they, unless forgiven, hold the persons guilty."³

Our Reviewer represents us as attempting to accomplish a "feat" in reconciling Augustinism with the "radical principles" of the sermon which he has assailed. Did he not know that Augustinism has been repeatedly explained by its great author, as in essential harmony with those radical principles? Did he not know that Augustine often wrote in the language of feeling, and that after all his eloquent expressions in regard to passive sin, he declared them to be only figurative expressions? Does our Reviewer agree with Augustine? If not, is he ready for his favorite inference, that whoever differs from the African bishop is a Pelagian? Does our critic now see any need of his stating or rather mis-stating a German theory, as one by which we might be suspected of harmonizing Augustine's reiterated assertions that all sin is voluntary, with the same assertions in a New England discourse?

A volume might be filled with similar testimonies from ancient

¹ See his Unfinished Work, IV. 103

² C. Jul. II. 9, 10.

³ C. Duas Epp. Pel. I. 13, a work written only ten years before Augustine's death, and eight years after he commenced his controversy on original sin.

worthies. Notwithstanding all that our critic has imagined (p. 319) about "the names of all generations of saints inscribed on" the walls of his own Gibraltar, yet even he must confess that the Alexandrine and Greek Fathers stood upon no such fortress of strife and tumult, but occupied the same broad and peaceful ground which the Dwights and Appletons of New England have enlarged and enriched as the garden of the Lord, and on which the sword will soon be beaten into the ploughshare.—But leaving the fathers, let us listen to the voice of the clearest thinker among the Reformers. Zuingli, in his *De Peccato Originali Declaratio*, says, that he will not contend about a word, that he will permit men to call our native tendency to self-love by the name of sin, and, if this be not sufficient, by the name of wickedness also, crime and profligacy; but he insists that so far forth as it is passive and inborn, it is "not a sin but a disease."¹ "Original sin I have called a disease and not a sin, because sin is conjoined with fault, but fault arises from the transgression of one who has chosen wickedness."² "Our original fault is not called a fault truly, but metaphorically on account of the offences of our first parent."³ "Therefore that propension to sin through self-love is original sin, which propension indeed is not properly a sin, but is a source [of it] and natural bent [to it]. We will give an example from the young wolf. It is in all respects a wolf as to its natural bent, and by its ferocity would be led to commit all depredations. But as yet, it has borne away no plunder, because it could not on account of its age. In consequence of its nature, however, the hunters no more spare it than they would spare a wolf from whose jaws they seize the prey;⁴ for although young, yet even now its nature is so thoroughly understood by them that they know it will, when grown up, follow the ways of its species. This native bent, then, is original sin or vitiosity, but the act of plunder is sin, which comes from this native bent; this itself is sin in the act, which more recent authors call actual sin, and which properly is sin."⁵ So in his celebrated *Confession of Faith*, Zuingli says: "Whether we will or not, we must admit, that original sin, as it exists in Adam's descendants, is not properly a sin, as has now been shown; for it is no wicked act

¹ Huldrici Zuinglii Opera, Vol. III. p. 628.

² *Ib.* 629.

³ *Ib.* 629.

⁴ Zuingli believed, as we do, that our native disease would expose us to future suffering, unless it were removed by Him who came to heal our sicknesses. This suffering is not a punishment, in the sense of implying any real sin. It is a punishment in a loose sense.

⁵ Huldrici Zuinglii Opera, Vol. III. pp. 631, 632. The same also is frequently repeated in this Treatise.

against the law. It is therefore properly a disease and a condition : It is a disease, because as he fell through self-love we also fall in the same way ; it is a condition, because as he became a servant and guilty of death, so we are born servants and children of wrath, and consequently are subjected to death."¹ That our original sin is improperly so termed, and is merely a "disease," a "rupture," is often reiterated by this excellent reformer, in his *Treatise on Baptism*, his *Commentary on Romans*, and his *Letters to Oecolampadius*. And so, on this doctrine, and if on this, then on many other doctrines, Zwingli has bound together multitudes of verbal polemics ; for various parties are willing to confess, that our nature is itself sin, *provided that* it be such a kind of sin as is produced by God who never produces any real iniquity ; such a kind of sin as is viewed, in and of itself, with regret instead of remorse, humiliation instead of penitence, and is followed with suffering instead of *that* punishment which the law threatens against all transgressors ; such a kind of sin as derives all its wickedness from its being a cause or effect or concomitant of what is truly iniquitous ; such a kind of sin as, according to Augustine, the chief author of the doctrine, is properly called a disease rather than a transgression of the law. And we ask as a favor from our assailants, if they persevere in asserting that "our nature itself, as well as all the motions thereof, is truly and properly sin," to give a definition of the conscience which condemns this passive nature ; and also, that they point out the inspired passage in which this inborn nature is prohibited by the law, and that they rehearse the words in which it will be sentenced to the legal penalty at the last day. *When and where*, (and if nowhere, why so) are we exhorted to "*resist the beginnings*" of this germinal iniquity ? not to *enter* upon that state which to its own wickedness superadds the shame of originating all other abominations ? Commit a passive iniquity ? Exhort men against being born with evil tendencies ? What is the passive voice of the verb, *sin* ? What is the inactive form of the word, *evil-deers* ? Why is language made without any such phrases as to endure or suffer a criminality without any criminal volition ? The language of every man whispers the truth, that in practical life, whatever he may do among his books, he no more believes in this peculiar metaphysics of involuntary sin, than Bishop Berkeley believed in the non-existence of the material world.²

¹ Martin Luther's *Sämtlichen Schriften*, Band XX, ss. 1942—1943, and Huld. Zuing. Opp. Tom. IV. p. 6.

² We request an answer to these and similar questions *as a favor*. We are entitled to demand such an answer *as a right*. It may do for once, but it will not do

"Truly," says John Calvin, "I abominate mere verbal disputes, by which the church is harassed to no purpose; but I think that those terms ought to be religiously avoided, which sound as if they had an absurd meaning, especially where error is of pernicious consequence."¹ Now, it has been a great aim of New England writers, to dispense with such terms in doctrinal discussion, and confine them to their appropriate sphere. They have watched the theology of good men in its alternating forms of beauty and of power, and have tried to seize and portray, and even *daguerreotype*, those features into which it has been wont to settle down as its natural expression, after all the changes of its emotive style. Thus have they held up the enduring substance of doctrine, to be looked at not only through the stained glass of the old artists, but also in the pure light of heaven. It was natural that men who criticised the endeared phrases of other times, and condemned the errors into which those powerful phrases had often beguiled their adherents, should be repaid by volleys of intemperate words, even from those who at times make the same criticisms, and renounce the same errors. If rivers have been stained with blood by means of the verbal controversies on Nominalism, still more in theology, where the feelings of men are swift to rise, must we expect that "Gibraltar or Ehrenbreitstein" will bristle with armor, whenever the gentlest query is whispered about the safety of some figurative expressions. But, our consolation is this, that the distinctive theology of New England is not opposed at the present day, unless it be first misrepresented; and when its arguments press hard, we are often told that we say "*the very thing* which the old Calvinists" meant; and when we name the great and good men who have stood forth as champions of our "three radical principles," we are assured that "Nolo contendere" is inscribed on every gun which was once pointed against the theology of Andrew Fuller; and when we assail the old doctrine "Lumborum Adae," we are gracefully reminded that the doctrine is covered all over with fig-leaves and flowers of rhetoric, and it now lies snugly hidden "*behind* the walls of Gibraltar or Ehrenbreitstein." Very well, if our opponents will be so kind as to qualify all the terms which we criticise, why may we not

twice, for our Reviewer to escape from all objections by the plea: "*Having failed so entirely to understand the Sermon, we shall not be presumptuous enough to pretend to understand the Reply,*" Bib. Repertory, XXIII. p. 307, and by then proceeding to discuss a theory of Schleiermacher, which has no more connection with the Sermon or Aldrich's than it has with an acute-angled triangle.

¹ Inst. III. Cap. II, § 7.

cultivate the pacific arts and virtues? This is our aim. With this design was an humble sermon preached on "the one theology in two forms." It was intended not to shield such men as Pelagius from the charge of heresy, but such men as our Reviewer, from the charge of remaining *steadfast* and *uniform* in an absurdity. It was meant to be an olive branch of peace. But it is now found out to be first a '*weapon*, striking a blow upon *sturdy* trees;' ¹ secondly, "the last *arrow* in the *quiver*;" ² and thirdly, if it be what its author avows it to be, then it is a "penny whistle."³ We shall not dispute about a name. We only re-assure our excellent Reviewer, that the Sermon was intended to call forth no such "*sort* of a model of candor and charity," ⁴ but to accelerate the coming of the day when every "*weapon*" of war shall be turned into a pruning hook, and when "the leopard shall lie down with the kid."

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

L. ANDREWS'S EDITION OF FREUND'S LEXICON.⁵

It is a little remarkable, that the people that are most fond of theorizing, and of daring speculation, furnish the most patient lexicographers. Holland has lost her old reputation for plodding scholarship. The mantle has fallen on the cousins beyond the Rhine. Men are found, who will devote themselves, year after year, with uncomplaining and iron diligence, to all the researches, comparisons, discriminations, re-examinations, protracted and almost endless studies, which are needed, in order to complete their great vocabularies. Scarcely had Pape come to the end of his Greek Lexicon of more than 3100 octavo pages, and while the new edition of Passow was lingering in mid course, when Drs. Jacobwitz and Seiler, moved by the want of a good Greek lexicon, brought out the "*greater Manual*" containing 208 *Bogen*.

¹ Bib. Repertory, XXII. p. 674. ² Ib., XXIII. p. 320. ³ Ib., XXIII. p. 341.

⁴ "We wrote a Review which we intended to make a *sort* of a model of candor (!) and charity," (!) etc. Princeton Review, XXIII. p. 307.

⁵ A Copious and Critical Latin-English Lexicon, founded on the Larger Latin-German Lexicon of Dr. William Freund; with Additions and Corrections from the Lexicons of Gesner, Faccioliati, Scheller, Georges, etc. By E. A. Andrews, LL. D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1851. pp. 1663.

Freund had hardly emerged into the upper air with his four ponderous folios, of 4600 double-columned pages, when Prof. Klotz of Leipzig betook himself to the same prodigious task, or rather to a still more wearing labor, for his lexicon bids fair considerably to outweigh that of his Breslau rival. The picture which is on the cover of Klotz's *Lieferungen* is quite fitting—a lean figure in a shrunk coat, gasping into and almost buried by some huge volumes.

Of the value of Dr. Freund's work it is not necessary for us to speak. The preface, in which he details the plan and principles of his lexicon, was published in the *Bib. Sac.*, 1846, p. 79, seq. The lexicon is the fruit of many years of hard labor, by an accomplished classical scholar, trained under the advantages, for which the German schools are unrivalled, and prepared to make full use of all the researches of modern scholars in classical and general philology. His learning, industry and judgment are obvious on every page. In the selection of illustrative examples, in the arrangement of the materials, and in tracing the etymologies, he is particularly happy.

In regard to the merits of the translation, or the work as it appears in the English dress, we cannot give an opinion which is the result of extensive personal examination. We have used the original for several years and have read articles in the translation here and there. An adequate judgment could be given only by those who use the book as they are engaged in the actual study or teaching of Latin. The well-known character, however, of the editor and his two accomplished collaborators, Profs. Robbins and Turner, is a good guaranty that the work is thoroughly done. All are well known as experienced instructors and able philologists. As the lexicon now appears in the English form, it may be described:

First, as compressed into reasonable limits, four large volumes being condensed, with sound judgment, into one.

Secondly, as printed, so far as we can judge, with very great accuracy, the closest attention having been bestowed upon the translation and upon the correction of the sheets.

Thirdly, the divisions, paragraphs, etc. are marked with the utmost distinctness, so that the eye very readily catches what it is in pursuit of. Indeed, we have here an excess of a good thing. The type by which the words are introduced and the divisions marked, is too obtrusive. Our attention is called to the sign-board, rather than to the road which it should point out.

Fourthly, the copious, illustrative quotations from Latin writers, which render many articles pleasant reading, and which form one of the most useful features of the work.

Fifthly, the natural and logical order in which the meanings of a word are arranged. In this respect, the lexicon stands on a level with the late dictionaries in the Hebrew and Greek languages, and in beautiful contrast with the confused and unscientific methods of the old lexicographers.

Sixthly, the pertinence and exactness of the definitions. They are given generally with brevity, yet with precision. Doubtless in this, as in other similar works, there is room for improvement in this the most important, yet most difficult part of a lexicon.

In short, the lexicon is a great advance on all which have been hitherto used in our country, and will make an era in the study of Latin. The hearty thanks of all classical scholars are due to the editor and his assistants, for the fruits of their long and patient toils.

The American student is now supplied with admirable helps in the study of the three learned languages of antiquity. For the best and almost the only good grammars and lexicons of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, we are indebted principally to the labors of German scholars. What would be the state of sacred and classical philology among us, if these often calumniated German scholars had not lived?

We subjoin a reference to a few slight errors and oversights, as minute accuracy in a work of this nature, is a matter of importance.

P. 1177, col. 2, l. 1, s. v., "prædico," "præbico," for *prædico*—right in the original; p. 1258, c. 2, l. 23, s. v., "que," "Virg. E. 9, 18," for *E. 7, 18*—wrong in the original; p. 1304, c. 8, l. 6, s. v., "repercutio," "Virg. A. 5, 23," for *A. 8, 23*—wrong in the original; p. 1343, c. 1, l. 22, s. v., "sacrum," "dictis" for *dictis*—wrong in the original; p. 1476, c. 1, l. 18, s. v., "subisto," "armis," for *arma*—wrong in the original; p. 1686, c. 1, l. 21, s. v., "vir," "a husband for maritus, (so perhaps not in Cicero, but elsewhere very frequent)." *Vir* is used in this sense by Cio., in *Orat. Philipp. II. 14, sententiam dixit in sororis suae viro*. In the first part of the work, "gut classisch," denoting the character of words as depending on usage, is rendered "classico," as s. vv. "cachinnas," "ambigo," "candor"; while in the rest of the volume it is translated "quite classic." The former is a competent translation, but the latter involves an ambiguity by the use of *quite*; the colloquial sense of which is easy, but according to good usage, it means *entirely*. The want of uniformity in the version of this phrase, will give the student a false impression. There is some inconsistency in the mode of writing words; as s. v. *littera*, one *t* only is admitted into the word, so also s. vv. "accipio" and "do," but s. v. "interpretes," it appears with two *t*s. Nothing is said about the origin of the difficult word *interpretes*, for instance; and *posideo* is said to be made up of *po* and *sedeo*, but no account is given of the form *po* as a prefix; s. v. *sustineo*, it is stated that the word is compounded of "subs for *sub* and *teneo*;" but by a euphonic change, *b* becomes *s* before *t*. Compare *versipes* for *versipes*.

II. RECENT WORKS UPON LOGIC.¹

The works of which we give the titles below, are all of interest and importance to the student of Logic and Philosophy. The fact that so many works on Logic, are now published in Great Britain, is a decisive proof, that the interest in studies of this sort, and an estimate of their importance, are both advancing. The character of these works, also shows that Logical studies are pursued in a different spirit, and with greater thoroughness, than formerly. The contrast between the best English and German writers, has been, till recently, greatly to the advantage of the latter; and even now, with a single exception, no English writer with whom we are acquainted, is worthy to be compared with very many among the Germans, in respect to precision of language, and scientific perfection, while the relations of logical analysis to elements of thought, and the first truths of Philosophy, as well as their application to language and to grammar, seem hardly to be considered. We are confident, from signs that cannot fail, that this will not long be the case, but that the impulse given to logical studies by Sir William Hamilton, is destined to produce a decisive and permanent influence on English Philosophy.

The work of Mr. Mansell, is a reprint from Aldrich, so long the text-book at Oxford. It is accompanied by a valuable Introduction, and a still more valuable Appendix, in which some of the most important subjects, which occasion many earnest questions, and much subtle speculation, to the student, are briefly but very intelligently discussed. The foot-notes to the text and appendix, give, however, the chief value to the work. They are very numerous and appropriate. They are drawn from a very great variety of sources, from Aristotle, his commentators, the earlier and later scholastics, and the living English and German authorities. They indicate a very com-

¹ *Artis Logicæ Rudimenta*, from the text of Aldrich, with notes and marginal references. By the Rev. H. L. Mansel, M. A., Fellow of St. John's College. 8vo. pp. xxiv. 137—169. Oxford, William Graham: Whitaker & Co., London, 1849.

An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought: a Treatise on pure and applied Logic. By William Thomson, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Oxford. Second edition, much enlarged. 18mo. pp. xiv. 392. London: William Pickering. Oxford: W. Graham.

Logic, or The Art of Thinking: being The Port-Royal Logic. Translated from the French, with an Introduction. By Thomas Spencer Baynes. 12mo. pp. xlii. 362. Edinburgh: Sutherland & Knox, George street. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1850.

An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms, being that which gained the prize proposed by Sir William Hamilton, in the year 1846, for the best exposition of the new doctrine propounded in his Lectures; with an historical appendix. By Thomas Spencer Baynes, Translator of the Port-Royal Logic. 8vo. pp. x. 157. Edinburgh: Sutherland & Knox. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1850.

plete acquaintance with the subject matter, an extensive course of reading, in which the reader has mastered his books, and not been mastered by them. For all these reasons, it is a work which we can recommend as both scholar-like and philosophical.

Mr. Thomson's "Outline," etc. is a work of a different character. It approximates more closely to the form of the German Treatises, than any work in the English language which we have seen. It is clear and vigorous in thought, though somewhat diffusely written. It lacks that precise use of technical language, and the rigor almost mathematical, with which technical terms are used, which is preeminently appropriate in the treatment of such a science as Logic, and which constitutes its severe but real beauty. There are no signs, however, of a confused or feeble thinking, no tokens of indolent neglect, of shuffling evasion, or of limited reading. Mr. Thomson has also an elegant, as well as a scientific, mind, and his work is written in such a way as to please and allure the unscientific reader. The illustrations, too, are drawn from other sources than from the meagre and limited circles of stereotyped examples which seem to have served logicians for centuries, and which have contributed to leave the impression, that logic is not only worn thread-bare, but that the original texture was very slight and incapable of being employed to any useful purpose. Mr. Thomson's illustrations not only serve to explain the law under which they are adduced, but they also enrich the mind with real knowledge, and cause this knowledge to sparkle with light reflected from the law enounced. Mr. Thomson's work is enriched with an account of the most important methods of notation which have been adopted to exhibit the various forms of the Syllogism, and was the first to give to the world the very ingenious and peculiar method, of which Sir William Hamilton was the inventor.

The Port-Royal Logic is not introduced to the English reader for the first time, by the translation of Mr. Baynes. It has been translated twice before, and as is well known, was very highly appreciated in those days in which the study of logic was prosecuted by English scholars. Its merits are very great; for though it is not a work of pure logic, and its authors either seem not to be aware what these limits are, or in fact often overstep them, yet their digressive discussions are never impertinent to the wants of the student of philosophy, and the interests of truth. Indeed, we may say with safety, there are few works in existence, which convey more information, and are fitted to discipline the mind more wisely and severely, on some of the most important subjects in logic, language, and philosophy, than the Port-Royal Logic. One of the most important contributions to the distinction and nomenclature of logic, the clear distinction between the extension and comprehension of the conception, we owe to the Port-Royalists. It was a sagacious thought which directed Mr. B. to the preparation of a new translation of a work so important; and the reasons why a new translation was needed, as stated by him, show conclusively that a new translation was required. He has accompanied his work with an introduction, which, though brief, contains some valuable matter on the history of the science.

The "Essay on the New Analytic," will be sought for with eagerness, by all who are curious to acquaint themselves with the peculiarities of Sir William Hamilton's discovery, or rather, invention, by which his ardent pupils and admirers, claim for him a merit second only to that of Aristotle. The system is certainly very ingenious, and the scheme of notation complete and beautiful. It accomplishes entirely the object proposed: that the logical forms should exactly represent what is conceived in the thought. The basis of this discovery is what is termed "the quantification of the predicate," i. e. the expression in the predicate of the extent in which it is actually used. In the ordinary mode of stating certain propositions, this is left to be inferred by the subject matter, or is entirely undetermined. The various forms of the regular syllogism appropriate to each figure, are designed to meet this difficulty, and to guard against the mistakes into which we are liable to fall, from a want of regard to the undetermined extent of the predicate. The new method of enouncing the proposition, leads to an entirely new method of exhibiting the various forms of valid reasoning. Instead of the old lines, "Barbara Celarent," etc., we have a scheme addressed to the eye.

It is not our design to describe at length, nor to remark upon, this scheme of notation, as exhibited in this essay. As a system of accurate and beautiful symbolization, it deserves all the praise which it has received. For all the purposes of formal logic, it is doubtless of great value. It may admit of a question, whether its adoption would not remove the forms of logic too far from the ordinary language of life and science, to admit of their ready application to the detection of unsound reasoning, and to the explanation of the syntactical relations. But into this question, we do not enter. We are sure that all who are aware of the very eminent merit and erudition of Sir William Hamilton, will be desirous to read the essay of Mr. Baynes. We ought to add, that besides the elucidation of the professed theme of the essay, it contains not a little of interesting and erudite matter.

III. JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY.¹

After struggling through several years of precarious existence, this association is now able to command the respect of the most distinguished oriental scholars abroad. Its meetings, and the principal articles in its *Journal*, are regularly noticed in the *Journal* of the German Oriental Society. A few of the Articles have been reprinted in London. Some of its members have been elected members of foreign Societies. Its library, amounting to between 500 and 600 volumes, deposited in the building of the Boston Athenæum, is quite valuable. It possesses some rare works in relation to China. Besides the volumes which are obtained by donation and exchange, a small sum is regularly expended in purchasing books. An Oriental Society in America, though laboring under obvious disadvantages, enjoys some eminent

¹ *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Second Volume, New York, George P. Putnam, 1851. pp. 384, 8vo.

facilities. The commerce of the United States is second only to that of England. The distance between us and the whole of eastern Asia is shortening every year. Beirut can now be reached from Boston in thirty or forty days. Some of our merchants, in a spirit of enlarged liberality, are ready to lend their coöperation. Again, our foreign missionaries are a select body of well educated men, and are providentially laboring in the regions which are most interesting to the orientalist—Palestine, Asia Minor, Assyria, India and China. Their great work is missionary and spiritual; but they are able to accomplish very much for oriental studies mediately and collaterally. In the second volume of the *Journal*, now before us, *one hundred and seventy-three* pages are from the pens of American missionaries. Some of these communications will add to the positive stock of knowledge. There is every reason to hope that there will be in the course of a few years a large accession of missionary laborers, so that more exact researches may be undertaken. We may add, also, that the number of our scholars who are devoting themselves to the study of Arabic, Sanskrit, and other oriental languages is gradually increasing. Four or five individuals have already made distinguished progress. We must also add that the Society is highly favored in its learned and accomplished Secretary, who has leisure, zeal and knowledge to devote to this interesting field.

The volume, now before us, is brought out in excellent style, as regards paper, type, correctness of typography, etc. Forty-two pages are occupied in detailing the proceedings of the Society, etc. Art. I. is a translation from the Turkish by Mr. Schauffler of Constantinople of an account of a Jewish sect, the followers of Shabbathai Zevi, the fragments of which sect still exist on the continent of Europe. The second article is an account of a Japanese Novel, from the German of Dr. August Pfizmaier of Vienna, by Mr. W. W. Turner of New York. Dr. P's book contains a reprint of the original Japanese (printed with movable types, the first ever made for this language in Europe) and a German translation. Appended is a note on Japanese Syllabaries, by S. Wells Williams of Canton. Article III. is a contribution to the geography of Kúrdistan, with a map, by Dr. Azariah Smith of Aintab in Turkey. In Article IV., Rev. Dr. J. Perkins of Persia gives an interesting Journal of a tour from Oroomiah to Mosul through the Kúrdish mountains. In Article V., Prof. Gibbs describes some of the characteristics of the Peshito Version of the New Testament. In Article VI., Rev. H. R. Hoisington, late principal of a Seminary in Ceylon, furnishes a syllabus of one of the sacred books of the Hindûs, entitled Siva-Gnâna-Pôtham. Rev. N. Brown, missionary in Assam, gives, in the following Article, some specimens of the Naga language of Assam. Then follow Remarks on Chinese Culture, or on the causes of the Peculiarities of the Chinese, by Rev. S. R. Brown, late principal of the Morrison School at Hong-Kong. Article IX. is a continuation of Et Tabary's Conquest of Persia by the Arabs, translated from the Turkish by John P. Brown, of Constantinople. In Articles X., XI. and XII., we have Notes of a Tour in Mt. Lebanon and to the eastern side of Lake Hâleh (Merom) by Dr. De Forest, of 'Abeih on Mt. Lebanon; the

Forms of the Greek Substantive Verb, by Prof. J. Hildrey, of Yale College; and a translation of two unpublished Arabic documents, relating to the Doctrines of the Isma'ilis and other Batinian Sects, with an Introduction and Notes, by Prof. Salisbury. A variety of interesting *Miscellanies* conclude the volume. We may add, that a part of the Articles will furnish very instructive matter to the general reader.

IV. KITTO'S CYCLOPAEDIA.¹

Biblical and classical scholars in England, particularly in London, have now ample facilities in the British Museum for illustrating and enriching their works. That immense repository is becoming more and more valuable almost every month. The friezes of the Parthenon, the Phigaleian and Lycian marbles, the terra cotta vases, the Greek and Roman bronzes, the Egyptian and Persepolitan antiquities, the coins, the Nineveh steen, the ancient MSS., etc., besides the printed books, furnish almost unrivalled facilities to the student of classical and sacred science. Of the extent to which these privileges are used, the dictionaries of Dr. Smith, and the one lying before us, are good specimens. Dr. Kitto has illustrated his pages by several maps and a great number of drawings and wood-cuts. For example, the article "Musical Instruments" is accompanied by more than twenty cuts, containing in all seventy-nine distinct figures. In such a work there can hardly be an excess of these aids. On some subjects they are indispensable.

Another signal advantage which English authors and compilers enjoy is the books of travels in which England is so prolific. The language probably contains more valuable journals of this nature than all other languages together. We here refer not merely to the formal books, but to the reports and proceedings of societies, articles in reviews, works printed but not published, official documents and manuscript letters, most of which are never translated into foreign languages, and must be used mainly by Englishmen. By means of her commerce, colonies, number of educated men, etc., England is accumulating facilities for dictionaries, geographies, etc., such as no other countries can lay claim to. Of the biblical lands, we may name Egypt, Arabia, Assyria, Persia, Asia Minor and Greece. The reader will instantly recall a host of names that do honor to the country of their origin. The prominent qualities of the English character are peculiarly adapted to investigations of this nature—a spirit of untiring enterprise, habits of observation, a conscientious love of truth uninfluenced by theory, ability to control others, as in the case of Layard, and means and taste for effective illustration. This we may name as a second advantage of this Cyclopaedia. It embodies a very large amount of information gathered from the pages of

¹ A Cyclopaedia of Biblical Literature, edited by John Kitto, D. D., F. S. A., editor of the Pictorial Bible, etc. In two volumes. 8vo. pp. 864, 964. New York: M. H. Newman & Co.

Wilkinson, Salt, Balzoni, Burckhardt, Irby and Mangles, Layard, Leake, Fellows, Hamilton, and many others, as well as from American, German and French works.

As a third excellence of the work, we may say that many of the leading articles were prepared by men whom all would acknowledge as eminently qualified. The articles on Ecclesiastes, Job, Isaiah, etc. were written by Hengstenberg; those on Exodus, Leviticus, Deuteronomy, the Pentateuch, Daniel, etc. by Hävernick; on the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, and the Epistle to the Romans, by Tholuck. Some of the remaining more important subjects are handled with distinguished ability by Dr. Davidson of Manchester, Dr. W. L. Alexander of Edinburgh, and Mr. J. E. Ryland of Northampton, all of whom are well versed in German literature, while, at the same time, they know how to separate the chaff from the wheat. The articles by the six writers we have named, may be regarded, perhaps, as giving a character to the work, taken in connection with the geographical and other articles of the learned and industrious editor, and the articles on natural history by Prof. Royle of King's College, an experienced and able naturalist.

We may name, again, the comprehensive character of the work as a marked quality. It comprises those branches of positive knowledge which are indispensable for the understanding of the Bible and its historical interpretation, including biblical archaeology and introduction. A wide field is traversed, and not a little classical and general information is introduced. Indeed the amount of information and discussion is very great. Eighteen or nineteen hundred pages, double columns, small type, furnish evidence of great industry and learning on the part of the editor and his assistants.

In closing this notice, we must make one or two criticisms, which we do the more readily, as we suppose the time will soon come when a supplement or an additional volume will be needed, in order that the information may keep pace with the rapid progress of discovery in the biblical lands, as well as in sacred philology. Such a supplement should, in the first place, carefully bring every topic up to the time of publication. Secondly, some of the articles are unworthy of a place in the dictionary on account of the erroneous sentiments contained in them; as instances, we refer to the biographies of David and Solomon, and some others, by F. W. Newman. The editor should have had independence enough to have rejected them, or required them to be modified. They are derogatory to the sacred character of the Bible, and fill the reader with pain. There are other articles, by different writers, which, if they do not contain positive errors, are not free from doubtful speculations or groundless fancies. In other instances we notice a dogmatism and an attributing of unworthy motives, which are not seemly in such a work. We refer as an instance to Vol. I. p. 677. We may also add that other articles need to be rewritten on account of the defective and inadequate information communicated. We may instance "Habakkuk." The writer has not mentioned or made use of the most important helps which were accessible at the time he wrote, such as the Commentaries of Maurer,

1839, Biamlein, 1840, and Deliusch, 1848. The last is worth all the rest together, and is indispensable to an adequate exhibition of this prophet. "K. M. Tusti, 1721," is misprinted, II. 795, for K. W. Justi, 1821. There are other errors to which we might allude, but for which an apology is furnished by the fact, that the *Cyclopædia* is the work of so many hands. At the same time, it has many and positive merits, and is enjoying, we understand, a large sale both in Great Britain and this country.

V. THE STONES OF VENICE.¹

In earnestness, in a kind of dogmatic directness of style, Mr. Ruskin belongs to the Arnold School. The characteristics of a very large class of English writers, for a century and a half, have been an unimpeachable correctness of style and a respectable, dull mediocrity of thought. Innumerable sermons have been preached and printed, practical treatises have appeared from the press without number, very smooth, very accurate, and very unimpressive. This want of depth and earnestness has been owing to circumstances in the public education of Englishmen, to a strong national characteristic, to features growing out of an established church, to a formal liturgy, etc., to which we cannot now allude. But a new era has commenced. Dr. Arnold's writings, and perhaps his life more, contributed to break the spell. Dr. Chalmers's *perfidium ingenium* has also been felt south of the Tweed. The great Reviews and the style of writing in the London Times and other Journals have powerfully contributed to the same end. But there is now danger of rushing to the other extreme. Fervor, passion, antithesis, epigrammatic point, an originality, often rather affected than real, are eagerly sought. Many of the Articles in the newspapers have more piquancy than truth—show more skill in sophistry than in argument.

Mr. Ruskin is an excellent specimen of the modern school. He is master of his subject, an independent thinker, who will not bow down to the idols set up before him. In zeal against some of the prevailing theories in art, he rivals that great image-breaker, Leo the Isaurian. He is manifestly somewhat under the dominion of prejudices, and has some of the one-sided tendencies of an ardent reformer. Still, one feels irresistibly attracted to his pages, by his learning, strong Saxon sense, his thorough conviction of the truth of what he advances, his serious spirit, and his fresh and awakening thoughts. The first volume is preliminary. "In the following pages, I have endeavored to arrange those foundations of criticism, on which I shall rest in my account of Venetian architecture, in a form clear and simple enough to be intelligible even to those who never thought of architecture before." The virtues and six divisions of architecture are then considered at some length, with the aid of diagrams and striking illustrations. The second vol-

¹ The Stones of Venice. The Foundations. By John Ruskin, author of *Modern Painters*, the *Seven Lamps of Architecture*, etc. With illustrations drawn by the author. New York: John Wiley, 1851. pp. 435, 8vo.

time will treat particularly of the buildings at Venice. A third volume will contain twelve examples of the buildings, each containing five plates, engraved by the first artists.

We advert to this volume because it may be made very useful to clergymen. Every person has an interest in architecture; clergymen more especially so. They have, or ought to have, a leading voice in the erection of schoolhouses and churches. They are called to deliberate, on the important questions as to the site of a building; its material, wood, brick, or stone; its adaptation to its objects; how much and what kind of ornament is consistent with those objects, etc. With thorough knowledge of the subject, they may correct the ignorance of building committees, and resist the appointment of incompetent architects. If the great body of ministers had been duly informed and zealous on this subject, our country would exhibit fewer specimens of architectural deformity, in what are named churches, schoolhouses and colleges.

VI. CLARK'S FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.¹

The British and American religious public are under great obligations to that enterprising firm for the volumes which they are bringing out in so handsome a form, and at so cheap a rate, (about seven dollars to subscribers, for four volumes). Of the twenty volumes now published, Vols. V, X, XIII, XVI, XIX. and XX, contain Olshausen's Commentary on the Gospels, Acts, Romans, and the two epistles to the Corinthians; Vols. I, II. and XII, Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Psalms; Vols. III. and VI, Hagenbach's Compendium of the History of Doctrines; Vols. IV. and IX, Gieseler's Compendium of Ecclesiastical History; Vols. VII, VIII, XI, XIV, XV. and XVII, Torrey's Translation of Neander's General Church History; and Vol. XVIII, a part of Hävernick's Introduction to the Pentateuch. Of the value of Olshausen's labors on the New Testament, it is not necessary to speak. They have marked excellencies which render them peculiarly acceptable to the evangelical scholar, after his feelings have been chilled in the atmosphere of a dead orthodoxy or of an icy rationalism. For a logical development of the sentiments of the text, and for a cordial sympathy with the spirit of the Divine word, few commentaries are superior to Olshausen's. For learning, philological tact, grammatical knowledge, etc., they cannot be compared with the Manuals of De Wette and Meyer.

Of Neander's History, we need not say a word. Would that the accomplished translator might enjoy the benefits of an international copyright law! As it is, he is deprived of what is justly his due, and this, we are sorry to say, through the narrow and mistaken policy of Americans. Hengstenberg on the Psalms is well known among us, both in the original and by the use which Dr. Alexander has made of it in his work on the Psalter. Hagenbach's Compend was reviewed in the B. S. Vol. IV. p. 552. Gieseler's Manual needs no commendation.

¹ Published by T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, Edinburgh.

Hävernick's Introduction, though written earlier than some of his commentaries, and containing statements and positions which have been corrected or set aside by later investigations, is well worthy of its place in the Library. The present volume forms a portion of the "*Handbuch der Historisch-Kritischen Einleitung in das alte Testament.*" It is the first part of the Special Introduction, and defends the credibility of each of the books of the Pentateuch from various points of view. Another volume, containing the General Introduction to the Old Testament, and embracing a discussion of the history of the Canon, of the Hebrew language, ancient versions, etc., will be brought out during the present year, from the pen of Dr. W. L. Alexander of Edinburgh.

The second volume of the Library for 1851, will contain all the remaining Commentaries of Olshausen on the Epistles of Paul; the other two volumes will probably embrace a translation of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Apocalypse. Of the works which it is proposed to translate, are Ullmann's Reformers before the Reformation, Neander's Exposition of the Epistle to the Philippians and the Epistle by James, Ritter's Palestine, Bengel's Gnomon, etc.

The value of the Library would be increased were more care taken to give an exact translation. Some of the gentlemen employed seem not to have had an adequate acquaintance with the peculiar idioms of the German language, and have either failed to give the full sense of the original, or have given a wrong sense. It is obvious that the ultimate value of this publication will depend not a little on its faithfulness to the original, as well as on a good, idiomatic, English style. Prof. Torrey's translation is an admirable instance of accuracy combined with a neat and expressive English diction.

VII. GROTE'S HISTORY OF GREECE.¹

It is hardly necessary to commend a work which has been received with such distinguished favor throughout the literary world. As the volumes of Grote, Thirlwall and Mure, are lying at our side, along with the maps of Kiepert, we can only mourn over the days which we spent or wasted on Rollin, Gillies and Mitford. If the youthful generation of scholars do not obtain an adequate and satisfying view of Hellenic life and history, the fault and the shame will be all their own. Mr. Grote's preëminent advantage over nearly all his predecessors and contemporaries, results in part from his enlarged knowledge of politics and of practical life, so essential in a Greek and Roman historian, and without which a thousand points will be misunderstood or obscured. The Greeks were stirring, sea-faring, commercial communities, full of freedom and conscious power. An historian, educated in the commercial metropolis of the world, amid the free English in-

¹ History of Greece, by George Grote, Esq. Reprinted from the Second London Edition. Andover: John D. Flagg, stereotyper and printer. Boston: published by John P. Jewett & Co. 1850, 1851.

stitutions, and himself an active member of the supreme legislature, might be expected to possess eminent advantages over a mere closet student or theorist, such as most of the continental historians have been. In reading Grote, we feel that we are in the company of a man of enlarged views, of practised ability, who has long mingled with men, as well as with books. He shows himself to be everywhere a master of his multifarious reading. He grasps his principles with a strong hand and makes all the details do his bidding. Where we do not accord with him, we are pleased with his ingenuity, and candid and courteous bearing.

The reprint is brought out in excellent style, that of a portable duodecimo, on clear paper and good type. The price is 75 cents a volume. Eight volumes of the original are printed, and five of the American edition. The whole work will probably embrace as many as twelve volumes.

VIII. JACOBI'S CHURCH HISTORY.¹

Dr. Jacobi was one of the beloved pupils and intimate friends of Dr. Neander, and this *Manual* was prepared at the instance and with the counsel of the great historian. In a brief preface, Dr. Neander says, "Here appears such a compend as I should desire, fitted to serve studious youth as a preparation for lectures, and for a review of what has been heard, fitted also to excite the susceptible to independent study and investigation. It is, indeed, something different from what I had specially in mind. Jacobi has not felt compelled to make a mere excerpt from the works and lectures of another man, though of one who had reached to him the torch of science. He must labor according to the impulse of his own mind, independently and creatively. In science and in art, as in active business, it is something morbid, indeed, *to wish* to be original, and not to accept what one has received from others. From such strivings proceed the monsters which so often meet us in these days of pretence and conceitedness. True originality gives out from itself, according to a natural law of the soul's development, where the left hand knows not what the right doeth. Such is my friend, Jacobi." The great design of the book, says the author, is to supply a help for students in the knowledge of church history. The text is a short delineation of the course of church history, or a condensed outline of facts and their relations. The accompanying notes embrace literary notices, references to sources, and the citation of the most important proof passages. The first volume embraces the classical period of church history, when the foundations were laid, and is consequently handled more at large. It extends from the birth of Christ to Gregory the Great, A. D. 590. The second volume, concluding the work, will be published during the present year. The author gives notice that he has made provision for an English translation of it. We notice that English writers on church history are almost wholly neglected. Mem-

¹ *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, von J. L. Jacobi, a. o., Professor der Theologie, a. d. Universität zu Berlin. Erster Theil, S. 405. Berlin, 1850.

bers of the English episcopal church have published quite a number of valuable works, especially on the history of the first four centuries, e. g. those of the bishop of Lincoln. Waddington's History is too important to be passed in silence. We hope that the English translator will supply the deficiency.

IX. UNITARIAN BIOGRAPHY.¹

These volumes contain brief memoirs of twenty-four individuals who have reached more or less eminence in the ranks of "liberal Christianity." Memoirs of some of the most distinguished, e. g. Dr. Channing and Mr. Buckminster, have been published in separate volumes. The lives of others have been commemorated in the pages of the *Christian Examiner* and elsewhere. Still, it was a happy thought to abridge the larger works, and bring the scattered notices into a convenient form. The sketches are generally written with ease and in a finished style, and some of them with peculiar felicity and grace. They embody many striking facts and incidents, and will constitute no unimportant element in the ecclesiastical history of New England. To some allegations contained in these volumes, a great proportion of our community would demur. We refer to the "very complete and satisfactory statement respecting the Hollis Professorship," Vol. I. p. 249; to enumerating as Unitarians such men as Newton, Locke and Milton, Vol. II. p. 183, etc.

X. COMMENTARY ON EZEKIEL.²

We are glad to welcome evidence of the prevalence of a better style of Bible interpretation in England and Scotland. For several years the island appears to have been overrun with Millenarian literature, with detached works and elaborate systems, constructed with great painstaking, often written in an earnest manner, breathing a spirit of elevated piety, but unhappily founded on false views of interpretation, and built up in support of some worthless theory. Of the vast number of books on the prophecies, which have appeared from the transatlantic press, which one, we may ask, has made any permanent impression? What one has changed the modes of thinking on this subject, or is likely to do so, either in England, or on the continent, or in this country? Some have enjoyed a temporary popularity, but, so far as we can ascertain, have made no permanent lodgment in the minds of biblical students or theologians.

But, Mr. Fairbairn belongs to a different school. He recognizes the fundamental importance of exact grammatical knowledge, that all exposition is

¹ Memoirs of Individuals who have been distinguished by their writings, character, and efforts in the cause of liberal Christianity. Edited by William Ware. Boston: James Munroe & Co. Vol. I. 1850. pp. 396, Vol. II. 1851, pp. 452, 12mo.

² Ezekiel, and the Book of his Prophecy: an Exposition. By the Rev. Patrick Fairbairn, of Salton, Scotland. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1851. pp. 448, 8vo.

worthless, which is not naturally developed from the text, in full accordance with the laws of philology. He also holds what appears to us the only true principles of prophetic interpretation, viz: that the prophets do not in general describe future events specifically, but only give the outlines—the bold points, not the minute details; that they had no commission to furnish a chart of secular history; that they were only concerned with the great developments of the church of God; that, if at certain times, they made exact statements, and gave us detailed measurements and facts, this does not authorize a literal and detailed interpretation; but, couched under these minutiae, are some great spiritual truths, which we are to investigate with sober judgment—truths which will be far more quickening and precious, than any amount of literal detail.

Accordingly, Mr. F. finds in the last nine chapters of Ezekiel, a representation which was not intended to meet, either in Jewish or Christian times, with an express and formal realization, but which is a grand and complicated symbol of the blessings which God had in reserve for his church, especially under the Gospel. The description purports to be a vision, something which never had been or would be in actual existence. Besides, there are points in it, which taken literally, are in the highest degree improbable, and which even involve natural impossibilities. A literal fulfilment would suppose the separate existence of the twelve tribes, which would now be regarded as a natural impossibility, the distinctions having been long since lost. A literal fulfilment would also imply the ultimate restoration of the ceremonials of Judaism, and thus the prophet would be placed in direct contradiction to the writers of the New Testament.

The exposition in general bears evidence that the author possesses a sound judgment and correct habits of thinking. Many of the practical remarks are pertinent and striking. It will be regarded as among the few books in the language, or even in any language, which casts much light on this very difficult prophecy. Even the Germans, with the exception of Hitzig and Hävernich, have done but little for its elucidation. For our own part, we should have preferred a much fuller interpretation of the text, than Mr. Fairbairn has given, and a less amount of practical matter. The book has somewhat the aspect of a series of lectures, addressed to a popular audience. More of the philological element would have been welcome.

XI. REVIEW OF THE LAST FIFTY YEARS.¹

Seventy pages of this volume are taken up with an account of the political changes, progress of education, improvements in printing, etc., of the last fifty years. The four chapters which follow (very well written, by Rev. B. N. Martin of Albany) give an historical sketch of science, of applied

¹ The Christian Retrospect and Register: a Summary of the Scientific, Moral and Religious Progress of the first half of the Nineteenth Century. By Robert Baird. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1851. pp. 420.

science, of the arts, of intercommunication, and of social progress, post office, mechanic arts, etc. The remainder of the volume is occupied with a history of the enlargement of Christendom, by the agency of a great number of religious and philanthropic associations.

In so vast a field, only the prominent points, of course, could be marked; of the immense number of facts, only the more essential could be retained. The field is, emphatically, the world. The events which have been crowded into the last fifty years, in the providence of God, have been hardly less momentous in importance, than great in number. Wisely to select those events which have been, or are likely to be, attended with the largest consequences, to condense the description of them within a small space, as far as possible to show their bearings on other events, and narrate them without party spirit or prejudice, is a task of no little difficulty and delicacy. It is much easier to see how it should be accomplished, than actually to accomplish it.

In forming an estimate of the value of Dr. Baird's volume, it is important to observe, that two or three months only were devoted to the preparation. It cannot of course have that value which a year's unbroken labor might have imparted to it. Still it is worthy of high commendation for its general accuracy, for its judicious selection of materials, and happy arrangement of them, and for the liberal and Christian spirit which reigns throughout. Sympathy for the struggling nations of Europe, and a confident belief that the recent movements have not been in vain, are freely expressed. The volume will be of special service to ministers and others, as a repository of materials. The half century should not pass away, or a new one begin, without a distinct recognition, and the erection of a monument of gratitude on the part of all the pastors in our happy land. To such, this volume will be a store-house of well-arranged and important statements. Every chapter will furnish to a thoughtful mind many suggestions.

Were we to make a single criticism, it would be, that sufficient prominence is not given to the labors of Clarkson, Wilberforce, Buxton, etc., *nomina clara et venerabilia*, men of whom the world was not worthy, whose sublime deeds constitute one of the most marked features of modern history. There are also places where greater definiteness of statement might be introduced to advantage, e. g. in relation to female schools, on p. 46; a specific account of a single school, would be better than mere generalities.

XII. RELIGION OF GEOLOGY.¹

The Lectures in this volume are fourteen in number, and on the following topics: Revelation illustrated by science; the epoch of the earth's creation unrevealed; death an universal law of organic beings on the globe from the

¹ The Religion of Geology and its connected Sciences. By Edward Hitchcock, D. D., LL. D., President of Amherst College, and Professor of Natural Theology and Geology. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1851. pp. 527. 12mo.

beginning; the Noachian deluge compared with the geological deluges; the world's supposed eternity; geological proofs of the Divine benevolence; Divine benevolence as exhibited in a fallen world; unity of the Divine plan and operation in all ages of the world's history; the hypothesis of creation by law; special and miraculous Providence; the future condition and destiny of the earth; the telegraphic system of the universe; the vast plans of Jehovah; and scientific truth, rightly applied, is religious truth.

These lectures were delivered to successive classes in college, and have thus had the advantage of repeated reconsideration. They may be regarded as the result of the author's studies and reflections for thirty years. They are written in a style of great freshness, and will attract, if we mistake not, a wide circle of readers. The illustrations are drawn from a very extensive observation. The author has made excellent use of his late tour in Europe. The scenery of Wales, the Rhine and the Alps, is drawn with so graphic a pencil, that the reader longs to behold it with his own eyes, or if he has once seen it, to feast his vision again upon it. One is struck also with the enthusiasm of the author. He is drawn forward by an ardor which never tires. He feels that he is in the company of one whose eyes and heart are always open, and whose industry keeps pace with the wonderful progress of science in all directions. The lectures will be acceptable in a high degree to the theologian and religious man from the fact that they are consecrated to the service of the church, that the religious bearings of science are brought out so prominently, and from the special reverence which is everywhere paid to the written revelation. At the same time, there may be particular views from which the reader may dissent, or in regard to which further light may be needed. All will readily allow that the subjects which are discussed are of great and momentous interest, and should be approached with candor and with an earnest desire to ascertain the truth.

On one topic we will venture a suggestion. Philologists would hardly accept Dathe, the older Rosenmüller, or even Knapp and Dr. J. P. Smith, as adequate representatives of the present state of their science. Sacred philology, or the thorough grammatical and philological study of the Bible, in the original languages, has made very great progress, since the time of even the younger Rosenmüller. The venerable Dr. Pye Smith, with all his multifarious reading, was evidently but imperfectly acquainted with the progress of philology for the last ten or twenty years. He would be regarded as a respectable, but by no means a high authority.

President Hitchcock suggests the importance of the establishment of a professorship of natural theology in our theological seminaries, and adduces weighty reasons in favor of the measure. The new college of the Scotch Free Church, and the new Dissenting College in London have made a provision of this nature. But to accomplish this object in our American seminaries, a fourth year would be indispensable. A large part of the first year is employed, we had almost said *wasted*, in the elementary study of Hebrew. In the middle year, many topics in theology are passed over, or but partially considered, for want of time. Into the third year, pastoral theology, the

composition of sermons, and church history are crowded. In order to render a professorship of natural theology really useful, the students must have time, to master for themselves in a good degree the various topics of natural science, in their theological bearings, which would be brought under review. The mere hearing of lectures, it seems to us, would not be sufficient. At the same time, the subject is worthy of serious consideration.

ARTICLE IX.

SELECT BIBLICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

UNITED STATES.

THE works of Rev. Dr. Samuel Hopkins, of Newport, R. I., are in the press, and will be published in the autumn, probably in four volumes. A new memoir will be prefixed to the first volume. It is almost half a century since he died, and his works, though some of them have been often published, have never been collected into a convenient form. Some of them have been long inaccessible. A generation of ministers is now arising, who know the fame of the great "Hopkinsian," only by tradition.

It gives us great pleasure, also, to add, that the same society, the American Doctrinal Book and Tract Society, are about to publish the writings of John Robinson of Leyden, the true founder of the Puritan commonwealth, at Plymouth.

A Memoir of the life of Rev. Dr. Samuel Worcester of Salem, Mass., first Corresponding Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, is preparing by his son, Rev. Dr. S. M. Worcester. "Copious and rich" materials have been unexpectedly discovered, which will serve to illustrate the early life and character of Dr. W. Many interesting facts will also be incorporated in relation to the earliest history of the home and foreign missionary enterprise in New England. Dr. W. was a distinguished and leading actor in the stirring scenes, religious and ecclesiastical, which marked the twenty-five years from 1795 to 1820. The work will be published in the autumn, in two volumes, large 12mo.

Rev. Dr. John Proudfit, professor in Rutgers College, N. J., is preparing a history of the Huguenots who came from France, and settled in New York and New Jersey.

The fourth volume of Professor Torrey's translation of Neander's Church History, is in the press at Andover, and will be soon published. It brings down the history from Pope Gregory VII., A. D. 1073, to the martyrdom of Huss, including all of the history which had been published at the author's death. We may state in this connection, that a translation of Neander's Practical Commentaries on the Epistle to the Philippians, and the epistle of James, by Mrs. Conant of Rochester, N. Y., will soon be published.

A new edition of Kühner's School, or Middle, Grammar of the Greek language, is in the press at Andover, and will be published in a few months, by Messrs. Appletons of New York. The third German edition, 1850, contains many alterations and improvements. These, and other improvements, are incorporated into the new American edition. This edition is published in a duodecimo form, and will be sold at a considerably reduced price. The value and popularity of Kühner's grammatical works, may be estimated from the fact that his Elementary Greek Grammar has reached, in about fourteen years, the eleventh edition, and his Elementary Latin Grammar, the eighth edition, and this in the face of much competition, and not a little prejudice. The habitual references to his Greek grammars, in leading New Testament commentaries, e. g. that of Meyer, show the estimation in which they are held in Germany. It may be added that an edition of 2500 copies of the translation of the School Greek Grammar, has been sold, and that it has been for some time out of print. The tenth edition of the translation of the Elementary Greek Grammar, has been published.

The new edition of Horace, by Prof. Lincoln of Providence, has been published for some months, and is received with much favor. It is a beautiful book, printed with the utmost care and accuracy, while the notes illustrate the really difficult points, and hit the happy medium between the meagreness of annotations in some editions of the classics, and the redundancy in others. We would suggest that a plan of old Rome, and a map of the surrounding country, with a larger number of wood-cut illustrations, would much enhance the value of the volume. We hope to insert, at an early day, an extended review of this edition.

An edition of the Ajax of Sophocles, has just appeared from the Cambridge press, with a large body of learned notes. The text fills 60 pages, the notes 280. Various readings are frequently discussed, and the notes of earlier editors, Brunck, Musgrave, Porson, Elmsley, Hermann, Lobeck, Wunder, etc., are carefully collated, and the most valuable of them used. Discussions so full and learned as many of the notes exhibit, are of course beyond the reach of most persons who are studying the classics in our colleges. But they will be highly prized by the few who are able to appreciate them, and they will be of great service to teachers. "The wants of the tyro have received a large share of the editor's attention, as the numerous references to the grammars of Jelf [Kühner], Matthiæ, Buttmann, and Krüger will evince." We fear that "the tyro" does not possess these grammars. At least he would be far more profited, if the references had been made to the smaller grammars of Kühner and Buttmann. The name of the editor is not given.

We mentioned on p. 457, that Prof. Felton was preparing a new Selection of Reading Lessons in Greek. We learn that the object is, by extracts from Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, etc., to give, as far as possible, a connected political and civil history of Greece.

A Translation of the Book of Proverbs, with a Commentary, is in the course of preparation by Prof. Stuart, and will soon be ready for the press.

This book, so peculiarly oriental in its spirit and character, has hitherto received but little attention from commentators, either in the English or German languages.

The translation of Mosheim's Historical Commentaries (*De Rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum*), is printed, and will soon be published in two large octavo volumes of about 600 pages each. The first was translated in England by Mr. Vidal, the second by Dr. Murdock of New Haven. "Mosheim," says Hagenbach, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 552, "was the first who raised church history into the rank of a science, in that he freed it from all orthodox and heterodox party interests, casting them down at his feet. It was not that colorless impartiality, weakened into indifference, in which Mosheim saw the triumph of history. He was not satisfied with a dry accumulation of learned material, but he had a happy union of learning, acuteness and taste, of religious earnestness and human mildness, of precision and versatile representation, which have won for him the honored name of father of modern church history."

The Works of the Rev. Dr. Lyman Beecher are about to be published by John P. Jewett & Co. of Boston in five vols. 12mo.

On p. 458 of this volume, we mentioned the number of students at fifteen of the principal theological schools of this country. We now add the following:

| | | Whole No. students. |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|
| Fifteen Seminaries already mentioned, | | 650 |
| Rochester, N. Y., | Baptist, | 20 |
| Hamilton, N. Y., | " | 8 |
| New Hampton, N. H., | " | 17 |
| Western Theol. Institution, Ky., | " | 7 |
| Theol. Dep. Howard Coll., Ala., | " | 12 |
| Da. Do. Mercer Coll., Ga., | " | 4 |
| Furman Theol. Sem., S. C., | " | 6 |
| Kalamazoo Theol. Sem., Mich., | " | 18 |
| Theol. Seminary, Columbia, S. C., | Presbyterian, | 32 |
| Total, | | 769 |

It is stated, that of the 123 students connected with the Baptist Seminaries, less than 80 are pursuing a purely theological education.

ENGLAND.

The University of London was founded in 1827. In 1836, it was incorporated, not as the University of London, but as University College, London. King's College, London, had already received a similar charter. In Dec. 1837, a distinct body of gentlemen were incorporated as The University of London, who were appointed to act as "the Senate." A chancellor is nominated by the crown for life, a vice-chancellor annually by the senate. This senate confer, "after examination," the degrees of B. A., M. A., LL. B., LL. D., M. B. and M. D. University and King's Colleges were empowered by the charter to send up candidates for examination. Provision was made

for "affiliating" other educational institutions. Candidates produce certificates from their respective colleges that they have completed the course of instruction determined by the regulations of the senate in that behalf; on being declared by the examiners entitled to their degree, they receive their certificate, under the university seal. The literary and theological institutions that have become "affiliated," are about twenty-seven, besides nearly one hundred medical colleges in different parts of the empire. The sum received for matriculation and other fees in 1850 was £1585. The senate of the University of London have apartments in Somerset House. The buildings of University College are in Gower Street.

Messrs. Bagsters are publishing a new edition of the Septuagint, and also of the Greek Testament; a Syriac Reading Book, with Translations and a Grammatical Analysis; also a Chaldee Reading Book on the same plan; a new Greek Harmony, a new and complete Hebrew Concordance, and a Syriac Concordance.

The third and concluding volume of Dr. Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament has been published in a volume of 632 pages. It is furnished with a General Index. Isaac Taylor has in press a work entitled "Wesley and Methodism." Dr. Traill's translation of Josephus, edited by Mr. Taylor, is completed in two beautiful and admirably illustrated volumes. A new quarterly theological and critical Journal, edited by the Rev. T. K. Arnold, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, the classical editor, has appeared. It will probably advocate "high church" principles.

Rev. Dr. Henderson's Commentary on Jeremiah has appeared under the title, *The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah and that of the Lamentations*. Translated from the Hebrew, with a commentary, critical, philological and exegetical. 8vo. pp. 306.

A prospectus of Dr. S. P. Tregelles's edition of the Greek Testament has been published with a specimen. "The text is formed on the authority of the oldest Greek MSS. and versions, aided by early citations, so as to present, as far as practicable, the readings which were commonly received at the earliest period to which we can revert to obtain critical evidence. The various readings are, 1st, those of *all* the more ancient Greek MSS., most of them collated by the editor; 2d, of all the ancient versions, most of which have required reexamination; and 3d, of the citations in the early ecclesiastical writers, given fully to the end of the third century, including Eusebius. The Latin version of Jerome is given, mostly on the authority of the Codex Amnicianus of the sixth century, collated by the editor."

It is stated by the "Tablet," a Roman Catholic newspaper of London, March 15, 1851, that Cardinal Mai's edition of the Codex Vaticanus (MS. B.) is printed, and will be published as soon as the extensive critical apparatus which is to accompany it, is completed. This apparatus is the *Bibliotheca Nova Patrum Graeca et Latina*, consisting of treatises on the real presence and transubstantiation, the veneration of images, etc., never before published! Six volumes were to have been published in April. The whole will consist of about ten volumes.

SCOTLAND.

The new college building of the Free Church was opened on the 6th of Nov. 1850, with appropriate public exercises. It was erected by the liberality of twenty-one individuals, who gave £1000 each. The foundation-stone was laid by Dr. Chalmers, June 4, 1846. It is a handsome and substantial edifice of stone. During the week of the opening of the building, a sermon was delivered by Dr. Paterson, moderator of the general assembly; an address to the professors and students by Dr. P., and an address by William Cunningham, D. D., principal of the college, and professor of church history, were also delivered, together with the following introductory lectures: On church history by Dr. Cunningham; systematic theology by Dr. James Buchanan; apologetical theology and the doctrine of the church by Dr. Bannerman; theology of the Old Testament by Dr. Duncan; exegetical theology by Dr. Black; logic and metaphysics by Rev. A. C. Fraser; moral philosophy by P. C. Macdougall; and natural science by Dr. John Fleming. These lectures will be read with much interest as showing the spirit with which the college commences operations, and the talents and kind of culture which the professors possess. We are surprised that no provision is made for sacred rhetoric. One sentence in Dr. Cunningham's lecture, we quote with particular gratification. "There is good reason to hope that the next general assembly will require a knowledge of the elements of Hebrew as a qualification for entering the hall."

FRANCE.

The number of books and pamphlets, published in France, in 1850, was 7208, of which 4701 were printed in Paris, the rest in the provinces, including 37 in Algiers. There were published besides, 2697 engravings and lithographs, 597 pieces of vocal music, 625 of instrumental music, 122 geographical charts, etc.

It is a melancholy fact, though easily accounted for, that for a long series of years, no very important works in theology or in biblical interpretation, have appeared in the French language. The Catholic and Protestant churches of "the most refined" nation in Europe have been alike barren. A little activity has recently been shown by the countrymen of Bochart and Calvin. The following books have appeared within a few years; a Commentary on the Galatians by Prof. Sardinoux of Montauban; on Philippians by Rilliet of Geneva; on Romans by Oltramare of Geneva; and the work of Arnaud on Jude, alluded to on a subsequent page. The two letters of Edmund Scherer, late professor in the theological school in Geneva, have called forth replies from Malan, Merle, Darby, Chénèvière, etc. Licentiate Colani, a friend of Scherer, has published at Strasburg, since July, 1850, a periodical entitled, "*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie Chrétienne.*"

GERMANY.

The number of works published, in the six months preceding the late Easter fair, according to the Leipsic catalogue, was 3684; number of works in press, 1186. It is gratifying to observe that the number of volumes, which relate to the "inner mission," the Sabbath, and other questions of an urgent practical nature, is increasing.

Among the most recent works in biblical literature are the following: Commentary on the Book of Job by Lic. H. A. Hahn, pp. 342; Die Völkertafel der Genesis, or ethnographical investigations by Dr. Knobel, pp. 371; The prophet Isaiah explained by Prof. E. Meier, first half, pp. 320; Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, second part, chs. 7—11, by Dr. F. A. Philippi, pp. 278; The Second Epistle of Paul to Timothy with a Commentary, in Latin, by Dr. G. E. Leo, pp. 135, (Comment. on First Epistle was published in 1837); Gospel of Mark, in its composition, position, origin and character, by Lic. Hilgenfeldt, pp. 141; Von Raumer's Palestine, third edition, much improved, pp. 492; The first three Gospels translated and explained by H. Ewald, pp. 388; Vol. II. of the second edition of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Psalms, pp. 482; and second edition of Meyer's Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians.

Of late works in other departments of oriental literature, we may name: History of the Israelites from the destruction of the first temple to the entrance of the Maccabees, Simon, on the highpriesthood, by L. Hersfeld; the nature and genius of the popular language of the Egyptians, by H. Brugsch; explanation of the Egyptian monuments in the museum at Berlin, by the same; Schwartze's Coptic Grammar, edited, after the author's death, by H. Steinthal; Movers's "Phœnician Antiquity," in three parts, Part 1, political history and administration, Part 2, history of the colonies, Part 3, not published; Indian Studies, a Journal for the knowledge of Indian Antiquity, edited by Dr. Albert Weber, teacher of Sanskrit in the University of Berlin; four Nos. published, 1 Th. 10 gr. each; and J. Fürst's Biblia Judaica.

Of the classical publications, we name: the Dictionary of the Greek Language by C. Jacobitz and E. E. Seiler, in 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 1502 and 1792, price 7 1-3 Th.; the same abridged in 1 vol. for schools, pp. 1602, 4 1-2 Th., highly commended in the Leipsic Repertorium, Jan. 1851, p. 97; first half of the third part of K. F. Hermann's Manual of Greek Antiquities; Investigations on the documents inserted in the orations of the Attic orators, by A. Westermann; Plato's Works in 1 vol. ed. Stallbaum; March of the Ten Thousand, geographically explained by Prof. Koch of Leipsic; Part 2. of Weissenborn's edition of Livy; Works of Tacitus, ed. C. Halm, Part 1. containing the Annals.

The first year of the "Deutsche Zeitschrift für Christliche Wissenschaft und Christliches Leben," established by Professors Julius Müller, Neander, and Nitzsch, is now completed. It is published weekly, or in monthly parts, in quarto form, with good paper and print, at five thaler a year, and forms a volume of 424 pages. Among the more important articles to American

readers, is one on "The position and importance of the book of Job in the Old Testament, according to its didactic and dramatic character," by Hupfeld; on "Heathenism, Judaism, and Irvingism," by J. L. Jacobi; on "The doctrinal system, and the development, religious and theological, of the Scottish church," by Köstlin; on "The invisible church," and on the question "Whether the Son of God would have become incarnate, if the human race had remained without sin," by Julius Müller; on "The last half century, in its relation to the present;" the "Nature and importance of practical exegesis;" the "Relation of the Hellenistic to the Christian ethics," by Neander; and on the "Doctrine of inspiration," by Tholuck.

The 2d Heft of the *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, for 1851, contains the following Articles: Wherein consists the forgiveness of sins, by J. F. K. Gurlitt.— Rome and Cologne, or the development of the Christian-German Art, by B. Stark, private teacher in Jena, containing among other things a comparison of the Cathedral at Cologne, its structure and influences, with the Roman basilicas, much to the advantage of the former.— On the importance of the Study of Christian Ethics at the present time, An Address delivered at the opening of his lectures in the university of Heidelberg, by Prof. Lic. Schoeberlein.— A review of the 2d edition of Lücke's Introduction to the Apocalypse and the apocalyptic literature generally, by Tischendorf, the New Testament editor, containing many illustrations of the Apocalypse from the writer's studies in the apocryphal books.

The last Article, filling about eighty pages, is a contribution towards a memorial of the life of Dr. Neander, by Dr. C. H. Kling, pastor in Ebersbach in Württemberg. We translate a few biographical notices, which may be interesting to those who have read the Article on Neander in our last Number.

"Dr. Neander was baptized on the 25th of February, 1806, at St. Catharine's, in the house of the pastor Bossau, who also performed the holy office. There were present as sponsors: John Gurlitt, Charles Augustus Varnhagen, and William Neumann. Mendel took in baptism the name: John Augustus Neander—evidently one Christian name from each of the three sponsors, and also the family surname from Neumann.

"As it regards the other members of the family, the eldest brother, a doctor of medicine, born 1780, was baptized in the same year with Neander, on the 25th of June, under the name of Andrew Charles John Mendel, an excellent physician and highly esteemed because of his science, skill, and disposition. He lived unmarried and died with several other physicians, in the winter of the siege, of typhus fever, which at that time prevailed in the military hospitals. Neander writes respecting it to K. Mayer: "Terrible news came upon us at the close of last week, to show us how this life is only a dream, and how the waking and the being for which we long, is only in the next, or rather the first true life. My good, noble brother, in the fulness of health, has fallen a victim to his calling, a victim which God hath accepted. He died of a violent and quick-destroying nervous fever; I left him stronger than myself."—The second brother had been already baptized

in 1804, and bore, as also did the sisters, the name Mendahl, a kind-hearted man, of easy and lively humor, and more inclined to the customary ways of the world, who at every opportunity expressed his deep veneration for his Augustus, for whom he only wished something more of the spirit of the world, or at least a power of helping himself in the world and of mingling with it. He was a long time a travelling merchant. — The eldest sister, Henrietta, (Madame Scholtz) born 1777, was baptized on the 12th of September 1807; on the 22d of March, 1809, the middle one, Joanna, born 1782, his faithful housekeeper and nurse until his death; on the 7th of November of the same year, the youngest, Betty, born 1788, among whose sponsors he himself is mentioned, and who died of a disease of the mind. There is no record of the baptism of the *mother*. According to a trustworthy oral tradition she was baptized shortly before her son went to Heidelberg, and that too, as all the children, by Pastor Bossau, who also in 1816 baptized Emma von Wertheim, the daughter of Mrs. Scholtz by her first marriage."

The following relates to the change in Neander's views: "Neander was deeply moved and restless, pondering his thoughts with himself, he travelled on in company with a relative to Hamburg. Here he met with Matthias Claudius, and the aged Dr. Heise, and he preached in Wandsbeck his first sermon on John 1: 1 sq.

"After his return from Hamburg, his friends observed an important change in him. He, *Neander*, had in fact become a new man, although many hard conflicts still remained before him. He could not say enough of the friendliness and the pious temper of those excellent men who had become so dear to him, and whom he visited again and again, as often as he came to Hamburg. Schleiermacher, whom till now he had held so high, and what he had of the writings of Schelling and Fichte, were laid aside. He read much more in the New Testament, and soon the Christian Fathers of the first century filled his rooms, and on these he often expressed himself with eloquent enthusiasm. For a few months, however, he remained quiet and reserved, and said little to his friends, who were also careful not to intrude upon him. Then he handed them a full confession of faith, written in Latin, which they copied, and in which at the close he laid down *the study of Church History as the aim of his theological study*, and earnestly implored the Lord that he would guide him therein and keep him from all error."

"In the autumn of 1810, Neander, after he had spent one year and a half in Hamburg as a licentiate preacher, went to Heidelberg, notwithstanding all the scruples of his friends, who feared that he would put no measure or limit upon his labors. Soon, indeed, came information from thence, that he was studying incessantly, and that traces of earlier suffering were showing themselves. Then the anxious mother, with her daughters, hastened to him, and remained with him. In the year 1817, she died in Berlin. Pastors Jaenike and Hermes, together with ourselves and family friends, among whom were at that time Olshausen and Tholuck, followed her to the grave. How often did Neander, as we afterwards met in Berlin, bring to mind the way in which he had come to Heidelberg, and how I had been a feeble in-

strument of it in the hand of the Lord. Also I may not leave unmentioned how Neander in the first years of his residence in Berlin said to me that he would indeed like a family life, and if the Lord would so order it, would not be disinclined to enter into the state of holy matrimony. He was my groomsmen at my marriage in 1817, took part in the festivities of the occasion, and entertained himself with the guests, gentlemen and ladies, although chiefly with the Rev. Prof. Spilleke and Director Bernhardt. Towards my wife, and afterwards towards my children, he was always friendly, and entertained himself with them; and so late as 1841, when I was in Berlin, he would have me with my three daughters dine with him."

The first article of the 3d Heft, 1851, is an academical address in memory of Dr. Neander's services to Church History, delivered Nov. 4, 1850, by Dr. Hagenbach of Basil, filling about fifty pages. About half is taken up with a rapid review of early church history, and of that written by German Protestants, with particular remarks on Mosheim, Planck, Marheinecke, and others. Neander's principal works are finally characterized. Then follow an explanation of Phil. 2: 6, in opposition to Baur, by Ernesti, pastor at Wolfenbüttel; an explanation of Paul's "self-confessions," in Rom. vii., by Umbreit; a new investigation of the passage Rom. 8: 18-25, in opposition to Rupprecht, by F. F. Zyro of Berne; a review of Semisch's "*die Apostolischen Denkwürdigkeiten*" of Justin Martyr, by W. Grimm of Jena; a notice of E. Arnaud's critical researches on the epistle of Jude, by Kienlen of Colmar; and remarks on the second and third church conventions at Wittenberg, 1849, and Stuttgart, 1850, by Dr. Lechler of Waiblingen. An Index for the *Studien u. K.* for 1838-37, and another for 1838-47, have been published; price for both, one thaler.

A Prospectus of Dr. Neander's works, has been published. The exegetical part will embrace lectures on the New Testament, except the Apocalypse, the last three chapters only of which he had lectured upon. The second part will embrace those historico-theological lectures which it may be thought best to publish. These will include a sketch (sketchography), of church history, history of doctrines, history of Christian ethics, and on the opposite tendencies of Protestantism and Catholicism. The third part will embrace systematic theology—dogmatics and ethics. The aim of the editor, Dr. Julius Müller of Halle, will be to give a true and exact exhibition of the thoughts of Neander, without intermingling any foreign element. Several of the younger pupils and friends of Dr. Neander, will give their assistance in preparing the edition.

AUSTRIA.

The imperial printing press at Vienna is conducted on a large scale. It was established by the late emperor Francis. It furnishes regular employment for 700 persons, besides many artists, men of science, and mechanics. It has branches in Lemberg, Temesvar, Salzburg and other large towns. An engine of 20 horse power moves 46 printing and 24 copper-plate presses, and 10 glazing machines. There are, besides, 36 large and 12

small iron hand presses, 12 numbering and embossing machines, and 80 lithographic presses. One thousand reams of paper are consumed in a day. Among the objects which this establishment has sent to the Exhibition in London, are 11,000 steel punches of characters and alphabets. There are punches of 164 different alphabets, from the hieroglyphic, hieratic and demotic, down to the Laos, Formosan, etc. There is a copy of a certain work, entitled "The Hall of Languages," consisting of 17 sheets in elephant folio, containing the Lord's Prayer, in 608 languages printed with Roman letters, and in 200 languages in the characters peculiar to each language. There is also a Japanese novel (see Vol. II. p. 39 of the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*), the first work of this kind that was ever printed with movable type.

AFRICA.

Dr. Krapf returned from Europe to his station on the eastern coast of Africa last winter, accompanied by three ordained missionaries and three mechanics, all Germans. The present force of the mission, therefore, is nine males, six of them being ordained. It is the wish of the Church Missionary Society to commence new stations without delay, particularly in Usambara and Ukambani, the former country lying some 200 miles to the south-west of Rabhai Empia, and the latter 400 or 500 miles to the north-west. The ultimate aim of the society is to push on to the interior, in the hope that the missionaries of the American Board, coming from the Gaboon, will meet them in the centre; and the latter will undoubtedly endeavor to do their part in the enterprise, if they shall be properly reinforced from our theological seminaries.

The tours which Dr. Krapf and Mr. Rehmman have already made, show conclusively that the country back from the coast is a vast table land, having an elevation of 2000 or 3000 feet; and there is every reason to believe that it will be found adapted to the European constitution. Indeed, Rabhai Empia has proved to be very favorable to health, though it is near the coast. There are numerous mountains rising from the table land; and two have been discovered already, the Kilimandjaro, about $3^{\circ} 20'$ south of the equator, and the Kenia, about 1° south, whose summits are covered with perpetual snow. Both of these mountains are the sources of large rivers, some of which are sufficiently identified; and Dr. Krapf thinks it probable that the White Nile has its origin in the Kenia; or, at any rate, that its fountain head is not far distant. He rejects the theory that Lake Niassi feeds the Nile; for he has recently visited the Lufuma, and he says that the Niassi discharges its waters through this river into the Indian Ocean. Judging from what he has heard of the Uniamése, he supposes that in this country, some 500 or 600 miles west of Mombas, or the bordering territories, will be found the head quarters of the Congo, the Tchadda, the Nile, and the Kilimani; so that it will prove to be the great water shed of Africa, sending forth its treasures to all points of the compass.

The tribes which live back a few hundred miles from the coast, are decid-

edly superior to those on or near the ocean. And it is thought that the obstacles to missionary operations will diminish, as the missionaries proceed toward the interior. Among the Wakamba, for example, Dr. Krapf found much less "beggary" than he had been led to expect from his previous experience; and this he regards as a very serious hindrance to the spread of the Gospel in some parts of East Africa.

The languages of these tribes seem to belong to that great family which has spread over so large a portion of Africa; and hence there will be less difficulty in becoming acquainted with them. It was found, for instance, that the Jaggas and the Wanika were able to understand each other sufficiently for purposes of business. In the course of a few years, we shall have the materials for a thorough examination of one of the most interesting problems connected with the history of Africa.

A knowledge of two or three laws of language in East Africa, will assist the reader in understanding the proper names which are of most common occurrence. *Wa* is used to form the plural, and *M* the singular. Thus, *Wakamba* means the Kamba people; *Mkamba*, one of the Kambas. The prefix *U* denotes a country; and *Ki* indicates the language. Thus, *Usambara* means the country of the Wasamba; *Kisamba* is the language of the Wasamba. Or we may say, the Wakuafi speak the Kikuafi, and live in Ukuafi.

ASIA.

A Society has been formed in Jerusalem, by Englishmen and other foreigners living there, for the purpose of investigating all objects of interest in the Holy Land, whether relating to ancient or present times. It has corresponding members in Beirut, Damascus, and other places. Weekly meetings are held, and a library and museum are begun.

J. D. Hooker has published in the Journal of the London Geographical Society, for 1850, an account of a fourth excursion which he has made into the passes of Thibet by "the Donkiah Lah." This pass lies in the eastern chain of the mountains, about 28° N. Lat. and 88° 30' E. longitude. On the right the Donkiah Lah rises like a wall, 23,175 feet. The snow line on the south side is about 17,000 feet high, and on the side towards Thibet, 18,000 feet. As a general result, Mr. Hooker says: "I no longer consider the Himalaya as a continuous snowy chain of mountains, but as the snowed spurs of far higher unsnowed land behind; which higher land is protected from the snow by the peaks on the spurs that run south of it."

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
NO. XXXII.
AND
AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY,
NO. LXXXIV.

OCTOBER, 1851.

ARTICLE I.
LIFE OF ZUINGLI.

By R. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages, Middlebury College.
[Continued from p. 594.]

His Preaching at the Convent of Einsiedeln, and its Results.

ONE of the duties assigned to Zuingli in the convent at Einsiedeln was the preaching of the gospel. And most faithfully did he perform this part of his duty. He was to be sure, cautious, at first, as both his own distrust of himself, and his knowledge of the prejudices of others, admonished him to be. His reverence for the fathers, influenced him to give more heed to their interpretations, than he subsequently felt at liberty to do. Still he adhered to his general principle of explaining scripture by scripture; and as he by degrees became imbued with the spirit of the writers of the Bible, his own pulpit exercises became in a high degree spiritual and effective in the reformation of his hearers. He insisted on the necessity of sincere repentance, newness of life, and firm trust in the Lord Jesus Christ, as revealed in the Bible, as the only Redeemer and Saviour of sinners. Works, so far as they are the expressions of right feeling within, are praiseworthy; but all penances and mortification of the flesh are without efficacy in procuring absolution from sin. He endeavored to dissuade his hearers from any trust in the aid of the saints, and of the virgin, whose power was supposed to have been exerted so often there, and from honoring any image or likeness of

man or God, but the only perfect image of humanity and the God-head, Jesus Christ. By the inculcation of such and similar doctrines, the way was gradually prepared for a more formal and public attack upon the superstitious practices and beliefs of the age.

He chose the annual festival held in commemoration of the supposed miraculous consecration of the convent, called the Angels' Consecration, when immense crowds flocked to Einsiedeln. He ascended the pulpit and rose amidst the assembled multitude for his customary discourse. After making an exordium full of warmth and feeling, in order to gain the attention of his auditors, he thus proceeds to remark upon topics connected with the day and the assembling together in that place: "Cease to believe that God resides in this temple more than in every other place. Whatever region of the earth you may inhabit, he is near you, he surrounds you, he grants your prayers, if they deserve to be granted; but it is not by useless vows, by long pilgrimages, offerings destined to adorn senseless images, that you can obtain the divine favor; resist temptations, repress guilty desires, shun all injustice, relieve the unfortunate, console the afflicted; these are the works pleasing to the Lord. Alas! I know it, it is ourselves, ministers of the altar, we, who ought to be the salt of the earth, who have led into a maze of error the ignorant and credulous multitude. In order to accumulate treasures sufficient to satisfy our avarice, we raised vain and useless practices to the rank of good works; and the Christians of these times, too docile to our instructions, neglect to fulfil the laws of God, and only think of making atonement for their crimes, instead of renouncing them. Let us 'live according to our desires,' say they, 'let us enrich ourselves with the goods of our neighbor; let us not fear to stain our hands with blood and murder; we shall find easy expiations in the favor of the church.' Senseless men! Do they think to obtain remission for their lies, their impurities, their adulteries, their homicides, their treacheries, by prayers recited in honor of the Queen of Heaven, as if she were the protectress of all evil doers? Undeceive yourselves, erring people! The God of justice suffers not himself to be moved by words which the tongue utters and the heart disowns. He forgives no one but him who himself forgives the enemy who has trespassed against him. Did these chosen of God, at whose feet you come hither to prostrate yourselves, enter into heaven by relying on the merit of another? No—it was by walking in the path of the law, by fulfilling the will of the Most High, by facing death that they might remain faithful to their Redeemer. Imitate the holiness of their lives, walk in their

footsteps, suffering yourselves to be turned aside neither by dangers nor seductions; this is the honor that you ought to pay them. But in the day of trouble put your trust in none but God, who created the heavens and the earth with a word; at the approach of death invoke only Jesus Christ, who has bought you with his blood, and is the sole Mediator between God and man."¹

The impression made by such sentiments thus glowingly expressed, at such a place and time, can be more easily imagined than described. Astonishment was depicted upon every face, so directly did the preacher discard all that had given notoriety to the very place where he stood, and so directly in opposition to all that had been heard on that festival day in Einsiedeln for a century or more. But mingled with the astonishment, very diverse feelings could be read in those upturned faces, and detected in the low murmur that occasionally rather heightened than interrupted the stillness and solemnity of the house. Many, filled with indignation at the insult offered to the objects of their most sacred veneration, seemed to expect that the very images and walls would cry out, and rebuke the arrogance and insolence of the speaker. Others, on the other hand, who, overcome by the power, and enlightened by the brilliancy of the exhibitions of truth, began to feel their doubts and fears giving way, and strong faith elevating them above their former superstitions, glowed with admiration of the apostle of truth who, they felt, spoke out the honest and strong convictions of a heart, which despised all fear of man, and was elevated above all earthly considerations. Between these two classes were all grades of feeling, according as the regard for the faith of their fathers and their own earlier belief, or the conviction of the faithful exhibition of the truth upon their judgment prevailed. Doubt, and desire for further light were strong in many a breast, as the assembly broke up that day. Murmurings, now unrestrained by the sacredness of the place, were heard from little groups collected here and there in the region around the convent; others discussed and doubted; and still others openly applauded. The fact that Zuinagli escaped personal insult and injury is perhaps a sufficient proof that he carried a large part of his audience with him.

The records of the time also give us an additional proof of the influence of this sermon, which, says Schuler,² 'if ever anything did, produced effects like that of the first preaching of the gospel by Peter at Jerusalem and Paul in Asia.' Many pilgrims were seen, on all

¹ Hess, p. 62 sq.

² S. 246.

the ways leading from Einsiedeln, returning with the gifts and tapers which they had brought as offerings to the virgin and saints. Frequently as they met other bands of pilgrims they stopped to recount to them the doctrines which they had heard. Thus many were induced to turn about and leave their pilgrimage incompleted, as a weariness to the flesh and without advantage to the spirit. The result of the preaching of Zuingli was accordingly an immediate diminution of pilgrimage to the Loretto of Switzerland, and the people of Einsiedeln themselves, penetrated by the spirit of the truth, forgot their prejudices, and no longer troubled themselves about those who came to worship at their long renowned shrine. It is true that some of the monks were exasperated at the prospect of the diminution of their revenues, and the neighboring convents, too, fearing that the craft by which they obtained their wealth would be endangered, began to spread injurious reports of the reformer.

His Relation to the Papal Hierarchy.

The effect which this preaching of Zuingli had at Rome, upon the emissaries of the Pope, who were in authority in the church, was perhaps different from what we, who look back under the influence of subsequent developments of popery, should expect. Not a word of warning or rebuke was administered; no mark of the displeasure of his ecclesiastical superiors was exhibited. On the contrary, the papal legate, Antonio Pucci, mentioned Zuingli, as one who might become highly useful to the court of Rome, both from his ability in the pulpit, and from his influence in the cantons; and Pope Leo X. sent him, as a mark of favor, a diploma which gave him the title of chaplain acolyte to the Holy See.¹ He was, indeed, at this time, politically a friend of the Pope, not because he consulted for his aggrandizement, but for the good of his country, and felt that the French party, as it was called, which was *then* hostile to the Pope, was also hostile to the best interests of the cantons. Besides, it was an object which Leo could not overlook, to attract men of learning and influence to his cause, and he hoped, perhaps, that Zuingli would follow in the path that Erasmus afterward pursued, or in one leading more directly to Rome. Furthermore, Zuingli had, as yet, shown no disposition to withdraw himself from the control of the church, only to bring about a reformation of abuses. It also should be remembered,

¹ Hess, p. 65.

that the jealousy which afterwards watched for the least indications of defection, was not yet awakened.

There was no want of faithfulness or plainness in Zuingli's dealings with the leaders of the church at this time. Even before the sermon at Einsiedeln, he had written to Hugh of Landenberg, bishop of Constance, to urge him to put an end, in his diocese, to puerile and dangerous practices, which would otherwise produce incalculable mischief; and to inform him of the course which he himself felt constrained to enter upon, in disclosing the truth, opposing errors, and assailing abuses. The legate, he says, conversed with me four times upon this subject, (the corruption of the church,) and I obtained from him the most brilliant promises. I freely explained to him what must be done, and added thereto, that by God's help I was going forward to preach the Gospel, by means of which, popery would become not a little shaken and weakened. He also gave up his pension at this time, and consented to receive it for three years more only at the urgent request of the legate, so that he might not seem to have come to an open hostility with his highness the Pope. But he adds, "I will not for any money, suppress a single syllable of the truth."

To cardinal Schinner, with whom he had long been on terms of political intimacy, and with whom he had frequent opportunities of consultation at Einsiedeln, he spoke with a plainness deserving the highest praise: "The new lights which have been diffused since the revival of letters, have lessened the credulity of the people, are opening their eyes to a number of superstitions, and will prevent them from blindly adopting what is taught them by priests equally destitute of virtue and of talent. They begin loudly to blame the idleness of the monks, the ignorance of the priests, and the misconduct of the prelates, and will no longer give their confidence to people whom they cannot respect. If care be not taken, the multitude will soon lose the only curb capable of restraining its passions, and will go on from one disorder to another. The danger increases every day, and delay may be fatal. A reformation ought to be begun immediately, but it ought to begin with superiors, and spread from them to their inferiors.

"If the princes of the church would give the example, if they would return to themselves and to a conduct more conformable to the Gospel; if bishops were no longer seen to handle the sword instead of the crozier; prelates to put themselves at the head of their subjects, in order to wage inveterate war against each other; ecclesi-

astics of all ranks to dissipate in scandalous debauchery, the revenues of their benefices accumulated upon their heads; then we might raise our voices against the vices of the laity, without fearing their recriminations, and we might indulge some hopes of the amendment of the people. But a reform in manners is impossible, if you do not get rid of those swarms of pious idlers, who feed at the expense of the industrious citizen, and if you do not abolish those superstitious ceremonies and absurd dogmas equally calculated to shock the understanding of reasonable men, and to alarm the piety of religious ones."¹

In reference to his efforts with Cardinal Schinner and others, he writes to Valentinus Compar, in 1525, "Hear, my Valentinus, what I say to you, and can prove by living witnesses: Before a separation in religious matters was effected, I conversed with the leading men in the church, cardinals, and bishops, and expostulated with them upon the errors that had been introduced through human traditions, and admonished them to make a beginning of removing the multitude of abuses and errors; for, if this be not done, the already overpowering burden threatens to overwhelm them with a terrible crash. Eight years ago, (1517,) while I was yet at Einsiedeln, I spake upon this subject with the Cardinal of Sion, and afterward during the first part of my abode at Zurich, and plainly and clearly pointed out to him, that popery rests upon weak and almost failing foundations. I substantiated it by plain and undoubted passages of the Holy Scriptures. Geroldseck, Zingk, and Sander, who are all yet alive, can bear witness that they have often heard me talking thus with him. Yes, I can assure you that the cardinal more than once expressed himself as follows: 'When, by the grace of God, I shall be again reinstated in my former dignity and power, and be quiet and firm in my position, (he was not at that time in favor with the Pope, and the majority of the cardinals), I will use all my influence to bring to light the arrogance and deceit of the Pope, (he spoke in anger at his own want of favor with him,) and a true reformation shall everywhere be effected.'" He often, Zuingli adds, talked with me upon the doctrines of the church, and the Holy Scriptures, and expressed his knowledge of, and opposition to, the errors of Rome.² These assurances of the cardinal were probably in a measure sincere, but both he and the Pope were too much occupied with their ambitious schemes, and their projects for personal and family aggrandizement, to give much heed to the spiritual abuses and wants of the church. Yet, Zuingli labored on, and was instant in season and out of season,

¹ Hess, p. 65 sq.

² Schuler, 257-8.

in the performance of the work assigned him. In the meantime his reputation for learning and piety increased day by day. He was in constant correspondence with such men as Erasmus, Faber, Henry Lorit, or Glarianus, Gasper Hedio, Wolfgang Capito, Beatus Rhemanus, and many other of the literary men of the age. Their letters are filled with commendations of his learning, and value to the church, his faithfulness and ability in the discharge of his ministerial duties, and the expectations that had been awakened in his friends, in regard to the results of their labors.

His Appointment as Preacher at Zurich.

His fame was indeed beginning to be too much noised abroad for him to remain in his quiet retreat at Einsiedeln. His two years of study and investigation, with occasional practical duty, had not been lost in settling his views and giving him confidence to go forward in the work of reforming the church. He had been gradually coming to the conviction that this reform must proceed from him and other friends of the Gospel, and not from the hands of the church itself; and if the preachers of the Gospel would not exert themselves for reformation, the preachers of violence would have recourse to revolution.¹ It was now plain that his master had need of him to labor in his vineyard in a more public capacity. And an ardent desire filled his soul to diffuse the light which had shone upon his own darkened mind. He however did not go forth from the quiet of the monastic walls without many regrets and many forebodings in regard to the combats and struggles and opposition which would beset his new faith, but his confidence was not in an arm of flesh. His love and gratitude and his pecuniary interest would have inclined him to yield to the urgent solicitations of his friends at Einsiedeln to remain with them; but he was influenced by higher and more enlarged desires of usefulness.

Among the persons with whom Zuingli had been on terms of intimacy while at Glaris and Einsiedeln, was Oswald Myconius,² now a teacher of the Latin and Greek classics at Zurich. This man had been laboring with assiduous zeal, for several years (since 1516), first at Basle where Zuingli first saw him, and then in Zurich, to diffuse the light of learning, which had but just dawned in Germany

¹ See Schuler, S. 267. The truth of this was but too literally verified in the history of the Peasants' war and the Anabaptists.

² See page 587.

and Italy amidst the darkness which had so long brooded over Europe. A vacancy in the situation of preacher in the cathedral at Zurich gave him the hope of drawing his friend into his immediate vicinity, an object which he had long earnestly desired to accomplish. This was the more easily effected as Zuingli had by previous visits become favorably known to the inhabitants of Zurich, and the clergy in some degree appreciated his talents and learning, as well as his boldness in attacking the current vices of the age. The choice of the chapter was not, however, without opposition. October 29, 1518, Myconius wrote to him in accordance with the wishes of many at Zurich, to urge him to come to them: 'I will,' he says, 'neither advocate the case nor argue against it. It is doubtless perfectly understood by you. Revolve it in your own mind. But if you can give a favorable answer, then I shall not know how adequately to express my joy at the prospect of seeing my friend Zuingli pastor at Zurich. How very much I desire you to be in a position worthy of you. Farewell; listen to me.' Zuingli answered him: 'In a few days I will come to Zurich myself and talk with you in reference to this matter. In the meantime, make diligent inquiries about this place; whether the pastor must hear confessions and visit the sick; what sort of superiors and what compensation he has. And if you understand these and other things, I will in accordance with your counsel either act in the case, or relinquish all thought of it.' Among those who were rival candidates for this important post was one Laurentius Fabula, a Suabian by birth. A report went abroad and reached Zuingli, but was, however, immediately contradicted, that Fabula was elected. Zuingli gave to his friend Myconius a frank exhibition of his feelings on the occasion. "Is it still true," he says, "that the prophet is not honored in his own country; is a Suabian preferred to a Switzer? I had not indeed considered him as one to whom I should yield the precedence."—"Act thou now for me! I confess I begin to be more desirous of this place, since such a wight is striving for it, and what I had else given up without regret, I now look upon as a reproach. I had designed, if elected, to preach upon the Gospel by Matthew in course, a thing yet unattempted in Germany. But if they prefer this Suabian, they must see what he will bring forth from his wallet. Commend the matter also to Utinger, and you yourself take counsel as shall be for the best. But excuse my letter; it is written in haste, and more in accordance with feeling than reason." An answer was returned on the following day by Myconius: "Fabula," he says, "will continue to be fable. For my lords heard that he is

already father of six boys, and has very many benefices. I have done all I could, and perhaps have thus made myself too troublesome. You have both friends and enemies; of the latter, few; of the former, many, and those who are on the side of right action — still, there is no one who does not praise your learning. I will speak to you all things freely. With some your love of music is an objection; hence they call you a voluptuary and worldly. Others find fault with your earlier life;¹ you have had too much to do with people of pleasure (*qui voluptatibus studuerint*). I have refuted them, and so refuted them that you will no longer suffer in this particular. First I made the burgomaster Roust acquainted with your doctrine; you are pleasing to him. Then I was questioned by Hofman, who as you perhaps know, preached so pointedly and plainly, not in reference to your doctrine, to which he finds nothing to object, but concerning your life. I commended you, as both truth and friendship required, and gained the man entirely for my Zuingli." Myconius proceeds to speak of his influence with others, and of the encouragement he has to believe that Zuingli will be the final object of their choice. No answer of Zuingli to this letter is found.

A letter written by Zuingli to Utinger cannot be omitted in this connection. "I assure you," he says, "if theologians would not become *matatologians* (babblers) or perverters of the truth for this place, I would relinquish it. I am surrounded here by most favorable circumstances. The baron of Geroldseck seeks to retain me here by great promises, and I have not yet explained myself to him fully on this point. Therefore let no one be too importunate with requests in my behalf. If my character will bring dishonor upon Christ, I will remain here; for I will not bring reproach upon his cause. And if my enemies thus go on in their calumniations, the Zurichers would hear my sermons unwillingly, and thereby the cause of the Gospel receive detriment. I therefore entreat you to consider the matter well, whether I shall thus be a greater injury than benefit to the cause; and then, you must regard God rather than man. They object to my love for music. Now indeed such fools do not deserve a thought," etc.²

A letter of D. Sander, agent of Cardinal Schinner, shows that he favored the choice of Zuingli. Two or three days before the election he writes: "Those who favor the appointment of Zuingli excel the others in number and worth. Be of good courage. Their calumnies,

¹ With reference to the earlier years of his ministry at Glaris.

² Schuler, S. 300.

if they for a time made an unfavorable impression, now avail nothing in alienating honest men from you. With God's help, I hope all things will go as we wish. The choice is to be made on the 10th instant. You have been much commended to the cardinal."¹ The election was finally made on the 11th of December, 1518, and Zuingli was pastor of Zurich with the approbation and highest hopes of the best citizens of the place.

The separation from Einsiedeln soon followed. No one perhaps felt it so deeply as the baron of Geroldseck. The years of Zuingli's abode at the convent were fraught with interest and profit to him. As a friend, counsellor and teacher had Zuingli been to him. He had been able to slake his thirst for knowledge with him, and as the friends of Socrates, with whom he unfolded the wisdom of the ancient sages, he counted it all joy that their friendship had strengthened and increased day by day.² Neither did it end with the separation from Einsiedeln. Afterwards, in 1523, Zuingli dedicated to him his Essay on the Canon of the Mass, and thus acknowledges his kindness and constancy: "Never since thou hast put thy hand to the plough hast thou looked back. Thou art indeed a friend of all learned men; but me thou hast for several years loved, cared for and protected, as a father his son. Thou hast not only made me thy friend, but hast admitted me with Zingk to the inmost secrets of thy heart. Go on as you have begun. Stand firm in your place. God will finally bring you to the goal. Only those who have fought the good fight, are crowned."³

A few words upon the subsequent history both of the abbot and administrator, as showing the influence of Zuingli's abode at Einsiedeln, cannot be out of place here. Conrad died in 1526, without employing any of the rites of the Romish church, and after having banished almost all superstitious observances from his abbey. Only two monks, indeed, remained there. A little before his death, hearing a disputation between Leo Juda, the successor of Zuingli, upon some abstruse point in theology, which he did not consider essential, he said with warmth: "What does all this signify? For my part, I wish with my last breath, to cry with David, 'Have mercy upon me,

¹ Schuler, p. 301.

² Memorabilia, B. I. Ch. VI. 14: *Και τοῖς θεοσκευοῖς τῶν πολλῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκείνους κατέλειπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράφοντες, ἀναλίσκων, παρῇ οὖν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ ἂν τι ὀρώμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐπilogόμεθα καὶ μέγα νομιζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις φίλοις γινώμεθα.*

³ Schuler, S. 237.

O God, according to thy loving kindness; enter not into judgment with thy servant, O Lord!' I concern myself about nothing else."¹

As soon as it was decided that Zuingli was to go to Zurich, Geroldseck, full of anguish at the prospect of separation, besought Zuingli to exert himself to procure for them a successor, who should be of a like mind and spirit with himself. To him he committed the whole responsibility of the selection. Leo Juda, then pastor at St. Pilt in Elsass, who had long been a dear friend, was suggested to Zuingli as a suitable person. He immediately communicated with him, and obtained his consent to come to Einsiedeln. He entered upon his duties there, in the summer of the following year, 1519. Leo soon endeared himself to Conrad and Geroldseck, and followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, by engaging in every good word and work, and even after Zuingli's death, was a pillar of the reformation. Geroldseck remained at Einsiedeln, until 1525, when he went to Zurich, to live in the neighborhood of his old friend, and died with him on the battle field at Cappel. Friends were they in life, and in death not divided.

Parts of the letter which Zuingli wrote to Leo Juda, inviting him to Einsiedeln, are too descriptive of the feelings of the man, to be withheld here: "I will not now enlarge further upon the intimacy of our former friendship, for I am persuaded that you, in accordance with your noble nature (*humanitas*), are as mindful of it as I am myself. As I am always mindful of you, so am I desirous for your welfare. Whenever I have heard that anything disagreeable had happened to you, I immediately applied myself to thinking how I could be of service to you. I know that you, although not born among the Switzers, have a prepossession in favor of them. I am sensible of your great learning and wisdom, that may be compared to that of Cato; and I would fain give you a proof of my care for you. The people of Zurich have lately invited me there. — The baron of Geroldseck, administrator of the cloister, has shown his regard for me in this, as well as other things, that he has committed to me the business of communicating to you, his invitation to this place. Herewith is offered, first, the opportunity of being transferred in the most honorable manner, among the Switzers. Then, if you come, you will find the administrator obedient to your every wish. All things are now committed to your disposal. — The administrator has become so anxious for you, that he wishes before all others, to gain you to himself. Seize, therefore, upon this favorable circum-

¹ Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 17.

stance, while it is in your power. The people over whom you will be placed, are a simple people, who will gladly, since I have broken the road, hear Christ preached. There is no want of the means of living here. The baron is only moderately learned, but is a lover of learning, and prizes literary men above all. Moreover, I shall not be over six hours distant from you, so that you can, if you wish, avail yourself of my society. Let this, which I have so hastily, but from the heart, written to you, move you. Make the journey hither, at the expense of the administrator. I know you will not regret it. Now, if you have well weighed the whole matter, farewell."

The following letter of Beatus Rhenanus, written from Basle, five days before Zuingli's call to Zurich, is interesting both as showing the spread of the sentiments which Zuingli had promulgated, and the confidence which was everywhere placed in him by his friends. Such expressions of sentiment and feeling must, too, have been a cordial to his spirit, amid the perplexities and troubles which everywhere beset the path of the true reformer. "Nothing," he says, "is so painful to me, as to see Christianity overloaded with so many useless ceremonies, yea, follies. The cause of this, I find in the priests, who themselves corrupted by scholastic and sophistical theologians, preach rather heathenish or Jewish doctrine; I speak of the majority of the priests. For I well know that you, and those of kindred spirit, propound the purest wisdom of Christ, out of its original sources, unfermented by the interpretations of a Scotus or Gabriel (Biel) but according to the simple and true exposition of Augustin, Ambrose, Cyprian, and Jerome. They spout forth, from the places where the people receive all that is said, as undoubted truth, noisy words upon the power of the Pope, forgiveness of sin, purgatory, legends of the saints, restitutions, testaments, vows, punishment in hell, antichrist, etc. You, on the contrary, preach briefly, and, as it were, paint out before our eyes the whole doctrine of Christ, that he, sent by God, came into the world to teach us the will of his Father, and to persuade us to despise the world, i. e. its riches, honors, power, and allurements, and whatever pertains to these; and on the other hand, to seek with all our hearts, a heavenly country; to teach us peace, concord, and that beautiful community of all things, (for Christianity is nothing else,) as Plato, one of the greatest prophets, once represented it, although his Republic was regarded only as a beautiful dream; to remove from us a childish love of earthly things, native land, parents and kindred, health, and other good things; for his life is elevated above all human precepts. If, however, Switzerland had many men

like you, it would be easy to improve our countrymen by better morals. Surely indeed the people are easily moulded, if only those were not wanting who could and would teach of a risen Saviour, Jesus Christ."¹

Zuingli's Reception at Zurich.

Zuingli took up his residence at Zurich Dec. 28th, 1518. He had previously visited his beloved Glarions, and resigned his benefice there, and recommended his pupil and friend Valentine Tschudi as his successor, who was immediately instituted into the office of priest of Glaris. At his departure, he was honored with many tokens of respect and love from the people of his former flock. The same honor also awaited him at Zurich. The favor with which his appointment was received by the friends of liberal sentiments may be seen from a letter of Glarian, who however himself sympathized strongly with his native townsmen of Glaris in their loss: He says that "his young Swiss friends, especially those of Zurich, shouted for joy when his appointment was announced; I indeed foresee, also, that your learning will draw down upon you much envy. But be as you have hitherto been of good courage, even if, as Hercules, you are compelled to battle with monsters. Easily will you conquer with perseverance and wise management. Now I would gladly have a prebend at Zurich, so that I might live with you. By your influence will the Christian faith be diffused in Zurich. If I return again to Switzerland, I would wish to become a fellow-combatant with you."² Zuingli himself was duly sensible of the importance of Zurich, and this was his principal motive for going there. He says: "It could scarcely be but that, if the grace of Christ were preached and received in so celebrated a city as Zurich, the rest of Switzerland should follow the example."³

We shall better understand the importance of this place if we look for a moment at its previous history and position, at the time of Zuingli's appointment. It owed its origin to a college of canons founded and endowed by Charlemagne in 810. "Forty years after, Louis the Germanic caused a convent for nuns to be built near by, and his daughters Hildebrand and Bertha were the first abbesses."⁴ A town gradually grew up around under the fostering care of the ecclesiastics. But the inhabitants soon became impatient of ecclesiastical domination, and by degrees, aided by imperial favor, became independent and enjoyed all the rights of sovereignty. Until the fifteenth century,

¹ See Schuler, S. 305-7.

² Schuler, p. 307.

³ Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 18.

⁴ Hess, p. 79.

however, its power did not extend beyond its own walls, and even until the reformation the two monasteries preserved their particular jurisdiction and maintained their independence. These monastic establishments, as in other cases, did not answer the design of their original founder. Charlemagne, at least, intended his college as a nursery of learning, but it proved an asylum of idleness. Still, some preparation had been made during the quarter of a century which had just passed, for the work of Zuingli. Young men began to frequent foreign universities, a school had been established, over which Myconius presided, and the clergy, who had previously hardly been able to read and write, had received some small impulse, but still the preaching was mostly done by monks, whose main object was to minister to the temporal interests of their convents. Their bickerings among themselves, immoral lives, and puerilities in the pulpit, did not increase the respect due to religion among the lower orders. "It had," it is said, "become an object of derision to some, of indifference to others, and the vulgar were only acquainted with its outward practices." Corruption had crept in with foreign intercourse, and especially by means of foreign gold, which those intriguing for the alliance of Switzerland had proffered. The severer virtues of former days had long been unknown among them, and the venality of many of the magistrates threatened the destruction of the government. And notwithstanding a glimmering of light had here and there beamed upon them, yet it is not said without reason that "Letters wanted a restorer; both the governors and governed an intrepid censor, who should dare to recall them to their mutual duties; and fainting religion an orator capable of rekindling its ardor, and restoring its influence upon manners."¹ How well Zuingli was fitted for this task our knowledge of his previous course will suggest, and how well he executed it the sequel may show.

There were many things to encourage our reformer in his work at Zurich. "Where," says Schuler, "could the reformation be so easily established and unfold itself in freedom as at Zurich? Not in Glaris or the canton of Schweitz, dependent upon the caprices of a people whose freedom was without limit, and who had no schools; not in a cloister as at Einsiedeln, which was too much subjected to the power of the church; not in Berne, ruled by the interests of certain families; not in Luzerne, where the people were too much devoted to warlike pursuits, and too far removed from Germany, and the free spirit there, which was constantly becoming more active and efficient, so that there

¹ Hess, *Life of Zuingli*, 82-4.

was no one man there of character and power, who protected the friends of the reformation; and not indeed in Basle, the nursery of learning and culture, but situated at the extremity of Switzerland, and on that account not fitted steadily and effectively to operate upon the heart of the father-land. In Zurich, among free citizens, at a time when the greatest and purest patriotism prevailed, when a wise and noble-hearted council was at the helm of government, when rich ecclesiastical foundations furnished abundant means for schools and institutions of liberal culture,—there in the centre of free Switzerland, must it find its true home.”¹

Soon after Zuingli's arrival at the place of his destination, he presented himself before the provost and chapter, and thanked them for making him their choice. They then proceeded to make known to him the regulations of the chapter in reference to the pastor's duties, which proved to have reference mainly to the increasing and management of the revenues. Religious duties, such as the administration of the sacraments and preaching, especially the latter, although required by the statutes, yet might be, for the most part, performed by his substitute.²

Zuingli, undaunted by these instructions of the chapter, so foreign to his notions of the real duties of the priest's office, proceeded, on his part, to make known what course he should pursue in his ministrations. As he had before suggested to Myconius in a letter, he did not propose to preserve the order of the dominical lessons, but in the beginning of his ministry he proposed to give his hearers an account of the life of Christ, according to the order in the Gospel of Matthew. “Too long,” he said, “has the life of Jesus been concealed, to the injury of Christian souls. The Evangelists shall no longer bear their name in vain. I will preach the Gospel not in accordance with human teachers, but in the sense of the Divine Spirit itself, which I shall discover by a comparison of Scripture with itself, which I will accompany with sincere and hearty prayer. This will I do with a view only to the glory of God, and the instruction and edification of the faithful.”³

This plan pleased a majority of the chapter, but some regarded it

¹ S. 289, 290.

² “You will,” they say, “use your utmost diligence in collecting the revenues of the chapter—not overlooking the smallest item. You will exhort the faithful, both from the pulpit and in the confessional, to pay all dues and tithes,” etc. See D'Anbigne, p. 340, for a more extended account of these instructions of the chapter.

³ See Schuler, S. 310, and Hess, p. 84.

as an innovation, that would not be favorable in its results; if such things were begun, where would the end be? One, Hofmann, a canon, who had been desirous of obtaining Zuingli, was specially scandalized by this announcement of the new pastor. He was opposed to all change in religion. He claimed that Zuingli should not be permitted to carry out his plan, which would prove more injurious than beneficial to the people. He also entreated the provost, to warn him that he would make the people sceptical in reference to the objects of their former faith. This warning was duly communicated, but our reformer could not easily be shaken in a resolution which he had thoughtfully and honestly made. He replied, "that he was only returning to the practice of the primitive church, which had been retained down to the time of Charlemagne; that he should observe the method made use of by the fathers of the church in their homilies, and that by Divine assistance he hoped to preach in such a manner that no friend of the Gospel should have reason to complain."¹ The wisdom of this course of Zuingli cannot be questioned. He could go forward step by step in counteracting previous erroneous teachings and belief, with the sanction of the inspired word, even as it were, led on by the guidance of the Spirit of God, which ought to shut the mouths of gainsayers.

His First Preaching at Zurich, and its Results.

On the first day of January, 1519, his 36th birth-day, Zuingli preached his first sermon at Zurich, in accordance with the plan that he had announced to his superiors. The fame of him that had gone abroad, the novelty of any divergence from the established order of religious worship, brought together a great multitude. He explained to them the course that he proposed to pursue, and did not lose the favorable opportunity presented, of showing that Christ is the sole author of salvation, and inveighing against all vice, especially superstition and hypocrisy. "It is to Christ," he said, "that I wish to guide you — to Christ, the true spring of salvation. This Divine word is the only food that I seek to minister to your hearts and souls." He also insisted on the necessity of amendment; thundered against idleness, intemperance, the excesses of luxury, and the passion for foreign service; he enjoined upon the magistrates to distribute impartial justice, and to protect widows and orphans,"² etc.

¹ Bullinger, Schweitz. Chron. T. III. A, as quoted by Hess, pp. 84, 85.

² Hess, pp. 85, 86.

On the next day, the first Sabbath in the year, he began his regular course of sermons, upon the life of Christ, as recorded by Matthew, to a more numerous auditory than that of the previous day. He, in these sermons, read the text, which was generally several verses, and explained it according to his own understanding of it, without restraint from the authorized translation, the Vulgate, or from ancient or modern expositions, although he used them as helps. The Greek text alone was ultimate and unchangeable authority with him. He pursued much the same course with the ancient fathers in their homilies. After he had explained the text, he brought forward all the circumstances of time or design, which could make the text profitable to his hearers, and applicable to the common affairs of life, thus teaching not only the meaning, but varied applications of Scripture. One thing which gave peculiar force to his preaching, was its appropriateness to the time and circumstances, to the feelings, thoughts, the religious, political, and moral position of the people of his charge. This gave clearness, life, power, to all that he said, and, as it were, compelled his hearers to apply it individually to themselves. "He was," says Schuler, "a preacher for all ranks and conditions of the men of his age. For he spake out of every heart, concerning those objects which are demanded by the nature of all the wisest as well as the weakest, and in clear and strong language, which bears the impress of truth, and enlightens every sound understanding and heart at the first view. Whilst for the learned he traced to their origin the most lofty and profound ideas, in which only the most practised thinkers could follow him; he preached the Gospel in so simple and sincere a manner, in the dialect of his people; discussed the most sublime truths with such simple clearness, that he, as his spiritual brother Paul, became all things to all. Must we not both admire and love this noble man, who with the boldest thinkers of all ages, ventured on the most lofty flights towards the sun of truth, who, with the feeling of one who expresses a well known and firmly believed truth, opposed doctrines which had been objects of common belief for centuries; but who, when he was once reminded by a child, that he had said something that was not right, was not ashamed openly to confess his error."¹

The influence of preaching so new and strange could not be small; it was at first various, as we should expect. The severity of his doctrines, expressed with so much sincerity and fervor and indeed elo-

¹ Schuler, S. 314, 315.

quence, did not repel all in even so depraved an audience as that at Zurich. Passion would not unfrequently flash from the eye or curl the lip of those of all classes, magistrates, ecclesiastics and common men, yet they could not resist the force of truth so simply and definitely exhibited, nor the power of eloquence at once so attractive and persuasive. They could not lose his sermons, and finally, convinced of their errors, were ready to "thank God for having sent among them this preacher of the truth." Others, however, enraged at his censures of their vices and opinions, and fearing that their private interests would receive detriment, if his influence should become dominant, exerted themselves to injure him. Sometimes they represented him as "a knave who by his hypocritical preachings was aiming to destroy the respect and submission of the subjects for magistrates;" sometimes, he was a fanatic, "whose unbounded pride led him to put his own reveries in the place of the decisions of the church;" and then he was a man destitute of religion and morals, who would, unless silence were imposed upon him, not only sap the foundations of virtue and religion, but introduce anarchy and discord into the State.¹ But such calumnies did not move Zuingli. He says: "I have for a long time permitted incredible falsehoods to be told about me, without giving myself any anxiety about it. For I have supposed that the disciple is not above his master; and if they defamed Christ falsely, it is not strange that they should calumniate me." He proceeded on in the even tenor of his ways without ever turning aside for the ill-natured growlings and cynic attacks that beset his path, and the most marked success attended his labors. "At the expiration of a year, notwithstanding much formidable opposition, he was able to reckon as many as two thousand persons who were so far, at least, his converts, as to avow his sentiments."²

Zuingli's own account, written in 1528, of the manner in which he had fulfilled the pastoral office, cannot be without interest: "It is now," he says, "four years ago that I preached through the whole Gospel of Matthew. — I then proceeded to the Acts of the Apostles, that the church of Zurich might see in what manner and by what persons the Gospel was at first propagated in the world. Next followed the First Epistle of Paul to Timothy; which, as exhibiting the rules of the conduct that become Christians, seemed admirably calculated to form a consistent and well ordered flock. As some now

¹ Compare Hess, pp. 86, 87. Myconius says of him at this time: "*Insidie adeo scatebant omnia ut ab eis nullum fere momentum esset vacuum.*"

² Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 20, and Ruchat, p. 71.

appeared not to be sound in the faith, I deferred the Second Epistle to Timothy, till I had gone through that to the Galatians, and then I explained it also. Some pretenders to wisdom then began impiously to say: 'Who after all is Paul? Is he not a man like ourselves? Though he might be an apostle, he was but of an inferior order—not one of those who personally conversed with Christ. Aquinas or Scotus is more to be relied on than he.' Such being the case, I next brought forward the two Epistles of Peter, the chief of the apostles, that they might clearly see whether one spirit did not animate both him and Paul, and whether both did not speak the same things. I have since entered upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the people might more fully understand the benefits and the glory of Christ. Hence they will learn, and indeed have in some degree learned, that he is the great High Priest;—and that he 'by his one offering of himself, once made, hath for ever perfected them that are sanctified.' Such are the things which we have planted: Matthew, Luke, Paul, Peter have watered them; and God hath given a wondrous increase—which I will not be the person to proclaim, lest I should seem to seek my own glory, and not that of Christ. Go now and say, if you can, that this plantation is not of our heavenly Father's planting. Thus, by no cunningly devised modes of address, but in the use of simple words of our own country's native growth, I have led the people to the knowledge of their disease—following our Lord's example, who commenced from this point. I have withdrawn no man from connection with his proper pastor, provided he were a true pastor and not a thief and a robber. From what source I derived the discipline of the church, I have already shown. I have earnestly exhorted the people to hold fast the glory of our profession; having a great High Priest, Jesus the Son of God, who is passed into the heavens; and not to seek honor one of another—a practice which led away the Jews from faith in Christ. As much as in me lieth I withdraw men from confidence in any creature, to the only true God, and Jesus Christ his only Son, our Lord; in whom, 'whosoever believeth shall never die.' With all the earnestness of which I am capable I urge them to seek pardon from him who invites us to turn to him even when we have sinned, saying: "Come unto me, ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." This word of his I so firmly believe, that should circumstances require, I think I have no need of either bishop or priest to make satisfaction for me; for Christ hath done that, who 'gave himself an offering for us, and hath washed us from our sins in his own blood.' I reverence the

whole order of presbyters (or priests) as the angels (or messengers) of God; but I abhor those 'whose god is their belly.' I bear, however, even with these, and suffer the tares to grow among the wheat. I exhort men to 'pray without ceasing;' but to do it with the spirit and the heart; 'in spirit and in truth,' as our Lord's words are; and to persevere therein with an importunity which might seem to be wearisome — according to the parable of the widow."¹

We cannot forbear to dwell a little longer on this part of the character and labors of one who must be acknowledged to have been the first preacher among the early reformers. There is abundant testimony from his contemporaries, who were best qualified to judge, of his power in the pulpit. Bullinger says: "His style was unaffected, simple and clear. There was nothing far fetched or unnatural in it. Everything was distinct and as it were presented on canvas before the eyes. There was nothing low and grovelling. It was full of animation and of a massive force, and it carried with it an irresistible loveliness. His exposition of Scripture was striking, acute, pious, incomparable. His skill in searching out the hidden meaning of a passage; his simplicity and naturalness in discussing it; his truth and accurateness in translating from a foreign language were incomparable. — How well he knew how to touch the heart with friendly words; how powerful was he in rousing the feelings; how naturally did he commend; how severely administer rebuke! All in him was *great*. In this man was a burning love of the right, unceasing exertion to advance the interests of his native country, and the most untiring zeal in opposition to vice and its adherents." Myconius says: "I never saw one administer rebuke with such dignity, or a preacher of the divine word who compared with him in zeal and strength of faith." The provost of Luzerne gives similar testimony. Thomas Platter describes, in the strongest language, the effect of Zuingli's preaching in causing him to forsake popery, and preach the Gospel.² Before Zuingli went to Zurich, many of the principal men had ceased to attend worship, not feeling themselves benefitted by the preaching of those in whom, the poet and historian Füsolin says: "Avarice and voluptuousness are the only qualities I can discover." Such persons were at first attracted by curiosity to hear Zuingli, but as D'Aubigne says, left the church singing: 'Glory be to God; this is a preacher

¹ Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, pp. 21, 22.

² After describing in glowing terms the effect of his preaching, Myconius says: "Quod dixi, veritatem et auctoritatem viri significat, contra quam palam ne matre quidem muli fuerunt ausi unquam." — *Myc. Vit.* 45.

of the truth. He will be our Moses to lead us forth from Egypt.' They also gave warning to the magistrates not to oppose the preachers of truth; for in case they did, as fishermen were raised up after Christ was put to death, so now glass-workers and millers and potters and founders and shoemakers and tailors would be ready to teach in their stead.

The Mission of Samson into Switzerland, and Zuingli's opposition to him.

In the previous part of the same year in which Zuingli went to Zurich, Pope Leo X., in order to provide means for the aggrandizement of the papal seat at Rome, published a general indulgence of sin to all those in Switzerland who would aid by pecuniary contributions. The Franciscan monk, Bernardine Samson, to whom this business was committed, entered Switzerland in August, and executed his commission with "as much effrontery, indecency and extortion as the notorious Tetzl practised in Germany." Every artifice was employed which ingenuity could devise for the accomplishment of the object desired. When the confidence of persons of influence had been gained by flattery, intrigue or bribery, the most barefaced impudence was not concealed. When surrounded by a crowd of poor people, Samson would disperse them, by causing the attendants whom he kept around him, to proclaim with a loud voice: "Let the rich come near first, who can buy the pardon of their sins; after they are satisfied, the prayers of the poor shall also be attended to."¹ The power of the Pope, whose vicegerent he was, he said "was unlimited both in heaven and on earth; he had at his disposal the treasure of the blood of Jesus Christ and the martyrs; he had the right of remitting both sin and penance, past and future, and that the sinner would participate in divine grace the moment his money was heard to chink in the box."²

Zuingli, as is plain from previous references to his preaching, had long been an active opponent of the very things that Samson's mission was intended to cherish, namely, trust in any other than our Lord Jesus Christ for remission of sins. And his influence was such that Samson could not make much progress in the canton of Schweitz, where he first went, while Zuingli was in Einsiedeln. He then proceeded with more success to Zug, Luzerne and Unterwalden, although

¹ Bullinger, Schw. Hebr. Chron. iii. B., quoted by Hess, 6, 9.

² Hotting. Hebr. Kirch. T. iii. p. 31, cited in Hess, p. 89.

even in these cantons the leaven of the reformed doctrine was beginning to penetrate.¹ Before he went to Berne, he sent emissaries forward to counteract the unwillingness that was felt there to receive him. And when this was in a measure accomplished, he "entered the town with a splendid retinue under banners displaying jointly the arms of the Pope and the cantons; exhibited his letters of credence with great pomp in the cathedral church; and celebrated high mass before a crowded assembly, and proceeded with a high hand to the dispensing of pardons to individuals and communities, for the dead and the living." Nothing could exceed the barefaced impositions of this viceregent of the Holy See. "Here," said he, "are indulgences for the rich on parchment, for one crown; there, absolutions for the poor, on common paper, for only two batz." To a knight who presented himself before him on a beautiful, spirited, dapple-gray charger, he gave an indulgence for himself, for his troop of five hundred, for all his vassals on his domain of Belp, and for all his ancestors, on condition of receiving the horse on which he rode. He even granted absolution for all kinds of perjury, for thirteen florins.²

His entrance into the territories of the bishop of Constance, without his permission, as an invasion of episcopal rights, was followed by an order to all the parish priests to shut their churches against him. The bishop was sufficiently acquainted with Zuingli's sentiments, and his public hostility to indulgences, to know that he should have a supporter in him, not so much from his anxiety to prevent an infraction of ecclesiastical order, as to oppose the spread of error and superstition. He accordingly directed his vicar general, Faber, to write to him, to make known his high esteem for him, and promising him support in the good work which he had begun, adding an expression of his own strong feeling against Samson and the object of his mission.

In consequence of the efforts of Zuingli, there was a strong exhibition of feeling against Samson at Zurich, and he did not dare approach directly there, but went to Bremgarten, a town about four leagues from Zurich, where he was received by the magistrates; but the parish priest, Henry Bullinger, father of the reformer of the same name, refused him entrance into his church, as he came without the sanction of the bishop. Neither threats nor the anger of the pontiff

¹ In Zug, Zuingli's friends, Meiner, Stein, Kolin and Müller, and in Luzerne, J. Jacob, Zimmerman and J. Kilchmeyer were laboring for the reformation. Schuler, S. 277.

² See Hötting. *Helv. K. Gesch.* III. 29, and D'Aubigne, p. 344.

and the cantons, where he pretended to have been everywhere graciously received, nor even a formal excommunication had any influence in causing Bullinger to retract his refusal. Zuingli, in the mean time, as the enemy approached, lifted up his warning voice with redoubled energy against trusting in any remissions except by the merits of Christ alone. "Go," he said, "if you will, and buy indulgences, but be assured you are in nowise absolved. They who grant the remission of sins for money are but companions of Simon, the magician, the friends of Balaam, the ambassador of Satan.

Samson, however, determined to visit Zurich. "I know," he said, "that Zuingli will oppose me, but I will stop his mouth." He now pretended a special mission from the Pope to the Diet of the cantons which was then assembled at Zurich, in order to gain admittance to the city. But the falseness of his pretext was soon discovered, and he was ordered by the Diet not only to take off the ban of excommunication from Bullinger, but to leave Zurich and the cantons forthwith. His fear of a detention of the money that he had already amassed, if he refused, influenced him to depart soon, and make a hasty retreat into Italy, with a cart load of gold, drawn by three horses, as the result of his eight months' speculation. Men now began to be ashamed of the imposition to which they had submitted, and the new pastor at Zurich received a fresh accession to his previous reputation. But the bishop of Constance had committed himself to Zuingli farther than he found it convenient to be committed in his position, and extricated himself as best he might. Zuingli says: "I failed not, with all reverence and humility, publicly and privately by written addresses, to urge him to countenance the light of the Gospel, which he now saw bursting forth, so that no human counsels could suppress it. But, from causes which I pretend not to assign, a change had taken place; and they who had lately excited me by their reiterated exhortations, now deigned me no answer beyond mere public and official communications, which bore no more resemblance to those that had preceded them, than a mite does to an elephant."¹

The Pestilence at Zurich.

In the summer of 1519, the next year after Zuingli went to Zurich, a pestilence raged in Switzerland, and in Zurich alone carried off twenty-five hundred persons in a short time. When it first made its appearance, Zuingli had been ordered to the baths of Pfeffers, to re-

¹ Quoted in Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 28.

cruit, after the severe toil to which he had subjected himself. The students who had resided with him at his own house, and his brother Andrew were sent home, in order to avoid danger. He could not himself, however, remain away, when disease was making such ravages in his flock, but hastened back, and was unwearied in his attention to the sick, until he was attacked, near the end of September, and brought to the brink of the grave. He however after a time gave signs of recovery, and at the beginning of November, his friends were cheered with the intelligence that he seemed out of danger. At the end of this month, although yet feeble, he again appeared in the pulpit, and by the close of the year, was completely restored. During this sickness, he composed three short precatory poems expressive of his feelings at the beginning, middle, and end of his sickness. These poems were first printed by themselves, but subsequently were incorporated in the Zurich Hymn Book, and published in various other forms, sometimes accompanied by a melody, (in connection with two others for other lines,) also composed by Zuingli. One of the editors of his works¹ says of this poem, for the three parts may be considered as forming one whole, "It appears to us in every respect a true master-piece of spiritual poetry for that age, since it is equally distinguished by condensed religious thought and deep feeling, fittingly expressed, as by an artistic, labored, and correct external form." These poems have much interest as indicative of the effect of suffering and approaching death, upon his spirit. He now had occasion to put in practice some of the lessons which he had so often given to others, an implicit reliance upon Christ for pardon and consolation; and doubtless this sickness had a great influence upon his whole subsequent course as a reformer. He was thrown into the furnace of affliction, and came out seven times purified.

The solicitude of the friends of Zuingli for his safety, whilst ministering to the necessities of the dying, as well as when himself on the borders of the grave, shows the estimation in which he was held. Letters reached him from Basle, Tockenburgh, and elsewhere, exhorting him to be careful for himself. At one time it was noised abroad that he had fallen a victim to the terrible scourge. The whole city of Basle resounded with lamentations. Hedio cried out in anguish of spirit, "Alas! the deliverer of our country, the trumpet of the Gospel, the magnanimous herald of the truth is stricken with death,

¹ Werke, II Bde. Abth., 2, S. 259. And see a translation of them in *Hist. Reform.*, pp. 348, 349.

in the flower and spring tide of his age." The university of Basle, too, shared in the grief, and it was often said there of him, "He whom God loves, is made perfect in the morning of life." When the report of his death was contradicted, the joy was commensurate with the grief that previously had been felt.

ARTICLE II.

PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. A REPLY TO ANSELM, AND ANSELM'S REJOINDER.

[SEE JULY NO. 1851, P. 534.]

Translated by Rev. J. S. Maginnis, D. D., of the Rochester University, N. Y.

I. A BOOK IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL; OR A REPLY TO THE REASONINGS OF ANSELM IN HIS PROSLOGION. BY GAUNILON, A MONK OF MARMOUTIER.

1. WHEN one doubts or denies the existence of a being which is such that nothing greater can be conceived, in proof that such a being does nevertheless exist, it is alleged in the first place, that he who denies or doubts this has already such a being in his intelligence or understanding, since when he hears this mentioned he understands what is said; and in the next place, that what he understands must of necessity exist, not in his intelligence alone, but also in reality; which is proved from the fact that it is something greater to exist in the intelligence and in the reality, than to exist in the intelligence alone. And if the being in question exists in the intelligence or understanding alone, then whatever exists in reality also will be greater than this, and thus that which is greater than everything will be less than something, and will not be greater than everything, which is a contradiction. Therefore, that which is greater than all, which is now proved to exist in the intelligence, must of necessity have an existence, not in the intelligence alone, but in reality also, since otherwise it could not be greater than all.

2. To this it may peradventure be replied, that this being is said to exist already in my intelligence only because when I hear it mentioned I understand what is said. May I not also, in the very same

manner be said to have in my intelligence false things of any kind which can have in themselves no existence whatever; since, should any one speak of these things I could understand whatever he might say? unless perhaps it be evident that this being is of such a nature that it is impossible to have it in our conception in the same manner as we do things that are chimerical or doubtful; and therefore when this being is named, I am not said merely to conceive or have in my conception the words employed, but to understand, and to have in my intelligence the thing itself; in other words, unless it is of such a nature, that I am unable even to conceive of it, otherwise than by understanding (*intelligendo*), that is, by including in my knowledge, that it exists in reality. But, if this is so, then in the first place it will not be one thing to have this being in the intelligence, and another to know that it exists; nor can the conception we form of it precede in the order of time a knowledge of its existence, as in the case of the picture which first existed in the mind of the painter and afterwards in his production. In the next place, it would be scarcely credible, that when one hears this being named, it would not be as possible to conceive it not to exist, as it would be to conceive God not to exist. For, if it is not possible, why all this disputation against one who denies or doubts that there is such a being? Finally, it must be proved to me by indubitable evidence, that this being is of such a nature, that as soon as it is suggested to the mind, it is impossible not to have a perfect knowledge of its undoubted existence; but it is not a sufficient proof of this to say that it exists already in my intelligence the moment that I understand the terms which designate it; for I still maintain that any other uncertain or even false things, may in like manner be in my intelligence, since, should any one mention them I could understand his words; and moreover they would be more truly there, if, being deceived, as is often the case, I should believe that these things exist, while as yet I do not believe in the existence of the being in question.

3. Wherefore, the example drawn from the painter, having in his intelligence the picture he was about to produce, has but little bearing upon this question. For this picture, before it is produced, exists in the art itself of the painter; and such a thing in the art of an artist, is nothing else than a part of his intelligence itself; because, as Augustine says, when a workman is about to construct a coffer, he first of all has it in his art; the coffer which is produced, is not life; the coffer which is in his art, is life, because it lives in the mind of the artist, in which repose all the productions of his genius before they

are brought forth. Now, why are these said to be life in the living soul of the artist, unless it is because they are nothing but the knowledge or intelligence of the soul itself? But, aside from these things which are known to pertain to the very nature of the mind, whatever real object may be perceived, whether a knowledge of this is attained by the hearing of the ear, or by the action of the intellect; undoubtedly this object is distinct from the intellect that perceives it; wherefore, even if it is true that there is something than which a greater cannot be conceived, yet this, however known, is very different in its nature from a picture yet unexecuted in the intellect of the painter.

4. Add to this, what has been intimated above, that this thing, greater than everything else that can be conceived, which is said to be nothing else than God himself, — when I hear it mentioned, can no more be conceived by me, or grasped by my intelligence as a thing known to me either in its species or its genus, than God can be, whom I also even for this same reason conceive not to exist. For, I neither know the thing which God is, nor am I able to learn it from anything similar, since you also assert it to be of such a nature, that there can be nothing similar. Should I hear anything said concerning some man entirely unknown to me, and of whose very existence I am ignorant, I might, nevertheless, through the aid of that knowledge, general or special, by which I know what man is, or what men are, represent him to myself according to my conception of what really constitutes a man; and yet it might happen that he who had spoken of this man, uttered falsehood, and that the man himself of whom I had formed a conception, had no existence, though I had conceived of him according to a true idea, not of what this man was, but of what any man is. When, however, I hear GOD mentioned, or THAT WHICH IS GREATER THAN ALL, I cannot have this in my conception or intelligence in the same manner as I had this feigned man; for while I am able to conceive of a particular man, from my knowledge of man in general, that is, from a reality known to me, it is utterly impossible to conceive of this Great Being, except from the sound of the words which alone can rarely, or never, convey a true conception of anything. If, indeed, we concede, what is also undoubtedly true, that when a conception is formed under such conditions, it is not the mere word, that is, the sound of the letters, but the signification of what is heard, that constitutes the real object of thought. Yet, to one who knows the object which is usually signified by a word, and who is therefore able to form the only true conception,

a very different signification is conveyed from that which occurs to one, who, by hypothesis, is entirely ignorant of the object, who is for the first time to be instructed in relation to it, and who is under the necessity of forming his conception only according to the mental movement produced by the sound of the word, and from this of endeavoring to construct for himself a true idea of the object referred to. It would be wonderful indeed, if, under these circumstances, his effort should ever prove successful. Thus, therefore, it is precisely under these conditions that I receive any notion or idea into my intelligence, when I hear and understand the words of one who asserts that there is something greater than all things else that can be conceived. This is my reply to the statement, that this supreme Being is already in my intelligence.

5. But that this being exists not only in the intelligence, but necessarily also in fact, is proved to me by the following argument, to wit: that unless this is the case, then whatever does exist in fact, will be greater than this, and that, therefore this, which is already proved to be in my intelligence, will not be greater than all. I still reply: if that may be said to be in the intelligence, which exists there only as to the sound of the words, and which cannot, even in thought, be represented under the form of any real thing, then I do not deny that the being in question is, in this sense, in my intelligence; but since it by no means follows from this that it exists also in fact, I do not as yet entirely concede this, until it is proved to me by an indubitable argument. But he who says, that this being, greater than all, would not otherwise be greater than all, does not properly consider to whom this argument is addressed; for I do not as yet admit, nay, I deny, or at least doubt, that this is greater than anything having a real existence; nor do I concede to it any other existence than that, if it may be called existence, which the mind imparts to it by its effort to represent to itself only from a word which it has heard, some real thing entirely unknown to it. How, therefore, can it be proved to me that this greater being exists in reality, by asserting it to be evident that this is greater than all, while I thus far still deny, or at least doubt, that this is evident? May I not still say that this greater being is in my intelligence or conception only in the same manner as even many doubtful and uncertain things are there; that is, in a manner which does not necessarily imply its actual existence? It is necessary that it should, in the first place, be made clear that this greater being really exists somewhere; then, from the fact that it is greater than all, it will no longer remain doubtful that it is also self-existent.

6. For example; they say that there is somewhere an island of the ocean, which from the difficulty, or rather the impossibility of finding what has no existence they call the *lost island*; they say that it abounds, in a much higher degree than is ascribed to the fortunate islands, with an incalculable abundance of riches and of all delicacies; and that, without owner or occupant it exceeds in every species of luxury all other lands inhabited by man. Let any one affirm to me that this is all true, I could easily understand what he says; there is here no difficulty. But should he then say, as if announcing a logical deduction, you can no longer doubt that this island, more excellent than all other lands, has a real existence somewhere, since you do not hesitate to admit that it is in your intelligence; and since it is more excellent to exist in reality also, than to exist in the intellect alone, therefore it necessarily follows that it does exist in reality; because, unless it does, any other land that exists in reality will be more excellent than this; and thus this very island, already understood by you to be more excellent, would not in reality be so; if, I say, any one should attempt to convince me by these things that this island truly exists, and that this can no longer be doubted, I should either believe that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard the greater fool, myself, if I should yield to his argument; or him, if he should suppose that he has established the existence of this island with any certitude, unless he had first proved that its superiority is by no means a mere false or uncertain conception of my intellect, but an existing and undoubted reality.

7. Such in the meantime is the reply which the fool may make to the things which have been advanced. Henceforth, when it is asserted to him that this greater being is of such a nature that it cannot even in thought not exist, and when this again is said to be proved by no other argument than this, that otherwise it will not be greater than all; he may make the same reply and say, When have I admitted that there is any such being as this, which is said to be greater than all, that from this it should be proved to me that its existence is so real and necessary that it cannot even be conceived not to exist? Wherefore it is necessary, first of all, to prove by some solid argument the existence of a superior being; that is, of a being greater and better than all others, in order that from this we may be able to prove all the other attributes which necessarily belong to such a being. But when it is said that this supreme being cannot be conceived not to exist, it might perhaps be more proper to say that it cannot be known that it does not exist, or that it is able not to exist; for, as-

according to the strict import of this word, false things cannot be known (intelligi); yet these things can assuredly be conceived of in the same manner as the fool has conceived that God is not. I know assuredly that I exist; yet I know, nevertheless, that I am able not to exist; and I know too beyond all doubt that this Supreme Being, which is God, both exists and is unable not to exist; yet does this prevent me from conceiving that he does not exist? I know not indeed that I am able to conceive that I do not exist, so long as I certainly know that I do exist; but if I am able, why may I not conceive the same of anything else of whose existence I am equally assured? If I am not able, then God is not the only Being of whom it may be said that I cannot conceive that he is not.

The other things described in this little book with so much truth, clearness and splendor, are so useful, and so fragrant with the odor of pious and holy feeling, that they ought not to be undervalued on account of those things, which in the beginning are advanced with good intention indeed, but with less strength of argument. While the latter require to be confirmed by a more rigorous logic, the whole should be received with great respect and veneration.

II. THE APOLOGY OF ANSELM IN REPLY TO GAUNILON RESPONDING IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL.

Preface.

Since it is not the fool, against whom I reasoned in the Proslogion, who here attacks my argument, but a Catholic, and no fool either, speaking in behalf of the fool, it is sufficient for me to reply to the Catholic.

CHAPTER I. *The reasoning of the objection refuted in general, and that than which a greater cannot be conceived shown to exist in reality.*

You maintain — whosoever you are who say that the fool may reply in these terms — that there exists not in the intelligence anything than which a greater cannot be conceived, except as to the mere sound of the words, and except in such a manner that it cannot even in thought be represented under the form of any existing reality; and that it no more follows that this greatest conceivable being, to which I allude, has any real existence, from the mere fact that it is in the intelligence, than it follows that the *lost island* exists in reality from the fact that he who hears it described in words has no doubt that it

is in his intelligence. But I reply, that if this greatest conceivable being is neither understood nor conceived; if it exists neither in the intelligence nor in the thought, then surely God is not the greatest conceivable Being, or he is neither understood nor conceived, and exists neither in the intelligence nor the thought. But for the falseness of this conclusion I have an unanswerable argument in your own faith and conscience. Therefore we both truly understand and conceive we have in the intelligence and the thought, a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. Hence the premises from which you endeavor to prove the contrary are not true, or the conclusions which you think you logically draw from them are false. You suppose that from the mere fact that the greatest conceivable being is understood, it does not follow that it is in the intelligence, and if it is in the intelligence it does not follow that it exists in reality.¹ Certainly, I reply, if it can even be conceived to be, it of necessity is. For the greatest conceivable being can only be conceived to exist without a beginning; but whatever can be conceived to exist, and yet does not exist, can be conceived to exist only through a beginning. Therefore the greatest conceivable being cannot be conceived to be, and yet not be. Therefore if it can be conceived to be, it is of necessity. Again, if it is even possible to form a conception of this being, it necessarily exists. For no one who doubts or denies that there is anything than which a greater cannot be conceived, will doubt or deny that if it did exist it would be unable either in fact or in our conception not to exist, for otherwise it would not be that, than which a greater cannot be conceived; but whatever can be conceived and yet is not, if it should hereafter exist would be able both in fact and in our intelligence not to exist. Wherefore if it is even possible to conceive of the being in question, it is impossible for it not to exist. But let us suppose that this being does not exist, even if it can be conceived; then, whatsoever can be conceived and yet is not, should it hereafter exist, would not be the greatest being conceivable. If therefore this greatest conceivable should hereafter exist, it would not be the greatest conceivable; which is supremely absurd. It is false, therefore, that this greatest conceivable being does not exist, if it is possible even to form a conception of it; much more so if it is possible for it to be understood, and to exist in the intelligence. I will farther add that without

¹ Gaunilon's view is that from the mere fact that this being is understood, in the sense of understanding the words by which it is announced, it does not follow that it is in the intelligence, in the sense of being fully and perfectly comprehended.

doubt what does not exist in some place or at some time, even if it exist in some other place or at some other time, may yet be conceived to exist in no place or at no time, in the same way that it does not exist at any other particular place or time. For that which yesterday was not, and to-day is, may be conceived never to have been, just as it is known not to have been yesterday; and what here is not but elsewhere is, may be conceived to be in no place, just as it is not here. In like manner that of which each part does not exist at the same time and in the same place with all its other parts, may, with all its parts and therefore as a whole, be conceived to exist never and nowhere. For, although time is said to be always and the universe everywhere; yet the whole of time does not exist at each moment, nor does the universe as a whole exist in every place; and as each part of time does not exist at the same moment with all its other parts, so all the parts of time may be conceived as never existing; and as each part of the universe does not exist in the same place with all its other parts, so all parts of the universe may be conceived as existing nowhere; also, whatever is composed of parts, may in thought be decomposed and conceived as not existing. Wherefore, everything which does not exist as a whole at every particular time or place, even if it exist, may be conceived not to exist; but the greatest conceivable being, if it exist, cannot be conceived not to exist; otherwise, if it exist it is not the greatest being conceivable; which is a contradiction. There is, therefore, no time or place when, or in which, this being does not exist as a whole; but as a whole it exists everywhere and always. Do you question in any degree whether it is possible for a being of which such things are predicated to be conceived or understood; to exist in the thought or in the intelligence? For if this being cannot be conceived, these things cannot be predicated of it. But if you say it is not understood and it does not exist in the intelligence, because it is not fully and perfectly understood, you may as well say that he who is unable to look upon the bright effulgence of the sun does not see the light of day, which is nothing but the light of the sun. Unquestionably this greatest conceivable being is, so far at least, understood and in the intelligence, that these things can be predicated of it.

CHAPTER II. *The preceding reasoning farther urged, and this greatest conceivable being shown to be an object of thought and therefore to exist.*

Accordingly I have said in the argument which you reprehend, that when the fool hears this greatest conceivable being mentioned,

he understands what he hears. Clearly, he who does not understand this when he is addressed in a language with which he is acquainted, must either be entirely destitute of intelligence, or his intellect must indeed be exceedingly obtuse. I then said that if this is understood, then it is in his intelligence. Can that be denied to be in any intelligence, which is proved to have a real and necessary existence? But you will say if it is in the intelligence, it is not in consequence of its being understood. But, mark, it follows that it is in the intelligence precisely, because it is understood. For that which is conceived, is conceived by the thought; and whatever is conceived by the thought, is in the thought just as it is conceived; so, what is understood is understood by the intelligence; and what is understood by the intelligence is in the intelligence just as it is understood? What is more plain? Subsequently, I said that if it is in the intelligence alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. If, therefore, it exists in the intellect alone, then forsooth, this very being, the greatest conceivable is one, than which a greater can be conceived. What, I ask, can be more conclusive? For, if it is in the intellect alone, can it not be conceived to exist in reality also? and if it can, does not he who conceives this, conceive something greater than it, if it is in the intellect alone? What is more evident than that, if this greatest conceivable being exists in the intellect alone, this same being is such that a greater can be conceived. But, assuredly, that, than which a greater *can* be conceived, exists in no intellect, and is never apprehended as something than which a greater *cannot* be conceived. Does it not follow, therefore, that if that, than which a greater cannot be conceived, exists in any intellect, it does not exist in the intellect alone? For, if it exists in the intellect alone, then something greater can be conceived, which is a contradiction.

CHAPTER III. *The example of the objector, that it must follow that the fictitious island exists in reality, because it is conceived.*

But, you say, it is as if some one speaking of an island in the ocean excelling in fertility all other lands, which, owing to the difficulty, nay, the impossibility, of finding what does not exist, is called the *lost island*, should declare that it cannot therefore be doubted that this island has a real existence, because any one easily understands the words by which it is described. I reply confidently, that if any one will find for me any object whatever, existing either in reality or in the conception alone, to which the reasoning of my argument is applicable, besides that being, than which a greater cannot be con-

ceived, I will pledge myself that I will find for him this lost island, and will secure it to him in such a way that it will never be lost again. But it has already been made expressly to appear, that this greatest conceivable being cannot be conceived not to exist, because the grounds of its existence are so certain and necessary; for otherwise it could not exist at all. Finally, if any one affirms that he conceives this not to exist, I reply, that when he conceives this, he either conceives something than which a greater cannot be conceived, or he does not. If he does not, then obviously he does not conceive that not to exist which he has not conceived at all. But if he does, he unquestionably conceives something which cannot be conceived not to exist. For, if it could be conceived not to exist, it would be conceived to have a beginning and an end; but this can have neither. Whoever, therefore, conceives this, conceives something which cannot be conceived not to exist; but he who conceives this, does not conceive that this same thing does not exist; otherwise he conceives what cannot be conceived. This greatest conceivable being, therefore, cannot be conceived not to exist.

CHAPTER IV. *The difference between being able to be conceived not to exist, and being able to be known not to exist.*

But as you intimate, that when it is affirmed that this supreme thing cannot be conceived (*cogitari*) not to exist, it would be more proper to say, that it cannot be *known* (*intelligi*) not to exist, I still maintain that *conceived* was the best word to use. For, had I said that this thing cannot be *known* not to exist, you who say that according to the proper signification of this word, false things cannot be known, would, perhaps, object that nothing which is, can be known not to be; for it is false to say that that is not, which is; wherefore it is not peculiar to God, that He cannot be known not to exist. But if any one of these things which certainly are, can be known not to exist, in like manner other certain things can be known not to exist. But this objection evidently will not hold in relation to the word *conceived*, when properly considered. For although none of the things which are, can be *known* not to exist; yet they can all be *conceived* not to exist, except that which is supreme. For all those things, and those alone can be conceived not to be, which have a beginning and an end, and are composed of parts; and, as I have said, whatever does not exist as a whole at any time, or in any place; but that alone cannot be conceived not to exist, which has neither parts nor beginning nor end, and which no conception can find except existing as a

whole, everywhere and always. I know, therefore, that you are able to conceive yourself as not existing, while you certainly know that you do exist; I marvel that you should say you do not know that you can do this. For we conceive many things not to exist, which we know do exist; and many things to exist, which we know do not exist; not by believing, but by imagining, them to be as we conceive them. Indeed, we are able to conceive anything not to exist, while we know it does exist, because we are able to conceive the one and to know the other at the same time; and we are not able to conceive a thing not to exist, while we know that it does exist, because we are not able to conceive that it is, and is not, at the same moment. Whoever is able to appreciate the distinction made in these two sentences will easily understand that nothing can be conceived not to exist while it is known that it does exist; and, that whatever does exist, excepting the greatest conceivable being, can, even while it is known to exist, be conceived not to exist. Thus, therefore, it is both peculiar to God that he cannot be conceived not to be, and yet there are many things which cannot be conceived not to be while they are. But in what sense God is said to be conceived not to be, I think I sufficiently explained in my little book.¹

CHAPTER V. *A special consideration of various things advanced by the objector; and first, that he has in the outset mis-stated the reasoning he undertakes to refute.*

But there are other things which you, in behalf of the fool (pro insipiente) object to my reasoning, the fallacy of which I had supposed it would be unnecessary for me to expose, as this could be easily detected by one of even a feeble capacity. But since, as I hear, these things seem to weigh something against me with certain of my readers, I shall allude to them in a few words.

In the first place you repeatedly represent me as saying that that which is greater than all things exists in the intelligence; and if it exists in the intelligence, it exists in reality also; otherwise, that which is greater than all would not be greater than all. Now such an argument is nowhere to be found in all that I have written. For in order to prove that the being in question exists in reality, it does not amount to the same thing whether we speak of a being *greater than all*, or of a being *the greatest that can be conceived*. For if any one should say that this greatest conceivable being has no real existence or that it is able not to exist, or even that it can be conceived

¹ Proselogion, Chapter III.

not to exist, he can easily be refuted. For what is not, is able not to be; and what is able not to be, can be conceived not to be; and whatsoever can be conceived not to be, if it exists, is not the greatest that can be conceived; and if it does not exist, even if it should, it would not be the greatest than can be conceived. But it cannot be said, that the greatest conceivable being, if it exists, is not the greatest conceivable; or if it should exist, that it would not be the greatest conceivable. It is evident, therefore, that this neither exists not, nor is it able not to exist, or to be conceived not to exist. For otherwise, if it does exist, it is not the being in question, nor would it be if it should exist. But this cannot be so easily proved of that which is merely said to be greater than all things. For it is not so evident that that which can be conceived not to be, is not greater than all things which exist, as it is, that it is not the greatest being conceivable. Nor is it so indubitable, that, if there is anything greater than all, it is not something different from the greatest conceivable being; or, if there should be, that it would not, in like manner, be something different, as it is certain in relation to the being in question, than which a greater cannot be conceived. For what if some one should say to me that there is something greater than all things which are, and yet that this same thing can be conceived not to be; and that something greater than this, even though it may not exist, may be conceived; could the inference be so clearly drawn in this case, that therefore it is not greater than all things which are, as it can most manifestly be said in the reasoning which I have adopted, that therefore it is not the being than which a greater cannot be conceived? In the former case, the object referred to would need some stronger proof of its existence than to be called greater than all; in the latter, the object needs no higher proof of its existence than is contained in the very terms which designate it as the being *than which a greater cannot be conceived*.

If, therefore, that cannot be equally proved of the being said to be greater than all, which can be shown to be self-evident in relation to that being than which a greater cannot be conceived, you do me injustice in censuring me for saying what I have not said, and in ascribing to me language so very different from that which I have employed. But if the same thing is true of that which is greater than all and can be proved by some other argument, why should I be thus censured for maintaining what can be proved? And whether it can be, he can easily decide who considers that the medium of proving this also, is furnished by the very idea of a being, than which

a greater cannot be conceived. For no being can be known to be the greatest conceivable, except that being alone which is *greater than all*. As, therefore, this greatest conceivable being is comprehended by us, and is in the intelligence, and on this account is asserted to be in reality also; so we may conclude that that being which is said to be greater than all is comprehended by us and is in the intelligence and on this account has a real and necessary existence. You see therefore with what propriety you compare me to that foolish person who proposes to prove the existence of the *lost island* from the mere fact that the description of it can be understood.

CHAPTER VI. *A consideration of the objector's statement in the second paragraph; that any false things whatsoever may in like manner be understood and may therefore exist.*

But as to your objection that any false or doubtful things can be understood and can exist in the intelligence, as well as that being of which I was speaking, I see not that your opinion in this particular, differs from my own, since I was aiming to prove what was yet supposed to be doubtful. It was sufficient for me, at first to show that this, in some sense, was understood and existed in the intelligence in order that it might be subsequently considered whether it existed in the intelligence alone, as false things; or in reality also, as true things. For if false and doubtful things are understood, and exist in the intelligence in this sense, that when they are mentioned, he who hears understands the meaning of him who speaks, there is no reason why that, of which I have been speaking, should not be understood and exist in the intellect. But how can the things which you advance harmonize with themselves? For you say that should any one speak to you of false things, you could understand his words; and that when you here mentioned that which exists, you are not said to conceive or have this in your thought, in the same manner as false things are held in the thought, because you cannot conceive of this in any other way than by *understanding* that is, by *comprehending in your knowledge*, that it exists in reality. How, I ask, can these things harmonize, both that false things are understood (intelligi), and that to understand anything is to comprehend in our knowledge that it exists in reality? This is nothing to me. It devolves on you to see that such contradictions are reconciled. But if you reply that false things are *understood* in a qualified sense, and that the definition you have given is not of understanding in general but only of a particular kind of understanding, then I ought not to be censured for saying that the

greatest conceivable being is understood and is in the intelligence, even before it is conceded to exist in reality.

CHAPTER VII. *Refutation of another assertion of the objector in the same paragraph; viz., that this being supremely great, can as easily be conceived not to exist as the fool conceives God not to exist.*

In the next place you object that it is scarcely credible that when we hear this being mentioned, it cannot be conceived not to exist, in the same manner as the fool conceives God not to exist. Let those answer for me who have attained but the slightest experience in argumentation and controversy. Can any one be consistently said to deny what he understands, because this is asserted to be identical with that which he denies for the very reason that he understands it not? Or, if at any time a thing is denied which is in some degree understood, and yet this is identical with that which is in no degree understood, would it not be more easy to prove what is doubtful in relation to that which is in some intellect, than it would be in relation to that which is in no intellect, and is in no degree understood? Wherefore it is not to be supposed that any one denies the existence of that being, than which a greater cannot be conceived, which, when mentioned to him he understands in some degree, merely because he denies the existence of God, of whom he has conceived no notion whatever. Or if the former is also denied because it is not entirely understood, yet, is it not easier to prove that which is in some sense, than that which is in no sense understood? It is not without reason, therefore, that I have adduced this being than which a greater cannot be conceived as a medium of proving, in opposition to the fool, the existence of God; for, of God he has no understanding; but this being he understands in a certain degree.

CHAPTER VIII. *Examination of the comparison of the picture in the third paragraph; and the source of our knowledge of that supreme good inquired for by the objector in the fourth paragraph.*

But it was entirely unnecessary for you to labor so assiduously to prove that this being, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is not like the picture yet unexecuted in the conception of the painter. For I did not adduce the example of this preconceived picture with any design of maintaining that the being in question was like it, but only to show that there can be something in the intelligence which can be known not to exist. You farther object, that when you hear this being mentioned, than which a greater cannot be conceived, you

are unable to have it in your intelligence or to form any conception of it corresponding to any real thing known to you either in its genus or species; since you neither know the thing itself, nor are you able to learn it from anything similar. Now, plainly, this position is untenable. For, since every less good, in so far as it is a good, is so far similar to a greater good, it is clear to any rational mind, that in ascending from the less good to the greater good, we may by means of that than which a greater can be conceived, do much towards attaining a knowledge of that good, than which a greater cannot be conceived. Who, for example, cannot, at least, conceive, though he may have no belief in the existence of the object of his conception, that, if there is any good which has a beginning and an end, that is a much greater good which has neither beginning nor end; and that, as the latter is greater than the former, so that will be a greater good still which has neither beginning nor end, even though it is constantly passing from the past through the present to the future; and that a far greater good even than this, must that be, which, whether it exists in reality or not, is conceived as being beyond the need of motion or change and is in no respect subject to either. Cannot a good like this be conceived; and can anything greater than this be conceived? But is not this to reason from these things, than which a greater can be conceived, and through these to acquire knowledge concerning that being than which a greater cannot be conceived? There are therefore existing, things from which we may interpret the character of this being. Thus also, the fool who receives not the sacred authority of the Scriptures, can easily be refuted if he denies that, from these things, we can acquire a knowledge of this greatest conceivable being. But if a believer in divine revelation denies this, let him remember that *the invisible things of God from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead.*

CHAPTER IX. *That a being supremely great can be conceived and understood; and the argument against the fool strengthened.*

But even were it true that this greatest conceivable being cannot be conceived and understood, yet it would not be false that such a being can be conceived and understood. For, as nothing hinders but that we may speak of a being whose nature is *ineffable*, though that cannot be expressed which is said to be ineffable; and as we can conceive of a being whose nature is *inconceivable*, although that cannot be conceived which can properly be called *non-conceivable*;

so, when a thing is mentioned, than which a greater cannot be conceived, beyond doubt that which is heard can be conceived and understood, although it may not be possible fully to conceive and understand the thing itself. For although any one should be so foolish as to assert, that there is nothing than which a greater cannot be conceived, yet he will not have the hardihood to say that he neither understands nor conceives what he asserts; or should any such an one be found, not only is his statement to be rejected, but he himself is to be despised.¹ Whoever, therefore, denies that there is anything, than which a greater cannot be conceived, undoubtedly conceives and understands the negation which he makes; and this negation he cannot understand and conceive without its parts; but one of its parts includes a conception of that being *than which a greater cannot be conceived*. Whoever, therefore, denies this, conceives and understands a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. It is, also, obvious that what is not able not to exist, can, in like manner, be conceived and understood; but he who conceives this, conceives something greater than he who conceives what is able not to exist. Therefore, when this greatest conceivable being is conceived, if it is supposed to be something which is able not to be, then it is not conceived as the greatest conceivable; but the same thing cannot be conceived and not conceived at the same time. Wherefore, he who conceives the greatest being conceivable, conceives not what is able, but what is not able, not to exist. Hence, what he conceives, necessarily exists; because, what is able not to exist, is not what he conceives.

CHAPTER X. *Force of the preceding reasoning. Conclusion.*

I think I have now made it evident, that in the Prosligion I have proved that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be conceived; and that, too, not by a weak, but by a necessary argument, which no objection is sufficient to invalidate. The great force of this proof lies in the peculiar nature of the demonstration employed, as the being in question is proved to have a real and necessary existence, from the very fact that it is conceived and understood; and that this being is whatever it is proper for us to believe concerning the Divine substance to be. For, we predicate of the Divine Nature, whatever can be absolutely conceived as better to be than not to be. For example, it is better to be eternal than not eternal; good, than not good; nay, goodness itself than not goodness itself.

¹ Non modo sermo ejus est respiciendus, sed et ipse conspiciendus.

But anything of this kind cannot but be that than which a greater cannot be conceived. This greatest conceivable being is therefore necessarily whatever it is proper for us to believe concerning the Divine Nature. I tender to you my thanks for the kindness with which you have both censured and approved my little work. For the high commendation which you have bestowed upon those things which appeared to you worthy of reception, are a sufficient proof that in reprehending what you regarded as the weaker points of my argument, you were actuated by no malevolent design.

ARTICLE III.

HARRISON'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE.¹

By Daniel R. Goodwin, Professor in Bowdoin College.

MR. HARRISON seems to have been in the habit of noting down the grammatical errors he encountered in his English reading until he had accumulated such a store, that, arranging them, with desultory remarks, under the several Parts of Speech, and prefixing some "historical" and "philological" dissertations, he ventured to publish a book, with the imposing title of "The Rise, Progress, and Present Structure of the English Language." Such a genesis does not augur all the depth, breadth, thoroughness, and systematic completeness which we might desire and might otherwise have expected under such a title. We must confess that, in our apprehension, the work is in its substance too light, and in its style too "flippant," for the gravity of the subject; besides being guilty of committing many gross errors in the very act of assuming to correct the alleged errors of others. Had it not been thought worthy of special notice on the other side of the water, and of republication on this, we should not have thought it worth while to disturb its distant repose with any criticisms of ours. But as we have now ventured a charge, we must be allowed to produce at least a few of our witnesses. Not having seen the English

¹ The Rise, Progress, and Present Structure of the English Language. By the Rev. MATTHEW HARRISON, A. M., Rector of Church Oakley, Hants; and late Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. 12mo. pp. 393. Philadelphia. 1850.

original, we shall refer in our citations to the American reprint, although the latter may exhibit errors for which the author is not responsible.

In the first place, let us look at some of Mr. Harrison's historical and philological facts and theories.

"We have the extraordinary fact," says he, "that whilst not a *single fragment* of Anglo Saxon Literature existed or *even had been called into existence*, a Scandinavian Literature *had existed for ages in Iceland* — the remotest habitation of man."¹

Now according to Bosworth's express statement, — and to his authority Mr. Harrison himself refers in his preface, — Iceland was not so much as known to the Norsemen till A. D. 861, and not settled at all till some years after. But, not to speak of Beowulf or the Saxon Chroniclers, Alfred's works must have been written or compiled about the year 880; and, whatever may have been the precise age of the Poet Caedmon, Alfred's fragmentary versions show that he must have lived many years before, probably some 200; and the laws of Ethelbert cannot be placed much later than the year 600.²

After eulogizing in the strongest terms the ancient Greek for its

¹ Page 35. Here and elsewhere we take the liberty to insert our own *italicizing*.

² Grimm's view of the relative antiquity of the Anglo Saxon and the Icelandic literature may be gathered from the following, which is immediately subjoined to a paragraph relating to the *Gothic* language and literature: "Auf der entgegengesetzten westseite haben andere auswanderer, die *Angelsachsen*, sehr bedeutende freilich um vier und mehr jahrhunderte jüngere denkmäler ihrer sprache, in poesie wie in prosa, hinterlassen, aus welchen ein ausser ordentlicher gewinn gezogen wird: denn wenn auch die gedichte sämtlich schon in christlicher zeit aufgeschrieben oder abgefasst sind, enthalten sie doch anklänge an frühere heidnische darstellung, vorzüglich Beowulf, Caedmon," u. s. w.

"Im Norden dauert der eingeborne volksstamm bis heute fort, der sprachquell hat sich da mächtig und in ungetrübter lauterkeit erhalten: sind *die aufzeichnungen noch später als die angelsächsischen* erfolgt, so geht die fassung der meisten eddischen lieder der grundlage nach doch ungewisselt in das heidenthum selbst zurück und zeigt dichtung und rede fast ungestört; die *altnordische* sprache hat uns also nicht wenige geheimnisse des alterthums zu erschliessen; ihre kraft flüchtete aus Norwegen nach Island.

"Ueber den *althochdeutschen* sprachquellen hat ein ungünstiges geschick gewaltet: sie stehen hinter der reinheit und dem hohen alter des *gotischen* denkmals; sie erreichen zwar das alter, aber lange nicht den werth noch die menge der *angelsächsischen* quellen, und wenn ihre aufzeichnung allerdings um *drei oder vier jahrhunderte früher erfolgt ist als die der altnordischen*, werden sie durch den inneren gehalt und reichthum dieser weit übertroffen," u. s. w.—Deutsche Grammatik, I. B. S. 2, 3, u. 7.

subtleness and copiousness, its facility and precision, its harmony and perfect grammatical finish, Mr. Harrison yet talks in another place of something's being "humane," — it is not easy to discover what it is — "when compared with the twisting and turning, the fantastic gyrations, and the indefinite declensions, of the German noun," (pages 74 and 92). But, which exhibits the greater variety and complication of "twistings and turnings, fantastic gyrations, and indefinite declensions," the Greek noun, or the German? Which is the easier for a learner to master? Or, is what was a perfection in the idolized Greek, become an intolerable blemish in a modern tongue?

He declares, in one place, that the Hebrew language dispensed altogether with Case inflections, "each noun remaining invariable, except in the difference between the singular and plural numbers," thus ignoring entirely the construct state of the Hebrew noun, and the modifications it undergoes in connection with different suffixes; yet, in another place, he says that "the Hebrew had four Cases, the Greek five, the Latin six." (pp. 46 and 140.)

The Normans are represented as having dispensed with the Cases of the Anglo-Saxon, in order to avoid trouble, as they supposed, while they were really returning, it is said, to a more ancient philosophical principle. But it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the modifications of the Anglo-Saxon language, were made by the Anglo-Saxons themselves, much more than by the Normans; and that those changes would have been very nearly what they have been, had no Normans ever seen the Island of Great Britain. Moreover, as to the philosophical principles on which the changes proceeded, it is hard to say whether to express Case relations by separate words, by prefixes, or by suffixes, is the most philosophical. The use of separate words is undoubtedly the most ancient. But it is to be noted, that the "Northmen" — we hardly know whether by this term, our author means to designate the "Normans" again, or their predatory predecessors, the Danes, etc; but if the latter, which is the proper use of the word, then the Northmen" — had Case inflections in their own languages, and those inflections, notwithstanding all the "trouble" they occasion and all their want of "philosophical principle," have retained a firm footing in those languages or their successors to the present day. (p. 40.)

In his theory of the formation of language, Mr. Harrison seems to have quite confounded the original or primeval language with the languages of savages, barbarians, nomadic tribes, pastoral people, etc. "All languages must originally have been scanty; in the first place,

simply expressive of visible objects. [No verbs — no sense but sight ?] Grammatical inflections, philosophical principles and subtle distinctions must have been unknown." "As mankind advanced in civilization, convenience would dictate abbreviation and the adoption of arbitrary forms of speech; and language would thus gradually become more artificial. As new objects and new combinations of ideas presented themselves, new terms would be invented; and the language would thus become more copious and more connected." (pp. 67, 68.)

All this may sound very well as a "philosophical" theory; although his idea of a "philosophical principle" seems here to be quite different from that on which he just now represented the Normans as having acted. But it is a fact founded on the most irrefragable testimony, that the dialects of savages — as many of the American and African dialects, for example — are often distinguished by a most poetic copiousness, a most elastic power of expansion, and a most artificial grammatical structure.

Mr. Harrison holds that our language has lost in euphony by the change of the *th* of the third person singular of the verb into *s*. This *th* he declares to be "the gentlest and most pleasing of all sounds." "Change the *th* of loveth," says he, "into *loves*, [he means, change *loveth* into *loves*] and we at once pass from the note of the dove to the hiss of the serpent." We will only stop to ask how much better the last statement would sound, if pronounced thus: "we at onth path from the note of the dove to the hith of the therpent" ? (p. 50.)

Mr. Harrison throws down the gauntlet boldly to all authority in points of grammar. He aims at principles. "A principle is a landmark to which we can always look forward, in doubt and perplexity. It is a pedestal on which we can take our stand, prepared to climb higher and higher, but never to descend." "That which is right is right, without any authority at all; and that which is wrong cannot be made right by any authority." (p. 125.) Now we take the liberty to think, despite Mr. Harrison's authority, that in language there is no *right* but *fact*. There are no *à priori* principles which can be set against facts to judge or condemn them; without some authority of usage nothing right could exist; the right is founded upon the authority of actual use and nothing else. The business of the grammarian, like that of the true philosopher of nature, is to *interpret* facts, not to *prescribe* them. That is the right language for each age, place, rank, class, or profession, which is the established usage of that age, place, rank, class or profession. To seek after an absolute, universal, un-

changeable rule of good usage is bootless and meaningless. If a man would know what is the right language among the common country people, or sailors, he has simply to ascertain the actual usage of those classes; and if, presenting himself as one of their number, he should depart widely from that usage, he would be likely to be laughed at as an ignoramus or a pedant. If he would know what is the right language among the higher and more cultivated classes of society, he must learn the actual usage of those classes. This may be called good usage — the best usage, if you please. It is still only usage, only a *fact*. If a man would know what is the best society, and who are the best authors, no rules of grammar can help him; he cannot determine either the one or the other by deduction from any abstract, *à priori* principles; but must find out both as best he may, by a common sense induction and inference from observed facts, or by the authority of those whom he may choose to trust. Principles are unchangeable; but right language is constantly fluctuating. Certainly the language of Chaucer or of Wicliffe is not the right English in contradistinction from that which is spoken at the present day. Still less can it claim to be the right language absolutely in preference to that of more modern times; for, on the very same principles on which such a claim should be made, it would instantly be forfeited. The right language, in this sense, will never be found, until we get some record of that which was spoken in Paradise. Our author himself is subsequently constrained, with sundry grimaces, to bow to the tyranny of custom, and with Horace, acknowledge it the

"Jus et norma loquendi."

In his grammatical developments, Mr. Harrison seems to us almost as unfortunate, as in his general philology.

He undertakes to develop the parts of speech *genetically*; and, in so doing, declares that names were the first words used, and expressed the "*being of a thing only*," not being drawn from, or attached to any observed property in the object; and that adjectives originated from the demand for terms expressive of the *state* and *condition* of things (129).

To illustrate the participle, he uses the phrase, "the mother loving her child"; and, having shown that *loving* possesses the nature of a verb, he adds, "but it expresses also an *attribute*, a capability of loving, and so far it partakes of the nature of an adjective." As though the phrase, "the mother loves (or *loveth*) her child," did not express the same attribute quite as fully; as he himself says, a page or two

further on, in regard to the phrase, "man thinks" — "here we have a subject, *man*, to whom we *attribute*, or assign, the *faculty of thinking*." These statements occur in fundamental definitions, where, if anywhere, strictness of speech should be required. We refer to them simply as specimens of the looseness of expression, if not confusion of ideas, which characterizes by far too much of the book.

In explaining the idea of an *object*, he uses the phrase, "vice produces misery," and says, "the term, misery, is the *object on which the action of the verb, produces, falls*." In this phrase, he only copies the current language of technical grammarians, by which they have contrived to confuse a very plain matter. How can the action of *produces*, fall on *misery*, unless *misery* already exists for it to fall upon; and how can *misery* be there for *produces* to fall upon, until it has been produced, and thus the action of producing, has already fallen upon it?

He says, "the nominative case is the noun in its primary and simple form," and this in reference to language in general, though every tyro knows the contrary to be true in Latin and Greek in innumerable instances; and in English the *form* of the objective case is as primitive and simple as that of the nominative.

He declares most zealously against certain incongruous grammatical genders in the German, as though in the classical languages, the genders of nouns were always determined by some *à priori* rational principle, without any caprice or inconsistency. "The German," says he, "running counter to the authority of antiquity,¹ and to our very innate feelings, makes the sun feminine and the moon masculine — the sun a *she*, and the moon a *he* — an act of violence and profanation against the majesty of the one and the loveliness of the other. It is probable that the genders of the sun and moon, and other arbitrary and incongruous genders, were fixed in German, and in many other languages, (the Anglo-Saxon included,) at a time when they were the languages of barbarous hordes," (p. 162). How, then, do they run counter to the authority of "antiquity?" Are "our very innate feelings," and "antiquity," too, the result of civilization? And is it not "probable" that the Greek genders were fixed at a time when the Greeks were equally barbarous hordes? And finally, if loveliness should determine the feminine gender, what should be the gender of *love* itself? In German, it is feminine, while by classical authority, it is masculine.

¹ But see Turner's Anglo-Saxons, Vol. I. pp. 207, 208.

Perhaps the strangest principle of all, is that which is laid down in regard to the gender of the article and adjective in English. "The English article is masculine when applied to a masculine noun, feminine when applied to a feminine noun, and neuter when applied to a neuter noun." The same is said to be true of the adjective. This point the author labors and develops with great zeal and fulness. But we confess it still remains clear to us, that neither article nor adjective could ever have gender in any language, in any other than a *merely formal sense*. If, therefore, the distinction of form is taken away, no distinction of gender can possibly be left. Yet, upon this *principle* of his, the author would determine practically, in English as in German or Greek, the propriety of repeating or omitting the article before the latter nouns of a series. "The question is," says he, "can that which is masculine, define that which is feminine and that which is neuter, at the same time; or that which is singular, and that which is plural, at the same time? Logically and grammatically it cannot, whatever custom, or negligence, or ignorance, may sanction to the contrary." May not the "masculine" *logically* perform such offices, as well as the *feminine* or *neuter*? But, let that pass. He then goes on, with the most interesting naïveté, to give the following illustrations: "Who would think of saying, 'I met a man and crocodile,' or 'a woman and ornithorhynchus paradoxus!'" Scarcely anybody, we think. "Our innate feelings," or something else, would forbid it; and they would equally forbid it, though the "crocodile" should be distinctly understood to be masculine, and a "hen" were substituted for the ornithorhynchus. We cannot see that *gender* has anything at all to do with the matter, except so far as it may be one circumstance tending to dissociate the objects in view, (pp. 218-220.)

The stale formula is carefully repeated, that "the absence of the article before *man* denotes the species at large." And this is proposed apparently as an illustration of a general rule; at all events it is not stated as an exception. The *generic* use of the definite article is ignored altogether; although *man* is almost the only name of any *species* in the animal or vegetable kingdom before which the article can be omitted when the noun in the singular number denotes the species at large — provided that noun be susceptible of a plural form — thus, the lion, the bee, the ant, the oak, the violet, the thistle; we may even add *the article* and *the adjective*, as used in the preceding sentences. It is quite amusing to see one grammarian after another devoutly repeat the prescribed phrase, "*The* is called the definite article, because it defines or points out some particular person or thing referred to," as, 'the horse is a noble animal.'" (p. 213.)

Mr. Harrison copies from Dr. Andrews a list of forty-four adjectives, which, it is alleged, do not admit of comparison. The same list is copied by Prof. Fowler and others. Yet nothing is more certain than that nearly half of these adjectives are used and properly used in the comparative or superlative form, as often, in proportion to their whole use, as any other adjectives in the language. And of *two thirds* of them those forms may be found in the best authorities. The truth is when we say one course is *safer* than another, we do not mean that either is absolutely *safe*; just as one man may be said to be *better* than another, when neither is absolutely *good*. Indeed when we say of one thing "it is safer or better" than another, we mean, not that the other is *safe* or *good*, but rather that it is somewhat dangerous or deficient in goodness. It is quite as natural to say "this is bad, but that is better," as to say, "this is good, and that is better." If, on inquiry after a person's health, it were answered, "he is better;" a bystander would certainly feel authorized to infer that such a person had lately been *ill* rather than *well*. A man would prefer a basket full of peaches to the fullest of these baskets, or a truly wise man to the wisest of a hundred taken at a venture. Such is usage.

Under the head of the *proper* use of the participle, we find *sweaten*, *sowen*, *growen*, *foughten*, (why not add *boughten* and *broughten*?) with only five others by way of illustrations. Indeed our author quite overflows with zeal for the good old forms of our perfect participle. He is clearly not a man of progress. He brooks no change in the king's (or queen's) English, although he scarcely writes a sentence *himself* which would not be convicted of treason, or at least of some high misdemeanor, if tried by a jury of Edward Third's time. "There is not one iota of difference," says he, between "I had *drank* and I had *knew*, (!) I had *rode* and I had *blew*, I have *sat*, and I have *gave*, (!) a web was *woove*, and a stone was *threw*. In such cases as these the error may be more palpable than in ordinary cases; but there is not the slightest difference of degree."! If anything can equal the strangeness of the *apparent* meaning of those two sentences, it is the slovenly looseness, the utter want of logical precision, which characterizes their construction.

Mr. Harrison has transcribed from Bosworth one stanza of the Danish song "Kong Christian," with Professor Longfellow's English version; but with such changes both in the original and in the translation as show conclusively — if the printers are not in fault — that he has no knowledge of metres and no ear for music. Perhaps he

thought that a Danish as well as an American poet could not fail to be improved by the retouching of an Englishman. (p. 88.)

He says that if "learned" were used without reference to a "tacit standard," it might be applied to the "*luminous* Hottentot." (p. 250.)

He expresses a holy horror of "the mawkish and insipid conventionalism" of employing *you* for *ye* and *thou*, in certain cases. (182). He complains that "particular *authors* presume too much upon their own *authority* and make use of strange and *unauthorized* terms;" under which category he includes *exhaustive*, enumerating with it four others. (109). Yet, after such an *authoritative* statement as that, having found in a sentence of three or four lines, from an "eminent divine," the terms, *works, towards, working*, in immediate succession, with *which, we, were, would*, distributed through the remainder of the sentence, he is "shocked at the hideous cacophony," and declares that, "such sounds and such a construction would have carried death into an Athenian mob." (315). In his opinion the sentence — "Is there a God to swear by, and is there none to believe in, none to trust to?" — exhibits "a license carried to the extreme point of endurance." "The Translators of the Bible," says he, "have not put this *flippant phraseology* into the mouth of Joseph, but made him to express himself in more dignified and respectful language — 'Is your father well, the old man of whom ye spake?'" Yes, but if they have not put this "*flippant phraseology*" (a phraseology, by the way, which we should rather characterize as *sometimes* exceedingly *nervous*) into the mouth of Joseph, they have not hesitated to put it into the mouth of God, whom they have made "to" express himself thus — "on one of the mountains which I will tell thee of." Gen. 22: 2. See also other similar cases innumerable. (196) But though these criticisms should be acknowledged to be in the main correct, "the dignified and respectful language" in which they are expressed is characteristic.

Mr. Harrison makes *it* stand for "a person or thing personified." (166). He thinks it probable that *itself* is a contraction of *its self*. (204). Whereas the fact that the Translators of the Bible never used *its*, but that they have often used *itself*, as in 1 Cor. 13: 5, is proof positive that *itself* is no such contraction at all. He doubts whether on "principle," absolutely to condemn and banish such phrases as, *the worse, the better, the best*, used adverbially, or to submit to them as "stiff-necked vulgarisms rendered intractable," (218); he says *be* as a principal verb means *exists*, as 'honesty is the best policy,' (261); in his zeal for restoring *so* in those cases where *such*, in colloquial usage, so often usurps its place, he lays down the

broad "principle" that "*such* denotes quality, *so* degree;" from which it will certainly seem to follow that not only is "such a high tree," for "so high a tree," a faulty expression, but "such high trees" is equally faulty; and we should be bound on "principle" always to say, "so high trees," "so lofty mountains," "so odd criticisms," however strangely or stiffly it may sound. (379). In the sentence, "See where thou hast been lien with;" "lien with," says he, "is a passive verb, effected by the conjoint efficacy of the preposition with." He has plainly forgotten "the Athenian mob."

We pass by his curious theories; that "mathematical propositions are not *demonstrated* by human reason," because "they are true or false in themselves," (318); and that "we speak *hypothetically* of that which is contingent as a fact, but not of that which is contingent in the speaker's mind," which furnishes his "principle" for the subjunctive mood. (292).

He has undertaken to give us a thorough and thoroughly "grammatical disquisition" on the proper distinctive uses of *shall* and *will*, *should* and *would*. (268—274). He says "the phrase 'I shall go to-morrow,' expresses simply the *intention* or *fixed purpose* of doing a certain thing;" [This may be true in some cases; but is not such a phrase more commonly the simple *prediction* of a certain fact?] "and 'he will go,' expresses the belief that it is the intention or will of the third person to do this or that." From which it *will* seem to follow that when we say "it will rain to-morrow," we express the belief that it is the *intention* or *will* of it [a "personified thing"?] to rain to-morrow; and do not merely predict the future event. "I should have been more mild." "*Would* in this case," says Mr. Harrison, "*would* express *resolution*; *should*, on the other hand, *would* express a simple intention," — *intention* again, not a mere *conditional fact*. "*Would* expresses *volition*, and has reference either to time past or present. 'I would do it were I in your place,' expresses a present inclination with reference to a future action." And, on the same broad *principle*, and for aught that appears in this grammar to the contrary, 'he would do it were he in your place,' *would* also express his present *volition* or *inclination*, and the phrase, "were he to re-examine his whole disquisition he would find it 'lamentably deficient in accuracy of expression,'" expresses his present *volition* or *inclination* so to find it. But he adds, "'I would do it,' with the emphasis on '*would*' expresses a *present feeling* and *determination* to have done a thing with reference to a particular time passed; i. e. 'I would at that time do it — I *was* determined to do it.'"! Had the Translators

of the English Bible possessed some such clever grammatical *principles* — such distinct notions of the relations of *tenses* — they might have been saved from “the intense nonsense” of saying, “If one went unto them from the dead they will repent.”

To our mind, this whole disquisition on *shall* and *will*, *should* and *would*, belongs to that class of discourses which, so far from developing or settling either plain *principles* or certain facts, “darken counsel by words without knowledge.”

Mr. Harrison appeals to classical authority as if it were final in matters of grammar (320—322); but if as great diversities of dialect and usage were held allowable in good English as were exemplified in Greek and Latin, even in so-called classical times, he would have been saved by far the greater part of the trouble of making his collection of grammatical errors. If the English really betrays a greater tendency to such errors than the classical languages, the cause is probably to be sought in what Mr. Harrison regards as its grand advantage — its comparative destitution of inflectional forms; in consequence of which there arises in them who use it a comparative inaptitude to employ with constant and strict appropriateness the few which it still retains.

But we hasten to direct attention to Mr. Harrison's *forte* — his collection of grammatical errors and criticisms. And here, to simplify matters, we shall confine ourselves, for the most part, to those drawn from the Received Version of the Bible. These will serve as fair specimens of the critic's taste and judgment; and will answer our purpose the better from being so perfectly familiar to all parties.

“In Scripture,” says he, “the Deity is sometimes represented under the neuter gender, — ‘Art thou not *it* that hath cut Rahab and wounded the dragon?’ etc. There is a peculiar fitness in thus speaking of Deity as an abstraction, apart from all human distinctions. So, again, ‘Our Father which,’ not who, ‘art in heaven,’ avoiding human personality and paternity.”

“The Americans have changed *which* into *who*, as being more consonant to the rules of Grammar. ‘This (justly observes the author of *Men and Manners in America*) is poor criticism, for it will scarcely be denied that the use of the neuter pronoun carried with it a certain vagueness and sublimity not inappropriate in reminding us that our worship is addressed to a Being infinite and superior to all distinctions applicable to material objects.’”

“Just criticism”! Our Father in heaven is in English of the neuter gender!!

Now we confess we remember no case in which "the Deity" is represented in Scripture "under the neuter gender." And, until Mr. Harrison can suggest some plainer one than these, we shall beg leave to think that the peculiar "vagueness and sublimity" of such an idea and of its corresponding expression were utterly foreign to the minds as well as to the style both of the original writers and of the English translators of the Holy Scriptures; but are an invention of heathen or of modern philosophy. It is the glory of the Scriptures that they reveal to us a living God, not an *abstract* "Deity;" a personal God, not a mere first cause or universal law; a *Father* in heaven watching over his (*its*!?) children with *paternal* care and more than *paternal* love. In such views we see nothing degrading to God, but everything elevating, ennobling, comforting to man. — But after all, this may be an Americanism.

As to the first passage which our author gives in proof of his position, we suppose it is from Isaiah 51: 9. If so, the pronoun "*it*" has for its antecedent, not *Lord*, but *arm* of the Lord. This passage, therefore, can afford him no support against the Americans.

Neither does the "*which*" in the Lord's prayer, denote the neuter gender, except to those who are ignorant of the "Rise, Progress, and Present State of the English Language." One feels humbled, to be obliged to inform Messrs. Harrison and Hamilton, that at the time when our present translation of the Bible was made, the relative pronoun *which*, was referred indifferently to persons or things, and to any gender, as is its etymological correspondent still in the cognate languages. As to the propriety of changing it to *who*, it is not a question of an abstract, or personal, or paternal Deity — not a question of gender at all — for, if the original Greek is to be followed, (and on this Mr. Harrison elsewhere lays great stress), the relative, i. e. the article, is unquestionably of the masculine gender; and indeed in what language was *father* ever conceived of "under" any other gender? It is not a question of gender at all; but simply a question whether we shall now pray in the English of the present day, or in that of the time of James I.

If one appeals to the devout and solemn associations which cluster around an old familiar form of words, we have not a word to say in reply. But such an appeal, if he made it, would come from Mr. Harrison with an ill grace; for he not only freely criticises, as we shall see, the familiar language of the received version of the Holy Scriptures, but, in one or two cases, openly calls in question expressions in the daily prayers of the English Church.

"Give unto thy servants that peace which the world cannot give, that *both* our hearts may be set to obey thy commandments and *also*," etc.—[Collect. Evening Prayer.]

"The term *both* is ambiguous, for it may signify the hearts of *both* of us. [It might have so signified in Dean Swift's congregation, when, seeing no one present but the sexton, the facetious Dean began the exhortation with, "Dearly beloved brother Roger," etc.] Better, 'give unto thy servants that peace which the world cannot give, that our hearts may *both* be set to obey thy commandments and *also*,' etc."

This might do, if "hearts" were to be the subject of the verb after "*also*," which it is not. As it is, the proposed amendment manifestly makes a bad matter worse—changes an ambiguity into a solecism; if, indeed, the ambiguity itself is, after all, certainly removed. The author seems not to have been sufficiently familiar with *men and manners in America*, to be aware that the "Americans," in the exercise of their "poor criticism," by simply omitting the word "*both*," have avoided ambiguity and solecism both together.

Bearing in mind Mr. Harrison's theory of the genders of the English article, let us proceed to note how far his criticisms upon its use are thereby enlightened. We shall see that he finds slight occasion for the application of his own elaborate "principles."

"When the morning was come, all the chief priests and elders of the people," etc. Matt. 27: 1.

"In cases of this kind, attention to the original text, in the use of the article, would keep us from error. In the Greek we have *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι*, and in the English we ought to have, *the* elders. The term *elders* in this passage, without having the definite article prefixed, according to the plainest idiom of our language, has a very different meaning from that which it is here intended to convey; for if we say that *elders* of the people took counsel, we mean that *certain* elders, or *some* elders, took counsel, which might be five out of five hundred; but when we say, *the* elders, we mean *the elders* as a body, a class, and this is the meaning required."

Here we have two remarks to add: First, that in this particular case it happens by a sad mischance that the insertion or omission of the definite article before *elders* produces, "according to the plainest idiom of our language," quite a contrary effect to that above alleged; (for neither in our copies of the Greek Testament, nor in the best editions of the English Version, is there any *comma* after "priests," and certainly there is no need of any; and) if we say "*all* the chief

priests and elders took counsel," ALL the elders will certainly be understood, and not merely *the* elders as a body — not to say "five, out of five hundred" of them; while, if we say *all* the chief priests and *the* elders, etc., it may be understood that perhaps not *all* the elders, but only the elders generally took counsel. Second, the original text is expressly appealed to as a safe standard in this and all similar cases. Now, it is remarkable that only thirty-nine verses before that above criticised, the phrase "from the chief priests and elders of the people" occurs, and forty-one verses further on, again, "with the scribes and elders;" in both of which cases the article is at least as necessary (in English) before elders as in the case under consideration, but in neither of them is it inserted before the Greek *πρεσβύτεροι*. See also Mark 15: 1; Acts 4: 5; John 18: 3; and almost innumerable other passages, where, in such phrases as, "the chief priests and elders," "the elders and scribes," "the chief priests and Pharisees," etc., the article is omitted before the latter noun in the Greek. Indeed its omission or insertion in such cases seems, with the writers of the N. Testament, to have been purely arbitrary.

We follow Mr. Harrison in his next passage, "And they continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread and in prayers." Acts 2: 42.

"A strange inaccuracy and carelessness characterize the whole of this passage. In the first place, there is an ambiguity in the *sound* of the apostles' doctrine, which might mean the doctrine of one particular apostle or of all the apostles. Secondly, there is a grammatical error in the phrase, in *breaking* of bread. Thirdly, there is a total perversion of the meaning in the omission of the definite article before *fellowship*, before *breaking*, before *bread*, and before *prayers*; for the definite article is used before each of these terms in the original, and is *absolutely necessary* for a proper understanding of the passage either in Greek or English. The whole passage translated according to the original, would run thus:—'And they continued steadfastly in the doctrine and the fellowship of the apostles, and in the breaking of the bread and in the prayers.'"

To this we answer *seriatim*: In the first place, must we then abandon the use of the English genitive in the case of all nouns whose plural ends in *s*? So it would seem; for if the *sound* of the genitive plural may be mistaken for the genitive singular, so may that of the genitive singular be mistaken for the genitive plural; and thus we should be allowed to use neither. It will not do to say that sometimes the connection may make the meaning clear, and then the gen-

itive form may be used; for we beg to think that the connection of the passage cited leaves no reasonable doubt as to the number intended.¹ In the second place, we admit that in our opinion, the phrase "in breaking of bread" is not the most eligible grammatical construction, but in regard to it the usage of the best writers in the language has always been divided, and it can hardly be branded as a grammatical error, (except on *à priori* "principles,") especially when the age of the Translation in which it occurs is considered. Thirdly, there is no more perversion in the omission of the article before *fellowship* than before *doctrine*. Indeed one would suppose this writer to have been ignorant that the article before the English genitive belongs to that genitive and not to the noun with which it is in regimen, that the article cannot stand before such governing noun or nouns, but must always in this construction be left to be understood. It is understood as well before *fellowship* as before *doctrine* by everybody who understands the English language on either side of the Atlantic. As to the article before *bread*, there is a previous question to be settled before the grammatical question in the English can be raised. Every one may not agree with Mr. Harrison's exegesis. The truth is, that, with this exception, if it be one, and allowing the *fellowship* spoken of to be the *apostles'* fellowship, as Mr. Harrison does not doubt, the whole passage, as it stands in our Translation, would be in strict accordance with the sense and order of the original and with the strictest idioms of the English language, if only the repetition of "in" were omitted before "breaking of bread" and before "prayers;" which repetition, by the way, Mr. Harrison retains. Yet, says he, "it is obvious that the whole passage (in the received version) is lamentably deficient in accuracy of expression."

"And are choked with cares and riches and pleasures of this life."
Luke 8: 14.

"*The* cares — the specific cares that belong to this life." So says Mr. Harrison. Would he have "*the* riches" and "*the* pleasures" also? There is no article in the original before either of the nouns. The English therefore is perfectly faithful to the original, which is

¹ We might have added that when Mr. Harrison says, "there is an ambiguity in the *sound* of the apostles' doctrine," — a phrase which we have faithfully copied with all the marks and points which it has in the American edition of his work, — he has himself fallen into an ambiguous expression; for his words might mean that the ambiguity is in the *doctrine* itself, and not in the *phrase* which he probably intends to quote. But we would not follow his example so far as to insist upon such petty criticism.

the more to its credit, as in this case, the current German, French, Spanish, and Italian versions have departed from the strictness of the text. The sense is partitive or general, not definite and universal — “cares,” i. e. “certain of the cares,” different perhaps in different cases; and not “*the* cares,” i. e. “the cares as a whole,” and always the same.

“For as the lightning that lighteneth out of the one part under heaven shineth unto *the* other part under heaven.” Luke 17: 24.

“If there had been only two parts under heaven, then the definite article would have been required; but as the parts are indefinite, it is improper to limit them to *the* one and *the* other, as if there were but two parts only.”

But it would surely be quite jejune to say that the lightning shines from one part of the sky to *another*, if “another” is taken in its proper sense for *some other*, *any other*, which might be one of the nearest parts. When, however, the lightning is said to shine from the one part to *the* other, of course we understand *the opposite*, *the most distant*. In this sense, be “the parts” as “indefinite” as you please, whatever we assume as a starting point, there can be but one other point to compare with it; and this we think clearly to be the sense of the passage in question.¹ Moreover, the definite article stands in the original words of our Saviour, and is used in the French, Spanish, and Italian translations, as well as in the English — the German employing a different construction.

But nothing seems to content Mr. Harrison. He quarrels with the following, “And they came into the house of Baal, and the house of Baal was full from one end to another.”

“If the house of Baal, like most houses, had only two ends, it might be full from one end to *the other*, *not another*, which implies one end of many.”

We presume that the house of Baal, like most houses, had several ends, extremities, sides, or corners, and that it is meant that it was full, not merely in a single line from one end to the opposite, but from end to end in all directions, into every nook and corner. Luther says, “in allen Enden.” The Hebrew is פִּי ופִּי, literally “mouth to mouth.” The object manifestly is, not as in the former instance to express great distance, but to indicate great expansion, or rather compact fulness. We really do not see that the text would be improved by Mr. Harrison’s architectural or grammatical emendation.

¹ This seems to be settled beyond dispute, by the parallel passage in Matt. 24: 27, where the East and the West are expressly designated as the two parts.

Ἀληθὺς Θεοῦ Ὦς ἦν υἱός. "Truly this was the Son of God." "Here are two errors — the first in the words *the* Son, which expression is definite and emphatic, where it ought to have been indefinite and indifferent; the second in the words "of God," which again, according to our idiom and notion of the Godhead, is definite, when, according to the real words and the meaning of the centurion, (who, it must be remembered, was a heathen,) it ought to have been indefinite, the word Θεοῦ never being used in Scripture, without the article τοῦ, where God, *the* God, is spoken of."

Here is certainly an astounding statement to come from an *English* clergyman, a fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, and a grammarian! Why, to omit all other Cases of this noun, and to confine ourselves to the genitive, so as to keep within the strict terms of the proposition, the word Θεοῦ occurs in the New Testament alone, without the article τοῦ, in nearly 200 instances, where there can be no doubt the true God is spoken of. The very same phrase as that here commented upon, occurs no less than three times, when, in each case, *vidē* refers to the same subject, viz.: Christ, and Θεοῦ unquestionably means the true God. One of these passages occurs only eleven verses after, Matt. 27: 43: "For he (i. e. Jesus) said, I am the Son of God;" the other two are, one in Luke 1: 35, where the angel Gabriel says to Mary, "that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God," and the other in Rom. 1: 4, "declared to be the Son of God with power," etc. Surely the apostle Paul, the angel Gabriel, and Jesus himself, will hardly be charged with heathenish notions, and, as to their speaking good grammar, Mr. Harrison is here dealing not with the English, but the Greek, and he expressly appeals not to his so-called absolute "principles," but to *facts*. Also the phrase "sons of God," occurs many times where Θεοῦ without the article, undoubtedly means the true God. Θεοῦ is used without the article, in the phrase "of the living God," at least eight times, 2 Cor. 8: 3 and 6: 16; 1 Tim. 3: 15; Heb. 8: 12 and 11: 31 and 12: 22; 1 Pet. 1: 23; Rev. 7: 2. It is also similarly used in connection with the word Father (and that without being raised to the "peculiar vagueness and sublimity" of the neuter gender) some dozen times; as 2 John 8; 2 Cor. 1: 2 and 14: 18; Eph. 1: 2 and 6: 23; Phil. 1: 2; Col. 1: 2; 2 Tim. 1: 2; etc. etc.

Indeed our conclusion would be, from our own careful examination — and the conclusion is nothing new in the critical world — that the omission of the article before Θεοῦ, is determined by no reference whatever to the proper meaning or application of that word, but in

general simply by the fact that the word with which it is in regimen, is without the article. The article is indeed *sometimes* inserted before Θεοῦ, when its governing word has no article. According to the received text, John 19: 7 would, in this connection, be a remarkable instance of this kind, when the Jews tell Pilate, to his exceeding terror, ὅτι αὐτὸν υἱὸν [τοῦ] Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν, that Jesus "made himself the Son of God." But many of the best manuscripts, and almost all of the modern editors, omit the article in this instance. There is also one passage in which the article is omitted before Θεοῦ, although it is inserted before the governing word, while Θεὸς again unquestionably means the true God. It is 2 Pet. 1: 21, οἱ ἄγιοι Θεοῦ ἁγθῶντοι, "holy men of God." But, as the article is not repeated before ἁγθῶντοι, perhaps this does not properly constitute an exception.

Whether, therefore, Mr. H. is right or not, in his interpretation of this passage — for which, it is true, he can claim the authority of Lowth — certain it is he has not given sufficient reasons for it. He has not convicted our English translation of *grammatical* error. Into other than grammatical considerations, it is not for us at present to enter; but we may be allowed to suggest in passing that, as to the Roman centurion and his presumed heathenish notions, they do not conclude so decisively for Mr. H., as he seems to suppose. How does he know that this centurion had not heard of the claims of Jesus, and of the charges against him in the sanhedrim, as well as the scribes and elders, who, eleven verses further on, use the same phrase which he uses? How does Mr. H. know that the centurion was not present when Pilate was so terror-stricken at the announcement made to him by the Jews, just before the crucifixion, that Jesus claimed to be "the Son of God?" How does he know even that the centurion may not have been a devout man — a believer in the expected Messiah? Before this, we read of a centurion who loved the Jewish nation, and had built them a synagogue, and whose faith exceeded all that was found in Israel. And soon after, we meet with another centurion who, without any subsequent special Christian instruction that we know of, was already in the habit of prayer and almsgiving, accepted with God, and ready with open arms to embrace the religion of Christ.

"If thy hand or thy foot offend thee, cut them off and cast them from thee," Matt. 18: 8. Here, "them" is objected to. But in this case again our Translators have only too zealously followed the original, which makes use of the plural number in consequence appar-

ently of the different genders of the antecedents. Ostervald in his French Version, and Diodati in the Italian, have done the same; while the Vulgate, Martin Luther, and the Spanish Version of Father Scio, have substituted for the plural pronoun the masculine singular, thus referring strictly only to "the foot" in each case.

"The Son of man shall be delivered *up to* [unto] the chief priests and *to* [unto] the scribes, and they shall condemn him to death and [shall] deliver him to the Gentiles, and *they* shall mock him and [shall] scourge him, and shall spit upon him and shall kill him." Here the ambiguity of "they" is objected to, and the substitution of "who" is proposed as an emendation. But here again the original is literally rendered. And we need only read "they" with an emphasis to make the sense perfectly clear; an advantage of which neither the original nor the Vulgate is susceptible.

The same objection is made to the following: "And they did all eat and were filled, and *they* took up of the fragments that remained twelve baskets full." Here too the original is scrupulously followed; except that, while, as in the former passage, the pronoun is omitted by the Greek idiom, it is inserted here in English, although it might have been omitted in English too. If it had been omitted, there would indeed have been no ambiguity, but a falsehood; and for that very reason its insertion, not being grammatically required and seeming therefore to stand in contradiction to that falsehood, naturally leads to the true sense; for we learn from John 6: 12, that it was the *disciples* who gathered up the fragments on this occasion.

"Wherefore kick ye at my sacrifice, and at mine offering which I have commanded in my [mine] habitation, and honorest thy sons above me, to make yourselves fat with the chiefest of all the offerings of Israel my people?" 1 Sam. 2: 29. "There is in this sentence a strange confusion of persons, and an extraordinary abruptness of transition." Yet the confusion and abruptness are precisely the same in the original Hebrew, in the Vulgate, and in all the leading modern versions. The Septuagint has given quite a different reading of the whole passage. But if we consider that a part was addressed to Eli and his sons, and a part, in its very nature, to Eli separately, we shall find the whole constructed in the original with great skill and naturalness. At all events, it does not seem the proper office of English Grammar to amend the Hebrew text, or to require it to be mis-translated.

* * * * "were written for our learning, that we, through patience and comfort of the Scriptures, *might have hope.*" Rom. 15: 4. "And

when they found not his body, they came saying that they had also seen a vision of angels which said that he was alive." Mr. Harrison maintains that "might have" should be "may have"; and that "was" should be "is"; and this in accordance with one of his favorite "principles," on which he very frequently takes occasion to insist. He says that *might* refers to the past, and *may* to the present or future. Whereas the use of *might* for the present or future is almost as familiar as any use it has; as, "he might at any time if he would," "oh that I might know the truth!" etc. Besides, in both cases and others like them, he forgets the *formal* effect of the tense of the preceding verb; thus, "are written that we may have hope," "were written that we might have hope." Such, we contend, is the natural English unencumbered by any *à priori* "principles." And as for the phrase, "said that he was alive," any English (or at least any American) ear will instantly detect how unnatural it is to say, "which said that he is alive." Indeed, Mr. H. hardly dares suggest this reading, but would alter the whole construction and read, "saying, he is alive." This, he alleges, is in strict accordance with the Latin and Greek, *eum vivere, αὐτὸς ζῆν*—and so it might be if there were no difference between the *oratio recta* and the *oratio obliqua*; although, in fact, the Greek text happens to read *ὁ λέγων αὐτὸς ζῆν*, "which say that he is alive." This last, however, is a point to which Mr. H. does not allude, and which would serve no purpose in illustration of his favorite "principle."

But he objects to the *also* in the latter passage, discoursing in this wise:

"We cannot connect an entity with a nonentity. The sentence amounts to this: they did not do a certain thing, and they did something besides. If we strike out *also*, the passage is clear and consistent. Both the Greek and Latin of this passage, however, require *also* to be in the position in which we find it."

And well they may; for, though we do not see what the *Latin* should have to do, more than the English, with *requiring* this; yet surely simple common sense would find no difficulty in understanding the passage as it stands in the original text and in the English Version, *also* and all, — without being frightened by any spectres of entities or nonentities. It is a case of obvious ellipsis; "and when they found not his body, they came saying that they had (not only not found it, but) *also* seen," etc.; i. e. one fact is stated, the not finding or the failure to find, and *also* another fact, the seeing, etc.

"If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be

persuaded though one rose from the dead." "Though one *rise* from the dead. Though one *rose* means, though one did rise at some former period." Yes, if you are sure it is in the indicative mood; otherwise it may mean, though one *should rise* at some future time.

"If one went unto them from the dead, they will repent." "That is, if one went at a future time, which is intense nonsense."

This certainly is sharp enough. Yet in the face of such authoritative criticism, we venture to assert that the use of *rose* and *went* with reference to a subjunctive future is good, idiomatic, and often elegant English. And nothing is wanting in either of those passages to make them pure, consistent English, but to change the corresponding *will* to *would*, which any one may see would leave the reference to futurity as distinct as ever. Our Translators retained *will*, probably because the original has the Indicative future, while the verbs translated *rose* and *went* are both in the aorist subjunctive. Luther too has translated these last words by the imperfect subjunctive in German; while, for the *will*, he has in one of the cases followed the Greek with a simple future, and in the other has conformed the phrase to the German idiom, which in this case is the same as the English, and used the conditional form.

"He that pricketh the ear maketh it to show her knowledge."
"We see no reason for *it* in one place and *her* in the other."

This is a borrowed criticism. Its supporters seem either to think that *her* is in the objective Case, or to be ignorant that *its* was not used by the Translators of the English Bible, but *thereof*, *his*, or *her*, instead of *it*. A strict following of the Anglo-Saxon might have led them to use *his* as the genitive of *it* in all cases. But though they did not intend to personify objects of the neuter gender and used *it* for the nominative and accusative Cases, yet, as the genitive *its* was not then in use, they seem to have taken in its stead *his* or *her*, according as they would more naturally have said *he* or *she* in case of personification. *Earth*, for example, would more naturally be personified in the feminine; consequently we find such phrases as the following: "And now art thou cursed from the earth which hath opened *her* mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand. When thou tillest the ground *it* shall not henceforth yield to thee *her* strength." Gen. 4: 11, 12. "And the earth shall remove out of *her* place, . . . and *it* shall be as the chased roe," etc. And so in a multitude of instances. Of charity, which Mr. Harrison, by an original metaphor, styles a "maternal virtue," it is said, "doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not *her* own." If therefore that pas-

sage in the Apocrypha must stand corrected, it will not stand alone. The truth is, our Translation of the Bible was made too early for some modern critics, who set down everything which is not actual usage as "nonsense," or at least as solecism.

"But if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God." Acts 5: 39. "Lest your attempts to put down and silence the disciples of Jesus be of such a nature with reference to his assumed position, as to exhibit you in the character even of fighters against God, and not against man only, *μήποτε καὶ θεομάχοι ἐσσηθῆτε*, lest you should prove even *God-fighters*."

"It is evident that, according to the sense of this passage, the term *even* should have followed and not preceded the words *to fight*—'lest haply ye be found to fight even against God.' And yet he himself has put it before in the version which he has given with the Greek in the preceding paragraph; so dangerous is it for some to play with edged tools.

"Sorrow not as *them* that have no hope." 1 Thessa. 4: 13. "This sentence made out would be, sorrow not as *them* sorrow that have no hope. As *they* sorrow, not as *them* sorrow." Yes; or, "even as others which have no hope," might do, as it stands in the text of the English version.

"And the contention was so great among them that they departed asunder one from another." Acts 15: 39. "As Paul and Barnabas only are here spoken of, they departed one from *the* other, not one from *another*; the said Paul went this way and the said Barnabas that. When we say they departed one from *another*, we at once plunge into plurality,"—and much more in the same strain and style; all which might have been spared, had the writer condescended to consult the text from which he professes to quote. That reads: "And the contention was so *sharp between* them, that they departed asunder one from *the* other." At least thus it stands in our "American" Bibles. Mr. Harrison assures us, in his Preface, that he has not set up men of straw to contend with, but has subjected to criticism only actually existing errors. Besides, in these cases he puts down the chapter and verse, which he has neglected to do, or has done incorrectly, or his printer for him, in some other cases. Such blunders in citations of Scripture are very common, but are exceedingly disreputable particularly in a clergyman. We are sorry to see this last copied verbatim by Professor Fowler in his work on the English Language.

But our readers are already more than worried with pursuing *them*

sort of game. Before taking leave of Mr. Harrison's book, however, we will add, that, if we count aright, it arraigns in all some forty-four passages of Scripture as containing grammatical errors. Of these we have here reviewed seventeen; and our readers can judge of the character of the criticism which has been applied on one side and the other. Of the remaining twenty-seven, we think fifteen or sixteen more equally capable of defence were there a demand and an opportunity for making it. There remain, therefore, only about a dozen cases out of the forty-four, in which, in our judgment, the charge of error has been substantiated. Of course a far greater number of passages containing alleged grammatical errors are drawn together from other quarters, and it may be that, in a greater proportion of those cases, Mr. Harrison's criticisms are correct;—*sed ex pede leonem*.

ARTICLE IV.

GOVERNMENT AND POPULAR EDUCATION.

By Rev. E. C. Wines, East Hampton, L. I.

THE subject of Popular Education, is exciting increased interest among the people of the United States. No subject can more worthily occupy the thoughts, or call into action the energies of our citizens, in their individual or social capacity. The cause of education is eminently the cause of the people. It is the cause of public order and virtue, of public liberty and prosperity.

We propose, in the present article, to inquire into the Relation of Government to Popular Education; and to show, that it is among the most solemn and imperative of obligations resting on a government, to provide by law for the thorough instruction of all the children in the community. In support of this position, we shall adduce three principal considerations. The line of argument and illustration which we intend to pursue, may be indicated by the following propositions: Popular education is necessary, and therefore it is the duty of the State to provide for it—first, because of its influence on national, family, and individual, character and happiness; secondly, because of its connection with the purity and perpetuity of our civil

institutions ; and, thirdly, because of its bearing on the pecuniary interests of the community, it being by far the readiest and the surest road to public prosperity and wealth. It is on the last of these topics that we propose to dwell most in detail, in the present discussion.

First, we infer that it is the duty of government to make adequate provision for the sound Christian instruction of the people, because of the influence of education on character and happiness.

That education, founded on Christianity and impregnated with its principles, is adapted to elevate the character and promote the happiness of its possessors, is a truth attested by universal experience. It has ever been the great promoter of whatsoever things are true, honest, pure, lovely, and of good report. It is the parent of virtue, industry, and order, and essential to the full benefits of gospel preaching. The want of it is the principal cause of the extreme profligacy, improvidence and misery, which are so prevalent among the laboring classes in many countries.

A comparison between the Irish and Scottish peasantry would, of itself, be sufficient to establish this general fact. Among the former, we behold little else than sloth, destitution, crime, and misery ; among the latter, even those who are in the worst comparative circumstances, a degree of comfort, the fruit of industry and order, is everywhere observable. To what is this difference to be ascribed ? The Irish possess as vigorous constitutions, and are as capable of hard labor, as the Scotch. In the two great physical elements of prosperity — soil and climate — Ireland has a clear advantage over Scotland. The question, then, returns upon us, to what is the difference in their social condition to be ascribed ? Something, doubtless, is to be set down to the account of misgovernment in Ireland. But, after making every allowance on that score, that truth and candor can require, the difference is yet, beyond a peradventure, owing to the prevalence of intellectual and moral culture in the one case, and the want of it in the other. No other cause can be named, adequate to the effect, and consequently, to assign any other, would violate one of the first principles of philosophy, as well as one of the clearest dictates of common sense. In Ireland, the education of the poor is deplorably neglected. Few of them can either read or write ; and most of them are ignorant of nearly everything which it most befits a rational and accountable creature to understand. In Scotland, an order of things essentially different, exists. It is rare to meet with a person who has not some education. Schools exist in every parish. The means of

knowledge are brought within the reach of the lowest classes. The result, in each case, is such as must always take place under the like circumstances.

Another illustrious example of the humanizing power of Christian education is seen in the history of those mountain parishes in the Ban de la Roche, under the pastoral care of the celebrated Oberlin, — a name embalmed in every philanthropic and pious heart. We behold there a transformation, wonderful as the scenes of an Eastern romance, wrought, within the brief period of a few years, in the character and condition of an entire people. We see them rescued from the accumulated evils of ignorance, vice and poverty, and raised to the enjoyment of all the blessings of knowledge, virtue and competence. We perceive industry, order, contentment, and all the social and moral virtues, enthroned in the heart and shining in the life, where but a few years before the whole social fabric was the sport and prey of every capricious and malignant passion. We behold a desolate wilderness, over which the gloom of ignorance, like the pall of death, has brooded for centuries, suddenly converted into the garden of the Lord, with the freshness of Eden covering the scene, and the smile of heaven gilding the prospect. And what are the agents that effected this amazing revolution? Learning and Religion, those guardian angels, that watch, with spirit ever wakeful and benignant, over the happiness of mortals. Christian education was the sole source of the change, and of the long and rich train of blessings that followed thereupon.

Nor is education less benign in its influence on families, than on communities. Few contrasts can be imagined stronger than that which exists between an enlightened and well ordered Christian family, and a family enveloped in the dark and putrid atmosphere of ignorance; between the dignity, refinement and happiness, which mark the domestic relations on the one side, and the brutal passions and haggard wretchedness that reign, with undisputed and terrific sway, on the other. How appalling is the picture of the ferocity and misery of a family destitute of religious and mental culture! Parental menaces and imprecations; filial strife, rudeness and insubordination; a total blank, as it respects intellectual pursuits and pleasures; none of the interest of imparting knowledge or receiving it; no pleasant reciprocations of mental stores already acquired; the luminaries of the spiritual heaven extinguished; no spot, in the whole social territory, clear of the dark fog of ignorance; the redeeming mediation of Christ unknown; the solemn realities of eternity wholly obscured in the shade; the conscience stupefied; the discriminations of duty

indistinct; the passions brutalized; the affections debased, or extinguished; no parental love, unmixed with vulgar harshness, on the one side, and no true filial respect felt or shown on the other, but a mutual, unmitigated, incessant coarseness of manners and language; — these are some of the lines in which truth requires the picture to be drawn. How striking, how beautiful the contrast, afforded by the picture of a household under the power of a genuine Christian nurture! Just in proportion as Christian education sheds its genial influence on families, it will have the effect to exalt, refine and hallow the domestic relations; to convert them into unfailing sources of the purest enjoyment; and to render them conducive to the highest end of our being.

Personal dignity and happiness are no less promoted by education than national and social elevation and felicity. Silly, atheistical ranters, it is true, are sometimes to be met with, who, in their impious ravings, elevate savage over civilized life. But none but a fool, a knave, or a madman, would contend, that the barbarian warrior numbing his scalps, or the ignorant drone in civilized countries, whose pleasures, as Paley truly says, are scarcely superior to those of an oyster, are to be placed on the same level, in these respects, with Newton, investigating the laws which bind the planets in their orbits; with Locke, affixing their just limits to the powers of the human understanding; with Franklin, teaching the lightning to obey his will; with Milton, soaring to the sublimest regions of poetry; or with Wilberforce, arousing the British Senate with his eloquence. Christian education confers even upon the poor a quickness of conscience, a strength of principle, an erectness, independence and nobility of character, which place them on an eminence, whence they can look down upon the misery and degradation of the multitudes that throng the cheerless vales of ignorance below. They are often elevated to a region far above the clouds and storms, which darken the horizon, and oppress the hearts, of the less intelligent and virtuous of their fellow-creatures. They stand in a relation to these somewhat analogous to the position occupied by the loyal seraph in reference to the recreant crew of angels, by whom he was surrounded and solicited to rebellion; and of whom Milton, extolling his independence, firmness and elevation of purpose, says:

“ So spake the Seraph Abdiel, faithful found
Among the faithless, faithful only he;
Among innumerable false, unmoved,
Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified,
His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal;

Nor number nor example with him wrought
To swerve from truth, or change his constant mind,
Though single. From amidst them forth he passed,
Long way through hostile scorn, which he sustained
Superior, nor of violence feared aught ;
And with retorted scorn his back he turned
On those proud towers to swift destruction doomed."

How Christian knowledge secures this elevation is easy to be understood. "It expands the mind, exalts the faculties, refines the taste of pleasure, and opens numerous sources of intellectual enjoyment. Instead of being continually solicited by the influence and irritation of sensible objects, the mind can retire within herself, and expatiate in the cool, quiet walks of contemplation. These are self-created satisfactions, always within our reach. They spring up spontaneously, unsolicited, unborrowed, and unbought." [Robert Hall.] During the intervals of labor in the week, and the longer interval afforded by the Christian Sabbath, persons, without any of the resources of knowledge or religion, if they are of a cold and torpid temperament, generally pass the time in utter inanity ; either sleeping it away, or sunk into a listless, unreflecting dulness, in which the mind is far less active than in actual sleep. Or, if they are of a more lively turn, they betake themselves to all kinds of vulgar merriment, — the profane scoff, the ribald jest, the coarse repartee ; or they take refuge in those gross, sensual pleasures, which are more hurtful, both to themselves and others, than utter vacuity of thought and emotion. Not so with men, in whom the seeds of knowledge and religion were sown and took root in early childhood, gradually shooting up into plants, which have since been constantly unfolding their beauties to the sun, and whose fruit now appears in all its fair proportions, engaging colors and mellow ripeness. Reading, meditation, innocent amusements and elevating social pleasures fill up the leisure hours of such persons ; and the Sabbath, — that distinctive and glorious feature in the Christian economy, — is devoted to occupations alike profitable to themselves and honorable to its Author.

Secondly, *We infer the obligation of government to make adequate and effective provision for instructing and training all the citizens to knowledge and virtue, from the connection of popular education with the purity and perpetuity of our civil institutions.*

This is an argument of great force and cogency ; but we shall be compelled to dismiss it with a very brief consideration. To the citi-

sens of the United States is committed the charge of maintaining those free institutions which it cost our forefathers so much blood and treasure to establish — institutions which are at once the pride of our own country, and the hope of the world. Yes, and we say it in no spirit of vain-glorious boasting, but with a deep impression of the responsibility which our position involves; we stand upon an eminence such as few nations have ever occupied. We are as a city upon a hill, whose light cannot be hid. The eyes of the world are upon us — one portion regarding us with anxious, but trembling hope, the other with a fiendish desire to see our prospects blasted, our honor prostrate in the dust, and our greatness and very existence among the things that were. Our fall will be the triumph of despotism and the knell of liberty throughout the world. The same pile of ruins in which our Constitution lies entombed, will cover the ardent hopes and cherished expectations of the friends of freedom everywhere. To maintain our free institutions, then, and to transmit them unimpaired to posterity, is no light trust, to be committed to rash hands and rasher heads. It is pregnant with the fate of empires. In its issue are involved, for ages yet to come, the happiness or misery of a large portion of the civilized world. It is a trust most solemn in its nature, and the due execution of it demands, in every citizen, knowledge, judgment and virtue, as well as patriotism, vigilance and independence. It is not to be disguised, that our political fabric is encompassed with dangers, and that there are elements of destruction at work among us, which, if left to operate without check or control, must in the end ensure its fall. We speak not this as politicians. We do not even allude here to the agitation of the slavery question, which, in the minds of many, recently threatened such disastrous results. The dangers to which we allude, spring from our circumstances. They are inherent in our political organization as a nation, and our moral constitution as men. They are, therefore, wholly irrespective of political parties, as well as of local and temporary excitements. These dangers are numerous and multiform; but the two whose influence is most to be dreaded, are, in our opinion, the facility with which foreigners are admitted to vote at our elections, and the loss of a proper intelligence of judgment, and a proper independence of action in our own people, resulting, necessarily, in an undue and dangerous susceptibility of being swayed by artful, selfish, and unprincipled party leaders.

Let us here guard against misapprehension. We have had, and still have, many naturalized citizens, whose talents and virtues are

an ornament to our country ; men of enlightened views and devoted patriotism ; men, sound to the core in their political and moral principles, and forward in every patriotic enterprise ; men, whose public services are a part of our national glory, and who are justly regarded as among the pillars of the State. It is not of such that we speak. We refer to that overflowing tide of immigration, which disgorges on our shores its annual thousands and tens of thousands of Europe's most degraded population — men without knowledge, without virtue, without patriotism, and with nothing to lose in the result of any election. Look at the statistics of immigration into this country. It is estimated that there are now among us about 5,000,000 of foreigners, including their immediate descendants. Not less than a million have landed on our soil within the last five years. And such is the ratio of increase in these accessions, and such the strength and permanence of the causes operating to produce it, that it is quite safe to predict, that the number of foreign immigrants arriving among us during the ensuing ten years, will not fall below 5,000,000. In that case, we shall then have a foreign population of 10,000,000 in the midst of us, equal to half the present inhabitants of the entire Union, — a state of things unprecedented in the history of this, or, as we believe, of any other country. Are these persons fit depositaries of political power ? Have they any of that knowledge of our form of government, or that attachment to our institutions, which are essential to its safe exercise ? Surely there is danger, there must be danger, impending over us, from this source, as well as from the other.

Now, what is the remedy for each ? The proper remedy for the former of these dangers, would be a change in our naturalization laws ; but such a change can scarcely be anticipated. The only practicable antidote to this, the only effectual safe-guard against the other, the only sure palladium of our liberties, is so thorough an education of all our citizens, both native and foreign, as shall nullify the dangerous element in immigration, and secure in the natives of the soil, true independence of thought and action.

Our very freedom will prove our bane, unless the people, the original source of all power, are so far enlightened as to be able to exercise the various functions of power aright. Universal suffrage, like many other things in this contradictory world, is either a blessing or a curse, according to circumstances. It is a blessing to a nation whose citizens use it with intelligence ; it would be a curse to any people so far wanting in that attribute, as to allow themselves to be made mere tools in the hands of ambitious demagogues. It is possi-

ble that a nation may be well governed, where the mass of the people are ignorant; but it must be a government in which the people have no voice. Russia is governed with ability; but what imagination can paint the horrid scenes that would ensue, upon the sudden introduction there of the right of universal suffrage? Freedom under such circumstances would be the most terrible of curses. It would become an instrument of destruction to be dreaded in proportion to the degree in which it was possessed. No, the ability to reflect, examine and judge, and the possession of elevated virtue, each attainable, for the most part, only through the agency of Christian education, are essential to the safe enjoyment and useful exercise of the privileges of freemen. Intelligence and virtue are the bulwarks of a free government. In proportion to our intellectual and moral illumination will be our chances of surviving, in the vigor of perpetual manhood, the operation of those causes which have undermined all preceding republics. Nor should it be forgotten, that the importance of education is increasing every year in proportion to the vast influx of foreign voters, the increase of our native population, and the expansion of our people over a wider territory.

A development of the causes which have given strength and stability to China would be both pertinent and instructive here. We may not attempt such a labor now, but we cannot forbear an allusion to the subject in passing. There can be no doubt that the sea and the mountain barriers by which China is surrounded, the unwarlike character of her neighbors, her isolation from the rest of the world, her vigilant police, the eligibility of all to the trusts and dignities of office, and her rigid system of official responsibility, have all had their share in the result. But these are insufficient to explain the phenomenon. The most powerful agent, beyond all question, is the EDUCATION OF HER PEOPLE. We speak here not so much of the education received in schools, as of that which consists in early, constant, vigorous and efficient training of the disposition, manners, judgment and habits both of thought and action. The sentiments held to be appropriate to man in society are imbibed in infancy, and iterated and reiterated through the whole of subsequent life. The manners considered becoming in adults, are sedulously taught in childhood. The habits, regarded as conducing to individual advancement, social happiness, and national repose and prosperity, are cultivated with the utmost diligence. In a word, the whole channel of thought and feeling for each generation is scooped out by that which preceded it, and the stream always fills, but rarely overflows its em-

bankments. The greatest pains are taken to acquaint the people with their personal and political duties; — and herein they set us an example worthy of imitation. The sixteen discourses of the Imperial moralist, — Yong-tching, — are read twice every moon to the whole empire.

It is the testimony of Mr. Roberts, Mr. Gutzlaff, and other intelligent travellers, that the Literary Institutions of China are the pillars that give stability to her government. Her military forces are quite inadequate to hold together her numerous and extensive provinces. Her soldiers, for all the purposes of defence and protection, are little better than dead men; and were they stricken from the roll of the living, the strength and stability of the empire would not be sensibly affected. The greatness and repose of China are chiefly attributable to her peculiar literary institutions. Wealth and rank are not without their influence here, as elsewhere; but their relative power is far less than in most other governments. As a general rule, learning, while it is an indispensable prerequisite for all who aspire to official station, is sure to command respect, influence, and distinction. A way is thus opened, whereby every gifted and ambitious youth may rise to the highest dignities in the State — the throne only excepted. And in point of fact, the most eminent statesmen are usually those who have risen by intellectual efforts. They are at once the philosophers, teachers, and rulers of the land. Power — high official rank — is the dazzling prize, held out to intellectual superiority. At regularly recurring periods, examinations are held, to which crowds flock from every quarter of the imperial dominions, none being denied admission to these literary probations, except servants, lictors, play-actors, and priests. These examinations are designed to elicit and make manifest the “true talent of the people, with a view to its ulterior application to affairs of State. The results are, a stable throne; a country enjoying an unusual degree of internal quiet; a population mild, peaceful, obedient, cheerful, and industrious; and a perpetuity of national existence, unparalleled in the world’s history.

The Chinese government, then, the purest despotism on earth, is upheld and perpetuated by Education. How forcible the argument thence derived in favor of this exalted and exalting power. And if it has force as applicable to such a country as China, it applies, *à fortiori*, to civil institutions, founded, as ours are, on the principles of freedom and equality, and depending, confessedly, on the intelligence and virtue of the people, for their security, permanence, and vigor.

Thirdly, *We infer the obligation of Government to provide schools for the people, because of their connection with the pecuniary interests of the State — Education being the readiest and surest road to public prosperity and wealth.*

The arguments hitherto insisted on — potent and impregnable as they are — constitute a vantage-ground, which we may surrender, and still make good our position. We are, indeed, now about to appeal to a lower principle of our nature, but not, perhaps less powerful or energetic — we mean the love of property. The desire of gain is a master spring of human action. The farmer produces to sell. The mechanic fabricates to sell. The merchant buys to sell. The laborer sells his time. The professional man sells his skill. And even the scholar trims the midnight lamp, that he may sell the productions of his genius. Can this instinct, so universal, so deeply seated, and of such potential energy, be enlisted in behalf of education? We think it can. We think it ought. We think it will. Why are poor teachers ever tolerated? Because, and only because, they work cheap. Convince parents that cheap education is bad economy, as well as bad philosophy, and the very same motive that now inclines them to employ the incompetent teacher, will then compel them to repudiate him.

The only objection that can be urged against the most liberal system of public instruction, is its expensiveness. This objection we meet with a counter proposition, which, if it can be maintained, necessarily refutes it. Our proposition is this, Universal education, whatever its cost may be to a nation, so far from being an expense, is an actual gain in dollars and cents.

It is so, in the first place, by its effects on legislation. An undeniable connection exists between the intelligence of a nation, and its laws. Nor is the relation less close and significant between a nation's legislation, and its wealth. Wise laws, by quickening ingenuity, encouraging industry, and securing the quiet enjoyment of their fruits, tend powerfully to develop the resources of a country, and to swell the tide of national prosperity. Who can calculate the riches often derived to a country, from a judicious course of policy in reference to any one important interest, or even from the operation of a single wise law? Look at those extended systems of internal improvement which have doubled, and even quadrupled, the wealth of some of the States of this Union. Look at the law which secures to the author of any useful invention, the benefit resulting from the sale of the article invented. How has it stimulated human ingenuity! What

arithmetic can calculate, what scale can measure, the activity and enterprise it has diffused through the community, the degree in which it has augmented the productive labor of the country, and the untold riches it has thus poured into the lap of the nation?

View this subject in another aspect. Select any period of the world's history — antiquity, the middle ages, or modern times — and compare with each other the nations then existing. Compare England with France, France with Spain, Spain with Morocco, and Morocco with the kingdoms of interior Africa. Compare the same country with itself, at different eras of its history; Italy, for example, before and after the revival of letters. We shall find that the connection is not more inseparable between light and the sun, between the shadow and its object, than that which exists, and ever must exist, between national prosperity and good laws, and between good laws and general intelligence.

Visit once more, in illustration of this point, the scene of Oberlin's labors. That extraordinary man was the lawgiver of his people, as well as their pastor; their temporal, not less than their spiritual, guide. On his arrival at the Ban de la Roche, he found the people sunk to the lowest level on the scale of moral and social existence. Few of their schoolmasters could write; some of them could not even read with fluency. Their ignorance had resulted in a degree of rudeness, indigence, and misery, absolutely appalling. But nothing could deter this excellent man from attempting their reform. He entered upon his work with the zeal of an apostle, the wisdom of a sage, and the patience of a devotee. He instructed them not only in religion and science, but also in agriculture and the mechanic arts. He taught them, practically, the principles of political economy. What was the result? In a few years, the rude mountaineers had exchanged their wretched hovels for comfortable cottages, and their scanty rags for decent apparel. Their barren rocks had been converted into fruitful fields. Manufactories had been established. A small but prosperous commerce had been commenced. Roads had been constructed. Schools had been instituted. An agricultural society had been formed; and industry, contentment, and plenty, smiled throughout the valley, and cheered the abode of every cottager. Behold the triumph of Christian education! and read in it the important lesson, that it is a pecuniary, as well as moral, gain. The most abundant proof exists, that uneducated labor, is comparatively unprofitable labor. The Massachusetts Board of Education obtained statements from large numbers of master manufacturers, covering a

series of years, the result of which was, that increased wages were found in connection with increased intelligence, just as certainly as increased heat raises the mercury in the thermometer. Not the most fertile soil, not mines of silver and gold, can make a nation rich without intelligence. Who ever had a more fertile soil than the Egyptians? Who ever handled more silver and gold than the Spaniards? The universal cultivation of the mind and heart, is the only true source of opulence.

An active, spirited, intelligent body of laborers, in every department of industry, is an essential condition of a high state of national prosperity. But, such a condition can never coëxist with general ignorance. "For it is not nature alone that makes the man. The living spark can be first kindled only by schools. It is the school that quickens curious thought, fills the mind with principles of science, and starts the inventive and creative powers into action. Therefore we say, push the schools to the highest possible limit of perfection. Spare no pains, count no expense. Let every talent, every type of genius, in every child, be watched and nurtured by the State, as by a mother watching for the signs of promise in her sons."¹ Rely upon it, that the State, which could find the readiest road to wealth, must regard it as among the very first of her duties, to develop the productive genius and energy of her people. No waste that society can suffer, will, in the end, prove so expensive, as the waste of talent and creative skill. "If," says Dr. Bushnell, giving utterance to a striking thought in a striking manner, "if you can give to one man the power of three, then you have three for production, and only one for expenditure. The readiest way, therefore, to make a city of ten thousand, swell to a population of thirty thousand, is to make the ten thousand worth thirty thousand, by the stimulus of a right education. Nor need you be concerned beforehand, how the ten thousand will impart a threefold value to their labors. They will determine that for themselves. Given so much of manhood as a creative power, it will be sure to appear in ways of its own."

But, again, not only does education increase the capacity of its subjects, it also adds something to the average duration of human life, and thus tends to augment the riches of a State. The preservation to society of cultivated talent, is undoubtedly an important element. It is only necessary, then, to inquire into the relation of intellectual and moral culture to longevity. This inquiry must result

¹ Rev. Dr. Bushnell.

in the conviction, that civilization does not more tend to sweeten man's existence, than to prolong it. In the statements we are about to make, we repose on the authority of the Belgian philosopher, M. Quetelet, one of the most learned, able, and reliable statisticians of this or of any age. We will first compare the mortality of different countries, possessing a higher and lower civilization; next, that of the same country at different periods, of which the intervals have been marked by social ameliorations; and finally, that of the different classes of society, in the same country, and at the same time.

England and the Mexican State of Guanajuato are placed nearly at the two extremes in the scale of civilization. In the former country, there are fifty-eight inhabitants to one death; in the latter, nineteen. Thus, it appears that, proportion being kept in view, the deaths are just three times as numerous in Guanajuato as in England. This immense disproportion, after making all due allowance for climate and other adventitious circumstances, is yet mainly to be ascribed to the different degrees of civilization in the two countries. England is a highly civilized State; in Guanajuato, the mass of physical, moral, and political pollution, is of an appalling magnitude.

Let us next look at the effect of advancing civilization on the diminution of mortality in the same country. At the close of the 17th century, the annual number of deaths in London rose to 21,000. A hundred years later, notwithstanding the increase of population, the number was only 17,000. In the middle of the last century, the annual mortality was still one in twenty; at present, it is only one in forty; so that it has diminished exactly one half. The towns of Manchester, Birmingham, and Liverpool, have presented almost the same decrease of mortality, as London. France, like England, has experienced a great diminution of mortality. In 1781, it was computed, that one death took place in that country to every twenty-nine inhabitants; now, one in forty. In Sweden, half a century ago, one death occurred to every thirty-five inhabitants; in 1823, one to forty-eight. Likewise at Berlin, in 1750, the annual mortality was one to twenty-eight; at present, the ratio is less than one to thirty-four.

Results equally surprising will be obtained by comparing the mortality of man in his different social positions. Of ten thousand persons in the agricultural districts of England, where education is more generally diffused, 8858 reached the age of forty years; while, of an equal number in the manufacturing districts, only 1919 survived to that age. M. de Chateauneuf has made a comparison of the deaths of 1600 persons of the highest rank in France, and 2000 in the 12th

arrondissement of Paris, which contains a population of ragmen, sweepers, day-laborers, and delves of all kinds. His tables show a mortality among the latter class, more than double that of the former. The registers of life-insurance companies, likewise exhibit very clearly, the great mortality of the ignorant poor. The tables of mortality used by these associations are the same which are made for the whole population of a country. But the Equitable Insurance Society of England, discovered that the deaths of 8800 insured persons were in the ratio of only two to three, compared with those given in the tables. Here is a difference of one-third in favor of the longevity of educated over uneducated persons; for it is almost invariably individuals of the former class, that avail themselves of the benefit of life insurance companies. This must be a great source of profit to these institutions, and a source due almost exclusively to the influence of education in prolonging human life. On the other hand, to take an extreme limit, if we consider man in the state of deepest degradation, it is computed that one negro slave in the West Indies dies annually out of every five or six! What a vast disproportion between the mortality of these unfortunate beings, and that of the select and comparatively cultivated individuals insured by the Equitable Society, among whom the average deaths annually are only one in eighty-two! From the researches of M. de Chateaufneuf, it also appears, that the mortality of the French soldier is a little greater than that of the mass of the French people; that the guard has fewer deaths than the army; and that the sub-officer dies more rarely than the soldier, both in the guard and army. Casper of Berlin, has made many curious investigations on the influence of the professions on mortality, from which it results, that of all the multitudinous pursuits of human life, the members of the clerical profession — at least in countries where they are not over-worked, as they are too apt to be among us — have the best chance of surviving to a green old age. According to this distinguished statistician, of one hundred clergymen, there attained the age of seventy and upwards, forty-two; of advocates, twenty-nine; of artists, twenty-eight; of physicians, only twenty-four.

Thus, in whatever aspect we view this subject, our study of it must lead to one and the same result, — the conviction, that there are certain elements in Christian knowledge and culture, the tendency of which is to prolong human existence. Nor, indeed, could it well be otherwise. Whatever improves the habitations, food, and clothing, of man; whatever tends to the formation of rational and temperate

habits, more regulated passions, and less rapid transitions in the mode of living; whatever secures the supremacy of law and order; whatever multiplies the commercial intercourse of nations; whatever improves the cultivation of the earth, and thereby renders famine less frequent and formidable; whatever advances medical science and public hygiene, whose office it is to discover and apply the means of resisting mortality; whatever develops the industry of a country, liberalizes its institutions, and increases the security of person and property; whatever tends to diminish the number and ferocity of wars, to promote peace and good-will among men, and to clothe them in the heavenly ornaments of a meek and quiet spirit—results, each and all, of advancing civilization and Christian culture—must add to the active means of preserving life, and in the same proportion, contribute to the increase and diffusion of wealth.

An efficient system of universal education would, in the fourth place, tend to quicken ingenuity, and thus to promote those inventions and discoveries, by the application of which to the arts of life, the wealth of nations is incalculably augmented. Men without education, or with comparatively little, do sometimes stumble upon a new idea, that may be turned to purposes of general utility. But it is impossible, in the nature of things, that such cases should be of frequent occurrence. Most new inventions, are merely ingenious deductions from known principles of science. And how can a man, ignorant of these principles, discover new applications of them? Genius alone is here, obviously, insufficient. Knowledge and discipline must be superadded, to enable even her eagle ken to pierce into the secrets of nature, and bring back those bloodless triumphs which shed a real glory on our race, which exalt our conception of the power and dignity of the human mind, and which multiply beyond expression our comforts and our gains.

What is the voice of history on this subject? Her story is short and plain. She tells us, that those nations where the general intellect has been most cultivated, and the lights of science most diffused, have been also most distinguished for their inventions and improvements in all the branches of industry, by which wealth is accumulated. The records of the Patent Office read an instructive lesson on this subject. A scale that should measure the comparative intelligence of different sections of the country, would be at the same time an infallible criterion of the degree of inventive skill possessed by each. More than four-fifths of the patented inventions of the whole country, belong to New England and the Middle States; and

Massachusetts invents nearly twice as much, in proportion to her population, as any other State in the Union. Could there be a more striking proof of the connection between general education and the ability to invent, improve, and perfect the instruments of productive labor?

But what is the relation of inventiveness to wealth? Let us see.

It is chiefly through the use of machinery, that modern nations have been enabled so immeasurably to outstrip those of ancient times in riches; and it is by the same means that one nation now surpasses another in this respect. In illustration of this point, the Rev. Dr. Young, president of Centre College, Kentucky, has made a comparison, founded on the statistics of Baron Dupin, between the commercial and manufacturing condition of England and France. From this calculation, it appears that the muscular force employed in commerce and manufactures, in those two countries, is about equal, being, in each, equivalent to the power of six millions of men. Therefore, if the productive enterprise of the two countries depended solely on the animate power employed, France ought to be as great a commercial and manufacturing country as England. But the English, by means of machinery, have increased their force to a power equal to that of twenty-five millions of men; while the French have only raised theirs to that of eleven millions. "Is it now," asks the learned President, "any wonder that these islanders, with a narrower territory, smaller population, and less genial climate, should immeasurably outstrip their less intelligent and ingenious neighbors? And can we conceive a stronger proof of the actual pecuniary gain that accrues to a nation from cultivating the intellect of her sons, than is furnished by such a fact?"

There is a fact, also noticed by Dr. Young, connected with the British East India cotton trade, which illustrates, in a very striking manner, the superiority in respect to their command over the sources of wealth, of those nations, in which the common mind is developed and quickened by education. The manufacture of cotton goods was commenced in the East Indies, and for a long time cotton fabrics were imported from that country into England. But now, in consequence of the use of machinery in England, British manufacturers purchase the raw material in India, transport it seven thousand miles by water, pay a heavy duty to the State upon it, convert it into cloth, send it back again, and actually undersell the natives in their own market. It is hardly necessary to add to this statement, that the native weavers use the same rude hand-looms which were employed hundreds of years ago.

The ingenuity of a single intellect, which might have slept forever in inactivity, but for the stimulus of education, sometimes saves a nation more than it would cost to educate all her sons. About a century ago, Hugh Middleton devised a plan for supplying London with pure water. It is estimated, that a supply of water for that metropolis, if furnished by hauling — the method originally in use — would cost nine million pounds sterling. By Middleton's plan, it costs less than half a million. Thus the city of London has, by a single invention, saved, in the article of water alone, more than forty million dollars — a sum sufficient to maintain good schools throughout the whole of Great Britain and Ireland.

Education, such as it now exists in the United States, has already, by the inventions and discoveries it has promoted, increased the riches of the nation to an extent incalculably beyond all that the best system of education would have cost us. The application of steam to the propulsion of boats, railroad cars, and machinery, is alone sufficient, and more than sufficient, to justify the remark. "It has done more for every State in this Union, than all the power of industry, working by the old methods, could have effected for it in a hundred years. It has filled our houses with the productions of every country and climate. It has raised the price of every acre of land, and every article of our produce."¹ It has infused new life into all the branches of industry by which men seek to create or to augment their fortunes.

But the advantages of the application of steam to these purposes, great as they are, scarcely bear an assignable proportion to the aggregate benefits derived from innumerable other inventions and discoveries. What gauge have we to measure the immense gains derived from the power-multiplying contrivances of our countrymen, whose name is legion? And to what are we indebted for this mass of labor-saving machinery, — this multitude that can scarcely be numbered of instruments for the accumulation of wealth? Beyond a doubt, to the development of the national mind by education. But, the intellect of the American people is not cultivated to one fourth the extent that it would be by the adoption, in each State of the Union, of a truly wise and efficient system of public instruction. And what imagination can set limits to the pecuniary advantages that would accrue to the nation, if useful inventions and discoveries were multiplied fourfold? "What multitudes would then benefit society by their in-

¹ Dr. Young.

geniety, who now curse it with their vices?" How many, whose fine native capacity now rusts in dull obscurity and depression, for want of a sufficiently quickening stimulus in our schools, to bring it into action, would then astonish the world with the brilliancy and beneficence of their intellectual achievements? "How many Franklins, and Fultons, and Rittenhouses, [and Henrys, and Morses], would rise up to enrich the land, if the beams of knowledge were poured upon every mind, to quicken the flame of slumbering genius?"

Again, fifthly, the diffusion of sound education among all the members of a community would enable them to push their researches far into the powers and productions of physical nature, to subject these mighty agents to their will, and to render them subservient to the purposes of gain. Here are two distinct sources of wealth,—the powers of nature and the productions of nature,—over each of which the best educated, whether individuals or nations, have the greatest command, and can most effectively turn them to account in the pursuit of riches.

If we look around us to ascertain our true position and circumstances, we find ourselves encompassed with a vast assemblage of powers. These all bear some relation to the human mind, and are susceptible of being, to some extent, controlled and converted to our use by art and skill.

There is a mysterious power in the earth, which draws the loadstone always towards the same point. The discovery of this power, and the application of it in the construction of the magnetic needle and the mariner's compass, have made the ocean the highway of nations,—the ocean, that plain without line or landmark, that stretches over half the globe, and suffers the mightiest ships to cleave their way through its waters, without leaving the least trace of their progress. Had not the intelligence of man,—an intelligence, be it ever remembered, drawn forth and quickened by education,—made this secret influence subservient to his will, what would now be the state of commerce? What the condition of this continent? What our knowledge of remote countries? What the civilization of the world? It would require, not a paragraph, but a volume, to develop all the effects on the acquisition of wealth of this wonderful principle, and the instruments that have been invented to render it available for human use.

There is another mysterious power in the earth, which causes all bodies on or near its surface to tend towards the centre. It is this principle which makes water seek its level and descend in streams

from more elevated regions towards the ocean. But educated intelligence enables man to stay the torrent in its course, to turn it from its channel, to appropriate its moving force, and thus to make it grind his corn, manufacture his cloth, print his books, forge his iron, spin his thread, and perform many other useful and profitable labors.

There is a subtle power in fluids, which, to whatever depth they may have descended, causes them to remount to their own level. Man, civilized and enlightened, has employed this admirable principle to procure for himself, when congregated in cities, a supply of wholesome water, and to irrigate and fertilize his fields amid the scorching droughts of summer.

There is a hidden power in heat, which causes almost all known substances to expand, and liquids, in the process of expansion, to assume the gaseous form. To what endless uses, in the business of life, has not educated man applied this simple principle? He has employed it to measure the state of the atmosphere; to blast the rocks with which he builds his cities; to move the floating palace through the water; to drive the richly freighted car along its iron course; to give intensity to his destructive energies in the wars he wages with his enemies; and to set machinery of all kinds and for all purposes in motion.

The wind bloweth where it listeth, and no human power can change its course, or stay its progress. But can man do nothing with it? Yes, he can; and he does. He spreads his canvas to the gale, catches a portion of the moving element, and traverses by its aid the broadest oceans, for purposes of traffic and of gain.

In such a state of things, knowledge is not only power, but wealth; and it is obviously the interest of man to become acquainted with the constitution and relations of every object around him, that he may discover its capabilities of ministering to his advantage. The power which man possesses of controlling nature to some extent, and, where this power is denied him, of accommodating his conduct to her course, is the direct result of his natural faculties. In proportion as these are cultivated, his sway is extended; and, in exactly the same ratio, his power of amassing wealth is increased.

An educated community does not possess a less striking advantage over an ignorant one, in its knowledge of the productions of nature, and in its ability to multiply and appropriate them to gainful ends. These gifts of nature are beautifully enumerated by Moses, in his Valedictory Ode to his countrymen, as "the precious things of heaven, the dew, and the deep that coucheth beneath; the precious things

brought forth by the sun ; the precious things put forth by the moon ; the chief things of the ancient mountains ; the precious things of the lasting hills ; the precious things of the earth, and fulness thereof." Who shall say, who can say, that science has exhausted her discoveries ? Who shall dare affirm, that she may not hereafter detect and bring to light new minerals, of as high a value to the human race as coal itself, and destined to produce as magnificent results ?

Not many years ago Monmouth county was one of the poorest parts of the State of New Jersey. Now, it is said, the lands in that county are worth more than those in any other equal extent of territory within the commonwealth. Whence this change ? No Aladdin's lamp, or Fairy's touch, has wrought it. Science challenges the whole glory to herself. The appreciation of the Monmouth farms is due to the discovery of marl, and the quickened industry consequent upon its use.

Of all the productions of the earth, those termed agricultural are the first in order, and the highest in usefulness. The relation of science to agriculture is every day becoming more close and important. The day has gone by, when the whole education of a farmer was supposed to consist in knowing how to sow and reap, the rest being left to the earth, the seasons, good fortune, and Providence. It begins to be understood, that the nature of soils and plants, the food they require, and the best methods of supplying it, are objects worthy of a close and earnest study ; in a word, that the principles of the science must be studied, mastered, and skilfully applied, in order to insure profitable crops. The science of farming is still in its infancy ; yet what noble results have been already achieved by it ! In many parts of Europe, and in some parts of our own country, it has incalculably augmented the product of the land. And who can affirm that, vast as our agricultural productions now are, it is not within the resources of science to quadruple this quantity ? If anything can accomplish such a result, it will be a higher and broader education of the common mind, — the development and active employment of that immense fund of talent which is now slumbering in unconsciousness, or only half awakened, by reason of the defectiveness of our schools.

Finally, universal education would be a pecuniary gain to the country, by its tendency to diminish the moral and social burdens which now oppress society and exhaust its resources : intemperance, crime, theatres, gaming, horse racing, prostitution, pauperism, litigation, and war. The relation of ignorance to vice and crime, in all their forms, is too well known to need either proof or illustration. One or two

brief statements, to revive the impression of this truth, will perhaps meet with the reader's indulgence. Of 1916 prisoners received into the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, less than half could read and write; and almost the whole even of these, could barely form rude and misshapen letters. They were not in possession of what could, with any kind of propriety, be called education. The Rev. Mr. Larcombe, chaplain of the penitentiary, in a letter some time ago received from him, by the writer of this article, states, that during the nine years of his connection with the prison, there have not been more than two or three convicts who had received a collegiate education, and not more than double that number, who had ever been members of an academy. He says, that among the three hundred convicts at that time in the prison, there was but one whom he could employ to write out catalogues for the prison library! The Reports of the Philadelphia House of Refuge, and indeed of all other establishments for the reception of criminals, confirm the same general position. Of 14,289 persons, accused of crimes in France, 8,689 could neither read nor write; 3,805 could read and write imperfectly; 1,509 could read and write well; while only 286 had received an education superior to that of the first degree, though how far superior, M. Quetelet, from whom these facts are derived, does not state.

Nearly one third of the fathers of prostitutes in Paris, cannot write their own names, and most of those who can, do it with difficulty, and in a bungling manner. The proportion of ignorant mothers is probably still greater. Of 4470 prostitutes born and bred in Paris, only 110 could sign their names well, 1780 wrote very badly, while considerably more than half the number could not write at all. Of 8103 persons of this class in London, only four had received a superior education, 89 could read and write well, 1237 could read and write imperfectly, and 6773, more than three-fourths of the whole number, could neither read nor write. Most of the female convicts of the Eastern Penitentiary have belonged to this degraded class; and they are, almost without exception, totally without education. The Directors and Matrons of our Magdalen Associations, with whom we have conversed, make similar representations, — though for the want of records bearing upon this point, we were unable to obtain from them the exact information with respect to the inmates of their establishments, which is afforded in reference to England and France, by the statistical tables of Quetelet and others.

We have bestowed some time and labor, with various success, upon

a research into the statistics of cost under each of the heads embraced in this division of our general argument. Without entering into a detail upon these expenditures, for which indeed both time and space are wanting, suffice it to say, that we have satisfied ourselves that the annual tax thus levied upon the industry and resources of the country, exceeds \$200,000,000, and probably does not fall much, if any, short of \$300,000,000.

The annual cost of intemperance, is estimated by the venerable Judge Cranch, of Washington city, at \$50,000,000. The Hon. William Jay, son of our illustrious American jurist, John Jay, an able statistical writer, after a minute examination of the subject, places the cost of the militia system of the United States, at more than \$50,000,000 per annum. These fifty millions now expended in the ridiculous mummery of making our citizens — “dressed in padded coats besmeared with gold” — look like soldiers for three or four days in the year, if devoted to purposes of education, would establish a school for every fifty children in the whole United States, add fifty volumes a year to its library, and place over it a well trained teacher at an average annual compensation of six hundred dollars! We invite our readers to contemplate these two pictures! There they are. The one made up of innumerable noisy and drunken gatherings, the progeny of wickedness and folly, a disgrace to Christianity, a blot upon our civilization, and an utter nullity in point of useful results. The other composed of eighty thousand precious jewels, glistening in a celestial radiance, and diffusing, over the length and breadth of the land, the light of knowledge and virtue. Which of these pictures shall we choose? Which of them is most in accordance with the spirit of Christ? Which most worthy of a nation, professing a reverence for the doctrines and precepts of his religion?

Of all the evils that afflict humanity, the greatest in magnitude, the most deleterious in its moral influences, the most repugnant to Christianity, and the most expensive in money, is war. The war debt of Europe, at this moment, is \$10,000,000,000. The annual interest of this debt is not less than \$800,000,000. The lowest estimate of the yearly pay and subsistence of the armies of Europe, in time of peace, is \$550,000,000. To this enormous sum, another of \$800,000,000 must be added, on account of the “loss sustained by the withdrawal of two millions of hardy, healthy men, in the bloom of life, from useful, productive labor.” The expenditures on account of the navies, fortifications, ordnance, and militia of the several European States cannot be less, and are probably more, than the sum lavished

on the pay and subsistence of the soldiers. This would give a grand total of \$1700,000,000 as the annual cost of the military establishments of Europe, in a period of profound peace. If we set down the whole of the rest of the world at an equal amount, an estimate undoubtedly below the reality, we shall have the stupendous and almost incredible sum of \$8400,000,000 as the annual cost of war to the human race! There are children enough on the globe to form about four million schools, allowing fifty to a school. This sum of \$8400,000,000, now expended on the trade of war, not only without benefit, but to the manifold detriment of humanity, if divided among these schools, would give to each eight hundred and fifty dollars. Such an average compensation as this, would afford to half the common schools throughout the world teachers equal to our ablest college professors. From a calculation made by Mr. Sumner, of Boston, it appears that, for the six years ending in 1836, "War absorbed ninety cents of every dollar that was pressed by heavy taxation from the English people, who almost seem to sweat blood! What fabulous monster, or chimera dire, ever raged with a maw so ravenous! The remaining ten cents sufficed to maintain the splendor of the throne, the administration of justice, and the diplomatic relations with foreign powers,—in short, all the proper objects of a Christian State."

It is difficult to preserve the temper in the contemplation of the untold evils which this enormous expenditure on war now entails upon the human race, and of the equally unuttered and unimagined blessings which the change of destination here suggested would draw in its train. Truly, when ambition is to be gratified, when tyranny is to be supported, when the demon of war and vengeance is to be unchained, and all the arts of mischief and destruction he has devised, are to be brought into operation, there is no lack of funds to carry such schemes into effect. But when it is a question of elevating man to his proper rank in the scale of moral and mental being, and thus augmenting beyond calculation his resources of happiness, the eyes of nations are suddenly opened to behold their poverty; economy becomes the first of public duties; and government, from an excessive regard for the people's money, refuses to provide for the people's most important interest.

Near the centre of the State of New Jersey, there stands a venerable pile, the seat of an Institution of learning, which has lately celebrated its hundredth anniversary. Through the entire lapse of a cycle, whose commencement antedates the origin of our national existence, has the College of New Jersey sent forth into the

world its annual harvests of educated men. In vain does the imagination essay to follow, in all their amplitude and variety, the good which these Christian scholars have achieved for mankind. Go and interrogate the courts of foreign potentates, the cabinet councils of our own country, the halls of legislation, the seats whence law and justice utter their decisions, the bar, the pulpit, the godlike art of healing, the professional chair, and the dark shores of heathenism in every quarter of the globe. They will give back one common response, telling of the imperishable laurels, gathered by the sons of Nassau, on all these fields of honorable ambition and self-sacrificing duty. Nevertheless, to build and equip a single ship of the line costs more than all the endowments and benefactions which that illustrious seat of learning has ever received; and the annual expense to the nation of every gun that floats upon the ocean, exceeds in amount the aggregate salaries of its president and professors. And yet Nassau Hall, — rich in libraries, in cabinets, in apparatus, and in all other intellectual furniture, — is venerable with the gray hairs of a goodness, as diffusive and beneficent, as it is sublime and holy. While the costly preparations for war in time of peace, under the vain pretence that they are necessary to prevent the one and maintain the other, do but inflame the national vanity; feed the already overactive love of false glory; excite and cherish the bad passions of the populace; and prove, in the strong language of the late King of France, on this very subject, but so many “incentives and instruments of war;” — thus postponing to a distant future, what ought, ages ago, to have been a glorious reality, — a consummation of blessing, which the Son of God descended from heaven to earth to achieve, — the establishment of universal “peace and good will” among men. Be it our labor to speed the coming of that new era of human happiness, so eloquently, yet so strangely, invoked, by a marshal of the French armies, in a toast given at a public dinner in Paris: “To the pacific union of the great human family, by the association of individuals, nations and races! To the annihilation of war! To the transformation of destructive armies into corps of industrious laborers, who will consecrate their lives to the cultivation and embellishment of the world!”

What heart can conceive, what tongue describe, the scenes of loveliness and beauty that shall start up amid the desolations of the apostasy, when war shall never again unfurl his crimson banner to the breeze, nor imprint his bloody footsteps upon the earth? Then shall learning, religion, social order, and regulated liberty, become the common inheritance of the race. Then shall the hungry be fed, and

the naked clothed. Humanity shall receive purer impulses. Industry and incorruptible integrity shall walk hand in hand. Arts shall flourish, and science extend her enriching victories. Plenty and contentment shall be the general lot. "The schoolhouse shall crown every hill top, and nestle in every valley; and the spires of new churches shall rise exulting to the skies." Piety, that plant of renown, the fairest ornament in the abode of primeval innocence, shall again strike deep its roots into the human heart; and its boughs shall be ever loaded with flowers of a richer bloom and fragrance than adorned the Garden of the Hesperides, and with fruits of a celestial beauty and flavor. And the earth,—the wide earth,—now burnt and blighted by the curse of its offended Maker, shall again smile in the freshness and beauty of Eden.

It may be asked, whether education would really diminish, in any considerable degree, the evils enumerated in the enunciation of this topic of argument. When we speak of education, we mean education founded on morals drawn from the Bible. The real question, then, is, whether Christian education has a tendency to diffuse Christian principles, to strengthen the Christian spirit, and to promote the Christian virtues. We humbly conceive, that it cannot be needful to argue this question in a Christian community. To maintain the negative, would be to deny all vitality to the Christian system, and degrade the Book of God even below the moral maxims of Confucius, of Zoroaster, of Socrates, and of Seneca.

Thus has it been made to appear, unless we have totally missed our aim in this discussion, that the prevalence of good and thorough systems of popular education in the several members of our Confederacy, would exalt the character and augment the happiness of our citizens, in their civil, domestic, and individual relations; that such education is inseparably connected with the right discharge of our duties as freemen, with the perpetuity of our Constitution, and with the progress of liberal principles and free institutions throughout the world; and finally, that every new degree of excellence in our schools, every successive approach towards perfection in the system of education, and towards universality in the enjoyment of its benefits, would add millions to the aggregate wealth of the nation. These considerations must establish, if anything can, the great importance, nay, the absolute necessity, of general education in a country like ours; and consequently, the duty of the several State Governments first to make adequate provision for it, and then to see that the means adopted for that purpose be faithfully employed. It would be a po-

sition scarcely worthy of serious refutation, it would be a contradiction to all the lights of experience, it would be little better than trifling, to contend that education can become either universal or thorough in a country where the government manifests no solicitude in its behalf, and puts forth no exertions to promote it. Mr. Bulwer, in his "England and the English," argues forcibly in support of this position. He says, "Never was this truth more clearly displayed, than in the state of our popular education. Behold our numberless charities sown throughout the land! Where is their fruit? What better meant, or what more abused? In no country has the education of the poor been more largely endowed by individuals. It fails; and why? Because in no country has it been less regarded by the government."

We cannot conclude this article, without a few words on the nature, or ingredients, of the education, which, as we have shown, the State is bound, in duty, to bestow upon all her children. Education ought to be suited to the attributes and destination of man. These may be expressed in two words, Immortality and a future Judgment. Religion is the first want of our nature, and ought to be the first object of attention in the training of the young. This remark points distinctly to a reform which is needed in our methods of education. More of a religious element must be infused into them. There is a morbid dread of religion in some of our schools, to call it by no worse a name, of baleful influence and augury. Men are scared by the spectre of sectarianism. But, is there not much common ground among the Christians of differing creeds? Nay, is not the common ground the broadest and the most important? Do not all Christians receive and hold the essential facts and doctrines of revelation? the Divine origin and authority of the Holy Scriptures; the being and perfections of God; his moral government of the world; the fall and redemption of man; his accountability; the obligations of a pure morality; and the doctrine of a future judgment and of endless retributions? And cannot these truths, so sublime in themselves, so well fitted to expand the mind, quicken the conscience, and transform the heart, and of such infinite moment to every human being, be taught and re-taught, till they are inwrought into the minds of all our youth, till their impress has been indelibly fixed in the heart and understanding, to the entire exclusion, if need be, of everything of a sectarian character? But, if religious instruction in schools, necessarily involve denominational or sectarian teaching, then we say without hesitation, let such instruction be given. The narrowest, blindest, most intolerant bigotry of sectarianism, is better than infidelity, whether

it come in the bold and open form of old English deism, or in the more insidious and captivating guise of modern transcendentalism. It is better, also, than that utter insensibility and indifference to religious truth, so common in our day, which are but one remove from infidelity itself. Education without religion, is education without its essence. To give men knowledge, and leave them immorality, would be but an equivocal boon. Rather, we might say, it would be to put into their hands an instrument of mischief, and supply stimulants to the use of it. It would be offering, not bread, but poison, to the eager appetite of the rising generation. "The Duke of Wharton; Wilmot, Earl of Rochester; Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, and Mirabeau, were in their days distinguished by wit, and taste, and learning, and knowledge; and they were not less distinguished by extravagance, revelry, lawless passion, and disregard of moral and social virtue. High attainments are tremendous engines for the working out of good or evil. If not guided by correct and safe principles, they are terrible weapons of ill. The educated rogue or infidel is but the more dangerous man."¹

Education, unbaptized, and unimpregnated with the Christian spirit, is not merely partial and defective, it is often positively pernicious. It is a curse instead of a blessing. It is an actual training for crime; a laborious providing of dangers for the community; a conferring of power, with the positive certainty of its abuse. It disciplines the evil passions of our nature, makes men wicked by rule, reduces vice to a system, and subjects the clear head and the strong arm to the impulses of the bad heart. The mildew of a cultivated but depraved mind, blights whatever it falls upon. It sears the souls of men. No human imagination can set bounds to the evil, either in space or duration. Through the agency of the press, it reaches other climes and far distant ages. "It corrupts the species in mass. It is not only in the actual generation, but in the rickety offspring, which follow late and long, that its deep-eating poison is strongly detected. Late ages wonder at the waste of great means, at the perversion of high opportunities and noble powers, at the dereliction of solemn duties, which everywhere characterize these strong but evil beings. Call them conquerors, call them philosophers, call them patriots, put on what golden seeming you may, when the mask falls off, as it always does in due season, we see behind it the worst combination which can disgust or afflict humanity. Such men-deliverers and enlighteners, as their sycophants hail them, are the true master-workers of the vices

¹ Hon. S. L. Southard.

and calamities of their age and country. But, who made them? They who taught them. Education left out its essence. It gave them knowledge, but it left them immorality.”¹

During the whole process of education, the attention of the young should be directed to the fundamental principles which Christianity teaches, the divine attributes which she unfolds, the rules of moral action which she enforces, the strict scrutiny which she announces, as awaiting us at the final judgment, and the eternal world, with its awards of endless bliss or woe, to which she points. These are subjects which ought never to be lost sight of for a single day. They should be interwoven with every department and with every part of literary and scientific instruction. “For my own part,” observes Addison, “I think the being of a God so little to be doubted, that it is almost the only truth we are sure of.” To this Dr. Barrow adds, as little more than the fair and natural inference, that the doctrines and the duties of religion are almost the only study, which we are not at liberty to cultivate or neglect. “They constitute,” he says, “the only science, which is equally and indispensably necessary to men of every rank, every age, and every profession. Admit the authenticity of the Bible, and the principal object of education becomes at once as obvious, as it is important; to regulate the sentiments and form the habits of beings, degenerate, indeed, and corrupt by their own fault; but made by their Creator rational in their faculties, and responsible for their conduct. If it be the business of education to prepare us for our situation in life, and the business of life to prepare us for the happiness of eternity; then do we perceive a system of perfect order and beauty in itself; and equally consistent with what we observe in the world, and with the wisdom and goodness of its Almighty Author. Science immediately finds its proper level, and its due estimation.” Access to the tree of knowledge, was once purchased by exclusion from the tree of life. Be it our endeavor, surely not an impracticable one, to commingle, in loving embrace, the foliage, flowers, and fruits of these twin sisters of Paradise. The true dignity of man consists in a severe morality, in self-control, in humility and moderation, and in the voluntary performance of all his duties to God and his neighbor. Religious education is, consequently, the first want of a people. “The end of learning,” says Milton, “is to repair the ruin of our first parents, by requiring to know God aright, and out of that knowledge, to love him, and to imitate him.”

But what a mass of false perceptions, false judgments and false

¹ Hon. Mr. Wye, M. P.

principles in morals is exhibited in many of our schools! It would be a curious research, as Dr. Arnold suggests, to gather up the several points in a character, which boys respect and admire, in order to show what a crooked rule they walk by. In the true scale of excellence, the order is, moral perfection, force of understanding, physical strength and dexterity. At school this order is reversed. The most active and expert player is the best fellow; the cleverest scholar comes next in the scale; while the best boy, with nothing but goodness to recommend him, rises but little above contempt. The habitual breach of duty even is countenanced and upheld. Everywhere else, but in schools, it is but a natural feeling that it is disgraceful to do our business ill; that it is contemptible either to have no employment, or, having one to neglect it. Not so in these communities. Here the contrary often happens; idleness is a glory, industry a reproach. We have heard of a college student, who, from an affectation of genius, would ask what the exercise of the hour was in the recitation-room, after having spent the day in idleness, and toiled at his lesson much of the preceding night under his bed, with the light behind the covers, lest it should be known that he sat up at night! Such a man, one would think, must despise himself for the rest of his natural life. But the most fearful laxity in the code of school morals is the estimation in which falsehood is held. Lying is far from being considered as hateful a vice as the Holy Ghost teaches us to regard it. But little disgrace is attached to it. It is fearful to contemplate the amount of direct falsehood, of artful equivocation, of unfair concealment, of deceitful representation, and the long train of similar wickedness, practised, without compunction or shame, often with exultation even, by school-children.

Nothing but the simple, plain, earnest, devout teaching of the word of God, can change this sad state of things to a better. That divine word is quick and powerful. Its influence upon the understanding is as healthful and invigorating as it is upon the heart; its quickening energy as great upon the intellectual as upon the moral perceptions. It is the controlling agency to be employed in the production of a better public opinion, a sounder public conscience, a higher standard of public morals, a purer and healthier action of the public heart. In the accomplishment of so desirable and excellent a result, religious education, founded upon the Bible, is the one thing needful. Other measures may change and subside, as the national mind changes and subsides beneath them. But this is a measure which creates the national mind; and which insures, by its firm and broad substractions,

the solidity, harmony and durability of the whole social structure. It is the bond of our union; the charter of our liberties; the ward and keeper of our Constitution; the palladium of our happiness, our safety, and our rights. It seems to us, that there is urgent need of a reform in this matter. We want a stronger infusion of godliness into the sources of public sentiment; a greater use of direct, plain and earnest Bible teaching, both in the family and in the school.

What, now, is the practical lesson of this subject? Development, progress, improvement, perfection, in our systems of common school Education, by every agency suited to attain these objects. Among such agencies may be enumerated the excitation and enlightening of the public mind, improved schoolhouses, the establishment of district libraries, the formation of Teachers' Institutes, and other kindred measures. But the essential complement of every system of public instruction, without which it must ever be like the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet omitted, are Teachers' Seminaries, or Normal Schools. We have never been able to comprehend how it should happen, that a statuary, who has only to carve the block of marble, or mould the mass of bronze, into the forms of material beauty, should find years of patient study and practice necessary to qualify him for his work; while no such preparatory discipline is required in him, whose harder, as well as higher office is, to give form and symmetry to the rude, chaotic faculties of a child, and to cause him to stand up a man, erect in the conscious dignity of his nature, with a culture worthy of his high powers and his immortal destiny. Is a Greek Slave a harder thing to make than an American freeman?

From the solemn duty which it has been the aim of this discussion to enforce, the friends of education in America may not shrink without a fearful responsibility. The intelligent and conscientious discharge of this duty, is a debt, which we owe to our children and to posterity. Let the Education of the people, then, in Christian knowledge and Christian virtue, receive, as it deserves, our earliest, deepest, most unremitted attention. Crown the honor of the nation. Let us do what in us lies, by our counsels, our labors, our example and our votes, to stimulate and perfect the common school—the People's College, the great fountain of popular light, the mighty bulwark of constitutional liberty. Let us multiply and purify the sources of knowledge. Deep, and broad, and indestructible be the foundations of that moral edifice—surpassing, in symmetry and beauty, the proudest structures of granite and of marble—which our wisdom and our energy shall help to rear. Let us do this in the humble but

courageous faith, that He, whose sunshine makes the flowers to unfold their beauties, and the corn to give back its golden increase, will not deny his blessing to the better seeds of knowledge and virtue. Is it asked what return may be expected for labors so patriotic? We answer — the consciousness of duty performed, of benefits conferred; the noblest reward that a noble nature can receive.

ARTICLE V.

HISTORY OF LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

[THE following historical statements in regard to the early history of Latin lexicography are from the pen of an eminent classical scholar in the vicinity of Boston, and, at our request, are given to the readers of this work. They will be read with interest in connection with the Lexicon of Dr. Andrews, and of others, which are appearing from time to time. — ED.]

WHENEVER an important addition is made to a branch of learning, we naturally look back upon what has previously been done in that department in order to form a correct opinion and a complete and just estimate of the merits or demerits of the new production. The translation of Freund's Latin Lexicon by Dr. Andrews is such a work. It has furnished us with an occasion of arranging and digesting the materials, previously collected, of a sketch or brief history of Latin lexicography from its earliest beginning to the present time. We intend to lay before our readers, at the present time, a small portion of this sketch relating to the lexicographical labors of the Romans themselves and the earliest attempts at Latin lexicography during the middle ages previous to the labors of Robert Stephanns.

It is in the nature of the case that lexicography belongs to the last stage of the literary development of a nation. The language must have fully unfolded itself, and a literature must have grown up, the meanings of words must have multiplied, some of them must have become obsolete, obscure or less intelligible, and only retained in the older portion of the literature, before the words of the language can become the subject of reflection, examination and research. Lexicography presupposes, not only the existence of words, but that they

should have undergone changes. And not only is it necessary that the language should have fully unfolded itself and that a literature should have grown up, but the intellectual development of the nation must have far advanced before the single words of the language can become the subject of examination and research. It indicates considerable intellectual progress when a man makes himself the subject of his reflection; and still greater, when he subjects the very instrument, language, by which he carries on and communicates this mental operation, to the same process.

As the history of philology commences with the first traces of a scientific and systematic consideration of the existing monuments of language and art, so the history of lexicography, which is a branch of philology, begins with the first attempts at examining into the origin, etymology, meaning and use of single words. Such attempts we can trace as far back as the time of the Sophists, of Socrates, and Plato. Both the Sophists, as teachers of eloquence, and the philosophers were fond of occupying themselves with the contemplation of single words both as to their meaning and form. This led naturally to etymological investigations, single instances of which are found, even earlier, in poets. The etymological inquiries were not confined to tracing a word to its root, but some attempted to point out how the root itself, or rather its sound, agreed with the object designated. It requires no great penetration to see how hazardous such a proceeding is and how easily it may degenerate into idle speculations. Whatever the success with which such speculations were indulged in, they naturally led to the question concerning the origin of language itself, whether it was the product of nature, or the result of convention and usage, whether it was *φύσις* or *θεσις*, *natura* or *usu*; a question which occupied the philosophers a good deal. It is known that Aristotle entertained the latter, Plato the former opinion. As we see from Cic. Partitione 5 and Lucret. 5, 1027, this subject was discussed by the Romans as well as the Greeks.

The first lexicographical attempts, among the Greeks as well as Romans, did not embrace the whole department of lexicography but were contributions to its several branches, etymology, synonymy, and dialectology. It is a familiar fact that the Stoics were particularly fond of etymological inquiries and, as we can judge from many instances quoted, for instance, in Cicero, frequently guilty of the most ridiculous and absurd derivations. Ignorance, or imperfect knowledge, of other languages and, consequently, the absence of that invaluable assistance which comparative philology affords, formed undoubtedly

a serious impediment. Grammarians and rhetoricians, period, compared the conversational language (*ἡ συνηθὺς* with the written (*ἡ τεχνικὴ συνηθὺς*) and the different collected words peculiar to single dialects, provincialisms, per of words and phrases, and pointed out the changes in the s of words according as they belonged to earlier or la These detached investigations and collections were ma want was felt, and deposited in commentaries on ancient especially Homer, or in separate works. Among the wri mology, deserves to be mentioned Apollodorus of Athens Aristarchus. Two of his works are known by name: *π γῶν* and *λέξεις Ἀστικάι*. Krates, an opponent of Arist a similar work, *λέξεις Ἀστικάι*. He differed from Arist point which divides most ancient philologists into two g While Aristarchus maintained that the principle of analog in language, Krates declared in favor of that of anomaly.

The most prolific occasion, however, for lexicographical were the comparisons of glossae, *γλῶσσαι*, that is, differ as to words and phrases with reference to time, locality : Such collections were not yet called *λεξικά* but *συναγωγὴ γλωσσῶν*, or *ὀρεμαστικά*. The mode of arrangement v the words being sometimes arranged in the order in whi curred in a particular author, or according to subjects, or betically. The name *λεξικά* was first given to those o which the words were arranged in the last mentioned this class belongs Philetas, who may be mentioned as earliest lexicographers among the Greeks. It is doubt he is the same Philetas mentioned in a fragment of the Strator or Stratis, which contains a scene in which a does not understand the antiquated words with which a his discourse, has recourse to the lexicon of Philetas t their meaning.

It is not our intention to encumber these pages with a the names of Greek lexicographers extending from the fo the Alexandrine school to the fall of the Greek empire, ar works nothing is left or scanty fragments only. We al name the two most important dictionaries which are still work of Suidas and the *Etymologicum magnum*. Both b ably to the same age, the latter part of the tenth century.

We have thus seen that among the Greeks the sophist first decided impulse to lexicographical studies, which were

taken up and continued by grammarians and philosophers. Of a somewhat more practical nature was the occasion of lexicographical investigations among the Romans. It became a matter of importance for the practice of the law to understand the antiquated terms of the ancient laws and legal formulas; these, therefore, were the first class of words which became the subject of lexicographical, and more particularly etymological, inquiry. After being once commenced the inquiry easily extended to other portions of the older literature. We have still the title of a work of Aelius Gallus who was a contemporary of Varro: *de verborum, quas ad jus civile pertinent, significatione*; and of Antistius Labeo, Gellius says, 18, 10; *in grammaticam atque dialecticam literasque antiquiores attioresque penetraverat, Latinarumque vocum origines rationemque percalluerat, easque praeceptis scientia ad erodandos juris laqueos utebatur.*

The Romans enjoyed in this pursuit an advantage not possessed by the Greeks; we mean a thorough knowledge of the Greek language and literature in addition to that of their own. Independent of the close relationship of the Greek and Latin, which of itself was an invaluable assistance to those who were acquainted with both, their familiarity with the Greek language enabled the Romans to avail themselves of the philological labors of the Greeks, especially as regards the philosophy of language, in the investigation of the phenomena of their own language. The Romans stood, as it were, on the shoulders of the Greeks and arrived much earlier and quicker at the point to reach which the Greeks had labored for ages. Hence the striking fact that Dionysius Thrax, the first Greek grammarian — if he is the author of the *τέχνη γραμματική* which bears his name — was a contemporary of Terentius Varro.

Those lexicographical notices were not at first collected into separate works; the jurists deposited theirs in their commentaries on the laws, the historians theirs in their historical works, and the grammarians theirs in their general grammatical treatises. Works exclusively lexicographical were rare and mostly of the class of glossaries; alphabetical works do not seem to belong to the period previous to Varro. The historian L. Cincius Alimentus may be named among the lexicographers of this age provided the *liber de verbis prisca*, mentioned by Festus, was a distinct work and not rather a collection of extracts from an historical or antiquarian work of the same author. Other glossographers of this and the succeeding period are Suetonius *de verborum antiquitate*, Publius Luvinius *de verbis cordidis*, Veranius Flaccus *de verbis pontificalibus* and *priscorum verborum liber*, Statilius

Maximus *de singularibus apud Ciceronem*, Verrius Flaccus *de obcuris Catonis*; C. Suetonius Tranquillus *de vestimentis et calceamentis et ceteris, quibus inluimur*; *de vocibus mali ominis*; Modesti libellus *de vocabulis rei militaris*. With the exception of the last named, fragments only of all these writers have been preserved in the works of Varro, Gellius and Festus.

In the progress of time more attention was bestowed upon synonyms. Remmius Palaemon, Valerius Probus, Aelius Melissus labored in this department, and particularly M. Corn. Fronto, of whose work *de differentiis vocabulorum* we have still an epitome, and Nonius Marcellus, whose work *de compendiosa doctrina*, contained in nineteen chapters, is partly lexicographical, partly grammatical and antiquarian, and partly of the description of a glossary. The age of Nonius is not ascertained. As he quotes Apuleius and is himself quoted by Priscianus, he must have lived after 200 and before 520 of our era. The principal value of his work consists in the quotations from ancient authors now mostly lost, especially from dramatists and historians; but this value is again considerably impaired by the circumstance that Nonius did not quote from the originals but copied from glossaries and similar collections.

Our object being to point out the commencement and progress of lexicographical studies among the Romans, rather than to enumerate those who have labored in the subordinate parts of this field, we shall merely remark that the taste for labors of this kind continued, and sometimes displayed itself in a somewhat whimsical manner. Aelius Spartianus, one of the *Historiae Augustae Scriptores*, relates of the emperor Geta that he was in the habit of ordering entertainments composed alphabetically; for instance, one in which the names of all the dishes commenced with *a*, another in which they began with *p* or *f*.

Much more important than these glossaries was the comprehensive work of M. Verrius Flaccus *de verborum significatione*. M. Verrius Flaccus was a distinguished rhetorician in the time of Augustus, and by the emperor selected as the teacher of his grandsons Caius and Lucius with the condition of not receiving any other pupils. This happened probably about 10 B. C. It is highly probable, if not certain, that he is the same person in whose honor a statue was erected in the forum of Praeneste, where he had caused to be placed an almanac, *fasti*, carefully and skilfully prepared by himself and inscribed on marble tablets. A portion of these tablets were discovered in 1770, containing the fasti of January, March, April and December. Verrius wrote, besides his dictionary, several other works, among

them *libri rerum memoria dignarum*, quoted by Gellius and Pliny. Whether he wrote a work *de rebus sacris* is doubtful, because what is quoted as from this work may as well have been passages from the work *de verborum significatione*. Our knowledge of this great work is derived from quotations in later writers and particularly from the epitome of Festus. But it is not to be overlooked that, although Verrius is frequently mentioned, A. Gellius is the only ancient writer who, in two places, quotes the lexicon by name, viz. 5, 7: *Verrius Flaccus in quarto de verborum significatione*, and 5, 18: *Verrius Flaccus refert in libro de significatione verborum quarto*. Verrius arranged his book, generally, in an alphabetical order, regarding, in doing so, not only the first but also the second and third letters. He sometimes united kindred letters, such as *e* and *i*, or *o* and *u*, and seems to have attached more importance to the consonants than vowels. In the arrangement of the several books he paid no regard to the alphabetical order. The number of books of which the whole work consisted, is uncertain. As the epitome of Festus filled twenty books, the original may have extended to forty or fifty. This may be considered a very moderate estimate, since the work which Verrius wished, perhaps, to imitate, the Greek lexicon of Pamphilus, a pupil of Aristarchus, had ninety-five books. The work contained as much information on subjects of history and antiquities as on matters of language. As an etymologist, Verrius belonged to the juste milieu and showed his sound judgment by being exclusively neither a Romanist nor Hellenist.

The epitome made by Festus was undoubtedly the cause of the neglect and eventually of the loss of the original. Sextus Pompeius Festus, of whom we know nothing except that he lived after Martial, whom he quotes, and before Macrobius, by whom he is quoted, between 100, therefore, and 435 A. D., made an epitome of the work of Verrius in twenty books, of which a portion, from the letter *M*, has been preserved in a fragmentary condition. It is probable that Festus, in making the Epitome from Verrius's work *de verborum significatione*, made use of other works also of the same author, such as *de obscuris Catonis*, *de Plauti vocabulis*, *de jure sacro et augurali*. However much harm the epitome of Festus may have done by causing the loss of the original, it is still, even in its imperfect condition, a rich mine of information which Niebuhr, among others, used in his historical researches with great ingenuity, though, as K. O. Müller thinks, with too little critical discrimination. Müller makes the same charge, and justly, against Forcellini, Schneider (K. L., the Latin grammarian) and Dirksen. The latter, a distinguished jurist, speaks

in his excellent work *de XII Tabulis* of codices of Festus, overlooking the fact that there has never been more than one codex, the codex Farnesianus.

The same fate which Festus had prepared for Verrius, his epitome being the indirect cause of the loss of the original work, he very nearly experienced at the hands of Paulus Diaconus. Paulus Winfried, sometimes called Paulus Diaconus, sometimes Pontifex, prepared in the eighth century for Charlemagne an epitome of Festus which was soon extensively used, and occasioned the neglect of the work of Festus. Until the sixteenth century the epitome of Paulus alone was known. About that time the only remaining codex of Festus, incomplete and beginning with the letter M, came to light. It is said to have been brought from Illyria, and came into the possession of Pomponius Laetus, who gave the greater portion of it to Manilius Rallus, retaining only several leaves. Angelus Politianus copied the whole, and Victorius made excerpts from this copy. The next time we hear of the codex, it—that is to say, the portion given to Manilius Rallus, wanting, therefore, the few leaves which Laetus had retained—is left by the Cardinal Michael Silvius to the Cardinal Ranuzio Farnese. How it got from the hands of Manilius Rallus into those of Silvius, is not known. While in the possession of Cardinal Farnese, Fulvius Ursinus caused it to be copied page by page and line by line, calling it *antiquissimum exemplar bibliothecae Farnesianae*, and to be printed in 1581. When in 1786 the Farnesian library of Parma was transferred to Naples, the codex Farnesianus wandered with it to the latter place, where it is at the present time. It was not until 1833 that a German scholar made a new, and, as Müller assures us, careful collation of the manuscript with the edition of Ursinus of 1581. The edition of K. O. Müller, undoubtedly the best, is founded on this collation.

We have dwelt longer on Verrius, Festus and Paulus, because the first was unquestionably the greatest among Roman lexicographers and the other two, who were the means of preserving in some measure the results of his labors, were the last representatives of Latin lexicography immediately before, and even after the commencement of, the darkness of the middle ages. When we emerge from this gloomy period we meet some lexicographers even long before the invention of the art of printing, but at this distance of time and with our imperfect means of information it is probably impossible to ascertain whether Festus and Paulus exercised any, and if any, what influence upon these specimens of Latin lexicography.

The earliest lexicographer whom we meet during the darkest period of the middle ages is Papias who lived about 1000 of our era. This fact is inferred from the circumstance that in the word *actas* he enumerates all the emperors and stops with Henry II. who reigned from 1002 to 1124. Papias, who was a native of Lombardy, understood Greek as well as Latin. His work is entitled *Vocabularium* or *Elementarium doctrinae rudimentum*, and was undoubtedly one of the sources of the Catholicon. It was repeatedly printed after the invention of the art of printing, for the first time in Milan in 1476, more than four hundred years after the death of the author, and several times in Venice in 1485, 1487, 1491, 1496.

About two hundred years after Papias, about 1196, lived Hugatio or Ugatio of Pisa, bishop of Ferrara. He copied Papias and he and Papias were again copied by de Janua. While coadjutor, or rather guardian, of a spendthrift abbot, he found in the library of the monastery a copy of Papias of which he availed himself in the composition of his Glossarium. This seems to have existed and circulated in manuscript alone. Nearly an hundred years later, about 1286, lived Joannes Balbus de Ginoa or Joannes de Janua or Januensis, being a native of Janua, a maritime town in Upper Italy. Availing himself of the labors of Papias and Hugatio he constructed the famous Catholicon, printed by Faust himself in 1460. It is not only the first printed dictionary but one of the first printed books. It contains some grammatical remarks and *dictiones, quae saepe inveniuntur in bibbia et in diariis Sanctorum et etiam poetarum secundum ordinem alphabeti ordinate subjunctas*. The Catholicon was frequently republished; the second, third and fourth editions appeared in Venice in 1483, 1487 and 1495; two in Lyons in 1506 and 1514; one in Paris in 1520. However popular the Catholicon was, chiefly from the want of a better work, its defects were too glaring to escape severe criticisms. Erasmus calls it *naenias* and *opus indoctissimum*.

Joannes de Garlandia belongs to this period, but is otherwise not connected with this first group of lexicographers, Papias, Hugatio and de Janua. He lived about 1040, was an Englishman, and wrote a work *Synonyma et Aequiroca*, which was first printed in Cologne 1490, afterwards in Paris 1496. The dictionary of Nestor Dionysius was published in different places, especially Paris and Venice in 1488, 1496, 1502, 1507.

With the works of Tortellius, Maius and Reuchlin, we approach a better time. They form, in this department, the transition to the period of the revival of literature. Joannes Tortellius, a native of

Arezzo, lived about 1439, and was a friend of the distinguished Laurentius Valla. His *Dictionarium vocum Latinarum*, in which he paid special attention to orthography, was repeatedly printed in Venice and other places in 1477, 1480, 1493, 1495, 1504, 1508. Junianus Maius, a native of Naples, lived about 1480 and his dictionary appeared in Naples and other places in 1475, 1477, 1480, 1496. Joannes Reuchlin, or Caprio, as he translated his German name, was the most remarkable of these three men, more, however, for his great literary attainments than his labors as a lexicographer. He was born 1454 at Pforzheim in South Germany, but passed a considerable portion of his life as Professor in Tübingen. It was in the earlier part of his life that he prepared and published, in Basil 1480, the *Breviloquium sive Dictionarium Latinum ordine alphabetico singulas voces breviter explicans*. This circumstance will account for its imperfections and for the fact that it soon fell into disuse. He was well acquainted with Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and was a statesman as well as a scholar. Being sent, by the prince of the Palatinate, as an ambassador to Rome, he sought there the instruction of the distinguished Greek Argyropylus. To show the extent of his knowledge of Greek to his new teacher, he translated a passage of Thucydides into Latin, upon which, the learned Greek exclaimed: *Græcica nostra exilio transvolavit Alpes*.

We come now to one of the most important men in the department of lexicography, who is, indeed, to some extent the founder of modern lexicography, although one of his successors and borrowers has gained a more extended reputation. Nicolaus Perotti was born 1430 in Sassoferrata, was professor in Bologna, became 1458 archbishop of Liponto, and died in 1480. He showed, in his *Cornucopia*, the way how to collect the materials for a trustworthy lexicon and made himself a very successful beginning. The first literary work by which he made himself known was a Latin translation of Polybius, which was esteemed so good that it gave rise to a charge that he had surreptitiously appropriated to himself an ancient translation discovered by him somewhere. Upon a closer examination it was found, however, that, excellent as the style was, the translation was so free and inaccurate that it does not deserve the name of a translation. The work which renders him distinguished in Latin lexicography was entitled *Cornucopia*, a commentary of Martial so complete that it may justly be called a dictionary. On account of the indecency of many parts of the author, Perotti was unwilling to have his work published, but he communicated it freely to his friends. As many availed them-

selves of his kindness without any acknowledgment whence they derived their information, his nephew, to guard against any doubts with regard to the authorship, copied the work secretly, and sent it to Fred. Ubaldini, duke of Urbino, for safe keeping. It was published soon after Perotti's death in 1482, and after that frequently reprinted in Venice, Paris, Basel and other places in 1492, 1499, 1500, 1518 (by Aldus Manutius), 1526, 1532, etc.

More fortunate, at least as regards a wide spread and long preserved name, was Ambrosius Calepinus, called so from Calepium, a town between Bergamo and Brescia, who lived at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century, and died 1510, at Bergamo, at a very advanced age. His dictionary, *Lexicon Calepinum*, was long famous, although he was more a diligent compiler from the works of Nestor, Tortellius, and chiefly Perotti, than an original collector and investigator. The defects of the work were numerous; many good words were omitted, many barbarous ones received, many mistakes committed in marking the quantity of syllables, and although numerous improvements were introduced into succeeding editions, many of the original defects remained so that it was said with some justice: *Bonus ille Calepinus toties coctus et recoctus parum sapit*. Besides benefitting by the labors of his predecessors, especially Perotti, which he copied, as we have already stated, he had the good fortune that succeeding good scholars retained his work as the basis of their own improvements and thus helped to perpetuate a name which, otherwise, would have been soon forgotten. The first edition appeared in 1502. In the preface Calepinus makes a characteristic remark which shows how little he was fitted for the task he had undertaken; he acknowledges that he places, in his labors, more confidence in the fathers Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine than scholars like Laurentius Valla, Priscianus and others. The second edition, of 1509, appeared like the first in Venice prepared by the author himself. For about two hundred years after this a great many editions were published in different places, Paris, Venice, Leyden, Antwerp, Genoa, and prepared by different scholars, in 1510, 1516, 1534, 1535, 1539, 1544 (by Conr. Gesner), 1545, 1548, 1560, 1570, 1572, 1581, 1592, 1620, 1647, 1663, 1681; so that the name of Calepinus was for several generations one of the most familiar, and Manutius says very justly: *Bonum fatum Calepinus sortitus est, cui fere omnes homines de suo largiantur. Certe enim illius dictionarium non tam auctoris industria quam aliorum labore studioque in tantam altitudinem excrevit*. Many distinguished scholars were employed in revising

and improving different editions; the names of others were sometimes used by booksellers without authority. It is more than probable, from the statement of Casp. Schopp (Scioppius), that the name of Jul. Passeratius was thus improperly used.

The path which Perotti had entered upon, making a single author, Martial, the basis of his lexicographical labors, was pursued by Mario Nizzoli (Nizolius). He was born, in 1498, in Bersello on the Po, lived for some years in the house of Count Gambara, a patron of literary men, was made professor at Parma in 1547, director of a new academy in Sabionetta, and died in his native place in 1566. His great work is the *Thesaurus Ciceronianus sive Observationes in Ciceronem ordine literarum digestas, quibus omnis vere Latine loquendi ratio et quot quibusque modis unaquaeque vox distingui variarique possit, per exempla Ciceronis plane demonstratur*. This thesaurus was frequently republished in Basil, Venice, Lyons and other places in 1530, 1535, 1541, 1548, 1551, 1568, 1608, 1612, until, chiefly through the labors of Ludovicus Lucius, it grew into a dictionary, published in Basil 1613. The thesaurus of Rob. Stephanus, who was a contemporary of Nizzoli and who had himself prepared one of the editions of Nizzoli's thesaurus (that published in Venice in 1551), principally furnished the materials which Lucius introduced into the enlarged *Thesaurus Ciceronianus*. We ought not, perhaps, to omit making mention, in this place, of Basilius Zanchius, a native of Bergamo, who lived in the time of Leo X. and died in 1560, who furnished additions to Nizolius and Calepinus.

We have thus arrived at a new and important era in Latin lexicography, which is at the same time the limit of our present task, we mean the era of Robert Stephanus.

ARTICLE VI.

OF THE NATURE AND KINDS OF THE SOUNDS OF SPEECH
AS A PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR GRAMMAR.

Translated from the German of Hupfeld by Prof. George R. Bliss, University of
Lewissburg, Pa.

§ 1. *Mechanism of the Organs of Speech.*

HUMAN speech, as an outward phenomenon (apart from the operations of the mind which give rise to it), is a mechanical function of certain corporeal organs. Its sounds belong in general to that class which are produced by the passage of a current of air through an orifice or a hollow body. They arise from the passage of the *breath* out of the lungs through the *throat* and *mouth*. The first of these, therefore, is in a manner, the *matter* of which speaking sounds are formed (the real principle), the two latter the *instruments* or *organs* by which they are executed (the formal principle). These latter, which first require our more particular attention, together form a passage corresponding in structure throughout to that of a wind instrument, the throat and cavity of the mouth respectively to the mouth-piece and tube. In each of the two parts, again, distinct sections must be discriminated, each having its special functions.

1. The *throat* or rather the *larynx* (the upper end of the throat or trachea, with the rest of which we are not concerned) is a hollow vessel consisting of several cartilages, in which we note the following parts. (1) In the middle, a lengthened, narrow aperture or cleft, the *glottis*, whose lower orifice communicates with the trachea, its upper with the mouth. This is that, properly, which answers to the mouth-piece in the wind instrument. (2) On the inner edges of the glottis, two tense elastic ligaments, the *voice-bands* or *glottis-bands* (whose vibrations accompany the voice). (3) Over the glottis, an upright, flexible and somewhat oval-shaped cartilage, the *lid of the glottis* or *epiglottis* which rests its outer convex surface against the tongue, while the inner concave side faces the glottis so that in swallowing it is bent over by the tongue and covers it.¹

2. The *mouth* presents a more complex mechanism in which two

¹ Comp. Liskovius, *Theorie der Stimme*. Leipz. 1814 (with plates). S. 9—16.

organs always unite in one function. Chief parts to be noticed are, *within*, the *cavity of the mouth* and its parallel the *tongue*, that the passive, this the active member; *without*, the *mouth-flaps* or lips which open and shut the mouth. More minutely, we distinguish, proceeding forward, the following places or pairs of organs. (1) The *root of the tongue* (βάσις τῆς γλώσσης) on one side, and on the other the *epiglottis* together with the *fauces* (palate, velum palati) against which it leans. (2) The *back of the tongue* (its upper surface) and the *roof of the mouth*. (3) The *tip of the tongue* and the *upper row of teeth* or the gum lying above them. (4) The *two rows of teeth* which like palisades [ἔρκος ὀδόντων] enclose the mouth. Finally, (5) The lips covering the two rows of teeth, as the folding doors of the mouth. Of these (2) (4) are secondary to (1) (3) leaving three chief organs, the root of the tongue, its tip (with the corresponding parts of the roof of the mouth) and the lips. Besides these the *nostrils* must be taken into account as side-passages and sounding-board of the mouth.

REMARK. While the oral cavity corresponds in general, as was said, to the tube of the wind instrument, both in structure and design (viz. the carrying forward and resonance of the tones, § 3), the *active* member in the former, the *tongue* distinguishes it from all artificial instruments of sound, which have merely passive cavities, and gives occasion to the characteristic peculiarity of human speech.¹

3. The instruments just described, throat and mouth, may be either *passive* or *active* with reference to the air streaming through them. The former, when they offer it a free course, serving merely as a channel; the latter, when they present some hindrance to its passage. The throat, however, can oppose such hindrance only in a passive manner, by contracting the glottis so that the breath must pass with a degree of force; the mouth, on the contrary, does this actively whenever its coupled organs meet and intercept the breath. Only the mouth, therefore, is capable of a proper activity, the throat of a barely passive effort, and hence we may call this the *feminine*, that the *masculine* organ of speech, designations which will be illustrated by our consideration of the sounds.

§ 2. Division and Classification of Speaking-sounds.

Whenever the instruments which we have described become active during the passage of the breath, speaking-sounds are produced, or

¹ Hence, perhaps, in many languages, named from the tongue (ἡ γλῶσσα, lingua, langue, etc.).

the elements of human speech. These fall at once into two chief classes, having reference to the two main organs or passage-points of the breath, the throat and mouth. Thus the more passive the organs, the more undeveloped and imperfect the sound; and the greater their activity and coöperation, the more complete and thoroughly organized is the sound. In regard to this three cases are possible. The organs may be either both *passive*, or *one active and the other passive*, or *both active*. In the *first* case, when both throat and mouth continue passive, i. e. stand open in such a way that the air can pass without meeting resistance anywhere, there arises a perceptible *breathing*. This is the lowest step in the formation of sound, not properly a sound as yet, but only the preparation, the attempt at a sound; still it was embraced in the original alphabet as a proper element of speech, and furnished according to the degree of its strength with a twofold sign, the weaker of which in later alphabets is lost. In the *second* case, when one of the organs becomes active, i. e. offers some resistance to the breath, we first obtain tangible elements of speech. If it is the *throat* which exerts itself by contracting the glottis so that the breath in passing is first forcibly compressed, and then, expanding in the open cavity of the mouth, is made to vibrate in all its parts, there arises a clear *voice* or *tone*, falling distinctly on the ear, commonly called a *voice-sound* or vowel (*vocalis*). If, on the other hand, the mouth alone is active, while some pair of the organs mentioned § 1 meet together and intercept and compress the air issuing from the now quiet (not sounding) throat, i. e. articulate, an obscure sound is formed, which first becomes distinct when joined to one of the former kind, a soft *noise*, most appropriately called *articulation*.¹ Sounds of this sort, being distinctly audible only in connection with vowels, are called *joint-sounds* (*consonantes*), while the vowels, as clear in themselves, are *independent sounds* (*sonantes*). Both stand in the same opposition to each other as the organs and operations by which they are produced (§ 1), and are in a strict sense *elements* (*elementa* as the letters are called in Latin), i. e. the primary matter of speech. The vowels are the *feminine*, i. e. material, positive, the consonants the *masculine*, i. e. formal, negative element, as it regards not only the sonorousness, but also their grammatical and etymological character. The vowels render speech clear and sonorous, while the consonants limit and give support to the tones which would otherwise flow away in an endless, confused succession. Those are the movable,

¹ So Silv. de Sacy, *Grammaire, Arab.* § 1, who well characterizes the sounds of both kinds.

flowing, these the fixed, combining element; those the light, these the shadow; those the flesh and blood, these the skeleton of the body of speech; those represent more the individual sensation, these more the universal conception; in a word, these give beauty, fulness, life to language, these give it outline, comprehension, strength.¹ It is implied in the very idea of an *element*, that it is of itself only a half-complete speaking sound, requiring the other as its complement. This necessity is met in the *third* case above mentioned, by the *coöperation* of both organs. Here the tone proceeding from the throat is accompanied by a compression of the oral organs (articulation), and so an *articulate tone* is formed in which vowel and consonant blend together and their opposition melts into a higher unit. In this manner first arises an *entire, perfect* (individualized) sound, and the syllable is accordingly to be regarded not as a twofold, but a single organic sound.² When several such articulated sounds are combined, through the fusing power of the Accent, into the unity of a conception, a higher vocal-whole is produced, an *articulate word*, in which the syllables form the members and joints (*articuli*). Words, again, link themselves together into a sentence, sentences into periods, etc., and the coherent discourse thus becomes a *membered* body, i. e. a body composed of syllables, words, sentences, etc., united as if by joints. This is the meaning of the appropriate, old designation *articulate discourse*, by which from the *μῆρονες ἀρ-θρονες* of Homer, the peculiarity of human speech as distinguished from the vowel-tones of animals and musical instruments, has been expressed.

§ 3. Of the Vowels.

For the formation of a *vowel* three things are requisite: 1. That *air* should issue from the lungs; 2. that the *glottis* should be so far

¹ Comp. A. W. Schlegel, *Wettsbreit der Sprachen in the Athenäum* 1 B. reprinted in his critical writings 1 B. S. 179 ff. 194 ff. — Böckh in Daub and Creutzer's *Studien* 4 B. S. 376. — The Rabbins also have much to say of this distinction, which they commonly express by calling the vowels the *soul* (i. e. the movable, living), the consonants the *body* (i. e. the fixed), part of language, a distinction which certainly is more striking in the Semitish than the Japhetish languages.

² So it was evidently regarded in the oldest oriental mode of writing, where not separate consonants and vowels, but syllables (of the simplest form, consonants united with the primitive vowel *a*, as *ba*, *ga*, *da*, etc.), hence not elements but individual units of sound, are denoted. Comp. the author's *Heb. Gram.*, § 11, 1. And it may now be safely assumed that no original language of either the Semitish or Japhetish stock, exhibits roots consisting of a mere vowel or consonant. Where this appears to be the case, one element is lost.

contracted that the air can only make its way through with a degree of force and vibration; 3. that the resultant tone should be carried forward through the *mouth*, shaped to its appointed form and sent out in front. The *first* of these, the emission of the air, takes place either with a light, scarcely perceptible *pressure* on the epiglottis, or with a stronger *thrust* from the depths of the chest — serving, perhaps, to open a way for the air into the mouth, or it may be only a sigh, as it were, occasioned by the exertion necessary to set the throat in action. One or other of these precedes every vowel pronounced with a fresh opening of the mouth, i. e. every vowel commencing a *new* vocal whole, whether word or syllable, and furnishes it a basis. When a preceding consonant furnishes this basis, it is therefore naturally wanting; and generally in medial sounds it is perceptibly weakened, hence easily swallowed up, and in many languages, as the Greek, is here entirely obliterated. This is indicated by the so called *breathing-letters* (breathings, spiritus, hiatus) which appear in the Semitish mode of writing in their integrity, with a twofold power (א and ה) and in all parts of the word, in medial and final as well as initial sounds; but which in the later alphabets have suffered detriment in various ways. On the *second* condition above mentioned, the *contraction of the glottis*, and the consequent vibration of the air, depends the *clear sound* [Klang] of the vowels. If the opening is too wide, a mere breathing only is produced, and this under the other conditions of speaking gives rise to the *whisper*, a colorless shadow of loud speech. In the *third* place, finally, the *mouth* though merely passive discharges a twofold function of essential importance: 1. By *carrying forward* the tone originating in the throat to the air without, it gives it resonance and clearness. Without this, led off through the nose, it would amount only to an *obscure*, muttering (μῦρρ) tone. Let the nostrils also be closed, and nothing is heard but a dull, stifled grunt. 2. By means of the different *form of its opening* (expansion or contraction) the mouth occasions the distinction between clear and obscure tones, that is, the *distinction of vowels* in speech, which is here the main subject of our investigations. To direct ourselves aright amid the multitude of different vowels, we must advert to the positions of the mouth in pronouncing them, and distinguish the primary from the secondary positions.

1. When the mouth is opened in such a way that the tongue rests quietly on the lower jaw, and all the other organs likewise lie perfectly still and passive — which we may call its *normal opening* or *normal position* — and therefore the tone from the throat streams

forth freely, without the slightest interference of the organs of the mouth, there arises a *pure throat-tone*, in this view the purest and most original of the vowels, the vowel *a*¹. It is neither clear nor obscure, but both (somewhat as the light shows no distinction of colors, yet contains in itself the ground of such a distinction), and is therefore not indicated in the original Semitish alphabet and the Dewan-agari, but is added in pronunciation to every letter. It may appropriately be called the *original vowel*. From this its Normal Position the mouth can depart in two ways; either by *expansion* (extension in breadth, diductio, dilatatio) or by *contraction* (constrictio), movements which are attended by an approximation of the related organs. In proportion as the mouth expands in breadth, by which the teeth are disclosed, while the tongue rises in an arch towards the roof of the mouth—the tone becomes *clear*, and gives by degrees *ä, e*, etc. In proportion, on the other hand, as the mouth contracts itself and projects the lips to a point—while the tongue drops its upper surface and retires within the lower jaw—the tone becomes *obscure* and sounds in succession *ä, o*, etc. Let these movements be carried to their extreme limit, and the exerted organs approximate so closely

¹ [It may, possibly, be worth while to observe that in testing the principles of this essay, the reader should drop from his mind the *names* of the letters treated of, and attend simply to their *sound*. And the sound, again, for the most part, particularly in the case of the vowels, is that which is represented by the German, Italian and Spanish (Continental) alphabets as distinguished from the English. What this sound is, or the true enunciation of each letter, as here employed, will best be understood from a careful study of the essay itself, and to this the consonants may safely be left; but a provisional exhibition of the principal vowel-sounds (though of only proximate accuracy) may not be unacceptable.


| | | | | |
|----------|------------|------------|---------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>a</i> | pronounced | as | <i>a</i> | in father, ark. |
| <i>i</i> | " | " | <i>ee</i> | " meet. |
| <i>u</i> | " | " | <i>oo</i> | " boot. |
| <i>e</i> | " | " | <i>a</i> | " cake. |
| <i>o</i> | " | " | <i>o</i> | " bone. |
| <i>ä</i> | " | somewhat " | <i>e</i> | " help (prolonged). |
| <i>ö</i> | " | " | Fr. <i>eu</i> | " fleur, (a little like <i>u</i> |

in churn,) but made by holding the organs firmly as in pronouncing *o*, while endeavoring to sound *e* (long *a*).


| | | | | |
|----------|------------|----|--------------|---|
| <i>ä</i> | pronounced | as | Fr. <i>u</i> | in <i>vu</i> , made by placing the organs as for <i>u</i> (<i>oo</i>), and then, with only a slight motion of the tongue towards the under teeth, giving out the <i>e</i> sound. (See Sears's edition of Nöhdén's German Grammar, p. 37, and Fosdick's Introduction to the French Language, p. 16). |
|----------|------------|----|--------------|---|

| | | | | |
|-----------|------------|----|-----------|-------------------------------|
| <i>ai</i> | pronounced | as | <i>ay</i> | in <i>aye</i> (<i>yes</i>). |
| <i>ei</i> | " | " | <i>i</i> | " fine. |
| <i>au</i> | " | " | <i>ou</i> | " found. — Tr.] |

that the tone can hardly escape between them, and there arises on the one side, between the tongue and roof of the mouth, the vowel *i*, and on the other, between the two lips, the vowel *u*, that the *clearest* and this the *most obscure* of all the vowels. If the approximation of the organs is pushed so far that an actual contact or articulation takes place, entirely cutting off the tone, these vowels pass over into real consonants, one into *j* or *ch*, the other into *v* or *f*. We can, therefore, call them *semi-consonants* or *consonant vowels* in contradistinction from the pure throat-vowel *a*. We have thus discovered *three landmarks* of the vowel region, *a*, *i*, *u*, the first standing over against the region of the breathing, the other two against that of the consonants; the former being also the point of beginning, the two latter the termination-points of the two series of vowels which are formed by the deviation of the mouth in either direction from its normal position. These two series may be mathematically represented as two lines proceeding from a common point, at whose extremities stand the three vowels, thus :




2. Between these three fixed boundary points fluctuate a multitude of *middle-tones*, which, mathematically considered, are as numerous as the conceivable points in the two lines and the whole space which they embrace, and practically are at least as many as the different positions of the mouth will express. If we next designate the intermediate space between *a* and *i*, *a* and *u*, in general, that by *e*, this by *o*, with which the alphabets of most languages are content, the figure will stand thus :




It is obvious, however, that these middle vowels admit of the greatest diversity of pronunciation, two forms of which are specially worthy of

notice; one *broad* (Ital. *suono largo* or *aperto*) and lying nearer the common point *a*, and one *more slender* (Ital. *suono stretto* or *chiuso*) which lies nearer the termination points *i* and *u*. Thus the *e* resolves itself into *è* (*ä*) and *é*, *o* into *ò* (*a^o*) and *ó* (if we may employ the customary mark over the French *e* in a somewhat extended application), and the following figure presents itself:




A still further increase of vowels results from the approximation of the *obscure* series *o*, *u* (with the neutral *a*) towards the *clear* vowels by which *clear-obscure*, *mixed tones* are produced, and these are represented on cross lines between the legs of the triangle, and the figure is completed.¹



3. *Compound or double vowels* (diphthongs) are formed by the *union in one syllable of the throat-vowel a* (as also of its derivatives *e* and *o*)

¹ Comp. Böckh in Daub and Creutzer's Studien, 4, 376—380. — In German they are produced, as may be proved, by the influence of *a* following *i*, and so by actual mixture with a clear element or confusion (hence denominated by Grimm *transformed sounds* (Umlaute). These are mathematically a movement of the obscure points *a*, *o*, *u* towards the clear point *i*, as shown by the following figure:



² Vid. on these points, especially the third, Grimm's deutsche Gramm., §. 223 ff., 372 ff.

with the two vowels of the mouth, *i* and *u*; *ei* and *ou* (*ei*, or possibility of this union of two vowels in one unit of sound on the circumstance that the latter in each case is a semi-c and made by an (only imperfect) articulation of the mouth position of the mouth in producing the guttural vowel here as that required by the latter vowels almost as easily as into *t* consonant; it is the simple transition of the mouth from an closed state, performed by a single operation and carrying both so to speak, on one route. But if the second is also a throat (*a*, *e*, *o*) demanding a new opening of the mouth and em breath, a so-called *hiatus* (i. e. soft breathing) takes place, combinations, as *ae*, *ao*, *oe*, *oa*, *eo*, *ea* (= *a'e*, *a'o*, *o'e*, *o'a*, *e'o*, never melt into diphthongs. And if, conversely, the first is the second a throat-vowel, the former, to facilitate the transition furnish a support for the following vowel, thrusts in the *a* which lies nearest itself, and is sounded with the lightest of the organs, or, in rapid pronunciation, passes quite over into here again no diphthong is heard, thus: *ia*, *ie*, *io*, *is* = *ija*, *iju* or *ja*, *je*, *jo*, *ju*; *ua*, *ue*, *uo*, *ui* = *uua*, *uwe*, *uwo*, *uri* or *vi*. Two only among even the regular diphthongs are to be regarded as original and genuine (in an orthoëpical and historical respect) *ai* and *au*, in whose sounds the difference (throughout all nations condition of a complete union) is purest and most extreme. *ou*, whose vowels stand respectively in a less decided opposition each other, arise out of those two original diphthongs, by an obscure pronunciation of the *a*, and then easily pass over either *e* and *o* or *i* and *u*, — the points of difference being here drawn together so as entirely to coincide. The combinations *oi* and real corruptions (from opposite series of vowels, like the mixed *ö*, *ü*) which exist in many languages, and are to be derived from *ai*, *au*, partly from the simple vowels *i*, *u*.

4. In taking a general view of the relations of the vowels, it is obvious that three of their number, *a*, *i*, *u* stand preëminent in every respect. (1) By virtue of their *determinate* limited pronunciation fixed points of the vowel region, (well represented mathematically the angles of the triangle) they are distinguished *Orthoëpically* from the variable tones which move along the lines. (2) In point of *Emphasis* they have the *purest* and *strongest* sound, the liveliest coloring, were, while all the rest appear as middle tints and mixtures. they prove themselves also (3) in a *historical* respect the *original* vowels, or rather the *original substance* of the entire b

vowels, whose strong, clear coloring has in the course of time become cloudy, and faded into the adjacent middle tones. From them these latter, *e* and *o*, may be derived in a threefold manner. (1) Most commonly from *a*, when this is pronounced either too *clearly* as *ä*, *e*, or too *obscurely* as *a'*, *o*,¹ individual men, as is well known, and whole nations preferring one or the other, to the entire loss of pure *a*; the Arabians, e. g. and the English the former, the Syrians, Rabbins and North Germans the latter. From which it is manifest why the Semitish original alphabet and the Dewanagari had no signs for *e* and *o* more than for *a*, regarding them equally as mere prolongations of the consonant sounds; and on the other hand, with what propriety the Greeks borrowed the characters for *e* and *o* as well as *a*, which were wanting in the Phœnician alphabet from the *gutturals* related to *a*, viz. א, ה, ו. Frequently, however, *e* and *o* originate (2) in *i* and *u*, in which case they have a more slender sound, and were denoted above by *é* and *ó* (as distinguished from *è* and *ò* growing out of *a*); and finally (3) in the diphthongs *ai*, *au*, by crasis or contraction into *ê*, *ô*. — If we inquire after the *efficient causes* and tendencies which have operated to bring about these transformations [Umlautungen] of the original vowels *a*, *i*, *u* into *e* and *o*, we shall discover several; namely (1) *Negligence*, and *convenience* of utterance, by which the sharply defined and extreme positions of the mouth in pronouncing those vowels are flattened and they suffered to drop from the points on which they stand. (2) The *mingling* of different vowel-elements, either mere clouding of the one by the other (Umlautung in a strict sense), or actual fusion (Synalaephe). (3) Influence of neighboring consonants, especially the liquids. To which add still the effect of the Accent, etc.

§ 4. Of the Consonants.

In the formation of a *consonant* four things are to be considered; first, the *place* in the mouth or *set of organs* by whose action it is

¹ Among the Arabic Grammarians there exists also the *name* for this twofold pronunciation of the *a*, which is in certain cases, a direction for the long *a* (أ) in reading the Koran. They call the clearer ("according to ي") an *attenuation* (verdünnung أَصَالَة), the more obscure ("according to و") a *thickening* or strengthening (تَعْخِيم), i. e. emphatic pronunciation, according to Silv. de Sacy). Notices et Extraits des manuscrr. de la Bibl. imp. T. IX. p. 12, 19, 55.

produced (which in the back part of the cavity are commonly designated with reference to the upper or passive member, as this is more easily inspected than the root of the tongue); secondly, the *function* of the organs, or the kind and degree of their compression; thirdly, the effect thus produced on the *air* issuing from the throat; and finally, the resultant *sound*. Here is ground for a fourfold description and classification of the consonants.

1. In considering the place or organs of the mouth, we find, beginning quite back, near the origin of the voice, and proceeding forward, (a) in the extreme back part of the cavity, between the root of the tongue and the epiglottis with the palate (curtain of the palate) the *throat* sounds (gutturales), properly called epiglottis sounds, and the *palate* sounds (usually taken together as gutturals or palatals), *g, k, ch, ng*, the further classification of which is given below. (b) In the middle region of the mouth, between the back of the tongue and the arch above it, the *palatals* (palatinae) in a strict sense, *j, ch, l*. (c) Further forward, between the tip of the tongue and the upper teeth, the *tongue* sounds (linguales), *d, t, th, r, n*. (d) Between the tip of the tongue and the two rows of teeth, the *teeth* sounds (dentales), *z, s, sch*. (e) Between the lips, the *lip* sounds (labiales), *b, p, f, v, m*; to which we may add still (f) the *nasals* or *nose* sounds (*nasinae*) *m, n, ng* (standing under a double category). These various sounds may be reduced to three classes, connected with the three principal places of the mouth (§ 1, 2), *posterior*, including the guttural and palatal sounds; *anterior*, the linguals and dentals; and *extreme*, the labials; among which, again, we can distinguish the two former as *interior* (formed within the mouth by the tongue) from the last as *exterior*. Both divisions are essential and important in a physiological or phonetical, as well as a grammatical point of view.

2. The particular sounds of the several organs differ according to the *kind* and the *degree* of the compression (articulation) of the lower, movable and the upper, immovable organ. In reference to the *kind*, this may be either an *elastic*, i. e. *slender* and *hard* pressure (a contact followed by a rebound of the movable organ), by which the channel is entirely closed (only at the three principal places), or a *broad* and *softer* occlusion by which the channel is not so entirely closed as to prevent the air from issuing between the organs. The former is always quick and instantaneous; the latter may be *quick* and vanishing or *protracted*, and in the last case, again, *equable* or *unequable* (rolling, trembling, shaking, etc.). It may, also, hold the channel quite shut, but suffer the air to escape through the nose, thus produc-

ing an intermediate species of articulation between those just named. In reference to the *degrees*, both kinds of articulation may be *weak* or *strong*, to which, in the oriental (Semitish) languages, must be added a *very strong*, which the Western tongues have lost. We have accordingly in the different places of the mouth the following kinds and gradations of articulation and of sounds thereby produced.

1. A thin, hard, elastic pressure of the three principal organs, with a weak, strong, and very strong articulation at each; (a) of the root of the tongue and the palate, weak *g*, strong *k*, very strong *p* (with rolling of the epiglottis, *rasura gulae*); (b) of the tip of the tongue and the upper teeth, weak *d*, strong *t*, very strong *ṭ*; (c) of the two lips, *b*, *p*, and the Aethiopic *Pait*.

2. A broad, soft occlusion, partly strong, and equally protracted, partly a weak, quick, vanishing, and as it were, confused, contact,¹ (a) of the root of the tongue and the palate, strong *ch*, weak *gh*, and with rolling of the epiglottis, strong *ṭ*, (Arab. *Ṭ*, Swiss *ch*), weak *ṣ*, (ع), and *v* also, as many pronounce it; more in the central region, between the back of the tongue and the roof of the mouth, a third *ch* and *gh*, with the latter of which *j*, the consonant echo of *i*, coincides; (b) of the tip of the tongue and the upper teeth, (not such as to prevent the air from pressing or gliding through), strong *th*, weak *dh*: of the two rows of teeth with the tip of the tongue drawn back, strong *s*, weak *z*, (ز); (c) of the lips, *ph* (*f*) and *bh*, with which *v* coincides. The following are still other degenerate varieties of this articulation, consisting in an unsteady or unequally prolonged occlusion: a rolling motion of the tip, sometimes also of the root, of the tongue (according as the sound is made in the front or back part of the mouth) *v*; a loose application of the back of the tongue, allowing the air to stream over at several unclosed points, *l*; a complete occlusion of the three principal organs (as in 1) but with an emission of the air through the nose, *ng*,² *n*, *m*. A general view of these classes is given in the following

¹ For the most part, sounds of the first sort softened by an appulse of the breath (aspiration), and hence indicated, for want of a specific sign, by annexing an *h*.

² *n* adulterinum, as Nigid. Figulus calls it, Schneider, latein Elementari. I. 316.

TABLE.

| | Epiglottis. | Palate | Roof of mouth. | Tip of tongue | Teeth. | Lips. |
|---|-------------|--------|----------------|---------------|-------------|-------|
| (1) <i>Hard, thin, elastic pressure.</i> | | | | | | |
| a. Weak | | g | | d | | b |
| b. Strong | | k | | t | | p |
| c. Very strong | p | p | | ʈ | | ʙ |
| (2) <i>Soft, broad occlusion.</i> | | | | | | |
| a. Weak | ɣ (ġ) | gh | gh(j) | dh | z | bh(v) |
| b. Strong | ŋ (ŋ) | ch | ch | th | s(sch) r | ph(f) |
| c. Very strong | | | | | | |
| d. Unequable | (r) | | l | r | | |
| (3) <i>Mouth closed, with emission of the air through the nose.</i> | | ng | | n | | m |

3. According to the kind and the degrees of strength of the articulation, the *air* is variously affected.

(1) In the hard, elastic pressure of the organs where the vocal channel is shut, it is *cut off*, (a) by the strong articulation, *sharply* *k*, *t*, *p*, (b) by the weak, *bluntly*, *g*, *d*, *b*, and is either lost in these cases imperceptibly by secret side passages, or conducted in full strength through the nose.

(2) Between the softly closed organs it is *suffered to pass*, (a) in the strong articulation being *crowded* through with violence *ŋ*, *ch*, *th*, *s*, *f*; (b) in the weak, gently *gliding* through, *ɣ*, *gh*, (j), *dh*, *z*, *bh*, (v); while in the modified form of this articulation [2, (2), (c)], it is crushed through *sch*, rumbles through, *l*, is rolled through, *r*.

(3) It escapes *by the nose* unobstructed and in full strength, *ng*, *n*, *m*.

4. On all these conditions, finally, and especially on the affections of the air, depends the *vocality* or *loudness* of the consonants, i. e. the impression which they make upon the ear, as compared with the clear ring of the vowels. In treating of this, we may attend, partly, in general, to the *degree of loudness*, or of approximation to the pure vowel sound [klang], and partly to the particular *kinds and modifications* of the sound.

I. The *degree of loudness* corresponds with the activity of the air, or the freedom and force with which it streams through the mouth; and is inversely as the action of the organs which are exerted to

hinder its passage. The consonants thus fall into two classes, *voiceless*, when the air is altogether suppressed, and the air accompanies it, stifled; and *semivocal*, when the air is free to pass, but carries with it the tone from the throat. A third class, *rustling*, [*wh*], stands intermediate between these two, when the air makes way for itself between tightly closed lips only by force, and with the loss of its tone.

1. When the air is *cut off* by the complete stoppage of the channel at the three principal points (the elastic articulation is audible but the obscure report of the collision of something like the sound of a falling key to a musical instrument), *a negative sound*, heard only as it limits a vowel, *voiceless*, *e*. not loud, entirely deprived of the vowel ring *quæri*, called *dumb consonants* (*mutæ*),¹ *consonants* in a strict sense are seen most pure in the strong articulation where they are *cut off sharply*, *k, t, p*; less pure in the weak articulation with intercepted breath, *g, d, b*.

Just as little is any clear sound produced when, in the occlusion, the air, after being arrested for an instant, *rushes out*, *gh, j, dh, bh, (v)*. These are the weakest and most muted consonants, and audible only *before* vowels. *Z* constitutes a class, of which, more below.

2. When the air, in the soft, broad, yet strong articulation, *forces itself through* between the organs, *forces itself through* between them, *a voiceless*, but still quite perceptible reverberating noise, *consonants* (*strepentes*), *rh, ch, th, ph, (f)*. By the relaxation of the articulation to a weak, vanishing contact through which almost imperceptibly, the sound becomes mute again, just shown.

3. If the soft articulation has become so broad or long, *steady*, and the occlusion consequently so imperfect, that the *air can rush out*, but also *the tone of the glottis obstructs* *through*, *semivocal* or half loud consonants are formed. *The dentals z, s, sch*, (originating in the space between the tips of teeth, when contracted, but not closed by the tip of the tongue); the linguals *l* and *r*; and the nasals (streaming through the nostrils), *ng, n, m*. Even the soft mutes mentioned above.

¹ The Greek name is better than the Latin, as it expresses the character of this consonant-sound, its lack of the proper vowel-sound; absolutely mute.

² As soon as it is closed, the lingual sounds *dh, th* are formed.

dh, may become vocal, if the weak articulation by which they are made, is so far relaxed as to leave almost no contact of the organs, and allow the vibration of the air to tremble through. There, then, arise undeveloped, (half vowel, half consonant), dull, humming, consonant sounds.

N. B. In the common division of the consonants into mutes and semi-vowels, the rustling sounds given above (under 2), are reckoned in the former class; and this is right, so far as their origin (in the *tenués*) and their want of an accompanying throat tone is concerned. But if we regard simply the consonant sound in itself, classes 1 and 2 coincide, for both consist of a reverberating sound altogether similar, in nature and in strength, as distinguished from the abruptly terminated, stifled sound of the mutes proper. Both views harmonize when, as is here done, the consonants in class 2, as *rustling*, are made the transition step between mutes and semi-vowels.

II. A greater variety of classes results when we distinguish the consonants with reference to the different *kinds and modifications of their sound*.

(1) *Hard, thin*, (*tenués, exiles*), (*a*) in the strong articulation which sharply terminates the sound — the *tenués* in a strict sense, *k, t, p*; (*b*) in the weak, blunt articulation, the *blunt* consonants (*obtusae*) *g, d, b*, attended in pronunciation with a scarcely perceptible hum, as if united with a nasal tone (almost like *ng, nd, mb*) which is most clearly heard among the French, English, and also many North Germans.

(2) *Soft, full*, when the air is suffered to pass between the lightly closed organs, hence commonly called (with reference to their formation from the *tenués*) *aspirates, (breathed upon, adspiratae)*.

(a) *Gliding, smooth*, when the air slips smoothly between the organs now scarcely in a state of contact, and half extinguishes again the sound which is on the point of being formed. Between the root of the tongue and the curtain of the palate, a light *gurgling*, sometimes rough (*cum rasura gulae*) like the oriental *g* (ج), sometimes soft, *gh* (ح), like the German *g* after obscure vowels, e. g. *schlagen, schlügen, flogen*), between the back of the tongue and the roof of the mouth, the still more soft, almost melting *gh*, (like the German *g* after clear vowels, e. g. *mögen, gegen, fliegen, schliügen*) with which *j*, the consonant echo of *i*, coincides: between the tip of the tongue and the upper teeth, the stammering *dh* (like the Eng. *th* in *than, that*, and the *d* between vowels in Low German popular dialects, e. g.

but make their appearance first in the later, derived languages, or in the later periods of the ancient, through a growing tendency to assimilation and the breaking down (*quetschung*, *schmelz*), respectively, of the lingual and palatal sounds.

(4) *Flowing* (*liquidae*), the *rumbling l*, and the *rolling* or *scraping r*.

(5) *Smothered* resonances through the nose (*nasales*), *ng*, *n*, *m*.

A Synopsis of this classification is given in the following

TABLE.

Sounds of the Epiglottis — Palate — Roof of mouth.

| | | | | | |
|------|----------------------------------|-----------|-------|--------|------------|
| Hard | { Thin (<i>tenuēs</i>) | | k | | |
| | { Blunt (<i>obtusae</i>) | | g | | |
| Soft | { Gliding (<i>lenes</i>) | Scrapping | gh(ɣ) | Smooth | Melting |
| | { Rustling (<i>strepentes</i>) | Rough | ch(ç) | | |
| | | | | | |
| | Hissing (<i>sibilantes</i>) | | | | |
| | Flowing (<i>liquidae</i>) | | | | rumbling l |
| | Smothered (<i>nasales</i>) | | ng | | |

| | Tip of tongue. | Teeth. | | Lips. | |
|--------|----------------|-------------|---|---------|-------------------------------|
| Blaise | t | | | p | Voiceless (<i>mutae</i>) |
| | d | | | b | |
| | dh | | | bh(v) | |
| | th | | | ph(f) | |
| | | { whistling | s | flowing | |
| | { whizzing | z | | | |
| | rolling | | | | |
| | r | | | | |
| | n | | | m | |

5. According to the conditions already adduced as determining the voicelessness or muteness of the consonants, i. e. the degrees of their destitution of the vowel sound, we may also graduate the *fixedness* or *corporeity* (body) of the consonants, — a distinction of the utmost importance to grammar. The distinction which we have noticed between vowels and consonants in general, as *flowing* (movable) and *fixed* (stationary),¹ repeats itself again within the region of the conso-

¹ This distinction coincides physiologically with that of the *light* and *shadow*,

nants, in ever diminishing circles, and with softened shades of difference. First there is the division into mutes as more fixed and distant from the vowel sound, and the semivowels which lie nearer to it. Among the mutes again we observe a distinction in point of fixedness between the hard (tenues) and the soft (apart from that founded on the hard and weak articulation). Among the hard mutes, once more, the labials (the outer) appear more fixed than the gutturals and linguals (the inner); and of these, finally, the former more so than the latter. So, likewise, among the semivowels, there is no lack of antitheses and gradations in respect of fixedness. The sibilants (nearly related to the linguals) are more fixed than the liquids, and among these *r* is more so than *l*, and *m* than *n* and *ng*. In this way the vowels and consonants in their contrasts and gradations, might be represented somewhat as in the following scheme:

| CONSONANTS. | | | | VOWELS. | |
|------------------------|-----------|--------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| Fixed, | | Obscure. | | Flowing, | Clear. |
| More fixed, voiceless. | | | More flowing, Semivocal. | | |
| Most fixed or hard. | | Soft. | | Consonant oral vowels. | Purer gutt'l vowel. |
| Exterior. | Interior. | | | | |
| p | k t | ph ch th | s | u i | a |
| b | g d | bh(ṽ)gh(j)dh | z | | |
| | | | r l m n(ng) | | |

6. *Grammatical and historical relation of the consonants.* Those which, as physiologically the most fixed, constitute the germ of the consonant system, viz. the *hard* (tenues) *p, k, t*; *b, g, d*, are also in a grammatical and historical view the *most original and characteristic*, the proper types or representatives of this element of speech,—while the liquids *r, l, m, n*, which fluctuate between these and the vowels,

the *clear* and *obscure*, which was introduced above. Matter, in proportion as it is fixed, or thickly compressed, is impervious to the rays of light, while the looser and more flowing, so much the more transparent is it and clear. But what the outward material world is to the rays of light, that are the functions of the vocal organs and the resultant sounds to the voice—rays issuing from the throat in speech; these the penetrating, illuminating principle, those the impermeable, dark matter. The stronger, more substantial, more fixed the latter, the less can the tones of the throat sound through; the looser and more flowing, the louder the tones, the more transparent as it were and clear. The analogy between the rays of light and the tone-rays (both having the air as their medium) and their modes of operation, is so close that in all languages the department of sound borrows its expression from that of light.

play a more subordinate part serving to accompany and harmonize the two elements. This primitive material of the consonants has gradually developed itself by means of a twofold *softening* process, viz. first by *Aspiration* through which the soft mutes (adspiratae), and secondly by *Assibilation* through which the sibilants are produced.

(1) Of *Aspiration*. It is evident that the dry and hard nature of those *tenuēs* must, in the bosom of words, be gradually softened, by contact with the vowels, through the influence of the breathing which accompanies the latter. And this softening influence of the breath manifests itself in two ways, according as the consonant is a *final* sound, *after a vowel*, or a *medial* sound, *between two vowels*. In the *first* case, since the breath can stream forth, thus gaining greater strength, there arises a *strong rustling, echoing* sound, which naturally appears most distinct in the case of the *strong tenuēs*, where the breath must force its way between the organs with some violence (*kh* [*ch*], *th*, *ph* [*f*]). Hence special signs were appropriated to these in the Greek alphabet (φ , χ , θ) and $\kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{\alpha}\sigma\pi\eta\rho$ the name of aspirates (the *weak tenuēs* β , γ , δ , whose aspiration is less distinct, hence called *mediae*, being restricted meanwhile to a single character, for both the thin and the aspirated sounds); while in Hebrew and Syriac,¹ the aspiration of either kind is more properly regarded as a grammatical *modification* of the thin pronunciation, and the difference accordingly indicated by a mere diacritic point. — In the *second* case, where the breath of the preceding vowel cannot stream on but is weakened by the following one and as it were blown away upon it, a *light, vanishing* sound is produced, of a nature eminently appropriate to the *weak tenuēs* (*gh*, *dh*, *bh*), since the strong incline to maintain their aspiration in spite of the mitigating influence of the following vowel.

(2) By *Assibilation*, which is nearly related to aspiration, or may rather be regarded as a further extension of the same, the *interior* primitive consonants are drawn out in another way, to a more limited extent. As we have already seen that in aspiration, the articulation

¹ In those languages aspiration appears still in its original, purely *grammatical* character, its dependence on a preceding vowel; hence only in a medial or final, never an initial sound or after a consonant. But already in the Arabic and other Semitish dialects, and still more in the Japhetish tongues it has become independent, appearing indifferently in an initial, medial or final sound, appropriating to itself a special sign, and supplanting to some extent the old thin sound. Vid. the author's Kritik of Ewald's Heb. Gramm. in the Hermes, XXX. I. S. 11, 12.

which employs the broad surface, inclines to thrust itself forward a little (the rough gutturals into the roof of the mouth, the linguals constantly into the region of the upper teeth), so by assimilation, all the articulations of the tongue are pushed forward from the back part of the mouth into the region of the teeth; so that from linguals, palatals and gutturals, *sibilants* are formed. This tendency manifests itself, as a general remark, later than aspiration, but once commenced constantly extends its influence; and the later periods of language, accordingly, are distinguished by the prevalence of sibilants and the narrowness and deficiency of the lingual and guttural classes. The *linguals* are *most easily and earliest* assimilated (lying as they do so near the teeth that mere aspiration gives them a degree of sibilance, only smothered by the still existing contact of the tongue and teeth), and pass over into *smooth* or *sharp* sibilants — *t* into strong *s*, also into *ts* (Germ. and Ital. *z*); *d* into weak *s* (*z*), and the oriental *ṭ* finally into *ṣ*. This transformation took place so early that it lies back of all our alphabetic monuments; since we have already in the oldest Semitish mode of writing four sibilant sounds denoted, — a weak, Zain, two strong, Samech and Schin, and a very strong (for Western organs impossible), Tsadhe.¹ At a *later* period, however, the *palatals* and *gutturals* also come under the power of assimilation and pass over into *crushed* sibilants; partly into *simple*, *sch* (in a double category), partly into *compound*, *tch*, *dech* (viz. the weak *tenues* *g*, *gh*, *j* into the weak *sch* or *dech*, the strong *k*, *ch* into the strong *sch*, *tch*), now only before certain vowels, and now everywhere. This change does not appear in the old Semitish alphabet, but in the Arab. and Pers. (here only in the case of *g*) we find it, in the Sanskrit mode of writing which is likewise very old (here forming a complete series of what are called palatal sounds), and, among the modern languages, more especially in those of Roman origin. It probably began with the soft palatals and gradually drew the gutturals also, which are stronger and stand farther back, under its influence. — If, finally, the sibilant seems here to be mingled with a lingual sound, the reason of this is to be found in the near relation between the guttural (palatal) and lingual system, by virtue of which, sounds of the former class commonly, even without assimilation, become attenuated into linguals, and conversely (although we hold the

¹ Since aspiration, as before remarked, is not yet denoted here by a special letter, but first by the far later diacritic points, we might hence conclude that this kind of assimilation was still earlier than aspiration — unless perhaps the greater phonetical distinctness of these sounds occasioned the difference.

other to be the more original and prevalent process), the latter are thickened into the former.¹

The more fixed and regularly graduated mutes push themselves forward in the softening process, in the series of their respective classes, while the more movable and unclassified liquids, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, experience individual changes in a more independent way. Still, a mitigating process may here also easily be traced. These fall, as we have seen, into two classes: those which are formed within the mouth by a loose and unsteady articulation of the tongue, (lingual liquids, as we might call them), *r*, *l*, and those which with a complete closing of the organs of the mouth, stream forth through the nose (nasal liquids), *m*, *n*, *ng*. In the former class, *r* is the earlier sound, from which proceeds *l* by softening and relaxation. Hence, those who cannot pronounce the *r*, (not merely children and stammerers, but even whole nations, as is known to be the case with the Chinese), substitute *l* in its place, and hence also in all languages, the frequent transition of *r* into *l*² (and also by exception the reverse). The second class are grammatically considered only a *single* sound, which takes the form, according to the organ of the following mute, before a labial of *m*, before a lingual of *n*, before a palatal of *ng*, and is thus subject to constant mutation.³ So far, however, as these remain three distinct sounds, independent and unaffected by the mutes, *m* as a labial nasal, is the most substantial among them, and of the earliest origin. It is frequently attenuated, especially as a final sound, into *n*,⁴ then sinks into a mere guttural resonance, *ng*, (the Nunnation of the Arabians, Anuswara of the Indians, nasillement of the French

¹ On this twofold increase and development of the consonant system, vid. the author's *Treatise über die hebräische Lautsystem* in the *Hermes*, XXXI. I. S. 10—12, 15, 16.

² Ewald *Hebr. Gramm.* § 31. S. 34. Comp. Grimm, I. 122, 386, 581. Schneider, *Lat. Elementarlehre* I. 209. Böckh in the *Studien* 4, 384. Fernow, *Ital. Gram.* S. 59. [See for farther statements on the changes referred to in this and the following notes, the articles on the several letters in Freund's *lat. Wörterbuch*, and *Lid. and Scott's Lex.*]

³ Comp. the Epiphonic rules in Sanskrit in Bopp, *Lehrgr.* § 15, 24 ff.; in the Greek, Buttman's *ausführ. Gramm.* § 25; in German, Grimm, I. 100, 536; in Latin Schneider, I. 309, 13, 315 ff.

⁴ Thus the final *m* in Hebrew particles and flexion endings has passed over in the Arab., Aram. and other later cultivated dialects for the most part into *n*, — Ewald, *Heb. Gramm.* § 34; the Sanskrit and Latin *m* in flexion-endings is thinned down to *n* in Greek; so likewise in the middle and new High German. — Grimm, I. 386.

and of the South Germans, the stroked vowel of the Lettish,¹) and so, finally, falls away altogether.²

In this manner, therefore, through the tendency to a softer form, the consonants of both kinds, mutes and liquids, are, within their respective circles, in a state of constant transition and change. We might naturally expect that transitions would take place also *from one province to the other*, and particularly in accordance with the direction hitherto noticed, *from that of the mutes to the liquids*. And the mutes do actually, as we have seen, pass over through assibilation into the class of semivowels, to which the liquids belong. Still, the sibilants, though forming one class with the liquids phonetically, adhere, in general, in a grammatical and historical respect, to the lingual letters from which they sprang; so that there even remains yet a sort of chasm between the province of the liquids and that of the mutes. At the same time, points of contact and transitions are not wholly wanting. Thus there is a twofold, narrow indeed, but somewhat practicable, path, which leads, especially in the Latin and old German, partly from the linguals, but chiefly from the simple sibilants *s, z*, to *r*, (which is likewise formed with the tip of the tongue, and stands physiologically very near them). In these languages, the older *s* standing in the middle or at the end of syllables, (and so weakened by contact with a preceding vowel, hence in the former case passing actually over, in the Gothic, into *z*), is very commonly changed, in the later periods, into *r*, e. g. *Furius* instead of *Fusius*, *dirimo* instead of *disimo*, *oris pluris* from *os, plus*; old German, *ror*, *ōra*, *hōryan*, *mēr*, *mir*, from Gothic *raus*, *hausjan*, *ausō*, *mais*, *mis*.³ In Latin, again, sometimes *d* passes into *r*, as *meridies*, from *medius dies*,⁴ and in some of the German vulgar dialects, *t* and *d* in the middle of a word first into *dh*, then into *r*, e. g. lower Hessian *rēre* (Eng. *ready*), upper Hessian *Vārer*, *Brūrer*, *Werrer*, for *Vater*, *Bruder*, *Wetter*, (properly *Vadher*, etc). In the bosom of these languages, transitions of the linguals, also, take place, especially of *d* into *l*

¹ Here belongs also the so called *mytaciſm* of the Latin *m*, vid. Schneider, I. 301 ff. Böckh ubi sup. 387; whence the familiar mode of writing in MSS. *multu* for *multum*, and the like.

² On the *mytaciſm* which especially belongs here, (the resolution of *m* into *n* before vowels), vid. preceding note. The apocope and syncope of the *n* is very common, as is known, in all languages, — certainly effected, however, everywhere through the above-mentioned nasal resonance — particularly where a general historical relation appears, as between the Greek ending *ων* and the Lat. *o*. Schneider, II. 497.

³ Schneider, I. 342 f. Grimm, I. 63, 121.

⁴ Schneider, I. 257 f.

(likewise a lingual liquid, and probably through *r* as an intermediate step), e. g. *δακρυ* into *lachryma*, *Ὀδυσσεύς* into *Ulysses*, *ὀψαίο*, compared with *odor*, Goth. *vaddjus* into *Wall* (Lat. *vallum*).¹ The same perhaps, may be noticed in the Semitish languages.² Finally, the labials, *p*, *b*, are found passing over into the liquid *m*, belonging to the same organ; in the Semitish languages, e. g. *מִן* and *מֵן*, *מִן* and *מֵן*,³ in Greek and Lat., e. g. *promulgare* for *vulgare*, *μῆλα* = *βηλα*, (*balare*), in Germ., *schwalme* for *schwalbe*.⁴ Other examples, as LXX. *Αἴμα* for *חַיָּה*, *σευρος* for *σέβρος* (from *σεβω*), *somnus* from *ἴσνος*, *damnum* from *δασαρυ*, *Bamberg* for *Babenberg*, *Stimme* from *Seibna*, belong to assimilation.

As we have thus seen certain transitions of the finer mutes into liquids, so again, the liquids, in which the consonant sound has reached the utmost limit of fluidity and fineness, sometimes pass over into the province of the vowels; much more rarely, however, since the separation between consonant and vowel is quite too important to be easily overstepped. The semi-vocal nature of *r* and *l* appears most clearly in the Sanskrit, by the formation of two proper vowels, *ri* and *lri*. In the modern European languages, they sometimes resolve themselves into *u* and *i*; in French and Dutch, namely, *al*, *ol*, into *au*, *ou*; in Ital. *l* between a mute and a vowel, into *i*, e. g. *fiore*, *chiare*, from *flos*, *claris*; ⁵ in Norweg., or into *oi*, e. g. *hoin*, *coin*, instead of *horn*, *corn*.⁶ And as *l*, *r*, resolve themselves into *u*, *i*, so, again, does *n* sometimes into the throat vowel *a*. Thus in the Suabian vulgar dialect, after long vowels, e. g. *nû*, *dû*, *grü*, *zie*, *a*, instead of *nun*, *thun*, *grün*, *zehnten*; since, however, this counterfeit *a* is universally a favorite resonance (a sort of Pattahh furtive) after long vowels, we ought perhaps to consider the *n* as apocopated here, or rather resolved into that nasal tone so agreeable as a final sound to the South Germans and the French, which, no longer representing a proper consonant sound, approximates to the vowel *a*. This transformation of the *n* into *a*, is more extensively and distinctly witnessed in the Greek, not merely in the hard, and for Greeks impossible, position between the two consonants, in 3 plur. perf. pass. as *εττά-*

¹ Schneider, I. 255 f. Grimm, I. 66.

² Ewald, Heb. Gramm., S. 36 f.

³ Gesenius, Lehrs., § 32, I. Ewald ubi sup. ⁴ Schneider, I. 315. Grimm, II. 193.

⁵ Strictly perhaps *j*, as the *i* is sounded before vowels, and then it coincides with the *r* in many words between *a* and *o* or *io*, e. g. *Gennaio*, *caprajo*, *notajo*, for *Genaro*, *capraro*, *notario*, and with the French pronunciation of the ending *aül*, *eil*, *ille*, etc., as *aÿ*, *eÿ*, *iÿ*.

⁶ Grimm, I. 570. Comp. 580, 581.

παιας, ἐγθάγαιας for *τεταγαιας, ἐγθαγαιας*, but also in the soft Ionic dialect, consistently with its known fondness for the prevalence of vowels, in a simple position with *τ* after vowels, e. g. *πεπαυαιας, κεκλειαιας, πυθοιάτο, κεχολιάτο, τιθείαιας*, and even *ἐβουλείατο, ἰγέαιας*, (instead of *ἐβούλοτο, ἰγαντας*). Here belong also, perhaps, the customary forms of the 3 pl. pres. *ἰξῆᾱσι, διδόᾱσι, τιθείᾱσι*, etc. (from *αιτος, ορτος, ερτος*, etc.), if we can assume that the *α* was originally short, and has been lengthened only by a misapprehension of its character. Still more prevalent is this use of *α* for *η*, in the flexion endings, *ων, ην, εις*, etc., e. g. in acc. sing. 3 decl. *ἰχθνα, τηδνα, βοα, εὔγεα*, etc., Ionic for *ἰχθυη, τηδην, βουη, εὔγηη*, etc., *παλγωα, μηλγωα*, compared with *-ων, δεσποτεα*, with *-ην*; again in plup. Ionic, *εα* for *ειν*, impf. *ἐτιθεα* for *ἐτιθηη*, *εα* and *ῆα* for *ῆη*, *ῆῖα* for *ῆειν*, and the like. One feels the more tempted to reckon these latter phenomena, with Buttmann, with those of the former kind, and recognize throughout the Ionic inclination to resolve *η* into *α*, since such a resolution, effected as above mentioned through the resonance *ng*, is precisely appropriate to the final sound. But it must not be overlooked here, that these variations are connected with that widely pervading, and as yet imperfectly investigated mutation of the flexion endings, *η* and *α*, partly in the formation of the accusative, partly in the flexion of verbs (especially in the historical tenses) when the *α* rests not on a mere volatilization of the *η*, but, as appears from a comparison of the Sanskrit and other affiliated languages, on the apocope of an earlier final *m*, from which the ending *η* has sprung. So that the *α* may have thus been originally no more than the *union-vowel* to connect the ending *m* with roots ending in a consonant, while those ending in a vowel, append immediately the *η* into which *m* has dwindled.

ARTICLE VII.

THE 'TRUE IMPORT OF כָּאֶרִי יָדַי וְרַגְלַי IN PS. 22: 17, COMMONLY TRANSLATED, "THEY PIERCED MY HANDS AND MY FEET."

By Rev. Robert W. Landis, Hillsdale, N. Y.¹

THE question as to the true import of this passage, has for a thousand years past furnished a theme for contention between the Synagogue and the Christian Church; the former insisting that כָּאֶרִי is compounded of the prefix כּ and אֶרִי *a lion*; and that the phrase simply means "*as a lion my hands and my feet*;" while the latter maintains that the word should be read not as a noun but as a verb; and that the phrase should be rendered, "*They pierced my hands and my feet*." A popular and excellent expositor, has lately in his work on the Psalms, afforded some countenance to the Jewish interpretation; and as the importance of the theme will be readily conceded, we have concluded to devote a few pages to a review of the question.

The expositor to whom we refer, it is almost needless to say, is the Rev. Joseph Addison Alexander, to whom the sacred literature of our country owes obligations which are neither trivial nor few. In common with many we feel gratefully indebted to this gentleman for the exegetical works with which he has already favored the Christian world; and though we decidedly dissent from his conclusions in relation to the passage before us, it is not without diffidence that we venture thus to call them in question; being assured of the scrupulous care with which his conclusions generally in this his favorite department of theological science, are considered and reviewed before being submitted to the public. We are, however, fully convinced that the exposition of the passage referred to is erroneous, and that it is calculated to do serious injury in more ways than one to the cause of truth; and so thinking and feeling, we shall endeavor with all the frankness which Dr. Alexander himself would observe in a similar case, to state the reasons which appear to us to justify this conviction.

That the matter may, however, be fully understood by all our readers, we shall here extract from the work of Dr. Alexander, the passage to which we refer. After translating the whole verse in

¹ The following Article was prepared for the Biblical Repository, and should have been inserted at an earlier day.—Eds.

consistency with the common version of it by evangelical Christians, he proceeds as follows in relation to the clause referred to :

“ The last clause, as above translated, contains a striking reference to our Saviour's crucifixion, which some have striven to expunge by denying that the ancients nailed the feet as well as the hands to the cross. But although there is a singular absence of explicit declaration on the subject, both in the classical and sacred writers, the old opinion that the feet were pierced may be considered as completely verified by modern investigation and discussion. So far, therefore, as the question of usage is concerned, we can have no difficulty in referring the clause to our Saviour's crucifixion, and regarding it as one of those remarkable coincidences, some of which have been already noticed, all designed and actually tending to identify our Lord as the most prominent subject of prophecy. It is very remarkable, however, that no citation or application of the clause occurs in any of the Gospels. It is also worthy of remark that the clause, thus explained, although highly appropriate to one part of our Saviour's passion, is, unlike the rest of the description, hardly applicable, even in a figurative sense, to the case of any other sufferer. Even supposing the essential idea to be merely that of wounds inflicted on the body, it seems strange that it should be expressed in the specific and unusual form of piercing the hands and the feet. On further inspection it appears that, in order to obtain this meaning, we must either change the text (כָּאֲרֵי or כָּאֲרֵי for כָּאֲרֵי), or assume a plural form so rare that some grammarians deny its existence altogether (כָּאֲרֵי for כָּאֲרֵי), and an equally rare form of the participle (כָּאֲרֵי for כָּאֲרֵי), and a meaning of the verb itself which nowhere else occurs, but must be borrowed from a cognate root (כָּרַח for כָּרַח); an accumulation of grammatical and lexicographical anomalies, which cannot be assumed without the strongest exegetical necessity, and this can exist only if the words admit of no other explanation more in accordance with analogy and usage. Now the very same form in Ps. 88: 18, is unquestionably used to mean *like the lion*, and a slight modification of the same in Numb. 24: 9. Ezek. 22: 25, *like a lion*. This idea would be here the more appropriate because the Psalm abounds in such allusions, and because the lion is expressly mentioned both before and afterwards. See above, v. 14 (13), and below, v. 22 (21). The sense would then be ‘they surround my hands and my feet, as they would a lion,’ or, ‘as a lion would,’ i. e. with the strength and fierceness of a lion. The hands and feet may be mentioned as the parts used in defence and flight. That the mention of these parts after all, in connection with the lion is not altogether natural, cannot fairly be denied, and this objection should have all the weight to which it is entitled. But whether it can outweigh the grammatical difficulties that attend the other construction, is a serious question, which ought not to be embarrassed by any supposed conflict with New Testament authority, since no citation of the clause occurs there. It may even be possible to reconcile the two interpretations by supplying a verb and giving כָּאֲרֵי

its usual meaning. 'Like a lion (they have wounded) my hands and my feet.' The point of comparison would then be the infliction of sharp wounds in those parts of the body, an idea common to the habits of the lion and to the usages of crucifixion." See *in loco*, pp. 184, 185.

Such are Dr. Alexander's annotations touching the clause referred to. But, before entering upon the discussion of the main question, we shall here offer a remark or two upon several topics raised in this exposition, but which have not an immediate connection with the point mainly at issue.

That there is in the sacred writers an absence of explicit declaration on the subject of the piercing of the feet in crucifixion, may, perhaps, be admitted; but by no means can it be admitted that there is a "*singular absence*" of such allusions; for this would imply that there existed a demand for such "explicit declaration" in the New Testament, which is by no means the fact. Whatever the custom in crucifying might have been, it was universally known in the time of Christ, and for centuries afterwards. Nor is it easy to imagine what occasion could exist, under such circumstances, that should require of the sacred writers, the "explicit declaration" referred to. The fact, however, that he was thus pierced, is sufficiently referred to and implied. For example, in Matt. 27: 35, 36, we have precisely the occurrences which are mentioned in Ps. 22: 17-19, "They crucified him," (that is, agreeably to the usages of crucifixion as then universally known, they pierced his hands and feet by nailing them to the cross,) "and parted his garments," etc. Then in Luke 24: 39, 40, the same idea is most forcibly implied in Christ's words to his disciples, "Behold my hands and my feet that it is I myself:" *ἰδετε εἰς χεῖρας μου καὶ τοὺς πόδας μου, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐγώ εἰμι*. It was by the marks which were visible in his hands and feet, therefore, that the disciples were to learn that he who then stood before them, was he who had been crucified.

As to the absence of such declaration in the classics, nothing need be here said, (though the reader, if disposed, may consult Plautus. *Mostell. Act. II. 1, 13*). The expressions on the subject, in both the Greek and Latin fathers, (while crucifixion was yet practised) can leave no room for doubt on the subject. Justin Martyr says, "As they therefore did crucify Him, they pierced through his hands and feet, by driving nails through them." Tertullian (*Adv. Marc. III. 19*.) expressly affirms also that the nailing of the feet as well as the hands, belonged to the peculiar severity of this mode of punishment: *quæ propria est atrocitas crucis*. He makes this remark in his ex-

planation of Ps. 22: 17, which he has just quoted. So too say all the fathers when they have occasion to refer to the matter. And can it be conceived that such an expression as that of Justin, or this of Tertullian would have ever been made thus openly, at the very time when this mode of executing was still practised, and yet the declaration be false, and remain uncontradicted? It is needless, however, to dwell upon this matter. No one will doubt that the recent, thorough investigations of this subject, have settled the question that the feet as well as the hands were pierced in crucifixion; and if so, every mention in the N. Testament of the fact that Christ was crucified, (and how frequently is it mentioned!) is a declaration of the fact that his hands and feet were pierced. And how Dr. A. could suppose that there need be, under such circumstances any more *explicit* declaration on the subject, is unaccountable. Nor should we have devoted so much space to this point, were it not for the strong and repeated efforts made by Dr. A. to employ this alleged absence of "explicit declaration," to sustain his criticism.

Dr. Alexander also considers it *very remarkable* that no citation or application of the clause occurs in any of the Gospels. But admitting it to be even so, what is there peculiarly remarkable herein? Is it not equally remarkable that Gen. 49: 10, and Dan. 9: 27, and other passages are not quoted and applied? There can be no doubt that all such passages were adduced by the apostles in their disputes with the Jews, and that they were among those with which Apollos "mightily convinced" them, and by which they were "confounded" by Paul; but why they should have been formally quoted and applied in the New Testament does not appear.

A third point raised in the foregoing exposition by Dr. A., and obviously for the purpose of preparing the reader's mind to abandon the commonly received view of the passage, is, that "Even supposing the essential idea to be merely that of wounds inflicted on the body, it seems strange that it should be expressed in the specific and unusual form of piercing the hands and feet." But wherein is this asserted *strangeness*? If the psalm be indeed Messianic, (Dr. A. strenuously maintains that it is,) the sufferings which it narrates are of course to be referred to the Messiah. Now, were not the hands and feet of Christ pierced? and is not the clause in question (as commonly explained,) a prophetic statement of the fact? If the wounds which he received were mentioned at all, why should they not be correctly mentioned? The *strangeness* appears to be on the other side, and in supposing that they could have been mentioned in some

other way.¹ But Dr. A. completely sets aside the force of this presumption, by conceding at the close of his exposition (as quoted above,) that "It may be even possible to reconcile the two interpretations by supplying a verb and giving פָּאָרַי its usual meaning. 'Like the lion (they have wounded) my hands and my feet.' " As to the *possibility* here referred to, it is somewhat problematical, to say the least; but the reader will perceive from this passage that it may not after all, therefore, be very "*strange that it should be expressed in the specific and unusual form of piercing the hands and the feet.*" But let us proceed to the main question.

Dr. Alexander remarks, "That in order to obtain this meaning, ('they pierced my hands and my feet,') we must either change the text, (פָּאָרַי or פָּאָרַי for פָּאָרַי), or assume a plural form so rare, that some grammarians deny its existence altogether, (פָּאָרַי for פָּאָרַי), and an equally rare form of the participle (פָּאָרַי for פָּאָרַי), and a meaning of the verb itself which no where else occurs, but must be borrowed from a cognate root (פָּאָרַי for פָּאָרַי): an accumulation of grammatical and lexicographical anomalies which cannot be assumed without," etc. This representation presents the full strength of the position assumed by Dr. A. The remarks which follow in his exposition, and which are designed to show that the version for which he thus contends, is susceptible of being justified on other than exegetical grounds, will be noticed hereafter.

And *first*, As to the change of the text. This consideration is placed by Dr. A., in the front of his array of argument, with much skill; for if it be even so that the words of the Holy Spirit must be *changed*, before we can obtain the version of the passage which is commonly given, Dr. A. may well expect to carry with him the piety and intelligence of at least the American public, in favor of the version which he proposes. The idea of rudely changing the sacred text, in order to sustain a theory, or a statement, is not to be tolerated for a moment by the evangelical churches in this land. And it is easy to imagine how the ideas of Unitarian and Rationalistic rashness and hardihood, must rise up and flit before the mental vision of his readers, awakening, too, the corresponding ideas of indignation at the audacity which would venture for any reason whatever to mutilate the inspired record of the Holy Spirit. But should it turn out

¹ It has been said of J. S. Semler that he was not content with knowing what other people knew, but that *he must know it in a different way from what they did*. This might be easily accomplished, if the supposition mentioned above could be realized.

that there now is, and has been for a thousand years past, (founded, too, on the best of reasons), a dispute as to what *the text* really is, (that is, whether it be כְּתָרִי or כְּתָרִי), and that there are strong, if not invincible, reasons for believing that what is now called *the text*, (or *Kethibh*), is really and properly not the text, as originally written; and should it appear, moreover, that in other instances Dr. A. does not at all hesitate to change the *Kethibh* for the *Keri*, (or the textual reading for that which is in the margin), and that he has made such *changes* in other places, without a tithe of the reasons which imperiously demand it here; we may be permitted to indulge our surprise that he should lay such stress upon a matter of so little consequence.

Let us be fairly understood here. We are gratified with the expression of that high regard which Dr. A. undoubtedly feels for the received text. That it ought never to be departed from, unless when the best and most conclusive reasons require and justify such a procedure, is too evident to need illustration; and Lowth and others have done serious injury to the cause of truth and righteousness, by their rash and conjectural emendations. Our objection is not therefore to Dr. Alexander's high regard for the *Kethibh* itself, but to his implied intimation, that there is no sufficient reason here for the substitution of כְּתָרִי for כְּתָרִי, and also to his want of consistency in not allowing this avowed reverence for the *Kethibh* to operate uniformly. For why should he with such apparent zeal require a strict adherence to the text, in an instance where its accuracy is, to say the least, extremely doubtful; and yet in many places where there is comparatively nothing of importance to the Christian church involved in the matter, depart from that very text without even an expression of regret or of doubt as to the correctness of the procedure? And not only so, but he repeatedly avers that the *Kethibh* should be corrected from the *Masora* and ancient versions, and in cases, too, where there appears not to be a tithe of the sufficient reasons for such a procedure, which are found to exist in behalf of the *change* referred to in Ps. 22: 17. See for example, Dr. Alexander's Exposition of Isaiah 9: 2, where, without the least hesitation, he omits the negative particle in his translation of the passage, and in his notes, justifies the omission. He renders the passage, "Thou hast increased its joy," expunging from the *Kethibh* the particle לֹא, and substituting in lieu thereof, כִּי, and then coolly remarking that it is best so "to read it with the *Masora*, several ancient versions, Gesenius, De Wette, and Knobel;" and also that "the same emendation is required by the con-

text in several other places, e. g. ch. 49: 5. 63: 5." See, *in loco*, p. 186. Now, all we ask of Dr. A., or of any other critic, is that these considerations should be permitted to operate also in the case under discussion. The import of Psalm 22: 17, would never thereafter be questioned by them.

We have likewise another instance of the kind in Dr. Alexander's Annotations on Pa. 16: 10, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption." The *Kethibh* here is קִדְּוֹנִי, *holy ones*, and the *Keri*, קִדְּוֹנִי, *holy one*; and yet he hesitates not to reject or "change" the text for the marginal reading,¹ and that, too, against the decision of Rosenmüller, De Wette, Gesenius, Bruns, Stange, Fischer, etc.

Now we again say that these principles of criticism ought not to be objected to; for the *Keri* is in these places doubtless the true reading. But we do object to the refusal of Dr. A. to apply the same principles to the case before us. We do object to his varying his ground as he does in relation to Ps. 22: 17; and so giving the authority of his distinguished and well-earned reputation to justify the cavils of Jews and Rationalists, in a matter of the highest interest to the church. For the distinguishing views of these gentlemen Dr. A. has obviously not much sympathy. But we regret that he should have departed from the principles upon which he expounded Is. 9: 2, just where they applied more strongly than to that passage itself; and just where a question of the utmost importance was in dispute between the church of Christ, and the Jewish and Rationalistic schools.

¹ In relation to this subject, Hengstenberg remarks that "the plural here must have been extremely welcome to the Jews, because it furnished them with the best means of refuting the Messianic interpretation of the Psalm." But Dr. Alexander remarks, that "the essential difference between the two (readings,) is less than it may appear at first sight, since even the singular is collective, and includes the whole class of God's chosen and favored ones, of whom Christ is the head and representative," p. 118. This observation appears to be peculiarly unfortunate; and, if we understand it, contains a concession of more than is just to the Jews and Rationalists. But is it a fact that God does not suffer his "holy ones," (i. e. "his chosen and favored ones,") to see corruption? It is true in no sense of the terms as here employed, and Dr. A. ought not to have conceded that the question as to which reading is here adopted, is therefore a question of less importance than evangelical Christians have supposed. Even Fischer (Proluss. de Vit. lexic. N. T. p. 184, seq.) and Stange, (anticrit. in Psalm. p. 101), who contend for the *Kethibh* here, yet admit that it is a *pluralis intensivus*, or plural of intensity, *having reference ONLY to Jesus Christ*. Could this criticism be established, it would of course lessen the importance of the question referred to; but how different is the ground of such a procedure as here presented from that which is above presented by Dr. Alexander!

To return to the point therefore. What is the amount of this accusation of *changing the text*, which has been put forth with such an air of rebuke and seriousness? If it were an attempt to sustain even an unsupported conjecture, Dr. A.'s unqualified statement could not be stronger than it is. The *change* is not even necessary in order to support the common version of the passage, as we shall see; but even if it were, why hold it up to view as something of sufficient weight and importance to counterbalance all the absurdities involved in the other rendering which has been proposed? That the word has always, until modern times, been read as a verb, we shall prove; and if in order to read it so now it were even necessary to change כָּאֵרִי into כָּאֵרִי where would be the harm of doing it, supported as we should be by the Masora, and all the ancient versions, the Latin and Greek fathers, to say nothing of other authorities which we shall adduce? Has a כ ever been mistaken for a א by the transcribers of the sacred text? Have no errors ever been committed, and do none confessedly now exist therein? The letters referred to are so alike in MSS. that even an attentive and careful reader does not always distinguish between them. As instances in point take Ezra 10: 44, where the text reads כָּאֵרִי while the margin has כָּאֵרִי *which is the true text*. But as in the case before us both readings have been preserved by the Jews, while the anomalous reading is now in the text itself and the true reading placed in the margin. See also Gen. 8: 17, and 14: 2, 8, and Ps. 9: 13. And who can doubt that the original reading in Hos. 13: 14, was not כָּאֵרִי as it is now, but כָּאֵרִי as it was obviously read by the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15: 55? Or that אָרִי in Ezek. 47: 13, has been mistaken for אָרִי, which is supported by the LXX, the Chaldee, 14 Ms. and our English version; or that אָרִי in the text of 1 Sam. 4: 13, should be exchanged for the Keri אָרִי? These things and many others in relation to the Heb. text are known to every one, and why must not their influence be permitted to operate in the instance before us?

The remaining anomalies suggested by Dr. A. as standing in the way of the common interpretation of this passage, relate merely to the question as to the plural termination, the adscititious א in כָּאֵרִי, and the derivation of that word from its proper root; all of which shall be fully considered hereafter.

The attempt of Dr. Alexander to justify his preference for reading כָּאֵרִי as a noun next claims to be noticed. The remark that the very same form in Is. 38: 13 is unquestionably used to mean *like the lion*, and a slight modification of the same in Numb. 24: 9, etc., strikes us,

however, as an instance of something like arbitrary criticism, or of special pleading, aiming as it does to lead the reader to a definite and important conclusion, without making him fully acquainted with the premises. If the most weighty authorities, authorities too which are elsewhere often relied on by Dr. A. himself, are of no importance in settling a question of Scripture criticism, then may the critic thus arbitrarily state his premises, and demand our assent to his conclusion; but if they are of weight and importance in such a matter, on what principle is it that they are thus to be kept back from the view of the reader, even where his assent is asked to a conclusion of so much importance as the one before us? It is true that the same word is used in Is. 38: 13, and that there it unquestionably means *as a lion*. But it is likewise true that the Masora most decidedly declares that in this place it is used in a sense entirely different from that attached to it in Ps. 22: 17; and it is true, moreover, that all ancient and modern versions (with exceptions not worth naming) sustain the declaration of the Masora. Had the reader no right to know these facts in determining a question like the present? The difference between the two words is as great as it would be if the reading in Ps. xxii., was "He that *forbears* to contend is wise;" and that in Is. xxxviii., "*For bears* to contend is agreeable to their nature."

The next consideration by which Dr. A. would justify the reading of the word in question as a noun, is thus presented: "This idea (i. e. *as a lion* my hands and my feet,) would be here the more appropriate because the Psalm abounds in such allusions, and because the lion is expressly mentioned both before and afterwards." This, however, is so far from being certain, that it is impossible to imagine what connection there is between such a conclusion and the premises. How can the mere fact, that the lion is mentioned in other passages which in no way resemble this in their construction, evince that the same idea is more appropriate here? Is not the fair and legitimate inference deducible from the facts, (even as stated by Dr. A. himself,) that the lion is not here referred to, because the comparison of a lion is employed by the sacred writer, just before, and just after, the text? (See v. 14, 22.) And is not the supposition, therefore, that the same comparison is here again instituted, harsh and unwarrantable, and not to be entertained without the strongest reason? The reader will decide which presumption is the more natural. And we may, moreover, safely challenge the advocates of this interpretation, to point out an instance in any classic, where such a comparison is three several times formally instituted and repeated in the course of some eight or ten lines.

Dr. Alexander continues as follows: "The sense would then be: 'they surround my hands and my feet as they would a lion,' or 'as a lion would,' i. e. with the strength and fierceness of a lion. The hands and feet may be mentioned as the parts used in defence and flight." He admits, however, that "the mention of these parts, after all, in connection with the lion, is not altogether natural:" a just and proper admission, as we shall see. But I would here ask, whether the *change* in the text contemplated by this construction, can possibly be regarded by Dr. A., as doing less violence to it, than the substitution of כְּאַרְיֵל for כְּאַרְיֵל , or than the regarding of אֵל as epenthetical, or the plural as terminating in י , or than deriving the meaning of the word from a cognate root? It were idle to say that no change or modification is contemplated in the exposition proposed by Dr. A., for the simple phrase, "as a lion, my hands and my feet," expresses no idea; and before anything more can be got out of the phrase, I apprehend that something more must be supposed to be connected with it. This is practically conceded by Dr. A., and he *supposes* the phrase to be elliptical: "*They surround* my hands and my feet as *they would surround* a lion": or, "as a lion *would*." But for what reason are we to resort to the supposition of an ellipsis? Simply on account of the "accumulation of grammatical and lexicographical anomalies" aforesaid; the force of which reasons, we shall consider presently.

If, then, the phrase under consideration is to be regarded as an ellipsis, (as the construction proposed by Dr. A., takes for granted), how is the ellipsis to be supplied, or filled out? This is a question of some importance, certainly, and we surely have the right to expect a direct and satisfactory answer to it, from those who assume that there is an ellipsis. Two methods have already been proposed by Dr. A., to wit: "*They surround* my hands and my feet as *they would surround* a lion;" and "*they surround* my hands and my feet as a lion *would surround them*." Now there is a prodigious difference between these proposed constructions of the passage, as much as there would be between the surrounding of a lion by men, and the surrounding of a man by a lion. Neither of these, however, seem satisfactory to Dr. A., and therefore near the conclusion of his annotation, he, (after Rabbi Coecus of the Chaldee Paraphrase,) proposes a third, to wit: "Like the lion (they have wounded) my hands and my feet;" and adds, "the point of comparison would then be the infliction of sharp wounds in those parts of the body." Here there are no less than three different methods of supplying this imaginary

ellipsis: and all, of course, taking for granted that the previous word, *הִקְטִינִי*, (*they surround me*), is to be understood in the clause referred to; an idea which conflicts with the fact that the Masorites have placed the *Athnach* under this verb to show that it has no connection with the following words, and is not to be joined to them.

But, let us examine these three methods *seriatim*. We commence with the last. If we mistake not, *הִקְטִינִי* is the preterite in *Hiphil*, from the root *קָטַן*; *Hiphil*, *הִקְטִין*, to go around, to enclose; and it is evident from its parallelism with *סָבְבוּנִי*, in the beginning of the verse, that this verb can only mean, to surround. To get from the term the sense of *piercing*, therefore, it must be derived from *קָטַן* (agreeing in signification with *קָטַן*), which in *Hiph.* would likewise give *הִקְטִין*, and with the affix, *הִקְטִינִי*. If this be so, therefore, it can afford Dr. A. but little assistance to suppose that this verb is to be understood in the phrase referred to. Its import is simply, *they surround me*. And the sense of *perforarunt* cannot be fairly obtained from its proper root, *קָטַן*, but only by a far-fetched J. D. Michaelis-construction from *קָטַן*: a procedure which would be rather remarkable, after the objection against borrowing a meaning from a cognate root as above stated. Another construction of the passage by Dr. A., is, "they surround my hands and my feet as they would a lion:" making *כְּאֵלֶּיּוֹן* the accusative. But a fatal objection to this, (to say nothing of the repetition of the metaphor referred to above), is, that it makes the sufferer, who in v. 7, under a deep sense of misery, compares himself to a *worm*, in the same connection, and under the same sense of misery, compare himself to a lion: an incongruity not to be supposed on any account. But, distinct from this consideration, what can be pleaded in favor of the foregoing construction? It is doubtful whether a parallel to such an expression, employed under such or similar circumstances by a sufferer, is to be found in the whole compass of human language. That a sufferer should say, "they surround *me* as they do a lion," may be perfectly natural; but that he should specify his *hands* and *feet* as being *surrounded* by his persecutors, is as incredible as it is impossible that his hands and feet (while forming a part of his body) could be surrounded, without himself having been surrounded at the same time.

Dr. Alexander evidently felt the force of these and other considerations which might be mentioned, and has therefore given to the reader his choice between this exposition, and the following: "they surround my hands and my feet as a lion would surround them." This alternative of ellipsis reminds us very forcibly of the eels men-

tioned by *Æsop*, who, finding themselves rather uncomfortable in a certain cooking utensil, concluded to crawl out of it, but in doing so, made their débüt upon a bed of burning coals,—for, how a *lion* could *surround* one's hands and feet, is certainly a mystery. Can Dr. A. seriously intend to propound this solution with (to say the very least) the incongruities and impossibilities with which it is clogged, as preferable to the common one? A *lion surround* a man's hands and feet! Can the imagination conceive such an idea? Can it be represented in painting? Can it be realized in any way whatever? If not, can it be proper to assert such a thing as a fact, in an exposition of the word of God? Nothing could be more ludicrous than to attempt in any way the development of such an idea. The nearest approach to its realization, with which we are acquainted, is contained in the following statement, which we remember having often heard in childhood, and which we hope may without offence, be introduced in this connection. When General Washington was encamped at White Marsh, above the city of Philadelphia, he was informed on a certain occasion that a soldier of his army had, single-handed, captured three of the enemy. The General being delighted with such an exhibition of courage, immediately sent for the soldier, (a gallant son of Erin), intending, for the encouragement of enterprise in the army, to reward him in some signal manner. Pat immediately appeared in the presence of the General, who addressed him as follows: "You have, sir, succeeded in capturing three of the enemy, as I am informed; and I should be pleased to hear how you effected it. That a man should capture one, or even two, is not so remarkable; but that one man should make three armed men his prisoners, depriving them of their arms, and marching them safely into camp, is somewhat surprising. Tell me, therefore, the particulars of the adventure." Pat hereupon bowed very politely, and then said, "Indeed and I had no difficulty in the matter at all, sir; for, may it please your honor, *I surrounded them.*" Now, could we only learn how he surrounded them, we should perhaps be able to form some idea of how a lion could surround a man's hands and feet. We have never learned that any artist has made Pat's adventure the subject of a painting; but one thing is certain, that if Pat could surround three men, a lion assuredly could surround one. But surely it is unnecessary to dwell upon this subject.

The phrase, therefore, as it stands, taking *כָּסָרְךָ* as a noun, is confessedly destitute of meaning; for what does it signify to say, "as a lion my hands and my feet?" And a sense must consequently be

obtained by supplying something. We have seen how Dr. Alexander has succeeded in the effort; and as the Jews likewise contend that the word is a noun, it may be proper before we pass on, to notice briefly how they have succeeded herein. They admit that the phrase as it stands does not make complete sense; though they have not yet agreed on the question as to what ought to be supplied, or how the phrase should be explained. Rabbi Joseph Coccus (as he is called,) author of the Chaldee Paraphrase of the Psalms supplies the word כְּבִיתִין *biting*, and connects the phrase with the preceding thus: "The congregation of the malignant surround me; biting my hands and feet as lions." Rabbi Solomon Jarchi thus explains it: "As a lion the hands of me and the feet of me, that is, as if they were broken by the mouth of a lion;" the sheer absurdity of which need not be here dwelt upon. Kimchi, and Aben Ezra, that they may avoid these incongruities, *formally* supply nothing, but merely connect the phrase with the preceding: "the congregation of the malignant surround for me, as a lion my hands and my feet;" an interpretation which does violence to the text; for David does not say הִקִּיפוּ לִי *they surround for me*, but הִקִּיפוּנִי *they surround me*; and it is certainly absurd to say "they surround *for me* my hands and my feet." And this exposition moreover as above remarked, is at war with the fact, that the Athnach, which is under the verb, makes a pause, and announces that the verb itself is not to be connected with what follows. It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the preposterous fable of Kimchi, who to render his exposition probable, says that a lion describes a circle with his tail around his prey before he devours it; a *fact* for the existence of which he drew upon his most fertile imagination. It may be found in the margin.¹ Such then are the efforts of our Jewish brethren in this same department; and certainly Dr. Alexander has made no improvement upon their labors.

Having thus therefore, as we conceive, evinced the inconclusiveness of the reasons urged by Dr. Alexander in justification of his departure from the ordinary interpretation of this passage, we shall next proceed to consider the grounds on which this interpretation may be justified.

¹ Whether this famous Rabbi ever wrote a *natural history* we do not know; but the following is his account of the lion; "Leo in sylvā cauda sua circulum describit, quem ferae cum vident, ex eo non audent excedere prae leonis timore et metu, et manus, et pedes colligunt, (that is, the fore feet and hind feet remain fixed to the spot,) et in medio circuli praedam suam invenit leo." This, we presume may be called an *ex post facto* history, designed for the benefit of Ps. 22: 17.

The simple point of inquiry is, whether the word in question is here to be regarded as a verb or a noun? That it is *not* a noun, may be fairly concluded, from the abortive attempts which have been made to construe it as such: for no ingenuity has ever succeeded on this supposition to make any tolerable sense of the passage.

Several methods of determining the question, have been proposed, either of which may be maintained without a resort to anything like the extremities of solution which are demanded by the presumption that the word is a noun. We shall briefly glance at them; but let not the idea embarrass the reader's mind, that we are compelled to settle the claims of either of these proposed methods, before we can avail ourselves of the legitimate inference which they all unite to sustain; for we are not required to do so by any principle of fair reasoning; and before our opponents demand it of us, let them first settle the question in respect to the filling out of the ellipsis aforesaid. We repeat it, therefore, that the simple question in dispute is, whether the word be a verb or a noun.

The idea of Gesner and others, that the word ought to be pointed, קָטַרְי, is not sustained by any very great authority, and seems at variance with the rules of punctuation. It need not therefore be here examined. The supposition also that קָטַרְי is a compound word from קָטַר and אִרְי, (which would connect the two significations, "*as a lion they pierced,*") is a mere unsupported conjecture. There are composite forms in the Hebrew, though seldom occurring; but this proposed compounding of the two words would make י both a servile and a radical, at one and the same time: a procedure which would certainly be at war with precedent.

There are, however, weighty reasons for concluding that קָטַרְי was the original reading of the text; and the ease with which a י may be mistaken for a ר, and the fact that in transcribing the Scriptures, they have frequently been mistaken one for the other, (as above illustrated), favors the argument. This word is simply the *scriptio plena* of the verb קָטַר, and the objection of Dr. Alexander to what he pronounces the anomalous א, is scarcely worth dwelling upon; that letter being epenthetical, (as is asserted by Rabbies Jacob ben Chaim, and Moses Haddarsan), as when it is added after the Qamets, for protracting the sound of a long vowel. See instances of such epenthesis, in Hosea 10: 14, וְקָטַם, and in Zech. 14: 10, וְרָאֵמָה, and in Prov. 24: 7, רָאֵמוֹה, and also in Is. 10: 13, Ezek. 9: 8, Joel 2: 6, 2 Sam. 19: 4, etc., and thus we have צוּרָר for צוּר, and מְלָאכִים for

מלכין, etc. There can be no solid objection, therefore, against this reading, on such ground.¹

Then, further: In the Masora textual in Numb. 24: 9, we have the following most decided testimony, to wit: כֹּאֲרִי יָדַי וְרַגְלֵי כֹאֲרִי, that is, "*As a lion my hands and my feet*"; for '*as a lion*,' which is the reading of the margin, the text has it, '*they pierced*.'" Hence, when the Masora was written, some ten or twelve centuries ago, the word in the text was כֹּאֲרִי, and כָּאֲרִי was only in the margin. So, too, Rabbi Jacob ben Chatim, in his Masora Magna says: "In many copies of the Scriptures, written with the most scrupulous care, I have found כֹּאֲרִי in the text, and כָּאֲרִי only in the margin, — when, according to the tradition of our Rabbies, the reverse ought to have been the fact." Many other eminent men, as we shall have occasion to note presently, testify to the same thing in substance.

Further: כָּאֲרִי may be the original reading, as many of the ablest grammarians think, who notwithstanding regard it not as a noun but verb. The Masora parva gives countenance to the supposition, when it states on Numb. 24: 9, that "כָּאֲרִי occurs four times; twice with Qamets on the first syllable, (Ps. 22: 17. Is. 88: 18,) and twice with Patah," (Numb. 23: 24, and 24: 9); which statement taken in connection with that of the textual Masora above cited, evinces that both the readings existed when the Masoras were written. The reader will indulge us with a single remark here, before we pass on. We ask, therefore, what is the fair inference from the fact that the readings כָּאֲרִי (כָּרִי) and כֹּאֲרִי are found still in MSS. and editions of the Heb. text, and confessedly existed in the codices many centuries ago? Let it be granted that כֹּאֲרִי is the true reading, and how, we ask, shall we ever explain the fact of these diverse readings if that word is to be construed as a noun? Does not the fact that they exist evince that the word in that connection was always regarded as a verb? It seems utterly inconceivable how these readings could have originated on any other supposition. This is a point, however,

¹ It is not improbable that the reading כָּאֲרִי, may have originated from this adscititious א. Some incompetent scribe, regarding the letter as a radical, and consequently not knowing what to make of the word thus spelled, might have (in order to make some sense of the clause in his view) spelled it with a י instead of a ר; or, as above-remarked, the י may have been mistaken for a א. At all events, the two readings early existed in the MSS.; and, considering the hostility of the Jews to the Gospel, it is not to be wondered that in later times they should have given the preference to that which might most easily neutralize the argument for Christ's Messiahship, which is founded upon this passage.

upon which (unless we err) Paulus and Ewald and their followers have not thought proper as yet to display their ingenuity; and we doubt whether Dr. Alexander has given to it the consideration which it deserves. But to return.

Pococke, Gesenius, De Wette, Winer, Hengstenberg in the *Christology*, and most of the earlier critics do not hesitate to adopt כָּאֲרִי as the true reading; regarding it as the irregular plural for כָּאֲרִים, the participle of כָּרַר (which is synonymous with כָּרַד) a word which, though it does not again occur in Hebrew, is clearly ascertained by a reference to the cognate dialects to mean *to bore through, to pierce*. The א is inserted by epenthesis as above remarked. Professor Ewald, (whose representations have obviously considerable influence on the mind of Dr. Alexander,) has objected that this irregular plural form is only an arbitrary supposition; to which Gesenius well replies that the single example of כָּרַר in Ps. 45: 9 is sufficient to justify the assumption of this form. With all deference to Verbrügge and Ewald, however, it is sheer folly to deny that the Hebrew language admits of the plural form ending in י, (the final ם being cut off by apocope,) or that such forms occur not unfrequently in the Old Testament. The celebrated Rabbi, David Kimchi (who flourished about A. D. 1190, and whose grammar of the Hebrew language Gesenius pronounces to be classical,) speaking of the plural masculine in י, declares that "there are plurals which are used with *Haireq* alone, as there are also, with ם superadded;" of which instances in the following verses are given as examples: 2 Sam. 23: 8. Ezek. 32: 30. Gen. 14: 16. Pococke also cites Gen. 40: 16. 2 Kings, 11: 4. Lam. 3: 14. See also 1 Sam. 20: 38, and 24: 14. Is. 38: 12, and Cant. 8: 2. These instances and others that could be named are more than sufficient to justify the reception of כָּאֲרִי as a noun.

It is not, however, we again remark, of much importance which of these readings is regarded as the true one; nor is it at all necessary that this question should be determined by those who reject the view presented by Dr. Alexander. The great and sole point in dispute is, whether the word referred to be a verb or a noun. That it may properly be regarded as a verb, is, we think, fully apparent from the foregoing remarks. Let us then proceed to the further consideration of the evidence which bears upon the question.

Gesenius candidly observes that "all the ancient interpreters have taken כָּאֲרִי as a verb; and this is certainly possible if we regard כָּאֲרִי as the participle in Kal formed in the Chaldee manner, and in the plural number for כָּאֲרִים." And he refers to two MSS. to prove

that "*it was commonly held to be a verb.*" And in confirmation of this Vatablus declares that the ancient reading was twofold פָּרְצָה and פָּרַח ; while according to the testimony of Gesebriard, the Jews continued to write פָּרְצָה in the margin and פָּרַח in the text until the six hundredth year of the Christian era, and then began to insert the marginal reading into the text itself; and finally to omit פָּרַח altogether.

It is scarcely possible to overestimate the weight and importance of the evidence furnished by the versions in favor of our position that the word in question is a verb. The limits allotted to this review are not sufficient to permit us to go thoroughly into this branch of the argument; and we can therefore do but little more than glance at it. We begin with the Septuagint, the most ancient of all versions, it having been made probably in the third century before the Christian era, and by Jews who unquestionably understood their own language. Now these interpreters rendered the clause in question by $\alphaἰσῶναι \chiεῖρας \muου \kappaαὶ \piόδας$, *they pierced my hands and feet*. If therefore the word in dispute was then regarded as a noun, how is this rendering to be accounted for? Can any one suppose that such a rendering would have been given in defiance of MSS., common sense, common honesty, and directly in the face of the knowledge of every one who could read Hebrew? and also without any assignable inducement whatever? If it was not done in defiance of these things, we apprehend that there is but one other alternative — *it was done in accordance with the MSS., common sense and honesty*. Add to this the fact that the Greek fathers all translate the word in a similar manner. Justin, in his dialogue with the shrewd and learned Jew Trypho, so translates it; so does the author of the Questions to Antiochus, Quest. 186, and Athanasius in his Dialogue on the Trinity and in his work on the Incarnation. Apollinaria, in his Paraphrase, thus renders it:

Ἐπείρουν αἰσῶν ὁμοῦ χεῖρας τε, πόδας τε.

The Latin interpreters, likewise, uniformly render it as a verb. So Tertullian, in innumerable places. Cyprian, also, in his second book of Testimonies *against the Jews*, renders it by *effoderunt*. In the old Latin version of the Psalms made by Jerome from the Hebrew with the utmost care, the word is translated also as a verb: "*Fixerunt manus meas, et pedes meas.*" Now to this version there is a preface addressed to Sophronius by Jerome in which he most confidently declares that he has not departed from the strict sense of the Hebrew in a single word; and he calls upon the Jews to show,

if they were able, one instance of such departure.¹ Now let the reader ask himself whether Jerome (or any other man of sense or integrity) could have thus challenged such a scrutiny, and in a case where so glaring an error would, to his shame and mortification, have been at once detected by his bitter opposers, the Jews, if in such a well-known instance as the one before us he had been conscious of having corrupted the text? The supposition is out of all question. Jerome knew that the Jews had *fastened* Jesus to the cross, and the Jews knew also that they had thus fastened him by piercing his hands and feet; and they likewise knew that all Christians applied this passage to that transaction. And yet under such circumstances Jerome thus challenges their scrutiny, and defies them to come forward and show that he had mistranslated a single word! The conclusion seems irresistible, that רָאָה was either the reading of the then approved text, or רָאָה in Ps. xxii. was universally regarded as a verb.

To all this may be added the strong fact that Aquila the Jew (a man of great industry and thoroughly acquainted with Hebrew) who in the second century of the Christian era translated the Old Testament into Greek, renders the word not as a noun but verb; not indeed by $\alpha\upsilon\sigma\tau\eta\varsigma$, but by $\xi\sigma\chi\upsilon\omega\varsigma$, a word whose import in this connection (though Hengstenberg has strangely questioned it) involves the signification of *pierced*. At all events he translates it as a verb, for this is the point before us. Here, then, was a most learned and eminent Jew thus translating from the approved text, or Kethibh of the Jews. What, then, must the reading of the Kethibh have been? Will any one say that it was רָאָה , and that this word is a noun?

Further: The old Syriac version, which every intelligent man admits was made directly from the Hebrew text, translates the word in question by one whose signification is *perforarunt* or *transfixerunt*. Now this version was probably made during the latter part of the first century; and of course its authors either found רָאָה in the text, or regarded רָאָה as a verb.

The old Arabic version, likewise, renders it by *perforarunt*; and the Aethiopic by *perforarunt miki pedes*, etc. The Latin Vulgate by *foderunt*; and if we come down to the later versions we find them equally harmonious here; Junius and Tremellius render the word *foderunt*; Castalio, *perfoderunt*; Luther by *durchgraben*; the Belgic

¹ His words are "Certè confidenter dicam, et multos hujus operis testes citabo, me nihil duntaxat sententiae Hebraica veritate mutasse;" and, a little further on, he adds "Interroga quemlibet Hebraeorum."

by *doorgraven*. So also Munster, Pagnini, Piscator, Genebrard, Muia, etc.

It may be added, also, that קָטַר is the reading of the Kethibh of the Complutensian Bible, published in 1520 by the patronage of Ximenes and with the privilege of Leo X. Genebrard, also, as above remarked, has proved by the testimony of the most learned Jews that this was the reading of the best and most ancient copies of the Hebrew text. Capito (Inst. Heb. lib. I. cap. 13) testifies that in a very ancient copy of the Hebrew Scriptures he found this reading in the Keri. Others equally eminent, sustain the statement of Genebrard; as, for example, Pagninus, Vatablus, and Müller *in loco*. Galatinus, also, (De Arcanis Catholice Veritatis, lib. 8, c. 17,) and John Isaac (lib. 2, cont. Lindanum), together with Andradius (Defens. Conc. Trident. lib. 4). These all aver that they had seen copies of the Hebrew Scriptures of the same character with the above. These copies have not come down to us, but no one will question that they once existed. And what is the only correct and legitimate inference from these facts, added to the consideration that all the versions, as above shown, translate the word referred to as a verb?

Not less conclusive is the Jewish testimony, of which a part has already been cited. The *Masora perva* at this place observes that "קָטַר occurs twice with Qamets, although the words themselves differ in their signification." Now the only other place in which it so occurs is Is. 38: 13, where it indisputably means "as a lion;" of course, therefore, such cannot be its meaning here according to this authority. So, too, in the *Masora Magna*. The last chapter of this work treats of words that are but twice employed in the Bible, though with different significations. The catalogue of these numbers 98. For example, קָטַר, occurs in Is. 17: 6, where it signifies *a high branch* of a tree; and also in Hos. 4: 7, where it is *a verb*, and signifies, *I will change* — (an instance of usage strikingly analogous to that of the word כָּאֵר). So, too, אֶבְרִית occurs in Exod. 1: 15, and Jer. 18: 4, with different significations. קָטַר also occurs in Gen. 26: 21, and Ezra 4: 6, in the same manner. Now, amongst the words thus enumerated, is קָטַר; which in page 2, column 2, the authors of this work mention as occurring in Ps. 22: 17, and Is. 38: 13; and as no one will question that in the last of these places, it means *as a lion*, and as the Jews uniformly thus explain it, the conclusion is irresistible that the Masorites did not attach to it this signification in Ps. 22: 17. The argument could still be strengthened by other testimony

of the same kind, but it is needless, and we must hasten to draw these remarks to a close.

There is one more consideration which certainly is of weight, and ought not to be overlooked in this connection. We refer to the following: In this same Psalm, everything else which our adorable Redeemer suffered while enduring the death of the cross, is mentioned, and why then should not the piercing of his hands and feet be referred to? When in the deepest agony on the cross, he repeated at least the first verse of the Psalm.¹ In vs. 8 and 9, he is represented as saying, "All who see me, laugh me to scorn; they shoot out the lip, they shake the head, saying, He trusted in the Lord that he would deliver him," etc. In v. 14, "They gaped upon me with their mouths as a raging lion." In v. 16, he complains of thirst, and in v. 19, says, "They part my garments among them, and cast lots for my vesture." Is it credible, then, that no reference should have been made to the excruciating agony which he endured from the piercing of his hands and feet? If Dr. Alexander's exposition of the word in question be the true one, *then there is no direct reference to this matter in the whole Psalm.* Can this be believed?

Not less forcible than touchingly beautiful, are the following words of Luther: "To us who believe in Christ, and who hold by the authority of the Gospel, that this whole Psalm was spoken concerning him, it is easy to perceive that the proper reading of the passage is, '*they have pierced my hands and my feet,*' instead of '*as a lion my hands and my feet.*' For we would not endeavor by means of the mysteries of the Scriptures, to explain the things which are known to have occurred; but on the contrary would clear up the mystery, by a reference to such things; that is, we would illustrate the Old Testament by the New, (and not the New by the Old,) and would determine what is the sense of the former, by the obvious import of the latter: thus making them both to look towards Christ, as the two cherubim looked towards the mercy-seat. For God said by the prophet, (Jer. 23: 30,) '*In the last days, ye shall understand my counsel;*' but to Moses he said, '*Ye shall discern only my hinder parts.*' Since, therefore, we are assured that Christ's hands and feet were pierced, and are equally certain also, that this whole Psalm ap-

¹ Osiander (Dr. Lucas) and others of ancient times, believed that Christ repeated the whole psalm while hanging on the cross; "*creditor Christus hunc Psalmum totum in cruce recitasse,*" says he,—an idea which Coleridge and others in modern times have adopted.

plies to him; and since the sense of the passage not only strikingly accords herewith, but absolutely demands that the word be read, '*they pierced*,' (especially since no rule of grammar forbids it); we may, without violence, and with perfect propriety, adopt this as its proper signification." *Comment. in Ps. xxii.*

ARTICLE VIII.

NEANDER'S SERVICES AS A CHURCH HISTORIAN.¹

Translated by Prof. H. B. Smith.

[THE following Article was originally delivered by Dr. Hagenbach as an Academical Address before the University of Basle, apparently at the opening of his course of lectures, Nov. 4, 1850. It speaks of Neander exclusively as a Church Historian. The author is amply qualified to do this by his own proficiency in the department, as shown in his lectures on the Reformation, and on the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. His name was also prominent as a successor to the chair of Neander. In the translation the introductory paragraph was omitted. He then states that in order to get a clear view of Neander's services it is necessary to give a somewhat long sketch of what his predecessors, especially the German church historians, had accomplished. Long as this sketch is, comprising rather more than half of the Article, it is written with so much animation that it can hardly fail to be of interest to any who take an interest in Church History, or in Neander as a Church Historian.]

CHURCH HISTORY, like all history, has come to be a science only by a gradual growth. The collection of the materials preceded the sifting of them; and this sifting again in all its separate parts went before the organic combination into a whole, and the spiritual mastery and artistic shaping of the masses of materials. Three centuries of the Christian era had already run their course when Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, was called to write the first Christian Church History, not only by his external position at the court of Constantine the Great,

¹ By K. B. Hagenbach, Professor in Basle. Translated from the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1851 drittes Heft, by Henry B. Smith, Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary of New York.

but also, with all his failings, by an inward fitness for the work. He made use of Flavius Josephus, for he took a large part of the Jewish history into his plan; he also used the History of Hegesippus, a Jewish Christian, which is now lost. The other Greek historians, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, Philostorgius the Arian, together with Theodorus and Evagrius wrote continuations of the work of Eusebius. This whole Hellenistic group of church historians gives us, from the nature of the case, an insight into the still continuing struggle of Christianity with Judaism and Heathenism. As the whole theology of the first centuries was of a preponderating apologetical character, so was it with their ecclesiastical histories. We may call them partizan — they must be so. It was necessary to bring into full consciousness the antagonism between the old and the new order of things, between what the world had till then considered sacred and what was now to be received as the salvation of the world. What wonder, then, that the glow of the persecutions just undergone casts its reflection upon the historical narration, and that this bears upon itself the very moles of that “great revolution of time,” as the warrior bears the scars of the wounds with which he was smitten in battle; what wonder, yet again, that in the consciousness of a hard-bought victory the admiration of the conquerors now and then breaks forth into high-wrought panegyric!

In comparison with the Greeks, the occidental historians of the first centuries take a subordinate place. Eusebius was with them too the chief source, made accessible to the West by the Latin translation of Rufinus. Orosius, Sulpicius Severus and Cassiodorus stand here alone still on the basis of the old times. It was only later, when in consequence of the migration of the nations the German church began to influence the popular life, that there grew up that mode of writing history peculiar to the chroniclers, which brings together the affairs of both State and church in their concrete unity, and which laid the basis for the history of the general culture of the German national races. In this style Jornandes (550), Gregory of Tours (†595), Venerable Bede (†735), Paul Warnefried (†799), Einhard, Haymo of Halberstadt (†853) and others, wrote the history of the church and extolled the exploits of kings, and later writers described the lives of popes and saints with enthusiastic love. Chronicles and legends are the forms in which the mediæval church history was first of all composed, and for the most part it is monks that use the pencil. Thanks, however, to the assiduity of these monks! They have brought massive building-stones to the edifice. The cloisters of Ful-

da, Hirschau, Lorch, Reichenau, St. Gall, of Old and New Corvey, Hirschfeld, Heisterbach, Göttingen and others yet, will be ever named as the fostering-places of science, especially of history. In the deeper mediæval period, historical investigations were in the background in comparison with philosophical and theological speculation, but yet individual authors produced special works upon their own times and people.¹

The time for a scientific exhibition of history had, in truth, not yet arrived. The triumphing church of the hierarchy, lived too much in the enjoyment of the present, to have the question, *how* and by *what means* it had become what it was, a matter of immediate interest. What we call "historical development," was strange to a time which, with fantastic youthfulness, wove together old and new, far and near, fable and fact, in one great invention, in which it rejoiced and was strong, without being disturbed by criticism. Where investigations were prosecuted, it could only be timidly and with great discretion, over against a priestly power which stayed itself upon its historical rights. How long it was before the deception of the donation of Constantine, and of the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals was brought to light! Such inceptive critical assaults as those of Laurentius Valla, of Erasmus, and others, were preliminary messengers of the Reformation.

But even the Reformation of the sixteenth century had at first another office than that of constructing a history of the church. The sifting of the ecclesiastical tradition, was not its chief aim. It dug deeper, to the roots. It did not so much inquire, how the church *became* what it is in the course of time; as, how has it *been* from the beginning, and how *ought* it to be, according to the revelation given once for all. The written word of the Scripture was exhibited in the boldest opposition to the depravities which man had introduced into the church, as the only norm by which all that had grown up in the course of the centuries, was to be measured and judged. This theological investigation was turned to the study of the Scriptures, before everything else, in order thence to begin the reconstruction of the church. The thirsting souls streamed to the newly opened wells of salvation, and less heed was given to the course of the stream which flowed from these sources, at first more clear, then more and more turbid, till it disembogued in the slough, from which it was their first duty to rescue Christianity. Luther did indeed cast some

¹ Among the Byzantines, Nicephorus Callisti in the fourteenth century, whose work comprises the whole of ancient church history to A. D. 610.

sagacious and thoughtful glances into the history of the church, for it never was his will to break away wholly from tradition, (and here perhaps the Swiss Reform went before him); but to construct the history of the church in the light of the newly won principles, was not vouchsafed to him, whose life and strife were in the very thick of reform, nor yet to his coadjutors and fellow combatants in Germany and Switzerland.¹

Historical studies can be entered upon anew, with profit, only when the storm of strife is in some measure laid, when the fermenting elements have formed a deposit, and new strata begin to be made, which are, as it were, the banks from which a look may be cast back upon the raging sea and its breaking waves. Thus it was in the sixteenth century. It was only after the peace of Augsburg, which concludes the history of the German Reformation, that we see men who belong to the second generation of the Protestants, disciples of the reformers of Wittenberg, unite in undertaking a grand historical work. Matthias Flacius Illyricus, whom many know only on the side of his immense theological zeal, and but few on his better side,² was the founder of the Protestant, and more especially of the Lutheran Church History. In the old city of Magdeburg, that fortress of pure Lutheranism, which had to suffer so much for the sake of its faith, this man, most zealous for the honor of Luther, united at first with his two companions, the Magdeburg preachers, Wigand and Judex, to whom others were afterwards added, in the publication of a Church History in the order of centuries, from the Protestant point of view. He was impelled to this, chiefly by the assumption which his opponents made of the uninterrupted purity of the Catholic tradition.³ He wished to conduct the proof of the opposite position. He wished to show that the evangelical doctrine was the old traditional doctrine of the Catholic church, and that error and corruption had only entered into this church by degrees, and that in opposition to this corruption, warning voices had always been heard from the mouths of the witnesses to the truth. He had already composed a

¹ One immediate fruit of the conflict of the Reformation, was the account of the struggle itself, in the Histories of the Reformation by Spalatin, Sleidan, Scultetus, Bullinger.

² Twisten, Matthias Flacius Illyricus, 1844.

³ It belonged to Protestant tendencies that special attention was given to the tradition respecting doctrine; cf. the Preface. Among other things, it is here said: *Est igitur admodum dulce pio pectori in tali historia cognoscere, quod haec ipsa doctrinae forma, quam nunc in ecclesiis nostris ex ingenti Dei beneficio habemus, sit illa ipsa vetus, non nova, germana, non adulterina, non commenticia.*

preliminary work in his "*Catalogus Testium Veritatis*," which he had collected from libraries in various countries, and from remote corners of cloisters, with a singular expenditure of pains and cost, and indeed not without craft and danger!¹ Evangelical princes,² and rich people in private life, were called upon to contribute to the greater work which he had now in hand. It was printed in Basle. From 1559 to 1574, there appeared thirteen folios, each comprising a century. With the thirteenth volume, the undertaking came unhappily to a stop.³ This work of the Magdeburg Centuriators called forth, however, a similar work in the Catholic church. Thirty years after its issue, Caesar Baronius, subsequently cardinal, put over against it his "*Annales*" from the archives of the Vatican, written from the point of view of the Roman Church.⁴ Like two hostile encampments, Protestant Church History and Catholic Church History, from this time forth stood out in opposition to each other; the bulwark of the one was the Magdeburg Centuries, that of the other, the Annals of Baronius. Polemical objects controlled on both sides, the investigations and the narration of the results. The whole history of the church was looked at, to see whether it spoke in favor of, or against, the one or the other confession. Each in the interest of his party, made it the armory from which to get weapons for fighting his opponent. This was the course of things through the sixteenth and through the seventeenth century. Where history did not directly subserve polemical ends, it either degenerated into a mere matter of curiosity, and gave employment to archaeological amateurs, or it was restricted to investigations and emendations upon detached topics. This was in part the case in the Reformed (Calvinistic) Church, where learned Frenchmen, Dutchmen, and Englishmen,⁵ busied themselves with collecting, publishing, commenting upon, and illustrating the fathers of the church, the councils, etc., emulating the

¹ *Cultellus Flaccianus*.

² In his preface, he complains bitterly that many great lords would rather spend their gold on dogs, the chase, festivities, and games of chance, than help out the church of Christ, by contributing to such a work.

³ A continuation appeared in the epitome of the work by Lukas Osiander, 1607.

⁴ *Ad horum conatus infringendos, commenta detegenda, imposturas aperientas.*

⁵ Blondel, Saumaise, Clericus, Ussher, Cave, Dodwell, Grabe, Lardner, and others. Comprehensive works upon the whole history of the church, by Hottinger, Spanheim, James and Samuel Basnage, Venema, etc.

Benedictines of the Catholic Church.¹ This toil of theirs is worthy of all thanks, though it is only a preparatory work, and not the science itself. To the Jansenists in the Catholic Church, and to the defenders of the Gallican Liberties, we are also indebted for several praiseworthy contributions to the same object.² Everything, however, still went on within the limitation of the different confessions, and with greater or less pretension to ecclesiastical orthodoxy. For even when Protestants and Catholics were fighting against each other with historical weapons, they both aimed equally to show that they were orthodox, either as the heirs or as the restorers of the pure church doctrine; and when they mutually accused each other of heresy, it was done, well aware that the charge of heresy was the gravest reproach which could be made against a church. Both parties held in equal abomination the names of Arian, Nestorian, Pelagian, and whatever else they are called, and ever since the zealous Epiphanius, in his work against the heretics, had classed the different generations of them with just so many kinds of snakes and adders,³ no one has dared to put himself forward as their advocate. Thus the decided hatred of heretics had as free vent in the historical works of the Protestants, as in those of the Catholics; and the Protestants even felt obliged in this matter to be still more zealous in order to ward off all suspicion of any connection with these enemies of the church.

But there came at length, at the end of the seventeenth century, an advocate of the heretics, and not, as might be imagined, one of those free-thinking geniuses who, in anticipation of the coming of a century of philosophers, declared war against all that is positive, and saw in the so-called heretics the true heroes who fought beforehand for the dawning illumination. No; it was Gottfried Arnold, a deeply pious, Christian, believing man, who, it was thought, could only be reckoned among the pietists and mystics. He, filled like many others with sadness by the dead orthodoxy of his times, thought that he had made the discovery that there were very many profound minds, men who had sought for an original and peculiar way of exhibiting Christian truth, who had at all times been misunderstood by the proud and "godless clergy," and put upon their list of heretics, and that such

¹ Montfaucon, Mabillon, Ruinart, D'Achery. Besides the Benedictines, Rucellus, Baluze, and others.

² Natalis Alexander, Tillemont, Bossuet, Ellies du Pin, and others.

³ Adv. hæc. in proximo: *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁδοδηγοῦντος, αὐτοὶς εἰς ὁδοὺς αἱ οὐκ ἐκπεπαισμένοι.*

pure gold might still be found in what the officials of the church treated only as rubbish. He therefore wrote his "Impartial" of Church and Heretics,"¹ with the good intention of helping rights that party which had heretofore been all along put from which, to speak with Tertullian, even the right of been cut off.² And who will blame him harshly that partiality he became a very partizan, and that he now upon some unfortunate enthusiast as a prophet? has the orthodox church undeservedly broken its justice on the one side cannot be made good by injury. The work of Arnold could only form a transition narration of history, which should make itself unbiassed and thorough exploration of the facts, the real contents of the history in a dispassionate the quiet hearing of the witnesses. Wise as thus, Buddens and Weissmann, pointed out ment of history; but it was reserved for Helmstädt, afterward Chancellor of the John Lawrence Von Mosheim, to elevate of a science, by releasing it from all or interests, and putting it erect upon colorless impartiality, diluted to indifference for the triumphs of history. Nor aggregation of erudite materials. acumen and taste, of religious exactness, precision and fluency of style, has Father of the later Church History. His orthodoxy did not make him unacquainted with historical understanding of the facts for the different formations of the church. His interest in heresies was either by polemical or apologetic. His materials, and presiding sometimes led him too far into an organic whole, into a form of isolated observation, the science of church history. Mosheim lived from

¹ 1699, and in many

² Cf. Lücke, Narr.



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of the times, all of these being points which the earlier historical narrations, prejudiced for their own party, had too little regarded, and which unquestionably form one element, along with others, in the development of human affairs.

As long now as this pragmatic method was employed in the service of a truth-loving, sagacious, and well-meaning mind, and as long as it was also built up on thorough knowledge, acquired by conscientious and personal research, as was in both respects in a high degree the case with the excellent Planck, so long it was favorable to a healthful excitement of men's minds. And it is certain that we are indebted to this mode of treating history, for a multitude of new points of view, previously unnoticed; we owe to it a more free and broad vision over the sphere of history; and very much which is now taken for granted as a matter of course, was then greeted as the direct result of such a philosophy of history. At the same time, with all our respect for the great merits of Planck, it is not to be denied that the method which he pursued, might lead to great deviations from the right path; the temptation to explain everything, and especially to interpret the greatest events by means of the concurrence of insignificant circumstances, might be indulged in, so far as to lead to that atomistic view of history which carries the "*nil admirari*" to an extreme, and robs history of its mysterious enchantments, and empties it of its genial and its ideal elements, and leaves us at last only a machine with innumerable little wheels and minute threads, which are put in motion sometimes by accident, and sometimes by the passions of men. Planck himself was often led too far by his fondness for pragmatism, and later science has learned to look at many things with other eyes than those with which he viewed them in his deservedly esteemed works.¹ But others went further than he. In Planck's soul there still lived a high veneration for Christianity, inherited from the fathers. He belonged to those theologians, firm believers in a revelation, who, with all the influence which they allowed the ideas of the times to have over their system, still held fast to the substantial scriptural doctrine respecting the historical foundations of Christianity with devout truthfulness of soul. But the state of the case must be altered when the spirit of the world got possession of this pragmatic method, when the subjectivity of the so-called sound common sense was elevated into

¹ Compare, for example, the works of Rothe, Ritschl, and others, upon the formation of the Catholic Church; of Baur, Dörner, Schneckenburger, and Schenkel, upon the doctrinal systems of the Protestants.

the highest authority, and history was judged of from this judgment seat. Then it became wholly dependent upon the spirits of the century; and, in accordance with the genius of the authors, it was sometimes made the basis for witty and ingenious ratiocination, and this was its best estate, and sometimes of insipid and superficial reasonings, which was most commonly the case.

With Planck, we mentioned the name of Spittler, a great name in his times! Louis Timothy Spittler was not a theologian; he was a statesman, a publicist, a man versed in public affairs. His investigations in the canon law led him into the sphere of general church history, which he then labored upon from worldly and political points of view, and also from an interest in the history of learning. He it was who delivered Church History from its theological exclusiveness, and made it a part of study in the sphere of general human culture, and for this he deserves great credit. The lectures upon Church History which he delivered at Göttingen, were frequented by students from all the faculties, by all who made any pretensions to cultivation. He first knew how to write a compendium of Church History; to wade through the prolix work of Schröckh, could hardly be exacted of a student of theology, to say nothing of a layman.¹ Spittler's "Outline of the History of the Christian Church," first published in 1782, and afterwards continued by Planck, was for a long time the guide in public lectures, and a favorite text-book with all who wanted a concise, clear, and animated view over the sphere of church history. Spittler was by no means an enemy of Christianity, but he assumed towards it the most objective position possible, one of cold superiority, the attitude of a civilian. He begins his history of the church in this way: "The world has never experienced such a revolution, in its first occasions so unnoticeable, and in its last, wide-spread consequences so very highly remarkable, as that which was made eighteen hundred years ago, by one who was born a Jew, Jesus by name, in the few years of his life." From this beginning, a conclusion about all the rest can be readily formed. Impulse and accident are the powers that rule in a church whose very founder was the work of accident. How much Spittler was accustomed to apply to all the events of history the standards of thought that prevailed in his own times, and how incapable he was, with all the wealth of his overflowing mind, of entering into the spiritual experience of earlier times, may be seen

¹ By this we do not mean to deny the merits of his work in other respects. Fleury's history (Paris, 1691-1720) written in a more genial spirit, was one of the chief sources along with Schröckh.

VII. only "craftiness and baseness," and who calls him "a man without religion, truth or faith;" he to whom the Saint of Assisi is only a "valetudinarian in soul and body," "an unfortunate, crazy fellow, spoiled and stunted;" such a man shows that he is deficient in one of the chief conditions of an historian, the elastic power of mind and heart of entering into other states of mind than those which our every day world calls forth.

With the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, there came a reaction in the sphere of church history. The philosophy of nature, with Schelling for its representative, became in philosophical matters an opponent of the "vulgar Rationalism," and from the same general philosophical tendency, new demands were made upon historians and also upon church historians. Schelling in his "Lectures upon the Method of Academical Study," had attempted an historical construction of Christianity, in which, in the strongest opposition to that pragmatic method which interpreted history by its accidents, he had pointed to that higher necessity which has its basis in the eternal unity of the absolute nature of God. On the foundation of this speculative method, which took its position above history, Marheinecke, then professor at Erlangen, published in the year 1806 the first part of his "Universal Church History of Christianity," the only part ever published. There, in the Introduction, we read: "The office of history is to take what has been transacted in the world, all those individual events with which time has been filled, and to give them shape in accordance with higher ideas, and with freedom of soul, for purposes of spiritual meditation." "True history ought not to be a mere coin-cabinet of events, in which the single coins are put up for show, in an arbitrary or accidental connection, along side of and separate from each other. Every real history throws aside all that is merely accidental, as not belonging to its sphere; *for the historian receives his laws neither from the events themselves nor from the times in which they have occurred*; only what can be connected in the way of cause and effect is to be selected from the chaotic mass; the rest may remain in its place, and so long as it does not offer to us what is intelligible or understood, it is to be simply deposited in the archives of time." And in respect to church history we read: "As the idea of the history of the world in general cannot be understood without religion, so too, and more emphatically, will it hold true, that the history of the church will always remain an enigma as long as it is not considered from a supernatural point of view; for here all stands in more or less close connection with what is in itself sacred. A high and holy

asceticism and contemplation," with such depth of soul and fineness of spirit as was possible only to a nature as religious as was his. From that "intensive power" which came from Bernhard's life he sought to explain his influence upon the world; and from this central point of view, without calling everything good, he interprets even his deficiencies, his ruggedness, his hard and seemingly unlovely conduct towards Abelard and the enemies of the hierarchy. He shows us also the reverse. He can understand an Abelard in his peculiarities as well as a Bernhard in his, and he brings before the eye of the observer these two great men in their struggle, repelling and completing each the other. And as he knows how to grasp the actors in this great drama of history in those individual peculiarities which they gave not to themselves and for which we are not to make them responsible, so, too, does he understand the times in which the drama is played. With what historical greatness he passes his judgment, for example, upon the crusades, when, in opposition to that belittling pedantry with which many criticise this romantic movement, he remarks: "It was indeed a misconception to try to rob with violence and shedding of blood that abode from which peace was to be spread abroad over the human race; those rude men did indeed relapse quickly from the devout feelings, which were not clear to themselves and had not penetrated their inmost life, into outbreaks of wild passion and of sensuality. But still we can see the traces of man's elevated origin in that enthusiasm, directed towards what the senses cannot grasp, that seized hold of whole nations, in those extraordinary efforts for what is itself extraordinary. On the lowest stage, most untrue to the original nobility of the human race, stands that cold understanding which looks down upon such times with an aristocratic compassion, not because it is enthusiastic for the true reality, but because that only appears to it to be real which is meanest among all vanities, because that which in such things is fairest seems to it to be insanity itself, and that is the working and daring for something which lives and has worth only in the hearts of men."

Neander did not confine himself to the writing of monographs upon remarkable individual characters. He also turned his researches to the History of Doctrines. In our general preliminary sketch we saw that the heretics had been by degrees brought into the field of calm investigation, and that after Gottfried Arnold's unsuccessful attempts, the great Mosheim first gave more importance to this part of church history. But it did not stop here. Since the end of the eighteenth century, the History of Doctrines had become a science

by itself; and, in connection with this, the heresies were no longer viewed as something single, isolated, and foreign. It began to be seen that, even though they were to be considered as disordered states of the body of the church, yet the history of these disorders was closely connected with the organism of the ecclesiastical life, and that even the historical unfolding of the *pure* doctrine, could only be understood in connection with its struggles with heresy; that to understand the physiology of the church, we must also know its pathology. This must hold good, especially of the first age of the church, in which Christianity had to uphold its distinctive characteristics in conflict with the ancient religious systems; and when the relapse into Judaism, or a continued adhesion to the form of the law, seemed as perilous as an abandonment to the fantastic influence of heathen mythological speculations. Judaizing Ebionitism on the one side, and Paganizing Gnosticism on the other, were the antagonistic tendencies, opposed to each other, yet often strangely intermingled with each other, between which the religion of redemption was placed, and against which it had to contend. It lies on the surface, then, that a more profound insight into the nature of Gnosticism, would greatly promote the study of the history of the church and its doctrines. Learned men had indeed before this given their attention to this remarkable phenomenon; particularly Mosheim and the French Calvinist, Beausobre, in his *History of the Manichees*. But they had only made a beginning, and given some hints for further study; very much still remained obscure and uncertain. Neander, in his work published in 1818, "*Genetic Development of the Principal Gnostic systems*," first treated this difficult subject in a comprehensive manner. Here he pointed out more definitely the sources of Gnosticism in Philo's ways of thinking, and in similar tendencies of the times; he classified the various Gnostic groups of speculation, sometimes very divergent from each other, and he sketched the special systems more sharply than his predecessors. Without interpolating his own interpretations, or hastily constructing from assumed premises, what can only be investigated in a historical way, he has, to use his own expression, "endeavored to exhibit the Gnostic systems in such a manner, that the ideas which animated them should be seen to shine through of themselves." By this method he first revived an interest in the Gnostics; he brought out into clear vision those ideas which were the soul of the systems, and which glimmer through the fantastic web of their bold combinations, in which had been previously seen only the creations of a rude imagination, or allegories abandoned to arbitrary in-

terpretations. Without being himself a speculative theologian, he awakened by this book a more thorough interest in the speculative side of Christianity, than many others have done, who only stand upon his shoulders that they may thus more easily depreciate himself.

After this work upon the Gnostics, Neander returned again with renewed love and vigor to biography, giving to the friends of church history, in the year 1821, his life of John Chrysostom.

As his Bernhard had presented a picture of the middle ages in the West, so does his Chrysostom depict the oriental church of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century, the time of its flower. The life of the greatest orator of the ancient church, his first education in the maternal house, his wider culture in the schools of the Greek rhetoricians, his abode among the monks, his efficiency as bishop in Antioch and in Constantinople, his conflicts here and there with the powers of the world and of the church, with heretics and with orthodox, the persecutions he endured even to his death, which overtook him in banishment—all this passes before our sight in simple and luminous narration. We become acquainted with the Christian thinker, the sacred orator, the man of prayer and of faith, in the different circumstances of his troubled and tried life; we go with him into the depths of Scripture, we hear the thunders of his vehement speech, while he chastises vice in high and low, without respect of persons; we follow him again when in his Homilies he unfolds so clearly and calmly the consolations of the Gospel, and the virtues of the Christian life, or when in his work on the Priesthood, he sketches for us the ideal of a Christian priest, according to the conceptions of his times; or, again, when he gives to Olympias, a rich widow, instructions in the exercise of charity. And there are, too, strowed through this monograph, so many special and thorough investigations upon the most difficult subjects, that the study of it will ever be a great gain to those who wish to be introduced to the classic period of the oriental church.

Neander wished that the side-picture to Chrysostom in the occidental church, Augustine, might be executed by the hands of his friend, Twisten,—a wish which has not yet been fulfilled.

The writings of Neander up to this time, especially his biographies of Julian, Bernhard and Chrysostom, had all been composed in such a manner that, excepting the learned dissertations for the most part put into appendices, they could be read with interest by cultivated minds not theologically trained. His next work was

also intended to advance the study of church history in wider circles. In 1822 he published his "Memorabilia from the History of Christianity and of the Christian Life," a gift right fitted to the times! It was very welcome to the newly revived Christian feelings of the educated classes. Pictures, fresh and warm with life, are here brought before us: Christian men and women, Christian institutions and states of society are described to us with the hand of a master; many costly deeds of self-sacrifice and of faithfulness are rescued from oblivion. How attractive are the descriptions given us in the third volume of the lives and acts of the heralds of our faith, of a Columba and a Gallus, and of Boniface and of Anscar! and all this from the impression made by going to the original sources; all this by one who himself had lived it all over with them, experienced it with them, felt it with them!

But we cannot linger upon these pictures. We next encounter another of his greater works, the fruit of elaborate investigations, which forms a counterpart to his work on the Gnostics, that upon Tertullian, or as the author entitled it, "Antignosticus, the Spirit of Tertullian, and an Introduction to his Writings, with Investigations in Archaeology and in the History of Doctrines." Berlin, 1825.

It was no slight thing to exorcise the mighty spirit of this child of Northern Africa. How few had known him, how few had understood him! Tertullian, he who did not seek for the essence of things upon the surface but in the marrow, must always remain a riddle to that shallowness which likes to have everything so plain and straight, which, because it shuns thinking, calls everything dark and obscure that it cannot see into at the first glance. What offence has been given by his "credo, quia absurdum est," not marking the irony with which he here, and in fact uncouthly enough, would despatch that common, worldly understanding which sets itself up as judge over the highest things. Men have not been able to wonder enough about the coarseness of a theology which ascribes to God a body, not heeding what Tertullian meant by "body," and that is, a real, substantial essence, in opposition to that spiritualism which volatilizes the essence of God into an abstract idea. If any one, then Tertullian, is to be understood only in connection with his times and by means of the antagonism which he felt in his inmost soul to the Gnostic speculations. The ideality of Clement of Alexandria and of Origen may ever be more congenial with our modern consciousness than the Punic soul of Tertullian, clogged with sensuous images; that dusky Montanism of his which makes him see in art only a lie, and his

hatred to heretics and his hatred of philosophy may only repel us; his style, always wrestling for expression, may appear to us rough and rugged; yet we are still obliged to say with Schwegler,¹ "with all his hatred of philosophy, Tertullian is assuredly not the worst thinker which the Christian church can count," and we shall not find it far from the mark when Gfrörer² calls him the Tacitus of the youthful Christianity. We shall above all recognize the justice of Neander's description of the man, when after long and thorough study of him, he says: "Tertullian has acuteness and depth, dialectic skill, but no logical clearness or repose or order; he has a profound and productive soul, but not harmoniously cultivated. In him the power of feeling and of imagination prevailed over the power of forming clear conceptions; his inward life, filled with Christianity, hastened before the development of the mere understanding. Tertullian had more, and what was higher, in his internal life, in feeling and in vision, than he was able to bring out in the form of definite conceptions. A new inward world was opened to him by Christianity. Feelings and ideas struggled in his living and fiery soul, and he only wanted the fitting words in which to express them."³ So much greater, then, is the merit of Neander in mastering this rough and not easily mastered material, in working into this inaccessible soul, and opening the passages and shafts which conduct to the hidden treasures of so rich a mind, obscure though it be. Such a work could be successfully achieved only by a persistent love, which is never weary in seeking out the truth, even where it is intertwined with error and overgrown with thorns.

After all these immense preparatory labors, which of themselves seem to surpass the power of any one man, Neander at length undertook a complete History of the Christian Church, in an extensive work, begun in the year 1825, and carried on in the second division of the fifth volume, or the tenth part of the whole work, to the second half of the era of the Middle Ages, when death took him away from its further continuation and completion.

You will not expect me to give even a sketch of this, the chief work of Neander. What has now been said, may suffice to show in

¹ *Der Montanismus und die christliche Kirche des zweiten Jahrhunderts.* Tübingen, 1841.

² *Kirchengeschichte*, I. s. 386.

³ We give this citation from the first edition, because we are following the chronological order. In the second edition, 1849, the expressions are altered, but not essentially.

what spirit he treated of Church History. Before summing up, as is appropriate to the occasion, our final judgment in respect to Neander as a church historian, I must speak concisely of the other works which he produced during the publication of his Church History.

The history of the apostolic age, which, taken strictly, does not belong to proper church history, is still the foundation of that history. Neander felt that those who had been led by him to a living comprehension of church history, must be desirous to know his views respecting that primitive form of Christianity from which all its later states had sprung; he owed them an account of his historical understanding of Christianity itself in its very origin. The questions here involved, were additionally pressing, because the historical basis of Christianity seemed to be made tottering by that destructive criticism which had put in its lever precisely in this place. It was natural to expect that Neander would have first written the history of the Founder of Christianity; but he preferred to get at the point of departure, by going on in an ascending line up the course of the history, and he first published his "*History of the Planting and Guidance of the Christian Church by the Apostles*," Hamburg, 1832, in two volumes, as a supplement to his Church History, though complete in itself. He did not here intend to give a complete history of the apostolic age, but only so much as is set forth in the title itself, that is an account of the establishment and direction of the Christian church by the apostles.

In his monographs, Neander had already admirably described the apostolical men of later times, by transferring himself as it were into their internal life, by feeling with them what they had felt; and so, too, as an historical psychologist, it was of the first importance for him in this work, also to take the psychological point of view, and to have a living knowledge of the very soul of a Peter, a John, and a James, and above all, of the grand peculiarities of a Paul. And in these psychological glimpses were given, so to speak, the stars that were to guide him in the difficult and thorny path through which he was to walk. Neander is not of the number of those who would go round, or set aside by a dogmatical asseveration, the difficulties which occur in the scriptures of the New Testament. In the preface to his book, he openly avows that he cannot agree with those who think they render a service to the truth, by leaving everything as of old, or rather by bringing back the condition of theology to the state in which we find it in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. "The word of God, indeed, which is designed to make everything new with

a perfectly rejuvenating power," remains for him eternal; but "the differences of philosophical statement" ought not on that account to disturb the fellowship of faith. "The coming forth of opposing tendencies is," he says, "unavoidable in our times of crisis, and it is far better than the death-like coldness and the dead uniformity that preceded it. On the other hand he appreciates the pious zeal and solicitude of those who are made fearful by these critical attempts, and he is very far from ascribing to them sinister motives and intentions as was often done with bitter passion by the other party. But yet he could not, for their sakes, be kept from continuing his labors, with his best knowledge and conscience, even with the knowledge that his criticism, mild and sparing as it was, would be to them a rock of offence. And now, at the time that the *Life of Jesus* by Strauss, had called forth that universal excitement not only in theological and ecclesiastical circles, but also in the highest as well as the lowest classes of society, of which we all still have a lively remembrance, now exactly the right point of time had come for Neander, now was the time for him also to exhibit the "*Life of Jesus Christ, in its Historical Connections and in its Historical Development.*" This work was published in 1837. Neander did not engage in this work without the tenderest reverence, and not without devout scruples. In the preface, he calls to mind a word of Herder's to Lavater, when the latter had exhorted him to a similar undertaking, "Who, after John, would venture to write the life of Christ?" He also mentions a confession of Anna Maria von Schurmann, that such an undertaking seemed as if one were to paint the sun with a coal, and that the life of a Christian is the best image of the life of Christ. And yet he attempted the task, for his doubts were outweighed by the necessity now so deeply felt of making as it were really present to us, the historically realized ideal of a life both divine and human, and of doing this from the point of view of that stage of development in life and science, to which we have attained; "for the image of Christ is not one which is rejuvenated yesterday or to-day, but it is still always rejuvenated with the race itself, and it infuses into the decaying world a new, heaven-aspiring, and youthful energy.

When Neander put his hand to this work, he was very conscious that he would not satisfy all. He says, "I shall not be thought right by the hyper-critics who make sacred history a prey to the arbitrary and subjective notions of a rationalizing, sophistical, and trifling acumen, nor yet by those who imagine that all criticism, or at least all criticism on internal grounds, is a matter of suspicion. Both these

tendencies have this in common, that they are in conflict with a sound love of truth, with a truth-loving conscience, and that they are both foes to a healthful progress. I am convinced that impartial criticism, as applied to all that is given us in the form of historical tradition in the scriptural documents, is not in contradiction with that childlike faith, without which, neither Christianity nor a Christian theology is possible. On the contrary, it is only as we have such faith that we can receive that real consecration of a sanctified mind, without which, nothing in theology can prosper, and that real acuteness which looks into the depths of truth." It is not for us to decide how far Neander, in his "Life of Jesus," has met the just claim of criticism, nor how far he has solved the acknowledged difficulties. It holds true here, if anywhere, in *magnis voluisse sat est*.

As Neander had thus ascended backward from the History of the Church to the life of its Founder, so too he sent out beforehand single preliminary works bearing upon that later period of church history which still remained to be written out in its completeness. Upon the history of the Reformation, including the lives of the reformers themselves, it is remarkable that (so far at least as I am aware) he has left us nothing;¹ in his casual writings, however, he has given us traits from the life of the "holy" John Huss, as an evidence that the truly evangelical spirit is always similar in its workings. This was written in 1819.² He has also singled out two men from the times of the Reformation, little known before, or at least misunderstood and falsely judged, George Wicel³ and Theobald Thamer.⁴ The first of these, disgusted with the altercations in the Protestant church, went back to the Catholics; the latter, who ended by taking the same step, belonged to men who like Schwenkfeld, Sebastian Franck and others, wished to substitute a mystical and speculative religion of reason for the positive revelation, on which account Neander describes him as a representative and predecessor of some modern tendencies. One of the last essays which came from the pen of Neander shows us the freedom of soul and large historical sense with which he could pass judgment upon those modern spiritual tendencies which have sprung up in our century. It is a short contemplation upon the last

¹ A short essay upon Melancthon composed just before his death has since been published in Piper's Evangelical Calendar for 1851, p. 196 seq.

² In his *Gelegenheitschriften*, 3d ed. Berlin, 1829, s. 217. With this may be compared "Erinnerungen an Marco Antonio Flaminio und das Aufkeimen der Reformation in Italien," see his work "Das Eine und Mannigfaltige des christlichen Lebens," Berlin, 1840, p. 111.

³ *Das Eine und Mannigfaltige*, s. 167.

⁴ Published at Berlin in 1842.

half century in its relation to present times, which appeared in the "Journal for Christian Science and Christian Life," edited by him in conjunction with Julius Müller, Nitzsch and others. How finely he there conceives the office of Schleiermacher, how mild and friendly his judgment of De Wette!

It would extend our essay beyond all proper bounds to mention all the smaller treatises, programmes, casual writings and prefaces, in which this unwearied investigator now kindled a new light and now revived a beneficent recollection, or if we were to point out how the new editions of his works were improved and often wholly recast.¹ What we have said may be sufficient to give us so much of a picture of what he accomplished as a church historian in comparison with earlier writers, that on the basis of this picture, we shall be in a condition to bring to its close the office we proposed to ourselves, and to sum up in conclusion Neander's merits as a church historian.

From our sketch of Neander's writings we shall be convinced of the truth of what Nitzsch expressed in his funeral oration upon the departed, that "Neander was raised up and consecrated by the Lord for the great work of reviving the theology of church history." It remains for us to separate this position into its individual elements and to name the prominent qualities which make Neander preëminent as a Church Historian.

To begin with his learning; there are few who can here be placed on an equality with him. Few have studied the original sources as did he — have read so much and retained it so well in memory, that they could wander like him among all the past forms of the church with an ever wakeful eye. Neander never made a parade with citations; but in the very way in which he quotes we see that he only needed to put his hand into the great treasury, and that it willingly opened itself to him as often as he wanted to verify his statements. And not only in the originals was he at home, but also in the works written upon them in ancient and in later times, by German, English, French and Dutch authors. Classical as well as biblical literature aided him in his investigations; and especially was the consummate exegete a help to the church historian.² But it is not his learning alone which

¹ Of his historical essays we may mention those upon Pascal, Baxter, Wilberforce, Oberlin and others. His work on Tertullian was entirely rewritten in the new edition.

² Neander's exegetical lectures were not less esteemed by the students than those he gave on church history, and it may well be said that in this department too he formed a school.

made Neander to be the first church historian of his times,¹ the re-newer and restorer of this science.

With his learning was combined a sound and sober criticism, such a simple and calm observation of the facts, as finds no pleasure in artificial and fanciful combinations. With the disciplined eye of the historical investigator, he looked over the conjunctions of events; by a sure tact he found what was similar and what was mutually dependent, and judged according to the law of reciprocal action, without wandering off into long-drawn and pragmatic discourse. But his proper greatness did not consist even in this. In acuteness, others may excel him; he himself put forth no claims to being very acute; he speaks in warning terms about that acuteness which is so acute, that it becomes crotchety.²

Is it then the *genius* which he displays in his treatment of history, which has won for him the wreath? If by genius, we mean that which is brilliant, which is pointed with wit, which glitters and glimmers, which excites constant surprise by quick and light flashes of thought, which carries us into transports, which will not let us be at peace for the ideas it forces and piles upon us, stroke after stroke, we can easily find authors of much greater genius than Neander. The spirit of a real genius does indeed impress upon Neander's writings the stamp which marks their value; but it is not the self-made, pretentious, and narrow spirit of the individual, nor yet the so-called spirit of the times; but that spirit which has *grown* to be what it is, which has drawn its stores from history, which has been nourished and ripened by the rays of that sun that shines through history, and thus been strengthened in its very roots, that is the spirit which breathes upon us, beneficent as the morning air, from the writings of Neander. Or, in other words, that which gives Neander, as a writer, such a hold upon our inmost soul, is not so much what men call genius, as it is his moral and religious, his completely Christian *character*. Character is what makes the historian; it is necessary to his greatness. Let us analyze the elements of this character.

It is first of all truthfulness, which fills us with high reverence for an historian, a truthfulness which is true in little things also, which esteems nothing lightly, which follows after truth in all its traces, and rests not till it comes to its grounds. To this truthfulness is added

¹ No intelligent person will think that we mean by this an absolute principality. The Latin would express it, *facile princeps*.

² In his preface to the Life of Jesus, p. xii: "vor der Schärfe, die allzu scharf, scharftig wird."

in him real humility of soul; that kind of self-denial which seeks not its own but what is of God; and what is of God, is that which is real, which is objective, eternal and abiding in history. This humility knows how to decry the essential things in that spirit which moves the times; it knows how to see the guidance of God in the affairs of men. To want to know everything better and to make everything better than history knows it and than history has made it; to be master and critic of history in the sense of the incumbents of the lifted up chairs of modern wisdom, is foreign to such real humility of soul; and where its judgment is announced it is ever modest and just, conditioned and justified by history itself. To such truthfulness and humility love comes as a companion, to illuminate and perfect the character. And so the historian is not cold and heartless towards history, but enters with sympathy into the states he is called to examine and to exhibit. It is a love which does not, indeed, cover up shame with its proverbial mantle, but even where its office is to uncover it, it does it with forbearance, pointing to the balsam which history, like nature, has always ready for its own wounds. It is only such love, too, which is capable of inspiring in others an enthusiasm for history; it excites sympathy, where a fleeting and worldly sense becomes soon weary; it casts new light upon whole groups of events which the learned dulness of centuries has passed by without notice; for in history it does not seek for dissipation of mind, but for collectedness; it does not seek to be amused and entertained, but to be edified and taught. It is not in the storm of excited passions alone that it finds its element, but in the quiet fields of nobility and goodness, where is the salt of earth.

With all this we do not mean to say that Neander has realized the ideal of a church historian in all respects in equal measure; for what mortal could do this? Some qualities of the historian are shaped less consummately in him than in others. Directing his eye chiefly to the inward life, it was perhaps less acute in looking at the worldly side of church history. Unsuspicious himself, the movings of human passion in its subtler currents and windings remained to him unknown; and hence he did not feel himself called upon to trace them out. The web of ecclesiastical politics has been seen through by others with greater dexterity of soul, for he stood remote in most cases from political life.¹ And there is another side of history which also seems

¹ Gfrörer goes to the opposite extreme; he has a great predilection for the web of intrigue and chicanery, and leaves the religious agencies unnoticed, e. g. in what he says about the Gottschalk controversy in his *History of the Carolingians*.

to have been less familiar to him, what we may call its aesthetical, its artistic element. Neander did not indeed belong to those Puritans who renounce Christian art altogether. But his simple, introspective nature, which made him neglectful of the fairness of external forms even in his personal intercourse, was not fitted to estimate, with the vision of an artist, the structure of the church in its architectural proportions, as it rises up before the eye of the imaginative observer. Thus, though he brought the long misunderstood middle ages again to honor, by going into the depths of its mystical visions, and showing that characters like Bernhard and Saint Francis are to be measured by another standard than that of the "vulgar rationalism;"¹ yet others have had a more open eye and a more living sense² for the grand poetry there is in the ecclesiasticism of the middle ages, as it comes out in the struggles of the hierarchy with the imperial power, in the various orders of clergy and of knights, in the pomp of the mass and the ritual, in the festivals of the saints, and which has built for itself a memorial that survives all storms in those gigantic cathedrals with their profound, symbolical significance. It is indeed hazardous when the sense for these things becomes so predominant, as is the case with Hurter in his life of Innocent III., that the real essence of Christianity, the worship of God in spirit and in truth, retires behind the scenery of ecclesiasticism. Yet, still historical science in its perfection ought to be able to catch, in the living mirror of imagination, the most various impressions from all times, to body forth the past with artistic freedom, to create it as it were anew, and to breathe a fresh life into states of society which long since vanished away, without being dazzled by their enchantments. This is that union of poetry with history, which these later times have striven to attain.³

Neander's deficiency in the perception of artistic forms, has mani-

¹ It is unfortunate that Neander's intention of giving us a detailed account of the life of St. Francis (vide Piper's *Evangel. Kalender*, Vorrede s. v.) cannot be carried into execution.

² To Hase belongs the credit of having first exemplified clearly this side of church history, which is now also treated by several other authors in a spirited and intelligent manner.

³ As Neander was not directly attracted by the beautiful as such, so he was less repelled by what lacks beauty than are those in whom fancy and wit predominate. Even in the caricatures of saints, he seeks and finds something saint-like, without feeling the temptation of letting the shadows be seen along side of the light in these grotesque forms. Cf. his preface to the second edition of *Terullian*, p. xi.

festly had an influence upon his style. The maxim holds true of him, if of anybody, le stile c'est l'homme. As he was careless in his habits of life, so too in his style. The spirit of the man does indeed betray itself everywhere, and shines out wonderfully in glorious utterances, which take hold of us all the more deeply, because they are the unsought expression of his lovely soul. But though a simple and unadorned discourse is more attractive to the unperverted sense, than that finical and high-seasoned mannerism which many, alas ! call style, yet there is still unquestionably a genuine historical style, which, by its plastic simplicity, its nervous conciseness, and its masterly strokes of delineation, brings out before the soul the images of history, better than can our daily speech. And such an historical style as Ranke, for example, has the mastery of, is wanting in some measure in Neander. Narration and investigation, negotiations and delineations, go on in the same tone, in the same attitude, almost without rise or fall of cadence, without light and shade. He lingers upon some favorite subjects with a prolixity which is in marked contrast with other portions ; and he often fails in giving a good general outline, and in the skilful distribution of his materials. In the artistic treatment of the materials those might easily surpass him who are far his inferiors in wealth of knowledge, in thoroughness of investigation, in profoundness of historical character. Others perhaps find that he is deficient in other things. Thus the speculative school of philosophy has denied to him the title of a scientific man, because he would not ascend with them to the heights of a philosophy, which constructs history by means of *à priori* ideas, or at any rate considers it only as the form through which the "immanent idea" is moving according to the trichotomy of the Hegelian logic. But we frankly confess that we see in this one of the merits of Neander. He has kept to what he so often declared should be the highest law in the case, and that is, that historical facts are not to be looked at through the "dim and borrowed glasses of the schools," but with a free and unperverted vision. And he was not wanting in the higher consecration which science can receive, in that which we may call the ideal view of history. On the contrary, he refers all the individual and manifold events to a higher idea which lies at the basis of the passing phenomena. Only this is not a philosophical category, brought from without and applied to history, but it is the truly "immanent idea" of history, and by this we mean an idea dwelling in the very life of history and moving it onward ; it is the heart, the very soul of history ; it is, to speak the very word, it is the Spirit of the Lord, whose influence and

efficiency, Neander strives to trace, with a soul allied thereto, and which he seeks to get possession of in the same measure in which he gives himself up to it in humility and self-forgetfulness. Neander's historical sense was especially repelled by two tendencies; the one the speculative tendency which makes everything just as it thinks it should be by means of *à priori* laws; the other the false and dead orthodoxy of the letter, which limits everything by some positive, ecclesiastical form, which misunderstands, and, were it possible, would stop the flow of history. Both these appeared to him to be forms of an unwarrantable scholasticism, which scoffs at the divine power there is in history, and, mild as he was in his usual judgments, he would speak as if irritated or bitter, when the one or the other of these tendencies tried to get the upper hand.

The services which Neander rendered to Church History are not exhausted with his writings. The living word, by which he worked as a teacher, the encouragement, the excitement, the guidance he imparted by his instructive personal intercourse, these things can be truly estimated only by those who had a part in them. How many have sat at his feet, and been won by him first and perhaps for always to the study of the history of the church; and this, too, in addition to the great multitude of those whose hearts were awakened by him for the practical service of the church and led in the way of salvation for themselves and for others. Neander's school is wide-spread; and where in later times has any talent shown itself in the sphere of historical theology that did not pass directly through this school at least in part? From this school have sprung whole branches of church history, especially that of the monograph, which in the last three decennia has borne such fair fruits. Some whole sides of the life of the church, as the History of Missions in its separate portions, the History of Christian Morals and Manners, of benevolent activity, and the History of the Internal, Spiritual Life of the Church, were first brought out by him into a clear light and woven into the web of ecclesiastical history. But the departed one has given us in his own life the most admirable addition to the History of the Church; for Neander's appearance is, as has been well remarked, the appearance of a Father of the Church for the church of the nineteenth century. Not only will his name be named with those of the great church historians, with the names of a Mosheim and a Planck, and in many things above them; but as a theologian for our later times Neander is to be reckoned in the number of those who have understood their

time and have labored for it, in a purifying, quickening and reconciling spirit.

Schleiermacher, De Wette, Neander. Yes, these three, now gone from us, (whom I name before all others because I have the singular happiness of owing to them more than others my own theological character), Schleiermacher, De Wette and Neander,¹ once united as colleagues in one of the principal universities of Germany, each great in his way, each helping to complete the other's. They abide no longer with us, and the coming generation of theologians can now only look up to their illustrious forms as we gaze upon the heroes of the times of our fathers. They will reverence in them, if they be not unthankful, the founders of a new form of theology, of a theology which, it is to be hoped, will neither be circumscribed by the old bondage of the letter, nor yet let itself be forced back from its positive foundations by the pretensions of that tendency of the times which sets itself in a hostile attitude to Christianity. These three names will shine in the firmament of theological science, as long as an unprejudiced examination of Scripture shall form the basis of theological science—so long as a sound philosophy, not snatched from the air, but taken from the inmost nature of man and purified by revelation, shall remain the companion of theology, and so long as true and living historical investigations shall bring the present and the primitive times of Christianity together and shall mediate between them.

The last words with which Neander separated from his friends and from the world were the words, "Good night." Oh! that no bitter irony may turn this simple wish of a pure heart into an evil omen; Oh! that that night may never break in upon us which shall obscure to our vision the brightness of this three-fold star, that night of barbarism, in which the powers of darkness shall interlock their hands in the covenant between superstition and unbelief.

¹ The putting them together is not an empty phrase. That these three theologians were very different, even in essential matters; that there was between Neander and De Wette for a long time an estrangement which began to be adjusted only in the last part of their lives, could be unobserved only by a blind man. But none the less may we regard each in his way as breaking the path for later times. That in which all three agreed negatively was in the protest against all unjustified reaction in the sphere of theological science, the preservation of their independence against this or that form of dogmatism. But still more emphasis is to be laid upon the community of the three on the positive basis of finding the only ground of salvation in Christ. Sufficient evidence of this could be cited, were it necessary, from the writings of all of them.

No ! far from us be this thought ! Rather will we direct our eyes, as a worthy close of this solemn hour, to the prophecy which the deceased uttered at the end of the preface to his *Life of Jesus* : " We stand," he says, " on the boundaries between an old and between a new world, which will be called into existence by that Gospel which is ever old and ever new. For the fourth time there is preparing a new epoch of life for the human race by means of Christianity ; and therefore can we, in every respect, only labor in preparation for the times of that new creation, in which, after the regeneration in life and in science, men shall proclaim with new and fiery tongues the great works of God."

ARTICLE IX.

RECENT WORKS ON ASIA MINOR.

" THERE is no country that now affords so fertile a field of discovery as Asia Minor." This observation was made by Mr. Leake in 1824, and it is still substantially true, notwithstanding the important investigations which have since been made by a number of eminent travellers and scholars. In point of deep and absorbing interest, it is in some respects not inferior to Greece, Egypt, or Italy.

The fabled Argonautic expedition sailed along the shores of Bithynia and Pontus. Here are the plains of Troy, and the scene of the great epic poem of antiquity. In regard to the earliest settlers of Lycia, we have more correct information from Homer and Herodotus, than from any other writers. Both almost claim this province as their native country, being perfectly familiar with its original legends. They tell the story of Europa's visit, and of her sons taking possession of the country. Some of the most beautiful parts of the *Iliad* recount the history of the Lycian heroes, Sarpedon and Glaucus, and the exploits of Pandarus. The climate of the country, and its beauty and fertility are frequently praised. All the remains termed Lycian, recently discovered, probably belong to the age of Homer, and that immediately subsequent. Much of the rock architecture, the sculptures, the language and the coins, do not refer to Byzantine, Roman, or even Greek subjects, which are known. Some of the most valua-

Recent Works on Asia Minor.

- [Oct. the late Rev. E. T. Daniell, by Lieut. T. A. B. Spratt, R. N., F. R. S., of the Mediterranean Hydrographical Survey, and Prof. E. A. Forbes, F. R. S. of King's College, London. In two vols. 8vo. London, 1847, pp. 302, 332, with a map of Lycia, nine views of ruins, etc., twenty-one wood-cuts, and thirty Plans. The A contain Remarks on Lycian Inscriptions by Daniel Sharpe, on the early Coins of Lycia, by Mr. Sharpe. A work of scientific value as might be expected, but less full on the untimely death of Mr. Daniell.
10. The Expedition for the Survey of the rivers of the Phrates, carried on by order of the British Government, 1836, and 1837, preceded by geographical and topographical volumes, large 8vo, with fourteen maps and plates besides numerous wood-cuts, by Lieut. F. R. S., F. R. G. S., Commander of the Expedition, II. only published. London, 1850, pp. 71. A vast compass and investigation. The work is the author's personal researches. The maps and plates du gouvernement Française pendant l'expédition, liée par le ministère de l'instruction publique, historical monuments, plans and topographical views. Paris, 1838, folio. This splendid work see.
12. The Life and Epistles of the Apostle Paul, Biography of the Apostle, and numerous illustrations on steel, made by W. H. Bartlett, by J. S. Howson. London, 1850. The work has been published in a new style, it still merits high praise for the beautiful illustrations, and what has been too much neglected of the rich stores of Greek literature.
13. Wiener Jahrbuch für die Kunde des Alterthums, A review of various articles published in the various journals, stall, in two Articles. A survey of an immense field.
- See also the Article

eye down the valley of the Xanthus, whose glittering waters were visible probably for seventy miles."

Speaking of Brûsa, the old capital of Turkey, Mr. Hamilton says: "No town in Asiatic Turkey is more justly celebrated for its picturesque situation and appearance. Situated at the southern edge of a rich and well-cultivated plain, covered with gardens and mulberries, its buildings extend some way up the steep and rocky hills which rise immediately behind it. Immediately above the town are thick, overhanging woods, while many trees, principally the tall cypress, rise up in and about it, interspersed with numerous graceful minarets and glittering domes. Such a scene on a sunny day, when every tree was putting forth its first shoots and buds, backed by the range of Olympus, whose deep and snowy valleys reflected every variety of tint, was the most welcome sight which could greet a traveller on his first appearance in the East."

At Nice in Bithynia, Sir C. Fellows writes: "As the view on approaching Nice was calm, rich and beautiful, so was this craggy, rocky and bold. As we descended through a gorge in the rocks worthy of the Alps, the ranges of mountains rose into rugged points, reminding me of the scenery in Savoy. The heavy clouds were rolling apart, and thundering along the broken chains of mountains, many of the higher peaks being shrouded with clouds."

"The route for the first six miles [near Dollomón in Caria] was over plains, but we soon entered a most beautiful series of wooded mountains, with bold cliffs rising above finely grown trees. At intervals we came upon narrow valleys of rich pasture, with crystal streams winding towards the sea, which frequently opened upon us towards the left, but so intersected by promontories and islands as to present the appearance of lakes. No part of Asia Minor that I have seen is so picturesque as the whole of this district, the hills throughout being well wooded from their tops to the sea."

Our limits do not allow us to go into further details. Perhaps no country in the world has a more diversified climate than this peninsula. Few combine more of the elements of beauty and sublimity in the scenery. Few will be more attractive to the tourist for the next fifty years.

III. Cities and Sites of places mentioned in the New Testament.

Adramyttium. This town on the bay of the same name, early became a flourishing city. It was in a ship of Adramyttium that Paul began his voyage from Caesarea to Rome, Acts 27: 2. In Pliny's time it was the most considerable of all the towns in the vicinity,

It is often named by the Byzantine historians. It is now called Adramiti. No antiquities are to be found here, except a few coins. The coast is here covered with woods of the richest trees; the myrtle, laurel, arbutus, etc., seem contending for preëminence with the vine, clematis, woodbine, etc. The country for fifty miles is covered with olives, interspersed with majestic planes.

Antioch in Pisidia. This city was founded by a colony from Magnesia, on the Maeander, probably under the auspices of Antiochus, from whom it took its name. Afterwards the Romans sent a colony there, and made it the capital of a proconsular government. In Pliny's time, it had the title of Colonia Caesarea. It seems originally to have belonged to that part of Phrygia named Parorea, Strabo terming it, "Antioch near Pisidia." The ruins appear to have been first discovered by Mr. Arundell, Nov. 7, 1833. It was visited by Mr. Hamilton, Sept. 27, 1836, and again by Mr. Fellows, March 6, 1840. Antioch is about one mile and a half from the modern town of Yalobatch, which is in lat. $38^{\circ} 17' 30''$. The site of the town, says Mr. Hamilton, is covered with huge blocks of marble. The first ruin which I saw, was an oblong building consisting of an inner and outer wall. The outer wall was built of rough blocks of limestone, four feet thick. The length is about 180 feet, the breadth 60. It was a temple or church, perhaps each in succession. About 200 yards to the north-east, are the remains of another massive building. One of the most striking objects, is a ruined aqueduct. "Twenty-one arches are perfect," says Mr. Arundell, "and are the most splendid ever beheld. The stones are without cement, and of massy dimensions." In an excavation, on what was probably the acropolis, Mr. Hamilton saw masses of highly finished marble cornices, with several broken fluted columns, probably the adytum of a temple, possibly devoted to the worship of Men Arcæus, for which Antioch was in early days celebrated.

The situation of Antioch, says Mr. Fellows, on an isolated rock, rising in the centre of the mouth of the valley of the Moaynus, and commanding a view of that of the Maeander, is worthy of the ancient Greeks, but the ruins now covering and undermining its summit, are quite inferior. Antioch is about half way from Smyrna to the Cilician gates leading to Tarsus. For Paul's labors here, see Acts 14: 1—5.

Assos in Mysia. This is the first place of note east of Cape Lectum. It is nine miles south of Troas, having the island of Lesbos opposite. It was the birth place of Cleanthes the Stoic. Aristotle resided here some time. It had a commanding situation, and was

strongly fortified. The port was chiefly formed by a great mole, is mentioned Acts 20: 13, "When Paul met with us at Assos, (having walked thither from Troas), we took him in and came to Mitylene." Col. Leake says the site is now called Beriam Hale. The remains are extremely curious, some in very perfect preservation. Sir C. Fellows writes: "Immediately around me were the ruins, extending for miles, undisturbed by any living creature except the goats and kids. On every side lay columns, triglyphs, and fragments of beautiful sculpture, every object speaking of the grandeur of an ancient city. In one place I saw thirty Doric capitals placed up in a line for a fence. I descended towards the sea, and found the whole front of the hill a wilderness of ruined temples, baths, and theatres, all of the best workmanship." "The Via Sacra, or street of tombs, extends for miles. Several are highly ornamented, and have inscriptions; others are as large as temples, being twenty or thirty feet square."

Attaleia in Pamphylia. This city on the edge of the Pamphylian Gulf, was built by Attalus Philadelphus, king of Pergamus, in order to command the trade of Syria and Egypt. It has always existed and flourished. Spratt and Forbes recognize it as the present Satalia. The style of its relics is invariably Roman, agreeing with the date of its foundation. Behind it is the plain through which the river Catarrhactes flows. In front of it, and along the shore on each side, are long lines of cliffs, over which the river finds its way in waterfalls to the sea, and which hide the plain from those who look toward the land from the bay. Beaufort describes the city as beautifully situated round a small harbor, the streets appearing to rise behind each other, like the seats of a theatre, with a double wall, and a series of square towers on the level summit of the hill.

Colosse. This was a city of Phrygia Major, on the Lycus, between Laodicea and Celaennae. Mr. Hamilton, II. 508, supposes the site to have been in the immediate vicinity of the present Chonos, the ancient Chonae, which grew into importance on the destruction of Colossae. Herodotus states that the Lycus disappeared in the town of Colossae, and flowed five stadia through a chasm. Mr. H. found that the Ak Sú (white water) had formerly fallen into the Lycus, lower down than where it now joins it, in fact, exactly where the chasm is narrowest. On this site are the theatre and other ruins. On the opposite side of the river is the necropolis. Here are pavements, which seem to have been the covers of sepulchres, and sarco-

phagi cut in the rocky ground, and so close to each other, that when the covers were laid on, they resembled a pavement made of gigantic blocks; the grotesque pedestals had been placed on them as cippi. The ruins deserve a more thorough examination than they have yet received.

Derbe. This city belonged to Lycaonia, and was within the confines of Isauria, Acts 14: 6, 20. 16: 1. The sites of this town and of Lystra remain unknown, or at best, are extremely uncertain. No coins or inscriptions have been found to decide the question. The sites were somewhere about the bases of the Kara-Dagh, (Black Mountain), an isolated mass with reaches of the plain extending round it like channels of the sea. Lystra is marked on Kiepert's map, near the place where Leake conjectured that it might be, some 20 miles south of Iconium. Mr. Hamilton, in a private note to Messrs. Coneybeare and Howson, in 1850, says: "There are ruins, though slight, at the spot where Derbe is marked on Kiepert's map, and as this spot is certainly on a line of Roman road, it is not unlikely that it may represent Derbe. I did not actually visit Diulé, but the coincidence of name led me to think it might be Derbe. I do not know of any ruins at the place where Kiepert writes Lystra, but I was not on that spot. There may be ruins there, but I think that they cannot be of importance, as I did not hear of them, though in the neighborhood; and I prefer Bin-bir-Kilisséh as the site of Lystra." The remains of many churches, some of considerable size, prove the importance of this place, even after the introduction of Christianity. This agrees better with Lystra than Derbe. It is further corroborated by the order in which Paul mentions the cities. He went from Iconium first to Lystra, then to Derbe. The ruins of Bin-bir-Kilisséh consist of about twenty Byzantine churches of various sizes, built entirely of red and gray trachyte, a few ancient tombs and sarcophagi, and many deep, subterranean cisterns. Some of the façades, windows, and arches of these churches, are quite perfect.

Ephesus. This was the celebrated capital of Ionia, on the southern bank of the Caystrus, and near its mouth. Its history and that of its great temple of Diana, are well known. The temple which Paul saw, was 425 feet in length, and 220 in breadth. The 127 pillars were each 60 feet in height. One was carved by Scopas. The altar was almost entirely adorned by Praxitiles. In Paul's time, the city was the great emporium of Asia. The ruins have been so often described, that it is not necessary to dwell on them.

They are near the modern Turkish village of Aiasaluk. Sir C. Fellows visited them in 1838. The theatre, which he supposes to be the scene of Demetrius's tumult, is a wreck of immense grandeur. Its form alone can be spoken of, every seat is removed, and the proscenium is a heap of ruins. A splendid circus or stadium, remains tolerably entire. There is also one of those gigantic buildings, called gymnasia, or temples, but, as he thinks, more probably, palaces, like one in Adrian's villa, near Tivoli. Mr. Hamilton suggests that these are the ruins of the temple of Diana, immediately in front of the port, raised on a base 30 or 40 feet high, and approached by a grand flight of steps, the ruins of which are still visible. Mr. H. thinks he discovered traces of three distinct lines of walls.

Herapolis. This was a city of Phrygia, so called, it is said, from the number of its temples. It was celebrated for its warm springs. The waters were remarkable for their petrifying qualities. Chandler mentions, that a cliff near the old town, is one entire encrustation. Paul mentions, Col. 4: 13, a church there, gathered by the labors of Epaphrās. Some centuries afterwards, its church claimed to be the metropolis of Phrygia. Fellows says the city is six or seven miles from Laodicea. His attention was drawn towards it, twenty miles distant, by the white streams of water poured down the sides of its hill. The waters rising from several deep springs among the ruins, and to be found in small rivulets for twenty miles round, are tepid, and to appearance, perfectly pure, though at the depth of twenty feet, a dark green hue is visible. This water deposits a kind of crust or feeble crystallization in its channel. These streams have flowed for ages, and the surface of the ground has been raised fifteen or twenty feet. The ruins are crowded and extensive, and some of them of immense proportions, but not in the best taste. Tombs are numerous, some of them a distinct temple or house, perhaps a place of mourning for friends. Mr. Hamilton, I. 517, describes the waters and ruins more at large. It may be called, he says, a town of ruined palaces and temples. The effect is heightened by the singular beauty of its position. It stands on a broad terrace, bounded on the NE. by a range of lofty mountains, while on the W. and S., the eye wanders undisturbed over a vast extent of productive plains and rich pastures. Mr. H. was struck with the grandeur of the ruins of the gymnasium, and of those of one of the most perfect ancient theatres to be found in Asia Minor.

Ioonium. The district of Lycaonia extends from the ridges of Mt. Taurus and the borders of Cilicia on the S., to the Cappadocian hills

on the N. Of this district, Iconium, the present Koniye, was properly the capital, situated midway between Cilicia and Cappadocia. The plain on which it is placed, is spoken of as one of the largest in Asia Minor. The eyes of Paul and Barnabas, for several hours before reaching the city, and also after they left it for Lystra, must have ranged over a vast expanse of level ground to the South and East. The two most striking objects, are the snowy summits of Mt. Argæus towards Armenia, and Kara-Dagh towards Cilicia. Leake says, "we saw the city with its mosques and ancient walls, still at the distance of 12 or 14 miles from us." Ainsworth remarks, "we travelled three hours along the plain of Koniye, always in sight, before we reached it." It is famous, as the cradle of the rising power of the Turks. It has been repeatedly destroyed and rebuilt, and its architectural character wholly altered. Little, if anything, remains of the Greek or Roman Iconium, except the ancient inscriptions and the fragments of sculptures which are built into the Turkish walls. At a late period of the empire, it became a *colonia*. Its population in the time of Paul, was probably the same as that of other important towns in Asia Minor, a large number of frivolous Greeks, some remains of an older population, a few Roman civil and military officials, and a colony of Jews, working at their trades in the week, and meeting in the synagogue on the Sabbath. See Coneybeare and Hawson, pp. 195-200. Mr. Hamilton, II. 197, says that the city is one scene of destruction and decay, with heaps of ruins and dilapidated mosques. The remains of at least 20 mosques were passed. The ruined walls alone mark the former extent of the city. A part of it is converted into a burial ground. Ainsworth, II. 65, says that Iconium appears the most fallen and ruinous of all the large towns of Asia Minor.

Laodicea. This was the chief city of Phrygia Pacatiana, on the river Lycus, S. of Hierapolis and W. of Colosse. It is now called Eski Hissar. The remains have been described by many travellers. Nothing can exceed, says Mr. Hamilton, the desolation and melancholy appearance of the site of Laodicea; no picturesque features in the nature of the ground, relieve the dull uniformity of its undulating and barren hills. With few exceptions, its gray and widely scattered ruins possess no architectural merit. Its stadium, gymnasium, and theatres, one of which is in a state of great preservation, with its seats still perfectly horizontal, though merely laid upon the gravel, are well deserving of notice. Other buildings, also, on the top of the hill, are full of interest; and on the East the line of the ancient

ple, which appears to have been unfinished. The remains of city vary very much in date. A theatre, stadium and temple be readily traced, but the masses of wall composing the rest of the city speak with certainty only of its extent. The largest piles of buildings must have been a palace. Opposite the curious mounds said to be the tombs of the kings of

Smyrna. This city is so well known that no description is required. It is now, and has always been, an important place. It is situated on a gulf which lies nearly east of the Hermas. A flourishing Christian church was which is highly commended, Rev. 2: 8. Polycarp of the city, is said to have suffered martyrdom in the city, 166 A. D. Chandler gives a detailed account of the old city. There are Cyclopiian remains on the east extremity of the bay, marking the acropolis. On mount Pagus and the adjoining hill, say, well preserved remains.

Tarsus. Cilicia was divided into two parts, Rough Cilicia, a collection of the branches of the Taurus, or Flat Cilicia, a rich and extensive plain, the neighboring countries by a high barrier. The language of Q. Curtius, "perpetuo jugo Cilicia includitur." Near the western extremity of the river Cydnus, a cold and rapid stream, is the city Tarsus, "no mean city," as is said by Strabo. In Roman times, it bore the name of Tarsus. We infer from a remark of Strabo that Tarsus was the western Mediterranean, Tarsus was the most important city, where the Greek language was cultivated. But still it was doubtless the most important. It was spoken and written in the city. It was the only city who had no literature. It was 100 miles from its port, Kazan, and was well cultivated. There are no remains of these having been destroyed. The theatre is said still to exist.

Thyatira. This city was founded between Sardis and Persepolis, a Macedonian colony. A church planted there, mentioned as a purple.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. HACKETT'S COMMENTARY ON THE A

A WRITER in one of the public Journals has recently diency of the abandonment of the study of Hebrew in naries. Among the reasons in opposition to such a bility that in such a case we should have no more ph like Prof. Hackett's. There would be no reading. There would cease to be purchasers enough to pa solitary students who might master the Hebrew duced to waste their time on that which would sure the production of thorough exegetical v least must be educated so as to understand r of the Greek of the New Testament is not knowledge is not possible, without the ai striking characteristics of Prof. Hackett's (is everywhere made of materials from th The sure hand of one who is familiar v edge is manifest in every chapter.

We may name, as a second charac and nothing else; it is an unfolding tion of what the words signify by th ing is superinduced upon the te: attempt at explanation. No effort There is a rigorous abstinence fr the temptation is strong. Pos enlivened, and some parallel hered quite so rigorously to the meaning of the text, i the well-wrought material

The commentary, again months' production. Th after year, in his class, acute and valuable, of which has been writ The valuable comme have Olshausen, Dr

1 Commentary c
Biblical Literatur
& Co. 1851. 8vo

scripts, but have been selected with care by accomplished scholars may name among this number, the libraries of Brown University, University of Vermont, Columbia College, S. C., the Astor Library, Theological Seminary at Andover, etc. Another encouraging fact is, that the books are widely diffused. Germs of libraries are in every State of the Union. There is diffusion, if not concentration, in that provision is making more and more for the support of libraries by setting apart permanent funds for this purpose. In mention, again, that one of the most important facts of our age is the appearance of Prof. Jewett's volume. It makes an inventory of the nakedness of the land. It shows how few colleges and public institutions have paid to this subject, and how many of their collections are. We hope it will stimulate emulation, and that Prof. Jewett's next Report will be of a more encouraging character, and three times the size of the present.

III. LETTERS OF HENRY

"There is no modern name dearer to me than that of Henry Martyn." Such loveliness of character, and devotedness to Master's service, are rarely found united in a scholar as were his. There is a more devotedness to a course that we see not in the career of any other scholar to commune with a mind so pure, with a heart so devoted to so blessed a work. Sargent has shown deep interest wherever the English language is spoken, not a little to form that missionary feature of the piety of our day.

No portion of the matter embodied in this edition is given to the American public. The entire contents of the edition; but the entire contents of the volume as contained in his Journal will not fail, we think, to reveal the view of the depth of his piety and of the strength of his conviction. The secret of his eminent attainments cannot fail to quicken a higher standard of piety and to increase the piety greatly needed to stay the world and to increase the spirit of piety.

¹ Journal and Letters of Henry Martyn. New York: 1847.

This history embraces the period from De Soto's expedition in the settlement of the country, to the final establishment of the government in 1769. It is written at a little too much on the plan of "historical romances" to suit our taste, or to attain to the rank and authority. And yet it is a book of real value and command. It gives a rapid and graphic record of the events of more than years of struggles with adverse fortune, of long and bloody native Indians, the fierce Natchez tribe, the powerful Mokolishiana, the fierce Chickasaws, and the unconquerable Mokolishiana, up many most interesting materials, many of them, character, for the use of some future historian. It is a task, did not give to the world a sober, and veritable, that immense region once comprehended in the whose colonial period under the Spanish sway of the essential qualities which give chief to this character.

VI. ANALYSIS OF THE EPISTOLARY

Charles Ferme or Fairholm seems to have obtained his education there. In 1589, he was chosen one of the regents, became minister of the town of Fraserburgh in 1605, in consequence of the persecution imprisoned more than a year, and then, in 1608, he wrote, "a thousand deaths mercy and truth of the Lord hath He then went back to his post at death, Sept. 24, 1617. The Ana written at the request of certain published in 1651. Through the printed in a very attractive for faithful translation, occupying

1 Louisiana: its Colonial History
2 A Logical Analysis
Epistle from the

2 A Logical Analysis of the
Epistle, by Andrew Melville
by Wm. Lindsay Alexander
pp. 520.

IX. FOURTH VOLUME OF TORREY'S NEANDER¹

We perceive from an advertisement of Perthes, of Hamburg, the part of this great history, printed from the author's MSS., after it is shortly to appear. A translation will, doubtless, follow as soon as possible. Alas! that the work must stop here. The great Refo have afforded, in some important respects, an admirable field for and comprehensive learning, the scrupulous fidelity, the unassuming and simplicity of spirit, the unobtrusive but pervading piety, which have thus far so eminently characterized every great work." The present volume, embracing the fifth, extends from Gregory VII. A. D. 1073, to Boniface VIII. Among the main topics are the following: Extension of Christianity in Germany, Prussia, Finland, Tartary, Mongolia, Norway; History of the Church Constitution; Hildebrand, the Pope, Arnulf of Brescia, Thomas Becket, Raymund of Limoges, Hildegard, History of Monasticism, Worship of the Saints, Cistercians, Carthusians, Dominicans, Friars, Worship, Penance, History of Doctrines, Anselm of Canterbury and his writings, Victorines at Paris, Hugo of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, William of Paris, controversies, foreknowledge, and predestination, A opposition to the hierarchy, e. g. Bogomiles. It will be seen at once, that the field which it presents is of the greatest interest to the philosopher as well as to the theologian, and is exceedingly difficult to survey with celerity. The discussions and publication of this work will much to throw light on this disputatio

X. OWEN'S EDITIO

The text occupies 488 pages. The text of Wolf, Leipsic, 1839, and Seventeen editions of Homer, having been particularly serviceable in his former works, he has "desired to

¹ General History of the Church and Intellectual Philosophy in the Middle Ages, volume, or ninth and tenth editions. Brewster. 1851. pp. 650. 8v.

² The Iliad of Homer, with a commentary for the use of schools and colleges. Greek languages in the Fifth Edition. 1851. pp. 740, 18mo.

Seminary, allow various hindrances to interrupt their course, and will defeat the best laid plans. Now it would be easy to show that the practical and missionary interests of the church require that there be a considerable number of well-trained, earnest, investigating students; the clergy, who should hold the lamp of theological science high; successors of the Augustines, Anselms, Howes, Edwardses, F. Hopkines of former ages. It is a short-sighted policy, an error of what is truly practical, which we in this country are pursuing. When shall the day come when clergymen shall feel enthusiasm in studying the great themes to which they are devoted, which a mighty host of naturalists now feel, who stand on land in all the civilized and uncivilized parts of the globe, already enormous stock of physical truths?

Measures are now taking to collect and print in the American Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, and tearful" Thomas Shepard of Cambridge. He was born in London, England, Nov. 5, 1605, and died at Cambridge, aged 44. Some of his works have been often printed, but others are extremely rare. Seventeen treatises by Dr. Allen in his Historical Dictionary.

Rev. George W. Williard, of Columbus, Ohio, of the Lectures of Zacharias Ursinus on the Institutes published by David Pareus. Ursinus was born at Neustadt in Baden, March 6, 1583, and died at Neustadt in Baden, March 6, 1583. His currency, having been translated into French, as one of the best of the Reformed Confessions.

The first vol. of the History of the Church of the Lewis Mayer, D. D., late professor in the American Reformed Church, has been published by the author, by Rev. Elias Heineken, history of the Swiss Reformation, by the author. The second volume, the materials of the author, will embrace the history of the United States.

Professor Philip Schaff of Madison, Wis., has published the first vol. of a "History of the Church in the present time." The first volume covers the Pentecost to the death of Christ. The use of the American publisher, Neander, "the father of modern church history," says a competent judge, "is vigorous thought from the beginning to the end, order and clearness." The second volume has undertaken, the revision of the articles from his previous work. Rev. Dr. Murdock.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|
| 4. Wesleyan Methodists | 90,363 |
| 5. Episcopal Methodists | 86,893 |
| 6. Baptists | 28,965 |
| 7. Lutherans | 7,420 |
| 8. Independents | 6,126 |
| 9. Universalists | 2,269 |
| 10. Other Presbyterians | 29,370 |
| 11. Other Methodists | 14,977 |

GREAT BRITAIN.

We observe nothing of special importance in the notices of late publications or of those soon to appear. The Papal controversy excites less interest, and the number of publications relating to it has decreased. The presses of the Bible, Religious Tract and other Societies have been unusually active in sending out Bibles and practical religious works for the great multitudes that have congregated in England. The two university presses are employed as usual, on editions of the classics, treatises on mathematics, logic, etc. to be used as text-books. Oxford has lately furnished a noble present to the Protestant English world in the publication, from the MSS., of Wiclif's translation of the Bible. Among Mr. Bohn's numerous publications are translations of the principal Greek and Latin classics, accompanied with Notes.

Of the books most interesting to the biblical student, now in preparation, are a new edition of Dr. Davidson's Lectures on Biblical Criticism, Dr. Tregelles's new edition of the text of the Greek Testament, the new Syriac works under the editorship of Mr. Cureton of the British Museum, and further publications in respect to the deciphering of the Assyrian inscriptions. Col. Rawlinson is earnestly engaged on this work, and is said to be making gratifying progress. Mr. Layard is now in London, and, we regret to say, suffering from ill health.

The Oxford University comprises twenty Colleges and five Halls, most of which possess their own quite valuable libraries. As only the University Library proper (the celebrated Bodleian) prepares catalogues of all its manuscripts, Mr. Coxo, the assistant librarian, has taken on himself the tedious labor of registering the manuscripts in the different college libraries, and has already finished a large quarto volume, in which 3,000 titles are recorded, and to which the index only is wanting.

The Baptists of England and Scotland have nine institutions of learning: Bristol, Horton at Bradford, Stepney in London, Pontypool in Wales, Haverford West, Theological Education Society, Accrington, Leicester (General Baptists), Edinburgh. Each has one professor, and the four first named one tutor each besides. The number of students in all is only 113. The following remarks will apply to the other bodies of Dissenters. Before the recent amalgamation of three London academies, the Independents had nine seminaries for the education of 150 men. Of the Baptist institutions, Bris-

tol, Horton and Stepney are all which could, in any proper sense, be called colleges. In all, the course of instruction is mixed, literary and theological. In several it embraces only the usual studies of the grammar school with limited theological studies.

In these nine institutions are embraced 113 students, averaging less than thirteen each, and conducted at the expense of about \$30,000 per annum. One institution, adequately provided with able professors, library and apparatus, could perform this labor twice as well, and with but little more than one quarter the expense.

FRANCE.

The French National Assembly have lately voted 78,000,000 of francs for the excavations at Nineveh, and 30,000 francs for clearing the temple of Serapis at Memphis. Opposition was silenced by the remark of the minister, that it was for the majority to decide, whether England should have the precious remains rather than France.

GERMANY.

A recent official statistical report upon Prussia, gives the following results: Total population at the commencement of the last year, 16,331,000. Of these, 10,000,000 were of the Evangelic church, 6,000,000 Catholics, 219,000 Jews, 14,000 Mennonites, and 1,200 Greek Christians. The whole population has increased by 220,000 since the former census at the close of 1846; and increase is the most marked among the Jews. In the beginning of 1850 the whole number of military men in active service was 199,000.

In Germany, Austria excluded, appear 746 newspapers, of which, 646 are printed in German, 5 in French, 1 in English, 15 in Polish, 8 in Wendish (the Wenden are a Slavonic people in the midst of Germany), 7 in the Lutheran language. In all Europe, according to official statements, 1856 newspapers are published, of which 169 are issued at Paris, 97 at London, 79 at Berlin, 68 at Leipzig, 36 at St. Petersburg, 24 at Vienna.

The subjects of the articles in the 4th No. of the "Theological Studies and Criticisms" for 1851, are as follows: Remarks on the Idea of Religion with special reference to psychological questions, by Dr. Charles Lechler, chaplain of the Insane Institute at Minnenthal; Lucian and Christianity, a contribution to the Church History of the second century, by Adolph Planck, deacon at Heidenheim in Würtemberg; Additions to the treatise on the author of the maxim "In necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in utrisque caritas," with some remarks on the Irenic literature of the 17th century, by Dr. F. Lücke; Review of Dr. C. A. Hahn's History of the Waldenses, contained in his history of the Sects in the Middle Ages, by Prof. Herzog of Halle; Review of Henry Hübsch's Work on Architecture, and its Relation to the Painting and Sculpture of the present day, by Dr. B. Stark; and the Evangelical Church Organization for Westphalia and the Rhine Province, by Dr. Kling. The writer of the article on Lucian,

investigates the following topics: Peregrinus Proteus as a cynic; his death by fire without doubt a parody on the Christian martyrs; Peregrinus as a Christian; Lucian's judgment of the Christians; and whether Lucian was acquainted with the New Testament? Dr. Lücke, in his little work on the age, the author, the original form, and the true sense of the famous maxim, "In necessariis," etc., sought to prove that the author of it was Rupertus Meldenius, a Lutheran theologian, not much known, in his essay "*Parænesis votiva pro pace ecclesiae ad theologos Augustanae Confessionis*," written about 1620 or 1630.

The 3d vol. (1850-1) of Ewald's "*Jahrbücher*" for Biblical Science, pp. 298, has been published. The tenth volume of Ritter's History of Philosophy, is shortly to appear. The later volumes have not been translated into English.

The second and concluding volume of Dr. Ebrard's Christian Dogmatics, is to be published in the course of this year. The 2d section of the 2d part of Dr. J. P. Lange's Christian Dogmatics is published.

The 7th edition of Tholuck's Doctrine of Sin and Redemption, or the true Consecration of the Skeptic, has just been published.

The first vol. of the 3d edition of Hagenbach's Encyclopedia and Methodology of Theological Science, has appeared, in 431 pages.

- The 3d vol. of the 2d edition of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Psalms, is also advertised. There does not seem to be much alteration or improvement in this edition.

Dr. Augustus Pfizmaier of Vienna has published the first part, in 92 pages folio, of a Dictionary of the Japanese language.

The last part published of Pauly's Real-Encyclopaedie, extends from Tullia to Viae, and carries the 6th volume of the whole work from the 2241st page to the 2560th.

The following parts of the Bibliotheca Classica Latina have just appeared. Cicero's Orations for Sulla, the Manilian Law, Archias, Murena, Milo, Marcellus, Ligarius, Deiotarus, Roscius, Plancius, the 4th against Catiline, and the treatise De Senectute and De Amicitia, with notes, etc. for the use of schools, by Geo. A. Koch. The first section of the 4th volume of Poppo's Thucydides has just come out.

Suidae lexicon Graece et Latine. The ninth part of the second volume, completing the text, of Prof. Bernhardy's edition of this lexicon, accompanied with notes, has been printed.

Dr. H. Weissenborn has published a short essay, entitled "Nineveh and its territory in respect to the latest excavations in the valley of the Tigris."

The following historical, biographical and geographical works are just announced: The first volume of the second edition of Böckh's "*Staatsanstellung*" of the Athenians, pp. 812; the third volume of Pertz's Life of the minister, Von Stein; Life and Studies of C. J. Zumpt, with six of his Latin speeches, by A. W. Zumpt; an Eulogy on C. F. Schulz, by E. F. Wüstemann; Palestine and Syria, being the second part of Ritter's Geography of

the Peninsula of Sinai, Palestine and Syria, in 721 pages; the seventh edition, by Dr. Mappaeus, of Stein and Hörschelmann's Manual of Geography and Statistics; Contributions to a History of the German Book-trade, by Albrecht Kirchhoff, the first volume containing notices of some booksellers of the 15th and 16th centuries.

RUSSIA.

Population of the Russian Empire.—The Russian Ministry have just published the census of the Empire for the year 1846. In European Russia it contains 52,565,334 souls; in the four Western Governments of Siberia, 2,153,958; in the Kingdom of Russian Poland, 4,800,000 (this is an approximation merely); in the Grand Duchy of Finland, 1,900,000; in the territory beyond the Caucasus, 2,500,000; total, 63,600,000. If we add to these the inhabitants of the district of Jarkutsk, of the island of Kamschatka, of Ochotsk, of the American possessions, the submitted Kiegis hordes, and finally, the army, the entire population of the Empire will amount to 65,000,000; of those 49,000,000 belong to the Orthodox Greek Church, 7,300,000 to the Roman Catholics, 3,500,000 are Protestants, 2,400,000 Mohamedans, 1,200,000 Jews, 1,000 Gregorian and Armenian Catholics, 600,000 Pagans.

ERRATA.

Page 424, bottom, for Brandis, read *Branis*; p. 464, line 19 from bottom, insert after *pages*, "of the 6th volume." P. 769, l. 13 from bottom, for Strator, read *Straton*; p. 770, l. 12 from top, for altioresque, read *altioresque*; l. 14, for erodandos, read *enodandos*; line 2 from bottom, for Luvinius, read *Lavinius*.

N. B. In Article VII. (July Number) frequent references are made to the Biblical Repertory, Vols. VI. and VII. These volumes are the sixth and seventh of the *Entire Work*, and are numbered II. and III. in the *New Series*. The reference in Note 2, p. 600, should have been to Vol. XXIII; in Note 1, p. 622, to Vol. II. New Series; in Note 1, p. 623, to Vol. XVII, p. 86. In the second Note on p. 615, insert *Pars II.* after *Ib.*, and on p. 216, read Lib. III. for Lib. II. On p. 639, 12th line from top, insert 11 for 2; and on p. 641, Note 6, insert Chapter 2 for Chapter 1.

German philosophy, 47; position of true Christian philosophy now, 48; orthodox German theologians, 49; mock transcendentalists in New England, 50; analogy of old and existing errors, 51; Syncretism and formal Catholicism, 52; phenomena of the Reformation, 53; hostility of revelation and science, 54; great contests of the present age, 55; hopeful views, 56; Christianity unchanging, 57.

Church History, its nature and worth, an inaugural address, by Prof. H. B. Smith, 412; arduous duties of a teacher of church history, 413; advantages in the study, 414; object, 415; true idea, 416; the historian revivifies and reproduces the past, 417; church history is the record of the progress of God's kingdom, 418; it is to be exhibited in a scientific form, 421; opposition to naturalistic and pantheistic schemes, 423; Christianity superior to all other systems in the greatness of its ends, 425; high ends wrought out in history, 427; character of Neander, 429; church history has an inherent dignity, 431; it guards against heresy, and confirms Christianity, 433; important bearings on theological controversies, 435; its value in the Papal controversy, 437; use in preparing for the future, 439; ministry which is now needed, 441.

Clark's Foreign theological library, 657.

Classical education, 1.

College Education, 1; relation to Theol. Seminaries and the ministry, 1; to biblical literature and theology, 2; the moral relations of the college and seminary, 3; necessity of improving the academics and preparatory schools, 4; three years' study indispensable in preparation for college, 5; mathematics to be studied in school, 6; the true test of the prosperity of a college is not numbers, but the kind of education secured, 7; course of college study necessarily limited, 8; from the great number of studies, from need of frequent reviewing, and from the nature of our system, 9; discipline,

not instruction the great object, 10; the basis of a college education is the classics and mathematics, 10; classical study leads to discriminating thought, 11; ensures a copious vocabulary and refines the imagination and taste, 12; teaches one to delight in order, fitness, congruity, 13; peculiar influences on the imagination and feelings, 14; enables us to trace our own language to its sources, 15; introduces us to a vast body of profound criticism, 15; influence of mathematics, 16; enables one to fix the attention and abstract the mind, 17; advantages of the two studies illustrated by experience, 18; appeal to the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 19; influence of the study of classics and mathematics in forming the English character, 20; sobriety of judgment and a fine culture, 21; these studies counteract an exclusively practical spirit, 22; references to particular cases, 23; living examples, 24.

Colleges, Religious instruction in, by Prof. Stowe, 304; visible creation formed in reference to man, 305; influence of the idea of God, 307; learning, without God, makes a distorted mind, 308; God's authority to be submitted to, 309; absolute authority of the Bible, 311; proved by texts, 312; the Bible a revelation, 313; the ministry indispensable, 315; temptations to scepticism, 317.

D.

Davidson's New Testament Introduction, vol. II. 221, vol. III. 883.

Davies Dr. B., on Syrian philology.

Derbe, 869.

Dwight H. G. O., Religious revival among the Armenians, 454.

E.

Education, Government and Popular, by Rev. E. C. Wines, East Hampton, L. I., 737; relation of government to popular education, 737; influence of Oberlin in the Ban de la Roche, 739; connection of education with civil institutions, 741; with civil liberty, 743; illustrated

by the instance of China, 744; Oberlin's labors, 747; mortality of Mexico compared with that of England, 749; education quickens ingenuity, 751; East India cotton trade, 752; inventive genius, 753; education ensures a knowledge of nature, 755; deters from crime, 757; cost of intemperance and war, 758; evils of war, 759; the education must be Christian, 761; evils of that which is merely secular, 763; value of the Bible in education, 765.

Education, Collegiate, 1.
Of ministers, 235.

Edwards Prof. B. B., Articles by, 1, 85, 318.

Edwards Rev. J., Exposition of the Psalms, 450.

Emmons Dr., New vol. of his sermons, 451.

English Language, Harrison on, 715.

Ephesus, 869.

Epistles Pastoral, Huther's introduction to, 318.

Europe Past and present, 445.

Exposition, by Dr. J. King, of an apostolical church, 378.

F.

Fairbairn's Ezekiel, 660.

Ferne's Analysis of Romans, 882.

Foster John's life, 229.

French Works in metaphysical science, reviewed, 73.

G.

Gayarre's Louisiana, 882.

Genesis 9: 25—27, 20: 16, 50: 26, explanation of, 58.

Genesis, examination of some passages in, by Prof. Robbins, 58; "Cursed be Canaan," etc., Gen. 9: 25—27, the posterity of Shem and Japheth are plainly included, 58; God shall make Japheth prosperous, 59; salvation of all nations shall proceed from the children of Shem, 60; meaning of the words "Behold I have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver," etc., Gen. 20: 16, the injury shall be expiated so as no longer to be seen, 62; meaning of "embalm," Gen. 50: 26, explained from Herodotus, 62; in conformity with Egyptian customs, 63.

Goodwin, Prof., Review of Harrison on the English Language, 715.

Government and Popular Education, by Wines, 737.

Gospels, Four, as we now have them in the New Testament, and the Hegelian Assaults upon them, by Prof. C. E. Stowe, 503; authorities, 504; the soul needs objective truth, 504; spirit with which the gospels are to be studied, 505; religious character of the Hegelian philosophy, 507; atheism of the Hegelians, 509; extended influence, 511; analysis of the principal Hegelian assaults on the gospels, 512; Hypothesis of Strauss, 513; origin of miracles, 514; theory of Weiss, 517; character of this theory, 519; Hypothesis of Gfrörer, 520; of Bruno Bauer, 521; of Tübingen school, 523; real importance of these assaults, 524; absurdity of these attacks, 527.

Gräfenhan's History of Philology, 464.

Grote's History of Greece, 658.

H.

Hackett's Commentary on the Acts, 878.

Hagenbach's Lectures, 462.

Harrison's English Language, reviewed by Prof. D. R. Goodwin, 715; imposing pretensions, 715; historical facts and theories, 717; usage the only law of language, 719; mistakes in the use of the article, 721; participle, 722; criticisms on the pronouns, 723; distinctions of shall and will, should and could, 724; alleged grammatical errors in the Bible, 725; on the use of the article in the Bible, 729; *Θεός* without the article, 731; alleged inconsistency in the use of pronouns, 733; Mr. Harrison's criticisms in most cases incorrect, 736.

Harris's Preadamite Earth, 227.

Hegelian Assaults on the Gospels, 503.

Hickok's Rational Psychology reviewed by Prof. Lewis, 181; Threefold division of Objects and Powers, 183; Difference of Reason and Understanding, 185; Intuition is immediate beholding, 187; Pure forms in time, 189; the idea in the em-

R.

- Rationalism*, Affinity to Romanism, 64.
Rational Psychology, Hickok's, reviewed, 181, 346.
Rawlinson, Col., 324.
Religious Instruction in colleges, 304.
Remarks on Biblical Repertory, 135, 594.
Ritter's Geography, 466.
Robbins, Prof. R. D. C., articles by, 58, 563, 675.
Robinson's Greek Lexicon, 218.
Romanism and Rationalism, Affinity between, by Prof. Joseph Packard, 64.
Rowland's Maxims of infidelity, 228.
Ruskin's Stones of Venice, 656.
Russia, Population of, 893.

S.

- Sanskrit*, Helps to study of, 468.
Sardis, 875.
Surtorius, Prof., article translated from, 64.
Scotch Free Church college, 668.
Science of Church History, 412.
Sedgwick, Prof. A.'s Discourse noticed, 442.
Seminaries Theol. in U. S., 458, 666.
Shedd, W. G. T., article by, 491.
Smith, Prof. H. B., articles by, 73, 412, 822.
Smith, William's, classical dictionary, 447, 461.
Smyrna, 876.
Sounds of speech as a basis for grammar, 778.
Speech, the nature and kinds of the sounds of, as a physiological basis for grammar, translated from Hupfeld, by Prof. G. R. Bliss, 778.
Spencer's Pastor's Sketches, 231.
Spring, Dr., lectures, 881.
Stearns, Rev. Wm. A., on the supply of ministers, 235.
Stowe, Prof. C. E., articles by, 304, 503.
Stuart's Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 456; on Proverbs, 665.
Studien u. Kritiken, 465, 891.
Stier, R., Commentary on Jude, 464.
Supply of Ministers, 235.
Style, its relation to thought, by Prof. W. G. T. Shedd, 491.
Syriac Philology, By Dr. B. Davies, 554.

T.

- Tarsus*, 876.
Testament chronological, 450.
Thenius's Commentaries, 463.
Theological Seminaries, 458, 666.
Thyatira, 876.
Thomson's Outlines of Logic, 651.
Thought, its Relation to Style, 491.
Translations from Anselm, 529, 699.
Tregelles's Testament, 667.
Troas, 877.
Turnbull, Rev. R., D. D., on Speculative Philosophy, 100, 268.

U.

- Ungewitter's Europe*, 445.
Unitarian Biography, 660.
Unity amid Diversity even on Imputed and Involuntary Sin, 594.
Universities, English, royal commission respecting, 459.

W.

- Washburn, Rev. E. A.*, Article by, 34.
Webster's and Worcester's Dictionaries, 234.
Williams's Religious Progress, 231.
Wilkie's Palestine, 448.
Willm, M., of Strasburg, his work on German philosophy, 73.
Woodbury's German Grammar, 444.
Woods, Rev. L., D. D. Review of his works by Dr. Humphrey, 25.
Worcester, Dr. S., Life, 664.
Worth of Church History, 412.

Z.

- Zuingli*, Life of, by Prof. R. D. C. Robbins, 563; birth of Zuingli, 563; early life, 565; teacher at Basle, 570; love for music, 571; pastor at Glaris, 573; biblical and theological studies, 575; character as pastor, 578; corruption of clergy, 579; Zuingli chaplain to Swiss troops in Italy, 581; efforts for political and religious reform, 584; acquaintance with Erasmus and Nicconius, 586; labors at Einsiedeln, 588; appointment as preacher at Zurich, 681; Zuingli's reception at Zurich, 687; his independent course, 689; first preaching and results, 690; Samson's mission to Switzerland and Zuingli's opposition to him, 695; pestilence at Zurich, 697.

